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1 Is Procreative Beneficence Obligatory? 1 2 3 Julian Savulescu has proposed what he calls the principle of 4 Procreative Beneficence (PB), according to which, where selection is 5 possible, parents have a prima facie moral obligation to select the 6 child who, on the basis of available evidence, is expected to have the 7 best life.[1-3] This principle has already been the focus of numerous 8 replies and criticisms[4-6], which cannot all be considered here, but 9 my purpose is to develop a new worry, regarding the alleged 10 obligatoriness of PB. I contend that Savulescu moves too swiftly from 11 the claim that parents have a (moral) reason to choose the best child 12 to the conclusion that they have a moral obligation to do so. We may 13 have moral reason to , but not have even a prima facie obligation to 14 do so. 15 16 The Argument for PB 17 18 Savulescu claims, plausibly I believe, that if we can choose 19 between a healthy embryo (A) and one with a significant genetic 20 disability (B), then we ought to choose embryo A.[1, pp. 416-7] 21 Furthermore, he argues that this is not simply a rational or prudential 22 ‘ought’ but a moral ought. In order to explain our intuitive judgement 23 about certain hypothetical cases, we must allow for the possibility of 24 harmless wrong-doing.[1, p. 418] If this is possible, then it is also 25 possible that it would be morally wrong to choose embryo B, even 2 26 though no individual is harmed (because B would not otherwise exist 27 and so cannot be harmed by this choice). 28 Having motivated his argument for selection with this simple 29 case, Savulescu then argues that the moral obligation that is operative 30 here also extends to non-disease cases.[1, pp. 419-21] He claims that it 31 is not disease itself that matters, but its impact on individual well- 32 being. The reason it would be wrong for a parent to select a child with 33 a significant disability is that they would have a worse life than 34 another child that could have been born. But this same reason can also 35 apply to non-disease cases. 36 Suppose embryo C is likely to be ordinarily healthy and, given 37 the right environment, enjoy slightly above average intelligence (say, 38 IQ of 105). Embryo D, however, is not worse in any way, but has the 39 potential for an IQ of 120. Assuming that intelligence is positively 40 correlated with well-being, Savulescu believes that parents have a 41 moral obligation to select D over C, just as they have an obligation to 42 select A over B. (The connection between intelligence and well-being 43 has recently been disputed[7] but I shall grant this assumption here.) 44 In general, Savulescu claims that parents have an obligation to choose 45 the child whose life is expected to go best. 46 47 Herissone-Kelly’s Objection to PB 48 49 Peter Herissone-Kelly criticises PB on grounds of the parental 50 attitudes involved.[8] He distinguishes two perspectives we may adopt 3 51 when assessing the value of someone else’s life. The ‘internal 52 perspective’ requires that we ‘imaginatively inhabit’ that other 53 person’s life, in order to judge what it is like for them.[8, p. 167] This 54 internal perspective only concerns the individual in question, so it is 55 impossible to make comparisons between two individuals whilst 56 remaining within the internal perspective. Conversely, we adopt an 57 ‘external perspective’ when we first emphasise with A, and then with 58 B, and then draw back in order to make a judgement as to which life is 59 better.[8, p. 167] 60 Herissone-Kelly argues that PB, because it requires comparative 61 judgements between different lives, requires us to adopt what he calls 62 the external perspective. But, while this external perspective might be 63 appropriate for political decision makers, prospective parents may 64 appropriately refuse to adopt the external perspective or respond to 65 these reasons. As he puts it, “it is only from the external perspective 66 that (again, other things being equal) there is a moral reason to choose 67 the better life embryo. From the internal perspective, the sort of 68 transpersonal judgment needed to ground PPB [sc. the Principle of 69 Procreative Beneficence] has no purchase: it cannot be regarded as any 70 sort of reason, let alone a moral one.”[8, p. 168] 71 I am not sure that the internal and external perspectives can be 72 contrasted as sharply as Herissone-Kelly suggests. Nonetheless, I will 73 assume that some contrast of this sort makes sense. Even so, there is 74 some ambiguity concerning how these thoughts relate to PB. We can 75 distinguish two possible readings of Herissone-Kelly’s argument: 4 76 Strong version: It is inappropriate for prospective parents to 77 adopt an external perspective, so PB is not simply not obligatory but 78 wrong. 