Download On the moral differences between mitigation and adaptation

Papper presenterat vid Statsvetenskapliga förbundets årsmöte, 30/9Ͳ2/10 Göteborg,
2010.Workshop:””Modernrättviseteori””
Onthemoraldifferencesbetweenmitigationand
adaptation––thenew‘‘facts’’inthecase
GöranDuusͲOtterström 1 &SverkerC.Jagers 2
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the ’’asymmetry assumption’’ in climate justice, according to
whichclimatechangemitigationandadaptationcanleaddifferentdistributionsofmoral
obligations. Proceeding from a classic distinction between negative duties (not to harm)
andpositiveduties(toaidifyoucan)andanambitioustypologybetweendifferentforms
of mitigation and adaptation, we identify various asymmetries that scholars and
policymakershave neglected to discuss. However, these asymmetries is not, as we have
argued elsewhere, primarily derived from differences between mitigation strategies and
adaptation strategies but rather between polluters duties not to cause harm and the
universaldutytoaidifonehasthecapacityto.
Introduction
Oneofthefundamentalquestionsofclimatejusticeishowtheburdensassociatedwith
combatinganthropogenicclimatechangeshouldbedistributedamongrelevantparties.
The burdens involved in managing the problems of a changing climate are in turn of
differenttypes.FollowingtheterminologyemployedbytheIPCC(2007),theliterature
predominantly distinguishes between mitigation and adaptation. 3 Mitigation refers to
various steps to decrease radiating forces and in this way reduce ongoing global
warming. This can be done either by decreasing the emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs), by increasing the use of various sinks, e.g. produce more biomass, or, finally,
1
ResearchFellow,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofGothenburg.
goran.duusͲ[email protected]
2
Professor, Department of Industrial Economics, Luleå University of Technology
[email protected] & Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of
[email protected]
3
Afulllistoverclimateburdensusuallyalsoincludecompensation.
1
throughcarboncaptureandstorage. 4 Adaptationistypicallyunderstoodas‘‘measures
whichenable[personsorstates]tocopewiththeillͲeffectsofclimatechange’’(Caney
2005: 752), and involves measures that prevent the effects of climate change to be
harmful(Paavola&Adger2006).Itisbynowwidelyrecognisedthatanycomprehensive
setofresponsestoclimatechangewillhavetoincludebothaggressivemitigationand
adaptationtotheclimaticchangesthatarealreadyunavoidable(seee.g.Adgeret.al.
2006;Caney2009).
Whilebothneeded,mitigationandadaptationrepresentquitedifferenttypesof
actions.Giventhis,itwouldbesurprisingifthedifferencesbetweenthetwostrategies
have no consequences for the overarching question of climate justice. Yet, most
theorists seem to hold exactly this. The convention in the literature is to run them
together under the generic heading of ‘‘climate burdens’’, and treat striking a balance
between the two as merely a pragmatic affair. According to this view, climate justice
concerns how we fairly share the costs involved in alleviating climate harm to
fundamental human interests, and it is not in itself important whether we do this via
adaption or mitigation (see e.g. Caney 2005; Page 2006). The requirements of climate
justicecanthusbesettledindependentlyofspecifyingthenatureoftheclimateburden.
Call this the ‘‘symmetry assumption’’, as it holds that the two types of burdens lend
themselvestothesamekindofnormativeanalysis.
Inspired by Paavola & Adger’’s (2006) seminal work on climate change
adaptation, we have elsewhere taken issue with the symmetry assumption (Jagers &
DuusͲOtterström 2008). We argued that there are principled differences between
mitigation and adaptation in terms of their normative logics, which scholars need to
tendtoinorderfortheiraccountsofclimatejusticetobecomplete.Inotherwords,we
defendedan‘‘asymmetryassumption’’.
4
SomeprefertospeakofgeoͲengineeringasanadditionaltypeofclimateburden.AsgeoͲengineering
involvesusingtechnologytoremoveGHGsfromtheatmosphere,weincludethismeasureintheconcept
ofmitigation.
2
Asymmetry assumption. The way climate burdens are distributed between
agents can be affected by whether these burdens are ones of adaptation or
mitigation.
It should be noted thatthis assumption speaksof an asymmetry specifically regarding
the distribution of burdens. In other respects there are clearly morally significant
differences between adaptation and mitigation. Let us provide a couple of examples.
Adaptation involves allocating resources which have been raised from burdenͲtakers,
whereas in the mitigation case the relevant questions are more or less exhausted by
emissions cuts or other GHG reducing action. It is true that different ways of cutting
down on emissions will affect different agents in different ways, but there is no
comparabledistributiveoutputͲsideinmitigation.Itwouldnotmakesensetosay,‘‘now
wehavecutdownonGHGemissions,butwhoshouldweallocatethisbenefitto?’’Butin
adaptionthatsortofquestionisperfectlynatural.Justiceinadaptationsimplyrequires
inamoreconcretewaythatweattendtonormativequestionsofbenefitͲdistribution.
This means, among other things, that we in adaptation have to be more concerned
about whether allocated resources actually reach their intended target as well as the
procedural fairness of the processes being applied to identify and rank target areas
(Paavola & Adger 2006). 5 But the asymmetry assumption makes a stronger and more
controversial claim than these differences. It pertains to the very question of burdenͲ
sharing. Put bluntly, it says that different agents will be held responsible when we
switchbetweentheburdens.
