Download Carbon Budgets Positioning - Policy Background

AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only
Temperature Target
1. What level of temperature increase relative to pre-industrial / 1880 levels, is it
appropriate for FoEI to call for, based on our climate justice principles and
scientific uncertainties?
2. Why do you think we should call for this temperature target, as opposed to other
options?
3. How will your member group primarily use this position? (e.g. in public materials?
for lobbying? for media work? in discussions and work with allies and social
movements?)
Level of risk
1. What is an acceptable level of risk for the temperature target we are calling for?
2. Why do you think this should be FoEI’s position?
This process

Please include any other comments or information about the involvement of your
member group or region on the issue of the global carbon budget which might be
of relevance for this internal process in FoEI.
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Carbon Budgets Positioning Process – Policy Background / Options Paper
(Version 1 – 26 July 2011)
What is this document?
This is the version 1 of the formal policy background / options paper for the FoEI carbon
budgets positioning process. It provides background policy information and scientific
modelling on the key decision areas in the forthcoming positioning process on carbon
budgets. This version of the document will be used to inform discussions on the first decision
area under the process – temperature target and risk. It sets out the main options for
discussion / decision in each area where these are clearly identifiable; and includes
recommendations to narrow down the options under discussion.
A second version will be circulated at the start of the second phase of discussion on effortsharing1 framework and implementation which will commence in September. The second
version will include additional information of relevance to the second phase of discussion.
NB. Please note that:
1. This document is not supposed to be exhaustive. There is a lot more
information available which is relevant to this debate and we very much hope
that member groups will input additional information into the positioning
discussions as they see fit.
2. While the goal of this positioning process is to agree new binding FoEI
positions. However, the recommendations set out in this document for the
narrowing of the options under discussion are not binding. Member groups
can support options outside of these recommendations if they so wish.
Decision-making on the contents of this paper
This document has been drafted by the Coordinator of the FoEI Climate Justice & Energy
Programme Sarah-Jayne Clifton. Support and inputs – including the detailed scientific
modelling on the global emissions pathways – were provided by Sivan Kartha, senior
scientist at the Stockholm Environment Institute and one of the lead scientists on the chapter
on equity in climate mitigation in the forthcoming IPCC report. This document has been
reviewed and agreed by the Climate Justice & Energy Steering Group.
Overall Positioning Process
The overall process for this positioning discussion, including the timeline, approach to
discussions and decision-making, and how outstanding differences in opinion will ultimately
be resolved is set out in the accompanying outline process document distributed alongside
this paper. If you have any questions please contact the Climate Justice & Energy
Programme Coordinator Sarah-Jayne Clifton: [email protected] .
1 NB. The term effort-sharing is also frequently referred to as burden-sharing. In some discussions / contexts,
the two terms have different implications, and are associated with more or less equitable approaches. In the
context of this paper the two are seen to be inter-changeable, with both broadly referring to how we divide
up the remaining carbon budget. The use of the term effort-sharing is not intended to have any implication
in terms of the actual answer to that question, i.e. to what position FoEI should adopt in this respect. Nor
does it bring into question FoEI’s agreed positions on climate debt and historical responsibility.
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DECISION AREA 1: Global temperature target and level of risk:
What level of temperature increase relative to pre-industrial / 1880 levels, with what
related level of risk, is it appropriate for FoEI to call for, based on our climate justice
principles and scientific uncertainties?
a. Global Temperature Target
This area is known in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations as the “long-term goal”. It is
extremely important from a climate justice perspective because developing countries and
poor communities – those who have done the least to cause the problem of climate change
– are likely to bear the brunt of climate impacts, and the likelihood of severe impacts
increases with the degree of warming. It is also significant for the subsequent decision area
in this positioning process – on effort sharing framework and implementation. Effort-sharing
refers to the differing levels of responsibility for reducing emissions assigned to each country
in order to meet the global temperature target. This is because the temperature target
determines the remaining “carbon budget” – i.e. the amount of greenhouse gas emissions
that can still be emitted globally whilst keeping warming below the target temperature.
According to NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, average temperatures have
climbed 0.8 degrees Celsius around the world since 18802. However, further warming of
0.6 degrees Celsius is already believed to be locked in without any further increase in the
concentration of global greenhouse gas emissions3. This means there is a very strong
likelihood that exceeding a 1 degree Celsius temperature increase is already unavoidable.
