Download The Geopolitical Implications of Environmental Change

The Geopolitical Implications of Environmental Change
Alexander B. Murphy* and Demian Hommel**
* Professor of Geography
** Doctoral Candidate in Geography
Department of Geography
University of Oregon
Eugene, Oregon 97403
United States of America
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Introduction
When Sir Halford Mackinder delivered his lecture “The Geographical Pivot of
History” to the Royal Geographical Society shortly after the turn of the twentieth century,
he was convinced that world politics would ultimately hinge on control of one specific
part of the globe. According to Mackinder, the historical importance of ‘Euro-Asia’ to
imperial dominance pointed to the potential centrality of that region to future world
political power. Moreover, with the rise of the industrial age and the gradual
disappearance of a colonial frontier, Mackinder believed that securing the rich natural
resources of central Eurasia would be key to the global power matrix of the twentieth
century (Dodds and Sidaway, 2004). He thus saw the Eurasian pivot area (later to be
called the Heartland) as a “natural seat of power,” one that might allow an imperial power
like Britain to become “the empire of the world” (Mackinder, 1904: 433; see figure 1).
For Mackinder, Great Britain’s best hope for countering the rise of Germany, Russia, and
China lay in a concerted policy focus on the Eurasian Heartland (Megoran, 2004).
Mackinder’s 1904 address opened up new ways of thinking about the complex
interactions among geography, politics, and power. Mackinder considered how
geographical and environmental circumstances—things like distance, climate and
topography—factored into historical imperial control and would likely influence future
power balances. Ultimately his premise was that the importance of naval power would
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diminish, meaning that countries such as Great Britain could not continue to prosper
unless they found ways to exert influence over the Eurasian Heartland (Dodds and
Sidaway, 2004).
Much has changed since Mackinder’s famous theorization—including the ways in
which warfare is conducted and the rise of global economic forces that complicate the
relationship between governmental authority and resource control. Under the
circumstances, evaluating contemporary geopolitical arrangements through a
Mackinderian lens does not necessarily lead to a focus on the same parts of the world
highlighted by him. Just because the world has changed does not mean that Mackinder
has become completely irrelevant, however. At the very least, Mackinder’s effort to
encourage thinking about the relevance of geography and environment in geopolitics
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demands attention at a time when environmental change has become a topic of pressing
global concern.
There is growing evidence that human-induced or naturally caused environmental
change could have profound effects on political, social, and economic systems (Tol,
2002; Handmer et al., 1999). Yet these effects are largely ignored in most geopolitical
analyses. Consider, for example, the recent U.S. National Intelligence Council’s Report,
Mapping the Global Future -- a 123-page evaluation of several possible geopolitical
scenarios for the future (NIC, 2004). The report devotes only one page to environmental
change, and that page focuses on the challenges and opportunities of regulation and
technology development in response to global efforts to curb climate change. Similarly,
while the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s (2000) “Global Trends 2015” identifies
ways in which shifting demographic pressures and environmental problems could alter
future geopolitical stability, there is no mention of how changes due to climate might
further complicate global power balances. Or take Hugh De Santis’ article in World
Policy Journal (2002), in which he closely examines four of the leading U.S. intelligence
reports, including the CIA’s Global Trends: 2015. Environmental changes, and changes
in climate in particular, are not treated in his critique of current geopolitical thinking. A
few studies highlight some particular implications of climate change for international
institutions and security regimes (see Purvis and Busby, 2004; Schwartz and Randall,
2004; Karas, 2003), but for the most part contemporary geopolitical studies lack a
significant environmental dimension.
When considering the nexus between geopolitics and environmental change, it is
important not to posit an overly simplistic tie between the two. The implications of
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environmental change for the geography of power are inevitably mediated by economic,
political, and demographic factors (see Fraser et al., 2002). Moreover, the task of
considering the geopolitical consequences of environmental change is complicated by the
many uncertainties that lie on both the environmental and the geopolitical sides of the
equation (see Handmer et al., 1999). These complexities should not keep us from
grappling with this subject, however. In a world inhabited by more than six billion
people, we no longer have the luxury of pushing questions of environmental change to
the side. As events such as the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 make clear, the
human consequences of environmental perturbations can be immense on our increasingly
crowded planet (Athukorala and Resosudarmo, 2005). Thus, examining the potential
spatial implications of predicted global environmental changes gives us a basis for
thinking critically about the ways in which the “geo” and the political are linked.