79 Weak version: Though prospective parents may adopt an 80 external perspective, it is also permissible (and perhaps preferable) for 81 them not to do so, thus PB cannot be obligatory. 82 While the stronger version presents a greater challenge to PB, 83 Herissone-Kelly only needs the weaker version to show that PB is not 84 obligatory. His remarks suggest a certain (studied?) ambivalence 85 between these two versions of the argument; for instance, he says: “It 86 is appropriate and fitting that prospective parents should make such 87 decisions from the internal perspective. Indeed, I think a case could be 88 made for the claim that the external perspective is a positively 89 inappropriate and unfitting one for prospective parents to take up.”[8, 90 p. 167]. This suggests that he finds the stronger version plausible, 91 though he does not commit himself to it. 92 In another, more recent, paper Herissone-Kelly writes “it is 93 appropriate (that is, it is at least permissible) for prospective parents 94 to take seriously the internal perspective”.[9, p. 256] Saying that it is 95 at least permissible, however, allows that it is obligatory, rather than 96 merely permissible. Shortly after, Herissone-Kelly insists that he need 97 not commit himself to this stronger version: “to hold that it is 98 appropriate for a prospective parent to give primacy to the internal 99 perspective is not to endorse the strong claim that she is obliged not to 100 give primacy to the external. Instead, it is (or at least need be) only to 5 101 endorse the weaker claim that she is not obliged to do so.”[9, p. 258] 102 Note that he does not actually reject the stronger version here, only 103 point out that he need not endorse it. However, he makes a number of 104 unqualified claims, such as “those reasons [to select the child likely to 105 have the best life] do not apply to prospective parents”.[9, p. 250] If 106 Herissone-Kelly means only that these reasons may not apply, if the 107 prospective parents choose to adopt an internal perspective, then this 108 is overstated. Moreover, in a still more recent paper, he writes: “There 109 is something about the perspective appropriate to a prospective 110 parent that strips of their reason-giving force considerations about 111 which possible child will lead the best life.”[10, p. 261] Here, he does 112 not simply say that the internal perspective is appropriate, but that it 113 is the appropriate perspective, suggesting (though not unequivocally 114 affirming) that it is uniquely appropriate. 115 Herissone-Kelly appears tempted by the stronger version of the 116 argument, but this seems implausible. His suggestion is that 117 prospective parents have reason to adopt the internal perspective 118 because, in so doing, they are “preparing for the role of parent”.[8, p. 119 168] But, even if it is always permissible for parents to adopt the 120 internal perspective, I do not think it can be maintained that it is 121 always wrong for them to adopt an external perspective towards their 122 children. For instance, if you have two children, and wish to treat them 123 tolerably fairly, then it seems that comparative judgements, and thus 124 an external perspective, are necessary. Thus, Herissone-Kelly’s 6 125 argument does not show that acting on the principle of PB is wrong 126 (forbidden). 127 If, however, Herissone-Kelly intends only to establish the weaker 128 position – that parents need not choose the best child, because they 129 may permissibly refrain from making external comparisons between 130 their (potential) children – then his argument has some force. This 131 objection leads us to consider whether PB really is a moral obligation. 132 133 The Obligatoriness of PB 134 135 Savulescu insists that PB is an obligation and not merely a 136 permission to choose the best.[3, p. 278] The principle of PB thus 137 conflicts with the idea of absolute parental autonomy or even the idea 138 that parents need only ensure that their child will have a ‘good 139 enough’ life.[3, pp. 279-80] Before we assess this claim, however, some 140 clarification is necessary as to in what ways PB is and is not obligatory. 141 Savulescu has always been clear that PB should not be coercively 142 enforced; there should be no legal obligation on parents to choose the 143 best child. 144 Some critics have found this puzzling, believing that there is a 145 tension in arguing for a moral obligation while insisting that the state 146 ought not to enforce it.[6,11] I think these critics are mistaken. Not all 147 moral obligations should be enforced by the state. I assume that I am 148 under an obligation not to cheat on my partner, but I do not think that 149 adultery should be punished by the state. At least for those operating 7 150 within the liberal tradition, the state has a legitimate role in enforcing 151 public order, but not morality as such. Thus, victimless wrongs are 152 generally beyond the purview of the state. Savulescu aligns himself 153 with this liberal tradition by invoking John Stuart Mill’s celebrated 154 ‘harm principle’, according to which interference with individual 155 liberty is permissible only to prevent harm to others.