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Preparing for worst case climate change scenarios Background paper for the VROM International Affairs Think Tank meeting on 8 July 2009 Authors: Prof Dr Bastiaan C.J. Zoeteman Ir Wouter C. Kersten, MSc Tilburg, September 2009 This document has been prepared by Bastiaan Zoeteman and Wouter Kersten (VROM International Affairs Think Tank Secretariat) with support from several representatives of the ministry of VROM Documentnumber: 09.029 Tilburg University / Telos Warandelaan 2 5037 AB Tilburg PO Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg The Netherlands T+31 ( 0)13 - 466 87 12 F +31 (0)13 - 466 34 99 [email protected] www.telos.nl / www.uvt.nl Summary On request of Minister Jacqueline Cramer the 7th meeting of the VROM International Affairs Think Tank, scheduled for 8 July 2009, will address the topic “Preparing for worst case climate change scenarios”. A number of developments have led to this decision. Since the publication of the last IPCC report (AR4), new scientific findings have been published which contain serious indications that the warming effects are underestimated, and that tipping points (after which climate change will sustain itself) could be reached in a near future. This led to a request by the Ministry of VROM to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) to report on new scientific insights, on the possibility of a run away climate change scenario and on technical options to prepare (The Netherlands) for extreme climate change. In parallel, the Think Tank was asked (January 2009) to address the same topic, with a focus on strategic policy making. These actions do not imply that the Dutch government considers a worst case climate change scenario to be unavoidable, but the government wants to assess possible pro-active actions in order to be prepared, including stepping up measures as necessary. During the preparation of the meeting a worst case climate change scenario has been selected with the PBL group which involves a warming of 4,5 degrees Celsius in 2100. The Think Tank is aimed to provide informal input on policy directions (in terms of amongst others mitigation and adaptation) in case these worst case climate change developments would occur, discuss what is required on the national, European and global level, and which role a single country as the Netherlands can play. The main guiding questions for the session will be: 1. National adaptation. Which national adaptation measures would a country such as The Netherlands have to take in addition to already foreseen measures? 2. Role of the EU. Which role can the EU be expected to take if the worst case scenario is in the process of becoming increasingly likely and which national initiatives are to be considered to stimulate the EU to effectively use its power. 3. Transition. How could a transition from the current IPCC AR4 based scenario to a worst case scenario take place and which independent choices can The Netherlands make to let this transition, once necessary, become a reality in its policies? 4. No regret measures. Which no regret measures should already be prepared, and which trade-offs (if any) are relevant to consider for these measures? In addition four topics are suggested to be elaborated, particularly in relation to questions 3 and 4 listed above. They can be discussed in small groups: Position on geo-engineering. What should be the national position on geoengineering options in terms of conditions under which these options are more or less acceptable? National mitigation. Which national mitigation efforts remain important, or gain importance, in case of a worst case climate change scenario? Stimulating the most desirable global scenario. What can nationally be done to increase the chance that the most desirable global scenario (see chapter 5) becomes reality? Institutional infrastructure. Which (global) institutional infrastructure is desirable to be able to cope with a worst case climate change scenario, which differences are required compared to the current situation, which role can countries like The Netherlands play to arrive at the desired institutional infrastructure. Because of the working assumption for this session that worse case climate change cannot be avoided and the more strategic level of the discussion, some aspects will not be discussed: • Whether a 4.5 degrees warming is likely to happen, and how likely. • The technical details of geo-engineering options. There are many ways how man could try to influence (the effects of) climate change in a desired direction, such as: • influencing the earth’s radiative forcing: if the reflexivity (albedo) of the Earth can be increased, its energy absorption (Watt/m2) will be lower and thus the temperature will not rise, or will rise less fast. An albedo increase of 1% could offset the warming effects over the next century; • absorbing past emissions: as greenhouse gasses (GHG) will be emitted for a considerable time to come, part of the overall strategy can be to absorb past emissions from the atmosphere; • reducing emissions: severely step up the mitigation efforts to quickly decelerate the GHG emissions, including innovative and far-reaching technology transfer and sharing arrangements. The number of ideas and experiments for all options is increasing, but for the first two categories the uncertainties are larger. Especially the occurrence and magnitude of side effects is largely unknown for many options, although some comparative insights have recently been published. Measures that fall in these categories are usually called geo-engineering; most measures are controversial because of their unproven effect, (possible) side-effects and uncertainties. Some 4 examples include man-made cloud forming, shooting reflective shields in the sky, fertilization of oceans, increasing the reflective parts of the earth surface, and massive introduction of biological or mechanical greenhouse gas absorbers. For more ‘traditional’ mitigation measures it is clear that in case of an approaching worst case climate change scenario, measures will have to become much more radical than currently considered. Some examples include factor 10 or 20 efficiency improvements, restructuring of mobility, energy and built environment infrastructures, massive introduction of near zero emission vehicles, large scale recycling, innovative financing mechanisms. In general, the effects of the geo-engineering options could materialise on the short term and therefore enjoy some popularity in the context of “fast action”. The consequences are more uncertain but in most cases associated with potentially high risk, compared to the slower, but more certain effects of regular measures that are implemented with much higher intensity than current measures. Moreover, traditional mitigation measures can only reduce the amount of currently emitted greenhouse gasses , whereas geo-engineering can help to reduce the effects of emissions from the past and as such contribute to the avoidance of surpassing certain critical concentration levels in the atmosphere or compensate for the effects of built up concentrations on the radiative balance of the planet. This may become a necessity if the worst case scenario would apply as has recently been discussed at the Copenhagen scientific Summit March 2009 in terms of negative CO2 emissions. The range of options that is open to governments to a large extent also depends on adaptation and governance mechanisms. For almost any country, adaptation is already an option that needs proper attention. In the worst case scenario no country will be able to ignore its importance and urgency, although the emphasis may lie on different aspects for individual countries, like water management, flood control, disease control, food resource management, migration etc. To approach these challenges, a highly cooperative attitude is required from all sides. This required mindset also means that contributions and experiences from all sides will need to be shared. Active involvement and thus empowerment from countries that are currently treated as victims will create a more productive basis for measures that work. In terms of governance, many raise doubts about the appropriateness of the current institutional infrastructure to address all challenges of climate change. Regional cooperation seems to play an increasingly important role, but on the global stage, the UNFCCC’s attempts to coordinate actions are laudable, but possibly not sufficient. Many solutions have been proposed how this could be improved (increased role of G20, a regional leader like the EU clearly taking the lead, forging a deal between the largest countries, Global Issue Networks), without a clear winner so far. While a country like The Netherlands cannot play a major role in these areas, it can make a significant contribution. The question arises: which initiatives to guide these domains are within reach, and are desirable for the national government. 5 List of Abbreviations CBS Central Statistics Agency Netherlands CCS Carbon Capture and Storage CoP Conference of Parties ECP Eco-Patent Commons EU European Union GHG Green House Gasses IIED International Institute for Environment Development IP(Rs) Intellectual Property (Rights) IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IRGC International Risk Governance Council ODA Official Development Assistance PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving) ppm Parts per million REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation THC Thermo Haline Circulation UN United Nations UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change VROM Dutch Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 6 Contents Summary 3 List of Abbreviations 6 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Introduction Background and focus The organisers Goals of the meeting Reading guide 9 9 9 10 11 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Current technical scenarios and discussions IPCC scenarios and uncertainties Influencing factors The +4.5 degrees scenario Scope of the meeting 13 13 14 15 16 3 3.1 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 Anthropogenic factors influencing speed of climate change Introduction Geo-engineering Measures under consideration Analysis of the effects Possible side-effects of the measures Emissions reductions at the source ‘War time’ measures in developed countries Actions in and for developing countries 19 19 20 20 21 22 23 23 25 4 4.1 4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3 4.1.4 4.1.5 4.2 Other factors influencing policy directions Adaptation Specific adaptation technologies Role of the EU Best practices Financing Migration policies and dealing with climate refugees Governance issues 27 27 28 28 28 29 30 31 7 5 5.1 5.2 5.3 Policy scenarios Four policy scenarios Example: (how) are measures used in each scenario ‘No regret’ measures 33 33 35 37 6 Guiding questions Think Tank meeting 39 References 43 Appendix 1: Factors influencing likelihood of extreme climate change 47 Appendix 2: Summary expert session 51 Appendix 3: Possible measures to change Earth’s reflexivity 57 Appendix 4: Possible measures to absorb greenhouse gasses 59 Appendix 5: List of influencing factors for policy intervention 61 Appendix 6: Information obtained in the preparatory process 63 8 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios 1 Introduction 1.1 Background and focus On request of Minister Jacqueline Cramer the 7th meeting of the VROM International Affairs Think Tank, scheduled for 8 July 2009, will address to the topic “Preparing for worst case climate change scenarios”. A number of developments have led to this decision. Up till now the last IPCC report (AR4) has been the basis for Dutch and European climate change policies and targets, including the 2008 Dutch New Delta plan proposal for adaptation. Since the publication of AR4, new scientific findings have been published which contain serious indications that the warming effects are underestimated, and that tipping points (after which climate change will sustain itself) could be reached in a near future . Questions have been asked in the Dutch Parliament urging the government to have a closer look into this issue. This has led to a request by the Ministry of VROM to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) to report on a) new scientific insights since IPCC AR4, b) assess the possibility of a run away climate change scenario and, c) listing technical options to prepare (The Netherlands) for extreme climate change. This report is expected to be published in the autumn 2009. It should contain the basis for further actions. In parallel, the Think Tank was asked in January 2009 to address the same topic, with a focus on strategic policy making. It is useful to note that apart from this request to PBL there is currently no ongoing research programme on accelerated or intensified climate change possibilities in The Netherlands and apart from limited research endeavours by a few individual scientists there is no research at all in the area of possible measures to reduce existing green house gas concentrations in the atmosphere or to compensate for their effect on the earth’s radiative balance (so called geo-engineering). 1.2 The organisers The Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) has started in 2006 a VROM International Affairs Think Tank, with the aim to 9 provide informal insights to the Dutch government on possible policy initiatives that it can take within, primarily, the framework of the EU or UN. Its Directorate International Affairs is responsible for the general Think Tank management. Recently the Unit for Knowledge and Strategy participates the preparation of the contents of the meetings. The Think Tank’s external chairman is Marius Enthoven, the secretariat is located at Telos, Tilburg University with Bastiaan Zoeteman as secretary. During the Think Tank meeting, questions will be discussed with implications on national, European and global level. Because of the strong links with the PBL-study, it is important to align the two trajectories in order to make them mutually supportive. For this purpose a common expert session was organised (31 March 2009), providing both activities with a common starting point. The summary of the expert session is included in Appendix 2. The PBL-project will focus on detailed research on the influencing factors and technical response measures, the Think Tank will focus on strategic aspects of possible policy responses.. More information on the process that resulted in the final set-up for the meeting can be found in Appendix 6. 1.3 Goals of the meeting The following -possible- guiding questions have been formulated for the meeting, as stated in the proposal to the Management Council (Bestuursraad) of the Ministry of VROM (VROM, 2009): a. b. c. Which physical problems / consequences has the Netherlands government to face in different scenarios? What are the policy directions (in terms of mitigation and adaptation) in case these developments occur and how can the citizen be involved in policy responses? What is required on the national, European and global level, and which role can the Netherlands play? The results of the Think Tank meeting are intended to be used as informal input for the development of a vision and a strategy for the Dutch response for the medium and long term. This perspective (2020-2050) is also of importance as background for the choices that are going to be made at Copenhagen (CoP-15), in December 2009, because policy choices and related investment decisions have a long time horizon. This may therefore influence decisions that need to be taken on the short term. The recommendations of the Think Tank are not intended to distract in any way from the process to arrive at a good new global agreement, but the input or outcome of CoP-15 can conceivably play a role in further agendasetting. The Think Tank session may provide suggestions for actions on the short term (1-2 years) after Copenhagen. . 