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On Design Flaws in the Regime to Control
Global Climate Change and Their
Consequences
Or Why We Need to Start Over
Definitions
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INSTITUTIONS = clusters of norms (standards of behavior) that
crystallize in particular pattern to guide social practices in large
areas of human social activity, e.g., law, government, religion,
diplomacy, international commerce, etc.
They constitute the rules of the game that create
complementary expectations about permissible behavior in
various circumstances. This is the glue that holds societies
together.
May include grants of authority (jurisdiction) to prescribe policy
in domains of varying scale, along with organizations, & their
stipulated decision-making procedures.
Definitions, cont’d.
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Regimes = one type of institution dealing always with
governance of human social activities at any/all
scales, from local to global. Governance = right to
manage; scope of authority, type of rules, mgmt.
approaches, etc.
Examples of international regimes = international air
& maritime transport, marine fisheries beyond
national jurisdiction, long-range transport of
atmospheric pollution (acid rain), etc.
What Goes Around…
Background
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Sept. 1989: beginning project with Norwegians to evaluate
performance of 15 international environmental regimes re
design & effectiveness (Miles et al. 2002). Aim to apply lessons
to GCC problem. Initial joint consultations with Norwegian Min.
Envir. at their invitation.
Deadline for results Spring 1991. Plan to table treaty for
signature at Rio summit, June 1992. This deadline totally
artificial.
Informed 2 processes at work: national level and global (IPCC).
1st workshop scheduled for October 1989; 2nd will be U.S.
workshop for IPCC. U.S. objective to slow down push for policy;
focus on research, but UNEP setting up small group with WMO.
Norway says they need a lot of basic ideas by Spring 1990.(!!)
Background, cont’d. 1
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Nor. Min. Envir. wants to know: what should be in legal
instrument? How phase? What should be left out? What
changed from usual approaches--Montreal Protocol vs more
elaborate? But remember: “The more elaborate the attempt, the
less the productivity of the global level”
[Life is complicated]. NME not sharing Brundtland (PM) view.
Not in favor of rush to regulate by treaty. Not sold on GLOBAL
treaty; don’t want to repeat UNCLOS III experience. Sees Nor.
PM & MFA as problems, but constrained to support PM initiative.
ELM & Nor. Colleagues say we can’t meet their deadlines. Just
starting project; applications to GCC regime the 2nd stage.
Reality Check, cont’d. 2
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Back in U.S. ELM asked by State Dept. to react to Canadian (&
Elliott Richardson) push for “Law of the Atmosphere”
Conference, similar to recently completed UNCLOS III. ELM
arguing strongly against.
Reasons: GCC problem the ultimate collective action problem-rife with Prisoner’s Dilemma situations. This combined with long
time scale & vertical disintegration of policy problems. Result is
both international system as whole & treaty negotiation under
those conditions = Pandora’s box. Gridlock the most likely
outcome. Even if able to get outcome eventually, governed by
Law of the Least Ambitious Program.
Objectives of Parts II & III of Study
with Norwegians
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Expectation that Part I would yield understanding of
determinants & dynamics of achieving increasing levels of int’l.
collaboration & relative effectiveness of joint action on int’l.
collective goods problems involving large ingredients of S & T.
On that basis, apply findings to elaborating combination of
strategies/incentives to be devised for achieving adequate levels
of joint action re GCC.
Strategies to be derived from two sources: Axelrod. The Logic
of Cooperation, (1984) & Keohane. “Reciprocity in International
Relations”, (1986).
Axelrod (1986)
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3 central questions: 1. Under what conditions will cooperation
emerge in a world of egoists w/o central authority? 2. What type
of strategy can thrive in a variegated environment containing
players using a wide diversity of more or less sophisticated
strategies? 3. Once a cooperative strategy established, how
resist invasion by less cooperative strategies?
Axelrod’s findings show that two conditions necessary &
sufficient for emergence of cooperation in PD situations:
existence of norm of reciprocity (individual perceptions of self
interest) & repetitive interactions between players over long time
horizons (long shadow of the future).
Axelrod. Changing the Strategic
Interaction Pattern
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If interaction repetitive, TIT FOR TAT strategy most robust, i.e.,
begin with cooperation & then respond with whatever the other
player did on the previous move. Retaliation can take many
forms; defection doesn’t always have to be paid back in same
coin.
Strategic setting can be transformed by:a). making the future
more important than present through making interactions either
more durable/and or more frequent; b) changing payoffs to
players such that long-term incentive for cooperation becomes
greater than short-term incentive for defection; c). teaching
players facts, values, & skills that will promote cooperation, i.e.,
changing perceptions of self interest.