[12] Since the 156 failure to select the best child is, even if wrong, victimless, there is no 157 basis for state interference. 158 So, PB is a moral, and not a legal, obligation. Furthermore, it is 159 not an absolute moral obligation.[3, pp. 277-8] If one has an absolute 160 moral obligation to do X, then (morally) one must do X no matter 161 what. It seems that Kant regarded the obligation not to lie as absolute, 162 since he infamously insisted that one ought not to lie even to an axe 163 murderer enquiring about the location of his next victim.[13] Few 164 contemporary philosophers, however, believe that we have such 165 general and absolute prohibitions. Any general duty, such as that not 166 to lie, seems to admit of exceptions; so, if we do indeed have absolute 167 duties, they must be precisely specified to remove any potential 168 exceptions from the duty (for instance, we have an absolute duty not 169 to lie, except where lying prevents a great harm, or where trivial lies 170 spare someone’s feelings, or in contexts where deception in implicitly 171 permitted such as poker games, etc). 172 In what sense is PB obligatory, if it is not something we always 173 have to do? Savulescu refers to it as a prima facie obligation. As 174 Savulescu and Kahane put it, “When the obligation to have the most 8 175 advantaged child is not overridden by sufficiently strong opposing 176 moral reasons, it will be true that parents ought, all things considered, 177 to select the most advantaged child”.[3, p. 278] In other words, a 178 prima facie duty is an actual duty if there are no conflicting moral 179 considerations that override or negate it. Savulescu allows, for 180 example, that the obligation can be defeated if choosing the best child 181 will harm others, including the parents and their existing children.[3, 182 p. 278] 183 It may be objected that this ‘prima facie obligation’ is so weak 184 that it scarcely deserves to be called an obligation at all. Robert 185 Sparrow presses such an objection when he writes: “Presumably the 186 force of the claim that we have an obligation to enhance our children 187 [or choose those likely to lead better lives] is that it will sometimes 188 give us reasons to do things we would otherwise not be inclined to do. 189 Yet if the welfare of future persons is always trumped by that of 190 existing persons, then parents will never have reasons to change their 191 minds about their reproductive decisions because their existing 192 preferences—which would be frustrated were they to do something 193 else—will settle the matter.”[11, p. 42, fn. 43] But this underplays the 194 force of a prima facie duty. 195 Contra-Sparrow, it is not the case that the duty can be 196 overridden by a mere preference or inclination. I might prefer to have 197 a son rather than a daughter, but it does not follow that my well-being 198 would be higher if I had a son rather than a daughter. (This is true 199 even on a desire-satisfaction account of well-being, assuming that the 9 200 desires are in some way idealised.[14]) Thus, if the best child I could 201 select is a girl, then PB requires me to choose her, regardless of my 202 preference for a son. It is only if my well-being would be adversely 203 affected that this obligation is even potentially defeated; mere 204 frustration of my preferences is insufficient. Moreover, even if my 205 well-being would be reduced, this will have to be weighed against the 206 obligation of PB; Savulescu says that this obligation can be outweighed 207 by parental well-being, but (pace-Sparrow) not that it is always 208 trumped by parental well-being. 209 While prima facie obligations are weaker than absolute 210 obligations, since they may be overridden, this does not mean that 211 they lack any normative force whatsoever. A prima facie obligation is 212 an actual obligation, unless some other moral consideration is 213 sufficient to override it. However, I now wish to question whether PB is 214 truly obligatory, even in this weak sense. 215 216 The Demands of Morality 217 218 In introducing PB, Savulescu says “I will understand morality to 219 require us to do what we have most reason to do”.[1, p. 415] It is 220 unclear, however, what this remark is supposed to mean. 221 One possible reading is that we have a moral requirement or 222 obligation to act upon the balance of all reasons. Andrew Hotke 223 criticises this interpretation, on the basis that it would make prudence 224 morally obligatory.[15] He offers an example in which he has more 10 225 reason to eat breakfast than to forgo it. If morality requires him to act 226 on all reasons, then it would be morally wrong of him to skip 227 breakfast. This, he suggests, is absurd. 