Download Preparing for worst case climate change scenarios

Preparing for worst case climate
change scenarios
Background paper for the VROM International Affairs
Think Tank meeting on 8 July 2009
Authors:
Prof Dr Bastiaan C.J. Zoeteman
Ir Wouter C. Kersten, MSc
Tilburg, September 2009
This document has been prepared by Bastiaan Zoeteman and Wouter Kersten
(VROM International Affairs Think Tank Secretariat) with support from several
representatives of the ministry of VROM
Documentnumber: 09.029
Tilburg University / Telos
Warandelaan 2
5037 AB Tilburg
PO Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
The Netherlands
T+31 ( 0)13 - 466 87 12
F +31 (0)13 - 466 34 99
[email protected]
www.telos.nl / www.uvt.nl
Summary
On request of Minister Jacqueline Cramer the 7th meeting of the VROM
International Affairs Think Tank, scheduled for 8 July 2009, will address the topic
“Preparing for worst case climate change scenarios”. A number of developments
have led to this decision.
Since the publication of the last IPCC report (AR4), new scientific findings have
been published which contain serious indications that the warming effects are
underestimated, and that tipping points (after which climate change will sustain
itself) could be reached in a near future. This led to a request by the Ministry of
VROM to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) to report on
new scientific insights, on the possibility of a run away climate change scenario
and on technical options to prepare (The Netherlands) for extreme climate
change. In parallel, the Think Tank was asked (January 2009) to address the
same topic, with a focus on strategic policy making.
These actions do not imply that the Dutch government considers a worst case
climate change scenario to be unavoidable, but the government wants to
assess possible pro-active actions in order to be prepared, including stepping
up measures as necessary.
During the preparation of the meeting a worst case climate change scenario
has been selected with the PBL group which involves a warming of 4,5
degrees Celsius in 2100.
The Think Tank is aimed to provide informal input on policy directions (in terms
of amongst others mitigation and adaptation) in case these worst case climate
change developments would occur, discuss what is required on the national,
European and global level, and which role a single country as the Netherlands
can play. The main guiding questions for the session will be:
1. National adaptation. Which national adaptation measures would a country
such as The Netherlands have to take in addition to already foreseen
measures?
2. Role of the EU. Which role can the EU be expected to take if the worst case
scenario is in the process of becoming increasingly likely and which national
initiatives are to be considered to stimulate the EU to effectively use its power.
3. Transition. How could a transition from the current IPCC AR4 based scenario
to a worst case scenario take place and which independent choices can The
Netherlands make to let this transition, once necessary, become a reality in its
policies?
4. No regret measures. Which no regret measures should already be prepared,
and which trade-offs (if any) are relevant to consider for these measures?
In addition four topics are suggested to be elaborated, particularly in relation to
questions 3 and 4 listed above. They can be discussed in small groups:
Position on geo-engineering. What should be the national position on geoengineering options in terms of conditions under which these options are more or
less acceptable?
National mitigation. Which national mitigation efforts remain important, or gain
importance, in case of a worst case climate change scenario?
Stimulating the most desirable global scenario. What can nationally be done
to increase the chance that the most desirable global scenario (see chapter 5)
becomes reality?
Institutional infrastructure. Which (global) institutional infrastructure is desirable
to be able to cope with a worst case climate change scenario, which differences
are required compared to the current situation, which role can countries like The
Netherlands play to arrive at the desired institutional infrastructure.
Because of the working assumption for this session that worse case climate
change cannot be avoided and the more strategic level of the discussion, some
aspects will not be discussed:
• Whether a 4.5 degrees warming is likely to happen, and how likely.
• The technical details of geo-engineering options.
There are many ways how man could try to influence (the effects of) climate
change in a desired direction, such as:
• influencing the earth’s radiative forcing: if the reflexivity (albedo) of the Earth
can be increased, its energy absorption (Watt/m2) will be lower and thus the
temperature will not rise, or will rise less fast. An albedo increase of 1% could
offset the warming effects over the next century;
• absorbing past emissions: as greenhouse gasses (GHG) will be emitted for a
considerable time to come, part of the overall strategy can be to absorb past
emissions from the atmosphere;
• reducing emissions: severely step up the mitigation efforts to quickly decelerate
the GHG emissions, including innovative and far-reaching technology transfer
and sharing arrangements.
The number of ideas and experiments for all options is increasing, but for the first
two categories the uncertainties are larger. Especially the occurrence and
magnitude of side effects is largely unknown for many options, although some
comparative insights have recently been published. Measures that fall in these
categories are usually called geo-engineering; most measures are controversial
because of their unproven effect, (possible) side-effects and uncertainties. Some
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examples include man-made cloud forming, shooting reflective shields in the sky,
fertilization of oceans, increasing the reflective parts of the earth surface, and
massive introduction of biological or mechanical greenhouse gas absorbers.
For more ‘traditional’ mitigation measures it is clear that in case of an approaching
worst case climate change scenario, measures will have to become much more
radical than currently considered. Some examples include factor 10 or 20
efficiency improvements, restructuring of mobility, energy and built environment
infrastructures, massive introduction of near zero emission vehicles, large scale
recycling, innovative financing mechanisms.
In general, the effects of the geo-engineering options could materialise on the
short term and therefore enjoy some popularity in the context of “fast action”. The
consequences are more uncertain but in most cases associated with potentially
high risk, compared to the slower, but more certain effects of regular measures
that are implemented with much higher intensity than current measures.
Moreover, traditional mitigation measures can only reduce the amount of currently
emitted greenhouse gasses , whereas geo-engineering can help to reduce the
effects of emissions from the past and as such contribute to the avoidance of
surpassing certain critical concentration levels in the atmosphere or compensate
for the effects of built up concentrations on the radiative balance of the planet.
This may become a necessity if the worst case scenario would apply as has
recently been discussed at the Copenhagen scientific Summit March 2009 in
terms of negative CO2 emissions.
The range of options that is open to governments to a large extent also depends
on adaptation and governance mechanisms.
For almost any country, adaptation is already an option that needs proper
attention. In the worst case scenario no country will be able to ignore its
importance and urgency, although the emphasis may lie on different aspects for
individual countries, like water management, flood control, disease control, food
resource management, migration etc. To approach these challenges, a highly
cooperative attitude is required from all sides. This required mindset also means
that contributions and experiences from all sides will need to be shared. Active
involvement and thus empowerment from countries that are currently treated as
victims will create a more productive basis for measures that work.
In terms of governance, many raise doubts about the appropriateness of the
current institutional infrastructure to address all challenges of climate change.
Regional cooperation seems to play an increasingly important role, but on the
global stage, the UNFCCC’s attempts to coordinate actions are laudable, but
possibly not sufficient. Many solutions have been proposed how this could be
improved (increased role of G20, a regional leader like the EU clearly taking the
lead, forging a deal between the largest countries, Global Issue Networks),
without a clear winner so far.
While a country like The Netherlands cannot play a major role in these areas, it
can make a significant contribution. The question arises: which initiatives to guide
these domains are within reach, and are desirable for the national government.
5
List of Abbreviations
CBS
Central Statistics Agency Netherlands
CCS
Carbon Capture and Storage
CoP
Conference of Parties
ECP
Eco-Patent Commons
EU
European Union
GHG
Green House Gasses
IIED
International Institute for Environment Development
IP(Rs)
Intellectual Property (Rights)
IPCC
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IRGC
International Risk Governance Council
ODA
Official Development Assistance
PBL
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Planbureau
voor de Leefomgeving)
ppm
Parts per million
REDD
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
THC
Thermo Haline Circulation
UN
United Nations
UNFCCC
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
VROM
Dutch Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning and the
Environment
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Contents
Summary
3
List of Abbreviations
6
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Introduction
Background and focus
The organisers
Goals of the meeting
Reading guide
9
9
9
10
11
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
Current technical scenarios and discussions
IPCC scenarios and uncertainties
Influencing factors
The +4.5 degrees scenario
Scope of the meeting
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13
14
15
16
3
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
Anthropogenic factors influencing speed of climate change
Introduction
Geo-engineering
Measures under consideration
Analysis of the effects
Possible side-effects of the measures
Emissions reductions at the source
‘War time’ measures in developed countries
Actions in and for developing countries
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19
20
20
21
22
23
23
25
4
4.1
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4
4.1.5
4.2
Other factors influencing policy directions
Adaptation
Specific adaptation technologies
Role of the EU
Best practices
Financing
Migration policies and dealing with climate refugees
Governance issues
27
27
28
28
28
29
30
31
7
5
5.1
5.2
5.3
Policy scenarios
Four policy scenarios
Example: (how) are measures used in each scenario
‘No regret’ measures
33
33
35
37
6
Guiding questions Think Tank meeting
39
References
43
Appendix 1: Factors influencing likelihood of extreme climate change
47
Appendix 2: Summary expert session
51
Appendix 3: Possible measures to change Earth’s reflexivity
57
Appendix 4: Possible measures to absorb greenhouse gasses
59
Appendix 5: List of influencing factors for policy intervention
61
Appendix 6: Information obtained in the preparatory process
63
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Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
1 Introduction
1.1
Background and focus
On request of Minister Jacqueline Cramer the 7th meeting of the VROM
International Affairs Think Tank, scheduled for 8 July 2009, will address to the
topic “Preparing for worst case climate change scenarios”. A number of
developments have led to this decision.
Up till now the last IPCC report (AR4) has been the basis for Dutch and European
climate change policies and targets, including the 2008 Dutch New Delta plan
proposal for adaptation. Since the publication of AR4, new scientific findings have
been published which contain serious indications that the warming effects are
underestimated, and that tipping points (after which climate change will sustain
itself) could be reached in a near future . Questions have been asked in the Dutch
Parliament urging the government to have a closer look into this issue.
This has led to a request by the Ministry of VROM to the Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) to report on a) new scientific insights
since IPCC AR4, b) assess the possibility of a run away climate change scenario
and, c) listing technical options to prepare (The Netherlands) for extreme climate
change. This report is expected to be published in the autumn 2009. It should
contain the basis for further actions. In parallel, the Think Tank was asked in
January 2009 to address the same topic, with a focus on strategic policy making.
It is useful to note that apart from this request to PBL there is currently no ongoing
research programme on accelerated or intensified climate change possibilities in
The Netherlands and apart from limited research endeavours by a few individual
scientists there is no research at all in the area of possible measures to reduce
existing green house gas concentrations in the atmosphere or to compensate for
their effect on the earth’s radiative balance (so called geo-engineering).
1.2
The organisers
The Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM)
has started in 2006 a VROM International Affairs Think Tank, with the aim to
9
provide informal insights to the Dutch government on possible policy initiatives
that it can take within, primarily, the framework of the EU or UN. Its Directorate
International Affairs is responsible for the general Think Tank management.
Recently the Unit for Knowledge and Strategy participates the preparation of the
contents of the meetings. The Think Tank’s external chairman is Marius
Enthoven, the secretariat is located at Telos, Tilburg University with Bastiaan
Zoeteman as secretary.
During the Think Tank meeting, questions will be discussed with implications on
national, European and global level.
Because of the strong links with the PBL-study, it is important to align the two
trajectories in order to make them mutually supportive. For this purpose a
common expert session was organised (31 March 2009), providing both activities
with a common starting point. The summary of the expert session is included in
Appendix 2. The PBL-project will focus on detailed research on the influencing
factors and technical response measures, the Think Tank will focus on strategic
aspects of possible policy responses.. More information on the process that
resulted in the final set-up for the meeting can be found in Appendix 6.
1.3
Goals of the meeting
The following -possible- guiding questions have been formulated for the meeting,
as stated in the proposal to the Management Council (Bestuursraad) of the
Ministry of VROM (VROM, 2009):
a.
b.
c.