Climate Change as a Key Variable
There are multiple natural and human-related environmental changes that should
be the focus of attention in the geopolitical arena, but climate change is arguably one of
the most important because of the scale of its impacts. We know from recent studies of
the changing fortunes of past civilizations that climatic shifts can have dramatic social
and economic implications (Linden, 2006; Burroughs, 2005; Diamond, 2005). It would
be naïve to suggest that this could no longer happen. This is particularly the case when,
in addition to a range of naturally produced climate changes associated with significant
volcanic eruptions, unexpected solar activity, or other natural shifts in the climate system,
there is ample evidence that the introduction by humans of unprecedented quantities of
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greenhouse gases into the atmosphere during the industrial era is altering the global
climate system (IPCC, 2001).
Even though natural factors have contributed to warming in the past, emissions of
greenhouse gases and aerosols due to human activities continue to increase and are
expected to alter the atmosphere in ways that will affect global climate (IPCC/SRES,
2001). Currently, several studies indicate that the global average surface temperature has
increased 0.6 °C over the 20th century (ibid). During the same time frame it is also clear
that snow and ice cover have decreased, that global average sea-level has risen, and that
the heat content of the ocean has increased (ibid). These changes have implications not
only for temperatures, but for global precipitation patterns as well. Moreover, most
climate models show that these trends will be amplified during the coming decades (see,
e.g., figure 2), producing changes in temperature throughout a significant portion of
Earth’s surface.
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In virtually all current climate scenarios, global average temperature and sea level
are projected to rise (see IPCC, 2001). The average global surface temperature is
projected to increase by 1.4 to 5.8°C over the period 1990 to 2100. Additionally, global
precipitation is projected to increase during the twenty-first century, although some
places will become drier even as other become wetter (ibid). Temperature shifts will
likely alter El Niño and monsoon cycles, raise sea levels, and foster more extreme
weather events (ibid). It is even possible that the thermohaline circulation in the Atlantic,
which is already showing signs of slowing, could collapse, producing rapid cooling
throughout much of the northern hemisphere and potentially affecting climate at a global
scale (Broecker, 1997).
While the global community is only gradually coming to grips with the
implications of these suspected changes, and predictive mechanisms for determining how
climate will affect human systems are in their infancy, global climate models are
becoming increasingly refined—giving us an ever clearer picture of where we are
headed. This in turn makes it timely, and indeed important, to consider how
environmental changes associated with a shifting climate system could alter the
geopolitical foundations of international relations.
Relevance for Geopolitics
The importance of incorporating climate change into geopolitical analysis comes
into focus when one considers the assumptions that lie behind the geopolitical scenarios
currently attracting significant attention. As will become clear, these assumptions are
premised on ideas about the geography of power that are abstracted from the concrete
possibilities and challenges that a changing environment presents. As noted above, most
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geopolitical studies do not treat the physical environment as part of the mix; instead they
focus on the potential strengths and weaknesses of particular states and regions based on
extrapolations of current political and economic circumstances.
It is difficult to discuss the contemporary geopolitical literature in general terms
because, unlike during the Cold War era, there is currently no consensus about the
geopolitical foundations of the international system. Hence, much of the literature on
geopolitics focuses on different scenarios that may define international relations in the
twenty-first century (see e.g., NIC, 2004). These scenarios are necessarily somewhat
open-ended and speculative, but that does not render them unimportant.
As Huntington points out, borrowing from Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure
of Scientific Thinking, the scenarios we create are intended to be roadmaps
or paradigms that impose a sense of order on the reality we confront and
guide our behavior. Although they are abstractions that neither
comprehend the totality of the world nor mirror it objectively, without
some blueprint we will have a hard time discriminating between what we
judge to be central versus peripheral to our purposes and what will
advance as opposed to impede our objectives (De Santis, 2002: 62).
It follows that the scenarios we create about where we are headed will influence public
debate and policy making, and by extension the on-going human construction of
international relations.
The four leading geopolitical scenarios currently attracting the most attention
embody different assumptions about the future territorial configuration of power. One
foresees the emergence of a new multi-polar world order centered around a few
competing states. Another anticipates the solidification of American power in a fashion
that will produce a uni-polar world order based on U.S. political and ideological norms.
Yet another posits a fragmentation of the world along civilizational lines, with interstate
tensions being overshadowed by conflicts between different communities sharing broad
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historical and/or religious ties. Still another focuses on the possibility of a set of
political-economic blocs acting as key players in a new international order. What follows
is a brief examination of each of these scenarios. The goal is not to evaluate their
comparative merits, but it is to elucidate the basic territorial assumptions on which they
are based. Subsequent sections of the paper then consider how climate change could alter
the territorial assumptions at the heart of these scenarios.
Scenario I: A Multi-Polar World Order
One of the clearest expositions of the multi-polar world order scenario comes
from the “2020 Project” of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC, 2004: 47-63).
As explained in the report:
The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—
similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in
the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape, with
impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In
the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the “American
Century,” the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the
developing world, led by China and India, come into their own.