The scientific analysis of the risks associated with different levels of temperature increase is
constantly evolving. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – the leading
scientific body for the study of climate change – recently updated its analysis on this
question. In 2007 it concluded that failing to prevent a 2 degree temperature increase would
lead to significant sea level rise, mass extinctions of species, and put millions of people
globally at risk of crop failures, water shortages, flooding and homelessness4.
However, research published in 2009 scaled up the assessment of the risk, with “large-scale
discontinuities” - i.e. dangerous tipping points which could give rise to irreversible climate
change – now considered moderately significant below 2 degrees on industrial levels
(approx 1.4 degrees on 1990 levels, the baseline used in the diagram below) and risks of
extreme weather events considered substantial or severe with warming of 1.5 degrees
above pre-industrial levels (approx 0.9 degrees on 1990 levels). Figure 1 below summaries
the findings. The diagram shows climate impacts for five different categories from the
original IPCC report in 2001 (on the left) and updated in 2009 (on the right). Red
corresponds to ‘substantial or severe risks’, and yellow to ‘moderately significant risks’.
2 http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/temp-analysis-2009.html
3 Hansen et al, Earth’s Energy Imbalance: Confirmation & Implications, Science, Vol 308, June 2005:
http://pubs.giss.nasa.gov/docs/2005/2005_Hansen_etal_1.pdf
4 Bernstein et al, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers, IPCC, 2007.
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/main.html
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While some text from this assessment, published by Smith et al (2009), was included by the
IPPC, this diagram was not. By some accounts this was because governments were
unhappy with how strong an image it presented.
Figure 1. Burning Embers diagram (Smith et al (2009))
Regional variations in warming
Scientists predict there will be a large amount of variation in temperature rise around the
world, so that warming will impact differently on different countries and regions with some
regions warming considerably more than the global average. The maps below show the
distribution in temperature rise for a global average warming of 1.5 degrees (top), and 2
degrees (bottom) 5. Earlier research from the IPCC has indicated that Africa is amongst the
regions expected to face the largest above-average temperature increase, with warming in
the region likely to reach around 1.5 times the global average. This means that average
warming of 2 degrees could mean 3 degrees of warming for Africa or more6.
5
These figures were produced using the MAGICC/SCENGEN model. (Note, the legend in the figure states
global mean temperature rise of 0.9C (top map) and 1.4C (bottom map), rather than 1.5C and 2.0C. This is
because MAGICC/SCENGEN reports temperature rise relative to 1990, at which time global mean
temperature rise was already approximately 0.6C.)
6 Contribution of Working Group I to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Chapter 11, Regional Climate
Projections, at page 866-867
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Potential Impacts of Warming
The direct physical impacts of climate change are already being felt and the potential
impacts are extremely destructive and wide-ranging, including:
 sea level rise, including the possible submersion and disappearance of some islands
and island nations;
 the increased incidence of extreme weather events like heavy rainfall, severe floods,
droughts, and tropical storms;
 severe impacts on ecosystems with the significant possibility of mass extinctions;
 significant changes to and falls in crop yields because of changes to rainfall patterns;
 increased incidence of water-borne diseases like malaria and dengue fever;
 changes in vegetation cover, including further loss of rainforest because of changes
in rainfall patterns
Vulnerability to climate change depends on the interaction of multiple factors including the
regional and local variability in warming levels examined above, on geographical factors like
height above sea level, topography, vegetation, and levels of ecosystem degradation; and
complex socio-economic factors like poverty levels, governance and institutional conditions,
infrastructure, access to markets, finance and technology, and the presence and/or legacy of
complex disasters and conflicts.
Because of their physical geography, the impacts of warming will be felt disproportionally by
low-lying countries, small island states, and Africa as a region. 2 degrees of warming could
threaten the existence of low-lying small island states, and in Africa, the IPCC has indicated
that without dramatic action, climate change could lead to:
 Reductions in crop yields in some countries by as much as 50% by 2020
 Increased water stress for 75-250 million people by the 2020s, and 350-600 million
by the 2050s
 A cost of adaptation to sea level rise of at least 5-10% of gross domestic product7.
In terms of geo-physical factors, according to a report by the Global Humanitarian Forum
(GHF) on vulnerability to climate change, people who are most vulnerable to the impacts of
7
Contribution of Working Group II to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Chapter 9, Africa, at page 435
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climate change live in semi-arid dry land belt countries, sub-Saharan Africa, South and
Southeast Asia, Latin America, Small island developing states and the Arctic8.
