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NOTA DI
LAVORO
136.2010
Beyond Copenhagen:
A Realistic Climate
Policy in a Fragmented
World
By Carlo Carraro, University of Venice,
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Emanuele Massetti, Fondazione Eni
Enrico Mattei, Euro-Mediterranean
Center for Climate Change
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Series
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Beyond Copenhagen: A Realistic Climate Policy in a
Fragmented World
By Carlo Carraro, University of Venice, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Emanuele Massetti, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Euro-Mediterranean
Center for Climate Change
Summary
We propose a realistic approach to climate policy based on the Copenhagen Agreement to
reduce Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) emissions. We assess by how much the non-binding,
although official, commitments to reduce emissions made in Copenhagen will affect the level
of world GHGs emissions in 2020. Our estimates are based on official communications to
the UNFCCC, on historic data and on the Business-as-Usual scenario of the WITCH model.
We are not interested in estimating the gap between the expected level of emissions and
what would be needed to achieve the 2°C target. Nor do we attempt to calculate the 2100
temperature level implied by the Copenhagen pledges. We believe these two exercises are
subject to high uncertainty and would not improve the current state of negotiations. Rather,
we take stock of the present politically achievable level of commitment and suggest an
effective way to push forward the climate policy agenda. The focus is on what can be done
rather than on what should be done. To this end, we estimate the potential of the financial
provisions of the Copenhagen Agreement to sponsor mitigation effort in Non-Annex I
countries. Using scenarios produced with the WITCH model, we show that lower
commitment on domestic abatement measures can be compensated by devoting roughly
50% of the Copenhagen financial provisions in 2020 to mitigation in Non-Annex I countries.
The policy implications of our results will be discussed.
Keywords: Kyoto Protocol, International Climate Agreements, Climate Policy, Clean
Development Mechanism
JEL Classification: F5, Q01, Q54, Q58
This paper is part of the research work carried out within the Sustainable Development Programme of
the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. The authors are grateful to Massimo Tavoni, Alice Favero and
Chiara Rogate for useful comments and suggestions.
Address for correspondence:
Emanuele Massetti
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta 63
20123 Milano
Italy
E-mail: [email protected]
The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: [email protected]
Beyond Copenhagen: A Realistic Climate
Policy in a Fragmented World
Carlo Carraro
University of Venice
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Emanuele Massetti
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Euro-Mediterranean Center for Climate Change
Abstract
We propose a realistic approach to climate policy based on the Copenhagen
Agreement to reduce Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) emissions. We assess by how
much the non-binding, although official, commitments to reduce emissions made in
Copenhagen will affect the level of world GHGs emissions in 2020. Our estimates
are based on official communications to the UNFCCC, on historic data and on the
Business-as-Usual scenario of the WITCH model. We are not interested in
estimating the gap between the expected level of emissions and what would be
needed to achieve the 2°C target. Nor do we attempt to calculate the 2100
temperature level implied by the Copenhagen pledges. We believe these two
exercises are subject to high uncertainty and would not improve the current state of
negotiations. Rather, we take stock of the present politically achievable level of
commitment and suggest an effective way to push forward the climate policy
agenda. The focus is on what can be done rather than on what should be done. To
this end, we estimate the potential of the financial provisions of the Copenhagen
Agreement to sponsor mitigation effort in Non-Annex I countries. Using scenarios
produced with the WITCH model, we show that lower commitment on domestic
abatement measures can be compensated by devoting roughly 50% of the
Copenhagen financial provisions in 2020 to mitigation in Non-Annex I countries.
The policy implications of our results will be discussed.
October 2010
Corresponding author: Emanuele Massetti, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, C.so Magenta 63, 20123 Milano.
Email: [email protected]. This paper is part of the research work carried out within the Sustainable
Development Programme of the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. The authors are grateful to Massimo Tavoni,
Alice Favero and Chiara Rogate for useful comments and suggestions.
1
1. Introduction
As many analysts predicted, the Copenhagen summit held in December 2009 did not achieve the
lofty goals that were set for it years ago. It failed to produce a legally binding agreement to
substitute the Kyoto Protocol after 2012 (Stavins 2009, Doniger 2009, Tol 2010). But it did make
progress. Indeed, a realistic assessment must admit that the outcome of the summit could not have
been different. Hopes for a more ambitious result were not based on the reality on the ground. There
were and still exist three insurmountable obstacles.
First, the USA could not sign a binding agreement, as the Senate had not passed the Boxer-Kerry
Bill. That bill, coupled with the already approved American Clean Energy and Security Act
(Waxman-Markey Bill), would have given President Obama the credibility to propose more
ambitious steps (see also Grubb 2010).
Second, the lack of commitment from fast-growing developing countries to reduce emissions – not
necessarily immediately, more realistically after a “grace” period – meant that any attempts from
developed countries to contain temperature increases to safe levels would have been in vain.
Third, fast-growing developing countries are reluctant to take on any legally binding commitment,
citing that their primary objective is to reduce poverty and to spread economic well-being to their
poorest citizens. They also point out that responsibility for the high concentrations of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere today is only marginally attributable to their emissions. Hence, their refusal
to sign any legally binding agreement, when the major world economies are not ready to do so, is
largely understandable.
These are the basic ingredients of the so-called “climate deadlock” that prevented the signing of a
real successor to the Kyoto Protocol and pushed the climate summit in Copenhagen to “take note”
of a more modest Copenhagen Accord on the morning of Saturday, 19 December 2009.
During the past ten months climate negotiations have not made progress. The chances to have a
legally binding treaty signed in Cancun at the next COP16 are extremely low, and US difficulties in
approving national legislation aimed at enforcing domestic targets to reduce Greenhouse Gases
(GHGs) emissions are only part of the problem. Indeed, the “climate deadlock” is the symptom of
the present fragmented international climate architecture: countries are willing to take steps towards
the reduction of GHGs, but on a voluntary and uncoordinated basis. The European Union is acting
fiercely to recompose the picture in order to reproduce a Kyoto-style, legally-binding agreement
with well-defined targets, although without success so far.