Proponents of the multi-polar thesis typically adopt a state-based view of the world.
They assume that individual states will remain the principal loci of power, but that no one
state will be able to dominate the world system. They argue that the United States’
position of dominance will inevitably be undermined by rapid population growth and
economic expansion in selected states in other parts of the world, as well as by the
expanding reach of economic globalization. They thus posit the emergence of a few
increasingly powerful states that will rival the United States in power and influence.
Not surprisingly, China and India figure large in the thinking of those who see a
coming multi-polar world order, but countries such as Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa
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are sometimes considered to be potentially important nodes as well. Few suggest that the
United States will fall out of the global power picture, but the assumption is that the
growing demographic and economic weight of other places will make it increasingly
difficult for the U.S. to sustain a position of global dominance. Despite its current
economic and political might, Japan is overshadowed by China in the thinking of most
future-oriented multi-polar world order theorists, and given the emphasis on size,
individual European states are not seen as significant nodes—with Germany as a partial
exception. Some see the European Union (EU) as a significant locus of power in a multipolar world, but the state-based assumptions underlying this scenario mean that the EU’s
role is tied to its ability to assume an increasingly state-like posture. Since the prospects
of this happening look dimmer in the wake of the 2005 rejection of a governing
constitution for Europe and integration challenges following the 2004 expansion of the
EU, the role of the EU remains fuzzy in the multi-polar world order picture.
The foregoing suggests that a small group of territorial assumptions lie at the
heart of the multi-polar world order scenario. These are:
•
China, India, and perhaps a few other states or state-like entities will expand their
global influence, even as the United States maintains a position of significant
global power
•
No regional alliances or other types of power blocs will emerge to challenge these
key geopolitical nodes
•
Destabilizing circumstances in other world regions will not fundamentally
challenge the positions of the key players
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These assumptions are predicated on an extrapolation of current economic and
demographic trends. Proponents of this scenario further assume that the most likely
disruptions to these trends will come from unexpected political or social developments.
Scenario 2: A Uni-polar World Order
One of the most forceful proponents of the uni-polar world order scenario is the
American journalist Charles Krauthammer, who writes a syndicated column for the
Washington Post. Krauthammer (2002/2003: 6) argues that the U.S. has become a
dominant single power “unlike anything ever seen”—with a military, economic, and
cultural reach that completely overshadows other countries. He sees American
unipolarity as potentially vulnerable, but not for decades and not unless political power in
the U.S. falls into the hands of what he would regard as misguided multilateralists. His
position is one of advocacy, but of a geopolitical scenario that he clearly sees as
attainable. In Krauthammer’s (2002/2003: 17) words:
The new unilateralism argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining
unipolarity, for sustaining America’s unrivaled dominance for the
foreseeable future. It could be a long future, assuming we successfully
manage the single greatest threat, namely, weapons of mass destruction in
the hands of rogue states. This in itself will require the aggressive and
confident application of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did
in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism.
Like its multi-polar counterpart, the uni-polar world order thesis sees geopolitics
primarily in state-based terms; however, the focus is on the dominance of one state and a
set of closely aligned allies. The power of the dominant state (the United States) is seen
to derive from a set of unique political and economic attainments that can be sustained as
long as the United States does not turn away from its global role and recognizes the need
to use force, or the threat of force, to counter those who would undermine it.
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Once again a small group of territorial assumptions lie at the heart of the uni-polar
geopolitical scenario. These are:
•
The United States will be able to consolidate its position as global geopolitical
hegemon
•
No competing major power will be able to emerge
•
The United States, cooperating with a set of close allies, will be able to keep
destabilizing tendencies in other parts of the world from fundamentally
undermining its position of dominance
These assumptions are predicated on an extrapolation of current military and economic
trends. Krauthammer and his followers assume these assumptions will hold unless the
U.S. loses the political will to capitalize on its position of dominance.
Scenario 3: Clash of Civilizations
Samuel Huntington (1996) is the most visible spokesperson for the clash of
civilizations scenario, which raises the prospect of a growing divide between societies
that have emerged in the context of fundamentally different religious traditions and
historical experiences (Western, Islamic, Asian, etc.). The key to these differences is that
they carry with them contrasting views of such core matters as the meaning of progress,
the nature of truth, and the place of humans in the universe. According to Huntington,
these differing visions are coming into ever greater conflict in an increasingly globalized,
interpenetrated world.
In the emerging world, the relations between states and groups from
different civilizations will not be close and will often be antagonistic. Yet
some intercivilization relations are more conflict-prone than others. At the
micro level, the most violent fault lines are between Islam and its
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Orthodox, Hindu, African, and Western Christian neighbors. At the macro
level, the dominant division is between “the West and the rest,” with the
most intense conflicts occurring between Muslim and Asian societies on
the one hand, and the West on the other. The dangerous clashes of the
future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance,
Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness (Huntington, 1996: 183).