Now,inourpreviousattemptwetriedtodrivehometheasymmetryassumption
byarguingthatagentsthatareatorbelowthelevelofemissionstheyareentitledto
(i.e.,agentsthatarenotpolluters),cannotbeaskedtomitigate,butcanstillhaveaduty
to engage in adaptation, e.g., because they can afford it. Thus, we suggested affluent
5
Forexample,thecurrentpracticewithintheUNFCCCarchitectureisthatcountriesformulatetheirown
rankingsandtargetsintheformofsocalledNAPAs(NationalAdaptationProgrammesofAction).Clearly
theaccuracyofthismethoddependsonthequalityoflocalgovernance.
3
nonͲpolluterscanbedutyͲboundtotakeonburdensofadaptationbutnotmitigation.
Thisseemstovindicateaclearasymmetryhere.
ButitisnoteworthythatourpreviousanalysisomittedthepossibilityofanonͲ
polluterhavingadutytomitigateothers’’emissionseventhoughitcannotsensiblybe
said to have a duty to mitigate its own. This idea has now found its potential
institutional manifestation via the introduction of NAMAs (Nationally Appropriate
MitigationMeasures) 6 intheclimatechangenegotiations.ThewayNAMAsisportrayed,
e.g.,intheBaliActionPlan,itisclearlyimpliedthat(future)wealthynonͲpollutersmay
come to have duties to mitigate GHG emissions though this will take place in other
countries. In omitting this sort of duty our analysis of the asymmetry assumption was
incomplete.Here,weaimtomakeupforthisomissionandfinalizetheanalysis.Aswe
shallsee,thiswillrevealthatthedistinctionbetweenadaptationandmitigationistoo
crude.
This paper thus offers a modified defence of the asymmetry assumption.
Proceeding from a standard distinction between negative duties (not to cause harm)
and positive duties (to aid), we argue that while there remain possible asymmetries
between mitigation and adaptation, a fuller picture emerges once we question the
appropriatenessofthedistinctionbetweenmitigationandadaptationitself.Wesuggest
that we need to be much more careful about the generic labels of adaptation and
mitigation.Onthemitigationsideweoughttodistinguishbetweendirect,indirectand
altruistic mitigation. On the adaptation side we ought to distinguish between
compensatoryandaltruisticadaptation.Basedonthesenewdistinctions,weretestthe
asymmetry assumption and find that there are several nuances to the distribution of
climateburdenswhichtherathercrudedistinctionbetweenmitigationandadaptation
6
NAMAsarevoluntaryemissionreductionmeasuresundertakenbydevelopingcountriesthatare
reportedbythecountries’’governmentstotheUNFCCC.Financialsupportforthesemeasuresshouldbe
providedbythedevelopedcountries(Annex1countries)onavoluntaryadhocbasiseitherbilaterallyor
throughtheCopenhagenGreenClimateFund,whichtheCopenhagenAccordstateswillbeestablishedas
anoperatingentityofthefinancialmechanismoftheConvention.Asoftoday,thismechanismhasnotyet
beensetup,butisexpectedtobeputintoactionsoon(Dalkmann&Binsted2010)
4
fails to capture. We end the paper by discussing how our findings relate to different
burdenͲsharingprinciples,andwhytheymatter.
Negativeandpositiveduties
Most would agree that climate change generates considerable otherͲregarding duties.
Oneneednotbearadicalcosmopolitantoagreewiththis.ButthisotherͲregardingduty
caninturnbedividedintodifferentsorts.Theoristswidelyacceptadistinctionbetween
negativeandpositiveduties.Negativedutiessaythatcertainactionsmustnotbetaken;
positive duties that taking certain positive action is required. 7 In normative analyses
negative duties are usually referred to as obligations not to cause harm (to morally
relevantinterests):they‘‘prohibittheinflictionofsufferingonothers’’. 8 Positiveduties,
ontheotherhand,aredutiestoaidorassistassuch:they‘‘involvefurtheringthewellͲ
beingofothers’’(Page2006,p.12)andaremoralobligationsonehassimplyonaccount
ofbeinginapositiontohelp.
Positive duties are in general more controversial than negative duties, in
particularwhenwearetalkingaboutassistingpeoplewithwhomwelackspecialties. 9 For example, it is today widely discussed if compatriots have positive duties of justice
towards nonͲcompatriots (see e.g. Miller 2007, Nagel 2005, Rawls 1999). 10 Less
controversialisthatonemustnotactinwayswhichbringaboutharmeveniftheharm
only befalls people that are outside the borders of our political community (see e.g.
Pogge2008).Ifwedocauseharm,thenitisanuncontroversialrequirementofjustice
that we stop doing it, that we compensate the victims, or both. Moreover, it is often
morepressing,otherthingsbeingequal,todischargeone’’snegativedutiesthanone’’s
positiveduties.Evenifitistruethatassistanceisduesomeone,itisafurtherquestion
whetherIamtheparticularagenttotakethat‘‘remedialresponsibility’’(Miller2007,p.
7
Forcriticalremarks,seeKagan(1998,pp.131Ͳ32).Thedifficultyisofcoursethatoftenittakespositive
actionnottoinfringeonsomeother’’snegativeright.
8
Elaborateonacts/emissions
9
Foraniceoverviewofargumentsconcerningspecialties,seeSinger(2002).
10
Somehavearguedthatpositivedutiesarenotonesofjustice.Miller(2008)providesacogentpotential
rebuttalofthatidea––italldependsonarathernarrowstipulationofwhatjusticeis.
5
47). The same does not hold for negative duties. Usually the only way I can stop
inflictingharmisifIactuallystopinflictingit.