228 If this is right, then it gives us reason to look for a more 229 charitable interpretation of Savulescu’s remark. Savulescu does not 230 distinguish between moral and non-moral reasons; indeed, he even 231 follows the remark with an example in which he says someone should 232 stop smoking, presumably for prudential rather than moral reasons.[1, 233 p. 415] Nonetheless, we might understand Savulescu’s remark to 234 concern moral reasons only, so morality requires us to do what we 235 have most moral reasons to do. While this may require some 236 charitable revision of the original formulation of his argument, it fits 237 with his more recent statements. For instance, in a 2009 piece co- 238 authored with Guy Kahane, Savulescu says that “PB … is the claim that 239 there is a significant moral reason to choose the better child”.[3, p. 240 278] This acknowledges a distinction between moral and non-moral 241 reasons, which was absent in his earlier formulation. 242 If we understand Savulescu’s remarks as the claim that morality 243 requires us to do what we have most moral reason to do, then it may 244 look not only unobjectionable, but trivial. However, this claim is not 245 trivial; it excludes the possibility that we may have moral reasons to 246 do more than is morally required of us. It is only because he denies 247 this that Savulescu is comfortable with using ‘moral reason’ and 248 ‘moral obligation’ interchangeably.[3, p. 278] 249 11 250 The Possibility of Supererogation 251 252 Many moral philosophers believe in the possibility of 253 supererogation, which is action going beyond the call of duty.[16-17] 254 Supererogatory action is morally praiseworthy, but not morally 255 required. For example, while we may all have a duty to donate to 256 charity, Mother Teresa’s devotion to helping the poor of Calcutta was 257 plausibly supererogatory. That is, we are not required to do as much 258 as she did, though doing so would be morally commendable, which (I 259 take it) means that we have moral reasons to do this. 260 Why should we believe in supererogation? This is too large a 261 topic for the present paper, but it fits our intuitive responses to cases 262 like that of Mother Teresa. I take it that we want to say that her 263 devotion to the poor is morally praiseworthy, while simultaneously 264 denying that we are under a moral obligation to do this much. 265 Presumably, this is because we think that there are limits to what 266 morality may demand of us. A morality that left us no room for 267 personal 268 unsympathetic.[18] We might reasonably ask why we should care for 269 the dictates of such an alienating morality.[19] projects and commitments would seem cold and 270 If supererogation is possible, then we are not always morally 271 required to do what we have most moral reason to do. It is possible 272 that I have more moral reason to emulate Mother Teresa than to 273 pursue 274 Nonetheless, I am not required (even prima facie required) to do as other personal projects, such as writing this paper. 12 275 much for the poor as Mother Teresa did, even if it would be admirable 276 of me to do so. Morality permits me to do less. 277 In suggesting that a moral reason to choose the best child is 278 tantamount to a moral obligation to choose the best child, Savulescu 279 implicitly rejects the possibility of supererogation. He assumes that we 280 are justified in not complying with this significant moral reason only if 281 we can appeal to some other weighty moral consideration, such as our 282 own well-being, that defeats the prima facie obligation. But refusing to 283 act in a supererogatory fashion does not require special justification; 284 we are always permitted to do no more than our duty. Thus, a parent 285 may be permitted to choose a child whose life is less than the best 286 because of some mere preference on their part, which is not morally 287 weighty in itself. 288 Of course, I have not shown that choosing the best child is 289 supererogatory. It might be argued that, since it does not require great 290 parental sacrifice, it is not too demanding to be a genuine moral 291 requirement. However, Savulescu does not argue this because he, 292 perhaps unwisely, neglects the possibility of supererogation. However, 293 it is his claim that we have a moral obligation to choose the child with 294 the best life that seems particularly counterintuitive. Matthew Liao 295 offers the example of a capacity to enjoy super-fine wine.[20, pp. 977- 296 8] If the only relevant difference between two embryos is that one has 297 this capacity and the other lacks it, then we may have reason to choose 298 the former, but it is far from clear that we have any obligation to do 299 so. Plausibly, we may be permitted to choose the latter on grounds of 13 300 a mere preference for some other non-welfare-enhancing aspect of 301 that child. 