10 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios 1.4 Reading guide This document is intended to ensure that participants to the session have a common information base. Chapter 2 will briefly discuss different technical factors that influence the range of outcomes within current IPCC scenarios. The ‘worst case scenario’ will be introduced, including arguments why this is currently believed to be a realistic technical worst case scenario. Chapter 3 will discuss factors that can influence the speed and direction of climate change. Given the fact (for the purpose of this meeting) that in this scenario a 4.5 degrees warming is taken as given, these factors include rather radical actions that could be taken. Chapter 4 will focus on other aspects that influence the capacity to cope with climate change, with emphasis on adaptation and governance issues. In chapter 5 various policy scenarios are discussed to deal with extreme climate change, once it is occurring. These policy scenarios are the result of the aforementioned expert session (see section 1.2). For the Think Tank these scenarios provide a context showing the consequences when other political conditions then presently common prevail. They have also helped to identify guiding questions for the Think Tank session. The premise is that The Netherlands as a member of the EU will in principle want to move towards the best policy scenario from an international co-operation and sense of urgency point of view, given the situation of worst case climate change. The questions that will be addressed during the session are introduced in Chapter 6. 11 12 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios 2 Current technical scenarios and discussions 2.1 IPCC scenarios and uncertainties The IPCC considers a range of technical climate change scenarios (including socalled storylines). In short, these are the following: • A1 storyline: a future world of very rapid economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. • A2 storyline: a very heterogeneous world with continuously increasing global population and regionally oriented economic growth that is more fragmented and slower than in other storylines. • B1 storyline: a convergent world with the same global population as in the A1 storyline but with rapid changes in economic structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in material intensity, and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. • B2 storyline: a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, and environmental sustainability, with continuously increasing population (lower than A2) and intermediate economic development. The IPCC subsequently selected six working scenarios, one from each of the last three storylines, and 3 of the first: A1F1 (fossil intensive), A1T (predominantly non-fossil) and A1B (balanced across energy sources). The dominant source of energy has a big influence on the volume of emitted greenhouse gasses and thus temperature rise. In the A1F1 scenario for example, the range of temperature increase lies between 2.4 – 6.4 degrees Celsius. This while the general policies (and the UNFCCC) use the basic premise that a temperature increase above 2 degrees moves us towards unmanageable scenarios. A number of findings since the publication of the last IPCC report have raised doubts whether the ‘manageable’ scenario is not too optimistic. There are signs that once +2 degrees will be reached, warming to +4.5 degrees may be unavoidable due to uncontrollable feedback and tipping points: changes will be non-linear 13 Scientific findings contain some hopeful and encouraging signals: 1) we seem to understand the dynamics of some aspects (e.g., temperature rise and weather pattern behaviour seems to follow model predictions), 2) effects could in some cases be less bad than expected (e.g., oceans seem to be heating slower than expected). But more signals point to worse scenarios (e.g., Arctic sea ice is declining faster, sea level rise over last 20 years is higher than thought previously). The scientific summit in Copenhagen in March 2009 gives a good reflection of this ambiguity: One part of the aforementioned PBL-report will compile and analyse these findings to arrive at more founded conclusions regarding these doubts. This report is not available in time to be included in this background paper. 2.2 Influencing factors To obtain an impression of the factors that influence which part of the scenarioranges will become reality, a small expert session was organized in January 2009. The full results have been included in Appendix I. The strongest overall factors, also with large uncertainties, are the radiative forcing and the climate sensitivity of the earth system. If these are used as main axes, the following main climatescenarios are the result1. High rad. forcing Review and adapt current policies, e.g. strengthen mitigation to address ocean acidification 1.2oC Low climate sensitivity Relax mitigation and adaptation policies Emergency adaptation and mitigation policies A1FI 4.5oC IPCC range B1 High climate sensitivity Review and adapt current policies, e.g. enhance adaptation 450 ppm stab Low rad. forcing Figure 1 Scenario directions _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 Courtesy of Rob Swart (ALterra). 14 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios The scenario in the upper right quadrant represents a ‘worst case’ which is caused by high radiative forcing conditions in combination with a high climate sensitivity of the earth system. This would result in a temperature increase of 4.5 degrees Celsius within a century. 2.3 The +4.5 degrees scenario In order to discuss options for governments once an extreme scenario is unfolding, an impression of the situation is helpful. In a recent book, Mark Lynas (2007) describes the state of the planet for various degrees of warming (one, two, three, four, five and six degrees above pre-industrial levels), based on available scientific studies. Some of the ‘highlights’ of the +4 scenario in his book include: • Dozens of millions of evacuates from coastal areas, billions of dollars of damage, both in developing and developed countries. • Cities in delta’s will at best transform to isolated islands. • No funds to absorb the need to rebuild cities more than once or twice; no insurances possible; enormous financial consequences for all stakeholders. • Structural streams of migrants to non-coastal higher situated areas. • Agricultural lands under heavy pressure from dehydration but also severe storms: less to eat. • Massive melting of ice at the poles, resulting in very high chance of sea level rise that goes beyond human adaptation capacity. • If West-Antarctic ice sheet melts, nothing would prevent flooding of all coastal areas2. • Accelerated melting of Eastern-Antarctica can eventually result in sea level rise of 50 metres. • The last period on Earth when the temperature was 4 degrees warmer was characterised by no ice on the poles. • Southern Europe will look like Africa (including 2-month heat waves), Northern Europe will see very heavy storms. The number of storms may not increase but the severity will. • Present African and Near East temperatures will become common in mild temperature zones like the UK and Switzerland. • Only if the increasing energy need for air conditioning comes from completely renewable energy (solar) GHG emissions will not increase, otherwise increased emissions are the result. • Vegetation and trees will suffer everywhere, taking away the natural cooling system. • Once permafrost is massively defrosting, emitting of billions of tons of carbon dioxide and methane becomes unavoidable. Because of the uncertainty when this happens, these effects have not been included in scenarios so far. • Snow in places like the Alps will become a rarity, especially below 2000 metres. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 2 Although recent research by Bamber et al (2009) has re-evaluated assumptions and concluded that collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet would lead to somewhat lower than expected sea level rise (3.3 instead of 5 metres). 15 • Disappearing glaciers will impact the water supply system in virtually every area, especially the mountainous ones and their valleys. Since people from coastal areas will move there, the water supply system comes under high stress. For The Netherlands it is difficult to estimate exactly the impact of these changes. More research into the consequences of extreme scenarios for The Netherlands in particular is currently being executed. Some indications come from reports of the Deltacommissie (2008), mostly containing predictions until 20503, and from PBL (2009). These make use of the IPCC AR4 scenarios, and do not extrapolate beyond these. These reports indicate that: • Precipitation patterns depend on the air circulation, but the intensity and frequency will increase, while in summers there will be a severe shortage of rainfall. • The predictions of sea level rise are very uncertain but 1,5 metres towards 2100 is conceivable, and up till 3 meters in the next century. • The big rivers will have to deal with less water in the summer and more discharge in the winter, in total an increase of some 15-20%. • Costs for the Delta programme are between 1 and 1.5 billion Euros per year, slightly more if coastal areas are re-designed for other functions. • Strong increase of invasive (non-indigenous) flora and fauna, due to extended growing seasons (Bron, 2007). • The chance of having the warmest moment at 35 degrees Celsius increases from 1 in 5 in 2006 to 1 in 2 in 2050 (Bron, 2007). Heading towards 5 or 6 degrees means that we are moving to a totally different planet. As far as the best estimates go, the Earth will look similar as in the late Perm-era (250 million years ago), the last time the Earth heated up similarly quickly, although then it took 10.000 years (Lynas, 2007). The situation can be characterised with abandoned coastal areas, massive desertification, population concentrations in higher areas, iceless poles, deserts until well into Central Europe, massive extinctions of species, exploding methane bubbles4, possibility for small part of the population to survive based on strong private survival motivation, etc. However the latter situation is not part of the climate scenario considered. 2.4 Scope of the meeting The topic at hand leaves much room for many sub-topics to be discussed. The leading questions for the session will be introduced and briefly discussed in Chapter 6. In general, these follow a few guidelines: _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 3 With an averagely higher temperature of 2.6 above 1990-levels (approximately 3.2 above pre-industrial). This means that the +4.5 scenario will be more severe than these predictions. 4 As occurred in Cameroon (Nyos) in 1986, killing 1700 people. 16 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios • What are strategic issues assuming that worst case climate change will happen? • Which links between issues are important to consider? • What are expected implications (positive and negative) of measures, which complicating factors (e.g., politically) can be foreseen? • Which no regret measures can be devised, which trade offs (if any) are relevant to consider for these measures? Because of the working assumption for this session that worse case climate change cannot be avoided (which is not to say that this actually will be the case), and the strategic orientation of the discussion, some aspects will not be discussed: • Whether +4.5 degrees is indeed likely to happen, and how likely. • The technical details of geo-engineering options as opposed to general conditions for geo-engineering to be acceptable for the Netherlands. 17 18 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios 3 Anthropogenic factors influencing speed of climate change Several man made factors have an influence on the speed and direction of a change in climate. Some have relatively certain effects and side-effects. The effects of others can currently only be guessed. 3.1 Introduction There are many ways to influence climate change in a desired direction: • Influencing the earth’s radiative forcing: if the reflexivity (albedo) of the Earth can be increased, its energy absorption (Watt/m2) will be lower and thus the temperature will not rise, or will rise less fast An albedo increase of 1% could offset the warming effects over the next century (Victor et al, 2009). • Absorbing past emissions: as greenhouse gasses (GHG) will be emitted for a considerable time to come, part of the overall strategy can be to absorb earlier emissions from the atmosphere. • Reducing emissions: severely step up the mitigation efforts to quickly decelerate the GHG emissions, including innovative and far-reaching technology transfer and sharing arrangements. The number of ideas and experiments for all options is increasing, but for the first two categories the uncertainties are larger. Especially the occurrence and magnitude of side effects is largely unknown for many options (see section 3.2.3). The first two directions are briefly discussed and compared in section 3.2 and more in depth in the Appendices 3 and 4. Strategies to reduce emissions at the source are discussed in section 3.3. All strategies may be considered both in the current situation (to lower the chance of worst case climate change), as well as in the technical scenario where severe climate change can already no longer be avoided. 19 3.2 3.2.1 Geo-engineering5 Measures under consideration The options of influencing radiative forcing and absorbing past emissions can be labelled as geo-engineering: ‘the deliberate modification of Earth’s environment on a large scale "to suit human needs and promote habitability". The term is used to describe attempts to counter the effects of human-induced climate change. However, others define it more narrowly as focusing only on the mineralogy and hydrology of the Earth’ (Wikipedia). Most experts seem to agree that geo-engineering, in whichever shape or form, is no panacea and certainly no excuse to stop reducing GHG emissions. They do enjoy some popularity because the cooling effects can materialise relatively promptly after introduction (e.g., Victor et al, 2009). But having a fall back plan in place if these reductions are insufficient to prevent severe impacts could still be a reason to spend time on better exploring effective geo-engineering options (Van Nieuwstadt, 2009). As Figure 1 shows (Madrigal, 2009) a wide range of measures can be considered. These and several additional measures, like absorption by olivine, are described in more detail in Appendices 3 and 4. Figure 2 Visual overview of geo-engineering options _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 5 Well after production of this background paper, The Royal Society (Royal Society, 2009) published their report on Geoengineering. Because of it later publication date (September 2009), it is not discussed in this paper. Its content however is in line with the state of the art as presented in this background paper. 