Negative and positive duties stem from human interests, but their underlying
logicsdiffer.Asindicated,theimperativeoftheformeris:‘‘don’’tharm!’’Theimperative
ofthelatteris‘‘assistifyoucan!’’Itiseasytoseewhybothkindsofdutyareraisedby
climatechange.Mostobviously,pollutershaveaclearnegativedutytostoppolluting,
asthisharmscurrentandfuturepeople.Butifwecanhavepositivedutiestofurtherthe
wellͲbeingofothersonaccountofourabilitytodosowithoutunreasonablecost,then
wecanclearlyhavetheminregardtoclimatechangetoo.Climatechangeispredicted
tobringaboutsevereharm,andshouldbetakenonparwithmanyotheroftheglobal
problemsthatareusuallytakentotriggerdutiestoaid.
Climateburdens:atypology
Armed with the distinction between negative and positive duties, let us return to the
issue of climate burdens. It is clear that what types of duties an agent can have will
dependonwhetherornottheagentis(or,possibly,hasbeen)apolluter.Asafirststab
attheissue,itthusseemssensibletosaythatpollutershavenegativeandpossiblyalso
positivedutiestotakeonclimateburdens,whilenonͲpollutersͲiftheyhaveanyduties
at all Ͳ only have positive duties. The positive/negative distinction straddles the
predominantdistinctionbetweenadaptationandmitigation.Wewouldarguethatthe
followingtypesofclimateburdensareplausible(Figure1):
6
Figure1.Differenttypesofclimateburdens
MITIGATION
ADAPTATION
REGULAR
DIRECT
MITIGATION
INDIRECT
MITIGATION
ALTRUISTIC
MITIGATION
COMPENSATORY
ADAPTATION
ALTRUISTIC
ADAPTATION
LetusexplainFigure1.Tobeginwith,itisimportanttonote,aswashintedat
earlier, that a ‘‘polluter’’ is different from an emitter of GHGs. All living creatures are
emittersofGHGs,butthatisnottosaythattheyareallpolluters.A‘‘polluter’’isanagent
that emits more than it is entitled to. This serves to remind us that no agent can be
expectedto,atleastnotasamatterofjustice,emitlessthanitsfairshare.Forexample,
itisunreasonabletoaskanagenttoemitlessthanitrequirestomeetitsbasicneeds
(Shue1993).Anyaccountofclimatejusticemustthereforeincludeaspecificaccountof
how much GHGs different agents are entitled to emit. This question, which crucially
involvestheproblemofhowmuchGHGsthereoughttobeintheatmosphere,mustbe
answeredindependentlyofthequestionofburdenͲsharing.
Supposethatanagentisapolluter.Otherthingsbeingequalthisagentfailsto
dischargeitsnegativedutiesandisrequiredtostopcausingharm. 11 Thiscouldbedone
eitherbyaddressingthecausesideortheexperiencedharmsideoftheequation.The
former consists in reducing one’’s pollution, i.e. regular mitigation. Regular mitigation
11
We say ‘‘other things being equal’’ because an agent violates its negative duties only when it inflicts
harmandisunjustifiedindoingso.Forexample,allagentsmightemitmorethantheyareentitledto,and
it is unclear if one can single out an agent as in violation of its negative duties under universal nonͲ
compliance.
7
can in turn be direct or indirect. The latter consists in engaging in compensatory
adaptation(or,possibly,compensationsimpliciter).Letusspecify:
Direct mitigation: a polluting agent stops causing harm by addressing its own
excessive emissions (by way of emissions reductions, creating or maintaining
carbonsinksorbycaptureandstorage).
Indirectmitigation:apolluterstopscausingharmbyoffsettingitsownexcessive
emissionsbywayofreducingsomeotheragent’’semissions.
Compensatoryadaptation:apolluterpreventsharmbywayofadaptingothers,
invariousways,totheillͲeffectsofclimatechange.
Clearly, a polluter can discharge its negative duties by pursuing any of the
strategies,oracombinationofthem.Itisalsonoteworthythatthesedifferentstrategies
all have purchase in climate policyͲcircles. Given the physical properties of the
atmosphere, it is inconsequential, from the purposes of reducing radiative forcing,
exactlywhereGHGemissionsarereduced.AreducedtonneofCO2 isareducedtonne
regardless of whether a polluter lowers its own emissions directly or offsets them by
reducing some other agent’’s the emissions. Sometimes we might better meet our
obligations by addressing others’’ emissions rather than our own. It would then be
strangetomaintainthatitisimpermissibletodoso. 12
Indirect mitigation can take different forms and there are many realͲworld
examples.Moststraightforwardly,ratherthanreducingthedomesticemissions,Annex
1countriesinsteadreduceemissionsinother(NonͲAnnex1)countriesandregions.The
principal reason for this is simply that it is often cheaper and more costͲefficient to
12
TheUNFCCCandtheKyotoProtocolarchitectureallowsforindirectmitigation,asevidentbytheClean
DevelopmentMechanism(CDM)andJointImplementation(JI)devices.Althoughtherearemany
objectionstoCDMandJIperse,webelievethereislittlereasontoobjecttothepracticeofindirect
mitigationassuch(seeCaney2010).
8
reduceemissionsinlessdevelopedcountries(theyaresocalled‘‘lowͲhangingfruit’’).A
partly different form of indirect mitigation is what in the Bali climate summit in 2007
came to be called Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Measures (NAMAs). The idea is
that, rather than Ͳ or in parallel with –– domestic emission cuts, the Annex 1 countries
should also invest into various measures, e.g., technology development and transfer,
allowingdevelopingcountriestogroweconomicallywithoutbeingdependentupon‘‘old’’
technology that contributes significantly to climate change. This can be arranged and
administeredeitherviabilateraldevices,orviasomekindofmitigationfundfromwhich
developingcountriescanapplyforfundingfortechnologicalupgrading.
