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In fairness to current generations: lost voices in the climate debate
Ambuj D. Sagar a'*, Tariq Banuri b
aProgram in Science, Technology and Public Policy, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
bStockholm Environment Institute, Boston. USA
Received 13 July 1999
Abstract
Notions of justice and equity, although enshrined in the Framework Convention on Climate Change, have not shaped the outcome
of the subsequent negotiations to any substantial extent. These principles are relevant to various aspects of the climate debate,
especially those of particular importance to developing countries. While focusing on issues with justice and equity dimensions will
most likely be necessary for successful implementation of the Climate Convention, voices that speak out on such topics are often
ignored or sometimes completely absent. Here we present and discuss three aspects of the climate debate the allocation of "rights to
the atmosphere," liability for climate-related impacts, and the needs of those who do not contribute significantly to climate change
- - that are of substantial importance for countries of the South. We believe that an increased attention to such issues, and their
incorporation into the climate deliberations, is important for a robust climate regime. To do so will require, both, attention on the part
of scientists, other analysts, and policy-makers as well as strengthening the capacity for marginalized groups to speak up. © 1999
Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Climate change; Equity; Justice
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
The United Nations F r a m e w o r k Convention on Climate Change ( U N F C C C ) (UN, 1992) was signed in 1992
and has, by now, received 176 instruments of ratification.
But progress towards the objectives of the Convention
has been slow and meandering, with some key aspects of
the discussions (such as short-term targets and timetables
or mechanisms for improving the cost-effectiveness of
any abatement strategies) capturing most of the attention
in the negotiations and the surrounding analysis. Notions of fairness and equity, though enshrined in the
Principles of the Convention (UN, 1992: Article 3), have
generally not influenced, to any substantial extent, the
outcome of the subsequent debate. This is not surprising.
Even though the concepts of justice and equity have been
present in the theoretical environmental discourse, it is
only of late, and that too only to a limited extent for some
* Corresponding author. Tel.: + 1-617-496-6218; fax: + 1-617-4960606.
E-mail address: [email protected](A.D. Sagar)
issues in the North, that they have found their way into
policy-making. The environmental justice movement in
the United States that focuses on the distribution of
environmental burdens a m o n g communities, for
example, has had some success in entering the mainstream of the debate. But justice and equity have rarely
played a pivotal role in international relations, and
notwithstanding the rhetoric of "global environmental
stewardship," negotiations for global environmental
problems operate in the same domain as other international issues. While no party is prepared to explicitly
argue against justice and equity - - hence paying lipservice to these principles has become almost obligatory
- - they rarely shape the final outcome. On the contrary,
the negotiating behavior of most parties has been dominated by concerns about economic competitiveness,
minimal burden-sharing, and other strategic national
interests.
Yet, there is an increasing recognition that the climate
problem cannot be tackled by the N o r t h alone. Although
industrialized countries have been responsible for an
overwhelming portion of the historical greenhouse-gas
( G H G ) emissions, rising emissions in the South are
a source of disproportionate concern in the North. But
0301-4215/99/$- see front matter © 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S0301-42 15(99)00036- 1
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A.D. Sagar, 7". Banuri / Energy Policy 27 (1999) 509-514
Southern countries have been wary of making any commitments ("voluntary" or otherwise) or entering willynilly into international cooperative arrangements to
abate their G H G emissions. Underlying this reluctance is
a recognition of the strategic behavior of the industrialized countries as well as the absence of any concerted
focus on issues that are important to the South: equity,
justice and sustainable development.
It is our belief that in order to truly engage the South in
a global climate action plan, these issues must be brought
center stage of the discussions, especially in the negotiations. This may require a renewed commitment to
values and goals that have been present in the climate
discussions (sometimes at the forefront, but mostly in the
background), as well as consideration of some perspectives that have traditionally not been given much attention in the negotiations or the surrounding discussions.
Here we choose to highlight and discuss three issues
which we feel are central to such a commitment.
