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Papper presenterat vid Statsvetenskapliga förbundets årsmöte, 30/9Ͳ2/10 Göteborg, 2010.Workshop:”Modernrättviseteori” Onthemoraldifferencesbetweenmitigationand adaptation–thenew‘facts’inthecase GöranDuusͲOtterström 1 &SverkerC.Jagers 2 Abstract In this paper we investigate the ’asymmetry assumption’ in climate justice, according to whichclimatechangemitigationandadaptationcanleaddifferentdistributionsofmoral obligations. Proceeding from a classic distinction between negative duties (not to harm) andpositiveduties(toaidifyoucan)andanambitioustypologybetweendifferentforms of mitigation and adaptation, we identify various asymmetries that scholars and policymakershave neglected to discuss. However, these asymmetries is not, as we have argued elsewhere, primarily derived from differences between mitigation strategies and adaptation strategies but rather between polluters duties not to cause harm and the universaldutytoaidifonehasthecapacityto. Introduction Oneofthefundamentalquestionsofclimatejusticeishowtheburdensassociatedwith combatinganthropogenicclimatechangeshouldbedistributedamongrelevantparties. The burdens involved in managing the problems of a changing climate are in turn of differenttypes.FollowingtheterminologyemployedbytheIPCC(2007),theliterature predominantly distinguishes between mitigation and adaptation. 3 Mitigation refers to various steps to decrease radiating forces and in this way reduce ongoing global warming. This can be done either by decreasing the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), by increasing the use of various sinks, e.g. produce more biomass, or, finally, 1 ResearchFellow,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofGothenburg. goran.duusͲ[email protected] 2 Professor, Department of Industrial Economics, Luleå University of Technology [email protected] & Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of [email protected] 3 Afulllistoverclimateburdensusuallyalsoincludecompensation. 1 throughcarboncaptureandstorage. 4 Adaptationistypicallyunderstoodas‘measures whichenable[personsorstates]tocopewiththeillͲeffectsofclimatechange’(Caney 2005: 752), and involves measures that prevent the effects of climate change to be harmful(Paavola&Adger2006).Itisbynowwidelyrecognisedthatanycomprehensive setofresponsestoclimatechangewillhavetoincludebothaggressivemitigationand adaptationtotheclimaticchangesthatarealreadyunavoidable(seee.g.Adgeret.al. 2006;Caney2009). Whilebothneeded,mitigationandadaptationrepresentquitedifferenttypesof actions.Giventhis,itwouldbesurprisingifthedifferencesbetweenthetwostrategies have no consequences for the overarching question of climate justice. Yet, most theorists seem to hold exactly this. The convention in the literature is to run them together under the generic heading of ‘climate burdens’, and treat striking a balance between the two as merely a pragmatic affair. According to this view, climate justice concerns how we fairly share the costs involved in alleviating climate harm to fundamental human interests, and it is not in itself important whether we do this via adaption or mitigation (see e.g. Caney 2005; Page 2006). The requirements of climate justicecanthusbesettledindependentlyofspecifyingthenatureoftheclimateburden. Call this the ‘symmetry assumption’, as it holds that the two types of burdens lend themselvestothesamekindofnormativeanalysis. Inspired by Paavola & Adger’s (2006) seminal work on climate change adaptation, we have elsewhere taken issue with the symmetry assumption (Jagers & DuusͲOtterström 2008). We argued that there are principled differences between mitigation and adaptation in terms of their normative logics, which scholars need to tendtoinorderfortheiraccountsofclimatejusticetobecomplete.Inotherwords,we defendedan‘asymmetryassumption’. 4 SomeprefertospeakofgeoͲengineeringasanadditionaltypeofclimateburden.AsgeoͲengineering involvesusingtechnologytoremoveGHGsfromtheatmosphere,weincludethismeasureintheconcept ofmitigation. 2 Asymmetry assumption. The way climate burdens are distributed between agents can be affected by whether these burdens are ones of adaptation or mitigation. It should be noted thatthis assumption speaksof an asymmetry specifically regarding the distribution of burdens. In other respects there are clearly morally significant differences between adaptation and mitigation. Let us provide a couple of examples. Adaptation involves allocating resources which have been raised from burdenͲtakers, whereas in the mitigation case the relevant questions are more or less exhausted by emissions cuts or other GHG reducing action. It is true that different ways of cutting down on emissions will affect different agents in different ways, but there is no comparabledistributiveoutputͲsideinmitigation.Itwouldnotmakesensetosay,‘now wehavecutdownonGHGemissions,butwhoshouldweallocatethisbenefitto?’Butin adaptionthatsortofquestionisperfectlynatural.Justiceinadaptationsimplyrequires inamoreconcretewaythatweattendtonormativequestionsofbenefitͲdistribution. This means, among other things, that we in adaptation have to be more concerned about whether allocated resources actually reach their intended target as well as the procedural fairness of the processes being applied to identify and rank target areas (Paavola & Adger 2006). 