Butapollutermightalsoaddressnotitsemissions,buttheirillͲeffects.Itcould
engage in adaptation to an extent which prevents the amount of harm its surplus
emissionsislikelytocause,forexamplebybuildingfloodwallswhichprotectlowͲlying
regions from rising seaͲlevels or improving health care to better combat tropical
diseases.Itisimportanttonotethattheadaptivemeasureswouldhavetobeaimedat
otheragents,becausewhatwearetalkingaboutisstillanotherͲregardingdutytostop
causingharm.Forthisreason,werefertothistypeofadaptionascompensatory. 13
Sofarwehaveexclusivelyelaboratedonthenegativedutytostopcausingharm,
whichcanonlybefallpolluters.Letusnowturntothepositiveduties,thosethatstem
fromasimpledutytoaid.Againwecandistinguishbetweenstrategiesthattargetthe
causeͲside of the equation from those that target the experienced harm side. The
formerwerefertoasaltruisticmitigationandthelatteraltruisticadaptation.
Altruisticmitigation:anonͲpollutingagentassistsinpreventingharm(toothers)
byreducingtheemissionsofpolluters.
13
Compensatoryadaptationisproblematicbecauseclimateharmischaracterizedbyitspotentiallyglobal
scope.Thus,evenifonecouldsaydefinitivelythatapolluterinflictsharmtoamagnitudeofx,andthe
polluterengagesinadaptationtoanextentthatcounterbalancesx,itstillremainsphysicallytruethatthe
agentsemissionsharmsotherpeoplethantheonesithasadapted.Inthatsenseitcouldbearguedthata
polluterwillinvariablybecausallyimplicatedinharm,andthusviolateitsnegativeduties.
9
Altruisticadaptation:anonͲpollutingagentassistsinpreventingharm(toothers)
by way of engaging in various forms of adaptation to the illͲeffects of climate
change
Weshould explaintheprefix‘‘altruistic’’.WedonotruleoutthatanonͲpollutermight
have a selfͲinterested reason to take these actions. As the countries of the world can
aptlybecharacterizedas‘‘overlappingcommunitiesoffate’’(Heldet.al.1999,p.81)itis
often true that problems in one part of the world will ultimately have negative
consequences also for other parts of the world. It follows from this interdependence
that everyone might have an interest in, say, adapting the world to climate change.
Thus,wedonotuse‘‘altruism’’hereasdenotingtheoppositeofselfͲinterest.Instead,we
intend the motivation of agents to engage in mitigation and adaptation even though
they are not polluting (and, we might add, have compensated for their possible
prehistory of pollution). These duties are duties one takes on because one wishes to
preventharmassuch,notbecauseonecausesit.
Let us begin with altruistic mitigation. As of yet, this type of climate action is
mostlyhypothetical,butitmaybecomehighlytopicalinthefuture. 14 Thebasicideais
the following. In the future there will be wealthy agents that have become wealthy
withouthavingemittedanexcessiveamountofGHG.Followingthepresentdiscussions
intheclimatechangenegotiations,thesecountrieswillhavefewobligationsintermsof
emission reductions since they do not contribute, nor has contributed, to climate
change.Foraltruisticreasons,thesecountriesmayneverthelessbeinterestedinfurther
global emission reductions (e.g., because other countries they care about are
vulnerable).Thisleavesthemwithtwooptions.Eithertheylowertheirownemissions
additionally although this is neither morally ‘‘necessary’’ (nor, presumably, particularly
[cost] effective). Or they help other countries (poor or rich) to lower their excessive
emissions.Thelatteriswhatweprimarilyintendbyaltruisticmitigation.
14
Seefootnote6.
10
Often it would be difficult to say whether an agent mitigates another agent’’s
emissionsforaltruisticorselfͲinterestedreasons.Agoodhistoricalexampleofthelatter
isSweden’’spolicytomanageacidrain.Upuntilthe1990sSwedensufferedfromacid
rain caused by sulphur emissions released in countries such as Poland, Germany and
Great Britain. Rather than trying to decrease their already modest levels of sulphur
emissions, however, Sweden instead invested in cleaning devices in the polluting
countries.Themotivestotakethiskindofactioncanthusbeatleasttwo.Eitherone
doesitoutofselfͲinterest––onlyiftheglobalemissionsarebeingreducedfarbelowthe
level caused by my own emissions will the climate be stabilised, thus diminishing the
risksforme.Oronedoesitforreasonsoffairnessand/orefficiency:Itisbetterifthe
wealthy lowͲemitting country X pays the costs to lower the emissions in (poor) highͲ
emitting country Y so that the latter country can use their relatively limited resources
for better purposes such as welfare increases. In practice, agents can of course have
mixed motives, and saying which motive is weightier is subject to the usual epistemic
constraints.Butitremainstruethataltruisticmitigationrepresentsonedistinctandso
farneglectedtypeofclimateburden.
Note also that these altruistic duties mention preventing harm ‘‘to others’’.
Climateharmthatdoesnotbefallothersofcourselogicallybefallsonlytheagentitself.
Itispossibletosaythatanagenthasafurther‘‘duty’’topreventharmtoitself.Butthis
dutyisselfͲregarding,andassuchsimplyintheselfͲinterestoftheagent.Itisnotthe
job of a theory of climate justice to explain why or whether agents are permitted or
requiredtoprotecttheirowninterests––wesimplyassumethatthisissomethingthat
theyaregoingtodo. 15
Finally we have altruistic adaptation, which is a fairly straightforward idea.
