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DO MIRROR NEURONS SUPPORT SIMULATIONBASED, LOW-LEVEL MIND-READING?
Title:
§0. INTRODUCTION
A group of neurophysiologists from Parma have discovered mirror neurons – these
neurons, first discovered in the F5 ventral premotor cortex of the macaque monkey, respond
both when the monkey performs certain actions and when the monkey observes someone
else (monkey or human) performing those actions.1 The same researchers also discovered
mirror neurons in humans.2 One neuroscientist, not from the Parma group, predicts that
“mirror neurons will do for psychology what DNA did for biology” and further singles out
mirror neurons as the most important discovery of the past decade.3 This is because mirror
neurons may help explain what Baron-Cohen has dubbed “mind-reading,” the ability to
attribute mental states to oneself and others.4 For example, some of the Parma
neurophysiologists suggest that mirror neuron activity underlies our ability to learn by
imitation5 and our ability to empathize with others.6 Is there a neurological basis for our
mind-reading abilities? And, if so, what are the philosophical ramifications?
In philosophy, there have been two main approaches to mind-reading: simulationtheory (ST) and theory-theory (TT). Consider the following example.7 Mr. Crane arrives at
the airport 30 minutes late and is told that his flight left on time. Mr. Tees arrives at the
airport 30 minutes late, is told that his flight was delayed, and that he missed it by only 5
See Di Pellegrino et al., Rizzolatti et al. (1988), and Rizzolatti et al. (1996a).
See Fadiga et al. and Rizzolatti et al. (1996b).
3 Ramachandran, <http://edge.org/documents/archive/edge69.html>.
4 See Chapter 1 Mindblindness and Mindreading, 1-8.
5 See Rizzolatti and Craighero.
6 See Gallese.
7 See Kahneman and Tvesky, 201-208.
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minutes. Ninety-six percent of people tested said that Mr. Tees is more upset. How do we
account for this attribution of Mr. Crane’s and Mr. Tees’s mental states? According to ST,
we put ourselves in Mr. Crane’s and Mr. Tees’s shoes, so to speak, and imagine how upset
we would be in each of their situations. According to TT, we deploy a theory, with some
folk-psychological laws about what makes travelers upset, to infer whether Mr. Crane or Mr.
Tees is more upset.
Alvin Goldman is one of the key proponents of ST. Since their discovery, he has
suggested that mirror neurons support simulation-based mind-reading. He initially took on a
modest position: enthusiasm about the philosophical prospects of mirror-neurons with
respect to mind-reading. With Vittorio Gallese, he claimed:
[Mirror] neurons represent a primitive version, or possibly a precursor in
phylogeny, of a simulation heuristic that might underlie mindreading.8
Most recently, Goldman has argued that mirror neurons support simulation-based, low-level
mind-reading (but not necessarily high-level).9 Low-level cognitive processes are unlike highlevel ones in that they occur non-explicitly. So contrary to the mind-reading of the Mr. Crane
and Mr. Tees example, low-level mind-reading occurs automatically, below the conscious
level.
In this paper, I argue, contra Goldman, that mirror neurons do not support
simulation-based, low-level mind-reading. In the first section, I explain the distinction
between TT and ST and determine where Goldman’s view is located. In the second section,
I explain his case for a simulation-based mirroring model of low-level mind-reading. In the
third section, while I concede that Goldman paints a plausible picture of a mirroring model,
I argue that he fails to show that there is something distinctively simulational about it. If
8
9
Gallese and Goldman, 498.
See Goldman (2006).
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anything, I suggest that the mirroring model has distinctively theoretical features. I therefore
conclude that the discovery of mirror neurons does not favor simulational over theoretical
low-level mind-reading.
§1. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TT AND ST
Goldman states:
The core difference between TT and ST, in our view, is that TT depicts the
mind-reading as a thoroughly ‘detached’ theoretical activity, whereas ST
depicts mind-reading as incorporating an attempt to replicate, mimic, or
impersonate the mental life of the target agent.10
What is this ‘detached’ theoretical activity? And what qualifies as an attempt to replicate,
mimic, or impersonate? Goldman explains this distinction diagrammatically. In the following
figures, ellipses represent beliefs, squares represent desires, double-circles represent
decisions, hexagons represent decision-making mechanisms, diamonds represent theoretical
reasoning mechanisms, and shading indicates that the mental state is pretend.11
Figure A
In Figure A, we have an agent undergoing a normal decision-making procedure. She has a
desire to achieve a goal (g) and a belief that some course of action (m) will achieve that goal.