The clash of civilizations geopolitical model accords a significant position to
states, but it is not strictly a state-based idea because it acknowledges that civilization
divides exist within states and can cut across state boundaries (Huntington, 1996: 155179). Indeed, the increasing salience of intercivilization conflict is thought to be a
product in part of the declining power of individual states in an era of economic
globalization and institutional multilateralism. In a world of clashing civilizations, the
key challenge for individual civilizations is to maintain a degree of political-cumideological unity and avoid moral and cultural decline (Huntington, 1996: 304).
(Huntington expresses significant concerns about the ability of the West to meet these
challenges.)
The territorial assumptions at the heart of the clash of civilizations model are:
•
Current divisions within civilizational blocs will not increase
•
The interests of civilizational blocs will increasingly trump those of individual
states
•
Interdependence among civilizational blocs will diminish
These assumptions are predicated on an extrapolation of current patterns of conflict and
cooperation. Proponents of the clash of civilizations thesis take the position that the
major challenge to these assumptions will come from the ideological splintering of key
civilizations into competing groups based on differing values, cultural conceptions, and
political orientations.
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Scenario 4: Interregionalism
Interregionalism is an umbrella term for a set of geopolitical ideas that are aligned
with the multi-polar world scenario, but that see world regions as potential key power
nodes. Björn Hettne’s (2004) paper on “interregionalism and world order” provides a
useful overview of this way of thinking (see also Rusi, 1997). According to Hettne:
A more appropriate form for the return of ‘the political’ in today’s
gloablized world would be a post-Westphalian order, where the locus of
power moves up the ladder to the transnational level by the voluntary
pooling of state sovereignties. . . . However, from a realist perspective it
needs institutionalization. The most likely candidate for such a role,
although it does not appear to be imminent, is the interregional
organization pursued by the EU, facilitating multiregional governance as
the major alternative to unilateralism (Hettne, 2004: 2).
As the foregoing quotation makes clear, this scenario is the most idealist of the four, but
proponents such as Hettne see it as a realistic alternative both because they view
unipolarity as unsustainable and because they believe the EU has forged a model of
“multidimentional, horizontal institutional arrangements” (Hettne, 2004: 13) that has
much broader potential appeal and applicability.
The interregionalism scenario moves beyond states as key power nodes, although
it is still rooted in the map of states in the sense that regions are assumed to be collections
of states. The key issue for interregionalists is the capacity of strong regional blocs to
provide some check on the unequal power relations that can come from unfettered
neoliberalism. At the same time, interregionalists readily recognize that the EU is the
only regional bloc that comes even close to functioning as a reasonably integrated
economic actor. They also recognize that making interregionalism the foundation for a
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new geopolitical order will be a long and difficult task. Those who see interregionalism
as a realistic possibility, however, make the following territorial assumptions:
•
The world can be divided up into relatively discrete political-economic blocs
•
The EU model can provide a viable alternative to state-dominated regions and is
exportable to other parts of the globe
•
Political-economic regional blocs will be able to confront major internal social
and political divisions
These assumptions focus attention on the institutional challenges of integration in
different world regions. The major challenges to interregionalism are seen as coming
from the economic and political spheres.
A Geographical Analysis of Human-Induced Climate Change Impacts
Climate change could have significant implications for many of the assumptions
underlying the geopolitical scenarios outlined above. To gain some understanding of the
nature and scale of those implications, we now turn to a consideration of the potential
geographic consequences of changing climatic norms. Assessing these consequences is
no easy task, as climate change is often associated with multiple overlapping
consequences. But a useful point of entry is to consider the potential geographical
impacts of climate change on four key issues of social and political import: agricultural
productivity, the availability of fresh water, the severity of coastal hazards, and shipping
routes. Though certainly not the only issues of importance, these four can provide insight
into how environmental adjustments could alter the foundations on which the geopolitical
arrangements of the mid-to-late twenty-first century will be built.
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Agricultural Systems
Long-term studies of the relationship between climate and vegetation patterns
provide a good indication of the potential impacts of warming and cooling on the ability
to grow crops in different parts of the world (Halweil, 2005; Ager, 1997; Reilly, 1995).
Drawing on these understandings, Fischer et al. (2002) have developed a map showing
areas in which agriculture will likely expand and contract under conditions of global
warming. Using various social, economic and climatic indicators to assess potential
vulnerability to human food production, this map identifies key regions of potential
agricultural change.
