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Transcript
The
Climate
Institute
Beyond the limits:
Australia in a 1.5-2°C world
Beyond the limits
Australia in a 1.5-2°C world
August 2016
Contents
Key Points
1
Limiting warming to 1.5-2°C is in Australia’s interests
2
Role of the Paris Agreement
objectives
3
Australia’s Paris carbon budget
4
Implications for Australia’s national
emissions targets
6
Implications for the energy sector
8
Policy implications
Creating change takes leadership. We need people to
lead: individuals, communities, investors and business
leaders. We need people from all walks of like to step
forward and join us as leaders of change.
DONATE
10
This policy brief was written by Erwin Jackson, with contributions from
other staff of The Climate Institute.
www.climateinstitute.org.au/donate
Image Credits
Cover image: Cover Image: Nick Pitsas/CSIRO licensed under CC BY 3.0.
Page 2: XL Catlin Seaview Survey.
Page 8: Michael Hall, The Climate Institute Creative Fellow 2012-14.
Design The Climate Insitute Platform GLIDER
Key Points
In response to recent developments in both climate science and international climate
commitments, The Climate Institute commissioned Climate Analytics1 to examine the impacts
on Australia of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C and 2°C, and to provide estimates of the
global carbon budgets associated with achieving these temperature limits.
This policy brief outlines some of the implications for Australia. It is based on Climate Analytics’
findings, explained in their report, Implications of the 1.5°C limit in the Paris Agreement for
climate policy.
1 The Paris Agreement defines the long-term objective
of collective action to limit global warming to
“well below” 2°C above pre-industrial levels and
pursue action to limit warming to 1.5°C. To achieve
these goals, countries agreed to achieve net zero
emissions. Australia has signed this agreement
and has stated it will seek to ratify it by the end of
2016. It has also committed to examine a long-term
emissions pathway in 2017.
2 Climate change is already having costly and
dangerous impacts. Warming above 1.5-2°C
would have profoundly damaging consequences
for Australia. Even warming of 1.5°C would have
significant extra costs. If the world warms by 1.5°C,
currently rare climate related extremes (extreme
heatwaves, unusual dry spells, extreme rainfall,
massive global coral bleaching events) would become
the new normal. If global mean warming were to
reach 2°C, the climate system would move into
uncharted territory.
3 By
defining a long-term temperature objective, the
Paris Agreement has implicitly defined the total net
amount of heat trapping greenhouse gas emissions
the world can release. This amount is termed a
carbon budget.2 National budgets can be determined
by weighing up scientific, ethical and economic
factors. If Australia is to play its part in global efforts to
limit warming to 1.5-2°C, a mid-range carbon budget
of around nine billion tonnes between 2015-2050
would need to be targeted. Australia would need to
achieve net zero emissions well before 2050. If it does
not update its current 2030 target, to remain within
this carbon budget, Australia would need to reduce
emissions to zero within around five years after 2030.
4 The
sustained decarbonisation of Australia’s
electricity sector is necessary to meet the Australian
carbon budget. Electricity decarbonisation is a
strategic priority because it is the biggest source
of emissions, has a multitude of technological
options available to reduce emissions, and is a key
to decarbonising other sectors (e.g. zero emissions
electric vehicles and buildings). If Australia fails
to decarbonise electricity, we would only be able
to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement by
requiring other economic sectors to reduce emissions
more significantly and/or by placing a greater reliance
on carbon sequestration. For example, if electricity
emissions were only to decline in line with the current
2030 overall national target (26-28 per cent below
2005 levels), the transport and other major carbon
emitting sectors would have to reduce emissions
to around 40 per cent below 2005 levels in 2030 to
meet a credible national carbon budget.
5 The
government has committed to review Australia’s
climate policy framework and to consider a long-term
emissions pathway in 2017. This is the first major
opportunity to align Australia’s policy settings with the
Paris Agreement objectives to which Australia has
committed. Key outcomes from this review should
include:
+ A legislated 2050 emissions reductions target,
based on a carbon budget consistent with the
objectives of the Paris Agreement.
