Moral Imagination and Adorno: Before and After Auschwitz
... prevention of another genocide. While most would agree with such a statement, practically how do we respond to such a call, specifically in light of Adorno’s work? Answering this question is at the heart of this project and I argue that imaginative memorials can fulfill Adorno’s criteria for post-Au ...
... prevention of another genocide. While most would agree with such a statement, practically how do we respond to such a call, specifically in light of Adorno’s work? Answering this question is at the heart of this project and I argue that imaginative memorials can fulfill Adorno’s criteria for post-Au ...
The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth about Morality
... cognitive science, and evolutionary theory to explain why moral realism appears to be true even though it is not. I then argue, based on the picture of moral psychology developed herein, that realist moral language and thought promotes misunderstanding and exacerbates conflict. I consider a number o ...
... cognitive science, and evolutionary theory to explain why moral realism appears to be true even though it is not. I then argue, based on the picture of moral psychology developed herein, that realist moral language and thought promotes misunderstanding and exacerbates conflict. I consider a number o ...
Moral Beauty as An Overriding Imperative in
... conceptualization of Moral Righteousness as an espousal of both individual goodness and societal goodness debunks this tension. In chapter two, I start by arguing against Situationism before I propose a new way of defining Situationism based on Confucian texts. I then proceed to explicate Confucius’ ...
... conceptualization of Moral Righteousness as an espousal of both individual goodness and societal goodness debunks this tension. In chapter two, I start by arguing against Situationism before I propose a new way of defining Situationism based on Confucian texts. I then proceed to explicate Confucius’ ...
Enhancing Moral Conformity and Enhancing Moral Worth
... Chemistry? Unpublished.], suggests that “while there is indeed evidence that certain pharmaceutical and neuroscientific interventions can alter dispositions and behaviour in ways that we may be inclined to morally evaluate positively, this falls well short of constituting ‘moral bioenhancement’ in a ...
... Chemistry? Unpublished.], suggests that “while there is indeed evidence that certain pharmaceutical and neuroscientific interventions can alter dispositions and behaviour in ways that we may be inclined to morally evaluate positively, this falls well short of constituting ‘moral bioenhancement’ in a ...
Kant`s Puzzling Ethics of Maxims
... to deserve their name. Acting o n maxims (on any old maxims) does not impose uniformity of behavior (even though Kant seems to think that as a matter of fact there is generally not too much variation in the life or principles of most people). Maxims as such d o not require a firm resolution nor do t ...
... to deserve their name. Acting o n maxims (on any old maxims) does not impose uniformity of behavior (even though Kant seems to think that as a matter of fact there is generally not too much variation in the life or principles of most people). Maxims as such d o not require a firm resolution nor do t ...
An Internalist Dilemma - University of Colorado Boulder
... internalist claims I am interested in have four basic claims in common. First, I understand internalism as a conceptual claim. It can be understood to state that a sentence to the effect that it is right to expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, a judgment such that if a person holds it ...
... internalist claims I am interested in have four basic claims in common. First, I understand internalism as a conceptual claim. It can be understood to state that a sentence to the effect that it is right to expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, a judgment such that if a person holds it ...
The Moral Point of View in Hume, Kant and Mill Margaret Marie
... view. When we adopt the general point of view, he claims, we ignore the differences that distance and time can make to our non-moral reactions. From the general point of view, it does not matter how close to or far from someone we are. We adopt a point of view where we ignore the features particula ...
... view. When we adopt the general point of view, he claims, we ignore the differences that distance and time can make to our non-moral reactions. From the general point of view, it does not matter how close to or far from someone we are. We adopt a point of view where we ignore the features particula ...
Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism
... moved by what they believe is most reasonable to do, the lack of motivation would appear to count as a species of irrationality. But that is not always how the cases strike us. Huck Finn’s refusal to turn in his friend Jim was not a failure of rationality. It is partly on the basis of such examples ...
... moved by what they believe is most reasonable to do, the lack of motivation would appear to count as a species of irrationality. But that is not always how the cases strike us. Huck Finn’s refusal to turn in his friend Jim was not a failure of rationality. It is partly on the basis of such examples ...
The Emptiness of the Moral Law
... at all, because this standpoint provides nothing but an "empty principle of subjectivity" (PR § 148R). Morality is the standpoint of the individual moral subject who judges actions by a standard of the good, whose content is drawn from both right and well-being, taking into account not only the agen ...
... at all, because this standpoint provides nothing but an "empty principle of subjectivity" (PR § 148R). Morality is the standpoint of the individual moral subject who judges actions by a standard of the good, whose content is drawn from both right and well-being, taking into account not only the agen ...
Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency
... supported than analyses denying that moral opinions are optations. To be sure, emotivism has a lot of apparent problems. For example, many believe that emotivism is doomed for the simple reason that we can be morally weak, depressed, or just plain bad: in such cases moral opinions and corresponding ...
... supported than analyses denying that moral opinions are optations. To be sure, emotivism has a lot of apparent problems. For example, many believe that emotivism is doomed for the simple reason that we can be morally weak, depressed, or just plain bad: in such cases moral opinions and corresponding ...
A Plea for Moral Deference
... opportunity to the achievement of moral knowledge, and thereby to the achievement of a morally good life. Unfortunately, however, just because an idea is very nice—noble, even—that does not make it true. On inspection, moreover, this particular idea turns out to be philosophically suspect. Let us ex ...
... opportunity to the achievement of moral knowledge, and thereby to the achievement of a morally good life. Unfortunately, however, just because an idea is very nice—noble, even—that does not make it true. On inspection, moreover, this particular idea turns out to be philosophically suspect. Let us ex ...
Don`t Let it Happen Again: A Kantian Account of
... Kant only mentions forgiveness explicitly in a few, short passages in the Lectures on Ethics and the “Doctrine of Virtue.” But these passages, along with independent observations about his moral theory, provide us with the information necessary to construct a Kantian account of forgiveness. In this ...
... Kant only mentions forgiveness explicitly in a few, short passages in the Lectures on Ethics and the “Doctrine of Virtue.” But these passages, along with independent observations about his moral theory, provide us with the information necessary to construct a Kantian account of forgiveness. In this ...
1 Kantian Moral Psychology Michelle A. Schwarze Ph.D. Candidate
... While freedom and rationality are necessary conditions of morality for Kant, only the moral law itself (i.e. the Categorical Imperative or CI) can be a sufficient motive for moral action. The moral law, as Kant conceives of it, is simply the Categorical Imperative (CI): “act only in accordance with ...
... While freedom and rationality are necessary conditions of morality for Kant, only the moral law itself (i.e. the Categorical Imperative or CI) can be a sufficient motive for moral action. The moral law, as Kant conceives of it, is simply the Categorical Imperative (CI): “act only in accordance with ...
Is There Moral High Ground?
... Blackburn and Richard Rorty; it is an open question, however, whether this denial leaves them unable to distinguish the metaethical position they reject, moral realism, from their own. Be that as it may, Timmons is a more traditional metaphysician. Timmons’s irrealism is one which accepts the existe ...
... Blackburn and Richard Rorty; it is an open question, however, whether this denial leaves them unable to distinguish the metaethical position they reject, moral realism, from their own. Be that as it may, Timmons is a more traditional metaphysician. Timmons’s irrealism is one which accepts the existe ...
On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism
... 8, para. 7). Thus, Hume claims the existence of “the common principles of human nature” (T 3.2.6.9; cf. EPM 9.64). According to Hume, our moral sentiments rest on this unchangeable human nature. He says, “the sentiments of morality…are so rooted in our constitution and temper, that without entirely ...
... 8, para. 7). Thus, Hume claims the existence of “the common principles of human nature” (T 3.2.6.9; cf. EPM 9.64). According to Hume, our moral sentiments rest on this unchangeable human nature. He says, “the sentiments of morality…are so rooted in our constitution and temper, that without entirely ...
Rightness and Responsibility
... judge to be morally right or valuable. From the first-person point of view, these moral characteristics strike us as considerations that recommend or speak in favor of the actions to which they apply. Furthermore, the fact that they strike us as normative in this way is connected to our tendency to ...
... judge to be morally right or valuable. From the first-person point of view, these moral characteristics strike us as considerations that recommend or speak in favor of the actions to which they apply. Furthermore, the fact that they strike us as normative in this way is connected to our tendency to ...
haidt.bjorklund.2008.. - Faculty Web Sites at the University of Virginia
... taking a moral position. But he claims that the “uptown sophisticate” who holds burger-eaters in contempt makes a judgment of taste, not morality. On the standard definition (morality = harm, rights, justice), he is right. But we are not interested in the standard definition, handed down to psycholo ...
... taking a moral position. But he claims that the “uptown sophisticate” who holds burger-eaters in contempt makes a judgment of taste, not morality. On the standard definition (morality = harm, rights, justice), he is right. But we are not interested in the standard definition, handed down to psycholo ...
Moral Health, Moral Prosperity and Universalization in Kant`s Ethics
... The same kind of concern can be seen in the initially somewhat obscure duty we owe to ourselves prohibiting self-deception. The vice involved in this case, I claimed, is best understood as a kind of insincerity or lack of conscientiousness in reflecting on one’s actions and character. Kant thinks of ...