20 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios 3.2.2 Analysis of the effects The most recent insights related to the effect of many of such measures was described by Lenton and Vaughan (2009), summarised by Madrigal (2009) and is shown in table 1. Error! Reference source not found. Figure 3 Effect comparison of geo-engineering options visualised (Madrigal, 2009) Table 1 Cooling potential of several geo-engineering options (Lenton & Vaughan, 2009) 21 3.2.3 Possible side-effects of the measures Although the Think Tank will not discuss the pros and cons of any of the individual measures, this section briefly shows categories of (possible) side effects of the measures suggested. Overall greenhouse gas balance Many solutions require energy as input. The generation of this energy results in GHG emissions. If these emissions are too high compared to the emissions avoided or cooling effect induced the measure will not be (cost) effective. Especially if other possible negative side effects are likely or if large but uncertain negative side effects do occur (e.g., weather, local precipitation), these options should be carefully scrutinised. Risks of (geo) physical side effects For many measures, the effects on the air and weather system are uncertain and high risk6. The IRGC7 (2008) has proposed three categories of risks involved: • Complexity: difficulties in quantifying causal links between a multitude of causal agents and (observed) effects. An example is the critical load of eco-systems, or the exact effects on biodiversity in case of mono-plantations. • Uncertainty: lack of clarity or quality of scientific or technical data, for example referring to longer term effects of measures. • Ambiguity: divergence of contested perspectives on justification, severity or wider meanings regarding a given threat. They suggest the following risk management strategies: • Complexity: access and act on best available scientific expertise aiming for a risk-informed and robustness-focussed strategy. The robustness is especially important regarding processes that are not fully understood yet. • Uncertainty: use precaution-based and resilience-focussed strategies to make sure that decisions are reversible, and a system’s coping capacity can be increased to withstand surprises. • Ambiguity: use a discourse-based strategy which seeks to create tolerance and mutual understanding of views and values with the aim of eventually reconciling them. Following this advice means that each unknown and negative side effect (risk) would need to be placed in one of these three categories to provide direction for the strategy to manage it. Additionally, before countries embark on geo-engineering options, they may want to consider possible negative consequences. The discussion on who is to blame will be even more fierce, than currently on climate change as a whole (Victor et al, 2009). _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 6 E.g., destruction of stratospheric ozone if sulfate is injected into the stratosphere and possibilities of regional droughts. 7 International Risk Governance Council, independent organization aiming to improve understanding and management of emerging systemic risks. 22 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios Global ethics and governance issues Some measures are relatively cheap and therefore possible to execute unilaterally, especially because side-effects may not materialise in the country that implements the measure. Whether such considerations are taken into account is a matter of ethics (see e.g., Muylaert de Araujo et al. (2007). Less consideration for such aspects takes away the pressure to cooperate on mitigation efforts. While unregulated, commercial instead of public interests can determine the decisions (Victor et al, 2009) so it is important to consider which institutions take the decisions and which trade-off considerations are included in these decisions. These and other governance issues are discussed more in depth in section 4.2. Public apathy If too much emphasis is given to the worst case being likely, or even unavoidable, people might start to think “Why bother”, and may only support measures that supply a direct benefit to them on the short term, and/or cost as little money as possible. In particular, the public support for emissions reductions may dwindle. Furthermore, most geo-engineering options address the symptoms, and not the causes of the problem. If this becomes the dominant mindset, the main solutions will increasingly become symptom-oriented. Perception of extreme costs Although some measures are presented as being relatively cheap (Barrett, 2008), for others this is not the case. Many measures also appear to have a high science fiction nature. This can provoke discussion on ‘where to spend our money on’. Climate change strategy as a whole may lose public interest and support. More dependency of developing countries The more complex solutions get, the more dependent developing countries will become. This is not helpful as developing countries need to be enabled to look after their own interests if at all possible. Viewed from a different angle, developing countries may welcome seemingly simple measures if these appear to be less harmful as a strategy than (rigorous) mitigation measures. 3.3 Emissions reductions at the source Although a strong temperature increase is already unavoidable in the extreme scenario, society can still choose to prevent the problem from getting even more serious, if only to transform to a society that does not continue to make matters worse. Is it still feasible to step up the mitigation efforts to quickly decelerate the atmosphere from having to cope with even more GHG emissions? 3.3.1 ‘War time’ measures in developed countries Reducing emissions once an extreme scenario is unavoidable would be wholly insufficient, yet it is relevant to have a look at what measures could be thought of 23 in such a situation. Currently, the urgency (i.e. perceived necessity) is not high enough to generate radical measures while technologically, and even economically, much is already possible. If the situation becomes more urgent, the actual blocking issues (i.e., willingness to pay for these measures) may change. Assuming that the sense of urgency is high, one could think of the measures as occurred during World War II in the USA, such as: • Crash emissions reductions in industry and power supply sectors, e.g., if measures with short pay-back time that result in great efficiencies have already been taken (which is far from being the case); a next option is to start taking measures that involve a destruction of ‘sunk capital’, as delaying would incur even higher costs. If the urgency is high enough, the current lock in (taboo on de-investments) can be broken. This boils down to phasing out old, more carbon intensive technologies and moving towards sustainable energy sources. Some authors claim that based on currently available or known technologies, much more is already possible (see for example Monbiot, 2006 and McKinsey, 2008, 2009) • Massive efficiency measures in mobility, building and households, e.g., not 2% per year, but 10%, a below 20 ppm CO2 standard for cars instead of 120 ppm, fully redesigned mobility infrastructures, personal caps for mobility-related emissions, quickly phasing out of all appliances under B-label, only allowing net-zero emissions appliances in the course of 5-10 years large scale introduction of electric cars combined with smart grids and recharging stations using renewable energy sources, Factor 10 or 20 buildings, mass-build energy producing buildings, maximising recycling etc. • Manmade CO2 capture and storage, providing on the short term a primary means to quickly reduce harmful emissions: i.e., introduce the possibility of negative emissions; • Behavioural/economic structural change, e.g., if social change can reduce the number of travel kilometres and generated waste by a large factor, this would be helpful, and it can build towards a society that is structured differently. Behavioural change may need to be actively stimulated by incentives. While technology is part of the solution, we already have many options available that are not used (or not enough). It is realistic to assume, and shown in practice (Paine, 2006), that a conducive financial and political climate will facilitate the uptake of beneficial technologies and stimulate development to even better ones. Measures and their cost structures should therefore be facilitated by adjoining policies on taxes, investments, trade and financial products like insurances. Such measures could include: • Compulsory performance on greenhouse gas action for all (stock exchange listed) companies, see e.g., SFI/FI (2008) • innovative, but transparent, financial products, including insurances • Radical tax-system changes that stimulate large scale shifts in investments to sustainable technologies and sustainable consumer behaviour. • Indirect emissions caused by the financial sector included in carbon credit trading (SFI/FI, 2008) 24 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios • Beneficial arrangements on IP-free technological transfer and assistance with leapfrogging in developing countries. Also see 3.3.2. • Quickly gathering critical mass and sufficient (political) clout to tip the WTOsystem towards allowing more leeway for sustainable products and technologies. 3.3.2 Actions in and for developing countries Related to less developed countries, it will be necessary to think in two directions: 1. More effective and widespread ways to engage in technology transfer. If current initiatives do not work and if the urgency becomes high enough, new mechanisms providing developing countries with new technologies are likely to become more acceptable. 2. What can be done by developing countries themselves? Technology transfer Several of the measures discussed in 3.3 could also be relevant for developing countries. In fact measures may be even more appropriate here than in many developed countries. One increasingly popular mitigation measure is Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) with thermal storage8, which in principle could be applied on a much larger scale. For the application of large scale technology and transfer of knowledge an easy but unlikely solution would be for the developed countries to pay (almost) the entire bill. Otherwise these technologies need to be made much more affordable, e.g. using a mechanism where IP rights are given up, or revenues for inventing parties are ensured in another way. Once again9 the Eco-patent commons initiative (ECP) of the WBCSD springs to mind as an inspiration source to use as a basis for such a mechanism. Other directions for more effective deployment of new technologies could include10 auctioning to distributing parties and changing business and distribution models so developing market consumers do not bare the full burden11 etc. A recent report (Tomlinson et al, 2008), recommended a similar line of thought by suggesting a ‘protect and share’ agreement, in which governments create a situation where both accelerated diffusion as well as revenue certainty are stimulated, but especially for parties that see the bigger picture, i.e., wide scale deployment of sustainable technologies. Such an agreement can include aspects on market segmentation (prevent re-importation), public sector buy-out, forced terms for use of patents (i.e., losing them if they are not used), third parties paying for licenses acquired by developing countries and global commons (see ECP). _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 8 See for example http://climateprogress.org/2009/04/23/arizona-csp-solar-thermal-storage/ 9 See preparation documents for several think tank meetings, available on www.telos.nl. 10 E.g., see Sustainability: shifting emphasis to fostering deployment. 11 E.g., using Base of the Pyramid thinking (see Prahalad, 2004 and Noguera, 2009) 25 Other generic concepts that can be used to mobilise the world’s brains for technology challenges in developing countries is to make use of theme specific networks (both physical and virtual) that facilitate large scale cooperation on – open source (like) – solutions. Agreements that stimulate knowledge and technology transfer without foregoing on the financial interest of the parties owning the technologies will facilitate technological leapfrogging, and can be strengthened by societal (behaviour) leapfrogging. It may be politically sensitive, but practically reasonable to accept that in some countries existing capacity is insufficient to effectively absorb and use entirely new knowledge and technologies. Only if a country is ‘ready’ for it, it starts to make sense to build up capacity, most likely starting with foreign technical assistance (Collier, 2008). It is conceivable that this readiness determines the type of support a country receives. Domestic and regional actions While it is realistic to assume that many new technologies required for emission reductions in developing countries come from abroad, this is not the whole story. First of all, policies in developing countries and between countries should be conducive for transfer, diffusion and deployment of technologies. Secondly, just like with adaptation (see section 4.1) local, traditional, knowledge may very well be the basis for effective emission reduction approaches. This certainly seems relevant for dealing with deforestation. Local populations should have alternatives for ecologically destructive activities and should have space to develop these into sustainable livelihood activities, including sustainable energy generation. This requires some form of participatory decision making, and open minded governments. Emerging from within and with sufficient manoeuvring space, changes ‘bottom up’ can in some cases even lower the necessity for large scale technology transfer. This is however different for least developed countries and the rapidly developing economies like China. Sharing local practices could stimulate a more effective use of local knowledge and initiative, much in the same way as is proposed for adaptation practices (see section 4.1). 26 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios 4 Other factors influencing policy directions Besides the manoeuvring space offered by different categories of mitigation and geo-engineering measures, other categories of factors are relevant to discuss. These include adaptation and governance issues. 