+ Development of a stronger and more
comprehensive domestic policy framework
capable of delivering a credible emissions pathway
to the 2050 target. An inclusive economic and
community strategy to steadily replace our existing
coal fired generation with clean energy over the
next 20 years will need to be a core element of this
long-term plan.
•1
Limiting warming to 1.5-2°C is
in Australia’s interests
At the twenty-first Conference of Parties in Paris in
2015, over 190 governments decided to adopt the
Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).3 The
agreement has since been signed by around 180
countries, including Australia.
new normal. If global mean warming were to reach 2°C,
the climate system would move into uncharted territory.
Overall, warming of 1.5-2°C would have very significant
and costly impacts on Australia, its region and the
world. Limiting long-term warming to around 1.5°C
would reduce these risks, particularly those associated
with changes to climate extremes and their impacts on
communities, health systems and coral reefs. Failure
to limit warming to 1.5-2°C presents unmanageable
risks and costs to human health, natural systems,
infrastructure and economies.
The objective of this agreement is:
“Holding the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2°C above pre- industrial
levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels ...”
As the recent impacts of climate change demonstrate,
Australia is very exposed to climate change.4 If the world
warms by 1.5°C, currently rare climate related extremes
(extreme heatwaves, unusual dry spells, extreme rainfall,
massive global coral bleaching events) would become the
Australia’s long-term interests lie in limiting climate change
in line with the Paris Agreement’s objectives. Therefore,
the speedy implementation of the Paris Agreement is in
our national interest. As is the acceleration of domestic
policy responses in each country, including our own, to
deliver on the objectives of the agreement.
6
Table 1: Estimated impacts of climate change for 1.5-2°C scenarios.
Impact
1.5°C
2°C
Implications
Coral reefs
Severe impacts; some potential
for limited adaptation remains
Virtually all tropical coral reefs will
be severely degraded
Major impacts on natural
systems, regional economies and
food supply
Heat extremes
On average, south and central
Australia would experience
heatwaves of two weeks of
the year; heatwave length for
the northern regions would be
around a month
Extreme heatwaves are much
more severe than current
experience and occur annually.
Heatwave length extends to
about 3 weeks in south and
central Australia, and around two
months in the north
Impacts on human health as well
as labour productivity
Water availability
Declines (~10 per cent) across
most of Australia (more severe
in west); up to 30 per cent
reductions in some scenarios
Greater declines across southern
Australia. Up to 40 per cent
reductions in some scenarios
Combined with temperature
changes, impacts on agricultural
productivity, water supplies, and
bushfire risk
Sea level rise
~40cms to 2100; declining rates
of sea-level rise towards the
end of the 21st century reduce
the long-term sea-level rise
commitment; risks to multi-metre
increases still exist due to loss of
ice from major ice sheets
~50cms to 2100; multi-metre
sea-level rise commitment over
centuries to come
Long-term impacts on coastal
infrastructure and settlements;
regional displacement of lowlying communities
•2
In setting national emissions reductions targets, countries
are expected to consider their role in limiting warming to
1.5-2°C. For example:
+ Article 3 of the agreement outlines that all countries are
to undertake and communicate progressively stronger
emissions reductions with a view to limiting global
average temperature to below 1.5-2°C above preindustrial levels.
+ Targets will be updated every five years and informed
by the outcomes of the global stocktakes (Article 4.9).
+ These stocktakes will examine collective efforts
towards limiting warming to 1.5-2°C (Article 14) and net
zero emissions.
+ Beyond short-term targets, countries are expected
to define long-term emissions strategies to 2050 that
take into account the objectives of the agreement
(Article 4.19). Australia has committed internationally to
consider its long-term emissions pathway as part of
the 2017 domestic climate policy review.7
+F
urther rules for the communication of national targets
and how they relate to the objectives of the agreement
will be developed over the coming years.