2. The ignored voices: allocation of the
"rights to the atmosphere"
The allocation of global carbon emissions has figured
in the climate discussions intermittently. In fact, there
was substantial discussion (at least within research and
advocacy circles) on this theme preceding and subsequent to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) meeting in Rio de
Janeiro (see, for example, Grubb, 1989; Agarwal and
Narain, 1991; Solomon and Ahuja, 1991; Barrett, 1992;
Burtraw and Toman, 1992; Cline, 1992; Ghosh, 1993;
Smith et al., 1993; Welsch, 1993). Unfortunately, despite
the burst of intellectual activity on this topic, it receded
into the background soon after Rio as the focus of the
climate discussions moved to short-term targets and
timetables. This shift may have resulted in part from the
promise made by the Annex-I countries at U N C E D to
reduce their G H G emission to 1990 levels by the year
2000, and reinforced by the 1995 Berlin Mandate from
the first Conference of the Parties (COP-l) requiring the
Annex-1 countries to present a protocol by COP-3
(UNFCCC, 1995). Subsequently, in COP-2, the Annex-1
countries agreed to the inclusion of legally binding commitments in such a protocol (UNFCCC, 1996). This
resulted in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol which sets
targets to be achieved by these countries by the period
2008-2012 (UNFCCC, 1997).
While the Kyoto Protocol can be rightly regarded as
a momentous step, the attention on short-term Annex-I
country commitments effectively subverted longer-term
thinking on the climate issue. The discourse was reduced
to an almost exclusive examination of the feasibility and
costs of various short-term targets and timetables, and of
the potential applicability of policy options and instru-
ments (market-based ones in particular) aimed at reducing the costs of meeting a range of possible targets. It
would be fair to say that the economics of climate change
- - or rather, the economics of G H G abatement strategies
- - captured most of the debate leading up to the K y o t o
meeting. The post-Kyoto debates have been dominated
by discussion of principles, modalities, guidelines and
rules that would be appropriate for the "flexibility"
mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. This is not surprising since Annex-I countries regard these mechanisms
as key to reducing the economic costs associated with
meeting their K y o t o commitments.
Given the overwhelming contribution of Annex-I
countries to both the annual and the cumulative historical G H G emissions globally, any "fair" allocation regime
will have substantial consequences for them. Possibly
this consideration has been another reason for their unwillingness to engage in any discussion of this topic in the
climate negotiations. Thereby the issue has been effectively ignored despite a recognition of its importance by
both Northern and Southern analysts.
Still, the allocation debate has not disappeared completely. It has been kept alive by the G-77/China and
some advocacy groups (such as the Global Commons
Institute and the Center for Science and Environment).
The common position of the G-77/China is that an
allocation framework is a necessary precursor to any
consideration of acceding to an abatement regime. For
example, the governments of China and India
(UNFCCC, 1998a1 and the G-77/China (UNFCCC,
1998b) indicated the primacy they accord to equitable
allocations of emissions entitlements by linking it, in the
discussions during and following Kyoto, with the acceptance of emissions trading. This reaffirmation has possibly
provided the impetus for the recent resurgence in research interest in the subject of equitable allocation of
emission rights (see, for example, Rose, 1998; Byrne et al.,
1998; Najam and Sagar, 1998; Claussen and McNeilly,
1998).
But an issue as central as this one cannot continue to
be relegated to the margins of the climate debate. It also
cannot merely be debated and discussed in the pages of
policy journals (though that may be a useful first step). 1
Ignoring this issue in the negotiations will not make it
disappear. The need for full Southern participation in the
FCCC will eventually require greater attention to Southern perspectives. In the meanwhile, the Northern neglect
1Policy studies by prominent organizations such as the World Bank
and UN agencieshave the capability to influencethe debate, but these
organizations have also abdicated their responsibilities in favor of
institutional interests. Thus, the Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) are jostling to stake
a claim to be key players in the emerging emissions-trading arena and
their research programs seem to have been reoriented accordingly.
A.D. Sagar. T. Banuri / Energy Policy 27 (1999) 509-514
only polarizes the debate further. A resolution of the
allocation issue in line with the Principles of the Convention will help not only in reducing the contentiousness of
the negotiations, but also streamline the process by setting out a framework for implementing the Convention
in a logical, consistent, and fair manner (Najam and
Sagar, 1998).
3. The silenced voices: liability for climate-change-related
impacts
The possible large h u m a n health, environmental, economic, and societal costs associated with a changing
climate are of particular concern to the countries of the
South. Climate change could possibly cause large economic losses for some developing economies, i.e., a substantial fraction of their G N P , or take a large toll on
h u m a n life and health. F o r example, agriculture, a major
component of most Southern economies, m a y be strongly affected by a rise in mean temperature rise, changes in
the hydrological cycle, and variations in pest infestations.