Keohane’s (1986) Test of Axelrod: International
Trade Policy in 19th & 20th Centuries
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Reciprocity has two distinct meanings: “…situations in which specified partners
exchange items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence”, called
specific reciprocity; & situations where “…the definition of equivalence is less
precise, where one’s partners may be viewed as a group rather than as
particular actors, and the sequence of events is less narrowly bounded”, called
diffuse reciprocity, e.g., the EU “bubble” in the Kyoto negotiations.
Diffuse reciprocity better fits situations in which “…sequential negotiations will
take place in the context of extensive interdependence”--like re GCC.Specific
reciprocity not a compelling strategy because retaliation for defection threatens
achievement of collective good, risks denunciation by other parties, & may
increase benefits to party responding to defection only marginally.
Diffuse reciprocity may be more effective in situations representing the dilemma
of common aversions rather than the PD, e.g., Montreal Protocol. Objective of
former to establish stable equilibria rather than worrying about cheating &
compliance.
Miles’ Caveat re Axelrod & Keohane
re GCC Case
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“All of these suggestions take on particular power when one realizes that the
process of regulation vis-à-vis the global change problem will indeed be cast in
the form of iterated games where not only is state action contingent upon
choices made by others, but not acting in a timely fashion will also generate its
own perils. These perils will loom larger as knowledge accumulates. The moral
responsibility of doing something to reduce that peril will be a powerful goad to
action over time and give room for social pressures to be brought to bear. At the
same time, we recognize that different actors may be playing different games
and that the problem of global climate change is malign”. [cf. EU vs US].
White (1989): The GCC problem a classic dilemma of policy formulation
involving possibly severe but unknown levels of risk of undesirable
consequences; great uncertainty about causes, costs, & consequences; &
consequences will be visited on future generations unevenly.
Miles’ Anticipation of a “Hard Regulation”
Approach in 1991
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“Hard regulation” may not be politically feasible because scope of effort would
be too large.
Would involve clear global agreement on standard or standards of GHG
concentrations. This very difficult to do given painful cost implications for AICs &
adverse impacts to economies.
Negotiation of freely transferable quotas between states (emissions trading) &
within states between firms. This very complex undertaking & will take time.
Negotiation of a monitoring/surveillance system; effective enforcement
provisions; & a dispute settlement procedure.
All of the above will entail an extremely difficult, time-consuming process (>1-2
decades). In interim, few ameliorative actions may be taken. Decision process
itself would be very uncertain (Pandora’s Box); & the Law of the Least Ambitious
Program would be dominant.
Additional Problems re Hard
Regulation
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Level of ignorance re GCC problem in all its aspects
very high.
World community faced with combination of high
complexity & great uncertainty re physical process
and re magnitude & timing of impacts.
Under those conditions, setting hard targets
essentially an arbitrary exercise.
Need to let research process work its way forward,
but that need not stop all attempts to regulate.
If Hard Global Regulation Not Possible, What
Are the Alternatives?
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Assess in detail possibility of pursuing “soft regulation” in decentralized
fashion as strategy for buying time in face of uncertainty.
“Soft regulation” = avoiding clear standards, precise goals, & firm targets.
Seek to initiate process combining diffuse & specific reciprocity strategies
between OECD members, the USSR [now Russia], Central Europe [avoid
coal], China, & India, & eventually the Third World.
Begin process in OECD group. Significant reductions in emissions would
leave room for growth for Third World w/o necessity of triggering major
confrontation in global setting. [Use carbon tariffs on trade as penalty].
Process requires heavy reliance on side payments vis-à-vis Russia, China,
& Third World, in addition to epistemic communities & building of
consensual knowledge [the IPCC].
Design decision process to maximize learning potential over time to build
confidence participants would need for iterative rounds of cuts, [cf. LRTAP].
Miles’ Alternatives, cont’d.
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As part of preparatory process seek answers to following
questions:
On what scale does regulation have to proceed? Since group
size is an important criterion, what can effectively be done on a
regional as opposed to a global basis?
Is it possible to mute the potential North/South dimension to
conflict by initially focusing most regulatory action on the North?
What strategies are available for ensuring maximum
participation with the least potential for conflict?
How can states most effectively appraise the performance of
decentralized actions so that they can have confidence that the
standards are being met?
Outcome
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Proposal presented to Dept. of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, (External).
State (and CIA) initially excited by the ideas. Contract
moving through process. Then Major policy shift in
Bush I Administration; whole initiative killed by
Sunnunu in Sept. 1991. [See Miles, 1999].
Miles’ Conclusions re Process by 1994
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Mitigation, i.e., reducing emissions not likely to yield significant
benefits in short run as result of magnitude of required pain &
“law of the least ambitious program” in international
negotiations.