In Figure 3, we use Fischer et al.’s (2002) map as our starting point. We overlay
generalized areas of potential agricultural vulnerability and expansion from the Fischer et
al. report on a map showing demographic stress in different countries as a function of the
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amount of cropland per person (Cincotta et al. 2003). Though highly generalized, this
mapping exercise reveals several areas of potential gains and losses with regard to
agricultural productivity. Those areas where agricultural vulnerability coincides with
high levels of demographic stress (i.e., north coastal South America, northwest Africa,
and parts of eastern China) are likely to face particularly acute challenges under
conditions of global warming. This confirms Parry et al.’s (2004: 5) conclusion that
“climate change associated with increasing levels of carbon dioxide is likely to affect
developed and developing countries differentially, with major vulnerabilities occurring in
low-latitude regions.” However, Figure 3 also suggests that some areas in the lower
latitudes may improve in terms of agricultural expansion. The Indonesian Archipelago as
well as parts of South Asia actually may benefit agriculturally from climate changes. The
Midwestern U.S., parts of Eastern Europe and some parts of the Amazon Basin could see
a decrease in productivity, but the consequences may be less severe because these areas
are not ones of high demographic stress.
There are other challenges to agriculture not revealed by this scale of analysis.
These include the loss of biodiversity, increased weather extremes and unpredictability,
increased incidents of pests and vector-borne diseases, and changes in fish stocks and
aquaculture. Further, Rosenzweig et al. (1993) and Reilly et al. (1994) suggest that largescale destabilizations in trade networks associated with changes to agriculture could
affect a range of human social and political systems. The significance of these issues
suggests that we should be looking not just to prevent contributing to a warmer world but
also looking for ways to adapt to a more uncertain future where, in specific regions, the
risk of crop failure on a yearly basis is likely to increase.
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Water Availability
Significant parts of the globe are already facing freshwater shortages. By some
estimates over half of the projected eight billion people sharing the planet in 2025 will be
living in areas experiencing water stress and shortages (Arnell, 1999). Global warming
and the greenhouse effect are likely to alter the hydrological cycle in significant ways.
The contributors to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that global warming will likely increase both floods
and droughts and alter the cycles of wet and dry seasons in certain areas of the world
(2001). Although global average precipitation increases are predicted to increase under
conditions of global warming, much of this increase will occur over the oceans, whereas
large parts of the land surface will likely experience an overall reduction in precipitation.
This, combined with the increase in evaporation associated with higher temperatures,
means that river runoff could well decrease across significant land areas in the midlatitudes, threatening aquifer resources and accentuating the competition between human
and ecological water uses (Loa´iciga, 2003).
In Figure 4, we draw circles identifying generalized areas of potential water
vulnerability due to changes in climate (based on Fischer et al., 2002) on a map showing
current demographic stress due to water availability (Cincotta et al. 2003). On this map
we see that most of Northern Africa, East Africa, and parts of the Middle East and
Eastern South Africa are currently facing water availability-related demographic stress
due to a variety of factors (e.g. arid conditions, high population growth rates, and
environmental degradation). Since many of the regions of current water-related
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demographic stress are also predicted to face water vulnerability due to climatic changes,
the potential for instability is obvious.
Over the next few decades, increasing human population and growing water use
will put additional pressure on global water resources—particularly in Africa, parts of
southern Asia, and the Middle East. Changes in hydrological systems in these areas have
the potential to disrupt economic development and strain social and political institutions.
When these potential disruptions are considered alongside other stressors (environmental
degradation and pollution, population growth and concentration, resource conflicts within
river basins, etc), it becomes clear that water could be a resource of growing geopolitical
importance. Even though water has not often been a direct source of conflict in the past
(see Wolf 1998), the implementation of response strategies (e.g., expansion of facilities,
water-pricing policies, innovative technology, and mismanagement) could well be a vital
element in any strategy for avoiding future instability (accord Gleick, 1999; Homer-
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Dixon, 1994). Otherwise, significant regions could face economic depression, mass outmigration, and conflict over international borders.
Coastal Impacts
Global sea-level rise could have significant impacts on populations living along or
near coastlines. Recent work on the melting of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets
(Rapley, 2006; Lowe et al., 2006) suggests that if current trends continue, a substantial
rise in sea level is likely. In fact, some studies indicate that as ice sheets melt, sea level
changes will begin to increase at an accelerated rate (Schneider, 2002). Mapping areas of
the world that are no more than 20 meters above sea level reveals areas of particular
vulnerability (see figure 5).
When one considers those coastal zones that lie in areas with relatively low levels
of socio-economic development, it becomes clear that the potential impacts of sea-level
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rise could be particularly devastating to coastal areas in parts of Africa, East and
Southeast Asia, and Central America. If current trends continue, by the year 2010, 20
new coastal mega-cities will emerge in developing regions of the world (Li, 2003).