Changes in climatic patterns (that may already be occurring - - see, for example, Karl and Knight, 1998; Hansen
et al., 1998) can also lead to floods, droughts, and heat
waves which can cause significant damage to property
and h u m a n health.
Climate change may also increase the probability of
catastrophic events
for example, theory and modeling
exercises predict an increase in the intensity of hurricanes
as a result of temperature increases (Knutson et al., 1998).
Recent decades have also seen an increase in climaterelated catastrophes. In 1998, for example, windstorms
and floods caused about $75 billion in economic damages and the loss of tens of thousands of lives - - most of
these events were in developing countries, and hence only
a small fraction of the losses were insured (Munich Re,
1998). While there may be a number of reasons for this
increase in losses due to extreme atmospheric events,
m a n y believe that anthropogenic climate change is
implicated. Enhanced G H G concentrations could also
result in surprises (such as a disruption of the N o r t h
Atlantic thermohaline circulation (Broecker, 1997)) due
to non-linear responses of the climate system. Most
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) countries are
concerned about the potential consequences of sea-level
rise that is predicted to result from G H G - i n d u c e d climate
change. While the magnitude of the impacts will eventually depend upon the rate and level of global temperature increase, m a n y island states (as well as other
countries) are certain to suffer substantial losses even
though they have some of the lowest G H G emissions.
Countries of the South may well suffer substantial
impacts from a changing climate, yet most of them have
not contributed to the greenhouse problem in any significant manner. This is especially true for m a n y island states
511
and many African nations that are particularly vulnerable
to climate change but have had historically low G H G
emissions which are not even expected to increase substantially in the near future. Additionally, most developing
nations usually lack the capacity to engage in adaptation
against projected climate impacts or even respond in an
appropriate manner to such events as typhoons or coastal
storms. These countries also have only limited, if any,
insurance cover to mitigate the risk of impacts that may
result from climate change. To address concerns such as
these, AOSIS countries had proposed an insurance
scheme for sea-level rise as an Annex to the F r a m e w o r k
Convention, but in the end, this proposal sank without
a trace. These concerns were effectively silenced.
Somewhat disturbingly, the analyst community (which
is situated almost exclusively in the North) seems to have
chosen to more or less avoid a discussion of the transnational liability of climate impacts. 2 This could be attributable to a number of factors: first, our understanding of
the climate system is still limited, and the linkages between G H G build-up and the frequency, magnitude, and
regional distribution of impacts of climate-change are
fraught with significant uncertainty. This makes it hard
to attribute a specific climate-related event to enhanced
G H G concentrations (or even attempt to ascertain the
probability of a linkage within any reasonable range) at
the present time. Second, the models used for estimating
the impacts of increased G H G concentrations mostly
focus on significant changes in atmospheric G H G concentrations, often corresponding to assumed equilibrium
levels in the long term (such as by the year 2050 or 2100).
While over this time frame, the changes in climate induced by the build-up of G H G s could lead to large
impacts on h u m a n health, the environment, society, and
the economy, there is little motivation to think about the
issue of liability in such a distant future. Third, to some
extent, there is the problem of the bounding the discussion - - if one was to consider insuring against or
compensating for potential climate-related impacts, the
question remains what categories of impacts or events
would be covered or compared? Last, the liability issue is
a politically charged subject, and tendency of analysts
often is to avoid focusing on topics deemed as nonstarters. 3 While all of these factors indicate that the
2There is also an equity issue within Annex-1 countries because the
impacts of a changed climate will be (and may already be) borne
disproportionately by only a small fraction of the population, whereas
the benefits of greenhouse-gas emissions are being enjoyed by the
general populace. But in this paper, we do not discuss issues of equity at
a sub-national level in the North.
3Carbon taxes offer a good illustration of this - - while there is
general agreement that this would be the economicallyoptimal way to
achieve a desired target, the political infeasibility of this approach
within the US has for most purposes excluded it from consideration in
domestic policy analyses.
512
A.D. Sagar, T. Banuri / Energy Policy 27 (1999) 509-514
liability issue is a thorny one, to avoid the issue altogether suggests that current and near-term climate-related impacts are insignificant or that any causal links
between G H G emissions and such impacts are absent
- - this belies the current scientific consensus (Watson
et al., 1996).