She inputs this desire and belief into her decision-making mechanism, which outputs her
decision to perform m.
10
11
Gallese and Goldman, 497.
These figures are from Gallese and Goldman, 498, and (reproduced in) Goldman (2006), 26-29.
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Figure B
In Figure B, we have a TT account of mind-reading. The attributor believes that the target
has a desire to achieve a goal (g) and a belief that some course of action (m) will achieve that
goal. She also believes some folk-psychological law about how the target will make his
decision. She then inputs these three components into her theoretical reasoning mechanism,
which outputs the target’s decision to perform m.
Figure C
In Figure C, we have a ST account of mind-reading. The attributor believes that the target
has a desire to achieve a goal (g) and a belief that some course of action (m) will achieve that
goal. But she does not make use of some folk-psychological law about how the target will
make his decision. Rather, she creates a pretend desire in herself to achieve a goal (g) and a
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pretend belief that some course of action (m) will achieve that goal. She inputs these pretend
components into her (hypothesized use of a) decision-making mechanism, which outputs the
pretend (target’s) decision to perform m. This process simulates the target’s decision-making
process for the attributor, which allows her to attribute the decision to the target.
Goldman clarifies this distinction by making note of the negative and positive
approaches to ST. On the negative approach, any suggestion that mind-reading is theoretical
threatens ST. So ST traditionally denies that the attributor makes theoretical inferences. That
is, she does not make inferences from any folk-psychological law when mind-reading.
Additionally, Goldman claims that two features are central to the positive approach to ST:
(1) the hypothesized role of pretend states and (2) the hypothesized use of
mechanisms or processes of the same kind employed by the target.12
We can account for these two features in the above figures. (1) For example, the shaded
areas in Figure C are absent in Figure B. The attributor makes use of pretend states when
she creates in herself a desire to achieve a goal (g) and a belief that some course of action
(m) will achieve that goal. These inputs produce a pretend output, the pretend (target’s)
decision to perform m. (2) Further, the hexagon in Figure C represents the attributor’s
(hypothesized use of a) decision-making mechanism, which is the same kind of mechanism
employed by the target.
Ultimately, Goldman gives up the negative approach and embraces the positive one.
His considered view is therefore a ST-TT hybrid. He does not argue that mind-reading
involves the use of theory, but, at the same time, does not take this to be a threat to his view.
This is because he argues that there is something importantly simulational about mindreading, regardless whether theory plays a role in the process.
12
Goldman (2006), 34.
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When Goldman makes his case for the mirroring model of simulation-based, lowlevel mind-reading, it is not clear whether he takes the model to be pure ST or a hybrid.13 In
either case, arguments that low-level mind-reading entails theoretical inferences present little
threat to him. This is because he can easily make the move to a hybrid view. However, he is
committed to there being some distinctively simulational features of low-level mind-reading.
For Goldman, it seems that this consists in the role of pretend states (the shaded areas) and
the attributor’s use of a decision-making mechanism (the hexagon) of the same kind
employed by the target. Therefore, we should take these two features to be distinctive of ST
(both pure and hybrid).
§2. MIRRORING AND SIMULATION-BASED, LOW-LEVEL MIND-READING
Goldman argues that mirror neurons support a simulation-based, low-level model of
mind-reading.14 He makes his case on the basis of Face Based Emotional Recognition
(FaBER). Our ability to recognize the emotions of others based on their facial expressions is
an example of low-level mind-reading. This ability is a low-level ability because FaBERs
seem to automatically occur below the conscious level. By contrast, our ability to mind-read
the extent to which Mr. Crane and Mr. Tees are upset seems to be high-level. FaBER
qualifies mind-reading because recognizing that the target’s face expresses a certain emotion
involves classifying that emotion as a certain kind of mental state and attributing a mental
state to the target. Goldman cites evidence that patients with deficits in the experience of a
certain emotion will reliably fail FaBER tests of that same emotion. He argues that whether
When Goldman discusses high-level mind-reading, he is clear that he accepts a hybrid view. However, there
is nothing in his discussion of low-level mind-reading, which seems most congenial with a pure ST view, to
commit him to a hybrid view.