5 But the asymmetry assumption makes a stronger and more controversial claim than these differences. It pertains to the very question of burdenͲ sharing. Put bluntly, it says that different agents will be held responsible when we switchbetweentheburdens. Now,inourpreviousattemptwetriedtodrivehometheasymmetryassumption byarguingthatagentsthatareatorbelowthelevelofemissionstheyareentitledto (i.e.,agentsthatarenotpolluters),cannotbeaskedtomitigate,butcanstillhaveaduty to engage in adaptation, e.g., because they can afford it. Thus, we suggested affluent 5 Forexample,thecurrentpracticewithintheUNFCCCarchitectureisthatcountriesformulatetheirown rankingsandtargetsintheformofsocalledNAPAs(NationalAdaptationProgrammesofAction).Clearly theaccuracyofthismethoddependsonthequalityoflocalgovernance. 3 nonͲpolluterscanbedutyͲboundtotakeonburdensofadaptationbutnotmitigation. Thisseemstovindicateaclearasymmetryhere. ButitisnoteworthythatourpreviousanalysisomittedthepossibilityofanonͲ polluterhavingadutytomitigateothers’emissionseventhoughitcannotsensiblybe said to have a duty to mitigate its own. This idea has now found its potential institutional manifestation via the introduction of NAMAs (Nationally Appropriate MitigationMeasures) 6 intheclimatechangenegotiations.ThewayNAMAsisportrayed, e.g.,intheBaliActionPlan,itisclearlyimpliedthat(future)wealthynonͲpollutersmay come to have duties to mitigate GHG emissions though this will take place in other countries. In omitting this sort of duty our analysis of the asymmetry assumption was incomplete.Here,weaimtomakeupforthisomissionandfinalizetheanalysis.Aswe shallsee,thiswillrevealthatthedistinctionbetweenadaptationandmitigationistoo crude. This paper thus offers a modified defence of the asymmetry assumption. Proceeding from a standard distinction between negative duties (not to cause harm) and positive duties (to aid), we argue that while there remain possible asymmetries between mitigation and adaptation, a fuller picture emerges once we question the appropriatenessofthedistinctionbetweenmitigationandadaptationitself.Wesuggest that we need to be much more careful about the generic labels of adaptation and mitigation.Onthemitigationsideweoughttodistinguishbetweendirect,indirectand altruistic mitigation. On the adaptation side we ought to distinguish between compensatoryandaltruisticadaptation.Basedonthesenewdistinctions,weretestthe asymmetry assumption and find that there are several nuances to the distribution of climateburdenswhichtherathercrudedistinctionbetweenmitigationandadaptation 6 NAMAsarevoluntaryemissionreductionmeasuresundertakenbydevelopingcountriesthatare reportedbythecountries’governmentstotheUNFCCC.Financialsupportforthesemeasuresshouldbe providedbythedevelopedcountries(Annex1countries)onavoluntaryadhocbasiseitherbilaterallyor throughtheCopenhagenGreenClimateFund,whichtheCopenhagenAccordstateswillbeestablishedas anoperatingentityofthefinancialmechanismoftheConvention.Asoftoday,thismechanismhasnotyet beensetup,butisexpectedtobeputintoactionsoon(Dalkmann&Binsted2010) 4 fails to capture. We end the paper by discussing how our findings relate to different burdenͲsharingprinciples,andwhytheymatter. Negativeandpositiveduties Most would agree that climate change generates considerable otherͲregarding duties. Oneneednotbearadicalcosmopolitantoagreewiththis.ButthisotherͲregardingduty caninturnbedividedintodifferentsorts.Theoristswidelyacceptadistinctionbetween negativeandpositiveduties.Negativedutiessaythatcertainactionsmustnotbetaken; positive duties that taking certain positive action is required. 7 In normative analyses negative duties are usually referred to as obligations not to cause harm (to morally relevantinterests):they‘prohibittheinflictionofsufferingonothers’. 8 Positiveduties, ontheotherhand,aredutiestoaidorassistassuch:they‘involvefurtheringthewellͲ beingofothers’(Page2006,p.12)andaremoralobligationsonehassimplyonaccount ofbeinginapositiontohelp. Positive duties are in general more controversial than negative duties, in particularwhenwearetalkingaboutassistingpeoplewithwhomwelackspecialties. 9 For example, it is today widely discussed if compatriots have positive duties of justice towards nonͲcompatriots (see e.g. Miller 2007, Nagel 2005, Rawls 1999). 10 Less controversialisthatonemustnotactinwayswhichbringaboutharmeveniftheharm only befalls people that are outside the borders of our political community (see e.g. Pogge2008).Ifwedocauseharm,thenitisanuncontroversialrequirementofjustice that we stop doing it, that we compensate the victims, or both. Moreover, it is often morepressing,otherthingsbeingequal,todischargeone’snegativedutiesthanone’s positiveduties.Evenifitistruethatassistanceisduesomeone,itisafurtherquestion whetherIamtheparticularagenttotakethat‘remedialresponsibility’(Miller2007,p. 7 Forcriticalremarks,seeKagan(1998,pp.131Ͳ32).Thedifficultyisofcoursethatoftenittakespositive actionnottoinfringeonsomeother’snegativeright. 8 Elaborateonacts/emissions 9 Foraniceoverviewofargumentsconcerningspecialties,seeSinger(2002). 