4.1 Adaptation Adaptation as such does not influence in most cases12 the GHG concentrations. But it is a relevant (additional) policy direction that may become more or less urgent depending on the speed of developments. Because of the unavoidable built-in effects of climate change (i.e., due to past emissions that still have to materialise) it is certain that countries will have to adapt. Some more so than others, and in different areas like: • coping with drought; 13 • ensuring sufficient water and/or food supply in a different climate ; • river/watershed management; • sea level rise (coastal defence); • addressing diminished biodiversity; • mitigating loss of eco-system services; • control of disease and pests; • risk management, insurance etc. • high migration stresses (from developing countries but also between and within developed countries). The continuum of adaptation activities was described by Klein and Persson (2006) in four general strategies starting with a vulnerability focus and moving towards and impact focus: addressing the drivers of vulnerability, building response capacity, managing climate risks and confronting climate change. With the certainty of adaptation being a necessity and the realisation that adaptation will become a strategic global issue (Burton, 2008) more ‘radical’ policies regarding adaptation can be considered. The fact that a failure to assist _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 12 An exception is for example strengthening of river deltas with vegetation which as a side effect absorbs CO2. 13 This includes ‘management issues’ like access to markets and stability of supply (CCD, 2009) 27 countries to adapt can lead to an increased security risk (see e.g., Schwartz and Randall, 2003), adds to the urgency to come up with effective strategies that surpass the local level. To which extent funding of these strategies comes from regular budgets or should be complementary remains a controversial issue (e.g., Sachs, 2009). This is discussed further in section 4.1.4. This section will briefly discuss several main themes within the adaptation domain. These build on the premise that as long as adaptation keeps being framed as “will the West pay the adaptation of the rest”, the discussion is a very narrow one. As in the case of mitigation measures (3.3), more radical or innovative ways of thinking will be necessary to reach required breakthroughs. The directions that are described below contain a few examples of these relatively new ways of thinking. Special attention will be given to role of the EU and member states such as The Netherlands. 4.1.1 Specific adaptation technologies In section 3.3.2 a general description has been given how to deal with technology transfers in a contemporary way. The Netherlands can contribute to adaptation innovation and deployment especially in the area of water management. The plans for a new Delta plan (Deltacommissie, 2008) could be accelerated; the knowledge can be utilised abroad, in both developed and developing countries. It is advisable to always include local knowledge centres early in a process of ‘transfer’ (i.e., dialogue) to assess whether and how new technologies can be used in local circumstances. This will increase the effectiveness and thus reduce costs as well. 4.1.2 Role of the EU Although adaptation is sometimes considered most necessary for developing countries (see next section), it is also becoming an issue for the EU itself. This is not just true for the question how adaptation world wide should be financed (see section 4.1.4). Increasingly, it becomes clear that impacts within the EU can be high as well, especially in Mediterranean countries (drought, water supply) and river delta’s (Netherlands, Belgium, Germanium), extending to more countries once the higher range scenarios come into play. This seems to add to the relevance for intra-EU adaptation policy. 4.1.3 Best practices As set out in February 2009 at an IIED-organised conference, the Global Initiative on Community Based Adaptation to Climate Change (Padma, 2009) is a new initiative that aims to facilitate information and exchange of best practices 28 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios (Community Based Adaptation exchange14), which initiative will be complemented by new conferences. The strong point of this initiative is that it involves (knowledge from) developing countries themselves and it increases the general accessibility of relevant information. The countries are not only positioned as victims but also as sources of knowledge (Macchi, 2008), which will result in a much bigger feeling of empowerment and involvement than if they are solely put in the aid-corner. These feelings are also represented in the recent report of the Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCD, 2009): the dominant role of local institutions and entities (up till family level) is important, but they must be enabled by a coherent (international) framework and an information structure that reaches the most vulnerable. In this way as a side-benefit, local actors and supposed ‘victims’ can also become a source of solutions. Solutions not only for themselves, but that some developed countries can use later on, if the experienced effects of climate change start materialising in developed countries as well. Learning can take place in two directions. It therefore seems prudent to keep cooperating on these matters. Knowledge on coping with drought will benefit enormously from the actual experience that only people actually living in these conditions can contribute to the global knowledge pool (Macchi et al, 2008). Strengthened by (research) knowledge on for example resilient food crops processes can then work in a complementary way instead of introducing new dependence for developing countries. 4.1.4 Financing A returning issue regarding adaptation is how to share the financial burden. The discussion may be more cumbersome due to the wide range of expected adaptation costs, ranging from 31 billion currently, to as high as 89 billion in 2015 and 135 billion in 2030 (CCD, 2009). While these estimates supposedly were meant to persuade countries to act now, they may inadvertently have shocked countries into inaction, or at least fierce debate who is to pay for all this. For mitigation, a myriad of burden sharing methods has been proposed and some are used in practice. For adaptation, we mostly find ourselves still in a green field situation. Recent work (Dellink, et al, 2008) provides insight however in how the financial contribution of countries changes in different scenarios (i.e., using different burden sharing principles). They conclude that the definition of the Capacity to Pay is responsible for the largest part of the differences in the burden sharing outcomes. For The Netherlands the different scenarios point at on average a 1% contribution of total global adaptation costs. Having funds available is one thing, their fair and effective distribution and allocation is another. Setting up new funds may be rather confusing and hampering effectiveness (CCD, 2009). While Africa is supposedly the continent that will suffer most from climate change and will be in dire need of adaptation as _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 14 http://community.eldis.org/cbax/ 29 well, some complain that the continent will not benefit proportionally from rising budgets due to the current framework, including CDM-rules (Asfaw, 2009). Therefore, on the short term, simply honouring ODA-commitments and using integral solution frameworks like REDD are already important steps (CCD, 2009). The EU could stimulate such developments. Adaptation initiatives do not have to be developed from scratch. The IIED15 (2008) suggested a four-step approach including awareness raising, providing targeted information, starting pilot activities and finally mainstreaming. Referring to the information exchange initiatives, the more information is known, the more can be shared, which leads to investments indirectly being channelled back. Adaptation, as well as mitigation will benefit from a large global resource pool, some of which may be protected, but other parts can be used more freely. The collective wisdom will increase manifold in this way. Finally, on a lower geographical level, it is necessary to develop specialised services, like flood insurance, general micro insurance16 or even specific microinsurance (e.g. for specific livestock or crops). The seemingly more exciting trade in weather derivatives (Kistner and Meyer) could also be an option, although in light of the current financial crisis, the transparency of such products should be well scrutinised. Alternatively, the business sector could be stimulated to make climate change vulnerability - and thus appeal of taking and supporting local adaptive measures – part of their standard risk management procedures. 4.1.5 Migration policies and dealing with climate refugees Climate refugees are defined as “displaced persons caused by climate change induced environmental disasters”. Different categories of ‘people on the move’ exist, as suggested in a framework by Renaud et al (2007). The total number of climate related refugees could reach globally 150 million by mid-century, but controversies exist on how to calculate this. The number of people that is considered to live in vulnerable areas (10 metres above sea level or lower) is estimated at 634 million (Brown, 2008). In all cases, it can be assumed that the number of people on the move due to environmental and especially climate related causes will strongly increase. The US government has been warned about the security implications of this development (Schwartz and Randall, 2003) and it was urged to include this in its considerations to become active in the climate change policy arena. Given the fact that these movements will increase, countries that can expect to receive such refugees should better prepare, also with shared arrangements. Examples for measures are assigning a proper status to such refugees (i.e., _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 15 International Institute for Environment and Development (ww.iied.org), calls itself “a global leader in sustainable development”. As an independent international research organisation, they position themselves as specialists in linking local to global. 16 characterized by low premium and low caps or low coverage limits, sold as part of atypical risk-pooling and marketing arrangements, and designed to service low-income people and businesses not served by typical social or commercial insurance schemes (Wikipedia) 30 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios which automatic level of protection they should be entitled to receive), the relation with other migrant streams (rights and duties), their right to get opportunities etc. In most analyses, the prevention of large scale migrant streams is considered to be the best way to address this development. This however implies that a large scale effort is needed for mitigation and support for local adaptation. As mentioned in section 4.1.2, the EU will in this discussion not merely play a role of safe haven for refugees from other areas, but it will also experience internal movements of people, who as EU citizens have a full right to relocated to other EU-countries, and even within countries. The latter is especially applicable to The Netherlands: do we seriously need to consider that the western (currently richer) part of the country will become uninhabitable and will people move en masse to other parts, and what does this mean for infrastructure, investments and spatial planning? These questions will also start playing a role on EU level. 4.2 Governance issues Climate change is a global problem, but its governance is complicated by several aspects of ‘unequal distribution’: everyone is in the end affected, but not everyone to the same degree and also not in the same way. Also, some may be affected sooner or in more disruptive ways than others. Finally, there is hardly any relationship between the actors who are the biggest contributors to the problem and the ones that suffer most from it. All these aspects give cause to approaching the issue from a global perspective. However, so far the efforts of the quintessential global institution (UN) have not been unequivocally successful. Arguably, getting consensus amongst 200 nations is no easy task. So, on the current global institutional level we experience a paradox: deciding globally is more inclusive, but in practice often becomes stalling or watering down of measures that are taken. Some time ago, another type of solution arena was suggested, namely Global Issue Networks (Rischard, 2002). According to Rischard such Networks would combine several advantages, foremost the minimisation of complexity and hierarchy, start-up time and delivery time. All together this would lead to a networked governance system that he considers most appropriate for the global issues of our time. The main disadvantages of these Networks would lie in its lack of formal legislative capacity and its assumed lack of full democracy. At the same time, these could also become its primary advantages in terms of lower extent of political games, speed of decision making, etc. Whether a GIN would work in the end, depends on the reputation, the workability of the results and the political clout it can generate. In that same sense, sub-global institutions and combinations of stakeholders can take their own responsibility as well. If leaders lead well, others will follow. The big question is: who are willing to lead and can they implement their aspirations? For 31 some time the EU was considered to be the leader on climate change, but in part due to the enlargement, the ‘common’ opinion of the EU watered down somewhat. The package proposed in 2008 and accepted in 2009 (EC, 2009 and Council, 2009) still shows some ambition. The US sends hopeful signals since the beginning of 2009 but will have to gain back much good will before other countries will accept their leadership. In other words, while the positive signals are already an improvement from the situation of the past 10 years, agreed action is needed to convince. It has been suggested (Rischard, 2002) that the G20 summits may in the end provide the most effective channel for development of political clout. It represents both developed and developing economies from all parts of the globe, with no evident country in the lead. This means, that if decisions are taken at the G20, they will have a broad influence. Because the timing and severity of effects is local or regional rather than global, it does make sense if cooperation is started on regional scale as well. This relates to joining forces to push items on the political agendas but also in a more practical way, to tackle issues that are specific for that region. These may be in the area of research, mitigation and adaptation. As long as regional cooperation is not used to hurt or as an excuse to refrain from any cooperation on global action, there is nothing wrong with addressing issues regionally. A fear exists however, that if such behaviour is taken to the extreme, it could result in unilateral or bilateral action aimed at a direct national gain, but with (unforeseen) side effects, mostly for other nations. This is especially valid for various geo-engineering options (sulphate clouds, artificial water vapour cloud forming, cutting down forests in snow covered areas). But it also applies to mitigation options (huge dams in rivers to generate hydro power on which other countries depend for water and food supply) and even adaptation (divert river systems) as well as addressing streams of migrants. In general, except in areas where international agreements are in place (e.g., International Rhine Commission), nothing can be formally done about this, but the undesirability is clear. This raises the question if nations should commit themselves not to embark unilaterally on measures from which they benefit but which create unacceptable burdens for others, whether intended or not. The EU will have to start thinking about its position on such issues. Individual countries like the Netherlands will have to start to design their role in arriving at such common positions. 