Download Is Procreative Beneficence Obligatory?

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Is Procreative Beneficence Obligatory?
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Julian Savulescu has proposed what he calls the principle of
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Procreative Beneficence (PB), according to which, where selection is
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possible, parents have a prima facie moral obligation to select the
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child who, on the basis of available evidence, is expected to have the
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best life.[1-3] This principle has already been the focus of numerous
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replies and criticisms[4-6], which cannot all be considered here, but
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my purpose is to develop a new worry, regarding the alleged
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obligatoriness of PB. I contend that Savulescu moves too swiftly from
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the claim that parents have a (moral) reason to choose the best child
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to the conclusion that they have a moral obligation to do so. We may
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have moral reason to , but not have even a prima facie obligation to
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do so.
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The Argument for PB
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Savulescu claims, plausibly I believe, that if we can choose
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between a healthy embryo (A) and one with a significant genetic
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disability (B), then we ought to choose embryo A.[1, pp. 416-7]
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Furthermore, he argues that this is not simply a rational or prudential
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‘ought’ but a moral ought. In order to explain our intuitive judgement
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about certain hypothetical cases, we must allow for the possibility of
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harmless wrong-doing.[1, p. 418] If this is possible, then it is also
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possible that it would be morally wrong to choose embryo B, even
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though no individual is harmed (because B would not otherwise exist
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and so cannot be harmed by this choice).
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Having motivated his argument for selection with this simple
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case, Savulescu then argues that the moral obligation that is operative
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here also extends to non-disease cases.[1, pp. 419-21] He claims that it
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is not disease itself that matters, but its impact on individual well-
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being. The reason it would be wrong for a parent to select a child with
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a significant disability is that they would have a worse life than
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another child that could have been born. But this same reason can also
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apply to non-disease cases.
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Suppose embryo C is likely to be ordinarily healthy and, given
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the right environment, enjoy slightly above average intelligence (say,
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IQ of 105). Embryo D, however, is not worse in any way, but has the
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potential for an IQ of 120. Assuming that intelligence is positively
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correlated with well-being, Savulescu believes that parents have a
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moral obligation to select D over C, just as they have an obligation to
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select A over B. (The connection between intelligence and well-being
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has recently been disputed[7] but I shall grant this assumption here.)
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In general, Savulescu claims that parents have an obligation to choose
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the child whose life is expected to go best.
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Herissone-Kelly’s Objection to PB
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Peter Herissone-Kelly criticises PB on grounds of the parental
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attitudes involved.[8] He distinguishes two perspectives we may adopt
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when assessing the value of someone else’s life. The ‘internal
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perspective’ requires that we ‘imaginatively inhabit’ that other
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person’s life, in order to judge what it is like for them.[8, p. 167] This
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internal perspective only concerns the individual in question, so it is
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impossible to make comparisons between two individuals whilst
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remaining within the internal perspective. Conversely, we adopt an
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‘external perspective’ when we first emphasise with A, and then with
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B, and then draw back in order to make a judgement as to which life is
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better.[8, p. 167]
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Herissone-Kelly argues that PB, because it requires comparative
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judgements between different lives, requires us to adopt what he calls
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the external perspective. But, while this external perspective might be
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appropriate for political decision makers, prospective parents may
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appropriately refuse to adopt the external perspective or respond to
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these reasons. As he puts it, “it is only from the external perspective
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that (again, other things being equal) there is a moral reason to choose
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the better life embryo. From the internal perspective, the sort of
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transpersonal judgment needed to ground PPB [sc. the Principle of
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Procreative Beneficence] has no purchase: it cannot be regarded as any
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sort of reason, let alone a moral one.”[8, p. 168]
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I am not sure that the internal and external perspectives can be
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contrasted as sharply as Herissone-Kelly suggests. Nonetheless, I will
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assume that some contrast of this sort makes sense. Even so, there is
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some ambiguity concerning how these thoughts relate to PB. We can
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distinguish two possible readings of Herissone-Kelly’s argument:
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Strong version: It is inappropriate for prospective parents to
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adopt an external perspective, so PB is not simply not obligatory but
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wrong.
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Weak version: Though prospective parents may adopt an
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external perspective, it is also permissible (and perhaps preferable) for
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them not to do so, thus PB cannot be obligatory.
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While the stronger version presents a greater challenge to PB,
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Herissone-Kelly only needs the weaker version to show that PB is not
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obligatory. His remarks suggest a certain (studied?) ambivalence
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between these two versions of the argument; for instance, he says: “It
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is appropriate and fitting that prospective parents should make such
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decisions from the internal perspective. Indeed, I think a case could be
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made for the claim that the external perspective is a positively
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inappropriate and unfitting one for prospective parents to take up.”[8,
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p. 167]. This suggests that he finds the stronger version plausible,
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though he does not commit himself to it.
