The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth about Morality
... attribution of objective wrongness is harmless. However, a general tendency to think in terms of objective right and wrong is, I believe, quite problematic for two reasons. First, and less important, it’s simply mistaken. Contrary to common sense, moral realism is false. In Chapter 2 I will attempt ...
... attribution of objective wrongness is harmless. However, a general tendency to think in terms of objective right and wrong is, I believe, quite problematic for two reasons. First, and less important, it’s simply mistaken. Contrary to common sense, moral realism is false. In Chapter 2 I will attempt ...
Moral Beauty as An Overriding Imperative in
... people dependent on the proper execution of those roles. A good example would be a student of art who would like to pursue this interest but is forced not to by external factors such as responsibilities (parental, national or religious) where doing so might be seen as an act of betrayal, selfishness ...
... people dependent on the proper execution of those roles. A good example would be a student of art who would like to pursue this interest but is forced not to by external factors such as responsibilities (parental, national or religious) where doing so might be seen as an act of betrayal, selfishness ...
Enhancing Moral Conformity and Enhancing Moral Worth
... poverty. It is also increasingly recognised that many of history’s greatest atrocities—ranging from the First World War to the Final Solution to the Cultural Revolution—were made possible by the ordinary moral failures of ordinary people [1–3]. It is plausible that we have reasons to correct our mor ...
... poverty. It is also increasingly recognised that many of history’s greatest atrocities—ranging from the First World War to the Final Solution to the Cultural Revolution—were made possible by the ordinary moral failures of ordinary people [1–3]. It is plausible that we have reasons to correct our mor ...
Kant`s Puzzling Ethics of Maxims
... they are not de facto objectively normative. As maxims as such are hndamentally subjective principles that specify what an agent considers practically good, the ends he or she pursues, in short: what he or she wills can receive objective value, if at all, only by virtue of conforming to objective c ...
... they are not de facto objectively normative. As maxims as such are hndamentally subjective principles that specify what an agent considers practically good, the ends he or she pursues, in short: what he or she wills can receive objective value, if at all, only by virtue of conforming to objective c ...
A Plea for Moral Deference
... opportunity to the achievement of moral knowledge, and thereby to the achievement of a morally good life. Unfortunately, however, just because an idea is very nice—noble, even—that does not make it true. On inspection, moreover, this particular idea turns out to be philosophically suspect. Let us ex ...
... opportunity to the achievement of moral knowledge, and thereby to the achievement of a morally good life. Unfortunately, however, just because an idea is very nice—noble, even—that does not make it true. On inspection, moreover, this particular idea turns out to be philosophically suspect. Let us ex ...
Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism
... relative to distinct features of the agent’s history, psychology, and epistemic or practical situation. When fully worked out, this package helps us to explain how rational people can have the wrong moral views. A second set of ideas interacts with those just described to handle a different sort of ...
... relative to distinct features of the agent’s history, psychology, and epistemic or practical situation. When fully worked out, this package helps us to explain how rational people can have the wrong moral views. A second set of ideas interacts with those just described to handle a different sort of ...
On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism
... The Universality of this moral Sense, and that it is antecedent to Instruction, may appear from observing the Sentiments of Children, upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain’d as soon as they understand Language. They always passionately interest themselves on that side where ...
... The Universality of this moral Sense, and that it is antecedent to Instruction, may appear from observing the Sentiments of Children, upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain’d as soon as they understand Language. They always passionately interest themselves on that side where ...
Is There Moral High Ground?
... we must relativize truth. The only other option is to accept both ours and the Taliban’s claims and conclude that there are true moral contradictions: it is both true and not true that it is good to educate women. Pace dialethism, we should assume that true moral contradictions are untenable. We may ...
... we must relativize truth. The only other option is to accept both ours and the Taliban’s claims and conclude that there are true moral contradictions: it is both true and not true that it is good to educate women. Pace dialethism, we should assume that true moral contradictions are untenable. We may ...
The Moral Point of View in Hume, Kant and Mill Margaret Marie
... They will be the most important considerations in my decision-making process. From an impartial point of view, however, I must take this set of concerns and commitments and “put it in perspective”—i.e., recognize that it is merely one set among many sets of concerns and commitments. This is my set o ...
