Download Climate Conflicts: Extricating post-Kyoto Debates in Science and Policy

Climate Conflicts:
Extricating post-Kyoto Debates in Science and Policy
By Saleem H. Ali
University of Vermont, Rubenstein School of Environment and Natural Resources
Email: [email protected]
Chapter for Grover, Velma ed. Climate change: Kyoto – Ten Years and Still
Counting. To be published by Science Publishers (New Hampshire, USA) and
Oxford and IBH Ltd., India, 2007
DRAFT (October, 2006)
DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION
Introduction
Climate change has been one of the most contentious environmental concerns for
both scientists and policy-makers. The debate has been increasingly polarized by
various interest groups that continue to challenge each other's credibility. Even
the popular media has picked up on the polarization of the debate exemplified by
movies such as The Day After Tomorrow and the recent documentary produced by
former Vice President Al Gore titled An Inconvenient Truth. Skeptics of climate
change have been equally strident in their publications ranging from titles such as
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such State of Fear by bestselling author Michael Crichton to the recent book
published by the Cato Institute titled Meltdown: The Predictable Distortion of
Global Warming.
This paper provides a conflict assessment of the narratives on climate
change in scientific circles and how they have been appropriated by various
special interest groups in different parts of the world. The analysis attempts to
provide clarity to the issues and assumptions being made by each side in an
attempt to improve the success of future dialogue within the scientific community
as well as between scientists and policy-makers. In addition a more productive
policy frame for addressing many of the concerns about global warming is
provided.
Questions on which the conflict is predicated
Until recently there has been little attempt by social scientists to explore the
issues of climate change from a conflict resolution perspective. Dessler and
Parson (2006) provide the first systematic examination of the climate change
debate and suggest that four key questions first need to be recognized:
•
Is the climate changing?
•
Are human activities responsible for the observed changes?
•
What are the likely climate changes in the future?
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•
What will be the impacts of the future changes?
I would add to this series a fifth question: Can human intervention to reduce these
changes have any impact? This fifth question is particularly important to consider
in order to formulate effective policy recommendations. The question also ties in
with Dessler and Parson’s suggestion that we extricate positive from normative
statements about global warming – the former being expository material about the
state of the world’s climate and the latter implying how we would like the world
to behave.
Unraveling scientific orthodoxy
The main challenge arises regarding the interface of natural versus anthropogenic
impacts on the climate. Scientific methods and peer review processes are
considered the touchstone for ensuring objectivity. However, proponents of
climate change are also limited with an important additional imperative of time
constraints to ensure effective remedial action. Therefore, the peer review process
must proceed with an important normative concern in mind – if climate change is
occurring, action must be imminent or else the research will be in vain. This
inherent normative element in climate change research does indeed give
proponents of climate change a more activist edge than other scientists.
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Critics of climate change such as MIT Professor Richard Lindzen have also
argued that the peer review process has itself been corrupted by the
preponderance of views about climate change. An interesting critique of the peer
review process in climate change from the prestigious journal Science is presented
in Box 1. In a recent article for the Wall Street Journal Lindzen (2006) describes
several instances where skeptics of climate change were chastised for their views.
He also tries to show how any opponents of the dominant orthodoxy about global
warming are “libelously” discredited and dismissed as ‘stooges of the fossil fuel
industry.”
Indeed the conflict in this regard has been stepped up a notch by a recent
lawsuit filed in California in which scientists who are skeptical of global warming
are being ensnared – giving further credence to allegations of censorship. The
state of California, Environmental Defense, and the Natural Resources Defense
Council
have
asked
automobile
companies
to
produce
any
and
all
communications they have had with fifteen scientists critical of global warming
theories, whose research has been cited in court documents. Even the relatively
liberal Boston Globe appeared to support Lindzen as he tries to clear his name and
affirms that he has never communicated with the auto companies involved in the
lawsuit and only received a total of $10,000 from any fossil fuel sector for his
research in the early nineties. The Globe columnist Alex Beam (2006) ended his
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article on this lawsuit with the following:
“Of course Lindzen isn't a fake
scientist, he's an inconvenient scientist. No wonder you're not supposed to listen
to him.”