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In another, more recent, paper Herissone-Kelly writes “it is
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appropriate (that is, it is at least permissible) for prospective parents
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to take seriously the internal perspective”.[9, p. 256] Saying that it is
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at least permissible, however, allows that it is obligatory, rather than
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merely permissible. Shortly after, Herissone-Kelly insists that he need
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not commit himself to this stronger version: “to hold that it is
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appropriate for a prospective parent to give primacy to the internal
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perspective is not to endorse the strong claim that she is obliged not to
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give primacy to the external. Instead, it is (or at least need be) only to
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endorse the weaker claim that she is not obliged to do so.”[9, p. 258]
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Note that he does not actually reject the stronger version here, only
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point out that he need not endorse it. However, he makes a number of
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unqualified claims, such as “those reasons [to select the child likely to
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have the best life] do not apply to prospective parents”.[9, p. 250] If
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Herissone-Kelly means only that these reasons may not apply, if the
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prospective parents choose to adopt an internal perspective, then this
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is overstated. Moreover, in a still more recent paper, he writes: “There
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is something about the perspective appropriate to a prospective
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parent that strips of their reason-giving force considerations about
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which possible child will lead the best life.”[10, p. 261] Here, he does
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not simply say that the internal perspective is appropriate, but that it
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is the appropriate perspective, suggesting (though not unequivocally
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affirming) that it is uniquely appropriate.
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Herissone-Kelly appears tempted by the stronger version of the
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argument, but this seems implausible. His suggestion is that
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prospective parents have reason to adopt the internal perspective
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because, in so doing, they are “preparing for the role of parent”.[8, p.
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168] But, even if it is always permissible for parents to adopt the
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internal perspective, I do not think it can be maintained that it is
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always wrong for them to adopt an external perspective towards their
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children. For instance, if you have two children, and wish to treat them
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tolerably fairly, then it seems that comparative judgements, and thus
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an
external
perspective,
are
necessary.
Thus,
Herissone-Kelly’s
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argument does not show that acting on the principle of PB is wrong
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(forbidden).
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If, however, Herissone-Kelly intends only to establish the weaker
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position – that parents need not choose the best child, because they
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may permissibly refrain from making external comparisons between
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their (potential) children – then his argument has some force. This
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objection leads us to consider whether PB really is a moral obligation.
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The Obligatoriness of PB
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Savulescu insists that PB is an obligation and not merely a
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permission to choose the best.[3, p. 278] The principle of PB thus
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conflicts with the idea of absolute parental autonomy or even the idea
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that parents need only ensure that their child will have a ‘good
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enough’ life.[3, pp. 279-80] Before we assess this claim, however, some
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clarification is necessary as to in what ways PB is and is not obligatory.
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Savulescu has always been clear that PB should not be coercively
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enforced; there should be no legal obligation on parents to choose the
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best child.
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Some critics have found this puzzling, believing that there is a
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tension in arguing for a moral obligation while insisting that the state
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ought not to enforce it.[6,11] I think these critics are mistaken. Not all
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moral obligations should be enforced by the state. I assume that I am
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under an obligation not to cheat on my partner, but I do not think that
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adultery should be punished by the state. At least for those operating
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within the liberal tradition, the state has a legitimate role in enforcing
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public order, but not morality as such. Thus, victimless wrongs are
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generally beyond the purview of the state. Savulescu aligns himself
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with this liberal tradition by invoking John Stuart Mill’s celebrated
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‘harm principle’, according to which interference with individual
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liberty is permissible only to prevent harm to others.[12] Since the
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failure to select the best child is, even if wrong, victimless, there is no
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basis for state interference.
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So, PB is a moral, and not a legal, obligation. Furthermore, it is
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not an absolute moral obligation.[3, pp. 277-8] If one has an absolute
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moral obligation to do X, then (morally) one must do X no matter
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what. It seems that Kant regarded the obligation not to lie as absolute,
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since he infamously insisted that one ought not to lie even to an axe
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murderer enquiring about the location of his next victim.[13] Few
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contemporary philosophers, however, believe that we have such
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general and absolute prohibitions. Any general duty, such as that not
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to lie, seems to admit of exceptions; so, if we do indeed have absolute
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duties, they must be precisely specified to remove any potential
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exceptions from the duty (for instance, we have an absolute duty not
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to lie, except where lying prevents a great harm, or where trivial lies
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spare someone’s feelings, or in contexts where deception in implicitly
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permitted such as poker games, etc).