10 Somehavearguedthatpositivedutiesarenotonesofjustice.Miller(2008)providesacogentpotential rebuttalofthatidea–italldependsonarathernarrowstipulationofwhatjusticeis. 5 47). The same does not hold for negative duties. Usually the only way I can stop inflictingharmisifIactuallystopinflictingit. Negative and positive duties stem from human interests, but their underlying logicsdiffer.Asindicated,theimperativeoftheformeris:‘don’tharm!’Theimperative ofthelatteris‘assistifyoucan!’Itiseasytoseewhybothkindsofdutyareraisedby climatechange.Mostobviously,pollutershaveaclearnegativedutytostoppolluting, asthisharmscurrentandfuturepeople.Butifwecanhavepositivedutiestofurtherthe wellͲbeingofothersonaccountofourabilitytodosowithoutunreasonablecost,then wecanclearlyhavetheminregardtoclimatechangetoo.Climatechangeispredicted tobringaboutsevereharm,andshouldbetakenonparwithmanyotheroftheglobal problemsthatareusuallytakentotriggerdutiestoaid. Climateburdens:atypology Armed with the distinction between negative and positive duties, let us return to the issue of climate burdens. It is clear that what types of duties an agent can have will dependonwhetherornottheagentis(or,possibly,hasbeen)apolluter.Asafirststab attheissue,itthusseemssensibletosaythatpollutershavenegativeandpossiblyalso positivedutiestotakeonclimateburdens,whilenonͲpollutersͲiftheyhaveanyduties at all Ͳ only have positive duties. The positive/negative distinction straddles the predominantdistinctionbetweenadaptationandmitigation.Wewouldarguethatthe followingtypesofclimateburdensareplausible(Figure1): 6 Figure1.Differenttypesofclimateburdens MITIGATION ADAPTATION REGULAR DIRECT MITIGATION INDIRECT MITIGATION ALTRUISTIC MITIGATION COMPENSATORY ADAPTATION ALTRUISTIC ADAPTATION LetusexplainFigure1.Tobeginwith,itisimportanttonote,aswashintedat earlier, that a ‘polluter’ is different from an emitter of GHGs. All living creatures are emittersofGHGs,butthatisnottosaythattheyareallpolluters.A‘polluter’isanagent that emits more than it is entitled to. This serves to remind us that no agent can be expectedto,atleastnotasamatterofjustice,emitlessthanitsfairshare.Forexample, itisunreasonabletoaskanagenttoemitlessthanitrequirestomeetitsbasicneeds (Shue1993).Anyaccountofclimatejusticemustthereforeincludeaspecificaccountof how much GHGs different agents are entitled to emit. This question, which crucially involvestheproblemofhowmuchGHGsthereoughttobeintheatmosphere,mustbe answeredindependentlyofthequestionofburdenͲsharing. Supposethatanagentisapolluter.Otherthingsbeingequalthisagentfailsto dischargeitsnegativedutiesandisrequiredtostopcausingharm. 11 Thiscouldbedone eitherbyaddressingthecausesideortheexperiencedharmsideoftheequation.The former consists in reducing one’s pollution, i.e. regular mitigation. Regular mitigation 11 We say ‘other things being equal’ because an agent violates its negative duties only when it inflicts harmandisunjustifiedindoingso.Forexample,allagentsmightemitmorethantheyareentitledto,and it is unclear if one can single out an agent as in violation of its negative duties under universal nonͲ compliance. 7 can in turn be direct or indirect. The latter consists in engaging in compensatory adaptation(or,possibly,compensationsimpliciter).Letusspecify: Direct mitigation: a polluting agent stops causing harm by addressing its own excessive emissions (by way of emissions reductions, creating or maintaining carbonsinksorbycaptureandstorage). Indirectmitigation:apolluterstopscausingharmbyoffsettingitsownexcessive emissionsbywayofreducingsomeotheragent’semissions. Compensatoryadaptation:apolluterpreventsharmbywayofadaptingothers, invariousways,totheillͲeffectsofclimatechange. Clearly, a polluter can discharge its negative duties by pursuing any of the strategies,oracombinationofthem.Itisalsonoteworthythatthesedifferentstrategies all have purchase in climate policyͲcircles. Given the physical properties of the atmosphere, it is inconsequential, from the purposes of reducing radiative forcing, exactlywhereGHGemissionsarereduced.AreducedtonneofCO2 isareducedtonne regardless of whether a polluter lowers its own emissions directly or offsets them by reducing some other agent’s the emissions. Sometimes we might better meet our obligations by addressing others’ emissions rather than our own. It would then be strangetomaintainthatitisimpermissibletodoso. 12 Indirect mitigation can take different forms and there are many realͲworld examples.Moststraightforwardly,ratherthanreducingthedomesticemissions,Annex 1countriesinsteadreduceemissionsinother(NonͲAnnex1)countriesandregions.The principal reason for this is simply that it is often cheaper and more costͲefficient to 12 TheUNFCCCandtheKyotoProtocolarchitectureallowsforindirectmitigation,asevidentbytheClean DevelopmentMechanism(CDM)andJointImplementation(JI)devices.Althoughtherearemany objectionstoCDMandJIperse,webelievethereislittlereasontoobjecttothepracticeofindirect mitigationassuch(seeCaney2010). 