In this context, it is critical to note that the only way
global temperatures can be limited to 1.5-2°C is if the
total cumulative emissions are capped. Scientists have
calculated the amount of emissions that can be released
before global temperatures increase by 1.5, 2, 3 or more
degrees. This is commonly called a "carbon budget".
By defining a long-term temperature objective, the Paris
Agreement has implicitly defined a global carbon budget.
It is up to each individual country to define its fair part of
this budget. However, if one country does less, others
have to do more to keep total emissions within the overall
objective. Countries are increasingly examining how
others are contributing to global efforts. Diplomatic and
economic pressure on each country to ensure it is doing
its share, and not free riding on the efforts of others, can
therefore only grow.
In advancing their initial post-2020 emissions targets,
countries were expected to justify their targets against
the objective of limiting warming to less than 2°C.8 Many
countries did this, although others, including Australia,
did not.9 Under its current proposal, Australia’s per capita
emissions in 2030 would be around three times higher
than global per capita emissions benchmarks that are
consistent with Paris Agreement objectives (Figure 1).
FIGURE 1
G20 countries’ per capita emissions in 2030, compared with the per capita emissions range associated with Paris Agreement.
18
16
14
12
10
8
HIGH INCOME
COUNTRIES
6
MIDDLE TO LOW
INCOME COUNTRIES
4
2
2030 GLOBAL PER CAPITA
EMISSIONS CONSISTENT
WITH 1.5-2°C
U
K
In
di
a*
EU
Ita
Fr ly
an
ce
Br
a
M zil
ex
ic
o
lia
a
Au
st
ra
bi
C
a
Ar nad
g
So en a
ut tin
a
h
Af *
ric
a
Tu *
rk
ey
So
ut US
h
Ko A
re
a*
C
hi
na
Ja
G pan
er
m
In an
do y
ne
si
a
Sa
ud
iA
ra
si
a
0
Ru
s
Emissions per capitta (tCO2 e per person)
20
*Excludes LULUCF
•3
Image: CIAT - Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0)
Role of the Paris Agreement
objectives
Australia’s Paris carbon budget
The analysis below, based on the latest research and
the report by Climate Analytics,13 updates The Climate
Institute’s recommended carbon budget for Australia and
discusses the implications for the post-2020 emissions
targets currently proposed by both major political parties
in Australia.
Updating Australia’s carbon budgets
In defining a carbon budget for Australia, two key
questions need to be addressed:
1 What global carbon budget should be set?
This decision includes consideration of the level of
probability that any given carbon budget would limit
warming to a certain level.14 Other considerations
include whether the budget should be based on all
greenhouse gases or just carbon dioxide (CO2) and
what role the anthropogenic drawdown of greenhouse
gases will play.15 The latter is often called negative
emissions or carbon dioxide removal (CDR) (See box).
2 What is Australia’s equitable contribution to
global action? Since 1850, Australia has been the
14th largest contributor to global greenhouse gas
emissions.16 Australia also has relatively high per
person emissions when compared to other nations.
This means that, individually, we contribute more to
the problem than others.17 In addition, Australia is a
wealthy, advanced economy with strong capacity to
reduce our emissions.18 Over the last few decades,
many approaches have been suggested for defining
the role individual countries should take in meeting
global climate objectives. These approaches take into
account factors like historical responsibility for climate
change, technical potential and capacity to reduce
emissions, as well as other factors.19
Box 1: 1.5-2°C - Decarbonisation and
the role of negative emissions
The characteristics of energy sector transformation
for scenarios that limit warming to below both 1.5°C
or 2°C are similar.20 The major difference is that,
under 1.5°C, the global decarbonisation of the energy
system needs to be faster and more pronounced.
If the world is to get onto a 1.5-2°C pathway over
the next 15 years, it is critical that deployment of
renewable energy becomes more rapid and other
low and zero emission energy supply technologies
are deployed. This will also require the retirement of
existing emission-intensive energy infrastructure, like
coal fired generation, and upscaling highly efficient
energy technologies.