There are many reasons to believe that the stall in climate negotiations will not be overcome in the
near future. Not only in Cancun, but for several years beyond. It is therefore of the utmost
importance to build a realistic climate policy firmly grounded on the actions that countries have
unilaterally promised in Copenhagen. The two pillars of climate policy in the years to come are the
two important outcomes from Copenhagen. First, a non-binding, but politically relevant, declaration
of national emissions targets for 2020. Second, the definition of the resources that will be
2
transferred to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation actions (the Copenhagen Green
Climate Fund – CGCF).
The primary aim of this paper is to offer guidance to policy makers and negotiators on how to
structure efficiently and effectively climate policy in a post-Copenhagen world. We address key
issues that will be discussed during the next round of negotiations in Cancun and will very likely
remain at the core of climate policy for several years. We proceed as follows. We start by
estimating the level of 2020 emissions implied by the Copenhagen pledges. We then compute the
expected level of emissions and the level required to achieve the 2°C target. We argue that such a
comparison is informative, but that it might be inconclusive and possibly misleading. A more
realistic approach is needed. Therefore, we identify what is feasible and explore the role of
international finance to reduce emissions in Non-Annex I countries.
2. What is the effect of the announced Copenhagen targets on
global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020?
The Annex I to the Copenhagen Accord1 contains communications of the parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on the voluntary mitigation actions
that they intend to put in place to reduce emissions of GHGs in 2020. We have used the UNFCCC
Annex I quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020 and Annex II nationally appropriate
mitigation actions of developing country Parties as source of information. These targets are
voluntary, announced in an informal – although public – session on 18 December 2009, or
communicated later at the UNFCCC Secretary. While still not legally binding, the commitments
announced at Copenhagen are very informative on future climate policies. For this reason a first
step of any analysis of post-Copenhagen climate policy must start from an assessment of the likely
level of GHGs emissions in 2020. Table 1 presents historic and future levels of emissions, with and
without the Copenhagen targets, based on our analysis. We estimate emissions for twenty-two
countries, covering 75% of global emissions both in 2005 and in 2020.
Quantifying emissions in 2020 for Annex I countries is a straightforward task, because targets are
expressed in terms of historic emissions. The only exception is Turkey, that announced its intention
to follow its Business as Usual (BaU) scenario for 2020. We compute emissions reduction targets
without including emissions from Land Use Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF).2 The future
pattern of emissions from LULUCF is instead derived from the Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario
of the WITCH model (Bosetti et al 2006; Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni 2007; Bosetti et al 2009).3
1
Decision 2/CP.15, the “Copenhagen Accord”.
GHGs emissions excluding LULUCF for Annex I countries are from the UNFCCC. LULUCF emissions for Annex I
countries, and GHGs emissions for Non-Annex I countries– with and without LULUCF – are from IEA (2009).
3
For a description of the model, references and access to scenarios please visit www.witchmodel.org .
2
3
Greenhouse Gases Emissions (GT CO2-eq)
Country
Australia 1, 3
Belarus
Canada
Croatia
Euro 27
Iceland
-5%, -15% to -25% wrt 2000
-5% / '-10% wrt 1990
-17% wrt 2005
-5% wrt 1990
-20% / -30% wrt 1990
-30% wrt 1990
Japan 1
Kazakhstan 4
New Zealand 1
Norway
Russian Federation 1
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
Total Annex I
Pledge at COP15
-25% wrt 1990
-15% wrt 1992
-10% to -20% wrt 1990
-30% / -40% wrt 1990
-15% / -25% wrt 1990
-20% / -30% wrt 1990
BaU
-20% wrt 1990
-17% wrt 2005
5
Excluding LULUCF
1990 2005 2020
1990
0.42
0.14
0.59
0.03
5.57
0.00
1.27
0.36
0.06
0.05
3.32
0.05
0.19
0.93
6.11
0.53
0.08
0.73
0.03
5.12
0.00
1.35
0.24
0.08
0.05
2.12
0.05
0.33
0.42
7.10
0.62
0.10
0.83
0.04
6.13
0.00
1.54
0.26
0.09
0.06
2.31
0.06
0.40
0.52
8.23
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
LULUCF
2005 2020
11
Copenhagen Pledges
1990
Total
2005
2020
Target
LC
HC
12
wrt 1990 (%)
LC
HC
wrt 2005 (%)
LC
HC
wrt BaU (%)
LC
HC
-11%
56%
-16%
-2%
-13%
-36%
-29%
29%
-28%
-36%
31%
-22%
22%
75%
-17%
-32%
48%
-16%
-2%
-24%
-36%
-29%
29%
-36%
-46%
16%
-31%
22%
75%
-17%
-23%
29%
-26%
-20%
-27%
-44%
-38%
18%
-37%
-44%
22%
-32%
-44%
-28%
-41%
22%
-26%
-20%
-36%
-44%
-38%
18%
-44%
-52%
8%
-40%
-44%
-28%
0.02
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.44
0.14
0.62
0.03
5.59
0.00
1.29
0.36
0.06
0.05
3.38
0.05
0.19
0.93
6.18
0.54
0.09
0.77
0.03
5.13
0.00
1.38
0.24
0.08
0.05
2.16
0.05
0.33
0.42
7.13
0.63
0.10
0.88
0.04
6.15
0.00
1.57
0.26
0.09
0.06
2.32
0.06
0.40
0.52
8.23
0.48
0.13
0.65
0.03
4.47
0.00
0.98
0.31
0.06
0.03
2.83
0.04
0.40
0.74
5.90
0.37
0.13
0.65
0.03
3.91
0.00
0.98
0.31
0.05
0.03
2.50
0.04
0.40
0.74
5.90
11%
-6%
6%
-5%
-20%
-30%
-24%
-16%
-9%
-32%
-16%
-23%
115%
-20%
-5%
-15%
-11%
6%
-5%
-30%
-30%
-24%
-16%
-19%
-42%
-26%
-32%
115%
-20%
-5%
19.09
18.24
21.20
0.22
0.17
0.11
19.31
18.41
21.31
17.06
16.04
-12%
-17%
-7%
-13%
-20%
-25%
Brazil
1, 7
-0.97 / -1.05 GtCO2-eq wrt BaU
0.72
1.11
1.53
0.89
1.45
1.13
1.61
2.56
2.66
1.68
1.61
4%
0%
-34%
-37%
-37%
-40%
China
2, 6
reduce carbon intensity of output by
40-45% wrt 2005
3.72
7.61
10.75
0.04
0.03