8 reduceemissionsinlessdevelopedcountries(theyaresocalled‘lowͲhangingfruit’).A partly different form of indirect mitigation is what in the Bali climate summit in 2007 came to be called Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Measures (NAMAs). The idea is that, rather than Ͳ or in parallel with – domestic emission cuts, the Annex 1 countries should also invest into various measures, e.g., technology development and transfer, allowingdevelopingcountriestogroweconomicallywithoutbeingdependentupon‘old’ technology that contributes significantly to climate change. This can be arranged and administeredeitherviabilateraldevices,orviasomekindofmitigationfundfromwhich developingcountriescanapplyforfundingfortechnologicalupgrading. Butapollutermightalsoaddressnotitsemissions,buttheirillͲeffects.Itcould engage in adaptation to an extent which prevents the amount of harm its surplus emissionsislikelytocause,forexamplebybuildingfloodwallswhichprotectlowͲlying regions from rising seaͲlevels or improving health care to better combat tropical diseases.Itisimportanttonotethattheadaptivemeasureswouldhavetobeaimedat otheragents,becausewhatwearetalkingaboutisstillanotherͲregardingdutytostop causingharm.Forthisreason,werefertothistypeofadaptionascompensatory. 13 Sofarwehaveexclusivelyelaboratedonthenegativedutytostopcausingharm, whichcanonlybefallpolluters.Letusnowturntothepositiveduties,thosethatstem fromasimpledutytoaid.Againwecandistinguishbetweenstrategiesthattargetthe causeͲside of the equation from those that target the experienced harm side. The formerwerefertoasaltruisticmitigationandthelatteraltruisticadaptation. Altruisticmitigation:anonͲpollutingagentassistsinpreventingharm(toothers) byreducingtheemissionsofpolluters. 13 Compensatoryadaptationisproblematicbecauseclimateharmischaracterizedbyitspotentiallyglobal scope.Thus,evenifonecouldsaydefinitivelythatapolluterinflictsharmtoamagnitudeofx,andthe polluterengagesinadaptationtoanextentthatcounterbalancesx,itstillremainsphysicallytruethatthe agentsemissionsharmsotherpeoplethantheonesithasadapted.Inthatsenseitcouldbearguedthata polluterwillinvariablybecausallyimplicatedinharm,andthusviolateitsnegativeduties. 9 Altruisticadaptation:anonͲpollutingagentassistsinpreventingharm(toothers) by way of engaging in various forms of adaptation to the illͲeffects of climate change Weshould explaintheprefix‘altruistic’.WedonotruleoutthatanonͲpollutermight have a selfͲinterested reason to take these actions. As the countries of the world can aptlybecharacterizedas‘overlappingcommunitiesoffate’(Heldet.al.1999,p.81)itis often true that problems in one part of the world will ultimately have negative consequences also for other parts of the world. It follows from this interdependence that everyone might have an interest in, say, adapting the world to climate change. Thus,wedonotuse‘altruism’hereasdenotingtheoppositeofselfͲinterest.Instead,we intend the motivation of agents to engage in mitigation and adaptation even though they are not polluting (and, we might add, have compensated for their possible prehistory of pollution). These duties are duties one takes on because one wishes to preventharmassuch,notbecauseonecausesit. Let us begin with altruistic mitigation. As of yet, this type of climate action is mostlyhypothetical,butitmaybecomehighlytopicalinthefuture. 14 Thebasicideais the following. In the future there will be wealthy agents that have become wealthy withouthavingemittedanexcessiveamountofGHG.Followingthepresentdiscussions intheclimatechangenegotiations,thesecountrieswillhavefewobligationsintermsof emission reductions since they do not contribute, nor has contributed, to climate change.Foraltruisticreasons,thesecountriesmayneverthelessbeinterestedinfurther global emission reductions (e.g., because other countries they care about are vulnerable).Thisleavesthemwithtwooptions.Eithertheylowertheirownemissions additionally although this is neither morally ‘necessary’ (nor, presumably, particularly [cost] effective). Or they help other countries (poor or rich) to lower their excessive emissions.Thelatteriswhatweprimarilyintendbyaltruisticmitigation. 14 Seefootnote6. 10 Often it would be difficult to say whether an agent mitigates another agent’s emissionsforaltruisticorselfͲinterestedreasons.Agoodhistoricalexampleofthelatter isSweden’spolicytomanageacidrain.Upuntilthe1990sSwedensufferedfromacid rain caused by sulphur emissions released in countries such as Poland, Germany and Great Britain. Rather than trying to decrease their already modest levels of sulphur emissions, however, Sweden instead invested in cleaning devices in the polluting countries.Themotivestotakethiskindofactioncanthusbeatleasttwo.Eitherone doesitoutofselfͲinterest–onlyiftheglobalemissionsarebeingreducedfarbelowthe level caused by my own emissions will the climate be stabilised, thus diminishing the risksforme.Oronedoesitforreasonsoffairnessand/orefficiency:Itisbetterifthe wealthy lowͲemitting country X pays the costs to lower the emissions in (poor) highͲ emitting country Y so that the latter country can use their relatively limited resources for better purposes such as welfare increases. In practice, agents can of course have mixed motives, and saying which motive is weightier is subject to the usual epistemic constraints.Butitremainstruethataltruisticmitigationrepresentsonedistinctandso farneglectedtypeofclimateburden. Note also that these altruistic duties mention preventing harm ‘to others’. Climateharmthatdoesnotbefallothersofcourselogicallybefallsonlytheagentitself. Itispossibletosaythatanagenthasafurther‘duty’topreventharmtoitself.Butthis dutyisselfͲregarding,andassuchsimplyintheselfͲinterestoftheagent.Itisnotthe job of a theory of climate justice to explain why or whether agents are permitted or requiredtoprotecttheirowninterests–wesimplyassumethatthisissomethingthat theyaregoingtodo. 