Post-2030, in existing emission scenarios that
achieve both 1.5°C or 2°C, technologies that remove
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere will play a
significant role. If the Paris Agreement’s long-term
temperature goal is to be met, the physical presence
of such high concentrations of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere means some level of negative
emissions is virtually unavoidable at this stage, even
with very rapid emissions reductions between now
and 2050.
These negative emissions technologies include
bioenergy with carbon, capture and storage (bioCCS), or direct air capture. Both could directly
withdraw carbon dioxide from the atmosphere
and store it on geological timescales. The Climate
Institute has previously assessed the role these
technologies could play in meeting an Australian
carbon budget.21 Used appropriately, this research
found that negative emissions technologies, could
play a significant role in Australia, with a capacity
to remove and displace up to 65 million tonnes of
carbon dioxide annually by 2050.
However, given the uncertainties as to whether
negative emissions technologies can be deployed
at the required scale, policy should aim to minimise
the need for their use. It is therefore critical that
the initial, and most urgent focus should be on
the rapid deployment of renewable and other
low or zero carbon energy systems, as well as
rapid improvements in energy efficiency and the
electrification of transport systems.
•4
Image: CIAT - Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0)
Prior to Paris, a number of national carbon budgets were
developed for Australia. In 2013, The Climate Institute
released a policy paper to inform the development of an
Australian carbon budget.10 The development of such
a carbon budget was required as part of the Climate
Change Authority’s (CCA) report on national emissions
targets.11 The Climate Institute reviewed the various
approaches to setting national carbon budgets and
concluded the CCA should set a carbon budget to 2050
that is consistent with a high probability of limiting global
warming to less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. This
carbon budget should also hedge against the possibility
of even more ambitious action in the future (e.g. such as
a commitment to the 1.5°C global goal that was under
consideration within the UNFCCC at the time). This
approach was largely mirrored in the CCA’s final report.12
FIGURE 2
Mid range Australian emissions budget and pathway consistent with limiting warming to 1.5-2°C. Current and proposed emissions
targets are also illustrated.22
800
Emissions (Mt CO2-e)
700
600
500
400
300
200
0
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
HISTORIC
1.5-2°C EMISSIONS PATHWAY
2020 TARGET
PROJECTED
1.5-2°C CARBON BUDGET
GOVERNMENT TARGET
ALP TARGETS
To define Australia’s carbon budget The Climate Institute
has:
1 Used a global carbon budget that gives a high chance
(>85 per cent) of limiting warming to less than 2°C and
leaves open the option of limiting warming to 1.5°C
by the end of the century (>50 per cent chance).23
Budgets focused only on limiting warming to less than
2°C are not necessarily consistent with the totality
of the Paris Agreement’s objectives: for example, a
budget with a >66 per cent chance of limiting warming
to less than 2°C would give a low chance of limiting
warming to 1.5°C by 2100.24 Emissions reduction
scenarios that limit warming to 1.5°C by 2100 with a
higher than even chance are currently not available.25
Together, these assumptions imply a carbon budget for
Australia of around nine billion tonnes between 20152050. Based on current emissions projections, Figure 2
shows the linear reductions in emissions from 2020 that
would achieve this carbon budget. The overall carbon
budget from 2015 to 2050 is also illustrated. To play its
equitable part in limiting warming to 1.5-2°C, Australia
would need to achieve net zero emissions before 2050.
If more credible action had been taken to limit emissions
before 2020, this pathway would not be as steep.
2 Used a mid-range estimate of the emissions reductions
that developed nations would undertake if they
were playing their part in global action to meet the
objectives of the Paris Agreement.26 Depending on
your point of view, this approach may seem overly
generous or onerous for Australia. For example, this
would see Australia use around 0.7 per cent of the
global carbon budget. This is less than the nation’s
current contribution to global emissions, but still
twice Australia’s share of the global population. No
single approach will give an adequate measure of the
contribution a country should take to global action.27 In
this context, using a mid-range estimate is appropriate.