-0.28
3.76
7.64
10.47
10.47
10.47
179%
179%
37%
37%
--
--
reduce carbon intensity of output by
20-25% wrt 2005
1.33
2.05
2.59
0.05
0.04
0.01
1.38
2.09
2.60
2.60
2.60
89%
89%
24%
24%
--
--
0.45
0.45
0.34
0.30
0.73
0.61
0.44
0.67
1.13
0.84
0.51
0.79
0.41
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.84
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.49
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.86
0.48
0.35
0.30
1.57
0.65
0.44
0.67
1.62
0.87
0.51
0.79
1.20
0.82
0.34
0.55
0.96
0.61
0.34
0.55
40%
71%
-2%
84%
12%
27%
-2%
84%
-24%
26%
-23%
-18%
-39%
-6%
-23%
-18%
-26%
-6%
-34%
-30%
-41%
-30%
-34%
-30%
India 2, 8
1
Indonesia
Mexico 1
South Africa 1
South Korea 1
-26% / -41% wrt BaU
-51 Mt CO2-eq / -30% wrt BaU
-34% wrt BaU
-30% wrt BaU
Other Non-Annex I 9
5.91
7.69
9.59
3.75
2.98
2.00
9.66
10.67
11.59
11.59
11.59
20%
20%
9%
9%
--
--
Total Non-Annex I
13.22
20.90
27.72
5.17
5.40
3.39
18.38
26.30
31.11
29.25
28.72
59%
56%
11%
9%
-6%
-8%
0.61
0.94
1.47
1.47
1.47
141%
141%
57%
57%
--
--
5.38
5.57
3.50
38.30
45.65
53.90
47.79
46.23
25%
21%
5%
1%
-11%
-14%
International Bunker 10
0.61
0.94
1.09
World
32.92
40.08
50.01
Notes: 1 This country is part of a wider regional aggregate in the WITCH model. The growth of emissions in the BaU scenario is calculated using the average growth rate of the wider regional aggregate to which the country belongs. 2 We
use the increment of GHGs emissions in the WITCH model BaU scenario because the committed reduction of carbon intensity is inferior to the BaU autonomous carbon intensity improvement. 3 Australia’s total GHGs emissions were
equal to 496 Mt CO2-eq in 2000. 4 Kazakhstan is a Party included in Annex I for the purposes of the Kyoto Protocol in accordance with Article 1, paragraph 7, of the Protocol, but is not a Party included in Annex I for the purposes of the
Convention. The base year is 1992 for Kazakhstan. We estimate 1992 total GHGs emissions based on 1992 CO2 emissions from CDIAC. 5 Targets of Annex I countries do not consider emissions from LULUCF. Minor countries are not
included. 6 China also committed to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15% by 2020 and to increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by
2020 from the 2005 levels. 7 Brazil has announced specific mitigation measures. They correspond to GHGs emissions reductions of, respectively, -36.1% and -38.9% wrt the official BaU scenario. Here we use WITCH BaU scenario,
which is very close to the official one. 8 The emissions from the agriculture sector will not be part of the assessment of emissions intensity of India. 9 We assume that Other Non-Annex I countries will follow their BaU pattern of
emissions. 10 WITCH does not account for international bunkers explicitly. We have projected the level of emissions from international bunkers using the 2000-2005 growth rate. 11 Source of data for GHGs emissions excluding LULUCF
in Annex I countries is the UNFCCC. LULUCF emissions in Annex I countries and GHGs emissions in Non-Annex I countries – including and excluding LULUCF – are from IEA (2009). 12 Future emissions are authors’ calculations
based on BaU scenarios of the WITCH model. We use the UNFCCC Annex I quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020 and Annex II Nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing country Parties as source of
information.
Table 1. Historic emissions, Business-as-Usual emissions and Copenhagen Pledges.
4
-50%
-25%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Australia
Belarus
Canada
Croatia
Euro 27
Iceland
Japan
Kazakhstan (base year 1992)
New Zealand
lll
Norway
Russian Federation
+115%
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
+179%
Brazil
China
India
Indonesia
Mexico
South Africa
South Korea
+141%
Other Non-Annex I
International Bunkers
Total Annex I
Total Non-Annex I
World
Emissions wrt 1990
Emissions wrt 2005
Emissions wrt BaU
Figure 1. Copenhagen Pledges: comparison between the LC pledged
emissions, historical level and the BaU.
5
Some Annex I countries have announced two targets. We have therefore distinguished between a
Low and a High Commitment level (LC and HC henceforth).4 The HC is usually conditional on
other regions collectively taking aggressive action to reduce GHGs emissions.
GHGs emissions in Annex I countries as a group – excluding LULUCF emissions – were equal to
19 GTon CO2-eq in 1990, they declined to 18.2 GTon CO2-eq in 2005. If no action is taken to
reduce GHGs we expect emissions to be 21.2 GTon CO2-eq in 2020.5 Combining the Copenhagen
pledges and the expected pattern of emissions from LULUCF we estimate that emissions will be 17
GTon CO2-eq in the LC scenario and 16 GTon CO2-eq in the HC scenario.6 In the LC case
emissions will be 12% lower than in 1990 and 7% lower than in 2005. In the HC case emissions
will be 17% lower than in 1990 and 13% lower than in 2005.
Instead of announcing emissions targets with respect to a specific base year, Non-Annex I countries
have generally taken a more flexible approach. A group of countries has expressed the intention to
reduce emissions below the BaU scenario (Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, …).
China has a goal to reduce the carbon intensity of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 40-45%
compared to the 2005 level, to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption
to around 15% in 2020 and to increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock
volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020 from 2005 levels. India also has an intensity target of
-20% / -25% with respect to 2005.7 Brazil has quantified specific mitigation actions that range from
-0.97 to -1.05 GTon CO2-eq; when compared to the Brazilian government BaU, this is equivalent to
a contraction of emissions of 36.1% and 38.9%, respectively.
