Nature of Argument
... arguing is audience-centered we fashion arguments with specific listeners in mind effective arguments are geared to the receiver’s frame of reference an argument that appeals to one audience may not appeal to another ...
... arguing is audience-centered we fashion arguments with specific listeners in mind effective arguments are geared to the receiver’s frame of reference an argument that appeals to one audience may not appeal to another ...
DOC - A Level Philosophy
... whatever I like, as long as I don’t get caught. ‘Morality’ becomes no more than a matter of taste. And if this is so, then morality cannot provide any firm grounds for morally judging the practices of other people. Emotivists and prescriptivists can argue that this is either an unfair simplification ...
... whatever I like, as long as I don’t get caught. ‘Morality’ becomes no more than a matter of taste. And if this is so, then morality cannot provide any firm grounds for morally judging the practices of other people. Emotivists and prescriptivists can argue that this is either an unfair simplification ...
Nature of Argument PPT
... arguing is audience-centered we fashion arguments with specific listeners in mind effective arguments are geared to the receiver’s frame of reference an argument that appeals to one audience may not appeal to another ...
... arguing is audience-centered we fashion arguments with specific listeners in mind effective arguments are geared to the receiver’s frame of reference an argument that appeals to one audience may not appeal to another ...
Moral realism - A Level Philosophy
... Earth millions of years ago would be true whether anyone had found out about it or not. But it is more difficult to believe that values ‘exist’ quite independently of us and our talk about values. This contrast is unfair. There are lots of facts – for example, facts about being in love, or facts ab ...
... Earth millions of years ago would be true whether anyone had found out about it or not. But it is more difficult to believe that values ‘exist’ quite independently of us and our talk about values. This contrast is unfair. There are lots of facts – for example, facts about being in love, or facts ab ...
9 Deontology*
... base, there is reference within it to her. For example, rational egoism is an agent-relative theory – it holds that each agent has reason to promote only her own good, whereas actconsequentialism is an agent-neutral theory – it holds that each of us has reason to promote everyone’s good. Another way ...
... base, there is reference within it to her. For example, rational egoism is an agent-relative theory – it holds that each agent has reason to promote only her own good, whereas actconsequentialism is an agent-neutral theory – it holds that each of us has reason to promote everyone’s good. Another way ...
Ethics – Handout 3 Ayer`s Emotivism
... what our moral terms mean: e.g., “right” means “happiness-maximizing”. But many defenders of utilitarianism defend it not as an account of what our moral terms mean, but rather as a first-order account of what makes actions right; such utilitarians needn’t think that “right” means “happiness-maximiz ...
... what our moral terms mean: e.g., “right” means “happiness-maximizing”. But many defenders of utilitarianism defend it not as an account of what our moral terms mean, but rather as a first-order account of what makes actions right; such utilitarians needn’t think that “right” means “happiness-maximiz ...
Ethics – Handout 8 Foot, “What Is Moral Relativism?”
... Foot begins by assessing various claims about what the moral relativist is committed to, largely by means of drawing an analogy to the more plausible relativism about taste. She thinks that thinking about the analogy with taste can show us that relativism does not fall prey to some of the common obj ...
... Foot begins by assessing various claims about what the moral relativist is committed to, largely by means of drawing an analogy to the more plausible relativism about taste. She thinks that thinking about the analogy with taste can show us that relativism does not fall prey to some of the common obj ...
Chapter 3: Morality and the Moral Life Ethics
... culture to culture, moral standards are relative to culture (there are no objective moral standards).—FALSE 2. People’s moral judgments do differ from culture to culture.—DUBIOUS 3. Therefore, moral standards are relative to culture (there are no objective moral standards).—CONCLUSION UNSUPPORTED ...
... culture to culture, moral standards are relative to culture (there are no objective moral standards).—FALSE 2. People’s moral judgments do differ from culture to culture.—DUBIOUS 3. Therefore, moral standards are relative to culture (there are no objective moral standards).—CONCLUSION UNSUPPORTED ...
Kant and the Moral Will
... Kant takes it to follow from this that the right action will be an action performed out of duty (9-10). We don’t do our duty when we act in ways we know to be wrong; but even in some cases when we do the right thing, our action fails to have moral value. Why? The idea is that in any intentional acti ...