Which physical problems / consequences has the Netherlands government to
face in different scenarios?
What are the policy directions (in terms of mitigation and adaptation) in case
these developments occur and how can the citizen be involved in policy
responses?
What is required on the national, European and global level, and which role
can the Netherlands play?
The results of the Think Tank meeting are intended to be used as informal input
for the development of a vision and a strategy for the Dutch response for the
medium and long term. This perspective (2020-2050) is also of importance as
background for the choices that are going to be made at Copenhagen (CoP-15),
in December 2009, because policy choices and related investment decisions have
a long time horizon. This may therefore influence decisions that need to be taken
on the short term. The recommendations of the Think Tank are not intended to
distract in any way from the process to arrive at a good new global agreement, but
the input or outcome of CoP-15 can conceivably play a role in further agendasetting. The Think Tank session may provide suggestions for actions on the short
term (1-2 years) after Copenhagen.
.
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Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
1.4
Reading guide
This document is intended to ensure that participants to the session have a
common information base.
Chapter 2 will briefly discuss different technical factors that influence the range of
outcomes within current IPCC scenarios. The ‘worst case scenario’ will be
introduced, including arguments why this is currently believed to be a realistic
technical worst case scenario.
Chapter 3 will discuss factors that can influence the speed and direction of climate
change. Given the fact (for the purpose of this meeting) that in this scenario a 4.5
degrees warming is taken as given, these factors include rather radical actions
that could be taken. Chapter 4 will focus on other aspects that influence the
capacity to cope with climate change, with emphasis on adaptation and
governance issues.
In chapter 5 various policy scenarios are discussed to deal with extreme climate
change, once it is occurring. These policy scenarios are the result of the
aforementioned expert session (see section 1.2). For the Think Tank these
scenarios provide a context showing the consequences when other political
conditions then presently common prevail. They have also helped to identify
guiding questions for the Think Tank session. The premise is that The
Netherlands as a member of the EU will in principle want to move towards the
best policy scenario from an international co-operation and sense of urgency point
of view, given the situation of worst case climate change. The questions that will
be addressed during the session are introduced in Chapter 6.
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12
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
2 Current technical scenarios and
discussions
2.1
IPCC scenarios and uncertainties
The IPCC considers a range of technical climate change scenarios (including socalled storylines). In short, these are the following:
• A1 storyline: a future world of very rapid economic growth, global population
that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and rapid introduction of new
and more efficient technologies.
• A2 storyline: a very heterogeneous world with continuously increasing global
population and regionally oriented economic growth that is more fragmented
and slower than in other storylines.
• B1 storyline: a convergent world with the same global population as in the A1
storyline but with rapid changes in economic structures toward a service and
information economy, with reductions in material intensity, and the introduction
of clean and resource-efficient technologies.
• B2 storyline: a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic,
social, and environmental sustainability, with continuously increasing
population (lower than A2) and intermediate economic development.
The IPCC subsequently selected six working scenarios, one from each of the last
three storylines, and 3 of the first: A1F1 (fossil intensive), A1T (predominantly
non-fossil) and A1B (balanced across energy sources). The dominant source of
energy has a big influence on the volume of emitted greenhouse gasses and thus
temperature rise. In the A1F1 scenario for example, the range of temperature
increase lies between 2.4 – 6.4 degrees Celsius. This while the general policies
(and the UNFCCC) use the basic premise that a temperature increase above 2
degrees moves us towards unmanageable scenarios.
A number of findings since the publication of the last IPCC report have raised
doubts whether the ‘manageable’ scenario is not too optimistic. There are signs
that once +2 degrees will be reached, warming to +4.5 degrees may be
unavoidable due to uncontrollable feedback and tipping points: changes will be
non-linear
13
Scientific findings contain some hopeful and encouraging signals: 1) we seem to
understand the dynamics of some aspects (e.g., temperature rise and weather
pattern behaviour seems to follow model predictions), 2) effects could in some
cases be less bad than expected (e.g., oceans seem to be heating slower than
expected). But more signals point to worse scenarios (e.g., Arctic sea ice is
declining faster, sea level rise over last 20 years is higher than thought
previously). The scientific summit in Copenhagen in March 2009 gives a good
reflection of this ambiguity:
One part of the aforementioned PBL-report will compile and analyse these
findings to arrive at more founded conclusions regarding these doubts. This report
is not available in time to be included in this background paper.
2.2
Influencing factors
To obtain an impression of the factors that influence which part of the scenarioranges will become reality, a small expert session was organized in January 2009.
The full results have been included in Appendix I. The strongest overall factors,
also with large uncertainties, are the radiative forcing and the climate sensitivity of
the earth system. If these are used as main axes, the following main climatescenarios are the result1.
High rad. forcing
Review and adapt
current policies, e.g.
strengthen mitigation
to address ocean
acidification
1.2oC
Low climate
sensitivity
Relax
mitigation and
adaptation policies
Emergency
adaptation and
mitigation
policies
A1FI
4.5oC
IPCC
range
B1
High climate
sensitivity
Review and adapt
current policies, e.g.
enhance adaptation
450 ppm stab
Low rad.
forcing
Figure 1 Scenario directions
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
1
Courtesy of Rob Swart (ALterra).
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Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
The scenario in the upper right quadrant represents a ‘worst case’ which is
caused by high radiative forcing conditions in combination with a high climate
sensitivity of the earth system. This would result in a temperature increase of 4.5
degrees Celsius within a century.
2.3
The +4.5 degrees scenario
In order to discuss options for governments once an extreme scenario is
unfolding, an impression of the situation is helpful. In a recent book, Mark Lynas
(2007) describes the state of the planet for various degrees of warming (one, two,
three, four, five and six degrees above pre-industrial levels), based on available
scientific studies.
Some of the ‘highlights’ of the +4 scenario in his book include:
• Dozens of millions of evacuates from coastal areas, billions of dollars of
damage, both in developing and developed countries.
• Cities in delta’s will at best transform to isolated islands.
• No funds to absorb the need to rebuild cities more than once or twice; no
insurances possible; enormous financial consequences for all stakeholders.
• Structural streams of migrants to non-coastal higher situated areas.
• Agricultural lands under heavy pressure from dehydration but also severe
storms: less to eat.
• Massive melting of ice at the poles, resulting in very high chance of sea level
rise that goes beyond human adaptation capacity.
• If West-Antarctic ice sheet melts, nothing would prevent flooding of all coastal
areas2.
• Accelerated melting of Eastern-Antarctica can eventually result in sea level rise
of 50 metres.
• The last period on Earth when the temperature was 4 degrees warmer was
characterised by no ice on the poles.
• Southern Europe will look like Africa (including 2-month heat waves), Northern
Europe will see very heavy storms. The number of storms may not increase but
the severity will.
• Present African and Near East temperatures will become common in mild
temperature zones like the UK and Switzerland.
• Only if the increasing energy need for air conditioning comes from completely
renewable energy (solar) GHG emissions will not increase, otherwise increased
emissions are the result.
• Vegetation and trees will suffer everywhere, taking away the natural cooling
system.
• Once permafrost is massively defrosting, emitting of billions of tons of carbon
dioxide and methane becomes unavoidable. Because of the uncertainty when
this happens, these effects have not been included in scenarios so far.
• Snow in places like the Alps will become a rarity, especially below 2000 metres.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
2
Although recent research by Bamber et al (2009) has re-evaluated assumptions and concluded that collapse of the
West Antarctic ice sheet would lead to somewhat lower than expected sea level rise (3.3 instead of 5 metres).
15
• Disappearing glaciers will impact the water supply system in virtually every
area, especially the mountainous ones and their valleys. Since people from
coastal areas will move there, the water supply system comes under high
stress.
For The Netherlands it is difficult to estimate exactly the impact of these changes.
More research into the consequences of extreme scenarios for The Netherlands
in particular is currently being executed. Some indications come from reports of
the Deltacommissie (2008), mostly containing predictions until 20503, and from
PBL (2009). These make use of the IPCC AR4 scenarios, and do not extrapolate
beyond these. These reports indicate that:
• Precipitation patterns depend on the air circulation, but the intensity and
frequency will increase, while in summers there will be a severe shortage of
rainfall.
• The predictions of sea level rise are very uncertain but 1,5 metres towards
2100 is conceivable, and up till 3 meters in the next century.
• The big rivers will have to deal with less water in the summer and more
discharge in the winter, in total an increase of some 15-20%.
• Costs for the Delta programme are between 1 and 1.5 billion Euros per year,
slightly more if coastal areas are re-designed for other functions.
• Strong increase of invasive (non-indigenous) flora and fauna, due to extended
growing seasons (Bron, 2007).
• The chance of having the warmest moment at 35 degrees Celsius increases
from 1 in 5 in 2006 to 1 in 2 in 2050 (Bron, 2007).
Heading towards 5 or 6 degrees means that we are moving to a totally different
planet. As far as the best estimates go, the Earth will look similar as in the late
Perm-era (250 million years ago), the last time the Earth heated up similarly
quickly, although then it took 10.000 years (Lynas, 2007). The situation can be
characterised with abandoned coastal areas, massive desertification, population
concentrations in higher areas, iceless poles, deserts until well into Central
Europe, massive extinctions of species, exploding methane bubbles4, possibility
for small part of the population to survive based on strong private survival
motivation, etc. However the latter situation is not part of the climate scenario
considered.
2.4
Scope of the meeting
The topic at hand leaves much room for many sub-topics to be discussed. The
leading questions for the session will be introduced and briefly discussed in
Chapter 6. In general, these follow a few guidelines:
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
3
With an averagely higher temperature of 2.6 above 1990-levels (approximately 3.2 above pre-industrial). This means
that the +4.5 scenario will be more severe than these predictions.
4
As occurred in Cameroon (Nyos) in 1986, killing 1700 people.
16
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
• What are strategic issues assuming that worst case climate change will
happen?
• Which links between issues are important to consider?
• What are expected implications (positive and negative) of measures, which
complicating factors (e.g., politically) can be foreseen?
• Which no regret measures can be devised, which trade offs (if any) are relevant
to consider for these measures?
Because of the working assumption for this session that worse case climate
change cannot be avoided (which is not to say that this actually will be the case),
and the strategic orientation of the discussion, some aspects will not be
discussed:
• Whether +4.5 degrees is indeed likely to happen, and how likely.
• The technical details of geo-engineering options as opposed to general
conditions for geo-engineering to be acceptable for the Netherlands.
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Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
3 Anthropogenic factors influencing
speed of climate change
Several man made factors have an influence on the speed and direction of a
change in climate. Some have relatively certain effects and side-effects. The
effects of others can currently only be guessed.
3.1
Introduction
There are many ways to influence climate change in a desired direction:
• Influencing the earth’s radiative forcing: if the reflexivity (albedo) of the Earth
can be increased, its energy absorption (Watt/m2) will be lower and thus the
temperature will not rise, or will rise less fast An albedo increase of 1% could
offset the warming effects over the next century (Victor et al, 2009).
• Absorbing past emissions: as greenhouse gasses (GHG) will be emitted for a
considerable time to come, part of the overall strategy can be to absorb earlier
emissions from the atmosphere.
• Reducing emissions: severely step up the mitigation efforts to quickly
decelerate the GHG emissions, including innovative and far-reaching
technology transfer and sharing arrangements.
The number of ideas and experiments for all options is increasing, but for the first
two categories the uncertainties are larger. Especially the occurrence and
magnitude of side effects is largely unknown for many options (see section 3.2.3).
The first two directions are briefly discussed and compared in section 3.2 and
more in depth in the Appendices 3 and 4. Strategies to reduce emissions at the
source are discussed in section 3.3. All strategies may be considered both in the
current situation (to lower the chance of worst case climate change), as well as in
the technical scenario where severe climate change can already no longer be
avoided.