According to the GHF report, the impacts of climate change are already being strongly felt by
large parts of the world. In total, the report estimates that four billion people are vulnerable,
500 million people are at extreme risk, and that climate change is already responsible for
forcing some fifty million additional people to go hungry and driving over ten million
additional people into extreme poverty9.
It also estimates that every year climate change leaves over 300,000 people dead, and 325
million people seriously affected, in addition to causing economic losses of US$125 billion.
Of the deaths, over nine in ten deaths are related to gradual environmental degradation due
to climate change — principally malnutrition, diarrhoea, and malaria – with the remaining
deaths being linked to weather-related disasters brought about by climate change. In terms
of future vulnerabilities, it is estimated that lives lost due to climate change could rise to
approximately half a million per year within 20 years if impacts are unabated.
Finally, according to the GHF, developing countries currently bear the over-whelming burden
of these impacts – 98 percent of the seriously affected and 99 percent of all deaths from
weather-related disasters, along with over 90 percent of the total economic losses10.
Options under consideration in the climate talks
At the COP 16 climate talks in Cancun in 2010, UNFCCC countries agreed (without
unanimity – Bolivia refused to support the final Cancun outcome) to a target of keeping
overall warming below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The Cancun outcome
also recognises the need to consider strengthening the long-term goal to a global average
temperature rise of 1.5 degrees “on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge” with
a review of the temperature goal to be concluded by 201511.
In the context of the UNFCCC negotiations, the 2 degree target is supported by most Annex
I (developed) countries, while more than 100 developing countries, including the Alliance of
Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Africa Group, have called for a target of 1.5 degrees or
less. The 1.5 degree call was recently supported by the UN Executive Secretary Christiana
Figueres.
In the environmental movement, the Climate Action Network, of which FoEI is no longer a
member but some of our members groups are, is now supporting a 1.5 degree target
(although it is unclear whether this is an officially agreed CAN position) while many social
Global Humanitarian Forum, Human Impacts Report: Climate Change – The Anatomy of a Silent Crisis:
www.eird.org/publicaciones/humanimpactreport.pdf
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 UNFCCC, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action under the Convention, Decision 1/CP.16, Article 4:
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2
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movements are calling for a target of 1 degree after this target was agreed at the World
Peoples Summit on Climate Change in Cochabamba in 201012.
FoEI’s current position – Global Temperature Target
FoEI does not currently have an agreed position on our acceptable temperature target. Our
closest relevant position is our demand for a total phase out of carbon emissions by midcentury in order to minimise the chances of runaway climate change, and for a return of
atmospheric concentrations to an upper limit of 350 parts per million. We are committed to
revise this in line with new emerging scientific evidence.
Options for Carbon Budgets Positioning Discussion
It is recommended that FoEI confine our discussion to consideration of whether we want to
support at global average temperature target of 1, 1.5 or 2 degrees.
Rationale: The spectrum of 1-2 degrees is the space currently within which the broad
spectrum of civil society and scientific discussion is taking place, and there is very little
attention to incremental targets such as 1.3 degrees or 1.8 degrees, or available scientific
research to support those discussions.
b. Level of risk
Because of the complexity of the climate system and uncertainties about what emissions
reductions are necessary to avoid dangerous climate change, it is not possible to identify an
emissions reduction pathway that will lead to a particular temperature change with complete
certainty. Instead, computer models are able to identify probabilities arising from particular
pathways.
As a result all discussions around temperature targets are underpinned by an assumption
about tolerable levels of risk. For example, conditional commitments by the EU and UK to
reduce their emissions by 30 per cent and 42 per cent by 2020 are based on a greater than
50% chance of avoiding 2 degrees13. It makes no sense to argue about “1.5 vs. 2” degrees
without knowing what level of risk is being talked about. It will therefore be necessary for us
to pin down what we consider to be an acceptable level of risk as well as what we consider
to be an acceptable temperature target.
While the question of the risk or probability of avoiding certain temperature increases is not
discussed widely, together with the specific temperature target it defines
12 Working Group 9: Shared Vision, Final conclusions, Cochabamba Peoples Agreement, May 2010.
http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/30/final-conclusions-working-group-n%c2%ba-9-sharedvision/#more-1623
13 Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland: Reckless Gamblers – How politicians inaction is
ramping up the risk of dangerous climate change (December 2010)(page 6):
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/reckless_gamblers.pdf
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the remaining carbon budget available for the entire world, and the emissions reduction
pathway, i.e. the pace at which global emissions cuts need to be realised.