32 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios 5 Policy scenarios Even in the case the technical worst case scenario is defined as being a warming of 4,5 degrees Celsius in this century, many uncertainties remain which strongly influence the way government policy should or could respond. To start to get some feeling of the type of world we could be looking at the scenario approach was used to design such possible future worlds which include the major uncertainties for policy making as they appear at this moment in time. 5.1 Four policy scenarios Experts were invited for an Expert Meeting ( 31 March 2009 ) to help define these future scenarios. During this meeting around 40 main factors were identified that influence government’s intervention policies (see Appendix 5). Based on priority setting according to a Group Decision Room procedure two dominant factors emerged: 1. Extent of international cooperation among nations and other stakeholders. 2. Perceived sense of urgency to act upon extreme climate change. When these factors are used as the axes of a matrix, four scenarios (i.e., possible future worlds) emerge for an extreme climate change situation. 33 Shared perception of urgency high 1. Sauve qui peut 2. Global green endeavour high low Degree of global cooperation 3. Survival of the fittest 4. Together through the other crisis low Figure 4 Four scenarios for handling extreme climate change Below a brief description of each of these scenarios is provided, including some general directions for measures that would fit into each of these scenarios. It should be noted that these worldviews are not predictions but represent possible future conditions which may help to image a future world as it could emerge and to design policy responses that may also be helpful in a future situation as well as the present. The flexibility and range of options decrease in the four scenarios’s presented in the following sequence: • Within the “Global green endeavour “scenario there will be a strong international cooperation to anticipate the consequences of extreme climate change and to limit further temperature increase as much as possible. Prosperity will still be on the increase, differences in wealth will decrease. The EU will work closely with China and India in the development of green technology. Climate will be integrated in other international mechanisms such as trade, security and development cooperation. • Within the “Together through the other crisis” scenario the severity of climate change is ignored because all the attention will be drawn towards threats of global prosperity that are perceived to be more severe. Which threat, remains undefined. Stimulating prosperity and recovery from the current financial and economic crises is the top priority for governments. Solutions for climate issues need to be simple, cheap, and easy to implement. National emphasis lies on adaptation. A dominant role of big countries like China and the USA on climate issues is accepted by the others. Within the EU initiatives are only undertaken when in line with dominating themes in the international arena. 34 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios • Within the '"Sauve qui peut" scenario each country copes with national climate problems without looking for international solutions. Bilateral agreements are in some cases successful, but more exception than the rule. Climate refugees start to create serious problems in OECD countries. Protectionism is common practice and the world economy weakens. The EU can still function as a centre for regional adaptation programs, shared financing of mitigation, sustainable geo-engineering and looking after refugees. In the Netherlands the focus will be on ‘our own dikes first’, moving investments to climate safe areas and exporting adaptation knowledge on delta areas. • Within the “Survival of the fittest” scenario the signals of extreme climate change are largely ignored and international cooperation is limited. Conflict management is a high priority of government policy. Cooperation within the weakened EU focuses on adaptation. Large countries evade negative impacts of climate change by cheap local geo-engineering solutions without consulting other countries or caring about possible negative side effects for others. National adaptation is taking place where impacts become pressing. Illegal migration from southern parts is an even bigger problem than in the “Sauve qui peut” scenario. For the Think Tank session, the worst technical scenario and the most positive policy scenario( Global Green Endeavour) have been taken as background. Discussion can then focus on the types of measures and positions that fit in this world view. 5.2 Example: (how) are measures used in each scenario To provide some insights in the measures which are linked to the different scenario worlds, three examples of measures, and their application (or not) are specified below: 35 Concentrated Solar Power (CSP Cutting down Arctic forests (increase albedo17) Top down migration management Global green endeavour Likely mitigation measure, funded by large global funds Unlikely to be taken as a light decision, because effects on sinkcapacity and other natural cycles will be discussed first. If side effects are acceptable globally, this course may be taken. Issues are linked, so top down management conceivable; necessity lower because of measures in countries where effects materialise Through the other crisis together Only if it helps (e.g., jobs) to address the other crisis and if the costs have decreased substantially. Not a priority, but simple to execute once decided, so this may occur. Sauve qui peut Only by countries who can afford it themselves, and if it leads to national benefits If any Arctic country considers this to be beneficial they will do it. Migration is not a big issue, the emphasis lies on adaptation. Emergency aid is still provided thanks to global cooperation mindset. Only bilateral agreements, if any. EU becomes a fortress. Survival of the fittest May possibly happen in US and China if they see the benefits for themselves. No global development. Cutting down forests may happen but more for subsistence reasons than to counter climate change. Funds will only be allocated if it directly stimulates the own economy. Migration is a big issue, for which military solutions are considered first Table 2 Applicability and likelihood of possible measures in each scenario _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 17 Supposedly, cutting down arctic forests would expose the snow covered ground, thereby increasing the albedo, with a cooling potential of 0.8 degrees. 36 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios Table 2 demonstrates that some measures are far more likely and suitable in one scenario than in other ones. 5.3 ‘No regret’ measures When working with scenarios it is always useful to identify measures which are relevant in all scenarios. Such measures can be prepared anyway but could be subject to for example cost-benefit analysis and assessment of possible side benefits. The following measures can for example be considered in all scenarios: • Strengthening the climate resistance of food and water supplies • Better monitoring of tipping points in the global climate system. • Developing and applying rules for research and application of geo-engineering options • Increasing the flexibility of infrastructure and buildings in view of rising sea levels • Developing international agreements (judicial status) for climate refugees • Lowering dependence on non sustainable energy • Increasing market for mitigation options such as wind energy and CCS. 37 38 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios 6 Guiding questions Think Tank meeting When the main questions for each scenario are distilled, for each scenario dilemmas emerge on a global level as well as on a national level. For example, for the Global Green Endeavour scenario, a global dilemma would be: Go for global mitigation versus Using safety nets by means of adaptation or geo-engineering, and at a national level : Use the EU as main channel for initiatives versus Use international platforms (like UN) to start own initiatives. In general the more undesirable the scenario, the fewer options are left to cope with the issues. Options will be limited to respectively local adaptation, refugee facilitation and finally safety actions using military interventions. After further analysis, about 15 overarching questions were identified and grouped in a total of 9 sub-topics that seemed to be most appropriate to be discussed during the Think Tank session. These topics are listed below and are briefly described. The topics that were considered to be most important are listed as main questions. Main questions: 1. National adaptation. Which national adaptation measures would The Netherlands have to take in addition to already foreseen measures? For the purpose of this session, it seems most appropriate to focus on the areas that are not ‘usual suspects’ (like water management), but include themes that have received less attention, like for example the impact on agriculture, spatial planning, health, ecology, etc.. Furthermore, given the own domain of the ministry of VROM, it is recommended to focus the discussion particularly on spatial planning issues. This focus still leaves room for many questions, like: What impact should the prospect of worst case climate change have on investment decisions for infrastructure, housing and agriculture, especially in the Western part of the Netherlands? Can for example housing and spatial planning decisions be taken that are ‘adaptation-proof’ (i.e., adaptation measures can be plugged in later)? 39 Should we investigate in depth whether polders can be elevated a few metres to reverse salt water intrusion effects? Should we start thinking about developing more functions (work, housing, leisure) in the higher parts of the country? Should we start cooperating with Germany to develop joint spatial planning policies? Does it make sense to already look beyond 2100 (since sea level rise could be 23 metres in the following century)? 2. Role of the EU. Which role can we expect the EU to take if the worst case scenario in the process of becoming increasingly likely and which national initiatives could be taken to stimulate the EU to take on the desired role. The EU can still exercise considerable power on the global stage, but in which areas, and where should the Netherlands focus its energy? Some of these areas are research, trustworthy communication, coherent migration policies, the influence of climate change on the redesign of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and types of re-imbursements. But also external issues like global migration, assistance of and dialogue with developing countries, setting up or supporting financing mechanisms, a common position on geo-engineering options. In the short term the EU will start debate on Adaptation policies (see Green Paper on Adaptation) in relation to Regional developments and may also start a separate Climate Proofing Budget line. What are the areas where The Netherlands can actively play a role to co-develop EU policies and actions in the right direction? 3. Transition. How should a transition from the current IPCC AR4-based policy scenario to a worst case scenario take place, which independent choices can The Netherlands take to let a desired transition path become reality in its policies? Three main transition paths can be discerned: 1) a gradual process, 2) clear occurrences and visible manifestations of changing climate (e.g. mass floods in highly populated areas), 3) man made actions that result in a much higher state of awareness (e.g., another ‘Al Gore/Stern report’ tandem or fully unambiguous satellite images of the Arctic region). While the gradual process seems the most likely course of events, any of the other two paths may actually occur and will be necessary to speed up the level of action that is required in case worst case climate change becomes unavoidable. It remains to be seen whether occurrences that affect the highest number of people (Asia, Africa) will lead to reaction in the rest of the world. Also, most of the examples that could indeed trigger these paths cannot be fully influenced by people. It does however seem conceivable to define a transition path, where the milestones are occurrences that indicate the severity of the situation and the 40 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios speed with which they follow each other. The status of known tipping pointindicators is an example of data that would need to be monitored carefully. By tracking these indicators and comparing them with the defined transition path, more ammunition is provided to persuade actors of the necessity to step up efforts. This could happen on a national but also at European or global level. The CoP-15 summit and intended post-Kyoto agreement could provide such a commit, track and reconsider-agreement. In case the Copenhagen meeting would not result in serious progress a post Copenhagen agenda could be triggered by the risk of a worst case climate change scenario approach. 4. No regret measures. Which no regret measures should already be prepared, and which trade-offs (if any) are relevant to consider for these measures? While the notion of no regret measures is clear enough (possible and desirable in all future scenarios), a discussion may be required to choose between different no regret measures. First, they must be seen in the light of the policy scenarios that are considered. In other scenarios they may have a different status. Second, not all measures may be equally useful or effective. Measures that were mentioned in section 5.3 require different approaches. Reaching agreement on the judicial status of climate refugees is made in a completely different arena than decisions on renewable energy. It is not likely that all these measures can be developed at the same time, so additional analysis will be necessary, e.g., in the costs, direct benefits, side-benefits, possible negative side effects etc.. The following additional issues could furthermore be discussed.: A. Position on geo-engineering. What should be the national position18 on geoengineering options in terms of conditions when these would be more or less acceptable? Section 3.2 gives more background information on conditions, risks and uncertainties. Particularly irreversibility of measures is an issue. B. National mitigation. Which national mitigation efforts remain important, or gain importance, in case of the worst case climate change scenario? Should mitigation efforts be cancelled completely or do they remain important as ever, of even more important? Which type of measures would be most desirable? Which measures would have most co-benefits (e.g., health, employment, economic development). These questions and appropriate measures and conditions for these measures are affected by the perception whether they are taken as part of a one-off crisis scenario (measures have effect and then we can return to the regular scenario) or in a deliberate process to cope with the worst effects, as part of concerted efforts to transform society into a new direction. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 18 (possible) Positions of other countries can be used as input or inspiration as well. 41 C. Stimulating the most desirable global scenario. What can The Netherlands actively do, to increase the chance of the Global Green Endeavour scenario (see chapter 5) become reality? Does the Netherlands have influencing power on a global scale, e.g., through bilateral agreements or diplomacy, or should The Netherlands put all its energy in using the EU leverage on the world stage? D. Institutional infrastructure. Which (global) institutional infrastructure is desirable to be able to cope with a worst case climate change scenario, which differences are required compared to the current situation, which role can The Netherlands play to arrive at the desired institutional infrastructure. Is the current UNFCCC the right forum, or should other (UN) organisations play a bigger role? Is it necessary to found a World Climate Organisation (WCO) and what should its mandate be? Or should we start experimenting with Global Issue Networks (see section 4.2)? 42 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios References Asfaw, A. 2009. Climate change: bring Africa in from the cold. 4 March 2009. Bamber, J.L. et al. 2009. Reassessment of the potential sea-level rise from a collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet. Science, Vol. 324, no.5929. pp. 901-903. Barrett, S. 2008. The incredible economics of geo-engineering. Environmental Resource Economics, vol. 39, pp.45-54.. Bron, W. 2007. 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Wegen naar een klimaatbestendig Nederland. Prahalad, C.K. 2004. Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, The: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits. Wharton School Publishing. Renaud, F., J. Bogardi, O.Dun, K.Warner. 2007. Control, Adapt, or Flee: How to face environmental migration? InterSections No. 5/7. United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), Bonn. Available at www.ehs.unu.edu Rischard, J.F. 2002. High Noon. 20 global problems and 20 years to solve them. Basic Books. Royal Society. 2009. Geoengineering the climate. Science, governance and uncertainty. September 2009. London. Sachs, J. 2009. Recession Watch: boost the developing world. Nature 457. Published on-line 18-2-2009. Smith, J.B. et al. 2008. Assessing dangerous climate change through an update of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change (IPCC) “reasons for concern”. PNAS Schuiling, R.D. 2009. The use of olivine for massive, cost-effective and sustainable sequestration of CO2; thirty-nine ways to use olivine. Utrecht 44 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios Schwartz, P. and D. Randall, 2003, An abrupt climate change scenario and its implications for US national security SFI/FI. 2008. From principle to action. An analysis of the financial sector’s approach to addressing climate change. Tomlinson, S, P.Zorlu, C. Langley. 2008. Innovation and technology transfer. Framework for a global climate deal. November 2008, E3G and Chatham House. Van Nieuwstadt, M. 2009. Sleutelen aan de aarde. NRC Handelsblad, 7/8 March 2009. Victor, D.G. G. Morgan, J. Apt, K. Ricke. 2009. The Geo-engineering option. A last resort against global warming? Foreign Affairs. Vol. 88, no.2 March/April 2009. Zaelke, D. 2008. Tipping Points for abrupt climate change and need for fast-track mitigation. 5 November 2008. 45 46 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios Appendix 1: Factors influencing likelihood of extreme climate change The main natural factors that influence climate change and what is known about their development is one of the aspects that will be investigated in depth in the PBL-project. Here a brief summary will be given of the most important effects. These factors will not be discussed in depth because extreme climate change is the premise on which further discussions in the Think Tank meeting will be based. Understanding the dynamics behind extreme climate change is however important to design appropriate policy responses e.g. from the point of view of a realistic response time. There are various accelerating factors that can affect the actuality of current IPCC scenarios. These factors are just listed below and may occur individually or in conjunction with each other. Some are related to GHG emissions but others may proceed autonomously once a so-called tipping point is reached. Factors include a wide variety: acceleration of emissions due to defrosting landmasses, decrease of absorption capacity of sea water due to temperature rise, drying up of the Amazone forest, but also countering (cooling) effects like a possible collapse of the ThermoHaline Circulation (THC), diminished solar activity19, and the (conscious) use of greenhouse gas absorbers like olivine. In preparation of the discussion of “What to do in case extreme climate change occurs”, the question what would lead to a worst case climate scenario was addressed in advance. A thorough discussion between experts resulted in the following ‘best guess expert judgement’ (February 2009) of the most important factors, their impact and uncertainty. A negative value in the last column means that the experts are relatively certain of the effect. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 19 See NASA, http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2009/01apr_deepsolarminimum.htm (1 April 2009) 47 Factor Radiative forcing (W/m2) Nett man made emissions (e.g. land use) Man induced indirect emissions (permafrost, hydrates, etc.) Solar activity Aerosoles (man made, direct + indirect) Vulcanoes (producing cooling aerosoles) Land use albedo Climate sensitivity Water vapour feedback (including clouds) Lapse rate (snow altitude in mountains) Ice-albedo feedback Biogenous feedbacks Natural variations Fluctuations in earth magnetic field Impact Uncertainty 2 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 -1 2 -1 0 2 1 2 1 0 -1 2 -1 0 1 -2 2 (+2: very strong, +1: strong, 0: moderate, -1: weak, -2: very weak) Table 3 Factors influencing occurence of worst case climate change The strongest overall factors which also contain large uncertainties, are the radiative forcing and the climate sensitivity of the earth system. This leads to the following basis for four scenarios as presented in figure 5Error! Reference source not found.. The scenario in the upper right quadrant represents a ‘worst case’ which is caused by high radiative forcing conditions in combination with a high climate sensitivity of the earth system. The IPCC range in figure 5 shows the range of scenarios that the IPCC is actively considering. A1F1 (temperature rise between end of 20th and of 21st century between 2.4 and 6.4 degrees Celsius) refers to a convergent fossil-intensive scenario, a population peak around 2050 and rapid growth and introduction of more efficient technologies. B1 (temperature rise between 1.1 and 2.9 degrees Celsius) refers to a convergent world with low population growth, a service economy and clean technologies. 48 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios High rad. forcing Review and adapt current policies, e.g. strengthen mitigation to address ocean acidification 1.2oC Low climate sensitivity Relax mitigation and adaptation policies Emergency adaptation and mitigation policies A1FI 4.5oC IPCC range B1 High climate sensitivity Review and adapt current policies, e.g. enhance adaptation 450 ppm stab Low rad. forcing Figure 5 Four scenario directions for global climate change To get a more specific (but less robust) picture, the two concretely highest scoring factors listed in table 3Error! Reference source not found. can be used as axes. In that case a worst case climate scenario is characterised by 1. a high level of man induced indirect GHG emissions, as a result of factors such as melting of the permafrost and warming of the oceans. These are both resulting in the release of methane which is a potent green house gas and therefore further enhances these processes; and 2. a strong water vapour feedback mechanism, including cloud cover, altitude of cloud formation, etc., which have a strong effect on the heat balance of the atmosphere. This assessment shows that a combination of these two factors is considered to be the most likely cause of a possible worst case situation. 49 50 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios Appendix 2: Summary expert session The 7th meeting of the VROM Think Tank international affairs on the 8th of July 2009 will concern the matter of “Preparing for a worst case climate change scenario”. This think tank session has in part been prepared by means of an expert session on March, 31, 2009 in Het Buitenhuis, The Hague. This summary reflects the highlights of this meeting. The main underlying assumption of both the Expert Meeting and the Think Tank session , which has been formed in co-operation with the project group for this subject led by PBL, concerns an extreme climate scenario where a temperature increase of 4,5 degrees the coming century. This is not to say that this scenario is probable or inevitable. The Think Tank, and with it the Expert Meeting, has been designed to generate first thoughts for a fallback plan (strategic policy directions), should it ever get to this stage. In a plenary brainstorm, members of the Expert Meeting mentioned amongst other things, the following clustered factors which will determine the response from the government in the event of extreme climate change. These factors are not necessarily of an equal nature as they are the result of a plenary brainstorm: • The level of international cooperation. • The level in which the complexity of governance will increase in the case of extreme climate change. • Climate change as a power element and military safety issue. • The role of market mechanisms influencing the behaviour of different countries. • Unequal distribution of climate effects and risk acceptance in different parts of the world. • The reaction time and the speed of action following an alarm signal. • Dealing with uncertainties regarding the pro’s and contra’s of the planned actions. • Uncertainties on global risks of geo engineering options. • The role of adaptation measures. • The quantity and status of climate refugees. This plenary brainstorm formed a shared basis for the follow up session in a Group Decision Room (GDR). Here a total of a 100 factors were mentioned which can be of influence on policy shaping by the national government concerning how they will handle extreme global climate change. During this GDR session these factors were clustered into 40 factors. All participants judged these factors on their impact and on the level of uncertainty on the levels at which these factors will manifest. Through this process, factors which are unclear or which do not add to the bigger picture are pushed into the background. Some participants have also separately judged the non-clustered factors. 51 The following clustered factors were noted as being most important: 1. A shared perception on the severity of extreme climate change; 2. Level of international cooperation. This last factor includes a set of factors which are strongly linked to the matter whether countries globally will act as a whole, this is expressed in: their international cooperation, the role of international protocols, geo-political developments and the role of the continuation of prosperity as a way of creating conditions. This cooperation is not stimulated by climate change but is an independent factor which is being stimulated by e.g., fighting poverty, improving global prosperity, mutual trade interests etc. These two factors were chosen as a starting point to create scenarios of future situations that are related to these important and yet unsure factors for government policy. These two factors form the axes through which four combinations (scenarios) are created. In the following graph these four scenarios have been outlined. Shared perception of urgency High 1. Sauve qui peut 2. Global green endeavour High Low Degree of Global cooperation 3. Survival of the fittest 4. Through the other crisis together Low Figure 6 Four scenarios for the role of national governments in dealing with extreme global clilmate change The scenarios have been outlined in four workgroups. Afterwards suggestions for a dominant governmental action plan on an international scale have been discussed in a plenary meeting in which the specific role of the Dutch government in the different scenarios was discussed too. 52 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios The first scenario (Sauve qui peut) is marked by a climate change which is perceived as being very severe in which there is no international cooperation. Countries individually look for suitable measures which remain to be suboptimal. Protectionism starts to develop, global trade will decrease, prices for natural resources will show a great volatility. The right of the strongest is prevalent. Countries will participate in convenient coalitions which suit them. The Netherlands will put an emphasis on adaptation measures in their own country. A strong South to North stream of migrants will start appearing. EU will react with a fortress Europe. The scale of emergency aid programmes will decrease and rich Dutch people will move to safer countries. The participants see the dominant Dutch governmental task in the 1st scenario as going for adaptation and to work together regionally. A people’s insurance can also play a useful part. EU countries can also finance programmes for mitigation, sustainable geo-engineering and the caring for climate refugees as a team. In the Netherlands the focus will be on “our own dikes first’, moving investments to climate safe areas and export of the Dutch adaptation knowledge to other delta areas. In the second scenario (Global Green Endeavour) the severity of the situation is also perceived however this time, in a world where there is international cooperation and in which prosperity is still on the increase. By working together the division between rich and poor will decrease. China’s role will expand. There will be global economic growth because there will be few trade restrictions. There will be environmental demands which will have been agreed upon in the global green deal. Actors will prove themselves to be willing to act and show solidarity. International institutions will improve in their functioning and so will the corporate world. The big countries will have a leading role in this reshaping of international institutions. Climate change will be linked to other themes such as poverty alleviation. Mitigation measures will be introduced more quickly and there will be an emphasis on renewable natural resources.. Public means will be made available for things such as Carbon Capture Programs and Storage. Migration streams will be limited thanks to vulnerability reduction in the concerning countries and effective emergency help. Participants explain that in this second scenario the main governmental aim should be to get maximally involved in mitigation so as to limit global warming as much as possible, and to reach this goal to make use of global efficiency programs and to engage with the relevant climate and energy