Interestingly, the only insertion of such issues in the
climate discussions has occurred because of the financial
ramifications to insurance firms of the rapid increases in
the economic losses due to catastrophic climatic events.
This has led to a focus on the relationship between
climate change and the insurance industry (Berz, 1993;
Swiss Re, 1996; Tucker, 19971) and the role of climate
science in informing the insurance industry about climate
risk (Changnon et al., 1997; Michaels et al., 1997).
While not completely absent (see Chichilinsky and Heal,
1993; Tol, 1998), there has been much less interest on the
applicability of these insights to attend to the concerns of
developing countries or in examining the prospect of
their losses being covered through insurance schemes.
Unfortunately, the sparseness of this discussion and the
lack of any major institutional sponsors to carry it forward has effectively suppressed this issue. But the question and relevance of the liability of climate impacts
cannot be buried - - liability is the other side of responsibility, and the latter is one of the principles of the
Convention.
As our understanding of the climate system improves
over time, it m a y be possible to better detect changes in
climatic patterns (from the expected baseline) and establish linkages to atmospheric G H G concentration buildup with some estimable probability. This also raises the
question whether one should consider retroactive liability for impacts from climatic events if in the future it can
be shown that climatic patterns did deviate from the
expected trends and that some causality is attributable to
anthropogenic G H G emissions. 4 Or whether it may be
worthwhile to consider steps now to set up a compensation fund for the future in case anthropogenic interference with climatic patterns causes severe impacts in the
next few decades. 5 N o t only would this serve to compensate developing countries for damages incurred, but it
would also provide a signal to current emitters about the
possible economic risks to them resulting from their
activities (instead of this risk being borne by the communities that m a y suffer the impacts).
4The recent lawsuits filedin the US by various states against tobacco
companies to recover Medicaid expenditures incurred for the increased
medical costs of providing care for indigent smokers, and the subsequent settlements, suggest that consideration of retroactive liability
does have merit and applicability.
5Spain, for example,has decided that companiesproducing or planting genetically modified crops must contribute to an insurance fund
that is meant to cover any resulting environmental accident (Bosch,
1999).
4. The missing voices: focus on non-polluters
So far, most of the attention on the climate issue has
focused on the G H G emitters. This is appropriate because the modification of their activities is necessary to
curtail the build-up of G H G s in the atmosphere. Yet
there is a curious neglect of those countries (or populations within countries) that have not contributed to the
climate problem in any substantial manner. For example,
a large fraction of humanity consumes minimal amounts
of fossil fuels. An estimated 2 billion people use very low
amounts of energy per capita, and furthermore, m a n y of
their traditional energy sources - - animal dung, crop
residues and wood - - are often carbon-neutral 6 (Reddy
et al., 1997).
These groups do not indulge in activities that are
substantially deleterious to the global climate system, but
as a result, they are virtually excluded from the climate
discussions. It is important to include them and incorporate their needs into the deliberations. Their reliance
on traditional forms of energy, while climate-friendly, is
problematic for a number of other reasons (Reddy et al.,
1997): poor people pay a higher price per unit of energy
services than do the rich (since subsidies often increase as
one goes up the energy ladder); in addition, these people
also spend a higher proportion of their income on energy
which reduces their ability to invest in improved energy
devices. They also spend more time obtaining these energy services, especially because of the increasingly large
amounts of time needed to gather firewood. Finally, the
health impacts of the air pollution caused by burning
such fuels (especially indoors for cooking) are enormous
because of the combination of high emissions and high
exposures
women and children are at particular risk
(Smith, 1993).
It, therefore, appears logical to assist these groups in
getting access to improved energy services as part of the
activities catalyzed (and funded) by the climate-related
discussions and negotiations. The use of more efficient
energy-conversion devices and movement up the energy
ladder - - such as shifting from wood or charcoal stoves
to kerosene - - would thus bring immense gains to the
poor. ~ Even efforts to facilitate the availability of traditional sources such as firewood would be of substantial
help. Yet programs to do so have not yet been considered
a part of U N F C C C activities. Thus, we have this
6Inefficientcombustion of biomass-basedfuels, though, can lead to
emission of gaseous products of incomplete combustion that contribute
to the greenhouse effect.
7Introduction of more efficientcooking devices(based on biomass or
fossil fuels) would also result in the reduction of gaseous products of
incomplete combustion. Movement up the energy ladder will however
lead to some increases in carbon emissions through the shift away from
carbon-neutral fuels.