15 Finally we have altruistic adaptation, which is a fairly straightforward idea. Considerthebleakprospectspeopleinpoor,lowͲlyingregionsfaceiforwhentheseaͲ levelcontinuestorise.Thesepeoplearefacingconsiderableharmtotheirfundamental 15 Itisworthcommentingthefactthatwearesystematicallyvagueintermsofspecifyingourmoral subjects.Weareawarethattermssuchas‘agent’,‘polluter’,‘emitter’providepoorguidance.Thisis howeverdonedeliberately.Inthispaperwewishtostayprinciple,avoidingadiscussionwhether–and towhatdegreeourfindingsaredependentuponlevelofanalysis,i.e.,individual,corporateorstatelevel (cf.Nagel2005:Miller2008).Thisis,however,anissueforthefuturetoascertain. 11 interest:theirlifeaswellastheirpropertyandlivelihoodsarethreatened.Ifwehavea positive duty to assist such people, it follows that we can discharge this duty by financing adaptation, e.g. by building floodͲwalls or by helping communities move to lessvulnerablelocations.Adutyofaltruisticadaptationisthussimilartoanyotherkind of duty of aid, and it is possible that we have these duties simply on account of our abilitytohelpwithoutunreasonablesacrifice,andnotbecauseweareresponsiblefor theimpendingharm(seee.g.Singer1972).Butunlikealtruisticmitigation,whichtargets thecausesofclimatechange,altruisticadaptationtargetstheeffectside:theilleffects ofachangingclimate. Sofarwehavearguedthatbeneaththeburdensassociatedwiththeoverarching labels‘mitigation’and‘adaptation’areinfactdifferentsubcategoriesofclimateburdens (see, again,Figure 1). They differ in terms of what kind of action theyinvolve, and by extension also in terms of their normative logics. By definition a nonͲpolluter cannot havenegativeclimateduties.Onecannothavedutytostopinflictingaharmonedoes notinflict.Butcanpollutersalsohavepositiveclimateduties?Thisisatrickyquestion, sinceourpositivedutiestoaidareoftenthoughttoapplyatleastpotentiallytoallwho areabletoofferaid.Buttheoriststypicallyholdthatnegativedutiestakepriorityover positiveones:itismoreimportanttostopcausingharmthanitistopreventharmoneis notresponsiblefor(Kagan1998,p.97,Miller2007,p.47).Atleastinclimatechangethis isasensibleapproach,asanyeffortsofapollutertoreducetheGHGͲconcentrationin the atmosphere should, analytically as well as morally, be understood as aiming at reducingitsownemissions.Sowhenpolluterstakeonclimateburdens,weshallsaythat thisisconsideredanelementoftheirnegativeduties,untiltheagentceasestopollute and emits no more than its fair share. (Possibly it should also be added that has compensated for past pollution.) Only when the agent ceases to be a polluter do we face the next question whether it also has any remaining positive duties to take on climateduties. 16 16 Inthispaperweducktheobviousdemurtothisposition,namely‘whatifapolluterdecidestoprioritize andaidtheinterestsofanagentthatisrelativelydisadvantagedbutnotamongsttheleastadvantaged?’ 12 A further question is if it matters to the victim of climate harm if the harm is causedbyapolluterornot.Manyarguethat,fromtheperspectiveofthe‘entitlement holders’,itisirrelevantwheretheharmcomesfrom;theimportantthingismerelythat itisprevented(seee.g.Caney2009,p.212).Soitmightbearguedthatthedistinction between positive and negative duties really has no significance here. But this view seemsflawed.Itisreasonabletocaremoreaboutharmwhichwesufferasaresultof theexcessivepollutionofothersthantheharmthat‘justhappens’,becausetheformer isbroughtaboutbywrongdoing.Itcomesencodedwithadisrespectfulmessage;that somefinditpermissibletoputothersatriskbyoverusingtheatmosphericcommon.So whereas nonͲanthropocentric climate harm still requires action in the interest of prospectivevictims(cf.Page2008),inouropinionitremainstruethatthereisaneven greaterobligationthatpollutersstopcausingtheharm. Testingtheasymmetry Letussystematicallygothroughtheclimateburdenswehaveidentifiedandthekindsof agentsthatmayhaveanobligationtoshoulderthem.Itshouldbeclearfromwhatwe havesaidsofarthatwetakethetwomainnormativefactorstobecausalcontribution totheproblemandabilitytopay.WehavespokenthroughoutaboutpollutersandnonͲ polluters, as well as wellͲoff and badlyͲoff agents. Let us stay with these rather simplifieddistinctions,astheyareallweneedtoexaminetheissue.Itisnotimportant tobeveryspecificabouteitherofthem. First,letusbya‘polluter’simplyunderstandanagentthatemitsmorethanitis entitledto,asdeterminedbysome‘safetyͲlevel’(alevelwhichwouldavoiddangerous climate change Ͳ whatever that means more precisely Ͳ if everyone emitted at the level). 