Mitigation likely to yield significant benefits only if built into 2X
change in lifecycle of energy systems in next 100 years.
Therefore, an equally important governmental response to GCC
in short term is planning for adaptation to the consequences
(impacts) of climate change. Two ingredients critical: rate of
change & governmental capacity to learn.
Fast-forward to the Present
Dealing with the Consequences of a Failed
Initial Global Approach at Control of GCC
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What failed? System design in Art. 2, FCCC (see next slide)
because assumption of linearity in generation of impacts false.
Earth’s climate system highly nonlinear, consequently probability
of extreme effects of different levels of GCC increases. Larger
than expected impacts come faster than expected; lot of
thresholds involved. Thresholds amplify rates of change & often
shift systems into new states.
Kyoto also failed even before US rejection given dynamics of
Law of the Least Ambitious Program as predicted by Miles &
evaluated by Bolin ( 1998).
Residue of US rejection of Kyoto requiring turn around in US
policy re GCC to demonstrate credibility. But US leadership
absolutely necessary for a decentralized strategy to work; plus
fact that US accounts for 25% of global emissions.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC), Art. 2
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The ultimate objective of this Convention …is to achieve…stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to
proceed in a sustainable manner.
[Severe problems with this formulation: 1. Stabilization not the most
appropriate objective; 2. No single measure of “dangerous
interference” exists; 3. Assumptions about time to significant impacts
false because ignoring internal feedbacks, nonlinearities, and
thresholds in earth’s climate system].
Technical Implications of Kyoto Protocol: Comments
of Prof. Bert Bolin, Chair of IPCC, Nature,16 Jan.
1998
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Within “basket”, increase of CO2 alone accounting for 70% of total increase of
radiative forcing. Not many measures available for decreasing CH4 & Nox. Other
components contribute only few % to radiative forcing.
Even with full compliance of Protocol, by 2010 AICs still contributing 4X CO2
emissions of LDCs.
Even with full compliance, accumulated emissions of CO2 from 1990 to 2010 =
140Gt C, implying increase in atmospheric concentration by ~29ppmv to
382ppmv.
The Kyoto Conference did not achieve much with respect to limiting the buildup
of GHG in atmosphere.
US (Bush II) rejecting agreement. For Protocol to be functional, EU needing
Japan & Russia to sign & ratify. Side deal made with Russia re admission to
WTO. Japan requiring watering down of compliance provision. No penalties for
non-compliance. By 2006 compliance low generally.
Victor. 2001. The Collapse of the Kyoto
Protocol
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Main impediment to effective international policy to the GW problem is
lack of a viable architecture for international cooperation.
Targets & timetables constitute fundamental flaws in the regulatory
system for controlling emissions. Latter vary with economic growth &
technological change. Rigidity of targets & timetables make them
unresponsive to former.
Emissions trading meant to compensate firm, reduce costs of
compliance, & provide flexibility. Allocation permits worth hundreds of
billions of $. Integrity of system requires compulsory membership of all
the major players, but system can’t guaranty that.
Montreal Protocol the wrong template to apply. Global warming a
fundamentally different type of problem.
Alternative View of Ted Parson. 2002. “Breaking the
Policy Deadlock on Climate Change: A New Role for
Technology Assessment”, Issues in Science and
Technology, (Summer)
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Montreal Protocol highly successful but not because problem uniquely benign.
Policy deadlock for 10 years. Reasons for success different.
1988 organization of Technology Assessment Panel operating differently from
others. Dominated by representatives of firms, using knowledge of technology
and what firms could and would adopt to solve the problem.
Problem solving capability of the panel greater than even that of the largest firm.
Representation providing expertise, but not to extent that swallowed up by interfirm rivalries.
Firms could get help meeting regulatory controls in a highly feasible way based
on expert knowledge. “…[T]echnology assessments have much greater
capability to alter the reality they are assessing….”
Lack of such a capability in IPCC & FCCC a serious design flaw.
…Comes Around!
Trigger for Starting Over
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OECD participants now convinced the Kyoto Protocol cannot
produce effective solutions, perceive that urgency of problem
has increased, & are prepared to pursue less than global
pathway.
Return to the Buying Time Option: EU
Vision
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Preferences are for eschewing search for immediate global agreement
and shift to decentralized, coordinated policy agreements beginning in
OECD group, with or without formal legal arrangements at initial stage.
Would require formal agreement on monitoring & reporting system to
create transparency.
Would also require coordinated agreement on carbon taxes &
approaches to carbon sequestration, particularly from coal-fired power
& industrial plants.