These cities could be fundamentally threatened by sea-level rise. Moreover, there is
considerable scientific evidence showing that an increase in ocean temperature could
enhance cyclone intensity and frequency, contributing to increased storm surges and
flooding (Henderson-Sellers et al., 1998; Michener et al., 1997). This could have
disastrous results for countries such as Bangladesh, much of which is barely above sealevel (Ali, 1996). Figure 6 shows the potential impact of a 1.5 meter sea-level rise on
Bangladesh, suggesting that as many as 17 million people could be negatively affected.
Sea-level rise will not be an issue solely for less developed parts of the world.
One in-depth study on the effects of predicted climate change on freight transportation
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and shipping in the U.S. concluded that coastal flooding would be the most serious and
costly water-related impact of climate change. As Caldwell et al. (2003) comment, “the
risk of damage to low-lying port facilities, locks, airports, roads, rail lines, tunnels,
pipelines, ventilation shafts, and power lines is particularly great because of the large
number of freight facilities—international gateways in particular—that are concentrated
on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf Coast and along inland waterways.” Hurricane
Katrina’s devastation of New Orleans, Louisiana, in 2005 showed the potential
consequences of coastal flooding. The consequences of similar events in parts of the
world with higher coastal population densities and weaker coping mechanisms would
likely be even more serious.
Global sea-level rise will pose a special set of challenges for small island
developing states (SIDS), many of which lie no more than a few meters above sea level.
As Pelling and Uitto (2001: 56) note:
Even modest rises in sea level are likely to result in significant erosion and
submersion of land, increased flood hazard, salinization of freshwater aquifers,
and the loss of protective coral reefs and sand beaches, which will increase
exposure to hurricanes and storm surges in the coastal zone where much
biological diversity and most of the population, agricultural land and capital assets
are located” (citing Lewis, 1990; Maul, 1993).
Not surprisingly, then, global warming has emerged as a particularly critical focus of
concern for the Alliance of Small Island States—an organization with a geopolitical
agenda that unites the leaders of island states around the globe. Although climate models
do not currently offer detailed, reliable predictions for individual islands, several island
states are already considered ‘water scarce nations’ (e.g. Barbados and the West African
Islands) (Pelling and Uitto, 2001). In these areas, climatic variability will likely increase
the frequency and severity of drought and floods. More generally, the economies of
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small islands—often centered on natural resource exploitation (agriculture, fisheries,
tourism, etc.)—put them in a position in which climate change will not only increase
hazard risk but also erode the economic and resource base of these states. Further, the
implications of absorbing populations, or even entire states, forced to move because of
rising tides could have profound implications for the contemporary geopolitical calculus.
Shipping Routes
The primary shipping routes in the world today are in the mid and low latitudes.
However, recent years have seen a steady decrease in the amount of Arctic sea ice—
contributing to the possibility that the waters off the north coasts of Canada and Russia
could become avenues for shipping raw materials (notably oil) in the summer months
(see figure 7). This could have an impact on the relative location of Canada and Russia
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in relation to global movements of commodities. Figures 8 and 9 show the cost
differences between closed and open arctic shipping lanes (Aguirre, 2006).1 Notice, for
example, how the route from the North Sea to Alaska is the longest and among the most
costly under current Arctic conditions, yet it is potentially the shortest and least costly
under predicted warming scenarios. Since today’s shipping routes are fundamental to
current geopolitical configurations, changes in these routes could significantly alter the
power balance.
1
These maps are based on a “cost path” calculation done in ArcInfo. The colors represent a measure of the
total running cost of a ship sailing from London to the rest of the globe depending on whether the Arctic
Ocean is closed (figure 8) or is open (figure 9) to shipping.
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The implications of melting Arctic ice go beyond the movement of vessels on the
world’s oceans. The US Geological Survey estimates that a quarter of the world's oil and
natural gas reserves lie beneath the Arctic Ocean (Bethge, 2006; see figure 10). If the
thaw continues at current rates, excavation and drilling could soon become financially
viable. Norway and Russia are already at odds over drilling rights in the Barents Sea.
The size of the Russian Shtokman gas field alone is estimated at 3.2 trillion cubic meters,
making it one of the largest known deposits in the world (ibid). The region's gas could
soon be processed in the northern hemisphere and transported to Europe and North
America, fundamentally altering power balances in relation to current oil-rich regions in
Asia and the Middle East.
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Alternative Possibilities
The previous examples highlight some of the key challenges that are likely to
follow if recent climatic warming trends continue. The combination of a growing global
population, rapidly expanding industrialization in parts of Asia and South America, and
little international consensus on the reduction of greenhouse gasses makes such a
continuation likely. Having made this point, it is important to recognize that much about
the climate system remains little understood and that alternative scenarios are possible.