19
3.2
3.2.1
Geo-engineering5
Measures under consideration
The options of influencing radiative forcing and absorbing past emissions can be
labelled as geo-engineering: ‘the deliberate modification of Earth’s environment
on a large scale "to suit human needs and promote habitability". The term is used
to describe attempts to counter the effects of human-induced climate change.
However, others define it more narrowly as focusing only on the mineralogy and
hydrology of the Earth’ (Wikipedia).
Most experts seem to agree that geo-engineering, in whichever shape or form, is
no panacea and certainly no excuse to stop reducing GHG emissions. They do
enjoy some popularity because the cooling effects can materialise relatively
promptly after introduction (e.g., Victor et al, 2009). But having a fall back plan in
place if these reductions are insufficient to prevent severe impacts could still be a
reason to spend time on better exploring effective geo-engineering options (Van
Nieuwstadt, 2009).
As Figure 1 shows (Madrigal, 2009) a wide range of measures can be considered.
These and several additional measures, like absorption by olivine, are described
in more detail in Appendices 3 and 4.
Figure 2 Visual overview of geo-engineering options
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
5
Well after production of this background paper, The Royal Society (Royal Society, 2009) published their report on Geoengineering. Because of it later publication date (September 2009), it is not discussed in this paper. Its content however
is in line with the state of the art as presented in this background paper.
20
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
3.2.2
Analysis of the effects
The most recent insights related to the effect of many of such measures was
described by Lenton and Vaughan (2009), summarised by Madrigal (2009) and is
shown in table 1.
Error! Reference source not found.
Figure 3 Effect comparison of geo-engineering options visualised (Madrigal, 2009)
Table 1 Cooling potential of several geo-engineering options (Lenton & Vaughan, 2009)
21
3.2.3
Possible side-effects of the measures
Although the Think Tank will not discuss the pros and cons of any of the individual
measures, this section briefly shows categories of (possible) side effects of the
measures suggested.
Overall greenhouse gas balance
Many solutions require energy as input. The generation of this energy results in
GHG emissions. If these emissions are too high compared to the emissions
avoided or cooling effect induced the measure will not be (cost) effective.
Especially if other possible negative side effects are likely or if large but uncertain
negative side effects do occur (e.g., weather, local precipitation), these options
should be carefully scrutinised.
Risks of (geo) physical side effects
For many measures, the effects on the air and weather system are uncertain and
high risk6. The IRGC7 (2008) has proposed three categories of risks involved:
• Complexity: difficulties in quantifying causal links between a multitude of causal
agents and (observed) effects. An example is the critical load of eco-systems,
or the exact effects on biodiversity in case of mono-plantations.
• Uncertainty: lack of clarity or quality of scientific or technical data, for example
referring to longer term effects of measures.
• Ambiguity: divergence of contested perspectives on justification, severity or
wider meanings regarding a given threat.
They suggest the following risk management strategies:
• Complexity: access and act on best available scientific expertise aiming for a
risk-informed and robustness-focussed strategy. The robustness is especially
important regarding processes that are not fully understood yet.
• Uncertainty: use precaution-based and resilience-focussed strategies to make
sure that decisions are reversible, and a system’s coping capacity can be
increased to withstand surprises.
• Ambiguity: use a discourse-based strategy which seeks to create tolerance and
mutual understanding of views and values with the aim of eventually reconciling
them.
Following this advice means that each unknown and negative side effect (risk)
would need to be placed in one of these three categories to provide direction for
the strategy to manage it.
Additionally, before countries embark on geo-engineering options, they may want
to consider possible negative consequences. The discussion on who is to blame
will be even more fierce, than currently on climate change as a whole (Victor et al,
2009).
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
6
E.g., destruction of stratospheric ozone if sulfate is injected into the stratosphere and possibilities of regional droughts.
7
International Risk Governance Council, independent organization aiming to improve understanding and management
of emerging systemic risks.
22
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
Global ethics and governance issues
Some measures are relatively cheap and therefore possible to execute
unilaterally, especially because side-effects may not materialise in the country that
implements the measure. Whether such considerations are taken into account is
a matter of ethics (see e.g., Muylaert de Araujo et al. (2007). Less
consideration for such aspects takes away the pressure to cooperate on
mitigation efforts. While unregulated, commercial instead of public interests can
determine the decisions (Victor et al, 2009) so it is important to consider which
institutions take the decisions and which trade-off considerations are included in
these decisions. These and other governance issues are discussed more in depth
in section 4.2.
Public apathy
If too much emphasis is given to the worst case being likely, or even unavoidable,
people might start to think “Why bother”, and may only support measures that
supply a direct benefit to them on the short term, and/or cost as little money as
possible. In particular, the public support for emissions reductions may dwindle.
Furthermore, most geo-engineering options address the symptoms, and not the
causes of the problem. If this becomes the dominant mindset, the main solutions
will increasingly become symptom-oriented.
Perception of extreme costs
Although some measures are presented as being relatively cheap (Barrett, 2008),
for others this is not the case. Many measures also appear to have a high science
fiction nature. This can provoke discussion on ‘where to spend our money on’.
Climate change strategy as a whole may lose public interest and support.
More dependency of developing countries
The more complex solutions get, the more dependent developing countries will
become. This is not helpful as developing countries need to be enabled to look
after their own interests if at all possible. Viewed from a different angle,
developing countries may welcome seemingly simple measures if these appear to
be less harmful as a strategy than (rigorous) mitigation measures.
3.3
Emissions reductions at the source
Although a strong temperature increase is already unavoidable in the extreme
scenario, society can still choose to prevent the problem from getting even more
serious, if only to transform to a society that does not continue to make matters
worse. Is it still feasible to step up the mitigation efforts to quickly decelerate the
atmosphere from having to cope with even more GHG emissions?
3.3.1
‘War time’ measures in developed countries
Reducing emissions once an extreme scenario is unavoidable would be wholly
insufficient, yet it is relevant to have a look at what measures could be thought of
23
in such a situation. Currently, the urgency (i.e. perceived necessity) is not high
enough to generate radical measures while technologically, and even
economically, much is already possible. If the situation becomes more urgent, the
actual blocking issues (i.e., willingness to pay for these measures) may change.
Assuming that the sense of urgency is high, one could think of the measures as
occurred during World War II in the USA, such as:
• Crash emissions reductions in industry and power supply sectors, e.g., if
measures with short pay-back time that result in great efficiencies have already
been taken (which is far from being the case); a next option is to start taking
measures that involve a destruction of ‘sunk capital’, as delaying would incur
even higher costs. If the urgency is high enough, the current lock in (taboo on
de-investments) can be broken. This boils down to phasing out old, more
carbon intensive technologies and moving towards sustainable energy sources.
Some authors claim that based on currently available or known technologies,
much more is already possible (see for example Monbiot, 2006 and McKinsey,
2008, 2009)
• Massive efficiency measures in mobility, building and households, e.g., not 2%
per year, but 10%, a below 20 ppm CO2 standard for cars instead of 120 ppm,
fully redesigned mobility infrastructures, personal caps for mobility-related
emissions, quickly phasing out of all appliances under B-label, only allowing
net-zero emissions appliances in the course of 5-10 years large scale
introduction of electric cars combined with smart grids and recharging stations
using renewable energy sources, Factor 10 or 20 buildings, mass-build energy
producing buildings, maximising recycling etc.
• Manmade CO2 capture and storage, providing on the short term a primary
means to quickly reduce harmful emissions: i.e., introduce the possibility of
negative emissions;
• Behavioural/economic structural change, e.g., if social change can reduce the
number of travel kilometres and generated waste by a large factor, this would
be helpful, and it can build towards a society that is structured differently.
Behavioural change may need to be actively stimulated by incentives.
While technology is part of the solution, we already have many options available
that are not used (or not enough). It is realistic to assume, and shown in practice
(Paine, 2006), that a conducive financial and political climate will facilitate the
uptake of beneficial technologies and stimulate development to even better ones.
Measures and their cost structures should therefore be facilitated by adjoining
policies on taxes, investments, trade and financial products like insurances. Such
measures could include:
• Compulsory performance on greenhouse gas action for all (stock exchange
listed) companies, see e.g., SFI/FI (2008)
• innovative, but transparent, financial products, including insurances
• Radical tax-system changes that stimulate large scale shifts in investments to
sustainable technologies and sustainable consumer behaviour.
• Indirect emissions caused by the financial sector included in carbon credit
trading (SFI/FI, 2008)
24
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
• Beneficial arrangements on IP-free technological transfer and assistance with
leapfrogging in developing countries. Also see 3.3.2.
• Quickly gathering critical mass and sufficient (political) clout to tip the WTOsystem towards allowing more leeway for sustainable products and
technologies.
3.3.2
Actions in and for developing countries
Related to less developed countries, it will be necessary to think in two directions:
1. More effective and widespread ways to engage in technology transfer. If
current initiatives do not work and if the urgency becomes high enough, new
mechanisms providing developing countries with new technologies are likely to
become more acceptable.
2. What can be done by developing countries themselves?
Technology transfer
Several of the measures discussed in 3.3 could also be relevant for developing
countries. In fact measures may be even more appropriate here than in many
developed countries. One increasingly popular mitigation measure is
Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) with thermal storage8, which in principle could
be applied on a much larger scale.
For the application of large scale technology and transfer of knowledge an easy
but unlikely solution would be for the developed countries to pay (almost) the
entire bill. Otherwise these technologies need to be made much more affordable,
e.g. using a mechanism where IP rights are given up, or revenues for inventing
parties are ensured in another way. Once again9 the Eco-patent commons
initiative (ECP) of the WBCSD springs to mind as an inspiration source to use as
a basis for such a mechanism. Other directions for more effective deployment of
new technologies could include10 auctioning to distributing parties and changing
business and distribution models so developing market consumers do not bare
the full burden11 etc.
A recent report (Tomlinson et al, 2008), recommended a similar line of thought by
suggesting a ‘protect and share’ agreement, in which governments create a
situation where both accelerated diffusion as well as revenue certainty are
stimulated, but especially for parties that see the bigger picture, i.e., wide scale
deployment of sustainable technologies. Such an agreement can include aspects
on market segmentation (prevent re-importation), public sector buy-out, forced
terms for use of patents (i.e., losing them if they are not used), third parties paying
for licenses acquired by developing countries and global commons (see ECP).
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
8
See for example http://climateprogress.org/2009/04/23/arizona-csp-solar-thermal-storage/
9
See preparation documents for several think tank meetings, available on www.telos.nl.
10
E.g., see Sustainability: shifting emphasis to fostering deployment.
11
E.g., using Base of the Pyramid thinking (see Prahalad, 2004 and Noguera, 2009)
25
Other generic concepts that can be used to mobilise the world’s brains for
technology challenges in developing countries is to make use of theme specific
networks (both physical and virtual) that facilitate large scale cooperation on –
open source (like) – solutions.
Agreements that stimulate knowledge and technology transfer without foregoing
on the financial interest of the parties owning the technologies will facilitate
technological leapfrogging, and can be strengthened by societal (behaviour)
leapfrogging. It may be politically sensitive, but practically reasonable to accept
that in some countries existing capacity is insufficient to effectively absorb and
use entirely new knowledge and technologies. Only if a country is ‘ready’ for it, it
starts to make sense to build up capacity, most likely starting with foreign
technical assistance (Collier, 2008). It is conceivable that this readiness
determines the type of support a country receives.
Domestic and regional actions
While it is realistic to assume that many new technologies required for emission
reductions in developing countries come from abroad, this is not the whole story.
First of all, policies in developing countries and between countries should be
conducive for transfer, diffusion and deployment of technologies.