14 See Goldman (2006), Ch. 6 Simulation in Low-Level Mind-Reading: 113-145. For our purposes, ST in this
context may refer to either a pure or hybrid view.
13
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TT can explain this is doubtful. He further argues that ST, specifically, a simulation-based,
low-level mirroring mind-reading model, can. In short, ST has explanatory power.
Empirical evidence shows that deficits in the experience of a certain emotion and
selective deficits in FaBER tests of that same emotion reliably occur together. Goldman cites
FaBER tests on patients with such deficits. For example, patients with damage to the
amygdala, parts of the brain located deep within the medial temporal lobes that play a role in
certain emotional responses, reliably fail FaBER tests. Adolphs et al. performed FaBER tests
on a patient, S.M., who suffers from a disease, Urbach-Wiethe, which destroyed her
amygdala. They found that she reliably failed to recognize facial expressions of fear. Note
that the damage to her amygdala resulted in a severe deficit in her experience of fear.15 So it
appears that a deficit in the experience of an emotion somehow involves a related deficit –
poor performance on FaBER tests of that same emotion.
Can TT account for why FaBER deficits of a certain emotion reliably occur with
deficits in the experience of that emotion? Goldman argues that patients with such deficits
have all of the relevant theoretical knowledge. That is, it does not seem that the patients
make an error in how they deploy theory and thereby make the inferences. In the case of
S.M., she does not lack visual knowledge of the target’s facial expression, knowledge that
such an expression is associated with a certain emotion, or knowledge about that emotion. If
TT can offer a plausible account, it must provide some plausible explanation as to why
S.M.’s folk-psychological theory about fear went awry on some other grounds. Therefore,
Goldman concludes that a TT defender would be hard-pressed to provide an explanation for
this very real phenomenon.
15
See Damasio, 66.
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Can ST provide an account? Goldman argues that it can. His strategy is to examine
whether four possible simulation models can explain why FaBER deficits of a certain
emotion reliably occur with deficits in the experience of that emotion.16 Since my space here
is limited, I will only discuss the one Goldman favors: the mirroring model.17
Mirror neurons ground the mirroring model. Recall that a mirror neuron is a neuron
that fires both when we perform some action and when we observe someone else
performing some action. So mirror neurons indicate that we have a low-level mirroring
mechanism, which may be described as a causal pathway between the target (sender) and the
attributor.18 According to Goldman, this pathway has the following two components:
(a) a subpath within the sender from his own mental state to a behavioral
expression of that state and (b) a subpath within the receiver from an
observation of the sender’s behavior to a mental state that matches the
sender’s19
Because of this mirroring mechanism, the mental state of the sender (target) is mirrored by a
similar one in the receiver (attributor). So the attributor, who receives the mirrored mental
state, makes use of this mirroring mechanism for mind-reading. The pathway from (a) to (b)
is direct in the sense that it is unmediated by high-level cognition. Indeed, the attributor may
be entirely unaware that she adopts mirrored mental states. In the case of FaBER, we can
represent this mirroring mechanism diagrammatically as follows:
FaBER Mirroring Mechanism
The Generate and Test Model: [1] Generate a hypothesis → [2] Produce a facial expression → [3] Test this
facial expression against the target → [4] Is there a match? If so, continue [5]. (If not, return to [1]) → [5]
Classify one’s current emotional state and attribute this state to the target. See Goldman (2006), 124-125. The
Reverse Simulation Model: [1] Visual representation of the target’s facial expression → [2] Activation of facial
muscles which imitate target’s facial expression → [3] Experience of emotion → [4] Classification of the
current emotion state and attribution to the target. See Goldman (2006), 125-126. The Reverse Simulation with
as-if Loop Model: of what it would feel like to make the expression → [3] Experience of emotion → [4]
Classification of the current emotion state and attribution to the target. See Goldman (2006), 127.
17 Goldman identifies problems with each of the three models in explaining the FaBER test results; see
Goldman (2006), 129-132.
18 See Fadiga et al. and Rizzolatti et al. (1996b).
19 Goldman (2006), 133.
16
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[1] Observing the target’s facial expression.