Would require US leadership which becoming increasingly possible.
Significant bottom-up shift in policy views at city, state, & industry levels
in view of rate and magnitude of CC impacts. Split in fundamentalist
coalition on this point in US politically significant.
The more significantly adverse climate change impacts are
experienced, the stronger will be public support for the policies which
are required.
So What Changes Are On The Horizon?
Observations & Conversations, September 2006
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Widespread agreement among high-level government officials,
excluding US, from OECD countries that they shouldn’t try to
renegotiate UNFCCC & Kyoto Protocol in same manner as before.
Would take too long. Developing countries unlikely to accept binding
targets at level satisfying to AICs.
Strong agreement to seek energy security most immediately through
increasing efficiency. For instance, IEA calculating that if all household
appliances made with same capability of laptops (battery capacity for
independent ops.), would save 15GW electricity/yr.
Accept that rejecting global approach means accepting individual/group
approaches among like-minded.
Aware that in next 30 yrs. globally, nuclear power & renewables
providing only c. 10% of global energy needs. So coal is the real option
for the near term. This a huge problem [and why C sequestration req’d.]
Additional Views of Industry re
Future Policy
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Growth in energy use inevitable, world not running out of energy.
Moving beyond conventional resources in the right way is THE
major challenge. There are no silver bullets; lot of different
things have to be done.
Pressing up against the limits of conventional oil & gas
resources, but still room for moving towards unconventional oil
& gas resources, plus coal, nuclear & solar. However, lot of
objectives here contradictory. Application of biology to energy as
yet unexplored. Needs heavy investment.
Don’t wait for global treaty & certainty in science. Industry
should stake out bold positions. Move out of R&D into
demonstration projects at large scale. Accept risks.
Discussion: How to Make Things
Happen?
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Yes, get industry to step out, but what is the appropriate regulatory
environment? And do we move from domestic to regional to global? And does
government leave business to take the full risk of stepping out? To have the
capital to take the risks is necessary for getting the market to work.
Re the regulatory environment, the ideal system would be a global carbon tax,
but how likely is that?
Is energy storage technology a silver bullet, especially for renewables which are
use it or lose it technologies?
Speeding up action resolves into NATIONAL policy, even though it’s a global
problem and the patchwork quilt of outcomes will need to be integrated if we are
to avoid 550ppmv by 2050.
So doubling by 2050 is the best they think we can do, but they’re aware that
such a concentration level means a world of enormous environmental
destruction, given the observable nonlinearities.
Hansen et al. (2006) on the Need to
Act Now
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Earth’s thermal inertia delays the planet’s responses to climate
forcing of different types. Delay provides opportunity to reduce
magnitude of anthropogenic climate change before fully
realized. Can do on timescale of 5 decades. The longer
mitigation delayed, the more difficult to avoid magnitude of
change.
New measurement of net climate forcing, i.e., difference
between energy emitted & absorbed = 0.75W/m2 ± 0.15W/m2.
This a large imbalance in history of planet.
Imbalance, combined with warming already “in pipeline”,
complicates task of avoiding any specified level of climate
change. Near term anticipatory actions of critical importance.
Conclusions: Transportable Design
Elements
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Need for flexibility & responsiveness in control structure. Utility
of iterative assessments of state of problem and of regime
performance in context of high transparency.
Deliberate mechanisms which facilitate learning & for linking that
learning to policy formulation & revision.
NGOs should be able independently to evaluate governmental
performance.
Find the most appropriate architecture for international
collaboration.
Adopt a management approach to enforcement.
Epistemic communities & political entrepreneurs may be more
important at the beginning but the importance of national and
international administrative communities grows with time.
But Consider Following Points from Discussion of
Kennedy School Global Environmental
Assessments Project, May 1999
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With the ozone problem, the important interface with decision makers is
technology, not science.
If one accepts that technological fixes exist to environmental problems
and that experts can be left alone to find solutions based on market
acceptability [TEAP], then the role of science is to demonstrate that
there is an environmental imperative and that technology has the
solution.
Economic models are not very good at anticipating technological
innovation, so the only real test is market acceptability. TEAP
successful because only those executives who made those kinds of
decisions could participate. Companies that did not have technological
options were deliberately excluded from participation.
Who is excluded a very important question--has impacts both on the
framing of the issue & the urgency with which it is pursued.
How Imminent is Action?
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Not clear , although interesting re-alignment of forces under
way.
Forces for Delay:
The Org. filter--Dynamics of Bureaucracy
Perceptions of winners & losers within & between nations
Slow rate of environmental change
Forces for Change
Fast rate of change
Governmental capacity to learn
So we shall see