Box 1: Critique of peer review process by climate skeptics
Eric Rignot and Pannir Kanagaratnam published a paper in Science in early 2006 (Vol. 311, pp
986-990) claiming that glaciers along the periphery of Greenland are melting at a rapidly
increasing rate. Another paper on this subject was published by Science just last year (Vol. 310,
pp.1013-1016). Ola Johannessen did not consider direct ice lost by glaciers into the ocean but
instead only focused on elevations changes. Johannssen showed that increasing snowfall in
Greenland was leading to greater ice accumulations than had previously been measured and this
was acting to slow Greenland's contribution to sea level rise. It was conspicuously ignored in this
new report.
Why would Science publish this paper [Rignot & Kanagaratnam] with no reference to
Johannessen's earlier paper showing that Greenland is accumulating ice at a rate of about
5.4±0.2cm/year? Johannessen even used data from some of the same satellites. What's more,
Johannessen used real data and Hanna et al., cited by Rignot, used a model of surface melt. And
what does all of this have to do with global warming? A look again at real data is instructive.
Temperatures fluctuations around Greenland are part of a phenomenon -- known as the Atlantic
Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) -- that connects with temperature changes further south, in the
hurricane formation regions of the tropical Atlantic. The AMO goes through, as its name suggests,
multidecadal swings from being cooler than normal both in the ocean around Greenland and in the
tropical Atlantic, to being warmer than normal in both places. And modelers have suggested that
the AMO has been part of the natural system for at least the past 10-15 centuries. When the AMO
is in its positive (warm) phase, the Atlantic hurricane seasons become active with more and
stronger storms; and, apparently, Greenland's glaciers flow faster and dump more ice into the
ocean.
When the AMO is in its negative (cool) phase, hurricane activity in the Atlantic is suppressed and
Greenland's glaciers flow slowly. The AMO changed from negative to positive in 1995 -- and
since then hurricanes have become very active and glacier output has been accelerating. There is
no need to invoke global warming for any of this.
So what we have here are two stories making a lot of headlines -- Greenland is melting and
hurricanes are strengthening. Both things are true. And, again, looking at real data it is apparent
that at this time they are both part of a natural cycle that has been going on for thousands of years.
Excerpt from Michael 2006
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At the same time, proponents of global warming have also been raising
concerns about censorship but not by scientist but rather by policy-makers. Box 2
describes how NASA scientist Jim Hansen considers the government has been
constraining his public communication ever since he parted ways with the Bush
administration.
However, the manipulation by political forces is different from scientists
insofar that it is often framed in terms of meeting public opinion rather than some
objective reality. Thus politicians may claim to respond to irrational fears of the
public regardless of some greater allegiance to the public good based on the most
exhaustive review of science. The question of causal directionality about public
opinion being shaped by advocacy and policy intervention rather than policy
responding to public opinion is particularly prescient in this case. Since much of
the public is not in a position to evaluate science, they are likely to believe those
elements in the polity with whom they have a trusting relationship. Hence climate
change becomes an issue that can be very easily manipulated by politicians
depending on how the matter could be linked to other election priorities.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established
by the United Nations, partly to prevent such manipulation of science by
policymakers. However, concerns have been raised about the objectivity of the
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assessments. For example, a recent review of the IPCC by the House of Lords
(2005) in preparation for the G-8 summit stated that:
“We have some concerns about the objectivity of the IPCC process, with some of
its emissions scenarios and summary documentation apparently influenced by
political considerations. There are significant doubts about some aspects of the
IPCC’s emissions scenario exercise, in particular, the high emissions scenarios.
The Government should press the IPCC to change their approach. The
Government should press the IPCC to reflect in a more balanced way the costs
and benefits of climate change.”
Such criticism is not necessarily indicative of the performance of the IPCC
but rather the limitations of any institution that is grappling with the synthesis of
such a high degree of complexity and has multiple mandates stretching from
empirical research collection to prescriptive advice for adaptation. While climate
proponents are fairly confident that dissenters are a very small minority, the issue
continues to be far from resolved on even numeric terms. For example a notable
article by Orestes (2004) suggested that there is a trifling minority of scientists
who differed from the view that anthropogenic greenhouse gases were drivers of
climate. However, as a major skeptic of climate, Gerhard (2006) later pointed out,
the article had ignored a petition by 17,000 signatories under the auspices of the
Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine that challenges the orthodoxy.