A more extensive range of possible approaches is
outlined in the Appendix.
•5
Image: CIAT - Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0)
100
Implications for Australia’s
national emissions targets
Australia’s initial post-2020 emissions reductions target
is 26-28 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030. As noted
above, the government also made an international
commitment to consider a longer-term target in 2017.
Australia’s initial offer is not consistent with the objectives
of the Paris Agreement and is out of step with our
international peers.28
As part of the process agreed to in Paris, the government
will need to reconsider and resubmit its 2030 target by no
later than early 2020.
The Australian Labor Party (ALP) has committed to a
target of at least 45 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030
and net zero emissions by 2050. The party has also
committed to set a 2025 target within a year of office.
These targets are significantly more credible than the
government’s, but would still exceed the carbon budget
by 15 per cent.
Figure 3 illustrates post-2030 emissions pathways that
would be consistent with the Paris objectives if the
government does not revisit its current 2030 target. With
no access to negative emissions, post-2030 emissions
need to fall to net zero emissions in around five years
to stay within the carbon budget. Even with access to
substantial emissions offsets, national emissions would
still need to fall very sharply and reach zero in the early
2040s. After this point, national emissions would need
to be negative, with around 1,600 million tonnes either
sequestered in carbon stores or purchased from other
countries. This is around three years of current annual
emissions.
The ALP’s current target provides a more credible
pathway for Australia to contribute to the objectives of the
Paris Agreement (Figure 4), assuming it is revisited when
the party sets a 2025 target as it has committed.
Considering the current 2030 targets of our major political
parties, the government’s target would result in nearly
90 per cent of the budget being used by 2030, while the
ALP’s target would result in around 80 per cent. In both
cases, due to Australia’s weak 2020 target, around 40
per cent of the budget is used over the next five years.
•6
FIGURE 3
Post-2030 emissions pathways to meet a 1.5-2°C carbon budget.
800
700
600
500
300
200
100
0
-100
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
-200
-300
-400
HISTORIC
1.5-2°C EMISSIONS PATHWAY
PROJECTED
1.5-2°C EMISSIONS PATHWAY (INCLUDE OFFSETS)
GOVERNMENT TARGET
1.5-2°C CARBON BUDGET
FIGURE 4
ALP post-2025 emissions pathways to meet a 1.5-2°C carbon budget.
800
700
Emissions (Mt CO2-e)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
-100
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
-200
HISTORIC
1.5-2°C EMISSIONS PATHWAY
PROJECTED
1.5-2°C EMISSIONS PATHWAY (INCLUDE OFFSETS)
GOVERNMENT TARGET
1.5-2°C CARBON BUDGET
•7
Image: CIAT - Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0)
Emissions (Mt CO2-e)
400
Implications for the energy sector
The burning of coal, oil and gas remains the largest
contributor to climate change.29 In Australia, the carbon
dioxide emitted through the combustion of these fuels
accounts for around 65 per cent of national emissions.30
Limiting warming to 1.5-2°C requires emissions from
these sources to reach zero before total greenhouse gas
emissions. This is because:
1 Increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentrations have the largest impact on the
climate system and this greenhouse gas stays in the
atmosphere for a long time.31 It can take centuries
for a tonne of carbon dioxide released today to be
sequestered by natural processes and for atmospheric
concentrations to fall back to more natural levels.
In contrast to global trends, Australia’s current policy
framework is encouraging emissions from the energy
and electricity sector to increase, not decrease.33 For
example, total energy sector carbon dioxide emissions
in China and the USA have fallen in recent times.
Recent modelling by The Climate Institute examined
the impact of a range of policies on electricity sector
emissions and the implications of these policies for
achieving an overall carbon budget.34 This research
found that a policy package that actively supports both
clean energy investment and the orderly replacement of
our aging coal fired power stations can better manage a
timely transition to a cleaner electricity supply.