As noted above, there is clear evidence in the geologic record of non-human-induced
abrupt changes in the global climate regime–with impacts that are both long-term (the
drying of the Sahara around 5000 BP) and short-term (the Tambora eruption) (see de Blij
2005). Moreover, the growing presence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere could
produce changes in environmental systems of a very different sort from those that are the
26
focus of contemporary attention. For example, some recent work suggests that the
melting of the Arctic ice cap and increased discharge from rivers flowing into the
northern oceans could reduce the saline composition of the North Atlantic to the point
that the ocean’s thermohaline circulation system collapse (IPCC, 2001: 66) .
Thermohaline circulation is controlled by temperature (thermo) and salinity
(haline); the movement of water driven by density differences is thus called thermohaline
circulation (figure 11). Critical to this circulation is the sinking of warmer, more saline,
and hence denser water in the North Atlantic. Some fairly simple models of the world's
oceans simulate a rapid breakdown of thermohaline circulation when the density of the
water in the North Atlantic Ocean is lowered by adding fresh water (IPCC, 2001).
Increased rainfall over the North Atlantic and the melting of Arctic ice are both expected
as a result of increased greenhouse gas concentrations, suggesting that the ingredients
will be in place for triggering a collapse of the thermohaline circulation system (ibid). If
27
a collapse were to happen, a key mechanism for transporting warmth from low to high
latitudes in the northern hemisphere would be lost. Figure 12 shows the resulting
consequences for average temperatures around the globe; most of the northern
hemisphere would experience significantly colder average temperatures. This, in turn,
could alter agriculture and water regimes in a variety of places, disrupt political and
economic systems, and even halt or reverse sea-level rise.
The shutdown of the thermohaline circulation system is somewhat speculative at
the moment, but its theoretical plausibility points to the importance of treating climate
change scenarios with some caution. What we can say with confidence is that humanity
is involved in a giant uncontrolled experiment with the atmosphere. We need to
recognize that significant climate changes may well follow from that experiment, but that
the precise parameters of those changes are difficult to discern. Under the circumstances,
prudence suggests that the most likely climate change scenarios—those associated with
28
continued warming—should be taken seriously. But given imprecisions in our predictive
capacities and the chance of non-human induced environmental adjustments, the only
thing that should be taken as a certainty is that some kind of change is likely.
Geopolitical Implications
What is the potential significance of the previously discussed environmental
changes for geopolitical analysis? The relevance of such a question comes into focus
when one considers how many of the territorial assumptions underlying the major
competing geopolitical scenarios of the day could be altered if the current global
warming trend continues. To make the point, consider the following assumptions, which
either are leading propositions behind one of the scenarios reviewed earlier in this paper,
or are ideas that cut across more than one of those scenarios:
1. China and India will expand their global influence (the multi-polar order scenario)
2. The US will continue to move forward (the uni-polar order scenario)
3. No major regional destabilizations will disrupt expected trends (all of the
scenarios)
4. No new major power centers will emerge (the uni-polar order and clash of
civilization scenarios)
5. Divisions within major regions will diminish (the clash of civilizations and
interregionalism scenarios)
Even leaving aside the potential environmental implications of a collapse in
thermohaline circulation or another dramatic climate-changing event, viewing these
assumptions against the backdrop of the potential geographical implications of continued
29
global warming highlights the extent to which they could be called into question in the
decades ahead.
1. The assumption that China and India will continue to move ahead is premised on
an extrapolation of current economic and demographic changes. Yet China could
face significant agricultural challenges in its fertile eastern plains as a consequence
of global warming, and parts of northern India could face water shortages. These in
turn could impede economic growth, heighten internal tensions, and interfere with
efforts to extend the political and economic reach of these countries in ways that are
unanticipated by the multi-polar order geopolitical scenario
2. The assumption that the United States can maintain its position of dominance if it
has the political will to do so is premised on the idea that the U.S. will be able to
maintain its key international economic role and continue to finance its large
military. Yet the U.S. could face significant agricultural challenges in the Midwest
as a consequence of global warming, and the combination of sea-level rise and storm
intensification could produce significant and costly coastal flooding problems in the
East and Southeast. These in turn could produce internal challenges that could
undermine the unilateral projection of American power irrespective of the political
leanings of the country’s elected leadership.
3. All the reviewed geopolitical scenarios focus on contemporary economic,
political, and ideological trends, with little consideration given to the potential
impacts that large-scale regional crises might have outside the projected power
centers. Yet geographical models of the impacts of global warming suggest that
agriculture, water, and coastal flooding problems could combine to produce serious
30
destabilization in significant parts of North and East Africa, as well as in Southwest
Asia. Because of interdependencies in the global system, these could spill over into
other regions and/or alter development trajectories in a manner that could
fundamentally challenge each of the geopolitical scenarios outlined above.