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In what sense is PB obligatory, if it is not something we always
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have to do? Savulescu refers to it as a prima facie obligation. As
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Savulescu and Kahane put it, “When the obligation to have the most
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advantaged child is not overridden by sufficiently strong opposing
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moral reasons, it will be true that parents ought, all things considered,
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to select the most advantaged child”.[3, p. 278] In other words, a
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prima facie duty is an actual duty if there are no conflicting moral
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considerations that override or negate it. Savulescu allows, for
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example, that the obligation can be defeated if choosing the best child
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will harm others, including the parents and their existing children.[3,
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p. 278]
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It may be objected that this ‘prima facie obligation’ is so weak
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that it scarcely deserves to be called an obligation at all. Robert
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Sparrow presses such an objection when he writes: “Presumably the
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force of the claim that we have an obligation to enhance our children
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[or choose those likely to lead better lives] is that it will sometimes
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give us reasons to do things we would otherwise not be inclined to do.
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Yet if the welfare of future persons is always trumped by that of
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existing persons, then parents will never have reasons to change their
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minds about their reproductive decisions because their existing
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preferences—which would be frustrated were they to do something
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else—will settle the matter.”[11, p. 42, fn. 43] But this underplays the
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force of a prima facie duty.
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Contra-Sparrow, it is not the case that the duty can be
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overridden by a mere preference or inclination. I might prefer to have
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a son rather than a daughter, but it does not follow that my well-being
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would be higher if I had a son rather than a daughter. (This is true
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even on a desire-satisfaction account of well-being, assuming that the
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desires are in some way idealised.[14]) Thus, if the best child I could
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select is a girl, then PB requires me to choose her, regardless of my
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preference for a son. It is only if my well-being would be adversely
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affected that this obligation is even potentially defeated; mere
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frustration of my preferences is insufficient. Moreover, even if my
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well-being would be reduced, this will have to be weighed against the
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obligation of PB; Savulescu says that this obligation can be outweighed
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by parental well-being, but (pace-Sparrow) not that it is always
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trumped by parental well-being.
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While
prima
facie
obligations
are
weaker
than
absolute
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obligations, since they may be overridden, this does not mean that
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they lack any normative force whatsoever. A prima facie obligation is
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an actual obligation, unless some other moral consideration is
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sufficient to override it. However, I now wish to question whether PB is
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truly obligatory, even in this weak sense.
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The Demands of Morality
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In introducing PB, Savulescu says “I will understand morality to
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require us to do what we have most reason to do”.[1, p. 415] It is
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unclear, however, what this remark is supposed to mean.
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One possible reading is that we have a moral requirement or
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obligation to act upon the balance of all reasons. Andrew Hotke
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criticises this interpretation, on the basis that it would make prudence
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morally obligatory.[15] He offers an example in which he has more
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reason to eat breakfast than to forgo it. If morality requires him to act
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on all reasons, then it would be morally wrong of him to skip
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breakfast. This, he suggests, is absurd.
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If this is right, then it gives us reason to look for a more
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charitable interpretation of Savulescu’s remark. Savulescu does not
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distinguish between moral and non-moral reasons; indeed, he even
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follows the remark with an example in which he says someone should
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stop smoking, presumably for prudential rather than moral reasons.[1,
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p. 415] Nonetheless, we might understand Savulescu’s remark to
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concern moral reasons only, so morality requires us to do what we
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have most moral reasons to do. While this may require some
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charitable revision of the original formulation of his argument, it fits
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with his more recent statements. For instance, in a 2009 piece co-
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authored with Guy Kahane, Savulescu says that “PB … is the claim that
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there is a significant moral reason to choose the better child”.[3, p.
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278] This acknowledges a distinction between moral and non-moral
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reasons, which was absent in his earlier formulation.
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If we understand Savulescu’s remarks as the claim that morality
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requires us to do what we have most moral reason to do, then it may
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look not only unobjectionable, but trivial. However, this claim is not
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trivial; it excludes the possibility that we may have moral reasons to
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do more than is morally required of us. It is only because he denies
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this that Savulescu is comfortable with using ‘moral reason’ and
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‘moral obligation’ interchangeably.[3, p. 278]
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The Possibility of Supererogation
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Many
moral
philosophers
believe
in
the
possibility
of
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supererogation, which is action going beyond the call of duty.[16-17]
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Supererogatory action is morally praiseworthy, but not morally
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required. For example, while we may all have a duty to donate to
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charity, Mother Teresa’s devotion to helping the poor of Calcutta was
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plausibly supererogatory. That is, we are not required to do as much
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as she did, though doing so would be morally commendable, which (I
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take it) means that we have moral reasons to do this.