2 Achieving decarbonisation of the energy system,
particularly electricity, is a prerequisite for achieving net
zero emissions across other parts of the economy. In
the absence of a zero emissions electricity system, it
will be difficult to achieve net zero emissions through
the transport, building and other sectors. For example,
electric vehicles, buildings and aluminium smelters
powered by clean energy are in themselves critical
components of a net zero emissions economy.32
•8
FIGURE 5
Electricity sector emissions as share of national carbon budget under different scenarios.
50
Percentage
40
30
20
CURRENT SHARE OF
NATIONAL EMISSIONS
0
Weak Carbon Signal
Clean in,
Carbon out
Clean in,
Carbon out (low demand)
Here we use three of the scenarios from this analysis to
examine the impacts of electricity policies on Australia’s
overall carbon budget:
1 Weak carbon signal: Government implements a
weak carbon signal from 2020. This could be done by
turning the current policy framework into an intensitybased emissions trading scheme. Under this scenario,
the incentive to reduce emissions starts at around $17/
tonne in 2020 and increases to around $40/tonne in
2030.
2 Clean in, Carbon out: In addition to the carbon signal,
policies are put in place to ensure 50 per cent of
electricity is sourced from clean energy by 2030, and
the existing ageing coal-fired generators are steadily
closed over the next 20 years.
Figure 5 illustrates how much of Australia’s carbon
budget, to 2030, each of these scenarios uses and
compares this to the electricity sector’s current share
of emissions.35 It shows that, on its own, implementing
a weak carbon signal in the electricity sector would see
it consume nearly 50 per cent of Australia’s allowable
national emissions to 2030. This is much more than the
sector’s current share of emissions (approximately onethird). To stay within the national carbon budget, other
major carbon emission sources – direct combustion,
transport and land use, land use change and forestry –
would also need to reduce their emissions to around 40
per cent below 2005 levels by 2030. The other scenarios
consume less of the overall carbon budget and therefore
reduce the effort other sectors need to make to achieve
overall climate objectives.
3C
lean in, Carbon out (low demand): Same as the
above, except low grid demand is driven by the greater
uptake of distributed generation and greater energy
efficiency.
•9
Image: CIAT - Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0)
SHARE OF NATIONAL
CARBON BUDGET
10
Policy implications
Australia’s current emissions targets and policy framework are not consistent with the Paris
Agreement’s objectives. The first major opportunity to align Australia’s policy settings with
the commitments we have made will be the review of the domestic policy framework and the
consideration of the long-term emissions pathway the government has committed to in 2017.
Key outcomes from this review should include:
+ Based on a carbon budget consistent with objectives
of the Paris Agreement, legislate a 2050 emissions
reductions target. Defining a clear, and legislated,
commitment to a credible long-term emissions goal,
that has bipartisan support, would give companies
and investors a clearer basis for long-term investment
decisions. This target should:
+c
onsider Australia’s total contribution to global
emissions over the period from 2015-2050, not
just what emissions should be in 2050. Australia’s
contribution to limiting warming to 1.5-2°C is
determined by cumulative emissions, not emissions
in a single year
+m
anage scientific, technological, investment and
other uncertainties by hedging against the risk
that more stringent actions may be required in the
future. Setting a weak target increases the risks that
long-term investments become stranded as action
increases through time.
This indicates that a target of net zero emissions well
before 2050 is warranted. The Climate Institute’s long
standing recommended national targets of -45 per
cent on 2005 levels by 2025, -65 per cent by 2030
and net zero by around 2050 are consistent with this
carbon budget.