This in turn has implications for the implementation of effort-sharing (part of decision area 2
below). By way of example, the following graph shows two possible global emissions
reduction paths based on an uncertainty analysis by the C-Roads-CP climate simulation
model14
Path 1 (the brown path) gives a roughly 35% chance of exceeding 2 degrees of warming by
2100 (i.e. an 65% chance of avoiding 2 degrees), and a roughly 50% chance of exceeding
1.5 degrees of warming in 2100 (i.e. a 50% chance of warming below 1.5 degrees in 2100,
though possibly temporarily exceeding 1.5C before 2100).
Path 2 (the green path) gives less than 10% chance of exceeding 2 degrees by 2100 (i.e. a
greater than 90% chance of avoiding 2 degrees), and a roughly 15% chance of exceeding
1.5 degrees of warming by 2100 (i.e. a 85% chance of avoiding 1.5 degrees, again with the
possibility of temporarily overshooting 1.5C before 2100).
(NB. Path 2 is based on recent analysis by NASA scientist Jim Hansen as to the global
carbon budget and emissions reduction pathway necessary to return atmospheric CO2
concentration to 350 parts per million (ppm) – the level identified by increasing numbers of
climate experts, and progressive national governments as the safe upper limit for CO2 in our
atmosphere).
The red path in the graph shows the business as usual emissions trajectory, which has
virtually 100% chance of exceeding – perhaps by a large amount – both 1.5C and 2C by
2100.
14 This is the recently released version of C-Roads model developed by Climate Interactive (v2.154b.69). The
C-Roads model has been calibrated to general circulation models of the ocean-atmosphere system, providing
confidence in the model’s results when examining typical emission paths. These paths examined here are
more ambitious than those typically explored by GCMs, and the calibration is not as reliable. This is
especially relevant with respect to the estimates shown below of the probability of exceeding 1.5C. Personal
communication with developers of C-Roads.
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The following two graphs and table show what these trajectories would look like in terms of
emissions from different sources for the two paths indicated above.
NB. Please note that:
 The breakdown of emissions reductions between sources is only illustrative and the
levels could change between the different sources. We will need to have a
conversation about what kind of emissions decreases are possible in different
sectors as part of our discussions in phase two of this process on effort-sharing
implementation.
 The peak year used in these graphs is 2015. However, there is some flexibility
around the peak year, with the later the peak year, the steeper the subsequent
emissions decreases that are needed.
The graph for path 2 indicates that, to realise a <10% chance of exceeding 2 degrees, and a
~15% chance of exceeding 1.5 degrees by 2100, would require global emissions from fossil
fuels, fluorinated gases, methane, and nitrous oxide to have been reduced nearly to zero by
2070, and for negative forestry emissions from 2030 onwards. In similar research, the UK
AVOID programme has asserted that a 90% chance of staying below 2 degrees will probably
necessitate negative emissions and/or some form of geo-engineering intervention15.
Path 1:
(35% chance of exceeding 2 degrees of warming by 2100 and a roughly 50% chance of
exceeding 1.5 degrees of warming by 2100).
15 http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/media/pdf/9/8/avoid2.pdf
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Path 2:
(<10% chance of exceeding 2 degrees by 2100 and a roughly 15% chance of exceeding 1.5
degrees of warming by 2100).
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Quantities of emissions reductions by source for each path:
Reference
Path 1
Path 2
Cumulative fossil CO2
~7600 GtCO2
~1350 GtCO2
~820 GtCO2
Cumulative deforestation
~600 GtCO2
~200 GtCO2
~150 GtCo2
Cumulative afforestation
~50 GtCO2
~50 GtCo2
~370 GtCO2
Cumulative non CO2
~2300 GtCO2
~500 GtCO2eq
~340 GtCO2
Cumulative CO2eq
~10400 GtCO2
~2000
GtCO2eq
~940 GtCO2eq
Probability of exceeding
2C by year 2100
100%
~35%
<10%
Probability of exceeding
1.5C in year 2100
(possibly with
temporary overshoot
before 2100)
100%
~50%
~15%
Formal definitions of risk levels
The IPCC formally defines a 33 per cent chance of exceeding a certain temperature as
“unlikely” and a 10 per cent chance as “very unlikely”.
FoEI’s current position – Level of risk
FoEI does not currently have a position on level of risk, beyond our position above of
wanting to minimise the chances of runaway climate change.