Quantifying emissions reductions pledged by Non-Annex I countries is not an easy task. The most
important source of ambiguity is the lack of a clear reference. In general, countries have not
indicated their expected BaU level of emissions and therefore any assessment of their future level of
emissions is subject to a wide margin of uncertainty. Also, many countries have not specified
whether the promised emissions cuts will include or exlude LULUCF emissions. Brazil has clearly
indicated that part of the mitigation effort will be directed towards the reduction of deforestation
and land degradation. But other countries have not been as specific. Moreover, there is still wide
uncertainty on the BaU pattern of emissions from LULUCF. Since LULUCF emissions account for
20% of total GHGs emissions in the Non-Annex I group, the uncertainty that surrounds their
inclusion in the target and their future BaU pattern are other major sources of ambiguity. Since
emissions reductions from avoided deforestation and land degradation (REDD) are among the
cheapest options to reduce GHGs emissions, we assume here that all Non-Annex I countries have
included emissions from LULUCF in their Copenhagen pledges.
4
For those countries that have an intermediate level of commitment we consider only the two extremes.
The “20-20-20” European Union policy is not part of our BaU scenario.
6
Using IEA 1990 GHGs emissions – excluding LULUCF – emissions in the HC pledge would be equal to 15.6 GTon
CO2-eq. In the LC pledge emissions would 16.6 GTon CO2-eq. Different data sources for 1990 imply roughly +/- 0.4
GTon CO2-eq in 2020.
7
India includes all GHGs emissions in the target, but not emissions from the agricultural sector.
5
6
50
48 GTon
44 GTon
40 GTon
40
Range of emissions to achieve the 2°C Target.
Greenhouse Gases Emissions (GtCO2-eq)
60
30
20
10
0
1990
A1
NA1
2005
A1
NA1
2020
LC A1
LC NA1 2020 LC HC A1 HC NA1 2020 HC
Annex I (A1) - Emissions growth
Non-Annex I (NA1) - Emissions growth
Annex I (A1) - Copenhagen Pledge
Non-Annex I (NA1) - Copenhagen Pledge
Notes: LC stands for Low Commitment. HC stands for High Commitment. The range of emissions in 2020 to achieve the 2°C target in 2100
is from UNEP (2010). 44 GTon CO2-eq is considered by Nicholas Stern a “climate responsible target” for 2020. Van Vuuren et al (2010)
have established a range of 44 to 46 GTon CO2-eq for emissions in 2020 to attain the 2°C target at the end of the century.
Figure 2. Historic emissions, BaU emissions, the Copenhagen Pledges and the 2°C target.
In order to quantify the Copenhagen pledges of the Non-Annex I group we focus on the pledges
announced by six major emitters (60% of Non-Annex I emissions) and we assume that the other
countries will follow their BaU scenario. As a group, the Copenhagen commitments would imply
29.2 GTon CO2-eq of emissions in the LC case and 28.7 GTon CO2-eq in the HC case (including
LULUCF). The expected level of emissions represents a contraction of -6% (LC) and -8% (HC)
with respect to the BaU scenario. If compared to 1990, emissions would increase instead by 59%
(LC) and 56% (HC). Compared to 2005 the increment would be less dramatic, equal to 11% (LC)
and 9% (HC).
The quantified emissions targets of China and India deserve a comment. We find that both countries
would achieve their Copenhagen targets as the consequence of autonomous efficiency
improvements, triggered by long-term price and technology dynamics, more than by a specific
mitigation policy. The BaU scenario of the WITCH model shows an autonomous contraction of the
carbon intensity of output equal to 57% for China and equal to 45% for India, with respect to 2005
(for a wider discussion see Carraro and Tavoni 2010).8 Since the two targets do not appear to be
binding, in Table 1 we have set 2020 emissions for China and India equal to their BaU scenario.9
Globally, we expect GHGs emissions to be equal to 47.8 GTon CO2-eq in the LC case and 46.2
GTon CO2-eq in the HC case. This represents a contraction of emissions of 11% (LC) and 14%
(HC) with respect to the BaU. However, emissions still increase, not only with respect to 1990
(+25% in LC and +21% in HC) but also with respect to 2005 (+5% in LC and +1% in HC).
8
GHGs intensity of India’s GDP declines by 51% in 2020 with respect to 2005 in the WITCH BaU scenario.
Both the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) expect a contraction of
carbon intensity equal to 47% in China, in 2020 compared to 2005. For India, the EIA and the IEA see a contraction of
carbon intensity of 2020 relative to 2005 equal to 52% and 46%, respectively. Therefore, for both the IEA and the EIA
the intensity targets of China and India are already reached in a reference scenario.
9
7
The information on historic emissions, future BaU emissions and quantified emissions reduction
targets is summarized in Figure 2. From 1990 to 2005 global emissions have increased mainly in
Non-Annex I countries. Annex I countries, as a group, have followed a rather flat pattern: growing
emissions from the USA, Canada, Australia, Japan and fast-growing countries of the European
Union have been compensated by a collapse of emissions in Transition Economies after 1990. We
expect to see emissions rising again in Annex I countries from 2005 until 2020. Globally, emissions
in 2020 are expected to be 8.25 GTon CO2-eq higher than 2005. In the LC case, emissions
reductions with respect to the BaU scenario (6.11 GTon CO2-eq) would mainly come from Annex I
countries (4.25 GTon CO2-eq), but the contribution from Non-Annex I countries would be nonnegligible (1.86 GTon CO2-eq). In the HC case, the additional contraction of emissions would be
modest compared to the LC case: total emissions would decrease only by an additional 1.55 GTon
CO2-eq with respect to the BaU. Two thirds of the additional effort would come from Annex I
countries. By moving to the -30% target Europe would contribute with 0.56 GTon CO2-eq, half of
the Annex I effort but barely noticeable at global level.