organisations. The EU will create a bond with self conscious countries such as China and India to stimulate the green industry. Climate will be integrated in already existing international mechanisms, for example in safety and trade. The Dutch government will stimulate agreements on increased mitigation, and the forming of a global technology fund and other forms of international cooperation. In the third scenario (Survival of the Fittest ) the extreme climate change which will be occurring will not be perceived as being a serious problem and there will hardly be any international cooperation. This is why this scenario is seen as one in which 53 the wild west worldview is dominant. Every country looks out only for their own national interest and seems to be oblivious to the threats of climate change which are getting increasingly important. The economic growth will become irregular and the Netherlands will try to look after its own interests as much as possible. The growth of both the USA and China which will serve both countries, can develop at the detriment of the interests of other parts of the world. The Netherlands will start to orientate towards like minded Germany more and more. It will also strive to create it’s own solutions and be self sufficient on energy provision by using nuclear energy, solar and wind energy. The own national infrastructure capital will become a priority as it needs to be protected through a rapid roll out of a second Deltaplan. Big Powers will try to evade mitigation of emissions in a cheap way and without consulting with other countries and if it is in their advantage they will use geoengineering solutions even if this has major negative impacts on other countries. The Netherlands will profile itself as a free rider in this particular debate and it will benefit from the limitation of climate change which other countries are trying to achieve. Similar to the first scenario, wealthy Dutch people will move to countries deemed as being safer such as Norway and Germany. Illegal migration from southern parts will become an increasing problem, partly also because the budget for emergency aid will go down and the quality of the emergency help will decrease, even more than it would in the first scenario. Participants judge that the main task of governments will have to be conflict management and forming bilateral coalitions of interest. Each country will try to get maximal attention for their adaptation and try to get emergency help for their own country. The EU will lose some of their strength and this will be increasingly the case for the UN.. International institutions will also weaken. EU countries will have to work regionally in order to achieve adaptation. Emergency help will only be provided if the own economy benefits too. Although the risk of calamity will increase , these risks are mainly ignored. In the fourth scenario (Together through the other crisis), there is a dominant world view which is marked by a limited appreciation of the severity of climate change in a world where there is a great level of international cooperation. Apparently there is another global problem which is more threatening than climate change which absorbs most attention. The recent global financial crisis is a good example. Such a threat has led to the world community uniting in this 4th scenario and that led to global institutions such as the UN, the World Bank and the IMF playing an important role. The international cooperation will be aimed at a global division of labour. Solutions for the Climate problem will have to be simple, cheap and quick in their implementation. The focus will be on adaptation. Migration will not be a big issue in this scenario and emergency aid will be handed out when needed. There will be a relatively large amount of energy put in monitoring seen as this can help when it becomes necessary to give climate change more attention. Participants view the main task of governments on an international level as working together in a WTO context and to expand the financing possibilities of 54 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios international banks to help the environment, which also serve other interests. At the EU and UN level there will have to be a lot of focus on justice in the matter of division. Stimulating prosperity will be the leading motive. A dominant role of big countries will be accepted in this setting. Only at a ad-hoc level will geoengineering possibilities be explored. Initiatives the national (including Dutch) government can undertake are just-in-time adaptation and no-regret mitigation measures. The Netherlands will also have to aim for strong EU initiatives aimed at climate change which link to other more dominant themes in the international arena The key elements of each of the four scenarios will be resumed, with the observation that flexibility and range of options decrease in the sequence as presented below: Within the “global green Endeavour “scenario there will be a strong international cooperation so as to prevent extreme climate change and to limit the temperature increase as much as possible. Prosperity will still be on the increase and the differences in wealth will decrease. The EU will work closely with China and India in the development of green technology. The Climate will be integrated in other international mechanisms such as trade and security. Within the “through the other crisis together” scenario the severity of Climate change is ignored because all the attention will be drawn towards more severe threats of global prosperity. Stimulating prosperity will be the number 1 motive. There will be a lot of emphasis on justice within the division matters. Solutions for the climate problem will have to be simple, cheap, and easy to implement. The emphasis will be on adaptation. A dominant role of big countries will be accepted within this scenario. Within the EU initiatives will be undertaken which are in line with dominating themes in within the international arena. Within the '"Sauve qui peut" scenario each country tries to cope with the climate problems which are perceived as being severe as best as they can. Protectionism can be seen all around and the world economy weakens. The EU can still function as a centre for regional adaptation programs, shared financing of mitigation, sustainable geo-engineering and looking after refugees. In the Netherlands the focus will be on ‘the own dikes first’, moving investments to climate safe areas and exporting adaptation knowledge on delta areas. Within the “survival of the fittest” scenario the extreme climate change which will be taking place will be ignored and there will hardly be any international cooperation. Conflict management will be the governments’ highest priority. The EU will only work together for adaptation. Big powers will try to evade mitigation of emissions in a cheap way without consulting with other countries and they will try to limit the most obvious climate change with geo-engineering solutions and adaptation within the own territory. Illegal migration from southern parts will be an even bigger problem than in the Sauve qui peut scenario. Finally, participants were asked to come up with measures which will prove to be useful in all four scenarios (i.e., no regret measures).The following measures were mentioned.: • Strengthening the climate resistance of food and water supplies 55 • • • • • • 56 Better monitoring of tipping points in the global climate system. Making rules for research and following out of geo-engineering options Increasing the flexibility of infrastructure and buildings at rising sea levels Develop international agreements (judicial status) for climate refugees Lower dependence on non sustainable energy Increase market for mitigation options such as wind and CCS energy Preparing for worst climate change scenarios Appendix 3: Possible measures to change Earth’s reflexivity A range of options is proposed in the category of geo-engineering, which aim to decrease the radiative forcing. If the strategy directions of mitigation (see next sections) are not deemed sufficient or do not deliver results quickly enough, a third strategy direction could be considered. The greenhouse problem is in essence existing because the Earth is absorbing more energy than it is emitting, i.e., the reflexivity is not high enough. If the reflexivity (albedo) of the Earth can be increased, its energy absorption (Watt/m2) will be lower and thus the temperature will not rise, or will rise less fast. In popular terms, measures to achieve this are labelled under the term geoengineering. The majority of these measures have never been tested and many cannot actually be tested without generating a real effect, because the Earth’s crust and atmosphere would be the testing grounds. For many options, we have no real idea what the side-effects (unintended, underestimated and unknown) will be, both on local and global level, like changes in weather patterns. While for some the direct costs can be reasonably calculated, the indirect costs (due to the unintended side effects) are hard to assess. As the expected direct costs of some of these measures are considered to be ‘reasonable’ by some (e.g., Barrett, 2007), these could be taken unilaterally by large countries, which could be used as an excuse to not get involved in the other necessary strategies. I.e., the relatively low costs and localized implementation possibilities (with –unknown- global consequences) could undermine political efforts in the mitigation arena. The degree of urgency (something needs to happen now) will co-determine how important this uncertainty and governancedilemma will remain. Another issue to be taken into account is the amount of energy required for the various options. The more energy is required, the less attractive an options is as (structural solution), but again the urgency of doing something may outweigh such considerations on the short term, provided a solution can be reversed. In general it is important to assess the energy/emissions balance, i.e., how much energy is required to implement the measure and does this energy use more than offset the warming effect that it causes? The options fall into the following main categories: • Creating purposeful stratospheric aerosols. • Increasing reflexivity (albedo) with air-, land and water based methods. • Change behaviour of ice masses. In all cases, the result will be a cooling effect on Earth, thereby countering the warming trend. The side effects of the measures are however a large unknown factor, especially the behaviour of clouds. 57 The measures that were referred to in section 3.2 include: • Stratospheric aerosols: Inject enough sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere to reflect the small percentage of sunlight necessary to offset increased warming caused by carbon dioxide. This scheme is akin to the cooling induced by large volcanic explosions and will definitely work. But the influence on (global) weather patterns and evaporation rates are unknown but estimated to be severe (Van Nieuwstadt, 2009). • Albedo increase: cloud, mechanical: Manufacture sea salt spray to change the way clouds form over the ocean to increase their reflectivity. • Albedo increase: cloud, biological: Add di-methyl sulphide to a patch of ocean to create more micro-organisms that act as formation sites for water droplets and eventually lead to clouds. • Albedo increase: desert: Cover the Earth's non-sandy deserts with a material composed of a white polyethylene top and an aluminium bottom. That would increase the albedo of those surfaces, cooling the Earth. • Albedo increase: grassland: Breed or genetically engineer shinier plants to increase the reflectivity of the world's savannahs and shrub lands. • Albedo increase: cropland Breed or genetically engineer shinier crops to increase the reflectivity of the world's farmed land. • Albedo increase: human settlement: Make the areas where humans live considerably more reflective by, say, painting roofs white. • Enhance upwelling: Bring nutrient-rich water up from the deeps to foster carbon-using life at the surface of the ocean. • Enhance downwelling: Cool down huge amounts of water with large pumps to form and thicken sea ice that would in turn cool the sea water. That water would descend to the depths, taking a bit of extra carbon with it. • Sunshade: Shooting reflective sunshade into atmosphere (Kunzig, 2009) • Albedo increase: deforestation in arctic areas: purposeful deforestation would expose the snow on the ground, which increases the reflexivity of the Earth20. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 20 Obviously, one of the side effects is the removal of sink-capacity of these forests as well as the issue of what to do with the wood. I.e., this solution would require a more holistic approach not to make things worse. 58 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios Appendix 4: Possible measures to absorb greenhouse gasses As greenhouse gasses will be emitted for a considerable time to come, part of the overall strategy can be to absorb actual emissions. The following main methods are available: ° ° ° ° ° Capture and storage CO2 in terrestrial ecosystems, i.e., • Massive aforestation/ reforestation across the Earth to sequester more carbon dioxide naturally. Deforestation itself is increasingly considered to be an accelerator of climate change (due to loss of absorption capacity of the Earth) and may therefore get more formal status as well. Capture and storage in aquatic/marine systems, e.g., by: • Iron fertilization Add iron intentionally to the oceans, fertilizing the water, and creating more carbon-munching life there. Eventually, those creatures or the creatures that eat them die and drift into the deep ocean, taking that carbon with them21. • Ocean phosphorous addition Add phosphorous intentionally to the oceans, fertilizing the water, and creating more carbon-munching life there. Eventually, those creatures or the creatures that eat them die and drift into the deep ocean, taking that carbon with them. • Ocean nitrogen fertilization Add nitrogen intentionally to the oceans, fertilizing the water, and creating more carbon-munching life there. Eventually, those creatures or the creatures that eat them die and drift into the deep ocean, taking that carbon with them. • Carbonate addition to oceans Add carbonate to the oceans, increasing their carbon intake and fighting ocean acidification. Air capture and storage Use chemical processes to pull carbon dioxide out of the air and sequester it in geological reservoirs. Bio-char production Create charcoal from biomass, effectively sequestering the carbon in the plant matter, and bury it. Also see Lovelock (2009) Through mineral reactions, like Olivine (Schuiling, 2008) For most of these measures their effectiveness in terms of cooling potential is compared with that of other geo-engineering options in the section 3.2.2. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 21 According to some experts (e.g., see Van Nieuwstadt, 2009) iron fertilization would require the least volume compared with the other options but even then it will likely only be a temporary solution. 