↓
[2] Having an emotion that mirrors the target’s emotion.
This mirroring mechanism, however, does not in itself entail mind-reading. The
attributor may potentially draw from her mirrored mental state when mind-reading, but
Goldman claims that she must take two additional steps to attribute the mental state to the
target. First, she must classify her mirrored mental state token, which she experiences in [2],
as an instance of the relevant mental state type. For example, she may feel a fearful emotion,
but she may be unable to classify this instance of a fearful emotion as fear. It seems like she
must classify her mental state in order to attribute it to the target. Goldman calls this MClassification, “selecting a mental-state category, or classification.”20 Additionally, the
attributor must also attribute the mental state to the target. Goldman calls this Imputation,
“imputing an instance of that classification to the … target.”21 We can represent the
complete mirroring model diagrammatically as follows:
Mirroring Model
[1] Observing the target’s expression of a mental state.
↓
[2] Having a mental state that matches the target’s mental state.
↓
[3] M-Classification.
↓
[4] Imputation.
This model can explain selective failures on the FaBER tests. We can now
understand why Goldman claims that the mirroring model explains the face-based
recognition deficits. Deficits in the experience of an emotion reliably co-occur with selective
deficits in the face-based recognition of the same emotion. This is because of a defect in the
mirroring mechanism of that emotion. Step [2] clearly goes awry in the FaBER test patients
20
21
Goldman (2006), 133.
Goldman (2006), 133.
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because of their emotional deficits. Recall that S.M. has a severe deficit in her experience of
fear. An attributor cannot complete steps [3] and [4] without first completing step [2].
§3. IS THE MIRRORING MODEL SIMULATIONAL?
My goal in this section is not to argue that Goldman’s mirroring model is inaccurate.
Rather, it is to argue that Goldman fails to show that it is distinctively simulational. At this
point, we may fairly ask Goldman, “Where does simulation occur in the mirroring model?”
Unlike Figure C, this model does not involve pretending or a decision-making mechanism
(of the same kind employed by the target), which we may recall are the features Goldman
seems to take to be distinctive of ST. 22 However, he explicitly concedes that (1) pretend
mental states and (2) a decision-making mechanism are not necessary conditions for
simulation-based, low-level mind-reading.23 This is because pretending and decision-making
are high-level activities which play a role in high-level, but not low-level, mind-reading.24 This
is an odd concession, one it is not clear that he can make. In order to argue that mirror
neurons support simulational mind-reading, Goldman must at the very least show that there
is something distinctively simulational about the mirroring model.
Mirror neurons suggest a mirroring mechanism: when the attributor observes the
target’s expression of a mental state she will experience a mental state that matches the
target’s mental state. I grant this. The evidence from the Parma neurophysiologists is
convincing. But does this further suggest anything distinctively simulational about mindreading? A TT defender may well argue that there are distinctively theoretical features
concealed in mirroring-based, low-level mind-reading on the grounds that the mirroring
Goldman (2006), 34.
See Goldman (2006), 131-132.
24 See Goldman (2006), 131-132.
22
23
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model suppresses an intermediary step: [1→2] the inference from observing the target’s
expression of a mental state to the attributor’s experience of a mental state. This inference
seems to be distinctively theoretical features of the mirroring model, one that draws from
some folk-psychological laws. In the absence of distinctively simulational features, this
suggests that the mirroring model is more congenial with TT than ST.25
[1] Observation of the target’s expression of a mental state.
↓
[1→2] Inference from the target’s expression of a mental state to the attributor’s mental
state.
↓
[2] A mental state that matches the target’s mental state.26
Recall that mirror neurons were first discovered in the F5 ventral premotor cortex of
the macaque monkey. The neurons in this area are sensorimotor, i.e., they are responsive to
both motor activity and sensory observations thereof. Mirror neurons in humans are also
sensorimotor. For example, Fadiga et al. performed a transcranial magnetic stimulation study,
which demonstrates that when we observe others performing hand actions, some of our
sensorimotor neurons mirror this neuro-motor activity. So the attributor observes motor
In a longer draft of this paper, I argue that there are additional inferential steps suppressed in Goldman’s
mirroring model. Namely, [2→3] the inference from the attributor’s mental state to a classification of that
mental state, [3→4] the inference from the classification of that mental state to the attribution of the target’s
mental state.