This first analysis of the Copenhagen Pledges conveys some important policy messages. First, there
are high chances that emissions of GHGs will not be lower than 2005. This is not good news if we
expect emissions to start declining at a fast pace in the near future. However the efforts will not be
vain. Emissions are expected to depart from their BaU pattern in 2020, at the end of a decade that
will very likely continue to see the fast growth of the most dynamic emerging economies, with
millions of people lifted out of poverty and hungry for energy. The level of commitment registered
at Copenhagen is perhaps not as high as some had wished, but it cannot be judged negligible.
Second, policy makers and negotiators should avoid harsh confrontations on the level of
commitment: moving from low to high pledges does not bring us much closer to the desired
abatement level. Equivalently, unilateral moves to a HC target appear ineffective in controlling
global warming.
Our estimates tend to be slightly lower than in other studies, mainly due to different assumptions on
LULUCF emissions in the BaU, and to a different level of BaU emissions in Non-Annex I
countries. Most studies found that emissions in the HC case will be roughly equal to 48 GTon CO2eq, while we expect them to be equal to 46.2 GTon CO2-eq. Estimates of emissions in the LC case
range from 49.2 to 55 GTon CO2-eq in the literature while we expect them to be 47.8 GTon CO2
(Dellink et al 2010; den Elzen et al 2010; Lowe et al 2010; Höhne et al 2010; Houser 2010; Stern
and Taylor 2010).10
Some caveats apply to our analysis. First, we have used the BaU scenario of the WITCH model to
derive the pledges of Non-Annex I countries in 2020. The level of economic activity in WITCH is
endogenous and is governed by a Ramsey-type optimal growth model that is suited to study
productive capital accumulation in the long-run. With perfect foresight and no uncertainty, the
expansion of economic systems follows a smooth path, unable to reproduce short-term fluctuations
due to economic crises or booms. Therefore, the actual level of economic activity, and of carbon
emissions, in 2020, might well be above or below the long-term pattern of Non-Annex I countries
depicted in our scenario.
10
It must be noticed that many of the estimates in the literature are very similar because they have been generated using
the same BaU scenario produced by the IEA.
8
Greenhouse Gases Emissions (GtCO2-eq)
60
50
45.6
46.2
49.7
2005
2020 HC
2020 HC
Pessimistic
53.9
51.3
47.8
40
30
20
10
0
Annex I
Non-Annex I
2020 LC
2020 LC
Pessimistic
2020 BaU
International Bunkers
Notes: HC stands for High Commitment. LC stands for Low Commitment. In the Pessimistic
Scenarios LULUCF emissions remain as high as in 2005 and surplus AAUs from the first
commitment period are banked and carried over to the second commitment period.
Figure 3. Emissions in the Optimistic and Pessimistic scenarios.
The second caveat concerns the pattern of emissions from LULUCF. Emissions from LULUCF are
exogenous in WITCH and are assumed to decline over time. In the BaU scenario, the contraction of
LULUCF emissions accounts for a net reduction of 2 GTon CO2-eq in 2020, with respect to 2005,
mainly concentrated in Non-Annex I countries. If emissions in 2020 from LULUCF will be as high
as in 2005, an extra 2 GTon CO2-eq should be added to our estimates.
The third caveat concerns emissions from fossil fuels displaced in international bunkers, not
explicitly modelled in WITCH. Since they are non-negligible in level and are one of the fastest
growing sources of carbon emissions, we project emissions in 2020 by applying the same growth
rate observed from 2000 to 2005. Any specific action of countries to reduce emissions from
international bunkers would bias our estimates upward, or vice versa.
The fourth caveat concerns the possible use of surplus emission allowances or assigned amount
units (AAUs), often referred to as “hot air”, of Russia and Ukraine. While we do not make here any
specific assumption on the future use of AAUs, a recent study has shown that banking and use of
surplus AAUs from the first commitment period would add up to 1.5 GTon CO2-eq to the pledges
of Annex I countries (den Elzen et al 2010).
Finally, the LC and HC cases do not span the whole range of plausible scenarios for 2020 GHGs
emissions. The HC seems to be an optimistic scenario. Annex I countries take on the high
commitment pledge, Non-Annex I reduce emissions below a BaU scenario that already sees a
marked contraction of energy intensity. LULUCF emissions are halved by 2020 and AAUs are not
carried over to the future after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The LC scenario
has slightly higher emissions, but the gap between the two is not large. In Figure 3 we compare
these two benchmark cases with two pessimistic alternatives in which emissions from LULUCF in
2020 remain as high as in the present and AAUs are carried over to the future. Emissions in the HC
pessimistic scenario are higher than in the LC scenario, meaning that LULUCF emissions and
9
AAUs need careful consideration. More optimistic views on emissions from international bunkers
would reduce emissions below the benchmark cases.
3. Are the promised emissions reductions sufficient to
control global warming?
Scientific consensus states that severe climate change cannot be avoided unless we limit the earth’s
average temperature rise to something like below 2°C. Specifically, the goal announced by the
“Group of eight” (G8) and the Major Economies Forum (MEF) in L’Aquila in July 2009 and also
mentioned in the Copenhagen Accord, is to keep average temperature to no more than 2.0 °C above
the pre-industrial level, by 2100. The Copenhagen Accord also mentions the necessity to explore
possible ways to constrain temperature increase below 1.5°C.
The GHGs emissions stabilisation scenarios presented in the Fourth Assessment Report (FAR) of
the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007) show that this will require GHGs emissions
to: a) peak before 2015, b) decrease by roughly 5-10% starting from 2020 c) then decline steadily.
In particular, the UNFCCC prescribes a contraction of Annex I emissions from -25% to -40% with
respect to 1990 and Non-Annex I emissions should be -15% to -30% below BaU.
An assessment of post-FAR literature has found that 2020 emissions of GHGs should be in the
range of 20-48 GTon CO2-eq to meet the 2°C target (UNEP 2010). Nicholas Stern has fixed a
“climate responsible target” of 44 GTon CO2-eq in 2020 (Stern and Taylor 2010). Van Vuuren et al
(2010) find that emissions in 2020 should fall in the range of 44 to 46 GTon CO2-eq to attain the
2°C target at the end of the century.