Considerthebleakprospectspeopleinpoor,lowͲlyingregionsfaceiforwhentheseaͲ
levelcontinuestorise.Thesepeoplearefacingconsiderableharmtotheirfundamental
15
Itisworthcommentingthefactthatwearesystematicallyvagueintermsofspecifyingourmoral
subjects.Weareawarethattermssuchas‘‘agent’’,‘‘polluter’’,‘‘emitter’’providepoorguidance.Thisis
howeverdonedeliberately.Inthispaperwewishtostayprinciple,avoidingadiscussionwhether––and
towhatdegreeourfindingsaredependentuponlevelofanalysis,i.e.,individual,corporateorstatelevel
(cf.Nagel2005:Miller2008).Thisis,however,anissueforthefuturetoascertain.
11
interest:theirlifeaswellastheirpropertyandlivelihoodsarethreatened.Ifwehavea
positive duty to assist such people, it follows that we can discharge this duty by
financing adaptation, e.g. by building floodͲwalls or by helping communities move to
lessvulnerablelocations.Adutyofaltruisticadaptationisthussimilartoanyotherkind
of duty of aid, and it is possible that we have these duties simply on account of our
abilitytohelpwithoutunreasonablesacrifice,andnotbecauseweareresponsiblefor
theimpendingharm(seee.g.Singer1972).Butunlikealtruisticmitigation,whichtargets
thecausesofclimatechange,altruisticadaptationtargetstheeffectside:theilleffects
ofachangingclimate.
Sofarwehavearguedthatbeneaththeburdensassociatedwiththeoverarching
labels‘‘mitigation’’and‘‘adaptation’’areinfactdifferentsubcategoriesofclimateburdens
(see, again,Figure 1). They differ in terms of what kind of action theyinvolve, and by
extension also in terms of their normative logics. By definition a nonͲpolluter cannot
havenegativeclimateduties.Onecannothavedutytostopinflictingaharmonedoes
notinflict.Butcanpollutersalsohavepositiveclimateduties?Thisisatrickyquestion,
sinceourpositivedutiestoaidareoftenthoughttoapplyatleastpotentiallytoallwho
areabletoofferaid.Buttheoriststypicallyholdthatnegativedutiestakepriorityover
positiveones:itismoreimportanttostopcausingharmthanitistopreventharmoneis
notresponsiblefor(Kagan1998,p.97,Miller2007,p.47).Atleastinclimatechangethis
isasensibleapproach,asanyeffortsofapollutertoreducetheGHGͲconcentrationin
the atmosphere should, analytically as well as morally, be understood as aiming at
reducingitsownemissions.Sowhenpolluterstakeonclimateburdens,weshallsaythat
thisisconsideredanelementoftheirnegativeduties,untiltheagentceasestopollute
and emits no more than its fair share. (Possibly it should also be added that has
compensated for past pollution.) Only when the agent ceases to be a polluter do we
face the next question whether it also has any remaining positive duties to take on
climateduties. 16
16
Inthispaperweducktheobviousdemurtothisposition,namely‘‘whatifapolluterdecidestoprioritize
andaidtheinterestsofanagentthatisrelativelydisadvantagedbutnotamongsttheleastadvantaged?’’
12
A further question is if it matters to the victim of climate harm if the harm is
causedbyapolluterornot.Manyarguethat,fromtheperspectiveofthe‘‘entitlement
holders’’,itisirrelevantwheretheharmcomesfrom;theimportantthingismerelythat
itisprevented(seee.g.Caney2009,p.212).Soitmightbearguedthatthedistinction
between positive and negative duties really has no significance here. But this view
seemsflawed.Itisreasonabletocaremoreaboutharmwhichwesufferasaresultof
theexcessivepollutionofothersthantheharmthat‘‘justhappens’’,becausetheformer
isbroughtaboutbywrongdoing.Itcomesencodedwithadisrespectfulmessage;that
somefinditpermissibletoputothersatriskbyoverusingtheatmosphericcommon.So
whereas nonͲanthropocentric climate harm still requires action in the interest of
prospectivevictims(cf.Page2008),inouropinionitremainstruethatthereisaneven
greaterobligationthatpollutersstopcausingtheharm.
Testingtheasymmetry
Letussystematicallygothroughtheclimateburdenswehaveidentifiedandthekindsof
agentsthatmayhaveanobligationtoshoulderthem.Itshouldbeclearfromwhatwe
havesaidsofarthatwetakethetwomainnormativefactorstobecausalcontribution
totheproblemandabilitytopay.WehavespokenthroughoutaboutpollutersandnonͲ
polluters, as well as wellͲoff and badlyͲoff agents. Let us stay with these rather
simplifieddistinctions,astheyareallweneedtoexaminetheissue.Itisnotimportant
tobeveryspecificabouteitherofthem.
First,letusbya‘‘polluter’’simplyunderstandanagentthatemitsmorethanitis
entitledto,asdeterminedbysome‘‘safetyͲlevel’’(alevelwhichwouldavoiddangerous
climate change Ͳ whatever that means more precisely Ͳ if everyone emitted at the
level). 17 Next,wehavethedistinctionbetweenagentswhohaveahighabilitytotakeon
17
Weclaimthatallagentsareentitledtoemitgreenhousegases(GHG)uptoacertainlevel.Itisa
furtherquestionwhetherallagentsshouldenjoyanequalpercapitarighttoemit.Foradefence,see
Singer(2002).Foracriticism,seeCaney(2010).Iftheagentisbelowthatlevel,itisconsideredanonͲ
polluter.Justtogiveahintastowherewewouldplacethelevel:InpreͲindustrialtime,theatmospheric
concentrationof(GHG)wasapprox.275Ͳ285ppm(partspermillion).Today(2005)thatlevelisestimated
13
climateburdensversusthosewhohavealower.Thisdistinctionisobviouslyverytricky
to handle, as it is difficult to establish the relevant criteria of ability, let alone to say
where the possible cut off points are. Minimally, however, we could distinguish
betweenagentswhocannottakeonclimateburdenswithoutcompromisingtheirability
tomeettheirbasicneedsandthosewhocan.Forsimplicityweshallrefertotheformer
as ‘‘badly off’’ and the latter ‘‘wellͲoff’’, overlooking the huge variance that exist within
bothclassesofagents.