+ A domestic policy framework which is fit for the longterm. To achieve net zero emissions, all sectors of the
economy will have a role to play. However, accelerated
decarbonisation of the electricity sector is a strategic
priority because it is the biggest source of emissions,
has a multitude of technological options to reduce
emissions, and is a key to unlocking zero emissions in
other sectors (e.g. zero emissions electric vehicles and
buildings). A policy that starts to systematically retire
existing high-carbon generators and facilitate their
replacement with zero, or near-zero emission energy,
should be central to this approach.
• 10
Endnotes
1. Climate Analytics is a climate science and policy institute
based in Berlin, Germany. Its researchers have been at
the vanguard of climate science and policy analysis at an
international level for over a decade.
2. Note that “carbon budget” may apply to budgets exclusively
of carbon dioxide or of all greenhouse gases. Both
approaches are used in this paper. National budgets include
all greenhouse gases. Implications for the energy sector focus
on the associated carbon dioxide only budget.
3. UNFCCC, 2015, Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement.
4. A. Reisinger, R.L. Kitching, F. Chiew, et al., 2014, Australasia,
in: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects, Contribution of
Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [V.R. Barros,
C.B. Field, D.J. Dokken, et al. (eds.)], Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York.
5. B. Hare, N. Roming, M. Schaeffer, et al., 2016, Implications
of the 1.5°C limit in the Paris Agreement for climate policy,
Climate Analytics, Berlin.
6. Ibid.
7. Government of Australia, 2015, Australia’s Intended National
Contribution: “As a part [the 2017 policy review], the
Government will consider a potential long term emissions
reduction goal for Australia, beyond 2030, taking into account
international trends and technology developments.”
8. UNFCCC, 2014, Decision -/CP.20, Lima call for climate action.
9. UNEP, 2015, The Emissions Gap Report 2015, United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi.
10. The Climate Institute, 2013, Operating in Limits: Defining an
Australian Carbon Budget, Policy Brief, The Climate Institute,
Sydney.
11. CCA, 2014, Reducing Australia’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions
- Targets and Progress Review, Final Report, Government of
Australia/Climate Change Authority, Melbourne.
12. The most significant difference between the two approaches
was that the CCA did not recommend using a global
carbon budget based on keeping open the option of limiting
warming to 1.5°C by 2100. They concluded: “While limiting
global warming to 1.5 degrees is clearly desirable from a
climate change impacts perspective, scenarios consistent
with 1.5 degrees rely even more strongly on large-scale
implementation of negative emissions technology in the
second half of this century. This reliance creates larger
risks that the 1.5 degree target would not be met if such
technologies prove infeasible. Again, this could be reviewed in
light of changing circumstances when Australia considers its
longer term goals.”
13. B. Hare, N. Roming, M. Schaeffer, et al., 2016, op cit.
14. For discussion see: CCA, 2014, op cit.
15. For discussion see: L. Clarke, K. Jiang, K. Akimoto, et al.,
2014, Assessing Transformation Pathways, in: Climate
Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution
of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, [O. Edenhofer,
R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, et al. (eds.)], Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York,
NY, USA.
16. WRI, 2016, CAIT Climate Data Explorer, World Resources
Institute, Washington, D.C.: http://cait.wri.org/
17.Ibid.
18. CCA, 2014, op cit.
19. L. Clarke, K. Jiang, K. Akimoto, et al., 2014, op cit.
20. J. Rogelj, G. Luderer, R. Pietzcker, et al., 2015, Energy system
transformations for limiting end-of-century warming to below
1.5°C, Nature Climate Change 5, 519–527, doi:10.1038/
nclimate2572
21. The Climate Institute, 2014, Moving Below Zero:
Understanding Bio-energy with Carbon Capture & Storage,
The Climate Institute, Sydney.
22. The emissions reductions pathway starts in 2020 based on
the Government’s most recent emissions projections. If 2020
targets are achieved the slope of this pathway would be
slightly less steep and this is reflected in Figures 3 and 4. See
also: Department of Environment, 2015, Tracking to 2020.
An interim update of Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions
projections, Government of Australia, Canberra and
Department of Environment, 2016, Tracking to 2020 - April
2016 update, Government of Australia, Canberra.