... The same kind of concern can be seen in the initially somewhat obscure duty we owe to ourselves prohibiting self-deception. The vice involved in this case, I claimed, is best understood as a kind of insincerity or lack of conscientiousness in reflecting on one’s actions and character. Kant thinks of ...
Dewey`s Aesthetics and Today`s Moral Education - Purdue e-Pubs
... In sharp contrast, Dewey saw that the aesthetic permeates every aspect of our lives and there are aesthetic dimensions to all of our experience. We human beings seek experience that reaches to some level of fulfillment. “The aesthetic is that which makes it possible for us to have relatively unified ...
... In sharp contrast, Dewey saw that the aesthetic permeates every aspect of our lives and there are aesthetic dimensions to all of our experience. We human beings seek experience that reaches to some level of fulfillment. “The aesthetic is that which makes it possible for us to have relatively unified ...
"Nihilism" encyclopedia entry - Victoria University of Wellington
... Karamazov) that “if God is dead, then everything is permissible.” Advocates of nihilism seem drawn to this claim; opponents seem to fear its repercussions. In L’Homme révolté [The Rebel] (1951), Camus writes: “If one believes in nothing, if nothing makes sense, if we can assert no value whatsoever, ...
... Karamazov) that “if God is dead, then everything is permissible.” Advocates of nihilism seem drawn to this claim; opponents seem to fear its repercussions. In L’Homme révolté [The Rebel] (1951), Camus writes: “If one believes in nothing, if nothing makes sense, if we can assert no value whatsoever, ...
Moral Inquiry - Blackwell Publishing
... who used their theories for a critical evaluation of traditional Christian ethics. This theoretical assessment of prevailing moral traditions has been repeated, with important variations, by other philosophers in relation to other traditions around the world (Cho 1998). Extensive use of moral theory ...
... who used their theories for a critical evaluation of traditional Christian ethics. This theoretical assessment of prevailing moral traditions has been repeated, with important variations, by other philosophers in relation to other traditions around the world (Cho 1998). Extensive use of moral theory ...
The Intercultural Ethics Agenda from an Objectivist Point of View
... Indeed, given our concepts, everyone could be mistaken about the shape of the world, which is the hallmark of objectivity. ...
... Indeed, given our concepts, everyone could be mistaken about the shape of the world, which is the hallmark of objectivity. ...
Street`s Evolutionary Debunking Argument: Nuancing A Moral
... 6. So, realism must invariably give way to moral skepticism. Notice that Street does not try to argue against the existence of moral truths; instead, she takes a more epistemological tact, arguing instead that, because of the pervasive influence of evolution on our psychological dispositions which s ...
... 6. So, realism must invariably give way to moral skepticism. Notice that Street does not try to argue against the existence of moral truths; instead, she takes a more epistemological tact, arguing instead that, because of the pervasive influence of evolution on our psychological dispositions which s ...
Does Morality Demand our Very Best? On Moral Prescriptions and the Line of Duty
... than was her duty (Wes Autrey, for example, said: “I don’t feel like I did something spectacular; I just saw someone who needed help. I did what I felt was right.”i). But these protestations are usually thought the result of humility overwhelming honesty; we do not take them at face value. The belie ...
... than was her duty (Wes Autrey, for example, said: “I don’t feel like I did something spectacular; I just saw someone who needed help. I did what I felt was right.”i). But these protestations are usually thought the result of humility overwhelming honesty; we do not take them at face value. The belie ...
John McDowell
John Henry McDowell (born 1942) is a South African philosopher, formerly a fellow of University College, Oxford and now University Professor at the University of Pittsburgh. Although he has written extensively on metaphysics, epistemology, ancient philosophy, and meta-ethics, McDowell's most influential work has been in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. McDowell was one of three recipients of the 2010 Andrew W. Mellon Foundation's Distinguished Achievement Award. and is a Fellow of both the American Academy of Arts & Sciences and the British Academy.McDowell has, throughout his career, understood philosophy to be ""therapeutic"" and thereby to ""leave everything as it is"", which he understands to be a form of philosophical quietism (although he does not consider himself to be a ""quietist""). The philosophical quietist believes that philosophy cannot make any explanatory comment about how, for example, thought and talk relate to the world but can, by offering re-descriptions of philosophically problematic cases, return the confused philosopher to a state of intellectual quietude. However, in defending this quietistic perspective McDowell has engaged with the work of leading contemporaries in such a way as to both therapeutically dissolve what he takes to be philosophical error, while developing original and distinctive theses about language, mind and value. In each case, he has tried to resist the influence of what he regards as a misguided, reductive form of philosophical naturalism that dominates the work of his contemporaries, particularly in North America.