Our HC and LC scenarios fall both in the range of 40-48 GTon CO2-eq – although in the LC case
we are very close to the upper bound of the range – but remain above the “climate responsible
target” (See Figure 2). In the pessimistic case, both the HC and LC would remain above the range
indicated by UNEP (2010).
Controlling whether emissions in 2020 will be in the range indicated by the literature to achieve the
2°C target is certainly an informative comparison. However, it is misleading to assess a very longterm temperature target on action taken to reduce emissions in the short-term. The level of
emissions in 2020 is an important indicator of how strong the commitment is to move forward with
mitigation action, but the implications in terms of long-term temperature rise are overshadowed by
what will be done after 2020. We briefly explain here why this is the case.
Recent work has shown that the contribution to global warming caused by anthropogenic CO2
emissions can be directly related to cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide (Solomon et al 2010).11
11
We do not consider here other GHGs because their lifetime is much shorter than for CO2 and their warming effect is
therefore transitory. Increasing the natural absorption capacity of carbon dioxide by means of afforestation, combined
use of biomass and carbon capture and storage or other artificial methods would relax the budget. Geoengineering
methods would instead not affect the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere but would reduce the temperature increase.
10
Global mean temperature is basically a linear function of the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere. This
direct link between concentrations and temperature suggests thinking in terms of “carbon budget”.
This budget can be “spent” with a certain freedom over time. If the temperature target must be met
with a chance higher than 95%, the carbon budget for the future is equal to 1,000 GTon CO2. If we
are willing to accept that the probability of achieving the 2°C target is just above 50%, the carbon
budget increases to 2,000 GTon CO2. If the probability decreases to just below 50% the carbon
budget increases up to 3,000 GTon CO2 (Solomon et al 2010, Tavoni et al 2010). This means that,
without mitigation policy, according to the WITCH BaU scenario, the budget would be exhausted
in 2030 in the high probability case, in 2045 in the just above 50% case or in 2060 in the just below
50% case.12
It is therefore clear that, although not even mentioned in the text of the Copenhagen Accord, the
probability with which the international community wants to achieve the 2°C target is by far the
most important missing piece of information to test whether we are on the right or wrong track
towards the long-term goal. Let us assume, however, that there is consensus to reduce to the
minimum the probability not to achieve the 2°C target.13 When do we spend the remaining 1,000
GTon CO2?
Tavoni et al. (2010) estimate that a minimum budget of 2,000 GTon CO2 emissions is needed to
allow a fair growth of Non-Annex I countries14 and a floor of emissions in Annex I countries.15 It is
therefore necessary to absorb about 1,000 GTon of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and to store
it in forests or underground, by means of bio-energy with carbon capture and sequestration
(BECCS). Without net negative global emissions of carbon dioxide, the 2°C target can be achieved
only with a probability just below 50%. This simple, back-of-the-envelope calculation is confirmed
by a wide range of scenarios produced by the IAM community (Clarke et al 2010): without net
negative emissions on a gigantic scale (roughly 40 years of emissions), it is not possible to achieve
the 2°C target with a sufficiently high probability. Unfortunately, we still know very little about the
possibility to manage a global carbon dioxide sequestration project. We know very little about the
costs, the policy challenges, the technological feasibility and the repercussions on ecosystems of
what looks closer to geo-engineering than to mitigation action (see also Carraro and Massetti,
2010). The few IAMs scenarios that have shown a feasible pattern of emissions to achieve the 2°C
target with high probability rely on speculative assumptions on costs, technical availability and
feasibility of net negative emissions beyond 2050 (see Clarke et al., 2010, Tavoni and Tol, 2010).
These results are informative, but fragile.
It is therefore clear that few extra GTons of carbon dioxide in 2020 do not much affect the chances
to achieve the 2°C target. Even if we assume inertia in mitigation action, the level of carbon dioxide
emissions in 2020 has modest implications on the long term temperature target. For remaining
below 2°C with high probability what really matters is the possibility to absorb carbon dioxide at an
unprecedented scale. Policy makers should be aware of this important caveat. More attention should
12
WITHC model BaU scenario.
With lower probability the carbon budget is sufficiently large to relieve the pressure on short term targets.
14
For Non-Annex I countries: 1,500 GTon would allow 15 GTon of emissions per year over 100 years. This long-term
level of emissions would be 60% lower than BaU emissions of Non-Annex I countries in 2050, according to WITCH.
15
For Annex I countries: 500 GTon would allow 5GTon of emissions per year over 100 years. This long-term level of
emissions would be 80% lower than BaU emissions of Annex I countries in 2050, according to WITCH.
13
11
be paid to defining the range of probability within which the international community wants to meet
the 2°C target, and to studying the possibility of realizing negative emissions on a vast scale.
Without more information on these two key issues any evaluation of future targets on the basis of
present action is highly speculative.
For these reasons, we do not make heroic assumptions to extrapolate temperature targets from the
estimated level of 2020 emissions, as many other studies have done. We would only add uncertainty
on top of uncertainty. Also, we do not focus on measuring the “gap” between the projected
emissions and a desired target. Rather, we take stock of what is the present politically achievable
level of commitment and we suggest an effective way to push forward the climate agenda. The
focus is on what can be done, rather than on what should be done.
Policy makers and negotiators should avoid harsh confrontation on the level of commitment in the
next rounds of negotiations. It is not the right time to renegotiate targets. The Copenhagen pledges
are a sufficiently good starting point. If combined with an efficient allocation of the funding
provisions of the Accord there are high chances to achieve non-negligible emissions reductions and
to start a long-term trend towards a low-carbon world. In the next Section we propose a sensible
approach to the use of the funding provisions of the Accord employing a consistent set of scenarios
produced by the WITCH model.
4. Financing mitigation action in Non-Annex I countries
The main commitment contained in the Copenhagen Accord is to set up a fast track fund that will
consist of $10 billion per year from 2010 to 2012 (totalling $30 billion). If there is sufficient and
transparent action towards mitigation, developed countries have committed to mobilise, jointly,
$100 billion dollars a year by 2020.16 A significant portion of such funding will flow through a
newly established Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (CGCF).17
Recent research with an enhanced version of the WITCH model – designed to quantify the optimal
time profile of investments in adaptation and in mitigation – clearly shows that it is optimal to
invest immediately in mitigation actions, while delaying most investments in adaptation to the
future (Bosello, Carraro and Cian 2009). The reason is that it is imperative to control greenhouse
gas emissions as soon as possible to attain low-temperature targets, while the short-term climate
change impacts are still moderate and given that adaptation measures can be put in place relatively
quickly in the future.