Options for Carbon Budgets Positioning Discussion
It is recommended that we consider levels of risk of exceeding a certain temperature
threshold at the IPCC definition of ‘unlikely’, (i.e. levels of risk below 33%), or “very unlikely”
(i.e. levels of risk below 10%).
Rationale: Not specifying the level of risk for meeting a specific temperature target, or
specifying a level of risk that is high (e.g., 50%), would allow for inadequate policy responses
that pose a high probability of failing to protect people and the climate.
It is therefore recommended that, for simplicity, we make the decision on temperature target
(decision 1 above), our primary decision. It then follows that for our decision on level of risk
we would want to achieve a reasonable level of certainty that that temperature target could
be realised.
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DECISION AREA 2: Effort-sharing and Implementation:
What framework, in line with our agreed positions on historical responsibility and
climate debt, should we use for sharing the effort of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions between and within countries to achieve our agreed temperature target;
and how should this framework be implemented?
NB. The questions above will be the focus of phase 2 of the carbon budgets
positioning process starting in September 2011. Before the start of phase 2, a
second, updated version of this background policy / options paper will be distributed,
with additional background information included of relevance to phase 2 of the
discussions.
a. Framework for effort-sharing
The question of how we divide up the remaining carbon budget is a central area of
disagreement amongst countries in the UNFCCC negotiations, where pressure from civil
society and social movements is needed to increase the likelihood of outcomes in line with
climate justice.
Basic principles as to how effort-sharing should be undertaken are set out in the Convention,
including the core principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility and Respective
Capabilities (CBDRRC) in Article 3.1. This is the core principle recognising the historical
responsibility of rich industrialised countries in creating the problem of climate change and
the increased resources they have available to tackle the problem. In consequence, the
Convention asserts that: “UNFCCC parties should take action on climate change on the
basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
capabilities”. Accordingly, it goes on to state that: “Developed country Parties should take
the lead in combating climate change and adverse effects there-of”16.
The current deadlock in the UN climate negotiations is centred around how this basic
principle is interpreted in terms of responsibility to reduce emissions and responsibility for
providing climate finance and technology transfer. Essentially, there is a battle over who
gets what share of the remaining atmospheric space. A large number of proposed effortsharing frameworks are out there as to how the remaining carbon budget should be
allocated. These range from:
 The US model of pledge and review which rejects the basic premise of a top-down
agreement on emissions reductions with an aggregate target based on science and
equity and individual country responsibility based on the aggregate target. It instead
asserts that countries should unilaterally decide on their own commitments, thus
avoiding having any agreed collective limit on emissions, and sanctioning a situation
where high level emitters and rapidly growing emitters use up the remaining carbon
16 United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Article 3,1:
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf
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budget. It also rejects the common but differentiated responsibilities principles by
calling all countries to make individual pledges.

Per capita emissions approach: where all countries are awarded a share of the global
emissions budget (including the historical budget) in proportion to their population.

Greenhouse Development Rights approach: which distributes the effort of protecting
the climate in proportion to countries’ responsibility (i.e., emissions, including past
emissions) and capability (i.e. wealth), both of which are defined with respect to a
“development threshold”, so as to shield people who are still striving for a basic level
of welfare from mitigation and adaptation costs.

Brazil’s interpretation of historical responsibility: where countries are allocated
emissions cuts according to the total contribution of their historic emissions (going
back to the 1800s) to the current global temperature increase.
Obviously, different frameworks along this spectrum have different equity implications
between countries. In addition, the equity implications of any given framework also depend
on the level of ambition with regard to temperature increase (i.e. decision area 1. above).
(NB. The second version of this paper distributed before the start of discussions on
this section (effort-sharing frameworks and implementation) will contain more
detailed information of available options for effort-sharing frameworks and their
implications in terms of required emissions reductions for key countries and regional
groups (including Annex I / non-Annex I, the US, EU, China, India, South Africa and an
example LDC)
FoEI’s current position – Framework for Effort-sharing
The sharing of this burden must be based on historical responsibility and capacity to act in
order to enable a global just transition towards sustainable low carbon economies and
societies.
Industrialized countries have accrued a climate debt to developing countries which must be
reflected in ambitious emission reduction targets in Annex I countries, as well as financial
and technology transfer support for mitigation and adaptation requirements in southern
countries.
FoEI encourages developing countries to take national actions towards sustainable societies
and calls for Annex I countries to fulfill their obligations as part of the repayment of the
ecological and climate debt.