Secondly, just like with adaptation (see section 4.1) local, traditional, knowledge
may very well be the basis for effective emission reduction approaches. This
certainly seems relevant for dealing with deforestation. Local populations should
have alternatives for ecologically destructive activities and should have space to
develop these into sustainable livelihood activities, including sustainable energy
generation. This requires some form of participatory decision making, and open
minded governments. Emerging from within and with sufficient manoeuvring
space, changes ‘bottom up’ can in some cases even lower the necessity for large
scale technology transfer. This is however different for least developed countries
and the rapidly developing economies like China.
Sharing local practices could stimulate a more effective use of local knowledge
and initiative, much in the same way as is proposed for adaptation practices (see
section 4.1).
26
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
4 Other factors influencing policy
directions
Besides the manoeuvring space offered by different categories of mitigation and
geo-engineering measures, other categories of factors are relevant to discuss.
These include adaptation and governance issues.
4.1
Adaptation
Adaptation as such does not influence in most cases12 the GHG concentrations.
But it is a relevant (additional) policy direction that may become more or less
urgent depending on the speed of developments.
Because of the unavoidable built-in effects of climate change (i.e., due to past
emissions that still have to materialise) it is certain that countries will have to
adapt. Some more so than others, and in different areas like:
• coping with drought;
13
• ensuring sufficient water and/or food supply in a different climate ;
• river/watershed management;
• sea level rise (coastal defence);
• addressing diminished biodiversity;
• mitigating loss of eco-system services;
• control of disease and pests;
• risk management, insurance etc.
• high migration stresses (from developing countries but also between and within
developed countries).
The continuum of adaptation activities was described by Klein and Persson (2006)
in four general strategies starting with a vulnerability focus and moving towards
and impact focus: addressing the drivers of vulnerability, building response
capacity, managing climate risks and confronting climate change.
With the certainty of adaptation being a necessity and the realisation that
adaptation will become a strategic global issue (Burton, 2008) more ‘radical’
policies regarding adaptation can be considered. The fact that a failure to assist
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
12
An exception is for example strengthening of river deltas with vegetation which as a side effect absorbs CO2.
13
This includes ‘management issues’ like access to markets and stability of supply (CCD, 2009)
27
countries to adapt can lead to an increased security risk (see e.g., Schwartz and
Randall, 2003), adds to the urgency to come up with effective strategies that
surpass the local level. To which extent funding of these strategies comes from
regular budgets or should be complementary remains a controversial issue (e.g.,
Sachs, 2009). This is discussed further in section 4.1.4.
This section will briefly discuss several main themes within the adaptation domain.
These build on the premise that as long as adaptation keeps being framed as “will
the West pay the adaptation of the rest”, the discussion is a very narrow one. As
in the case of mitigation measures (3.3), more radical or innovative ways of
thinking will be necessary to reach required breakthroughs. The directions that are
described below contain a few examples of these relatively new ways of thinking.
Special attention will be given to role of the EU and member states such as The
Netherlands.
4.1.1
Specific adaptation technologies
In section 3.3.2 a general description has been given how to deal with technology
transfers in a contemporary way. The Netherlands can contribute to adaptation
innovation and deployment especially in the area of water management. The
plans for a new Delta plan (Deltacommissie, 2008) could be accelerated; the
knowledge can be utilised abroad, in both developed and developing countries.
It is advisable to always include local knowledge centres early in a process of
‘transfer’ (i.e., dialogue) to assess whether and how new technologies can be
used in local circumstances. This will increase the effectiveness and thus reduce
costs as well.
4.1.2
Role of the EU
Although adaptation is sometimes considered most necessary for developing
countries (see next section), it is also becoming an issue for the EU itself. This is
not just true for the question how adaptation world wide should be financed (see
section 4.1.4).
Increasingly, it becomes clear that impacts within the EU can be high as well,
especially in Mediterranean countries (drought, water supply) and river delta’s
(Netherlands, Belgium, Germanium), extending to more countries once the higher
range scenarios come into play. This seems to add to the relevance for intra-EU
adaptation policy.
4.1.3
Best practices
As set out in February 2009 at an IIED-organised conference, the Global Initiative
on Community Based Adaptation to Climate Change (Padma, 2009) is a new
initiative that aims to facilitate information and exchange of best practices
28
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
(Community Based Adaptation exchange14), which initiative will be complemented
by new conferences.
The strong point of this initiative is that it involves (knowledge from) developing
countries themselves and it increases the general accessibility of relevant
information. The countries are not only positioned as victims but also as sources
of knowledge (Macchi, 2008), which will result in a much bigger feeling of
empowerment and involvement than if they are solely put in the aid-corner. These
feelings are also represented in the recent report of the Commission on Climate
Change and Development (CCD, 2009): the dominant role of local institutions and
entities (up till family level) is important, but they must be enabled by a coherent
(international) framework and an information structure that reaches the most
vulnerable. In this way as a side-benefit, local actors and supposed ‘victims’ can
also become a source of solutions. Solutions not only for themselves, but that
some developed countries can use later on, if the experienced effects of climate
change start materialising in developed countries as well. Learning can take place
in two directions.
It therefore seems prudent to keep cooperating on these matters. Knowledge on
coping with drought will benefit enormously from the actual experience that only
people actually living in these conditions can contribute to the global knowledge
pool (Macchi et al, 2008). Strengthened by (research) knowledge on for example
resilient food crops processes can then work in a complementary way instead of
introducing new dependence for developing countries.
4.1.4
Financing
A returning issue regarding adaptation is how to share the financial burden. The
discussion may be more cumbersome due to the wide range of expected
adaptation costs, ranging from 31 billion currently, to as high as 89 billion in 2015
and 135 billion in 2030 (CCD, 2009). While these estimates supposedly were
meant to persuade countries to act now, they may inadvertently have shocked
countries into inaction, or at least fierce debate who is to pay for all this. For
mitigation, a myriad of burden sharing methods has been proposed and some are
used in practice. For adaptation, we mostly find ourselves still in a green field
situation. Recent work (Dellink, et al, 2008) provides insight however in how the
financial contribution of countries changes in different scenarios (i.e., using
different burden sharing principles). They conclude that the definition of the
Capacity to Pay is responsible for the largest part of the differences in the burden
sharing outcomes. For The Netherlands the different scenarios point at on
average a 1% contribution of total global adaptation costs.
Having funds available is one thing, their fair and effective distribution and
allocation is another. Setting up new funds may be rather confusing and
hampering effectiveness (CCD, 2009). While Africa is supposedly the continent
that will suffer most from climate change and will be in dire need of adaptation as
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
14
http://community.eldis.org/cbax/
29
well, some complain that the continent will not benefit proportionally from rising
budgets due to the current framework, including CDM-rules (Asfaw, 2009).
Therefore, on the short term, simply honouring ODA-commitments and using
integral solution frameworks like REDD are already important steps (CCD, 2009).
The EU could stimulate such developments.
Adaptation initiatives do not have to be developed from scratch. The IIED15 (2008)
suggested a four-step approach including awareness raising, providing targeted
information, starting pilot activities and finally mainstreaming. Referring to the
information exchange initiatives, the more information is known, the more can be
shared, which leads to investments indirectly being channelled back. Adaptation,
as well as mitigation will benefit from a large global resource pool, some of which
may be protected, but other parts can be used more freely. The collective wisdom
will increase manifold in this way.
Finally, on a lower geographical level, it is necessary to develop specialised
services, like flood insurance, general micro insurance16 or even specific microinsurance (e.g. for specific livestock or crops). The seemingly more exciting trade
in weather derivatives (Kistner and Meyer) could also be an option, although in
light of the current financial crisis, the transparency of such products should be
well scrutinised. Alternatively, the business sector could be stimulated to make
climate change vulnerability - and thus appeal of taking and supporting local
adaptive measures – part of their standard risk management procedures.
4.1.5
Migration policies and dealing with climate refugees
Climate refugees are defined as “displaced persons caused by climate change
induced environmental disasters”. Different categories of ‘people on the move’
exist, as suggested in a framework by Renaud et al (2007). The total number of
climate related refugees could reach globally 150 million by mid-century, but
controversies exist on how to calculate this. The number of people that is
considered to live in vulnerable areas (10 metres above sea level or lower) is
estimated at 634 million (Brown, 2008).
In all cases, it can be assumed that the number of people on the move due to
environmental and especially climate related causes will strongly increase. The
US government has been warned about the security implications of this
development (Schwartz and Randall, 2003) and it was urged to include this in its
considerations to become active in the climate change policy arena.
Given the fact that these movements will increase, countries that can expect to
receive such refugees should better prepare, also with shared arrangements.
Examples for measures are assigning a proper status to such refugees (i.e.,
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
15
International Institute for Environment and Development (ww.iied.org), calls itself “a global leader in sustainable
development”. As an independent international research organisation, they position themselves as specialists in linking
local to global.
16
characterized by low premium and low caps or low coverage limits, sold as part of atypical risk-pooling and marketing
arrangements, and designed to service low-income people and businesses not served by typical social or commercial
insurance schemes (Wikipedia)
30
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
which automatic level of protection they should be entitled to receive), the relation
with other migrant streams (rights and duties), their right to get opportunities etc.
In most analyses, the prevention of large scale migrant streams is considered to
be the best way to address this development. This however implies that a large
scale effort is needed for mitigation and support for local adaptation.
As mentioned in section 4.1.2, the EU will in this discussion not merely play a role
of safe haven for refugees from other areas, but it will also experience internal
movements of people, who as EU citizens have a full right to relocated to other
EU-countries, and even within countries. The latter is especially applicable to The
Netherlands: do we seriously need to consider that the western (currently richer)
part of the country will become uninhabitable and will people move en masse to
other parts, and what does this mean for infrastructure, investments and spatial
planning? These questions will also start playing a role on EU level.
4.2
Governance issues
Climate change is a global problem, but its governance is complicated by several
aspects of ‘unequal distribution’: everyone is in the end affected, but not everyone
to the same degree and also not in the same way. Also, some may be affected
sooner or in more disruptive ways than others. Finally, there is hardly any
relationship between the actors who are the biggest contributors to the problem
and the ones that suffer most from it.
All these aspects give cause to approaching the issue from a global perspective.
However, so far the efforts of the quintessential global institution (UN) have not
been unequivocally successful. Arguably, getting consensus amongst 200 nations
is no easy task. So, on the current global institutional level we experience a
paradox: deciding globally is more inclusive, but in practice often becomes stalling
or watering down of measures that are taken.
Some time ago, another type of solution arena was suggested, namely Global
Issue Networks (Rischard, 2002). According to Rischard such Networks would
combine several advantages, foremost the minimisation of complexity and
hierarchy, start-up time and delivery time. All together this would lead to a
networked governance system that he considers most appropriate for the global
issues of our time. The main disadvantages of these Networks would lie in its lack
of formal legislative capacity and its assumed lack of full democracy. At the same
time, these could also become its primary advantages in terms of lower extent of
political games, speed of decision making, etc. Whether a GIN would work in the
end, depends on the reputation, the workability of the results and the political clout
it can generate.
In that same sense, sub-global institutions and combinations of stakeholders can
take their own responsibility as well. If leaders lead well, others will follow. The big
question is: who are willing to lead and can they implement their aspirations? For
31
some time the EU was considered to be the leader on climate change, but in part
due to the enlargement, the ‘common’ opinion of the EU watered down somewhat.
The package proposed in 2008 and accepted in 2009 (EC, 2009 and Council,
2009) still shows some ambition. The US sends hopeful signals since the
beginning of 2009 but will have to gain back much good will before other countries
will accept their leadership. In other words, while the positive signals are already
an improvement from the situation of the past 10 years, agreed action is needed
to convince. It has been suggested (Rischard, 2002) that the G20 summits may in
the end provide the most effective channel for development of political clout. It
represents both developed and developing economies from all parts of the globe,
with no evident country in the lead. This means, that if decisions are taken at the
G20, they will have a broad influence.