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Box 2: Example of censorship allegations by proponents of global warming
James E. Hansen, longtime director of the agency's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, said in an
interview that officials at NASA headquarters had ordered the public affairs staff to review his
coming lectures, papers, postings on the Goddard Web site and requests for interviews from
journalists. Dr. Hansen said he would ignore the restrictions. "They feel their job is to be this
censor of information going out to the public," he said. Dean Acosta, deputy assistant
administrator for public affairs at the space agency, said there was no effort to silence Dr. Hansen.
"That's not the way we operate here at NASA," Mr. Acosta said. "We promote openness and we
speak with the facts."
In 2001, Dr. Hansen was invited twice to brief Vice President Dick Cheney and other cabinet
members on climate change. White House officials were interested in his findings showing that
cleaning up soot, which also warms the atmosphere, was an effective and far easier first step than
curbing carbon dioxide. He fell out of favor with the White House in 2004 after giving a speech at
the University of Iowa before the presidential election, in which he complained that government
climate scientists were being muzzled and said he planned to vote for Senator John Kerry. Among
the restrictions, according to Dr. Hansen and an internal draft memorandum he provided to The
Times, was that his supervisors could stand in for him in any news media interviews. In one call,
George Deutsch, a recently appointed public affairs officer at NASA headquarters, rejected a
request from a producer at National Public Radio to interview Dr. Hansen, said Leslie McCarthy, a
public affairs officer responsible for the Goddard Institute. Citing handwritten notes taken during
the conversation, Ms. McCarthy said Mr. Deutsch called N.P.R. "the most liberal" media outlet in
the country. She said that in that call and others, Mr. Deutsch said his job was "to make the
president look good" and that as a White House appointee that might be Mr. Deutsch's priority.
"He's not trying to create a war over this," said Larry D. Travis, an astronomer who is Dr.
Hansen's deputy at Goddard, "but really feels very strongly that this is an obligation we have as
federal scientists, to inform the public." The fight between Dr. Hansen and administration officials
echoes other recent disputes. At climate laboratories of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, for example, many scientists who routinely took calls from reporters five years
ago can now do so only if the interview is approved by administration officials in Washington, and
then only if a public affairs officer is present or on the phone. Where scientists' points of view on
climate policy align with those of the administration, however, there are few signs of restrictions
on extracurricular lectures or writing. One example is Indur M. Goklany, assistant director of
science and technology policy in the policy office of the Interior Department. For years, Dr.
Goklany, an electrical engineer by training, has written in papers and books that it may be better
not to force cuts in greenhouse gases because the added prosperity from unfettered economic
activity would allow countries to exploit benefits of warming and adapt to problems.
Excerpt from Revkin, 2006
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In order to understand the complexities of this conflict, it is essential to
understand the evolution of arguments for and against global warming. As shown
in Figure 1, the problem of global warming starts with an empirical observation
about an increase in various greenhouse gases (GHGs) from human sources.
There is no debate about this issue, as well as the next step (rise of GHGs in
atmosphere) which are accepted by all sides in the controversy (hence italicized).
It is important to note that the question of endogeniety (causal directionality) is
also posed at multiple levels. For example, some scientists have raised questions
about whether the rise in carbon dioxide is caused by a change in climate itself,
reversing part of the assumed causality. The diagram is constructed in the
conventional engineering format.
Starting off with what is known for certain, we can move along and see
how differences in opinion arise, based on differing assumptions.
The two
decision diamonds in the diagram critically suggest how we can get stuck in a
loop of uncertainty and decision paralysis in the global warming debate. The first
point of indecision occurs with observational uncertainty because of the enormous
complexity of variables in climate science. The second point of indecision, that
can lead to a spiraling of inaction, occurs when we consider prescriptive means to
reduce the impact of climate change. At this point, the inevitability of change
shifts the argument to adaptation without considering.
9
Part of the problem with using the inevitability of change as a pretext for
inaction is that the initial intention of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change is missed. The convention and the subsequent Kyoto protocol was never
intended to abort climate change but rather to allow for adaptation to proceed with
minimal disruption to human activities. As Article 2 of the convention states:
“The ultimate objective of this Convention is to achieve stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level
should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and
to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”
While critics may still feel that there is little we could do to adapt constructively
to climate change, it is important to at least appreciate that there was a measured
resignation to climatic change even in the original convention rather than any
draconian notion of aborting change – whether natural or anthropogenic.
10
Figure 1: Argument flow for climate change debates
Maybe
Yes
Can we now
affect the
outcome of
this change ?