FoEI does not call for differentiation that would mean calling for developing countries to
accept binding emissions reduction targets for the next commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol
Our demands for potential future binding targets on developing countries would be based on
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historical responsibility and capacity to act indicators, and be dependent on steps taken by
developed countries in the second commitment period to accept and carry out binding
emissions reduction targets and finance for mitigation and adaptation in the global South.
Options for Carbon Budgets Positioning Discussion
Options in line with our agreed positions on climate debt and historical responsibility will be
elaborated in the second version of this paper.
b. Implementation of effort-sharing
The decision on the effort-sharing framework for global emissions reductions will define
FoEI’s position on what emissions reductions countries should undertake in order to do their
fair share of keeping global temperatures below the agreed level, given the selected level of
risk. While it there is not yet enough known about how some of the very deep global paths
would actually be met in a safe and equitable way, neither is it known how we would cope
with temperature rises of greater than 2C, or even 1.5C.
All of the likely outcomes of this process are likely to indicate the necessity for dramatic
economic and social transformation in both in the North and South, which a significant
departure from current scenarios and trends of so called development and growth.
However, depending on what framework is agreed, it may be that the fair level of emissions
reductions for certain countries – not necessarily just Annex I countries but also some
advanced developing countries like those in the BASIC grouping17 – is simply unrealistic,
without the use of Negative Emissions Techniques (NETs)18, even in the context of dramatic
global economic and social transformation. We will then need to have a conversation about
how we deal with this situation.
Options include requiring countries unable to meet their fair share of emissions reductions to
pay funding to other countries that are able to make additional reductions beyond their fair
share, while keeping to our agreed position against carbon markets and making it clear that
ambitious targets cannot be used as a window to increase space for new financial markets
based on offsets for those countries not able to meet their fair share of emissions reduction.
However, it may be that our overall carbon budget and the industrialisation needs of
developing countries leaves insufficient space for this swap of emissions cuts for finance –
both from industrialised to developing countries, and between developing countries – in
which case there is a question over whether countries can use NETs to meet their required
emissions reductions, and if so which ones. We will need to figure out the implications of
such a possible conclusion for our federation, and depending on the outcome of this
17 BASIC is a group of four large developing countries: Brazil, South Africa, India and China
18 Negative Emissions Techniques are means of withdrawing CO2 (or other greenhouse gases) from the
environment such that atmospheric concentrations are reduced below the level that would have resulted
without the NET. Most NETs are classified as geoengineering, although of the category of 'carbon dioxide
removal' rather than solar radiation management (Shepherd et al, 2009). However, some NETs do not
involve geoengineering, these include biomass expansion, improved soil management, and peat bog
restoration
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discussion, we may need to revisit our conclusions under decision area 1, which determines
the overall budget that we are working with.
FoEI’s current position – Effort-sharing Implementation
Targets
FoEI currently demands that industrialised countries must reduce their emissions
domestically – without offsetting - by at least 40% by 2020.
Climate Finance
FoEI has a specific demand for the recognition and repayment of climate debt of the global
North, but does not currently have a specific demand in terms of the means and options for
the repayment of this climate debt from Annex I countries to developing countries.
Negative Emissions Techniques (NETs) and Geo-engineering
We have not formally explored our position on NETs and geoengineering as a federation.
We seem largely agreed that large-scale geoengineering, i.e. the deliberate manipulation of
Earth’s systems to alter the climate (including ocean-fertilization, cloud-seeding etc.) is
unacceptably dangerous. However, there are a number of low-tech geoengineering
technologies (e.g. algae sinks – not in the ocean but on land) and some other NETs like
biomass expansion, improvements in soil management, and peat bog restoration which have
received very little discussion and which some consider are worth investigating further, as
supplementary solutions to be undertaken alongside the obvious solutions that FoEI member
groups support as real solutions to climate mitigation and adaptation (i.e. the defence and
expansion of small-scale, sustainable agriculture, the transformation of production and
consumption patterns etc).
Options for Carbon Budgets Positioning Discussion
NB. Very little research has been done by scientists and policy-makers on the questions
raised in this final decision area, i.e. how we actually get down to the very low targets
globally, and in individual countries, as an equitable distribution of the remaining carbon
budget will require. It is ‘terra incognita’ for climate policy. Some more information on the
options available will be included in the second version of this paper, distributed before
discussions begin on this second area of decision-making. However, these options are likely
to be vaguer and less substantiated with existing research and policy analysis.
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