The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth about Morality
... because the community to which you belong dislikes, disapproves of, or prohibits it? Presumably not. If, somehow, the whole community were to decide that torturing cats is okay, this activity would, by the lights of most people, still be wrong. In answering these questions in the negative, one expre ...
... because the community to which you belong dislikes, disapproves of, or prohibits it? Presumably not. If, somehow, the whole community were to decide that torturing cats is okay, this activity would, by the lights of most people, still be wrong. In answering these questions in the negative, one expre ...
Abstracts - FGW-VU
... Moral progress is to be measured by the obliteration or reduction of an injustice, without the same injustice being replicated elsewhere. The conferment of human status to slaves in Western societies, the permission to pursue education and own properties to people previously considered unqualified, ...
... Moral progress is to be measured by the obliteration or reduction of an injustice, without the same injustice being replicated elsewhere. The conferment of human status to slaves in Western societies, the permission to pursue education and own properties to people previously considered unqualified, ...
Susan Wolf on moral perfection and the good life: a critical analysis
... there is also another possibility. Instead of looking for a single comprehensive system, one can include different viewpoints. Somehow, when ideals and the good life are in question, moral theorists tend to stick to only one system and a single point of view. But in life, there are several aspects t ...
... there is also another possibility. Instead of looking for a single comprehensive system, one can include different viewpoints. Somehow, when ideals and the good life are in question, moral theorists tend to stick to only one system and a single point of view. But in life, there are several aspects t ...
Moral Beauty as An Overriding Imperative in
... steps that I take to achieve this goal are first refuting Internalism, second Externalism and third Subjectivism and finally Particularism. These are the four major Western philosophical traditions whose subject matter is at the center of the debate about the nature of moral principles and motivati ...
... steps that I take to achieve this goal are first refuting Internalism, second Externalism and third Subjectivism and finally Particularism. These are the four major Western philosophical traditions whose subject matter is at the center of the debate about the nature of moral principles and motivati ...
Beyond Testing: Cognitive Moral Reasoning and Ergogenic Aids in
... The purpose of this quantitative, descriptive study is to develop a valid and reliable instrument based in normative ethical theory to measure moral reasoning in the context of doping in sport. Factor analysis procedure was used to provide evidence of statistical validity. We examined the factor str ...
... The purpose of this quantitative, descriptive study is to develop a valid and reliable instrument based in normative ethical theory to measure moral reasoning in the context of doping in sport. Factor analysis procedure was used to provide evidence of statistical validity. We examined the factor str ...
Morally Permissible Moral Mistakes
... First, some terminological clarification. Throughout the paper, I use “moral reason” to refer to other-regarding moral reasons. It is a hard question whether one is ever morally required to treat oneself well; I will not address this question. If we counted self-regarding reasons among moral reason ...
... First, some terminological clarification. Throughout the paper, I use “moral reason” to refer to other-regarding moral reasons. It is a hard question whether one is ever morally required to treat oneself well; I will not address this question. If we counted self-regarding reasons among moral reason ...
Enhancing Moral Conformity and Enhancing Moral Worth
... means available. There may be some means to increased moral conformity that we have conclusive moral reasons to avoid, and even among means that are not absolutely ruled out in this way, some means might be better supported by moral reasons than others. There is, in my view, much interesting work to ...
... means available. There may be some means to increased moral conformity that we have conclusive moral reasons to avoid, and even among means that are not absolutely ruled out in this way, some means might be better supported by moral reasons than others. There is, in my view, much interesting work to ...
Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency
... of intuitions about consequence and inconsistency, and to explain the nature and existence of various conditional and negative opinions expressed by sentences such as (A’) and (C’). 3. Explaining moral reasoning As noted above, whether an opinion is moral or non-moral makes little difference from th ...
... of intuitions about consequence and inconsistency, and to explain the nature and existence of various conditional and negative opinions expressed by sentences such as (A’) and (C’). 3. Explaining moral reasoning As noted above, whether an opinion is moral or non-moral makes little difference from th ...
in defence of moral error theory
... A's -ing would promote satisfaction or realization of some of A's desires or aims, or would promote fulfilment of some role A occupies. Suppose for instance that torturing animals for fun is morally wrong and that donating 20% of one's income to charity is morally required. It seems commonsensical ...