17 Next,wehavethedistinctionbetweenagentswhohaveahighabilitytotakeon 17 Weclaimthatallagentsareentitledtoemitgreenhousegases(GHG)uptoacertainlevel.Itisa furtherquestionwhetherallagentsshouldenjoyanequalpercapitarighttoemit.Foradefence,see Singer(2002).Foracriticism,seeCaney(2010).Iftheagentisbelowthatlevel,itisconsideredanonͲ polluter.Justtogiveahintastowherewewouldplacethelevel:InpreͲindustrialtime,theatmospheric concentrationof(GHG)wasapprox.275Ͳ285ppm(partspermillion).Today(2005)thatlevelisestimated 13 climateburdensversusthosewhohavealower.Thisdistinctionisobviouslyverytricky to handle, as it is difficult to establish the relevant criteria of ability, let alone to say where the possible cut off points are. Minimally, however, we could distinguish betweenagentswhocannottakeonclimateburdenswithoutcompromisingtheirability tomeettheirbasicneedsandthosewhocan.Forsimplicityweshallrefertotheformer as ‘badly off’ and the latter ‘wellͲoff’, overlooking the huge variance that exist within bothclassesofagents. It has been noted many times that climate justice needs to take both contributoryresponsibilityandabilityintoaccount.TheUNFCCC’sprincipleof‘common butdifferentresponsibilities’(CBDR),forexample,acknowledgesthatclimateeffortsbe distributed ‘on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (UNFCCC 1992, article 3.1). ThethinkingbehindtheCBDRprincipleunderlinesthatthereisastrongpresumptionin favour of letting the rich, polluting countries take the lion’s share of the climate burden. 18 Thispresumptionrevealswhatwetaketobeasalientfeatureoftheclimate debate:thattheclimateburdenscanallbetiedtoagentswho,throughtheirblatantly excessive emissions, have significantly violated their negative duties. ‘Mitigation’ and ‘adaptation’areunderthesecircumstancestobeunderstoodasregularmitigationand compensatoryadaptation.Thesecanindeedbetreatedinasymmetricalway. Butthiswayoflookingattheissueistoosimplistic.Pollutersmayhaveburdens of adaptation or mitigation. NonͲpolluters cannot have burdens of mitigation but may intuitively still have duties of adaptation. There thus seems to be an asymmetry between mitigation and adaptation, when both are thought of as stemming from causingorhavingcausedclimateharm.Whenusingthetermsmitigationandadaptation toabout380ppm(IPCC2007).Weproposethatareasonablethresholdtoproceedfromisanindividual contributionuptoanoveralllevelofGHGsintheatmosphereequivalenttoabout360ppm,whichwasthe approximateatmosphericlevelaround1990–afterwhichtheillͲeffectsofemissionscouldbeexpectedto beknownforallagents.Thus,demandsonmitigationkicksinwhenanagent’semissionsreachthelevel beyondwhichiteffectivelybecomesanetproducerof+360ppmͲemissionsintheatmosphere. 18 Itistellingthatarticle3.1continues:‘Accordingly,thedevelopedcountryPartiesshouldtaketheleadin combatingclimatechangeandtheadverseeffectsthereof’. 14 inanunreflectivemanner,therefore,thecaseinfavouroftheasymmetryassumption seemsstrong. However,itshouldbeclearbynowthattheinterestingpointisnotsomuchthe possible asymmetry between mitigation and adaptation as it is the imprecision of this verydistinction.Theremightbedutiestoadaptandmitigatewhichdonotstemfrom pollutingthatclimatetheoristsneedtoconsider.Letuswalkthroughouttypologyover climateburdensandseewhichagentsmighthaveanobligationtotaketheseon. Consider first burdens of direct and indirect mitigation. What agents can have these?Clearlyonlypolluters.Thesamecanbesaidforcompensatoryadaptation.Ifan agentdecidestodischargeitsnegativeclimatedutiesbyengaginginadaptation,itisstill premisedontherebeingpriororongoingpollution.Thesedutiesareaboutnotcausing harm, and so will naturally only apply to those who in fact are causing, or have been causing,harm. Consider next altruistic mitigation and altruistic adaptation. These are positive burdens agents have on account of their being in a position to prevent harm as such. Canpollutershavetheseburdens?Quitepossibly–but,asananalyticalifnotsequential point, we have argued that polluters (contributing to truly global harm) first have to discharge their negative duties and stop causing further harm. But the key thing to noticeisthatnonͲpollutersmayverywellhavetheseburdens,inparticulariftheyare wealthy.Thus,anagentwhichhaslowereditsemissionstotheextentthatitnolonger countsasapolluter,andinadditionmighthavecompensatedforpastpollution,willnot escape climate duties just because it is now ‘green’. Green agents might still have an obligation to help others ‘go green’ (altruistic mitigation) and to adapt the world to unavoidableclimatechange(altruisticadaptation). Does the distinction between negative and positive duties track the distinction between adaptation and mitigation? No. In a previous paper we suggested that they did,butthiswaspremisedontheassumptionthatwhenanagentemitsbelowherlimit, shecannotbeexpectedtoengageinmitigation(Jagers&DuusͲOtterström2008).But 15 thisonlyholdsaslongasoneexcludesaltruisticmitigationfromtheequation.Table1 summarizesourresults. Table1.Thedistributionofclimateburdens Responsibilityofagent Polluter Abilityofagent Welloff Badlyoff Negativeduties Regularmitigation Compensatory adaptation Regularmitigation? Positiveduties Secondary None Altruistic mitigation Altruistic adaptation None NonͲpolluter Welloff None Badlyoff None Comment. By saying that wellͲoff polluters have ‘secondary’ positive duties we intend that the agents have these duties in principle, but that, analytically, they apply only after the more pressing negative duties are dischargedandtheagentsceasetocountaspolluters. AfewconclusionscanbedrawnfromTable1.Firstofall,therearealotofnuancesto thedistributionofclimateburdenswhichthecrudedistinctionbetweenmitigationand adaptationfailstocapture.Secondly,asalreadynotedthemainasymmetryisnotreally