Download pragmatism and relativism

Moral relativism rejects that there are any universal and absolute moral principles that apply to
everybody everywhere at all times. This belief can have different motivations. Some people argue based
on epistemological considerations that there is no proper ‘knowledge’ of moral rules. Moral rules and
values are not the sort of things that one can know about in the way we can have knowledge of ordinary
states of affairs. Other people argue based on metaphysical arguments that objective moral facts do not
exist. Proponents of this anti-realist position sometimes use the denial of objective moral facts to justify
the claim that we cannot have proper knowledge about moral rules. Yet others simply argue that, as a
matter of fact, moral precepts evolve and change according to time and place. Hence, morality is always
relative to the historical context it is practiced in. One must be careful not to collapse relativism into
subjectivism. For example, even if you argue that morality is relative to specific cultures, it might be an
objective question what factors determine the prevalent moral code in that culture. In fact, in might be
argued that even at the individual level it’s an objective matter components in your motivational
structure determine your choice of actions depending on how much information is available. In a sense
this is Nagel’s worry: the more we know about the specific context moral decisions are made in, the less
room there is for genuine moral deliberation. Obviously a conclusion he doesn’t accept.
All three varieties of relativism are anti-absolutist: there are no universal, eternal, moral principles
independent of particular contexts. One of the important consequences of this view is that there are
many competing moral points of view and these are sometimes incompatible with each other.
Furthermore, since there are no objective independent moral standards we can appeal to, we can’t
settle the issue of what is right and wrong by evoking such standards.
Does this mean that everything goes? That there is no difference between right and wrong? Some
absolutists are eager to attack relativism by claiming this. They might argue as follows:
1. If relativism is true, then there is no moral system that is objectively better than any other.
2. If no set of moral rules is objectively better, then it doesn’t make sense to talk about some
moral values being right or wrong.
3. But morality is not possible unless we can make such judgments about right and wrong
4. Therefore, relativism, if it is true, makes morality impossible.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it assumes in the second premise that it doesn’t make
sense to talk about what is right and wrong unless we can appeal to objectively true context invariant
standards. But why should we accept this premise? Why can’t you argue that there is a right or wrong
thing to do based on the particulars of the situation. For example, this action is wrong because it will
cause needless suffering in this place at this time. It’s not clear why you can’t base moral reasoning on
specific values that are context dependent as opposed to eternal universal principles.
Pragmatists are often accused of being relativists. To some extent this is understandable because most
pragmatists would agree with all of the anti-absolutists positions above. However, they often reject the
label because they don’t want to be associated with moral nihilism. They maintain that certain
moralities are superior to others; however, they do not believe that such judgments depend on appeal
to universal moral principles. In other words, they take issue with premise 2 above and most of them
would reject that you could substitute “pragmatism” for “relativism” in premise 1, depending on how
you define “objectivity”(to some extent this is what Putnam and Rorty disagree about). Rorty, for
example, rejects the label and prefers “anti-foundationalist” or “anti-dualist”. Like other pragmatists
Rorty believes that ideas and concepts are tools we as a biological species have developed to cope with
reality. We, as human beings, have a number of interests that determine what goals we set for ourselves
individually and collectively. Our concepts and theories either help us realize these goals or impede us.
The theories that work well we call “true” and claims that are uncontroversial and uncontested we call
facts. However, this should not delude us into thinking that there are theory-neutral facts that exist
independently of our inquiries and interests. The idea that metaphysical realists subscribe to is that
science aims to discover what objectively true independent of our cognitive schemes. However,
according to the pragmatists, this is an illusion. We can’t compare our ideas to what is ultimately real
because there is no point of view from which such a comparison could be made. This line of reasoning
applies to ethics as well. The criterion for what is “true” in ethics is what works well. If you adopt a set of
moral principles that allow many people to live happy fulfilling lives, then those principles are the right
ones in that context. Obviously, things could change, and then we might have to reject these principles
in favor of new and better ones, but this is life, sometimes you have to adjust the means to get what you
want, sometimes you have to adjust the goals.