We therefore suggest that the financial resources mobilised in Copenhagen should be used primarily
to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The CGCF could be transformed into the International Bank
for Emissions Allowance Acquisition (IBEAA) envisaged by Bradford (2008). The resulting
climate architecture would not follow a pure “purchase of a global public good approach” (Bradford
16
It has not been specified what the level of funding would be between 2012 and 2020.
It has not yet been decided what fraction of the total funding will flow trough the CGCF. For simplicity, in the
discussion that follows we assume that the CGCF will distribute all international funding promised in the Copenhagen
Accord.
17
12
Annex I - High Commitment
Cost of
abatement
< 10$
>10$ and <20$
>20$ and <30$
< 30$
Annex I - Low Commitment
Non-Annex I Commitment
High
Low
BaU
Cost of
abatement
0.0
3.2
1.3
4.5
0.4
3.3
1.3
5.0
2.3
3.3
1.3
6.9
< 10$
>10$ and <20$
>20$ and <30$
< 30$
Non-Annex I Commitment
High
Low
BaU
0.0
3.4
1.3
4.7
0.6
3.3
1.3
5.2
2.5
3.3
1.3
7.1
Notes: Abatement potential is measured in GTon CO2-eq. The abatement potential in Non-Annex I countries has been estimated running three global
GHGs tax scenarios. The tax is on all GHGs and includes emissions from LULUCF. The three taxes start at 10, 20 and 30$ at 2020 and increase by 5%
per year thereafter. Tax revenues are recycled lump-sum into the economies. We then assume that Annex I countries cover 20% of their Copenhagen
Pledges target using international offsets. The abatement potential shown here is net of international offsets to meet the Copenhagen Pledges.
Table 2. Mitigation potential in Non-Annex I countries, at different costs, with different assumptions
on the level of commitment.
2008) because there would still be a multilateral, non-binding but official, set of emissions
reductions pledges that countries need to fulfil. The second difference is that the CGCF is meant to
finance adaptation and mitigation in Non-Annex I countries alone, while the IBEAA proposed by
Bradford (2008) has a global scope. The resulting climate architecture would be similar to the “No
Cap but Trade” proposal put forward by Tol and Rehdanz (2008) and proposed again in Tol (2010).
Let us move a step forward and quantify what the potential impact of the CGCF would be on
emissions in 2020, assuming different allocation of funds between mitigation and adaptation. We
estimate cumulative abatement potential in 2020 using scenarios produced by the WITCH model.
The advantage of our approach is that we can use a consistent set of scenarios to study BaU
emissions, to estimate the Copenhagen pledges and to assess the mitigation potential. It is important
to recognize that mitigation opportunities in Non-Annex I countries depend on the level of
abatement effort in Annex I countries, on domestic targets and on the number of international
offsets. For this reason we start by estimating how many GTon of CO2-eq can be sponsored by the
CGCF and at what cost, under different levels of commitments, as displayed in Table 2. We assume
that Annex I countries always cover 20% of the domestic abatement target by means of offsets in
Non-Annex I countries. The mitigation potential that we consider is therefore net of international
offsets to meet the Copenhagen Pledges.
A first analysis of Table 2 reveals that if Annex I countries have a low commitment and Non-Annex
I countries follow their BaU pattern of emissions, there are 4.5 - 6.9 GTon CO2-eq of mitigation
potential in Non-Annex I countries at a cost below 30$ per Ton of CO2-eq. The mitigation mix
includes energy efficiency measures, fuel switching, a new mix in electricity generation, reduction
of non-CO2 gases and avoided deforestation. The right balance of the mitigation mix is
endogenously determined in WITCH by taking into consideration a range of interaction channels
among countries and a future path of carbon prices. The estimated mitigation potential is therefore
consistent with long-term action to reduce global warming.18 Higher effort to reduce emissions in
Annex I countries – at a constant level of effort in Non-Annex I countries – reduces the amount of
18
We have run three GHGs tax scenarios to have three different levels of abatement in 2020. The starting level for the
taxes in 2020 is 10, 20 and 30$. The taxes grow at 5% per year afterwards.
13
7
Gton CO2-eq
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
A1 HC - NA1 HC
A1 HC - NA1 LC
A1 HC - NA1 BaU
A1 LC - NA1 HC
Share of CGCF for Mitigation in NA1 countries:
10%
A1 LC - NA1 LC
25%
50%
75%
A1 LC - NA1 BaU
100%
Notes: HC stands for High Commitment. LC stands for Low Commitment. A1 stands for Annex I countries; NA1 stands for Non-Annex I countries. 20% of
abatement in Annex I countries is covered by offsets in Non-Annex I countries.
Figure 4. International offsets available under alternative schemes of the CGCF and alternative
commitment levels of Annex I and Non-Annex I countries.
35
30
$ Ton CO2-eq
25
20
15
10
5
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
GTon CO2-eq
Domestic Abatement
Offsets for A1Pledge
10% CGCF
25% CGCF
50% CGCF
75% CGCF
100% CGCF
Figure 5. The distribution of GHGs abatement potential in Non-Annex I countries in 2020, LC scenario.
mitigation that can be financed via the CGCF because the demand for offsets increases. Also,
higher effort from Non-Annex I countries, – at constant level of effort in Annex I countries –
reduces the number of available mitigation projects that can be financed by international donors.
With the level of emissions prescribed by the high Copenhagen pledge in Non-Annex I countries,
there would be no mitigation opportunities below 10$ per Ton of CO2-eq.
Figure 4 shows how large the impact of the CGCF on global emissions efforts can be with different
combinations of commitment and with allocation rules for the CGCF. In case of high commitment
(A1 HC – NA1 HC), 50% of CGCF in 2020 would allow the global reduction of emissions by a
further 2.5 GTon CO2-eq; with a more relaxed level of commitment (A1 LC – NA1 BaU) the same
amount of emissions reductions could be financed with only 25% of the CGCF for mitigation.
