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THIRD WORLD NETWORK
THE SUNSHINE PROJECT
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY THREAT – WHO RULES DISREGARDED
US Nuclear Weapons Lab Conducts Research
with Synthetic Smallpox Genes
Sandia National Laboratory, part of the US Department of Energy, has initiated
experiments with smallpox genes engineered into other organisms. The genes were
inserted into the other bugs in order to produce smallpox proteins for undisclosed
purposes. According to Sandia National Lab, it did not obtain WHO approval for this
research because the US government has taken the position that WHA resolutions do
not apply to synthetic variola virus DNA. Loss of WHO control over synthetic vaiola
DNA would spell the end of WHO control over the virus itself.
A request to the US government for more information has not been answered. Official
minutes from a Sandia National Laboratory committee have been obtained, however,
that confirm the experiments (see: http://www.smallpoxbiosafety.org/sandia.pdf).
WHA resolution requires WHO approval for research involving smallpox DNA. It
appears doubtful that WHO would have approved of the experiments if it had been
formally asked to. Under WHO rules, only specific types of research that are essential
for public health may be conducted with smallpox and its genes. These rules appear to
preclude Sandia's research, especially since Sandia is not a health institution.
The historical mission of Sandia is creating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) for
the US armed forces, particularly technology for nuclear missiles. Sandia does not
have a biomedical mission. It is unclear how the United States construes Sandia's
smallpox DNA research to be within the public health bounds established by WHA
resolutions. There is also a double standard: It is highly unlikely that the US would be
pleased if any other country manipulated smallpox genes at a WMD laboratory.
Synthetic Genes: Notably, Sandia did not obtain the smallpox genes from the WHO
authorized repository at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia. Instead,
the genes were ordered from a gene synthesis company that sent them to Sandia.
According to WHA resolution, smallpox DNA should only be possessed and
distributed with explicit WHO approval. Thus, not only did the United States conduct
research with smallpox DNA without WHO approval, the unapproved research
involved synthesis, distribution, and expression of smallpox genes outside of the
WHO authorized repository system.
If experiments with synthetic smallpox DNA continue to take place beyond WHO
control, then WHO will lose control of smallpox virus.
The unapproved Sandia experiments underscore the urgency of
1) Fixing a prompt destruction date for the virus;
2) Banning genetic engineering experiments with the virus and its genes;
3) Firmly stating that WHO control extends to all smallpox virus and DNA,
whether natural or synthetic in origin;
4) Banning synthesis and distribution of smallpox DNA except by the two WHO
authorized repositories and, even then, only for use in time-limited essential
public health research that has been explicitly approved by WHO.