Because the timing and severity of effects is local or regional rather than global, it
does make sense if cooperation is started on regional scale as well. This relates
to joining forces to push items on the political agendas but also in a more practical
way, to tackle issues that are specific for that region. These may be in the area of
research, mitigation and adaptation. As long as regional cooperation is not used
to hurt or as an excuse to refrain from any cooperation on global action, there is
nothing wrong with addressing issues regionally.
A fear exists however, that if such behaviour is taken to the extreme, it could
result in unilateral or bilateral action aimed at a direct national gain, but with
(unforeseen) side effects, mostly for other nations. This is especially valid for
various geo-engineering options (sulphate clouds, artificial water vapour cloud
forming, cutting down forests in snow covered areas). But it also applies to
mitigation options (huge dams in rivers to generate hydro power on which other
countries depend for water and food supply) and even adaptation (divert river
systems) as well as addressing streams of migrants. In general, except in areas
where international agreements are in place (e.g., International Rhine
Commission), nothing can be formally done about this, but the undesirability is
clear. This raises the question if nations should commit themselves not to embark
unilaterally on measures from which they benefit but which create unacceptable
burdens for others, whether intended or not. The EU will have to start thinking
about its position on such issues. Individual countries like the Netherlands will
have to start to design their role in arriving at such common positions.
32
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
5 Policy scenarios
Even in the case the technical worst case scenario is defined as being a warming
of 4,5 degrees Celsius in this century, many uncertainties remain which strongly
influence the way government policy should or could respond. To start to get
some feeling of the type of world we could be looking at the scenario approach
was used to design such possible future worlds which include the major
uncertainties for policy making as they appear at this moment in time.
5.1
Four policy scenarios
Experts were invited for an Expert Meeting ( 31 March 2009 ) to help define these
future scenarios. During this meeting around 40 main factors were identified that
influence government’s intervention policies (see Appendix 5).
Based on priority setting according to a Group Decision Room procedure two
dominant factors emerged:
1. Extent of international cooperation among nations and other stakeholders.
2. Perceived sense of urgency to act upon extreme climate change.
When these factors are used as the axes of a matrix, four scenarios (i.e., possible
future worlds) emerge for an extreme climate change situation.
33
Shared perception
of urgency
high
1. Sauve qui peut
2. Global green
endeavour
high
low
Degree of
global cooperation
3. Survival of the fittest
4. Together through the
other crisis
low
Figure 4 Four scenarios for handling extreme climate change
Below a brief description of each of these scenarios is provided, including some
general directions for measures that would fit into each of these scenarios.
It should be noted that these worldviews are not predictions but represent
possible future conditions which may help to image a future world as it could
emerge and to design policy responses that may also be helpful in a future
situation as well as the present. The flexibility and range of options decrease in
the four scenarios’s presented in the following sequence:
• Within the “Global green endeavour “scenario there will be a strong
international cooperation to anticipate the consequences of extreme climate
change and to limit further temperature increase as much as possible.
Prosperity will still be on the increase, differences in wealth will decrease. The
EU will work closely with China and India in the development of green
technology. Climate will be integrated in other international mechanisms such
as trade, security and development cooperation.
• Within the “Together through the other crisis” scenario the severity of climate
change is ignored because all the attention will be drawn towards threats of
global prosperity that are perceived to be more severe. Which threat, remains
undefined. Stimulating prosperity and recovery from the current financial and
economic crises is the top priority for governments. Solutions for climate
issues need to be simple, cheap, and easy to implement. National emphasis
lies on adaptation. A dominant role of big countries like China and the USA on
climate issues is accepted by the others. Within the EU initiatives are only
undertaken when in line with dominating themes in the international arena.
34
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
• Within the '"Sauve qui peut" scenario each country copes with national climate
problems without looking for international solutions. Bilateral agreements are in
some cases successful, but more exception than the rule. Climate refugees
start to create serious problems in OECD countries. Protectionism is common
practice and the world economy weakens. The EU can still function as a centre
for regional adaptation programs, shared financing of mitigation, sustainable
geo-engineering and looking after refugees. In the Netherlands the focus will be
on ‘our own dikes first’, moving investments to climate safe areas and exporting
adaptation knowledge on delta areas.
• Within the “Survival of the fittest” scenario the signals of extreme climate
change are largely ignored and international cooperation is limited. Conflict
management is a high priority of government policy. Cooperation within the
weakened EU focuses on adaptation. Large countries evade negative impacts
of climate change by cheap local geo-engineering solutions without consulting
other countries or caring about possible negative side effects for others.
National adaptation is taking place where impacts become pressing. Illegal
migration from southern parts is an even bigger problem than in the “Sauve qui
peut” scenario.
For the Think Tank session, the worst technical scenario and the most positive
policy scenario( Global Green Endeavour) have been taken as background.
Discussion can then focus on the types of measures and positions that fit in this
world view.
5.2
Example: (how) are measures used in each scenario
To provide some insights in the measures which are linked to the different
scenario worlds, three examples of measures, and their application (or not) are
specified below:
35
Concentrated Solar
Power (CSP
Cutting down
Arctic forests
(increase
albedo17)
Top down
migration
management
Global green
endeavour
Likely mitigation
measure, funded by
large global funds
Unlikely to be
taken as a light
decision, because
effects on sinkcapacity and other
natural cycles will
be discussed first.
If side effects are
acceptable
globally, this
course may be
taken.
Issues are linked,
so top down
management
conceivable;
necessity lower
because of
measures in
countries where
effects materialise
Through the
other crisis
together
Only if it helps (e.g.,
jobs) to address the
other crisis and if the
costs have decreased
substantially.
Not a priority, but
simple to execute
once decided, so
this may occur.
Sauve qui
peut
Only by countries who
can afford it
themselves, and if it
leads to national
benefits
If any Arctic
country considers
this to be beneficial
they will do it.
Migration is not a
big issue, the
emphasis lies on
adaptation.
Emergency aid is
still provided thanks
to global
cooperation
mindset.
Only bilateral
agreements, if any.
EU becomes a
fortress.
Survival of the
fittest
May possibly happen
in US and China if
they see the benefits
for themselves. No
global development.
Cutting down
forests may
happen but more
for subsistence
reasons than to
counter climate
change.
Funds will only be
allocated if it
directly stimulates
the own economy.
Migration is a big
issue, for which
military solutions
are considered first
Table 2 Applicability and likelihood of possible measures in each scenario
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
17
Supposedly, cutting down arctic forests would expose the snow covered ground, thereby increasing the albedo, with a
cooling potential of 0.8 degrees.
36
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
Table 2 demonstrates that some measures are far more likely and suitable in one
scenario than in other ones.
5.3
‘No regret’ measures
When working with scenarios it is always useful to identify measures which are
relevant in all scenarios. Such measures can be prepared anyway but could be
subject to for example cost-benefit analysis and assessment of possible side
benefits.
The following measures can for example be considered in all scenarios:
• Strengthening the climate resistance of food and water supplies
• Better monitoring of tipping points in the global climate system.
• Developing and applying rules for research and application of geo-engineering
options
• Increasing the flexibility of infrastructure and buildings in view of rising sea
levels
• Developing international agreements (judicial status) for climate refugees
• Lowering dependence on non sustainable energy
• Increasing market for mitigation options such as wind energy and CCS.
37
38
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
6 Guiding questions Think Tank
meeting
When the main questions for each scenario are distilled, for each scenario
dilemmas emerge on a global level as well as on a national level. For example,
for the Global Green Endeavour scenario, a global dilemma would be: Go for
global mitigation versus Using safety nets by means of adaptation or geo-engineering,
and at a national level : Use the EU as main channel for initiatives versus Use
international platforms (like UN) to start own initiatives. In general the more
undesirable the scenario, the fewer options are left to cope with the issues. Options
will be limited to respectively local adaptation, refugee facilitation and finally safety
actions using military interventions.
After further analysis, about 15 overarching questions were identified and
grouped in a total of 9 sub-topics that seemed to be most appropriate to be
discussed during the Think Tank session. These topics are listed below and are
briefly described. The topics that were considered to be most important are listed
as main questions.
Main questions:
1. National adaptation. Which national adaptation measures would The
Netherlands have to take in addition to already foreseen measures?
For the purpose of this session, it seems most appropriate to focus on the areas
that are not ‘usual suspects’ (like water management), but include themes that
have received less attention, like for example the impact on agriculture, spatial
planning, health, ecology, etc.. Furthermore, given the own domain of the ministry
of VROM, it is recommended to focus the discussion particularly on spatial
planning issues.
This focus still leaves room for many questions, like: What impact should the
prospect of worst case climate change have on investment decisions for
infrastructure, housing and agriculture, especially in the Western part of the
Netherlands? Can for example housing and spatial planning decisions be taken
that are ‘adaptation-proof’ (i.e., adaptation measures can be plugged in later)?
39
Should we investigate in depth whether polders can be elevated a few metres to
reverse salt water intrusion effects? Should we start thinking about developing
more functions (work, housing, leisure) in the higher parts of the country? Should
we start cooperating with Germany to develop joint spatial planning policies?
Does it make sense to already look beyond 2100 (since sea level rise could be 23 metres in the following century)?
2. Role of the EU. Which role can we expect the EU to take if the worst case
scenario in the process of becoming increasingly likely and which national
initiatives could be taken to stimulate the EU to take on the desired role.
The EU can still exercise considerable power on the global stage, but in which
areas, and where should the Netherlands focus its energy? Some of these areas
are research, trustworthy communication, coherent migration policies, the
influence of climate change on the redesign of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and types of re-imbursements. But also external issues like global
migration, assistance of and dialogue with developing countries, setting up or
supporting financing mechanisms, a common position on geo-engineering
options.
In the short term the EU will start debate on Adaptation policies (see Green Paper
on Adaptation) in relation to Regional developments and may also start a
separate Climate Proofing Budget line.
What are the areas where The Netherlands can actively play a role to co-develop
EU policies and actions in the right direction?
3. Transition. How should a transition from the current IPCC AR4-based policy
scenario to a worst case scenario take place, which independent choices can The
Netherlands take to let a desired transition path become reality in its policies?
Three main transition paths can be discerned: 1) a gradual process, 2) clear
occurrences and visible manifestations of changing climate (e.g. mass floods in
highly populated areas), 3) man made actions that result in a much higher state of
awareness (e.g., another ‘Al Gore/Stern report’ tandem or fully unambiguous
satellite images of the Arctic region).
While the gradual process seems the most likely course of events, any of the
other two paths may actually occur and will be necessary to speed up the level of
action that is required in case worst case climate change becomes unavoidable. It
remains to be seen whether occurrences that affect the highest number of people
(Asia, Africa) will lead to reaction in the rest of the world. Also, most of the
examples that could indeed trigger these paths cannot be fully influenced by
people.
It does however seem conceivable to define a transition path, where the
milestones are occurrences that indicate the severity of the situation and the
40
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
speed with which they follow each other. The status of known tipping pointindicators is an example of data that would need to be monitored carefully. By
tracking these indicators and comparing them with the defined transition path,
more ammunition is provided to persuade actors of the necessity to step up
efforts. This could happen on a national but also at European or global level. The
CoP-15 summit and intended post-Kyoto agreement could provide such a commit,
track and reconsider-agreement. In case the Copenhagen meeting would not
result in serious progress a post Copenhagen agenda could be triggered by the
risk of a worst case climate change scenario approach.
4. No regret measures. Which no regret measures should already be prepared,
and which trade-offs (if any) are relevant to consider for these measures?