26 Note that a TT defender has the resources to argue that our perceptual processes themselves are inferentially
mediated, regardless of the role they play in mind-reading. In other words, in order to observe the target’s
expression of a mental state in the first place, we might think that low-level inferences are necessary. By way of
illustration, Fodor tells us the following fairytale about the history of the philosophy of perception. Once upon
a time, the Wicked Behaviorist claimed that perceptual processes are reflexes, which are non-inferential and
cognitively impenetrable. But the Handsome Cognitivist claimed that perceptual processes are inferential and
cognitively penetrable. Inferential mediation means that the perceptual stimuli elicit reflexes indirectly,
mediated by cognitive processes. Cognitive penetrability means that the perception is not informationally
encapsulated from high-level processes. However, Fodor argues: “Although perception is smart like cognition
in that it is typically inferential, it is nevertheless dumb like reflexes in that it is typically encapsulated” (Fodor,
514). So the Wicked Behaviorist was wrong to claim that perceptual processes are non-inferential because of
the poverty of stimulus arguments, which maintain that information from our perceptual stimuli radically
underdetermines our perceptions (Fodor, 516). Poverty of the stimulus arguments draw from examples such as
depth perception and color constancy. So in order for the attributor to even observe the target’s expression of
a mental state in step [1], the attributor’s perceptual processes must inferentially mediate information received
from the stimuli in her perceptual field. This, of course, is causally prior to her experience of a mental state in
step [2]. Therefore, a TT defender may argue that there are hidden inferences in our very perceptual processes,
which the mirroring mechanism takes for granted.
25
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activity in step [1]. Then, by way of the mirroring mechanism, she adopts some sort of a
mirrored mental state. That is to say, the mirroring mechanism causes some of her neurons
to mirror the target’s neuro-motor activity. But does mirroring the target’s neuro-motor
activity alone get the attributor to step [2]? On this story, the attributor’s mental state seems
entirely devoid of the intentionality of the target’s mental state. In order for the attributor to
mirror, for example, the target’s fear of the snake in front of her, it seems that the attributor
must in some sense take the snake as the object of her mirrored fear.
Whether the mirroring mechanism can account for the intentionality of mental states
is controversial. For example, Rizzolatti et al. (2001) make the disclaimer that it is not clear
whether the mirroring mechanism is sufficient for mirrored intentionality. They claim:
It is important to stress that we are not claiming that … the monkeys
understood the intention of the agent (that is, why the observed action was
performed), but only that they understood the action meaning (that is, what
the agent did).27
Yet, the Parma neurophysiologists seem more optimistic when it comes to humans.
Rizzolatti et al. (1996a) suggest that the mirroring mechanism “[enables] implicit action
understanding.”28 Further, Iacoboni et al. suggest that mirror neurons are “encoded” with
some intentionality. But to what extent this ‘enabling’ or ‘encoding’ can be explained on the
neurophysiological level is, at best, questionable.
One may indeed argue that motor mirroring is not sufficient for mirrored
intentionality.29 By way of example, suppose I reach for a glass of water. We can explain my
decision-making procedure by reference to Figure A. That is, I reach for the glass because I
have a desire to achieve a goal to quench my thirst and I believe that some course of action,
such as reaching for the glass, will achieve that goal. So I plug this belief and desire into my
Rizzolatti et al. (2001), 667.
Gallese, 173. Also see Rizzolatti et al. (1996a).
29 This same line of argument has been pursued by Jacob.
27
28
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decision-making mechanism, which results in my decision to reach for the glass of water.