It has been noted many times that climate justice needs to take both
contributoryresponsibilityandabilityintoaccount.TheUNFCCC’’sprincipleof‘‘common
butdifferentresponsibilities’’(CBDR),forexample,acknowledgesthatclimateeffortsbe
distributed ‘‘on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’’ (UNFCCC 1992, article 3.1).
ThethinkingbehindtheCBDRprincipleunderlinesthatthereisastrongpresumptionin
favour of letting the rich, polluting countries take the lion’’s share of the climate
burden. 18 Thispresumptionrevealswhatwetaketobeasalientfeatureoftheclimate
debate:thattheclimateburdenscanallbetiedtoagentswho,throughtheirblatantly
excessive emissions, have significantly violated their negative duties. ‘‘Mitigation’’ and
‘‘adaptation’’areunderthesecircumstancestobeunderstoodasregularmitigationand
compensatoryadaptation.Thesecanindeedbetreatedinasymmetricalway.
Butthiswayoflookingattheissueistoosimplistic.Pollutersmayhaveburdens
of adaptation or mitigation. NonͲpolluters cannot have burdens of mitigation but may
intuitively still have duties of adaptation. There thus seems to be an asymmetry
between mitigation and adaptation, when both are thought of as stemming from
causingorhavingcausedclimateharm.Whenusingthetermsmitigationandadaptation
toabout380ppm(IPCC2007).Weproposethatareasonablethresholdtoproceedfromisanindividual
contributionuptoanoveralllevelofGHGsintheatmosphereequivalenttoabout360ppm,whichwasthe
approximateatmosphericlevelaround1990––afterwhichtheillͲeffectsofemissionscouldbeexpectedto
beknownforallagents.Thus,demandsonmitigationkicksinwhenanagent’’semissionsreachthelevel
beyondwhichiteffectivelybecomesanetproducerof+360ppmͲemissionsintheatmosphere.
18
Itistellingthatarticle3.1continues:‘‘Accordingly,thedevelopedcountryPartiesshouldtaketheleadin
combatingclimatechangeandtheadverseeffectsthereof’’.
14
inanunreflectivemanner,therefore,thecaseinfavouroftheasymmetryassumption
seemsstrong.
However,itshouldbeclearbynowthattheinterestingpointisnotsomuchthe
possible asymmetry between mitigation and adaptation as it is the imprecision of this
verydistinction.Theremightbedutiestoadaptandmitigatewhichdonotstemfrom
pollutingthatclimatetheoristsneedtoconsider.Letuswalkthroughouttypologyover
climateburdensandseewhichagentsmighthaveanobligationtotaketheseon.
Consider first burdens of direct and indirect mitigation. What agents can have
these?Clearlyonlypolluters.Thesamecanbesaidforcompensatoryadaptation.Ifan
agentdecidestodischargeitsnegativeclimatedutiesbyengaginginadaptation,itisstill
premisedontherebeingpriororongoingpollution.Thesedutiesareaboutnotcausing
harm, and so will naturally only apply to those who in fact are causing, or have been
causing,harm.
Consider next altruistic mitigation and altruistic adaptation. These are positive
burdens agents have on account of their being in a position to prevent harm as such.
Canpollutershavetheseburdens?Quitepossibly––but,asananalyticalifnotsequential
point, we have argued that polluters (contributing to truly global harm) first have to
discharge their negative duties and stop causing further harm. But the key thing to
noticeisthatnonͲpollutersmayverywellhavetheseburdens,inparticulariftheyare
wealthy.Thus,anagentwhichhaslowereditsemissionstotheextentthatitnolonger
countsasapolluter,andinadditionmighthavecompensatedforpastpollution,willnot
escape climate duties just because it is now ‘‘green’’. Green agents might still have an
obligation to help others ‘‘go green’’ (altruistic mitigation) and to adapt the world to
unavoidableclimatechange(altruisticadaptation).
Does the distinction between negative and positive duties track the distinction
between adaptation and mitigation? No. In a previous paper we suggested that they
did,butthiswaspremisedontheassumptionthatwhenanagentemitsbelowherlimit,
shecannotbeexpectedtoengageinmitigation(Jagers&DuusͲOtterström2008).But
15
thisonlyholdsaslongasoneexcludesaltruisticmitigationfromtheequation.Table1
summarizesourresults.
Table1.Thedistributionofclimateburdens
Responsibilityofagent
Polluter
Abilityofagent
Welloff
Badlyoff
Negativeduties
ƒ Regularmitigation
ƒ Compensatory
adaptation
ƒ Regularmitigation?
Positiveduties
ƒ Secondary
ƒ
None
ƒ
Altruistic
mitigation
Altruistic
adaptation
None
NonͲpolluter
Welloff
ƒ
None
ƒ
Badlyoff
ƒ
ƒ
None
Comment. By saying that wellͲoff polluters have ‘‘secondary’’ positive duties
we intend that the agents have these duties in principle, but that,
analytically, they apply only after the more pressing negative duties are
dischargedandtheagentsceasetocountaspolluters.
AfewconclusionscanbedrawnfromTable1.Firstofall,therearealotofnuancesto
thedistributionofclimateburdenswhichthecrudedistinctionbetweenmitigationand
adaptationfailstocapture.Secondly,asalreadynotedthemainasymmetryisnotreally
betweenmitigationandadaptationbutbetweenpositiveandnegativeduties.Regular
mitigation and compensatory adaptation are ascribable only to polluters. Altruistic
mitigation and altruistic adaptation, on the other hand, do not depend on being a
polluter. This result is perhaps not surprising, but a great deal of clarity and precision
canbegained,webelieve,byrefiningthetypologyofclimateburdens.