While the notion of no regret measures is clear enough (possible and desirable in
all future scenarios), a discussion may be required to choose between different no
regret measures. First, they must be seen in the light of the policy scenarios that
are considered. In other scenarios they may have a different status. Second, not
all measures may be equally useful or effective. Measures that were mentioned in
section 5.3 require different approaches. Reaching agreement on the judicial
status of climate refugees is made in a completely different arena than decisions
on renewable energy. It is not likely that all these measures can be developed at
the same time, so additional analysis will be necessary, e.g., in the costs, direct
benefits, side-benefits, possible negative side effects etc..
The following additional issues could furthermore be discussed.:
A. Position on geo-engineering. What should be the national position18 on geoengineering options in terms of conditions when these would be more or less
acceptable?
Section 3.2 gives more background information on conditions, risks and
uncertainties. Particularly irreversibility of measures is an issue.
B. National mitigation. Which national mitigation efforts remain important, or gain
importance, in case of the worst case climate change scenario?
Should mitigation efforts be cancelled completely or do they remain important as
ever, of even more important? Which type of measures would be most desirable?
Which measures would have most co-benefits (e.g., health, employment,
economic development).
These questions and appropriate measures and conditions for these measures
are affected by the perception whether they are taken as part of a one-off crisis
scenario (measures have effect and then we can return to the regular scenario) or
in a deliberate process to cope with the worst effects, as part of concerted efforts
to transform society into a new direction.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
18
(possible) Positions of other countries can be used as input or inspiration as well.
41
C. Stimulating the most desirable global scenario. What can The Netherlands
actively do, to increase the chance of the Global Green Endeavour scenario (see
chapter 5) become reality?
Does the Netherlands have influencing power on a global scale, e.g., through
bilateral agreements or diplomacy, or should The Netherlands put all its energy in
using the EU leverage on the world stage?
D. Institutional infrastructure. Which (global) institutional infrastructure is
desirable to be able to cope with a worst case climate change scenario, which
differences are required compared to the current situation, which role can The
Netherlands play to arrive at the desired institutional infrastructure.
Is the current UNFCCC the right forum, or should other (UN) organisations
play a bigger role? Is it necessary to found a World Climate Organisation
(WCO) and what should its mandate be? Or should we start experimenting
with Global Issue Networks (see section 4.2)?
42
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
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46
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
Appendix 1: Factors influencing likelihood of
extreme climate change
The main natural factors that influence climate change and what is known about
their development is one of the aspects that will be investigated in depth in the
PBL-project. Here a brief summary will be given of the most important effects.
These factors will not be discussed in depth because extreme climate change is
the premise on which further discussions in the Think Tank meeting will be based.
Understanding the dynamics behind extreme climate change is however important
to design appropriate policy responses e.g. from the point of view of a realistic
response time.
There are various accelerating factors that can affect the actuality of current IPCC
scenarios. These factors are just listed below and may occur individually or in
conjunction with each other. Some are related to GHG emissions but others may
proceed autonomously once a so-called tipping point is reached.
Factors include a wide variety: acceleration of emissions due to defrosting
landmasses, decrease of absorption capacity of sea water due to temperature
rise, drying up of the Amazone forest, but also countering (cooling) effects like a
possible collapse of the ThermoHaline Circulation (THC), diminished solar
activity19, and the (conscious) use of greenhouse gas absorbers like olivine.
In preparation of the discussion of “What to do in case extreme climate change
occurs”, the question what would lead to a worst case climate scenario was
addressed in advance. A thorough discussion between experts resulted in the
following ‘best guess expert judgement’ (February 2009) of the most important
factors, their impact and uncertainty. A negative value in the last column means
that the experts are relatively certain of the effect.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
19
See NASA, http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2009/01apr_deepsolarminimum.htm (1 April 2009)
47
Factor
Radiative forcing (W/m2)
Nett man made emissions (e.g. land use)
Man induced indirect emissions (permafrost,
hydrates, etc.)
Solar activity
Aerosoles (man made, direct + indirect)
Vulcanoes (producing cooling aerosoles)
Land use albedo
Climate sensitivity
Water vapour feedback (including clouds)
Lapse rate (snow altitude in mountains)
Ice-albedo feedback
Biogenous feedbacks
Natural variations
Fluctuations in earth magnetic field
Impact
Uncertainty
2
2
0
2
0
1
0
1
-1
2
-1
0
2
1
2
1
0
-1
2
-1
0
1
-2
2
(+2: very strong, +1: strong, 0: moderate, -1: weak, -2: very weak)
Table 3 Factors influencing occurence of worst case climate change
The strongest overall factors which also contain large uncertainties, are the
radiative forcing and the climate sensitivity of the earth system. This leads to the
following basis for four scenarios as presented in figure 5Error! Reference
source not found.. The scenario in the upper right quadrant represents a ‘worst
case’ which is caused by high radiative forcing conditions in combination with a
high climate sensitivity of the earth system.
The IPCC range in figure 5 shows the range of scenarios that the IPCC is actively
considering. A1F1 (temperature rise between end of 20th and of 21st century
between 2.4 and 6.4 degrees Celsius) refers to a convergent fossil-intensive
scenario, a population peak around 2050 and rapid growth and introduction of
more efficient technologies. B1 (temperature rise between 1.1 and 2.9 degrees
Celsius) refers to a convergent world with low population growth, a service
economy and clean technologies.
48
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
High rad. forcing
Review and adapt
current policies, e.g.
strengthen mitigation
to address ocean
acidification
1.2oC
Low climate
sensitivity
Relax
mitigation and
adaptation policies
Emergency
adaptation and
mitigation
policies
A1FI
4.5oC
IPCC
range
B1
High climate
sensitivity
Review and adapt
current policies, e.g.
enhance adaptation
450 ppm stab
Low rad.
forcing
Figure 5 Four scenario directions for global climate change
To get a more specific (but less robust) picture, the two concretely highest scoring
factors listed in table 3Error! Reference source not found. can be used as axes.
In that case a worst case climate scenario is characterised by
1. a high level of man induced indirect GHG emissions, as a result of factors such
as melting of the permafrost and warming of the oceans. These are both
resulting in the release of methane which is a potent green house gas and
therefore further enhances these processes; and
2. a strong water vapour feedback mechanism, including cloud cover, altitude of
cloud formation, etc., which have a strong effect on the heat balance of the
atmosphere.
This assessment shows that a combination of these two factors is considered to
be the most likely cause of a possible worst case situation.
49
50
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
Appendix 2: Summary expert session
The 7th meeting of the VROM Think Tank international affairs on the 8th of July
2009 will concern the matter of “Preparing for a worst case climate change
scenario”. This think tank session has in part been prepared by means of an
expert session on March, 31, 2009 in Het Buitenhuis, The Hague. This summary
reflects the highlights of this meeting.
The main underlying assumption of both the Expert Meeting and the Think Tank
session , which has been formed in co-operation with the project group for this
subject led by PBL, concerns an extreme climate scenario where a temperature
increase of 4,5 degrees the coming century. This is not to say that this scenario is
probable or inevitable. The Think Tank, and with it the Expert Meeting, has been
designed to generate first thoughts for a fallback plan (strategic policy directions),
should it ever get to this stage.
In a plenary brainstorm, members of the Expert Meeting mentioned amongst other
things, the following clustered factors which will determine the response from the
government in the event of extreme climate change. These factors are not
necessarily of an equal nature as they are the result of a plenary brainstorm:
• The level of international cooperation.
• The level in which the complexity of governance will increase in the case of
extreme climate change.
• Climate change as a power element and military safety issue.
• The role of market mechanisms influencing the behaviour of different countries.
• Unequal distribution of climate effects and risk acceptance in different parts of
the world.
• The reaction time and the speed of action following an alarm signal.
• Dealing with uncertainties regarding the pro’s and contra’s of the planned
actions.
• Uncertainties on global risks of geo engineering options.
• The role of adaptation measures.
• The quantity and status of climate refugees.
This plenary brainstorm formed a shared basis for the follow up session in a
Group Decision Room (GDR). Here a total of a 100 factors were mentioned which
can be of influence on policy shaping by the national government concerning how
they will handle extreme global climate change. During this GDR session these
factors were clustered into 40 factors. All participants judged these factors on their
impact and on the level of uncertainty on the levels at which these factors will
manifest. Through this process, factors which are unclear or which do not add to
the bigger picture are pushed into the background. Some participants have also
separately judged the non-clustered factors.
51
The following clustered factors were noted as being most important:
1. A shared perception on the severity of extreme climate change;
2. Level of international cooperation.
This last factor includes a set of factors which are strongly linked to the matter
whether countries globally will act as a whole, this is expressed in: their
international cooperation, the role of international protocols, geo-political
developments and the role of the continuation of prosperity as a way of creating
conditions. This cooperation is not stimulated by climate change but is an
independent factor which is being stimulated by e.g., fighting poverty, improving
global prosperity, mutual trade interests etc.
These two factors were chosen as a starting point to create scenarios of future
situations that are related to these important and yet unsure factors for
government policy. These two factors form the axes through which four
combinations (scenarios) are created. In the following graph these four scenarios
have been outlined.
Shared
perception of
urgency
High
1. Sauve qui peut
2. Global green endeavour
High
Low
Degree of Global
cooperation
3. Survival of the fittest
4. Through the other crisis
together
Low
Figure 6 Four scenarios for the role of national governments in dealing with extreme global clilmate
change
The scenarios have been outlined in four workgroups. Afterwards suggestions for
a dominant governmental action plan on an international scale have been
discussed in a plenary meeting in which the specific role of the Dutch government
in the different scenarios was discussed too.
52
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
The first scenario (Sauve qui peut) is marked by a climate change which is
perceived as being very severe in which there is no international cooperation.
Countries individually look for suitable measures which remain to be suboptimal.
Protectionism starts to develop, global trade will decrease, prices for natural
resources will show a great volatility. The right of the strongest is prevalent.
Countries will participate in convenient coalitions which suit them. The
Netherlands will put an emphasis on adaptation measures in their own country. A
strong South to North stream of migrants will start appearing. EU will react with a
fortress Europe. The scale of emergency aid programmes will decrease and rich
Dutch people will move to safer countries.
The participants see the dominant Dutch governmental task in the 1st scenario as
going for adaptation and to work together regionally. A people’s insurance can
also play a useful part. EU countries can also finance programmes for mitigation,
sustainable geo-engineering and the caring for climate refugees as a team. In the
Netherlands the focus will be on “our own dikes first’, moving investments to
climate safe areas and export of the Dutch adaptation knowledge to other delta
areas.
In the second scenario (Global Green Endeavour) the severity of the situation is
also perceived however this time, in a world where there is international
cooperation and in which prosperity is still on the increase. By working together
the division between rich and poor will decrease. China’s role will expand. There
will be global economic growth because there will be few trade restrictions. There
will be environmental demands which will have been agreed upon in the global
green deal. Actors will prove themselves to be willing to act and show solidarity.
International institutions will improve in their functioning and so will the corporate
world. The big countries will have a leading role in this reshaping of international
institutions. Climate change will be linked to other themes such as poverty
alleviation.
Mitigation measures will be introduced more quickly and there will be an emphasis
on renewable natural resources.. Public means will be made available for things
such as Carbon Capture Programs and Storage. Migration streams will be limited
thanks to vulnerability reduction in the concerning countries and effective
emergency help.
Participants explain that in this second scenario the main governmental aim
should be to get maximally involved in mitigation so as to limit global warming as
much as possible, and to reach this goal to make use of global efficiency
programs and to engage with the relevant climate and energy organisations. The
EU will create a bond with self conscious countries such as China and India to
stimulate the green industry. Climate will be integrated in already existing
international mechanisms, for example in safety and trade. The Dutch government
will stimulate agreements on increased mitigation, and the forming of a global
technology fund and other forms of international cooperation.