betweenmitigationandadaptationbutbetweenpositiveandnegativeduties.Regular mitigation and compensatory adaptation are ascribable only to polluters. Altruistic mitigation and altruistic adaptation, on the other hand, do not depend on being a polluter. This result is perhaps not surprising, but a great deal of clarity and precision canbegained,webelieve,byrefiningthetypologyofclimateburdens. Importanttonoticeisthatwehaveputaquestionmarkastowhetherbadlyoff polluters have a duty to mitigate their emissions or not. This question will become increasinglyimportantasrelativelypoorcountrieswithsubstantiallevelsofpercapita emissions are emerging. Take for instance the case of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a significant polluter. In 2006 it emitted 12,6 tonnes of carbon per capita. But it is also relatively poor – recent figures from the IMF puts the country at 11,693 international 16 dollarspercapita(PPPͲadjusted).(ThiscanbecomparedwithSweden,whichthesame year had a GDP per capita of 35,965 international dollars while ‘only’ emitting 5,1 tonnesofcarbonperperson). 19 Ofcourse,itwouldperhapsbefarfetchedtosaythata country such as Kazakhstan is badly off in thesense that it cannot afford to meet the basicneedsofitscitizens.Butthereisanimportantdiscussionastohowmuchshould beexpectedintermsofregularmitigationoftherelativelypoor,whichatthesametime havemanyotherdevelopmentgoalstomeet.Wecoulddistinguishherebetweenstrict approaches that say that polluters must mitigate, moderate approaches that say that they must at least not worsen the situation by emitting more than they do, and soft approachesthatsaythatpoorpollutershavealicensetopollute. 20 Thisisnottheplace todiscusshowtohandlethisimportantproblem,butitdeservestobementioned. AsymmetryandburdenͲsharingprinciples Whatisthepointofscrutinizingtheseissuesasthoroughlyaswedo?Isitnotenoughto establish that addressing climate change gives rise to various burdens and that these burdensoughtlargelytobeshoulderedbythedevelopedworld?Inrecentyearsmany principles of burdenͲsharing has been proposed by both by climate negotiators and theorists. At least the most recognized of those principles all say that the developed world ought to take most burdens, regardless of whether we focus on causal contribution,abilitytopay,orthedegreetowhichpeoplehavebenefitedfromclimate changingactivities(or,morepopularstill,somecombinationofthesefactors). 21 Dowe needtoknowmore? Our line is that that we do. The current situation of convergence between burdenͲsharingprinciplesisdeceptive.Therearealreadydevelopmentsthatthreatenit, 19 EmissionsdatafromtheInternationalEnergyAgency: http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/CO2highlights.pdfGDPpercapitadatafromtheIMF’sWorldEconomic OutlookDatabase(April2010). 20 AninterestingparallelcanbedrawntotheCFCnegotiationsandtheMontrealprotocolfrom1987,in whichitwasspecifiedthatsomeofthedevelopingcountries,e.g.,ChinaandIndia,wereentitledtoa transitionalperiodduringwhichtheycouldcontinueusingvariousgasescontributingtothethinningout oftheozoneͲlayerinthestratosphere(Morissette1989). 21 Seee.g. Caney2005;2009,Grasso2009,Page2008,Miller2009,Vanderheiden2008. 17 mostnotablytheemergenceofrelativelypoorpolluters.Inthissituationitisimportant to call into question the assumption in favour of symmetry between climate burdens, fortheconventionofspeakingsimplyof‘climateburdens’dependsinlargepartonthe current state of affairs, in which heavy pollution, ability to pay, and historical benefit largelycoincideinthedevelopedworld.Butiforwhenthisstateofaffairschangeswe willneedtothinkabouthowdifferenttypesofburdenscanapplytodifferenttypesof agents.Becauseweareinterestedinnotonlymanagingclimatechangeeffectivelybut alsofairly,thenwearesimplyforcedtogothroughtheunderlyingquestionsofburdenͲ sharing carefully, even questioning the simple distinction between adaptation and mitigation. Inenvironmentalpoliticsthereisawellestablishedprincipleguidingamajority of all policies: the ‘Polluters Pay Principle’ (PPP). The one who causes environmental degradation is the very same who has the responsibility to take the costs that come withitand,typically,isalsoassumedtochangebehaviourinordertopreventfurther degradation.Formostenvironmentalproblemsthisisafullyreasonableprinciple:itis anattractiveideathathavingcontributedtoaproblemobligatesonetoremedyitsill effects(toadegreewhichcorrespondstoone’slevelofcausalcontribution).ThePPP suffersfromarangeofproblems,someofwhichstemfromfactsthatareparticularto climatechange.Forexample,becauseofthelonghalvingtimesofsomeoftheGHGs (e.g., 140 years for CO2) it is problematic to point out remedial responsibility since manyoftheemitterswhohavecausedtheproblemarenolongeralive.Moreover,in itsunmodifiedversionthePPPcannotaccountfortheplausiblefactthatitseemsunfair toholdpeopleresponsibleforemissionstheycouldnotknowweredangerous.Norcan itaccountforwhyverypoorpollutersarguablyshouldbeexempted. ThePPPcanbydefinitiononlyascribedutiestopolluters, i.e.negativeones.It cannot distribute positive duties. 22 The normative logic of the PPP is thereby a particularlyfittingprincipletodistributeburdensofregularmitigation.Totheextentwe thinkofadaptationassomethingwhichonehasinadditiontoone’smitigationburdens, 22 AsnotedbyPage(2006),thePPPisalsoincompleteasitcannottellushowtorespondtoclimateharm whichisnonͲanthropogenic. 