... Kant takes it to follow from this that the right action will be an action performed out of duty (9-10). We don’t do our duty when we act in ways we know to be wrong; but even in some cases when we do the right thing, our action fails to have moral value. Why? The idea is that in any intentional acti ...
Bernard Williams: A Critique of Utilitarianism Phil 240, Introduction to
... that we … cannot regard our moral feelings merely as objects of utilitarian value. Because our moral relation to the world is partly given by such feelings, and by a sense of what we can or cannot ‘live with’, to come to regard those feelings from a purely utilitarian point of view, that i ...
... that we … cannot regard our moral feelings merely as objects of utilitarian value. Because our moral relation to the world is partly given by such feelings, and by a sense of what we can or cannot ‘live with’, to come to regard those feelings from a purely utilitarian point of view, that i ...
Archetypes of Wisdom
... problematic because he rarely indicates “how deeply and pervasively gender-structured” society is. As Okin notes, “A feminist reader finds it difficult not to keep asking, ‘Does this theory apply to women?’” ...
... problematic because he rarely indicates “how deeply and pervasively gender-structured” society is. As Okin notes, “A feminist reader finds it difficult not to keep asking, ‘Does this theory apply to women?’” ...
Three Independent Factors in Morals
... conflict is an abstract and arbitrary simplification, so much so that it runs counter to every empirical observation of fact. I can only express, briefly and in passing, the idea that moral progress and the sharpening of character depend on the ability to make delicate distinctions, to perceive aspe ...
... conflict is an abstract and arbitrary simplification, so much so that it runs counter to every empirical observation of fact. I can only express, briefly and in passing, the idea that moral progress and the sharpening of character depend on the ability to make delicate distinctions, to perceive aspe ...
Moral Development Policy - St Thomas of Canterbury Catholic School
... As they develop a sense of morality, children should become more able to explore the place of reason in ethical matters and acquire value systems which are their own, rather than simply transmitted by others and accepted uncritically. They should also develop an understanding that their behaviour an ...
... As they develop a sense of morality, children should become more able to explore the place of reason in ethical matters and acquire value systems which are their own, rather than simply transmitted by others and accepted uncritically. They should also develop an understanding that their behaviour an ...
Kant - Def
... Suppose that time extends infinitely back. Then you would never be able to explain how we got to the present. This is because an infinite amount of time would have passed before we got to this year. And an infinite amount of time would take forever, so we could never get here. But… That means time m ...
... Suppose that time extends infinitely back. Then you would never be able to explain how we got to the present. This is because an infinite amount of time would have passed before we got to this year. And an infinite amount of time would take forever, so we could never get here. But… That means time m ...
Philosophy 323
... Due to its focus on the will, Kant’s ethics are deontological: actions are morally right to the extent that they derive from motives of duty, as opposed to motives of inclination. When we think about moral obligation, he argued, what we need to account for is its categorical character, the fact ...
... Due to its focus on the will, Kant’s ethics are deontological: actions are morally right to the extent that they derive from motives of duty, as opposed to motives of inclination. When we think about moral obligation, he argued, what we need to account for is its categorical character, the fact ...
here
... conception, which argues…. to an increased emphasis on the use of examples, for instance… He asks us to consider other key ideas such as foundationalism (……) and coherentism (….). Jamieson concludes that moral theories derive from moral theorising which is part of everyday life. ...
... conception, which argues…. to an increased emphasis on the use of examples, for instance… He asks us to consider other key ideas such as foundationalism (……) and coherentism (….). Jamieson concludes that moral theories derive from moral theorising which is part of everyday life. ...
Come Hell and High Water by Paul Keeling According to Plato
... short, rapaciously plundering the earth—and we now know what harm these are causing to present and future generations of earth’s human and nonhuman inhabitants. This means that virtually every aspect of modern life is morally implicated to some degree. But many of these environmental harms, such as ...
... short, rapaciously plundering the earth—and we now know what harm these are causing to present and future generations of earth’s human and nonhuman inhabitants. This means that virtually every aspect of modern life is morally implicated to some degree. But many of these environmental harms, such as ...