In the third scenario (Survival of the Fittest ) the extreme climate change which will
be occurring will not be perceived as being a serious problem and there will hardly
be any international cooperation. This is why this scenario is seen as one in which
53
the wild west worldview is dominant. Every country looks out only for their own
national interest and seems to be oblivious to the threats of climate change which
are getting increasingly important. The economic growth will become irregular and
the Netherlands will try to look after its own interests as much as possible. The
growth of both the USA and China which will serve both countries, can develop at
the detriment of the interests of other parts of the world. The Netherlands will start
to orientate towards like minded Germany more and more. It will also strive to
create it’s own solutions and be self sufficient on energy provision by using
nuclear energy, solar and wind energy. The own national infrastructure capital will
become a priority as it needs to be protected through a rapid roll out of a second
Deltaplan.
Big Powers will try to evade mitigation of emissions in a cheap way and without
consulting with other countries and if it is in their advantage they will use geoengineering solutions even if this has major negative impacts on other countries.
The Netherlands will profile itself as a free rider in this particular debate and it will
benefit from the limitation of climate change which other countries are trying to
achieve. Similar to the first scenario, wealthy Dutch people will move to countries
deemed as being safer such as Norway and Germany. Illegal migration from
southern parts will become an increasing problem, partly also because the budget
for emergency aid will go down and the quality of the emergency help will
decrease, even more than it would in the first scenario.
Participants judge that the main task of governments will have to be conflict
management and forming bilateral coalitions of interest. Each country will try to
get maximal attention for their adaptation and try to get emergency help for their
own country. The EU will lose some of their strength and this will be increasingly
the case for the UN.. International institutions will also weaken. EU countries will
have to work regionally in order to achieve adaptation. Emergency help will only
be provided if the own economy benefits too. Although the risk of calamity will
increase , these risks are mainly ignored.
In the fourth scenario (Together through the other crisis), there is a dominant
world view which is marked by a limited appreciation of the severity of climate
change in a world where there is a great level of international cooperation.
Apparently there is another global problem which is more threatening than climate
change which absorbs most attention. The recent global financial crisis is a good
example. Such a threat has led to the world community uniting in this 4th scenario
and that led to global institutions such as the UN, the World Bank and the IMF
playing an important role. The international cooperation will be aimed at a global
division of labour. Solutions for the Climate problem will have to be simple, cheap
and quick in their implementation. The focus will be on adaptation. Migration will
not be a big issue in this scenario and emergency aid will be handed out when
needed. There will be a relatively large amount of energy put in monitoring seen
as this can help when it becomes necessary to give climate change more
attention.
Participants view the main task of governments on an international level as
working together in a WTO context and to expand the financing possibilities of
54
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
international banks to help the environment, which also serve other interests. At
the EU and UN level there will have to be a lot of focus on justice in the matter of
division. Stimulating prosperity will be the leading motive. A dominant role of big
countries will be accepted in this setting. Only at a ad-hoc level will geoengineering possibilities be explored. Initiatives the national (including Dutch)
government can undertake are just-in-time adaptation and no-regret mitigation
measures. The Netherlands will also have to aim for strong EU initiatives aimed at
climate change which link to other more dominant themes in the international
arena
The key elements of each of the four scenarios will be resumed, with the
observation that flexibility and range of options decrease in the sequence as
presented below:
Within the “global green Endeavour “scenario there will be a strong international
cooperation so as to prevent extreme climate change and to limit the temperature
increase as much as possible. Prosperity will still be on the increase and the
differences in wealth will decrease. The EU will work closely with China and India
in the development of green technology. The Climate will be integrated in other
international mechanisms such as trade and security.
Within the “through the other crisis together” scenario the severity of Climate
change is ignored because all the attention will be drawn towards more severe
threats of global prosperity. Stimulating prosperity will be the number 1 motive.
There will be a lot of emphasis on justice within the division matters. Solutions for
the climate problem will have to be simple, cheap, and easy to implement. The
emphasis will be on adaptation. A dominant role of big countries will be accepted
within this scenario. Within the EU initiatives will be undertaken which are in line
with dominating themes in within the international arena.
Within the '"Sauve qui peut" scenario each country tries to cope with the climate
problems which are perceived as being severe as best as they can. Protectionism
can be seen all around and the world economy weakens. The EU can still function
as a centre for regional adaptation programs, shared financing of mitigation,
sustainable geo-engineering and looking after refugees. In the Netherlands the
focus will be on ‘the own dikes first’, moving investments to climate safe areas
and exporting adaptation knowledge on delta areas.
Within the “survival of the fittest” scenario the extreme climate change which will
be taking place will be ignored and there will hardly be any international
cooperation. Conflict management will be the governments’ highest priority. The
EU will only work together for adaptation. Big powers will try to evade mitigation of
emissions in a cheap way without consulting with other countries and they will try
to limit the most obvious climate change with geo-engineering solutions and
adaptation within the own territory. Illegal migration from southern parts will be an
even bigger problem than in the Sauve qui peut scenario.
Finally, participants were asked to come up with measures which will prove to be
useful in all four scenarios (i.e., no regret measures).The following measures were
mentioned.:
• Strengthening the climate resistance of food and water supplies
55
•
•
•
•
•
•
56
Better monitoring of tipping points in the global climate system.
Making rules for research and following out of geo-engineering options
Increasing the flexibility of infrastructure and buildings at rising sea levels
Develop international agreements (judicial status) for climate refugees
Lower dependence on non sustainable energy
Increase market for mitigation options such as wind and CCS energy
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
Appendix 3: Possible measures to change Earth’s
reflexivity
A range of options is proposed in the category of geo-engineering, which aim to
decrease the radiative forcing.
If the strategy directions of mitigation (see next sections) are not deemed
sufficient or do not deliver results quickly enough, a third strategy direction could
be considered. The greenhouse problem is in essence existing because the Earth
is absorbing more energy than it is emitting, i.e., the reflexivity is not high enough.
If the reflexivity (albedo) of the Earth can be increased, its energy absorption
(Watt/m2) will be lower and thus the temperature will not rise, or will rise less fast.
In popular terms, measures to achieve this are labelled under the term geoengineering. The majority of these measures have never been tested and many
cannot actually be tested without generating a real effect, because the Earth’s
crust and atmosphere would be the testing grounds. For many options, we have
no real idea what the side-effects (unintended, underestimated and unknown) will
be, both on local and global level, like changes in weather patterns. While for
some the direct costs can be reasonably calculated, the indirect costs (due to the
unintended side effects) are hard to assess.
As the expected direct costs of some of these measures are considered to be
‘reasonable’ by some (e.g., Barrett, 2007), these could be taken unilaterally by
large countries, which could be used as an excuse to not get involved in the other
necessary strategies. I.e., the relatively low costs and localized implementation
possibilities (with –unknown- global consequences) could undermine political
efforts in the mitigation arena. The degree of urgency (something needs to
happen now) will co-determine how important this uncertainty and governancedilemma will remain. Another issue to be taken into account is the amount of
energy required for the various options. The more energy is required, the less
attractive an options is as (structural solution), but again the urgency of doing
something may outweigh such considerations on the short term, provided a
solution can be reversed. In general it is important to assess the energy/emissions
balance, i.e., how much energy is required to implement the measure and does
this energy use more than offset the warming effect that it causes?
The options fall into the following main categories:
• Creating purposeful stratospheric aerosols.
• Increasing reflexivity (albedo) with air-, land and water based methods.
• Change behaviour of ice masses.
In all cases, the result will be a cooling effect on Earth, thereby countering the
warming trend. The side effects of the measures are however a large unknown
factor, especially the behaviour of clouds.
57
The measures that were referred to in section 3.2 include:
• Stratospheric aerosols: Inject enough sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere to
reflect the small percentage of sunlight necessary to offset increased warming
caused by carbon dioxide. This scheme is akin to the cooling induced by large
volcanic explosions and will definitely work. But the influence on (global)
weather patterns and evaporation rates are unknown but estimated to be
severe (Van Nieuwstadt, 2009).
• Albedo increase: cloud, mechanical: Manufacture sea salt spray to change
the way clouds form over the ocean to increase their reflectivity.
• Albedo increase: cloud, biological: Add di-methyl sulphide to a patch of
ocean to create more micro-organisms that act as formation sites for water
droplets and eventually lead to clouds.
• Albedo increase: desert: Cover the Earth's non-sandy deserts with a material
composed of a white polyethylene top and an aluminium bottom. That would
increase the albedo of those surfaces, cooling the Earth.
• Albedo increase: grassland: Breed or genetically engineer shinier plants to
increase the reflectivity of the world's savannahs and shrub lands.
• Albedo increase: cropland Breed or genetically engineer shinier crops to
increase the reflectivity of the world's farmed land.
• Albedo increase: human settlement: Make the areas where humans live
considerably more reflective by, say, painting roofs white.
• Enhance upwelling: Bring nutrient-rich water up from the deeps to foster
carbon-using life at the surface of the ocean.
• Enhance downwelling: Cool down huge amounts of water with large pumps to
form and thicken sea ice that would in turn cool the sea water. That water
would descend to the depths, taking a bit of extra carbon with it.
• Sunshade: Shooting reflective sunshade into atmosphere (Kunzig, 2009)
• Albedo increase: deforestation in arctic areas: purposeful deforestation
would expose the snow on the ground, which increases the reflexivity of the
Earth20.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
20
Obviously, one of the side effects is the removal of sink-capacity of these forests as well as the issue of what to do
with the wood. I.e., this solution would require a more holistic approach not to make things worse.
58
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
Appendix 4: Possible measures to absorb
greenhouse gasses
As greenhouse gasses will be emitted for a considerable time to come, part of the
overall strategy can be to absorb actual emissions. The following main methods
are available:
°
°
°
°
°
Capture and storage CO2 in terrestrial ecosystems, i.e.,
• Massive aforestation/ reforestation across the Earth to sequester more
carbon dioxide naturally. Deforestation itself is increasingly considered to
be an accelerator of climate change (due to loss of absorption capacity of
the Earth) and may therefore get more formal status as well.
Capture and storage in aquatic/marine systems, e.g., by:
• Iron fertilization Add iron intentionally to the oceans, fertilizing the water,
and creating more carbon-munching life there. Eventually, those
creatures or the creatures that eat them die and drift into the deep ocean,
taking that carbon with them21.
• Ocean phosphorous addition Add phosphorous intentionally to the
oceans, fertilizing the water, and creating more carbon-munching life
there. Eventually, those creatures or the creatures that eat them die and
drift into the deep ocean, taking that carbon with them.
• Ocean nitrogen fertilization Add nitrogen intentionally to the oceans,
fertilizing the water, and creating more carbon-munching life there.
Eventually, those creatures or the creatures that eat them die and drift
into the deep ocean, taking that carbon with them.
• Carbonate addition to oceans Add carbonate to the oceans, increasing
their carbon intake and fighting ocean acidification.
Air capture and storage Use chemical processes to pull carbon dioxide out
of the air and sequester it in geological reservoirs.
Bio-char production Create charcoal from biomass, effectively sequestering
the carbon in the plant matter, and bury it. Also see Lovelock (2009)
Through mineral reactions, like Olivine (Schuiling, 2008)
For most of these measures their effectiveness in terms of cooling potential is
compared with that of other geo-engineering options in the section 3.2.2.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
21
According to some experts (e.g., see Van Nieuwstadt, 2009) iron fertilization would require the least volume
compared with the other options but even then it will likely only be a temporary solution.
59
60
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
Appendix 5: List of influencing factors for policy
intervention
Many different dilemmas exist that influence government decisions on which
actions to take. It is important to determine the range and manoeuvring space for
(Dutch) government to act once a worst case climate change scenario is
emerging as a possibility which cannot be neglected. As an example of the type of
factors that could be considered, the list below is shown, which was the result of
the expert meeting. Other factors are also conceivable, like the energy
requirements of possible solutions, speed of implementation, global financing
mechanisms, the quality of monitoring systems.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
How well is international cooperation functioning?