18 then adaptation does not lend itself as well to allocation via the PPP (Jagers & DuusͲ Otterström2008). Next, consider abilityͲbased principles. According to the ‘ability to pay’ (ATP) principleitisone’sabilitytoacceptremedialresponsibilitywhichdetermineswhether one is remedially responsible or not (see e.g. Shue 1999). The better off an agent is, accordingtothisprinciple,thegreateritsobligationtoaccepttheburdensofclimate change.Thereisafurtherquestionhereaboutwhatcountsas‘betteroff’–isitsimply anagent’swealthorisitthesizeofitsopportunitycostsinpaying?–buttheimportant thingforourpurposesisthat,unlikethePPP,theATPattachesnomoralsignificanceto causal responsibility (i.e. historical or current pollution). Since the relevant factor is one’s level of ability, it is perfectly possible to envision remedially responsible agents without causal responsibility, and causally responsible agents without remedial responsibility. Because the ATP focuses on ability, it can distribute burdens among polluters and nonͲpolluters alike. It is currently true that high ability tends to go handͲinͲhand with pollution – one of the drivers behind economic development is and has been a carbonͲintensiveeconomy.Butthispatternmightverywellchangeinthefuture(and, leavingthestateͲcentredapproachaside,issurelynotuncommonamongindividuals). Since the ATP can apply to polluters and nonͲpolluters, it can distribute any of the climate burdens in our typology. But it is especially suited, we would argue, to distributealtruisticadaptationandmitigation.Itisarequirementofclimatejusticeto relieve the climate harm that can be relieved, and ability is an attractive method to decidewhoshoulddomosttomeetthisrequirement. Conclusions In this paper we have dealt with an issue that has puzzled us ever since having read Paavola&Adger’s(2006)pieceonclimatechangeadaptation,inwhichtheyarguedthat adaptation ‘presents formidable dilemmas of justice to the international community, oneswhicharemorecomplexandnolessimportanttothosepresentedbymitigation’ 19 (ibid.594).Clearly,therearesignificantdifferencesbetweenmitigationandadaptationͲ e.g.,whilejusticeinmitigationisprimarilyaboutburdenͲsharing,justiceinadaptation also requires normative analysis regarding benefitͲdistribution. These differences previouslyleadustosuggestanasymmetricalrelationshipbetweenmitigationburdens andburdensrelatedtoadaptation:differentagentsareheldresponsibledependingon which burden we are allocating. While mitigation burdens are only a matter for polluters,weargued,adaptionburdensshouldbetakenbybothpollutersand(wealthy) nonͲpolluters. Thanks to the introduction of NAMAs on the climate change political arena, according to which wealthy polluters (and potentially also nonͲpolluters) should help developingcountriestomitigate,wenotonlyseeapotentiallynewburdenenteringthe game.Intuitively,thepreviouslyidentifiedasymmetrybetweenmitigationburdensand adaptationburdensissuddenlyfadingaway. When proceeding from a classic distinction between negative and positive duties, as well as a typology comprising no less than five different subcategories of climateburdens,westillfindobviousasymmetriesinthecaseofclimatechangejustice. However,wecannolongerconcludethattheseasymmetriesareprincipallyassociated withmitigationoradaptation.Insteadthepaperdemonstratesthattheasymmetriesare related with weather we ascribe agents negative duties not to cause harm or positive duties to aid. From this we conclude that the appropriateness of the two most commonly suggested burden sharing principles, PPP and ATP, clearly differ, but not becauseofdifferentnormativecharacteristicsconnectedtomitigationandadaptation but depending on what subcategory of negative and positive burdens we are dealing with. Thoughweareratherconfidentthattheasymmetriesstillbeingidentifiedinthe case of climate change burdens do matter for identifying and specifying relevant burdenͲtakersontheglobalarenaaswellasinducementsforwhythisisthecase(which burdensharingprincipleisappropriateforwhichburden),intheendthepaperperhaps raises more questions for the future than it answers. As indicated, we duck several 20 intricateissues,allofwhichcallforfurtherscrutiny.Letusendthepaperbygivingafew examples. First,throughoutthepaperwehaveomittedtodealwiththequestionsofmoral agency and level of analysis. Who are actually the ‘agent’ and the ‘polluter’? Do our resultsdifferdependingonwhethertheanswertothisquestionis,say,acorporation,a stateoranindividual? Second, we have only discussed two burden sharing principles, PPP and ATP. Howareourresultsaffectedbyanintroductionofotherprinciples,e.g.,thosethatfocus onhavingbenefittedfromclimatechange.? Third, we have kept away from whether badly off polluters have a duty to mitigate their emissions or not. Even if this issue may not have theoretical priority – afterall,historicalresponsibilitytrumpsemergingresponsibilityͲitiscertainlyrelevant seenfromhowthecurrentnegotiationsareevolving(readtheUSvs.Chinapositions). Theimplicationsofraisingthesekindsofquestionsmustthusnotbeunderestimated. 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