Importanttonoticeisthatwehaveputaquestionmarkastowhetherbadlyoff
polluters have a duty to mitigate their emissions or not. This question will become
increasinglyimportantasrelativelypoorcountrieswithsubstantiallevelsofpercapita
emissions are emerging. Take for instance the case of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a
significant polluter. In 2006 it emitted 12,6 tonnes of carbon per capita. But it is also
relatively poor –– recent figures from the IMF puts the country at 11,693 international
16
dollarspercapita(PPPͲadjusted).(ThiscanbecomparedwithSweden,whichthesame
year had a GDP per capita of 35,965 international dollars while ‘‘only’’ emitting 5,1
tonnesofcarbonperperson). 19 Ofcourse,itwouldperhapsbefarfetchedtosaythata
country such as Kazakhstan is badly off in thesense that it cannot afford to meet the
basicneedsofitscitizens.Butthereisanimportantdiscussionastohowmuchshould
beexpectedintermsofregularmitigationoftherelativelypoor,whichatthesametime
havemanyotherdevelopmentgoalstomeet.Wecoulddistinguishherebetweenstrict
approaches that say that polluters must mitigate, moderate approaches that say that
they must at least not worsen the situation by emitting more than they do, and soft
approachesthatsaythatpoorpollutershavealicensetopollute. 20 Thisisnottheplace
todiscusshowtohandlethisimportantproblem,butitdeservestobementioned.
AsymmetryandburdenͲsharingprinciples
Whatisthepointofscrutinizingtheseissuesasthoroughlyaswedo?Isitnotenoughto
establish that addressing climate change gives rise to various burdens and that these
burdensoughtlargelytobeshoulderedbythedevelopedworld?Inrecentyearsmany
principles of burdenͲsharing has been proposed by both by climate negotiators and
theorists. At least the most recognized of those principles all say that the developed
world ought to take most burdens, regardless of whether we focus on causal
contribution,abilitytopay,orthedegreetowhichpeoplehavebenefitedfromclimate
changingactivities(or,morepopularstill,somecombinationofthesefactors). 21 Dowe
needtoknowmore?
Our line is that that we do. The current situation of convergence between
burdenͲsharingprinciplesisdeceptive.Therearealreadydevelopmentsthatthreatenit,
19
EmissionsdatafromtheInternationalEnergyAgency:
http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/CO2highlights.pdfGDPpercapitadatafromtheIMF’’sWorldEconomic
OutlookDatabase(April2010).
20
AninterestingparallelcanbedrawntotheCFCnegotiationsandtheMontrealprotocolfrom1987,in
whichitwasspecifiedthatsomeofthedevelopingcountries,e.g.,ChinaandIndia,wereentitledtoa
transitionalperiodduringwhichtheycouldcontinueusingvariousgasescontributingtothethinningout
oftheozoneͲlayerinthestratosphere(Morissette1989).
21
Seee.g. Caney2005;2009,Grasso2009,Page2008,Miller2009,Vanderheiden2008.
17
mostnotablytheemergenceofrelativelypoorpolluters.Inthissituationitisimportant
to call into question the assumption in favour of symmetry between climate burdens,
fortheconventionofspeakingsimplyof‘‘climateburdens’’dependsinlargepartonthe
current state of affairs, in which heavy pollution, ability to pay, and historical benefit
largelycoincideinthedevelopedworld.Butiforwhenthisstateofaffairschangeswe
willneedtothinkabouthowdifferenttypesofburdenscanapplytodifferenttypesof
agents.Becauseweareinterestedinnotonlymanagingclimatechangeeffectivelybut
alsofairly,thenwearesimplyforcedtogothroughtheunderlyingquestionsofburdenͲ
sharing carefully, even questioning the simple distinction between adaptation and
mitigation.
Inenvironmentalpoliticsthereisawellestablishedprincipleguidingamajority
of all policies: the ‘‘Polluters Pay Principle’’ (PPP). The one who causes environmental
degradation is the very same who has the responsibility to take the costs that come
withitand,typically,isalsoassumedtochangebehaviourinordertopreventfurther
degradation.Formostenvironmentalproblemsthisisafullyreasonableprinciple:itis
anattractiveideathathavingcontributedtoaproblemobligatesonetoremedyitsill
effects(toadegreewhichcorrespondstoone’’slevelofcausalcontribution).ThePPP
suffersfromarangeofproblems,someofwhichstemfromfactsthatareparticularto
climatechange.Forexample,becauseofthelonghalvingtimesofsomeoftheGHGs
(e.g., 140 years for CO2) it is problematic to point out remedial responsibility since
manyoftheemitterswhohavecausedtheproblemarenolongeralive.Moreover,in
itsunmodifiedversionthePPPcannotaccountfortheplausiblefactthatitseemsunfair
toholdpeopleresponsibleforemissionstheycouldnotknowweredangerous.Norcan
itaccountforwhyverypoorpollutersarguablyshouldbeexempted.
ThePPPcanbydefinitiononlyascribedutiestopolluters, i.e.negativeones.It
cannot distribute positive duties. 22 The normative logic of the PPP is thereby a
particularlyfittingprincipletodistributeburdensofregularmitigation.Totheextentwe
thinkofadaptationassomethingwhichonehasinadditiontoone’’smitigationburdens,
22
AsnotedbyPage(2006),thePPPisalsoincompleteasitcannottellushowtorespondtoclimateharm
whichisnonͲanthropogenic.