Geopolitical balances.
Perception of urgency.
Decreasing faith in feasibility of sufficient mitigation measures.
Development of the issue of international climate/environmental refugees.
Distributional effects: who wins/loses (more/less), both between groups and
regions.
7. Scarcity.
8. Policy instruments for quick adaptation measures including budgets.
9. How well are government and cooperating governments functioning?
10. Preventing all kinds of shocks that demand immediate attention draining
attention for longer term issues.
11. Prosperity.
12. Possibilities to act within realm of imagination.
13. Distribution of responsibilities.
14. Adaptive capacity of countries and regions.
15. Social economic impact and vulnerability.
16. Time scale (efficiency) of policy measures.
17. The political culture in a country.
18. Own versus common interests.
19. Social economic baseline.
20. Possibilities of free rider behaviour.
21. Linking adaptation and mitigation measures.
22. How interesting/profitable are the solutions for countries (can they make
money on the solutions).
23. Role of the business sector: as an opportunity (innovative solutions) and
threat (unilateral actions with unknown effects).
24. Spatial scale of policy measures.
25. Coherence with other global or regional issues (trade, safety, etc.).
26. Consensus amongst economists on the effectiveness of possible measures.
27. Population control through scarsities, migration but also higher death rate in
certain areas.
28. Volatility in prices and trade imbalances.
29. Herding.
61
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
62
Demographical developments.
Perception of risks.
Technological developments.
Consensus amongst scientists – do they give unambiguous signals to
politicians?
Speed and nature of climate change.
Regional differences.
Probabilities of occurrences -> risks.
Perception by politicians, media, opinion leaders in the society.
Availability of information.
Economic incentives on short term to solve long term issues does not work /
short comings of economical model/ bounded rationality market and
government.
Biodiversity.
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
Appendix 6: Information obtained in the
preparatory process
In order to get insight in the process that resulted in the final guiding questions for
the Think Tank, as well as benefit from the thought process during that period, this
Appendix will briefly discuss this evolutionary process, both in terms of activities
and contents.
Process January - July 2009
In January 2009 both PBL and the VROM Think Tank received an assignment
from VROM to address the topic of Worst Case Climate Change scenarios. Both
groups started preparations and aligned with each other. As a result, PBL
suggested two main dimensions (natural factors) that influence the technical
climate change scenarios. This helps to understand in which natural situations we
will or will not be facing a worst case climate scenario.
In March 2009 based on discussion in a special expert session, four technical
policy scenarios were explored, given the working assumption of a worst case
climate scenario. It was explicitly not the intention to suggest that this is already
unavoidable, but it was a hypothesis to identify which courses of action are still
open if society is irreversibly heading to that situation. This resulted in four
scenarios as described in Appendix 2 of this Background document. The Think
Tank secretariat developed on this basis an overview which type of measures are
probably considered in the four scenario’s.
During the spring it became clear that the Think Tank would need a selection of
clear guiding questions. For this purpose a small workshop was organized May
2009 to pre-select questions which would be most relevant and interesting to
address in the Think Tank. It was attended representatives from VROM, PBL and
the Secretariat, resulting in a prioritized list with questions from which the final
program was derived.
Below the processing of the outcome of the Expert Meeting of March 2009 and
the outcome of the workshop of May 2009 will be briefly outlined.
Taking results of March Expert Meeting further
The four climate policy scenarios developed in the March Expert Meeting were
elaborated and for each scenario a key dilemma on national and global level was
identified as presented below. The flexibility and range of options for measures
decreases from top to bottom.
Scenario
Global Green
Endeavour
Government dilemmas
Global
Focus on global mitigation
or
Hedging our bets through
National
Join EU policy
or
Also take own initiative,
63
adaptation and geo-engineering
Together
through the
other crisis
Sauve qui peut
Survival of the
fittest
Accept geo-engineering as
solution for the large countries
or
Try to realise directed mitigation
measures via the EU/ WTO.
Channel mitigation streams
through bilateral agreements
or
Closing the borders
Focus on conflict control, a.o.
through closing borders
or
military interventions
e.g., seeking support of UN
organisations
Focus on joint adaptation
approach within UN/EU
or
Prefer national adaptation
Modify spatial investment
strategy for national
adaptation
or
No modifications
Prepare gradual
evacuation from low lying
parts in the Netherlands
or
Abstain from evacuation
Upon closer inspection these dilemmas seemed less suitable as explicit guiding
questions for the Think Tank. Instead, it was decided that the discussion should
focus most on the most desirable scenario and all related questions.
Results of May Workshop
These steps resulted in the following possible questions for the Think Tank:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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How could a transition from the current regime to an emergency regime take
place and which independent choices can the Dutch government make
regarding that transition?
Which national adaptation measures should the Netherlands take in all
scenarios in addition to the currently foreseen measures (fortification of
dykes, evacuation plans, lengthening investment periods for infrastructure
etc.)
Do geo-engineering measures exist with just a local effect measures that are
executed elsewhere in which we can participate and which we should
consider?
Which national mitigation measures remain relevant to continue with if a
worst case scenario occurs.?
Do measures exist regarding the influx of climate refugees that the
Netherlands should consider and under which conditions?
Which role can the EU be expected to take if the worst case scenario is
inevitable and what should the Dutch approach be vis-a-vis the EU? (e.g.,
coordinated adaptation, possible geo-engineering actions of other countries,
dealing with climate refugees, emergency programmes)?
Which no-regret measures should be put in motion already?
What can the Netherlands do to encourage a desirable policy scenario
(Global Green Endeavour), assuming worst case is a given?
How can citizens be involved in formulating policies?
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
10. Which military efforts should the Netherlands consider to prevent or isolate
sources of conflict?
11. Which institutional developments will be required?
Through voting it was decided which topics seemed to be most relevant to
discuss in the Think Tank session. These topics were subsequently explored
further. The choice of topics is presented in the program of the Think Tank
meeting. Below a brief reflection of the discussion in this preparatory workshop on
three key questions is shown:
Question 1: Transition to a worst case scenario
Whereas the financial crisis can probably be mitigated by regulations, to address
worst case climate change a transition of society is needed. Which signals exist
that can trigger global awareness whether this scenario is approaching?
The IPCC plays an important role regarding authoritative reports, together with
measuring networks. Taken together, few indicators will go completely unnoticed.
But which ones will really trigger action in society? Climate by definition is a
problem for the longer term (not an immediate effect). Also the understanding of
the phenomenon is very gradual. Psychologically speaking this complicates
mobilization of needed action. What would be required to cross a tipping point
regarding taking action and which role does Copenhagen (CoP-15) play here?
Copenhagen presents an opportunity to move towards the upper range of global
actions, to decrease the chance that the Worst Case Scenario will actually occur.
Exploring this question may help to identify what type of actions countries are
prepared to agree upon.
In pre-ambles of CoP-15 it is likely that in the operational part a review clause for
2015 will be inserted, so shortly after the next IPCC report. What should be the
mandate of the revision clause? Which other forums exist which are more suitable
to sound the alarm bell? The official negotiations are probably the best channels
to take steps that actually matter.
Could a scaling up of the efforts happen in bursts? In the financial crisis the
signals were latent but the urgency arose quite suddenly. Could that happen in
case of the climate crisis as well? Can choices regarding energy, food etc be
compared with finance? How do the media deal with this question, when does
climate as a crisis become interesting for them and which shocks could trigger
media attention? Would that indeed lead to an increased level of action? For the
Netherlands another major flood as in 1953 would be such a trigger, as can be
seen by the floods in 1995/-98 that resulted in attention for and major measures
regarding adaptation in the Netherlands. It is important that people act on serious
signals and are not made numb by unnecessary signals.
Apart from a global development process of gradually more worrying signals from
the IPCC and comparable forums, the transition to a worst case scenario can also
spread slowly. Dependent on the extent to which they are affected, countries will
engage in transition. Not only small island states but soon countries with food
65
shortages will join like China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Brazil: when will
they take action and how?
Apart from transitions to a worst case scenario through 1) a gradual process, 2)
occurrences that increase the momentum and are a clear manifestation of tipping
points, the transition could also be a result of 3) man made actions (documentary,
satellite images) that shake up people around the world, like a new Pentagon or
Stern report.
When can actions that respond to such signals not be postponed anymore? We
could design a yard stick which identifies if society is still on a track in which
problems remain manageable (compare take off procedure for airplane pilot), and
review that yard stick. We then keep an overview of what is going on, whether
current policy is sufficient and what options remain to respond adequately.
On national level this seems to make sense anyway, but in fact is also useful on
regional and global level. The Think Tank can conceivably advise such a
measure, for example in the third Policy Brief on Climate change. This would be a
concrete recommendation.
There is a growing consensus to invite countries to start making low carbon
development strategies. What can countries do themselves, for what is
cooperation required regarding technology transfer, capacity building, funding
etc? This could be mapped on a critical path to get the allocation of resources
over time right.
What would for the Dutch government be a suitable path to anticipate on all these
possible transition pathways towards a worst case scenario?
Question 2: National adaptation
Countries like The Netherlands are facing the challenge to make all spatial
investments adaptation proof. This means taking into account future modifications
if climate change gets worse.
Adaptation should not only be considered to include water management but also
aspects like agriculture, health, ecology. Various spatial planning aspects are also
not sufficiently addressed. Which of these topics are most sensible to identify and
discuss? The Veerman Commission fot the Dutch Delta has taken the upper
range of the IPCC scenarios as reference point, so their results do not need to be
rounded up again. The sea level rise on the short term is manageable because
the melting of Greenland will still take many centuries.
Adaptation regarding biodiversity is not always possible to influence. Various
direct and indirect measures are however possible, including pest control and
stimulating cooling.
There are simply limits to increasing the level of dykes: the water pressure and
salinity level behind the dykes put constraints on the level of dyke level rise. In the
end, the land behind the dykes needs also to be elevated. The sea contains
66
Preparing for worst climate change scenarios
enough sand to for example increase the height of dykes by 5 meters. An
alternative is to live on the water, give up the greeneries and find another purpose
for agricultural lands. There are many implications for investment decisions and
spatial planning.
Is the period after 2100 considered to be an issue? We only know very little about
this, but we are certain that the sea level rise will continue for a few centuries. So
long term climate (adaptation) proofing appears to sensible advice, but physical
limits and acceptability of costs need to be specified?
Question 6: The Netherlands and the role of the EU
If the signals are clear, what type of initiatives can be expected from the EU? An
emergency policy does exist but is that applicable in this case? The following
areas of EU action are relevant:
• Mitigation: continuing in a higher gear is the likely policy on EU level.
• Geo-engineering: the EC is already publishing research tenders on this topic. In
technical and institutional terms there is a reasonable overview, but not so in
policy terms. What is the EU position regarding the trade off between impact
and uncertainty? A policy could be based on criteria such as usability, level of
uncertainty and impacts. The EU can certainly take initiatives regarding this
topic.
• Adaptation: defense mechanisms will appear, funded by EU resources, but to
avoid abuse, criteria for transparency are needed.
• Does the spending of funds within the EU and for the allocation of budgets for
development co-operation play a role? What can the Netherlands do? Where
can leverage be created? The role of the Dutch business sector seems to
provide opportunities. Which role does the revision of the CAP play and where
will the funds coming available after the revision be allotted? .
• Migration: EU policy is required. Will it be modified (made stricter) based on a
climate crisis? Should we start preparing for streams of refugees from outside
and within Europe?
We need to prevent too much dispersion of efforts and funding in the Netherlands
as well as within the EU.
67