... A's -ing would promote satisfaction or realization of some of A's desires or aims, or would promote fulfilment of some role A occupies. Suppose for instance that torturing animals for fun is morally wrong and that donating 20% of one's income to charity is morally required. It seems commonsensical ...
Shifting Liberal and Conservative Attitudes Using Moral Foundations
... suffering, and to empathize and care for others. The fairness foundation encompasses notions of justice, inequality, reciprocity, and general unbiased treatment. The ingroup moral foundation prioritizes loyalty and a group-based orientation, such as thinking in terms of “we.” The authority foundatio ...
... suffering, and to empathize and care for others. The fairness foundation encompasses notions of justice, inequality, reciprocity, and general unbiased treatment. The ingroup moral foundation prioritizes loyalty and a group-based orientation, such as thinking in terms of “we.” The authority foundatio ...
FIRst-PeRson MoRALIty AnD tHe RoLe oF ConsCIenCe
... alternatively, they can be reconstructed as the outcome of a double level of processing by different areas of our brain, that is, the automatic reactions by system 1, as corrected and integrated by the reflective, computational processes of system 2 (Greene 2008 and 2009). While it would be wrong to ...
... alternatively, they can be reconstructed as the outcome of a double level of processing by different areas of our brain, that is, the automatic reactions by system 1, as corrected and integrated by the reflective, computational processes of system 2 (Greene 2008 and 2009). While it would be wrong to ...
Reasons and Moral Principles
... to determine overall moral status. How this happens has important implications for moral theory but remains inadequately understood.8 In any case the idea that what one ought to do in a given situation is some function of potentially multiple relevant considerations is familiar: an action might be r ...
... to determine overall moral status. How this happens has important implications for moral theory but remains inadequately understood.8 In any case the idea that what one ought to do in a given situation is some function of potentially multiple relevant considerations is familiar: an action might be r ...
Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism
... are no moral facts. The analog of moral nihilism in the debate about perceptual skepticism is something like idealism, which let’s just stipulate is the view that there are no mind-independent objects. Of course, idealists might not put it this way. They would likely maintain that we do have hands b ...
... are no moral facts. The analog of moral nihilism in the debate about perceptual skepticism is something like idealism, which let’s just stipulate is the view that there are no mind-independent objects. Of course, idealists might not put it this way. They would likely maintain that we do have hands b ...
The Argument from Moral Experience
... Blackburn says that “the most forceful attack” faced by the moral projectivist “is that he cannot accommodate the rich phenomena of moral life,” but goes on to argue that his “quasi-realism” can indeed accommodate these phenomena.14 And “assertoric nondescriptivist” Mark Timmons says: [O]ne may be ...
... Blackburn says that “the most forceful attack” faced by the moral projectivist “is that he cannot accommodate the rich phenomena of moral life,” but goes on to argue that his “quasi-realism” can indeed accommodate these phenomena.14 And “assertoric nondescriptivist” Mark Timmons says: [O]ne may be ...
pages 22-48
... (Nagy 1996, abstract), and one can find strands in Polanyi’s work that prefigure certain much acclaimed arguments advanced by Alasdair MacIntyre. Yet it seems hard to fault moral philosophers and theologians for being less attentive to Polanyi’s contribution than epistemologists, social and politic ...
... (Nagy 1996, abstract), and one can find strands in Polanyi’s work that prefigure certain much acclaimed arguments advanced by Alasdair MacIntyre. Yet it seems hard to fault moral philosophers and theologians for being less attentive to Polanyi’s contribution than epistemologists, social and politic ...
If killing isn`t wrong, then nothing is: A naturalistic defence of basic
... To my ears, and I’m sure also to the ears of non-philosophers too, there is something deeply peculiar about these purported explanations. They evince in me the same kind of reaction as that reported by Wittgenstein in response to the empirical certainties exhibited by Moore: “even though I find it q ...
... To my ears, and I’m sure also to the ears of non-philosophers too, there is something deeply peculiar about these purported explanations. They evince in me the same kind of reaction as that reported by Wittgenstein in response to the empirical certainties exhibited by Moore: “even though I find it q ...
Review Article Reasons Consequentialism Benjamin Sachs Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2013) 671–682
... have decisive reasons to avoid them. And he is not willing to allow that morality could require irrational actions. These commitments set the agenda for the book. Portmore seeks to construct a moral theory whose permissions and requirements don’t exceed the boundaries of what rationality permits and ...