Further suppose that an attributor observes my behavior. Thus, some of her sensorimotor
neurons fire in a way that resembles my own neuro-motor activity. But in what sense does
her mental state mirror mine? Merely insofar that some of her sensorimotor neurons mirror
mine. So perhaps she mirrors some aspect of my mental state, that is, in an extremely
deflationary sense. But this step alone does not seem to help with mind-reading. My
attributor does not share my mental state in the sense that I desire to achieve a goal and have
a belief that some course of action will achieve that goal. This, it seems, requires an
inferential step. She may make use of a folk-psychological law, such as, when someone
reaches for a glass of water, he does so because he is thirsty and believes that drinking the
glass of water will quench his thirst. In order to have a mirrored mental state, over and
above mirrored neuro-motor activity, it seems that she must do some inferential work. So
too, we can apply this line of reasoning to low-level mind-reading. The FaBER attributor will
have mirrored neuro-motor activity on the basis of the target’s facial expression. But to have
a mirrored mental state, over and above mirrored neuro-motor activity, it seems that she
must also make some sort of low-level inference(s). 30
Furthermore, Borg has argued that the mirroring mechanism fails to capture
intentionality even if the mirror neurons are encoded. On the one hand, the mirroring
mechanism is too fine-grained to encode intentionality.31 This is because different mirroring
Recent empirical findings buttress this line of reasoning. Busso et. al. set up the following experiment. They
use a computer-based model (drawing from an Ekmanian facial action coding system) to present different
facial expressions of four different emotions: anger, sadness, happiness and neutrality. They found that
attributors correctly classify an emotion 85.1% of the time when presented with a visual representation of the
facial expression (Busso et. al., 209). By contrast, attributors correctly classify 89% of the time when presented
with both a visual representation and certain acoustic information. They conclude, “Humans use more than
one modality to recognize emotions” (Busso et. al., 210). This suggests that visuomotor mirroring is, at best,
only part of the story – and surely it is insufficient for mind-reading. It seems that humans, as a matter of fact,
draw from multiple modalities to perform FaBERs.
31 See Borg, 14.
30
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patterns can apply to a single intention. For example, suppose I reach for the glass with my
left hand instead of my right. The former is a distinct motor activity from the latter. But
regardless of which hand I reach with, one may attribute the same intention to me. In either
case, my intention is to quench my thirst. On the other hand, the mirroring mechanism is
also not fine-grained enough to encode intentionality.32 This is because different intentions
can apply to the same mirroring pattern. For example, I may reach for the glass to hand it to
the attributor (perhaps because I think that she is also thirsty) or I may simply reach for it to
drink myself. We can also apply this line of reasoning to low-level mind-reading. Two
different facial expressions convey the same emotion. At the same time, a single facial
expression may convey two different emotions.
The upshot of this section is that TT has the resources to account for why FaBER
deficits of a certain emotion reliably occur with deficits in the experience of that emotion. If
we accept that the mirroring model is theory based, Goldman’s argument for simulationbased, low-level mind-reading is no threat to TT. This is because FaBER is not a problem
for the mirroring model. TT may accept that some mirroring mechanism is necessary for
mind-reading. But this does not point to ST over TT.
To sum up, mirror neurons suggest that when the attributor observes the target’s
expression of a mental state she will experience a mental state that matches the target’s
mental state. We find this in the mirroring mechanism, which is the basis for Goldman’s
mirroring model. But we do not find any distinctively simulational features in the model.
Note that I did not argue that TT is true or that it offers an accurate model. Rather, I argued
for the plausibility of concealed inferences in Goldman’s mirroring model. This suggests
32
See Borg, 15.
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something theoretical about mind-reading, not simulational. At the very least, Goldman fails
to show that there is something distinctively simulational about the mirroring model.
§4. CONCLUSION
I have argued that the discovery of mirror neurons does not support ST. In the first
two sections, I explained Goldman’s distinction between ST and TT and his case for why
mirror neurons support simulation-based, low-level mind-reading. In the third, I argued that
he fails to show that there are any distinctively simulational features in his mirroring model.
Rather, I suggested that the mirroring model has distinctively theoretical features. So where
does this leave us?
Although there is strong evidence to suggest that some mind-reading draws from a
mirroring mechanism, applying the ST-TT distinction to low-level mind-reading does not
appear to be helpful. Indeed, hidden inferences in the mirroring model are not devastating to
Goldman’s view because he can adopt a ST-TT hybrid one of low-level mind-reading. But
should we be content with this move? If Goldman were to adopt such a view, it would seem
that the distinction between ST and TT becomes useless to him. Should we be content with
calling a hybrid view ST? What do we gain by calling it ST? So too, there does not seem to
be something devastating to TT. It is also not clear what ST brings to the table in the first
place. What would a hybrid view of low-level mind reading add to a TT account? By
contrast, TT brings crucial inferences to the table. So there seems to be little motivation for
simulational low-level mind-reading.
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