4. The uni-polar world order and clash of civilizations geopolitical scenarios pay
relatively little attention to new potential nodes of power; instead, they are largely
sketched out against the backdrop of current or rapidly emerging power centers and
geopolitical fault lines. Yet the combination of agricultural expansion and the
development of new shipping lanes in the Arctic region could significantly benefit
Russian agriculture while facilitating the export of that country’s rich mineral and
fossil fuel wealth from its northern and eastern reaches. This in turn could markedly
alter Russia’s current position in the global geopolitical matrix—potentially
returning it to a position that is largely unanticipated in any of the geopolitical
scenarios currently competing for attention.
5. The two geopolitical scenarios focused on the potential primacy of large-scale
regional blocs in international affairs (the clash of civilizations and the
interregionalism scenarios) foresee a global dynamic in which interregional
differences trump intraregional differences. Yet when one looks at several of the
key regional nodes in either scenario—notably Subsaharan Africa, South Asia, and
East Asia—it becomes clear that a changing climate could introduce significant
intraregional challenges. Can non-Islamic Subsaharan Africa maintain any kind of
meaningful unity in the face of significant environmental stresses? How will South
Asia deal with water shortages in some, but not all, of the region? Questions such as
31
these have important implications for assumptions of intraregional unity that
underlie the clash of civilizations and interregionalism scenarios.
Conclusion: Identifying Core Areas of Vulnerability to Climate Change
The prior analysis shows the importance of recognizing environmental change for
efforts to understand changing geographies of power. Part of Mackinder’s genius was to
encourage thinking about geopolitics in ways that are not constrained by the pattern of
states. He sought to understand which parts of the Earth’s surface, by their very spatial
and material character, were critical to the geography of power. In the process he
stimulated consideration of which areas (independent of states) should be the focus of
geopolitical attention. This is potentially Mackinder’s most defining contribution; right
or wrong, his notion that there is a geopolitical center of power promoted a new way of
imagining international relations that influenced subsequent political decisions, especially
during the Cold War.
Mackinder’s focus was unabashedly historical; he saw population shifts
accompanying various attempts to control the Eurasian Heartland as pivotal to world
history. Yet his focus was also predictive. In order to understand the world in 1904,
Mackinder used a geographic lens that looked beyond state boundaries in order to assess
which areas would likely play a significant role in international affairs. Applying
Mackinder’s general approach to a world that may increasingly be subject to climate
change is useful, as it encourages us to look beyond the circumstances of individual states
and consider the changing environmental circumstances of parts of the planet.
32
A strength—and also a challenge—of introducing environmental change into the
analysis and interpretation of future geopolitical shifts is that such an undertaking
requires considering many different factors simultaneously. Whereas Mackinder was
largely basing his map on the notion that land power would trump sea power and that an
area’s resource base was key, bringing environmental change into the geopolitical picture
requires consideration of the relationship among an array of different, somewhat
unpredictable factors. One way to gain some purchase on the problem, however, is to
consider the relationship between the areas of vulnerability highlighted in figures 3 and 4
(above), as well as areas of current social stress, as revealed by contemporary hunger
patters (see figure 13). Figure 14 represents one approach to such an undertaking. To
construct the figure, we superimposed the regions of potential vulnerability from the
previously introduced environmental stress maps. The layering of transparent spheres in
figure 14 thus reflects the compounding challenges that certain areas in Africa and
Southwest Asia will likely face if current warming trends continue.
33
34
Rather than suggesting a new center of power, the analytical approach represented
by figure 14 points to the importance of looking to regions of current vulnerability that
are likely to undergo multiple detrimental environmental changes in the future. In large
part, this figure is an exercise in ‘mapping vulnerability’ (after O’Brien et al., 2004) on a
global scale. The exercise shows the particular susceptibility of parts of Africa and
Southwest Asia to compounding negative impacts environmental change, in the process
potentially altering the previous geopolitical scenarios in ways rarely articulated in
current debates. Instead of a clear indication of a core area of world power, the exercise
points to regions that could act as security vacuums—necessitating international attention
and intervention.
Given that conflict can and often does escalate when a society loses its resource
base, such an endeavor turns Mackinder’s original calculus on its head. Rather than
focusing attention on areas that need securing in the interests of political/economic
control, attention is directed to areas that, if left unsecured (in environmental security
terms), could create destabilizing problems with global implications. Many recent
pressing geopolitical issues have necessitated interventionist approaches (Kosovo,
Rwanda, Darfur). If that trend continues, environmental change could produce a
different sort of shift from that highlighted by Mackinder’s—one that, in our current
highly interconnected world, undermines the notion of a distinctive ‘outer crescent’ (to
use Mackinder’s terminology). Instead, the problems of the outer crescent could
ultimately pose a threat to the current heartlands.
35
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