Criticisms of Kant - The Richmond Philosophy Pages
... moral obligations from social etiquette – someone could easily will everyone to eat with a knife and fork and be outraged at the thought of some adults using their hands or just spoons Also, there are some maxims which cannot be universalised on Kant’s account and as such must be morally wrong for ...
... moral obligations from social etiquette – someone could easily will everyone to eat with a knife and fork and be outraged at the thought of some adults using their hands or just spoons Also, there are some maxims which cannot be universalised on Kant’s account and as such must be morally wrong for ...
Right Reason in Action
... in the morality of actions; the moral object is the decisive factor. Ask the following question: Would I be willing to allow everyone in a similar situation to act this way? ...
... in the morality of actions; the moral object is the decisive factor. Ask the following question: Would I be willing to allow everyone in a similar situation to act this way? ...
YourLifeinChrist PowerPoint Chapter 2
... in the morality of actions; the moral object is the decisive factor. Ask the following question: Would I be willing to allow everyone in a similar situation to act this way? ...
... in the morality of actions; the moral object is the decisive factor. Ask the following question: Would I be willing to allow everyone in a similar situation to act this way? ...
Search out the Facts Intention
... in the morality of actions; the moral object is the decisive factor. Ask the following question: Would I be willing to allow everyone in a similar situation to act this way? ...
... in the morality of actions; the moral object is the decisive factor. Ask the following question: Would I be willing to allow everyone in a similar situation to act this way? ...
Kant`s Ethics - Valdosta State University
... o we find seeds of this thinking in Socrates (470-399BC) but the theory is not fully developed until Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) this theory, as we shall see, basically claims that there are certain fundamental duties that we must always follow, regardless of the particular outcome o e.g., keeping p ...
... o we find seeds of this thinking in Socrates (470-399BC) but the theory is not fully developed until Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) this theory, as we shall see, basically claims that there are certain fundamental duties that we must always follow, regardless of the particular outcome o e.g., keeping p ...
File - Tallis English & Philosophy
... to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger” • Later in his life he defends a kind of Impartial Observer theory: what would we feel when faced with a moral choice? • Hence, Hume’s “Is/Ought Gap”, or “Fact/Value Distinction” – you can't go from a factual statement (an ...
... to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger” • Later in his life he defends a kind of Impartial Observer theory: what would we feel when faced with a moral choice? • Hence, Hume’s “Is/Ought Gap”, or “Fact/Value Distinction” – you can't go from a factual statement (an ...
pragmatism and relativism
... independent of particular contexts. One of the important consequences of this view is that there are many competing moral points of view and these are sometimes incompatible with each other. Furthermore, since there are no objective independent moral standards we can appeal to, we can’t settle the i ...
... independent of particular contexts. One of the important consequences of this view is that there are many competing moral points of view and these are sometimes incompatible with each other. Furthermore, since there are no objective independent moral standards we can appeal to, we can’t settle the i ...
John McDowell
John Henry McDowell (born 1942) is a South African philosopher, formerly a fellow of University College, Oxford and now University Professor at the University of Pittsburgh. Although he has written extensively on metaphysics, epistemology, ancient philosophy, and meta-ethics, McDowell's most influential work has been in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. McDowell was one of three recipients of the 2010 Andrew W. Mellon Foundation's Distinguished Achievement Award. and is a Fellow of both the American Academy of Arts & Sciences and the British Academy.McDowell has, throughout his career, understood philosophy to be ""therapeutic"" and thereby to ""leave everything as it is"", which he understands to be a form of philosophical quietism (although he does not consider himself to be a ""quietist""). The philosophical quietist believes that philosophy cannot make any explanatory comment about how, for example, thought and talk relate to the world but can, by offering re-descriptions of philosophically problematic cases, return the confused philosopher to a state of intellectual quietude. However, in defending this quietistic perspective McDowell has engaged with the work of leading contemporaries in such a way as to both therapeutically dissolve what he takes to be philosophical error, while developing original and distinctive theses about language, mind and value. In each case, he has tried to resist the influence of what he regards as a misguided, reductive form of philosophical naturalism that dominates the work of his contemporaries, particularly in North America.