23. B. Hare, N. Roming, M. Schaeffer, et al., 2016, op cit.
24. J. Rogelj, G. Luderer, R. Pietzcker, et al., 2015, op cit.
25. Climate Analytics, 2016, op cit.
26. Based on mid-range of OECD 1990 emissions reductions
under scenarios limit atmospheric concentrations of CO2e to
<430 ppm. Assumes Australia reduces emissions from 20102050 in line with the average of all OECD 1990 countries.
For points of comparison budgets based on the range of
methodologies used by the Climate Change Authority are
also shown in Appendix. This gives a range of Australia using
between 0.3 per cent to 1 per cent of the global carbon
budget. See: L. Clarke, K. Jiang, K. Akimoto, et al., 2014,
op cit. and N. Höhne, M. den Elzen, D. Escalante, 2014,
Regional GHG reduction targets based on effort sharing:
a comparison of studies, Climate Policy, 14:1, 122-147, doi:
10.1080/14693062.2014.849452
27. CCA, 2015, Comparing countries’ emissions targets,
Government of Australia/Climate Change Authority,
Melbourne.
28. The Climate Institute, 2016a, 2030 emissions reduction
targets compared, Fact Sheet, The Climate Institute, Sydney.
29. IPCC, 2013, Summary for Policymakers, in: Climate
Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution
of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [T.F. Stocker, D.
Qin, G.-K. Plattner, et al. (eds.)] Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
30. Department of Environment and Energy, 2016, Australian
Greenhouse Emissions Information System, Government of
Australia, Canberra.
31. P. Ciais, C. Sabine, G. Bala, et al., 2013, Carbon and Other
Biogeochemical Cycles, in: Climate Change 2013: The
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change [T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, et
al. (eds.)] Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
32. See for example: ClimateWorks Australia, ANU, CSIRO,
CoPS, 2014, Pathways to Deep Decarbonisation in
2050: How Australia can prosper in a low carbon world:
Technical report, ClimateWorks Australia, Melbourne.
33. See: IEA, 2016, World energy-related CO2 emissions,
International Energy Agency, Paris, and Department of
Environment, 2016, op cit.
34. The Climate Institute, 2016b, A Switch in Time: Enabling
the electricity sector's transition to net zero emissions,
Policy Brief, The Climate Institute, Sydney.
35. This is based on a carbon dioxide only budget as this
is most relevant to fossil fuel based industries. To be
consistent with the other carbon budgets in this policy
brief, this carbon dioxide budget is derived from the same
emissions reductions scenario.
• 11
Appendix
FIGURE 6
Emissions pathways implied by a range of possible Australian carbon budgets.
Current and proposed emissions targets are also illustrated.
800
700
600
500
Emissions (Mt CO2-e)
400
300
200
100
0
-100
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
-200
-300
-400
-500
-600
HISTORIC
MID-RANGE EQUITY
2020 TARGET
PROJECTED
HIGH EQUITY
GOVERNMENT TARGET
LOW EQUITY
HIGH EQUITY
(NO NEGATIVE EMISSIONS)
ALP TARGETS
Figure 6 outlines a range of 2050 emissions pathways
which are based on different approaches to sharing the
global carbon budget. The mid-range equity approach is
the case used in this policy brief. Others include:
1 Low equity: Here Australia’s per capita emissions
converge to a global benchmark of 1.5 tonnes CO2e/
person by 2050. Under this approach, Australia uses
around 1 per cent of the global carbon budget despite
having only 0.3 per cent of the global population.
2 High equity: Australia’s share of the global carbon
budget is proportional to its current share of the global
population. Under this scenario, around 4 billion tonnes
of negative emissions or offsets are required.
3 High equity (no negative emissions): As above, but it
is assumed Australia does not have access to, or use,
the international trade of emissions units, or negative
emissions, to achieve the overall carbon budget.
• 12