... have decisive reasons to avoid them. And he is not willing to allow that morality could require irrational actions. These commitments set the agenda for the book. Portmore seeks to construct a moral theory whose permissions and requirements don’t exceed the boundaries of what rationality permits and ...
1 Are Empathy and Morality Linked? Insights from Moral Psychology
... theoretical views considering morality to be either purely emotional or purely rational. After illustrating the shortcomings of both views, we will argue that the most plausible view is the one allowing morality to have elements from both emotion and reason. We then focus on empathy, using empirical ...
... theoretical views considering morality to be either purely emotional or purely rational. After illustrating the shortcomings of both views, we will argue that the most plausible view is the one allowing morality to have elements from both emotion and reason. We then focus on empathy, using empirical ...
It`s complicated
... argument. Chomsky’s argument (see Chomsky 1957, 1959) did not concern morals, but was directed against empiricist accounts of language acquisition such as B.F. Skinner’s. Moral nativists such as Susan Dwyer, Marc Hauser and John Mikhail have later adopted Chomsky’s argument and directed it against e ...
... argument. Chomsky’s argument (see Chomsky 1957, 1959) did not concern morals, but was directed against empiricist accounts of language acquisition such as B.F. Skinner’s. Moral nativists such as Susan Dwyer, Marc Hauser and John Mikhail have later adopted Chomsky’s argument and directed it against e ...
On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism
... or moral sentiments alone cannot identify appropriate morals. Yet it is possible to interpret Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, and James Wilson as claiming that there is a universal moral sense or universal moral sentiments. Hutcheson holds that the moral sense is originally implanted in us, and it is univer ...
... or moral sentiments alone cannot identify appropriate morals. Yet it is possible to interpret Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, and James Wilson as claiming that there is a universal moral sense or universal moral sentiments. Hutcheson holds that the moral sense is originally implanted in us, and it is univer ...
Moral Dilemmas andRealism
... causal roles with respect to other propositional attitudes and nonmental causes and effects. But in my view beliefs and desires are distinguished not by such causal roles but by their different rationalizing roles with respect to other propositional attitudes. 4 Anyhow, let us assume that there is s ...
... causal roles with respect to other propositional attitudes and nonmental causes and effects. But in my view beliefs and desires are distinguished not by such causal roles but by their different rationalizing roles with respect to other propositional attitudes. 4 Anyhow, let us assume that there is s ...
Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo
... with the philosophical arguments for it?9 Of course not. For whether it is ultimately true or not, it is neither obvious nor incontestably established that regularly doing the outward deeds required by morality comports with the weight of nonmoral reasons. After all, regularly doing those deeds enta ...
... with the philosophical arguments for it?9 Of course not. For whether it is ultimately true or not, it is neither obvious nor incontestably established that regularly doing the outward deeds required by morality comports with the weight of nonmoral reasons. After all, regularly doing those deeds enta ...
Intuitive Methods of Moral Decision Making, A
... source of moral objectivity and reasons for what we ought to do. I will address this concern later in the paper. The error with the first point is the confusion between a pedagogical approach to applied ethics and actual moral decision making.13 In order to be applied, general moral principles need ...
... source of moral objectivity and reasons for what we ought to do. I will address this concern later in the paper. The error with the first point is the confusion between a pedagogical approach to applied ethics and actual moral decision making.13 In order to be applied, general moral principles need ...
Reasons, Rational Requirements, and the Putative Pseudo
... caught.) This fact is the sticking point for every attempt to show that for each person the weight of nonmoral reasons favors, or at least does not disfavor, regularly behaving morally. Moreover, even if this problem is solvable in principle, no one has yet solved it beyond dispute. Thus, even if th ...
... caught.) This fact is the sticking point for every attempt to show that for each person the weight of nonmoral reasons favors, or at least does not disfavor, regularly behaving morally. Moreover, even if this problem is solvable in principle, no one has yet solved it beyond dispute. Thus, even if th ...
Dilemmas and Moral Realism
... respect to other propositional attitudes and non-mental causes and effects. But in my view, beliefs and desires are not distinguished by such causal roles but by their different rationalizing roles with respect to other propositional attitudes.4 Anyhow, let us assume that there is some significant d ...
... respect to other propositional attitudes and non-mental causes and effects. But in my view, beliefs and desires are not distinguished by such causal roles but by their different rationalizing roles with respect to other propositional attitudes.4 Anyhow, let us assume that there is some significant d ...