... They will be the most important considerations in my decision-making process. From an impartial point of view, however, I must take this set of concerns and commitments and “put it in perspective”—i.e., recognize that it is merely one set among many sets of concerns and commitments. This is my set o ...
An Internalist Dilemma - University of Colorado Boulder
... perform, she is motivated to do that particular action however weak she thinks that reason is. According to (2), it is conceptually necessary that the person above is motivated to ψ as well in so far as she is rational. It follows that she has to be motivated to ψ in order to be entirely rational an ...
... perform, she is motivated to do that particular action however weak she thinks that reason is. According to (2), it is conceptually necessary that the person above is motivated to ψ as well in so far as she is rational. It follows that she has to be motivated to ψ in order to be entirely rational an ...
Rightness and Responsibility
... The position that results from this combination of claims leaves room for the kind of moral skepticism that is excluded a priori by moral judgment internalism. Indeed, there are two points at which space might open up between an agent’s sincere moral judgments and his or her motivations to action. F ...
... The position that results from this combination of claims leaves room for the kind of moral skepticism that is excluded a priori by moral judgment internalism. Indeed, there are two points at which space might open up between an agent’s sincere moral judgments and his or her motivations to action. F ...
Consequentialism and our special relationship to self
... in these relationships. The agent-relativity is of course what renders these obligations ‘special.’ Our special relationship to our selves grounds options instead of obligations because, though this relationship is rooted in agent-relative reasons, those reasons are fundamentally subjective, rooted ...
... in these relationships. The agent-relativity is of course what renders these obligations ‘special.’ Our special relationship to our selves grounds options instead of obligations because, though this relationship is rooted in agent-relative reasons, those reasons are fundamentally subjective, rooted ...
DOC - A Level Philosophy
... moral progress. If there is no moral reality, then our moral beliefs or feelings cannot become better or worse. Obviously, they have changed – people used to believe that slavery was morally acceptable and now they do not. But how can we say that this is progress if there is no objective moral truth ...
... moral progress. If there is no moral reality, then our moral beliefs or feelings cannot become better or worse. Obviously, they have changed – people used to believe that slavery was morally acceptable and now they do not. But how can we say that this is progress if there is no objective moral truth ...
Minimal Ethics
... spontaneous convictions (whether it is hedonistic utilitarianism, the morality of categorical duty, or the ethics of virtue), the author varies the scenarios of the initial experiments in such a way as to lead us to express contradictory convictions. On one occasion we are utilitarian when, in a pi ...
... spontaneous convictions (whether it is hedonistic utilitarianism, the morality of categorical duty, or the ethics of virtue), the author varies the scenarios of the initial experiments in such a way as to lead us to express contradictory convictions. On one occasion we are utilitarian when, in a pi ...
Is Procreative Beneficence Obligatory?
... reason to eat breakfast than to forgo it. If morality requires him to act ...
... reason to eat breakfast than to forgo it. If morality requires him to act ...
Objective Morality_final
... blame must, of course, be mediated by a more specific theory of moral character and the appropriateness of blame, which I shall not offer here. Furthermore, I do not want to state the connection between these concepts too strongly. It is likely that any connection between virtuous decisionmaking, pr ...
... blame must, of course, be mediated by a more specific theory of moral character and the appropriateness of blame, which I shall not offer here. Furthermore, I do not want to state the connection between these concepts too strongly. It is likely that any connection between virtuous decisionmaking, pr ...
The Intercultural Ethics Agenda from an Objectivist Point of View
... about how to apply shared principles or disagreement about factual matters that condition applicability of shared moral principles. – Indeed, one reason that diversity of moral views has been reduced during Information Age is precisely that new information technologies have made possible dialogues s ...
... about how to apply shared principles or disagreement about factual matters that condition applicability of shared moral principles. – Indeed, one reason that diversity of moral views has been reduced during Information Age is precisely that new information technologies have made possible dialogues s ...
The Demand for Justification in Ethics - MyWeb
... truth-respecting creatures, we want our decisions to be based, as we say, on the facts, and feeling the power of our contrary inclinations we are tempted to question whether after all we do really know what we ought to do and, if we generalize the question, which as truth-respecting creatures we may ...