18
then adaptation does not lend itself as well to allocation via the PPP (Jagers & DuusͲ
Otterström2008).
Next, consider abilityͲbased principles. According to the ‘‘ability to pay’’ (ATP)
principleitisone’’sabilitytoacceptremedialresponsibilitywhichdetermineswhether
one is remedially responsible or not (see e.g. Shue 1999). The better off an agent is,
accordingtothisprinciple,thegreateritsobligationtoaccepttheburdensofclimate
change.Thereisafurtherquestionhereaboutwhatcountsas‘‘betteroff’’––isitsimply
anagent’’swealthorisitthesizeofitsopportunitycostsinpaying?––buttheimportant
thingforourpurposesisthat,unlikethePPP,theATPattachesnomoralsignificanceto
causal responsibility (i.e. historical or current pollution). Since the relevant factor is
one’’s level of ability, it is perfectly possible to envision remedially responsible agents
without causal responsibility, and causally responsible agents without remedial
responsibility.
Because the ATP focuses on ability, it can distribute burdens among polluters
and nonͲpolluters alike. It is currently true that high ability tends to go handͲinͲhand
with pollution –– one of the drivers behind economic development is and has been a
carbonͲintensiveeconomy.Butthispatternmightverywellchangeinthefuture(and,
leavingthestateͲcentredapproachaside,issurelynotuncommonamongindividuals).
Since the ATP can apply to polluters and nonͲpolluters, it can distribute any of the
climate burdens in our typology. But it is especially suited, we would argue, to
distributealtruisticadaptationandmitigation.Itisarequirementofclimatejusticeto
relieve the climate harm that can be relieved, and ability is an attractive method to
decidewhoshoulddomosttomeetthisrequirement.
Conclusions
In this paper we have dealt with an issue that has puzzled us ever since having read
Paavola&Adger’’s(2006)pieceonclimatechangeadaptation,inwhichtheyarguedthat
adaptation ‘‘presents formidable dilemmas of justice to the international community,
oneswhicharemorecomplexandnolessimportanttothosepresentedbymitigation’’
19
(ibid.594).Clearly,therearesignificantdifferencesbetweenmitigationandadaptationͲ
e.g.,whilejusticeinmitigationisprimarilyaboutburdenͲsharing,justiceinadaptation
also requires normative analysis regarding benefitͲdistribution. These differences
previouslyleadustosuggestanasymmetricalrelationshipbetweenmitigationburdens
andburdensrelatedtoadaptation:differentagentsareheldresponsibledependingon
which burden we are allocating. While mitigation burdens are only a matter for
polluters,weargued,adaptionburdensshouldbetakenbybothpollutersand(wealthy)
nonͲpolluters.
Thanks to the introduction of NAMAs on the climate change political arena,
according to which wealthy polluters (and potentially also nonͲpolluters) should help
developingcountriestomitigate,wenotonlyseeapotentiallynewburdenenteringthe
game.Intuitively,thepreviouslyidentifiedasymmetrybetweenmitigationburdensand
adaptationburdensissuddenlyfadingaway.
When proceeding from a classic distinction between negative and positive
duties, as well as a typology comprising no less than five different subcategories of
climateburdens,westillfindobviousasymmetriesinthecaseofclimatechangejustice.
However,wecannolongerconcludethattheseasymmetriesareprincipallyassociated
withmitigationoradaptation.Insteadthepaperdemonstratesthattheasymmetriesare
related with weather we ascribe agents negative duties not to cause harm or positive
duties to aid. From this we conclude that the appropriateness of the two most
commonly suggested burden sharing principles, PPP and ATP, clearly differ, but not
becauseofdifferentnormativecharacteristicsconnectedtomitigationandadaptation
but depending on what subcategory of negative and positive burdens we are dealing
with.
Thoughweareratherconfidentthattheasymmetriesstillbeingidentifiedinthe
case of climate change burdens do matter for identifying and specifying relevant
burdenͲtakersontheglobalarenaaswellasinducementsforwhythisisthecase(which
burdensharingprincipleisappropriateforwhichburden),intheendthepaperperhaps
raises more questions for the future than it answers. As indicated, we duck several
20
intricateissues,allofwhichcallforfurtherscrutiny.Letusendthepaperbygivingafew
examples.
First,throughoutthepaperwehaveomittedtodealwiththequestionsofmoral
agency and level of analysis. Who are actually the ‘‘agent’’ and the ‘‘polluter’’? Do our
resultsdifferdependingonwhethertheanswertothisquestionis,say,acorporation,a
stateoranindividual?
Second, we have only discussed two burden sharing principles, PPP and ATP.
Howareourresultsaffectedbyanintroductionofotherprinciples,e.g.,thosethatfocus
onhavingbenefittedfromclimatechange.?
Third, we have kept away from whether badly off polluters have a duty to
mitigate their emissions or not. Even if this issue may not have theoretical priority ––
afterall,historicalresponsibilitytrumpsemergingresponsibilityͲitiscertainlyrelevant
seenfromhowthecurrentnegotiationsareevolving(readtheUSvs.Chinapositions).
Theimplicationsofraisingthesekindsofquestionsmustthusnotbeunderestimated.
Today there are only two parties in the climate change negotiations: those with a
historicallyhighemissiontrackrecord(annex1countries)andthosewitha(historically)
completelycleanconscience.SincethelattergroupincludecountriessuchasChinaand
Brazil, both of which’’s GHG emissions are increasing dramatically annually, it is
interestingtoponderuponwhichresponsibilitytheyhave,nottospeakoftheadequacy
ofthepresentdivisionbetweenannex1andnonͲannex1countries.
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