302 Several critics of PB think that parents are only required to 303 choose children who will have an adequately good life.[4,9,21] This is 304 compatible with believing that we have more moral reason to choose 305 children with better lives, provided that this is supererogatory (not 306 required). So, Savulescu’s assumption that morality requires us to do 307 what we have most moral reason to do means that he cannot make 308 sense of a position that seems attractive to many. If he aims to 309 advance a principle that can be accepted by adherents of various 310 moral systems, then this contentious assumption is ill-advised. 311 It may be thought that Savulescu’s rejection of supererogation 312 follows from his consequentialism. This is not so. Non-maximising 313 consequentialists can allow for supererogation.[22-23] Further, some 314 non-consequentialists reject the notion of supererogation, for instance 315 (on some interpretations) Kant.[24-25] Thus, whether or not one 316 accepts supererogation is logically separable from whether or not one 317 is a consequentialist. PB need not rest upon consequentialist 318 foundations, but the claim that it is (even prima facie) obligatory 319 presupposes that there is no such thing as supererogation. 320 321 Conclusion 322 323 The claim that PB is an obligation, even a prima facie one, 324 depends upon a rejection of supererogation. This is something that 14 325 Savulescu simply assumes without argument. Postulating that PB is 326 supererogatory (morally good but 327 Savulescu’s view that we have significant moral reason to choose the 328 best child with the opinion of various critics that we do not have an 329 obligation to do so. not required) can reconcile 330 It is therefore helpful, in arguing about PB, to distinguish two 331 separate questions: i) whether parents have significant moral reasons 332 to select the best child, and ii) whether they have an obligation to do 333 so. Savulescu answers both in the affirmative, because he recognises 334 no difference between them.[3, p. 278] The believer in supererogation, 335 however, may consistently answer yes to the first and no to the 336 second. Thus, Savulescu has failed to show that PB is genuinely 337 obligatory (even in a prima facie sense), as opposed to merely being 338 morally commendable. 339 340 Acknowledgements 341 I thank Eloïse Harding, Kent Hurtig, and two anonymous 342 referees for comments and discussion. 343 344 References 345 346 347 348 349 1. Savulescu J. Procreative beneficence: why we should select the best children. Bioethics 2001;15:413-26. 2. Savulescu J. In defence of procreative beneficence. J Med Ethics 2007;33:284-8. 15 350 3. Savulescu J. and G. Kahane. The moral obligation to create 351 children with the best chance of the best life. Bioethics 2009;23:274- 352 90. 353 4. Parker M. The best possible child. J Med Ethics 2007;33:279-83. 354 5. Stoller SE. Why we are not morally required to select the best 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 children: a response to Savulescu. Bioethics 2008;22:364-9 6. Bennett R. The fallacy of the principle of procreative beneficence. Bioethics 2009;23:265-73. 7. Carter JA. and EC. Gordon. Intelligence, wellbeing and procreative beneficence. J Appl Philos 2013;30:122-35. 8. Herissone-Kelly P. Procreative beneficence and the prospective parent. J Med Ethics 2006;32:166-9 362 9. Herissone-Kelly P. Two varieties of “better-for” judgements. In 363 Roberts MA. and DT. Wasserman, eds. Harming Future Persons: 364 Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. Dordrecht: Springer, 365 2009: 249-63. 366 10. Herissone-Kelly P. Reasons, rationalities, and procreative 367 beneficence: need Häyry stand politely by while Herissone-Kelly and 368 Savulescu disagree? Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2011;20:258-67. 369 370 371 11. Sparrow R. A not-so-new eugenics: Harris and Savulescu on human enhancement. Hastings Cent Rep 2011;41:32-42. 12. Mill JS. On liberty. In: Robson J, ed. The Complete works of John 372 Stuart Mill. Volume XVIII: Essays on Politics and Society. Toronto: 373 University of Toronto Press, 1977: 212-310. 16 374 375 376 377 378 13. Kant I. 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Selecting children: the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering. Philos Compass 2008;3:973-91. 21. Glover J. Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. 22. Mill JS. Auguste Comte and Positivism. In: Robson J, ed. The 395 Complete works of John Stuart Mill. Volume X: Essays on Ethics, 396 Religion and Society. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969: 397 261-368. 17 398 399 400 401 402 403 23. Portmore DW. Position-relative consequentialism, agent- centered options, and supererogation. Ethics 2003;113:303-32. 24. Baron M. Kantian ethics and supererogation. J Philos 1987;84:237-62. 25. Timmermann J. Good but not required? – Assessing the demands of Kantian ethics. J Moral Philos 2005;2:9-27.