Policy options (go to Figure 2)
No
Natural Sources of GHGs
Yes
GHG
emissions
from human
sources
Rise in
GHG levels
in
atmosphere
Impact on
Global
Climate
Is there a
change in
climate that
we can
observe?
Methods from climate science
Peer review
Maybe
Do more research
Time constraint for policy intervention due to
possible irreversibility of impacts
11
No
Status quo is
acceptable
Creating division among environmentalists
Another interesting aspect of climate change has been its propensity to
create divisions even within environmental ranks. This is largely due to the fact
that the time sensitivity of policy response has led some environmentalists to
consider this as a priority and a global emergency at the expense of other ideals.
On the one hand it has led to structural condemnation of the environmental
movement by writers such Schellenberger and Nordhaus (2005), who accuse
“environmentalists’ failures to the incuriosity about the human (read: social)
sciences, like social psychology and their scientific fetishization of the ‘natural’
sciences.”
At the other end are green activists who are in such a state of panic about
global warming that they are willing to embrace erstwhile ecological taboos such
as nuclear power and large-scale hydroelectric energy. One recent confrontation
of this kind occurred in the United Kingdom when veteran environmentalist
James Lovelock (originator of the Gaia hypothesis) declared that only nuclear
energy could save the world from global warming. However, many mainstream
environmentalist have rejected this view. According to Stephen Tindale,
executive director of Greenpeace UK, "Lovelock is right to demand a drastic
response to climate change; he's right to question previous assumptions. But he's
wrong to think nuclear power is any part of the answer. Nuclear creates enormous
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problems, waste we don't know what to do with; radioactive emissions;
unavoidable risk of accident and terrorist attack" (McCarthy 2004).
There are two factors contributing to this internal conflict: the global scale
of the threat posed by global warming for those who believe it has apocalyptic
ramifications. Therefore, using the precautionary principle in such a context puts
global warming ahead of other environmental factors. Furthermore, the
immediacy for action tends to negate due diligence and care in policy formulation
and quick solutions such as nuclear or large-scale hydropower are tempting to
pursue. That is not to say that such alternatives might not be worth considering,
but rather that much of the rhetoric from activists such as Lovelock is spurred out
of intense fear rather than reasoned analysis.
Extricating the conflict
Figure 2 shows a decision sequence of how policy choice to address global
warming might be considered once a decision has been made to address the issue
at a policy level (a continuation from Figure 1).
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Figure 2: Efficient policy decision sequence for action on climate change
Policy to intervene in climate
change on premise that
“winners” will be greater than
“losers” in climatic change
Yes
Investment in
carbon
sequestration
Is there a
purely tech.
solution?
Research
Capacity
No
Invest in emission
trading mechanisms
Yes
Is there a
purely market
solution?
Economic
Efficiency
No
Behavioral responses
Calculating costs:
*Investment expenses for
technologies
*Lost industrial jobs
*Lifestyle changes
* Security of energy supply
*Econ. and ecol. cost of
alternatives such as nuclear
Methods
for Calc.
Calculating benefits:
*Averting damage from
physical changes
*Reduced ecological
footprint
*New industrial
opportunities
* Security of energy supply
Local and national
calculation
Global
accountability
and equity
POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION
Global calculation
14
It is interesting to note that main missing link between Figures 1 and 2 is the
assumption that policy intervention in climate change is required because, at an
aggregate level, winners from this change will be fewer than the losers. Recent
writings have also raised the question that with a global problem such as global
warming, it may be inappropriate to even consider localized preferences or
“winners” given the enormity of the coping with the threat (Adger et al 2006). At
the same time framing the issue in terms of winners and losers (at least in the
short-term) might explain how conflicts of this kind arise. Hence the issue
becomes one of distributive bargaining to compensate for differential impacts
rather than common allegiance to a global problem.
The next part of the decision flow chart focuses on how policy-makers are
likely to approach the issue in terms of prioritizing solutions. The technological
question is first asked since there is always inertia regarding behavioral changes.
Note also that the solution box in this regard focuses on sequestration
technologies rather than other technological fixes such as hybrid cars or ethanol
etc. All other technological solutions will require some level of behavioral
changes, whereas sequestration technology assumes status quo behavior and a
repertoire of knowledge that can be tapped.