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Why should we believe in supererogation? This is too large a
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topic for the present paper, but it fits our intuitive responses to cases
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like that of Mother Teresa. I take it that we want to say that her
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devotion to the poor is morally praiseworthy, while simultaneously
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denying that we are under a moral obligation to do this much.
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Presumably, this is because we think that there are limits to what
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morality may demand of us. A morality that left us no room for
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personal
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unsympathetic.[18] We might reasonably ask why we should care for
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the dictates of such an alienating morality.[19]
projects
and
commitments
would
seem
cold
and
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If supererogation is possible, then we are not always morally
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required to do what we have most moral reason to do. It is possible
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that I have more moral reason to emulate Mother Teresa than to
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pursue
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Nonetheless, I am not required (even prima facie required) to do as
other
personal
projects,
such
as
writing
this
paper.
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much for the poor as Mother Teresa did, even if it would be admirable
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of me to do so. Morality permits me to do less.
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In suggesting that a moral reason to choose the best child is
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tantamount to a moral obligation to choose the best child, Savulescu
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implicitly rejects the possibility of supererogation. He assumes that we
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are justified in not complying with this significant moral reason only if
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we can appeal to some other weighty moral consideration, such as our
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own well-being, that defeats the prima facie obligation. But refusing to
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act in a supererogatory fashion does not require special justification;
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we are always permitted to do no more than our duty. Thus, a parent
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may be permitted to choose a child whose life is less than the best
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because of some mere preference on their part, which is not morally
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weighty in itself.
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Of course, I have not shown that choosing the best child is
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supererogatory. It might be argued that, since it does not require great
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parental sacrifice, it is not too demanding to be a genuine moral
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requirement. However, Savulescu does not argue this because he,
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perhaps unwisely, neglects the possibility of supererogation. However,
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it is his claim that we have a moral obligation to choose the child with
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the best life that seems particularly counterintuitive. Matthew Liao
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offers the example of a capacity to enjoy super-fine wine.[20, pp. 977-
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8] If the only relevant difference between two embryos is that one has
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this capacity and the other lacks it, then we may have reason to choose
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the former, but it is far from clear that we have any obligation to do
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so. Plausibly, we may be permitted to choose the latter on grounds of
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a mere preference for some other non-welfare-enhancing aspect of
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that child.
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Several critics of PB think that parents are only required to
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choose children who will have an adequately good life.[4,9,21] This is
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compatible with believing that we have more moral reason to choose
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children with better lives, provided that this is supererogatory (not
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required). So, Savulescu’s assumption that morality requires us to do
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what we have most moral reason to do means that he cannot make
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sense of a position that seems attractive to many. If he aims to
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advance a principle that can be accepted by adherents of various
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moral systems, then this contentious assumption is ill-advised.
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It may be thought that Savulescu’s rejection of supererogation
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follows from his consequentialism. This is not so. Non-maximising
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consequentialists can allow for supererogation.[22-23] Further, some
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non-consequentialists reject the notion of supererogation, for instance
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(on some interpretations) Kant.[24-25] Thus, whether or not one
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accepts supererogation is logically separable from whether or not one
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is a consequentialist. PB need not rest upon consequentialist
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foundations, but the claim that it is (even prima facie) obligatory
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presupposes that there is no such thing as supererogation.
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Conclusion
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The claim that PB is an obligation, even a prima facie one,
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depends upon a rejection of supererogation. This is something that
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Savulescu simply assumes without argument. Postulating that PB is
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supererogatory (morally good but
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Savulescu’s view that we have significant moral reason to choose the
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best child with the opinion of various critics that we do not have an
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obligation to do so.
not required)
can
reconcile
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It is therefore helpful, in arguing about PB, to distinguish two
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separate questions: i) whether parents have significant moral reasons
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to select the best child, and ii) whether they have an obligation to do
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so. Savulescu answers both in the affirmative, because he recognises
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no difference between them.[3, p. 278] The believer in supererogation,
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however, may consistently answer yes to the first and no to the
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second. Thus, Savulescu has failed to show that PB is genuinely
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obligatory (even in a prima facie sense), as opposed to merely being
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morally commendable.
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Acknowledgements
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I thank Eloïse Harding, Kent Hurtig, and two anonymous
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referees for comments and discussion.
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References
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