... truth-respecting creatures, we want our decisions to be based, as we say, on the facts, and feeling the power of our contrary inclinations we are tempted to question whether after all we do really know what we ought to do and, if we generalize the question, which as truth-respecting creatures we may ...
the ethics of obligation
... community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others…He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right.” John Stuart Mill in On Liberty ...
... community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others…He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right.” John Stuart Mill in On Liberty ...
What is Ethical Relativism?
... is more correct than another, I could just as easily adopt dogmatism as my overriding moral belief. Moreover, if relativism is true, why should I even bother to listen to another person’s moral beliefs, since by definition their beliefs cannot be better or more correct than my own beliefs? (See Bern ...
... is more correct than another, I could just as easily adopt dogmatism as my overriding moral belief. Moreover, if relativism is true, why should I even bother to listen to another person’s moral beliefs, since by definition their beliefs cannot be better or more correct than my own beliefs? (See Bern ...
Class #9 - 8/5/10
... egoism, but would say that when we do so, we may be acting unethically. • Note that Utilitarians are hard absolutists. • The principle of utility is sometimes referred to as the greatest happiness principle. • Utilitarianism is similar to but should be distinguished from the view held by Machiavelli ...
... egoism, but would say that when we do so, we may be acting unethically. • Note that Utilitarians are hard absolutists. • The principle of utility is sometimes referred to as the greatest happiness principle. • Utilitarianism is similar to but should be distinguished from the view held by Machiavelli ...
Class #10 - 5/14/12
... The Utilitarianism approach of Bentham and the greatest happiness principle is deeply flawed. “Ask yourself whether you are happy and you cease to be so.” In response to Bentham, John Stuart Mill claims that happiness is an intellectual achievement, not merely pleasure. Mill argued that you cannot s ...
... The Utilitarianism approach of Bentham and the greatest happiness principle is deeply flawed. “Ask yourself whether you are happy and you cease to be so.” In response to Bentham, John Stuart Mill claims that happiness is an intellectual achievement, not merely pleasure. Mill argued that you cannot s ...
Does Morality Demand our Very Best? On Moral Prescriptions and the Line of Duty
... than was her duty (Wes Autrey, for example, said: “I don’t feel like I did something spectacular; I just saw someone who needed help. I did what I felt was right.”i). But these protestations are usually thought the result of humility overwhelming honesty; we do not take them at face value. The belie ...
... than was her duty (Wes Autrey, for example, said: “I don’t feel like I did something spectacular; I just saw someone who needed help. I did what I felt was right.”i). But these protestations are usually thought the result of humility overwhelming honesty; we do not take them at face value. The belie ...
9 Deontology*
... conformist strategy is defensible. Even if it were, actconsequentialism would still differ from deontology concerning what makes acts right. The conformist strategy points out that in less than perfect conditions – imperfect knowledge and imperfect motivation to be moral – we may well do better to a ...
... conformist strategy is defensible. Even if it were, actconsequentialism would still differ from deontology concerning what makes acts right. The conformist strategy points out that in less than perfect conditions – imperfect knowledge and imperfect motivation to be moral – we may well do better to a ...
Ethics – Handout 8 Foot, “What Is Moral Relativism?”
... differences between individuals with radically different basic moral principles can be resolved. (Question: does emotivism, which seems to be (perhaps) a form of meta-ethical relativism, lead to normative moral relativism – that is, to the view that it might be okay for one person to do something it ...
... differences between individuals with radically different basic moral principles can be resolved. (Question: does emotivism, which seems to be (perhaps) a form of meta-ethical relativism, lead to normative moral relativism – that is, to the view that it might be okay for one person to do something it ...
Thomas Nagel
Thomas Nagel (/ˈneɪɡəl/; born July 4, 1937) is an American philosopher, currently University Professor of Philosophy and Law Emeritus at New York University, where he has taught since 1980. His main areas of philosophical interest are philosophy of mind, political philosophy and ethics.Nagel is well known for his critique of reductionist accounts of the mind, particularly in his essay ""What Is it Like to Be a Bat?"" (1974), and for his contributions to deontological and liberal moral and political theory in The Possibility of Altruism (1970) and subsequent writings. Continuing his critique of reductionism, he is the author of Mind and Cosmos (2012), in which he argues against a reductionist view, and specifically the neo-Darwinian view, of the emergence of consciousness.