The next step tends to be market mechanisms which also make an
essential assumption about the efficiency of the market in allocating carbon
credits. In this case money might compensate directly for behavioral inertia,
15
though in the long-run it may also create incentives for behavioral change. Again
the challenge is considering whether the timeframe within which the market could
function efficiently without violations is enough for effective mitigation of
climate change effects. Issues of fairness and justice are also raised in this regard,
since poorer communities would likely be victimized by the pollution credits
bought by industry that operate there. The outcome lends credence to the
hypothesis proposed by Wildavsky (1988) that implementation of the
precautionary principle in market settings tends to favor those with more power
and resources.
At the same time it could be argued that not addressing climate change
would impact small island states that have far more to lose and have far less
power in global decision-making. Hence the power struggle could be exemplified
in both directions which is at the heart of the North-South divide over climate
change and resulted in contentions leading up to the Kyoto Protocol.
Once we move to the next step in the decision sequence wherein
behavioral responses are needed, cost-benefit analysis becomes inevitable. This is
where we are also highly dependent on methods for calculating these metrics.
Economic factors such as the use of high discount rates in calculating future
benefits (thereby reducing the present value) are exemplifications of this
phenomenon. The resulting calculation then needs to be evaluated at a local level
as well as at a global level. Depending on the primacy of allegiances to global
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systems versus local impact, the policy intervention is made. The impact of global
governance structures in this phase of the decision analysis is crucial and the
lapses in the Kyoto protocol are clearly caused by imperfections in accountability
of member states to global institution such as the United Nations.
Apart from such structural factors related to global equity concerns, there
are also serious problems with the way the climate change debate is presented in
public forums which leads to escalation of the conflict. For example, Levy and
Egan (2003) quote a former vice president for an auto company vice president
about his misgivings about climate change as follows:
“There are people who have cast the automobile as a villain. It is a puritanical
view, that we are having too much fun, that we have too much mobility and
freedom, that suburban sprawl is bad. They think we should all live in beehives.”
Clearly the defensive posturing here is caused by a perceived threat to the
car industry itself. However, the major connection between cars and climate
change has more to do with the fuel being used rather than any inherent
misgivings about cars per se. Since many environmentalists conflate their
concerns about excessive consumption in general with climate conflicts, the
results can be a framing of the debate in terms of whether cars are good or bad,
rather than the more immediate question of whether fossil fuel usage should be
reduced.
17
At the same time this provides opponents of climate change to caricature
the debate and frame this in terms of a class of consumer ideologies and
marginalizing environmentalists as radicals who want us to live in “beehives.”
Similarly, the urgency of scientists to respond to climate change is often
dismissed as being theocratic, as illustrated by the following statement by a
notable European climate skeptic:
“But the human / fossil fuels emissions equals catastrophic climate change
remains a public orthodoxy to be defended at all costs. It is becoming similar to
the arguments between Darwinists, neo-Darwinists and Creationists, all of whom
attempt to explain evolution but none of whom have any idea how to come to
terms with genetics, uncertainty and modernity, lets alone all of the holes in their
hypotheses, in order to back up their lucrative prejudices. But together with the
climate change business, the whole keeps a lot of snouts in a taxpayer-funded
trough of public orthodoxy” (Kielmas, 2006)
It is also important to note that the conflict over climate change is
exacerbated because visual drivers are often less palpable in climate change.
When we do get large-scale visual drivers such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 that
are tenuously linked to climate change, there is dramatic dissent that dilutes any
likely policy impact. Such dissent is nevertheless genuine and not easily
dismissed as exemplified by the resignation of researcher Chris Landsea from the
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in protest of a speech given by the
lead author of the IPCC Kevin Trenbirth at Harvard in which he linked the 2004
Atlantic hurricane season to climate change.
In other cases, attempts have been made to connect climate change to
more palpable examples of human suffering in the domain of civil conflict or the
proliferation of diseases. However, these issues have been addressed with some
measure of caution by professional associations in the health sciences. For
example, The Royal Society for Tropical Medicine and Hygiene stated in its
proceedings that “both conflict and climate change may produce serious negative
health consequences. However, there is insufficient evidence that climate change,
e.g. through environmental degradation or freshwater shortages, leads to conflict
as is often claimed. Also, current theory on conflict would refute this hypothesis”
(Sondorp and Patel 2003).
Thus climate change continues to be a pervasive source of dissent and
discord within the scientific community as well as among policy-makers.