A.D. Sagar, T. Banuri / Energy Policy 27 (1999) 509-514
situation where part of the world's population that does
not contribute substantially to the G H G build up in the
atmosphere (and will not do so in the near-to-mid future)
is placed at the periphery of the climate discussions.
This issue can be addressed only in part by a national
allocation of the "rights to the atmosphere" (i.e., countries that do not contribute significant G H G emissions
may be able to sell their emissions rights to others gaining suitable compensation). Two other aspects that must
be considered. First, even within countries, there is a wide
distribution of G H G emissions. Developing countries
could choose to utilize some of their UNFCCC-related
financial transfers towards the needs of their non-polluting populations, but given the lack of the political standing of these groups, the chances of this occurring are
remote. It is more than likely that the North-South
transfers of finances will be utilized to improve the energy
and other industrial infrastructure supporting the lifestyles of Southerners who are the major G H G emitters in
their countries (though generally still not anywhere close
to their Northern counterparts). Therefore, it may be
necessary to ensure that such a perverse outcome is
avoided. This could be done, for example, by allocating
and targeting a fraction of the international transfers of
resources (financial and technological) specifically at
those responsible for "survival emissions." At the same
time, there may need to be an explicit discussion of the
distribution of emission rights within countries. 8
Second, at present there is little R&D in the South or
the North for improving the energy services to the poor.
This does not constitute a lucrative market nor does it
count as "sexy" science. For example, funding for improved cookstove programs is not very large, and often
there is only limited dissemination and exchange of information gained from various programs. (Barnes et al.,
1993) Even the health issues surrounding the use of
traditional fuels are not completely understood - - the
magnitude and extent of the health impacts from the
indoor cooking with traditional fuels has begun to be
appreciated only in recent years. Incorporation of this
issue into the UNFCCC agenda would provide a muchneeded impetus to an important but mostly neglected
area of the energy-poverty nexus, and rightfully so.
5. Conclusion
We have tried to illustrate here that incorporation of
justice and equity concerns into the climate debate requires a closer attention to issues that are of relevance to
s This is likely to be a sensitive issue within developing countries, yet
one that must be broached at some point. At the same time, international allocation of emissions rights should not be linked to this
domestic discussion.
513
the South. Some of these concerns have been raised
earlier, but mostly shunted aside; others have been completely absent from the debate - - mainly because the
people that they concern have no standing in the climate
arena.
The successful integration of such issues into the
mainstream debates and the emerging climate regime is
contingent on the ability of vulnerable nations and marginalized people to gain a voice. If the generation and use
of knowledge is shaped by societal and cultural variables,
including the distribution of power, then it seems important that a multiplicity of voices from different countries
and cultures demand attention to these issues
thus
shaping the questions as well as the knowledge base
relevant to the climate debate.
A better understanding and definition of the different
facets of the climate problem, of course, is only the first
step towards its resolution. Other steps include the determination and presentation of policy alternatives, selection of an acceptable set of solutions by decision makers,
and implementation (which may also require agreement
on appropriate methods for verification and monitoring
of national compliance). Negotiations on these issues
require the ability to understand and articulate national
needs and concerns, to make a concerted effort to bring
these onto the international agenda, and then being able
to support and propagate national positions through
targeted analysis.
As things now stand, most developing countries do not
have the capacity to engage in such activities. Capacity
building efforts under the UNFCCC (such as the Country Studies programs) have been focusing more on allowing countries to fulfill their obligations under the
Convention such as putting together national greenhouse gas inventories. Other programs to fund climaterelated activities in developing countries are often driven
by donor interests. Thus the North-South gap in capacity to engage in fundamental aspects of the climate issue
is widening and so may be the prospects of exploring just
solutions to the climate problem. This is unfortunate.
Protection of the global climate system requires buy-in
from all countries, and options that are deemed to be
inequitable are unlikely to be sustainable in the long
term. A robust climate regime will be facilitated by an
increased attention to voices that dwell on equity issues,
and their incorporation into the climate deliberations. To
do so requires not only keener hearing on the part of
scientists, other analysts, and policy-makers, but also
strengthening the capacity for others to speak up.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Michele Ferenz and James
Risbey for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
514
A.D. Sagar. T. Banuri / Energ)" Policy 27 H999) 509-514
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