59 60 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios Appendix 5: List of influencing factors for policy intervention Many different dilemmas exist that influence government decisions on which actions to take. It is important to determine the range and manoeuvring space for (Dutch) government to act once a worst case climate change scenario is emerging as a possibility which cannot be neglected. As an example of the type of factors that could be considered, the list below is shown, which was the result of the expert meeting. Other factors are also conceivable, like the energy requirements of possible solutions, speed of implementation, global financing mechanisms, the quality of monitoring systems. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. How well is international cooperation functioning? Geopolitical balances. Perception of urgency. Decreasing faith in feasibility of sufficient mitigation measures. Development of the issue of international climate/environmental refugees. Distributional effects: who wins/loses (more/less), both between groups and regions. 7. Scarcity. 8. Policy instruments for quick adaptation measures including budgets. 9. How well are government and cooperating governments functioning? 10. Preventing all kinds of shocks that demand immediate attention draining attention for longer term issues. 11. Prosperity. 12. Possibilities to act within realm of imagination. 13. Distribution of responsibilities. 14. Adaptive capacity of countries and regions. 15. Social economic impact and vulnerability. 16. Time scale (efficiency) of policy measures. 17. The political culture in a country. 18. Own versus common interests. 19. Social economic baseline. 20. Possibilities of free rider behaviour. 21. Linking adaptation and mitigation measures. 22. How interesting/profitable are the solutions for countries (can they make money on the solutions). 23. Role of the business sector: as an opportunity (innovative solutions) and threat (unilateral actions with unknown effects). 24. Spatial scale of policy measures. 25. Coherence with other global or regional issues (trade, safety, etc.). 26. Consensus amongst economists on the effectiveness of possible measures. 27. Population control through scarsities, migration but also higher death rate in certain areas. 28. Volatility in prices and trade imbalances. 29. Herding. 61 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 62 Demographical developments. Perception of risks. Technological developments. Consensus amongst scientists – do they give unambiguous signals to politicians? Speed and nature of climate change. Regional differences. Probabilities of occurrences -> risks. Perception by politicians, media, opinion leaders in the society. Availability of information. Economic incentives on short term to solve long term issues does not work / short comings of economical model/ bounded rationality market and government. Biodiversity. Preparing for worst climate change scenarios Appendix 6: Information obtained in the preparatory process In order to get insight in the process that resulted in the final guiding questions for the Think Tank, as well as benefit from the thought process during that period, this Appendix will briefly discuss this evolutionary process, both in terms of activities and contents. Process January - July 2009 In January 2009 both PBL and the VROM Think Tank received an assignment from VROM to address the topic of Worst Case Climate Change scenarios. Both groups started preparations and aligned with each other. As a result, PBL suggested two main dimensions (natural factors) that influence the technical climate change scenarios. This helps to understand in which natural situations we will or will not be facing a worst case climate scenario. In March 2009 based on discussion in a special expert session, four technical policy scenarios were explored, given the working assumption of a worst case climate scenario. It was explicitly not the intention to suggest that this is already unavoidable, but it was a hypothesis to identify which courses of action are still open if society is irreversibly heading to that situation. This resulted in four scenarios as described in Appendix 2 of this Background document. The Think Tank secretariat developed on this basis an overview which type of measures are probably considered in the four scenario’s. During the spring it became clear that the Think Tank would need a selection of clear guiding questions. For this purpose a small workshop was organized May 2009 to pre-select questions which would be most relevant and interesting to address in the Think Tank. It was attended representatives from VROM, PBL and the Secretariat, resulting in a prioritized list with questions from which the final program was derived. Below the processing of the outcome of the Expert Meeting of March 2009 and the outcome of the workshop of May 2009 will be briefly outlined. Taking results of March Expert Meeting further The four climate policy scenarios developed in the March Expert Meeting were elaborated and for each scenario a key dilemma on national and global level was identified as presented below. The flexibility and range of options for measures decreases from top to bottom. Scenario Global Green Endeavour Government dilemmas Global Focus on global mitigation or Hedging our bets through National Join EU policy or Also take own initiative, 63 adaptation and geo-engineering Together through the other crisis Sauve qui peut Survival of the fittest Accept geo-engineering as solution for the large countries or Try to realise directed mitigation measures via the EU/ WTO. Channel mitigation streams through bilateral agreements or Closing the borders Focus on conflict control, a.o. through closing borders or military interventions e.g., seeking support of UN organisations Focus on joint adaptation approach within UN/EU or Prefer national adaptation Modify spatial investment strategy for national adaptation or No modifications Prepare gradual evacuation from low lying parts in the Netherlands or Abstain from evacuation Upon closer inspection these dilemmas seemed less suitable as explicit guiding questions for the Think Tank. Instead, it was decided that the discussion should focus most on the most desirable scenario and all related questions. Results of May Workshop These steps resulted in the following possible questions for the Think Tank: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 64 How could a transition from the current regime to an emergency regime take place and which independent choices can the Dutch government make regarding that transition? Which national adaptation measures should the Netherlands take in all scenarios in addition to the currently foreseen measures (fortification of dykes, evacuation plans, lengthening investment periods for infrastructure etc.) Do geo-engineering measures exist with just a local effect measures that are executed elsewhere in which we can participate and which we should consider? Which national mitigation measures remain relevant to continue with if a worst case scenario occurs.? Do measures exist regarding the influx of climate refugees that the Netherlands should consider and under which conditions? Which role can the EU be expected to take if the worst case scenario is inevitable and what should the Dutch approach be vis-a-vis the EU? (e.g., coordinated adaptation, possible geo-engineering actions of other countries, dealing with climate refugees, emergency programmes)? Which no-regret measures should be put in motion already? What can the Netherlands do to encourage a desirable policy scenario (Global Green Endeavour), assuming worst case is a given? How can citizens be involved in formulating policies? Preparing for worst climate change scenarios 10. Which military efforts should the Netherlands consider to prevent or isolate sources of conflict? 11. Which institutional developments will be required? Through voting it was decided which topics seemed to be most relevant to discuss in the Think Tank session. These topics were subsequently explored further. The choice of topics is presented in the program of the Think Tank meeting. Below a brief reflection of the discussion in this preparatory workshop on three key questions is shown: Question 1: Transition to a worst case scenario Whereas the financial crisis can probably be mitigated by regulations, to address worst case climate change a transition of society is needed. Which signals exist that can trigger global awareness whether this scenario is approaching? The IPCC plays an important role regarding authoritative reports, together with measuring networks. Taken together, few indicators will go completely unnoticed. But which ones will really trigger action in society? Climate by definition is a problem for the longer term (not an immediate effect). Also the understanding of the phenomenon is very gradual. Psychologically speaking this complicates mobilization of needed action. What would be required to cross a tipping point regarding taking action and which role does Copenhagen (CoP-15) play here? Copenhagen presents an opportunity to move towards the upper range of global actions, to decrease the chance that the Worst Case Scenario will actually occur. Exploring this question may help to identify what type of actions countries are prepared to agree upon. In pre-ambles of CoP-15 it is likely that in the operational part a review clause for 2015 will be inserted, so shortly after the next IPCC report. What should be the mandate of the revision clause? Which other forums exist which are more suitable to sound the alarm bell? The official negotiations are probably the best channels to take steps that actually matter. Could a scaling up of the efforts happen in bursts? In the financial crisis the signals were latent but the urgency arose quite suddenly. Could that happen in case of the climate crisis as well? Can choices regarding energy, food etc be compared with finance? How do the media deal with this question, when does climate as a crisis become interesting for them and which shocks could trigger media attention? Would that indeed lead to an increased level of action? For the Netherlands another major flood as in 1953 would be such a trigger, as can be seen by the floods in 1995/-98 that resulted in attention for and major measures regarding adaptation in the Netherlands. It is important that people act on serious signals and are not made numb by unnecessary signals. Apart from a global development process of gradually more worrying signals from the IPCC and comparable forums, the transition to a worst case scenario can also spread slowly. Dependent on the extent to which they are affected, countries will engage in transition. Not only small island states but soon countries with food 65 shortages will join like China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Brazil: when will they take action and how? Apart from transitions to a worst case scenario through 1) a gradual process, 2) occurrences that increase the momentum and are a clear manifestation of tipping points, the transition could also be a result of 3) man made actions (documentary, satellite images) that shake up people around the world, like a new Pentagon or Stern report. When can actions that respond to such signals not be postponed anymore? We could design a yard stick which identifies if society is still on a track in which problems remain manageable (compare take off procedure for airplane pilot), and review that yard stick. We then keep an overview of what is going on, whether current policy is sufficient and what options remain to respond adequately. On national level this seems to make sense anyway, but in fact is also useful on regional and global level. The Think Tank can conceivably advise such a measure, for example in the third Policy Brief on Climate change. This would be a concrete recommendation. There is a growing consensus to invite countries to start making low carbon development strategies. What can countries do themselves, for what is cooperation required regarding technology transfer, capacity building, funding etc? This could be mapped on a critical path to get the allocation of resources over time right. What would for the Dutch government be a suitable path to anticipate on all these possible transition pathways towards a worst case scenario? Question 2: National adaptation Countries like The Netherlands are facing the challenge to make all spatial investments adaptation proof. This means taking into account future modifications if climate change gets worse. Adaptation should not only be considered to include water management but also aspects like agriculture, health, ecology. Various spatial planning aspects are also not sufficiently addressed. Which of these topics are most sensible to identify and discuss? The Veerman Commission fot the Dutch Delta has taken the upper range of the IPCC scenarios as reference point, so their results do not need to be rounded up again. The sea level rise on the short term is manageable because the melting of Greenland will still take many centuries. Adaptation regarding biodiversity is not always possible to influence. Various direct and indirect measures are however possible, including pest control and stimulating cooling. There are simply limits to increasing the level of dykes: the water pressure and salinity level behind the dykes put constraints on the level of dyke level rise. In the end, the land behind the dykes needs also to be elevated. The sea contains 66 Preparing for worst climate change scenarios enough sand to for example increase the height of dykes by 5 meters. An alternative is to live on the water, give up the greeneries and find another purpose for agricultural lands. There are many implications for investment decisions and spatial planning. Is the period after 2100 considered to be an issue? We only know very little about this, but we are certain that the sea level rise will continue for a few centuries. So long term climate (adaptation) proofing appears to sensible advice, but physical limits and acceptability of costs need to be specified? Question 6: The Netherlands and the role of the EU If the signals are clear, what type of initiatives can be expected from the EU? An emergency policy does exist but is that applicable in this case? The following areas of EU action are relevant: • Mitigation: continuing in a higher gear is the likely policy on EU level. • Geo-engineering: the EC is already publishing research tenders on this topic. In technical and institutional terms there is a reasonable overview, but not so in policy terms. What is the EU position regarding the trade off between impact and uncertainty? A policy could be based on criteria such as usability, level of uncertainty and impacts. The EU can certainly take initiatives regarding this topic. • Adaptation: defense mechanisms will appear, funded by EU resources, but to avoid abuse, criteria for transparency are needed. • Does the spending of funds within the EU and for the allocation of budgets for development co-operation play a role? What can the Netherlands do? Where can leverage be created? The role of the Dutch business sector seems to provide opportunities. Which role does the revision of the CAP play and where will the funds coming available after the revision be allotted? . • Migration: EU policy is required. Will it be modified (made stricter) based on a climate crisis? Should we start preparing for streams of refugees from outside and within Europe? We need to prevent too much dispersion of efforts and funding in the Netherlands as well as within the EU. 67