However, such dissent should not be an excuse for inaction, specially in these
heady days of preventative warfare. Comparative security analysts might also
argue that since the United States is willing to incur over $500 billion dollars in
preventative wars in the Middle East over a five-year timeframe, some measure of
serious consideration to preventative strategies on climate change is also in order.
19
Conclusion: Moving towards conflict resolution?
Given the complexity of the conflict of the causality involved in climate
change and the difficulty in empirical observation and ascription, it is highly
unlikely that the conflict can be resolved on purely scientific terms. If we continue
to articulate our call for action on purely scientific terms about diagnosing the
problem, we are likely to remain entrapped in the cycle of further research or
incremental policies that might not get us the results we seek. Even if we can
claim to have scientific consensus through bodies such as the IPCC, the dissenting
voices will remain in the background and polarization is likely to continue.
If the main goal is reduction of global warming effects, we should invest
our scientific resources to provide solutions to these challenges in ways that are
most socially acceptable. However, if the goal is to go beyond just global
warming and change consumer behavior on ethical and moral grounds, then
simply focusing on global warming as a driver is likely to muddle the planning
process for preventative action.
Focusing on other derivative impacts of some drivers of global warming
might also resolve the conflict because there is less teleological uncertainty about
some other resource constraints. The most significant focal point of such action is
20
the “peak oil” movement that seeks to look for alternative sources of energy on
the very simple and irrefutable premise that fossil fuels are indeed nonrenewable.
There is, however, a complication to this approach since one can also
argue that despite being nonrenewable it makes sense to at least harness all the
energy we can from existing supplies of fossil fuels. At this point the security
argument for measured conservation of these limited supplies is likely to be more
productive. Investing in alternative sources of energy is likely to be useful in the
long-run because diversification makes sense from a risk management
perspective.
Indeed, oil companies such as Chevron (2006) are following this approach
to tackling the debate rather than being mired in diagnostic controversy regarding
climate change. Gone are the days of the Global Climate Coalition – an industry
effort to actively resist regulations of fossil fuel emissions. The organization was
disbanded in 2002 as there was growing realization that we need a less
confrontational approach to the multiple facets of fossil fuel impacts. Levy and
Egan (2003) suggest that the climate debate is perhaps evolving towards the
concept of “negotiated hegemony,” suggested by the great Italian political theorist
Antonio Gramsci. The work of Gramsci was a critique of Marxist analysis which
had suggested economic determinism as the basis of power for select classes that
operate without the consent of the polity.
21
Instead the concept of negotiated
hegemony suggests that power in such contemporary conflicts is dependent on
coalitions and compromises and consent from numerous constituents.
Often an antidote to international conflicts on such matters can be
grassroots community action and decisions to change policy through incremental
exemplification. As long as due process and democratic procedures are used to
undertake such actions through state laws (in the absence of national laws) or
local programs for change, conflict can be mitigated (Petersen and Rose 2006).
Local climate change action programs are following the path of grassroots efforts
such as those for selling organic food that have gained national momentum.
Some analysts of climate conflicts at the North-South level have also
focused on the problem of per-capita framing of emission reductions which tends
to lead to defensive posturing and favoring higher population areas (that posit
their own set of environmental challenges). Raymond (2006) refers to this as a
“Gordian knot in climate policy.” He suggests instead that we focus on more clear
distinctions between wants versus needs of fossil fuel emissions (luxury emissions
versus essential emissions) and base our arguments from transitions on these
principles to resolve conflicts. Yet, this approach might still not address the
physical challenge of reducing the biggest contributors to emissions which might
be “need-oriented” power plants rather than luxury-based cars.
22
Conflict over the science and policy of climate change will require us to
be innovative in looking for justification for proposed solutions that tap into many
of these disparate constituencies. Instead of having a debate on climate change a
reframing of the issue as fossil fuel depletion and coping strategies at a global
level is likely to be more consequential. Linking climate policy to other
established environmental agreements as a means of “regime interplay” is also
possible such as with biodiversity conservation (Kim 2004). We also must be
careful to not let expeditious action on climate change lead to spillover problems
from alternatives such as nuclear power. All pathways need to be considered
simultaneously but without conflating issues, as suggested in the flow diagrams in
this paper. By following a structured process of issue delineation and reframing of
the conflict we may finally reach resolution to this confounding challenge of our
times.
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