14
( A)
(B)
60
GHG Emissions (Gton CO2-eq)
GHG Emissions (Gton CO2-eq)
60
55
50
45
40
46.2 Gton CO2 -eq
35
30
1990
1995
2000
High Commitment
2005
2010
2015
Low Commitment
55
50
45
40
45.3 Gton CO2-eq
35
30
1990
2020
BaU
1995
2000
50% CGCF
25% CGCF
Low Commitment
BaU
2015
2020
10% CGCF
60
GHG Emissions (Gton CO2-eq)
60
GHG Emissions (Gton CO2-eq)
2010
(D)
(C)
55
50
45
40
43.8 Gton CO2-eq
35
30
1990
2005
55
50
45
40
43.9 Gton CO2-eq
35
30
1995
75% CGCF
10% CGCF
2000
2005
2010
50% CGCF
Low Commitment
2015
25% CGCF
BaU
2020
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
75% CGCF
50% CGCF
25% CGCF
10% CGCF
A1 LC and NA1 BaU
BaU
2020
Figure 6. Different combinations of Copenhagen commitments and international funding of
mitigation in Non-Annex I countries.
Figure 5 presents for the A1 LC – NA1 LC scenario a detailed picture of how the abatement
potential could be shared between domestic mitigation, international offsets to cope with the
Copenhagen pledges and international finance, different allocation rules of the CGCF.
Our analysis shows that the same mitigation target can be achieved by a different combination of
domestic pledges and international funding of mitigation. High pledges and international financing
of mitigation can be substitute. Given the present climate deadlock the financial provisions of the
Copenhagen Accord could compensate the lack of more energetic action on the domestic mitigation
side.
Figure 6 gives illustrative examples of the possible combinations between financing and domestic
mitigation actions. Panel A shows the level of emissions with the HC pledge and no funding of
mitigation in Non-Annex I. Panel B considers instead a LC pledge plus 50% of the CGCF for
15
mitigation. With support of international finance it would be possible to more than compensate the
lack of high commitment in domestic mitigation effort. Panel C and D tell a different story. In Panel
C, both Annex I and Non-Annex I countries commit to the low end of the pledges and Annex I
countries devote 50% of the CGCF to mitigation. In Panel D the only difference is that Non-Annex
I countries do not make any voluntary domestic abatement effort. The resulting level of emissions
would be practically identical in the two cases, the reason being that the cost of abatement measures
increases due to the competition of domestic and internationally sponsored mitigation projects.
5. Conclusions
The mitigation targets set in Copenhagen will have a moderate, although non-negligible impact on
global emissions in 2020. Emissions will increase by 26%-22% with respect to 1990, but they will
be 13%-16% lower than in the BaU scenario. This reduction will be particularly remarkable in years
in which fast-growing developing economies will be responsible for the greatest share of global
GHGs emissions. In a pessimistic scenario, with low commitment from both Annex I and NonAnnex I parties, pessimistic assumptions on LULUCF emissions, banking of AAUs and
increasingly high emissions from international bunkers, emissions would be only 6% below BaU in
2020. For both levels of commitment emissions will be higher than in 2005.19
Nonetheless, our best estimate lies within the range of 40-48 GTon CO2-eq indicated by a recent
study by UNEP as a safe corridor towards the 2°C target. However, we prefer not to attempt to
measure the gap between the level of emissions implied by the Copenhagen Accord and what would
be needed to limit global warming below 2°C. Also, we do not make heroic assumptions to quantify
how the Copenhagen pledges will affect global temperature in 2100. As opposed to the focus of
most of the literature so far, we believe that it is impossible to make sensible predictions on future
temperature by looking only at emissions in the very short-term. At the same time, the uncertainty
on the long-term implications of any target on global emissions in 2020 and the very poor chances
of an agreement on more ambitious emissions cuts, suggest a shift in the focus of the debate away
from what should be done towards what can be done.
To this end, the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund represents a formidable tool to finance
investment in the development of low carbon technologies (and their diffusion) in energy
efficiency, in avoiding deforestation, in carbon capture and storage technology, etc (see also
Bradford 2002, Tol and Rehdanz 2008, Tol 2010).
We estimated the potential of using different shares of the CGCF to finance abatement actions in
Non-Annex I countries. The number of cheap abatement options (<30$ per Ton CO2-eq) is large
enough to reduce emissions by several GTon CO2-eq in 2020. Although we realize the complexity
of managing such widespread offsets schemes, it cannot be denied that there are low- hanging fruits
to be picked, especially in the form of reduced emissions from deforestation. For example, 25% of
19
It is important to note that the simple fact that emissions in 2020 will not be lower than emissions in 2005 does not
imply that emissions have not peaked between 2005 and 2020.
16
the CGCF in 2020 will enable to scale by a factor of 15 the amount of resources invested by the
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility in REDD projects.20
Future negotiations should devote greater attention to discussing opportunities to reduce emissions
based on what has already been established in the Copenhagen Accord. Trying to renegotiate the
targets and fuelling a harsh confrontation on the commitment levels of individual countries will not
make the fight against global warming any easier.
20
The amount of funding at March 2009 was 1.7$ billions (Bosquet et al 2010).
17
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(lxxxvi) This paper was presented at the Conference on "Urban and Regional Economics" organised by the
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and FEEM, held in Milan on 12-13 October 2009.
(lxxxvii) This paper was presented at the Conference on “Economics of Culture, Institutions and Crime”
organised by SUS.DIV, FEEM, University of Padua and CEPR, held in Milan on 20-22 January 2010.
(lxxxviii) This paper was presented at the International Workshop on “The Social Dimension of Adaptation to
Climate Change”, jointly organized by the International Center for Climate Governance, Centro EuroMediterraneo per i Cambiamenti Climatici and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, held in Venice, 18-19 February
2010.
(lxxxix) This paper was presented at the 15th Coalition Theory Network Workshop organised by the
Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d’Aix-Marseille, (GREQAM), held in Marseille, France, on
June 17-18, 2010.