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Climate Change, Equity and Emissions Trading1 Introduction Climate change poses a clear and ongoing threat to human well-being. As such, an international climate architecture is urgently needed that will implement effective policies of mitigation (to prevent dangerous climate changes that are still avoidable) and adaptation (to modify human practices to accommodate dangerous climate changes that are unavoidable). There is a growing consensus that to be both efficient and legitimate the emerging architecture must be consistent with the fair and equitable distribution of benefits and burdens across nations and generations. While the relationship between climate equity and climate policy remains quite poorly understood, five principles of equity have emerged (see eg Banuri et al, 1996; Athanasiou and Baer, 2002; Singer, 2002, pp.14-50; Page, 2007). P1 global greenhouse emissions should be stabilised below the point where dangerous climate changes emerge (effective mitigation); P2 policies designed to limit the negative impacts of unpreventable climate change should be efficient and fairly located (fair adaptation); P3 the costs of climate policy should not be so high as to jeopardise existing global poverty reduction goals or universal compliance (global equity); P4 the interests of all countries and generations should be represented in the construction of climate policies (universal participation); P5 the costs of tackling climate change should be distributed equitably (fair burden sharing). The assumption of this paper is that the ethical status of instruments for achieving the goals of global climate policy should focus on their fit with the above five principles. The principles themselves represent a mixture of two basic forms of reasoning about equity. Consequentialist reasoning (key to P1, P2 and P3) evaluates social policies according to their outcomes, such as the extent to which they maximise social welfare, benefit the worst off, or reduce inequality. Procedural reasoning (key to P4 and P5) evaluates social policies in terms of the legitimacy of the way they were selected, for example that the decision-making procedures involved respected the equal status of all parties and that the duties defined reflect the capacities and historical responsibilities of those they bind. In what follows, I outline the key elements of each of the five principles and briefly explore the extent to which emissions trading fits with each. The type of emissions trading I have in mind are specified by ‘cap and trade’ schemes. Such schemes have three main elements. First, an overall limit is placed on the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) to be emitted by those party to the scheme; second, a fixed number of permits are distributed amongst the users (typically firms and states, but on some accounts individual persons) each year which must be surrendered for every metric tonne of CO2 emitted; third, the users are at liberty to trade the emissions permits under their control in order to balance their carbon budgets either by selling excess permits to make a profit or by buying additional permits to meet their budgets if they face high marginal 1 Paper presented to the Swedish Political Science Association Annual Conference, Linköpings Universitet, 19 October 2007. Author details: Ed Page, Department of Politics and International Studies, Warwick University, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK. Email: [email protected]. 2 abatement costs. I take it that, as commonly presented, the ethical value of such schemes is derived from the instrumental benefit of achieving any given global carbon budget at the lowest possible economic cost rather than from any intrinsic value that the scheme itself might possess (Sorrell and Sijm, 2005, p.195; Mehling, 2005). Cap-andtrade schemes can be contrasted with ‘credit mechanisms’ - such as those developed under the Kyoto architecture through Joint Implementation (JI) or the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) - which allow users to gain credits in exchange for investing in emission reduction activities in other countries. P1: A Safe Atmosphere The ‘ultimate aim’ of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is specified by Article 2 as the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ (UN, 1995, p.5). Following Article 2, a central pillar of any viable global climate architecture is that it specifies and enforces a significant regime of climate change mitigation. Perhaps the most common way to interpret Article 2 is in terms of the aggregate benefits for human well-being of staying below a ‘safe’ ceiling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Early accounts suggested that a doubling of CO2 over its pre-industrial level of 280 parts per million might be safe but no more. More recently, it has been claimed that dangerous impacts will swiftly follow if the 450 parts per million CO2 threshold is broken (for the purposes of comparison, global concentrations of CO2 reached 380 parts per million in the atmosphere in 2006 (Alley et al, 2007)). Still others suggest that the focus should be on the impacts of increases in CO2 on key climate variables, such as rises in global temperature or sealevel, rather than their atmospheric determinants. The picture becomes even murkier when other greenhouse gases are brought into the equation, since the current combined atmospheric concentration of the six Kyoto gases has been estimated at roughly 430 parts per million of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) (Alley et al, 2007), which suggests that the lower values for a safe atmosphere quoted by environmentalists, and some social scientists, will be breached within 10 years assuming current emissions rates. Can emissions trading of the cap-and-trade variety serve as a valuable tool in achieving a more modest interpretation of Article 2 in terms of the objective of stabilising atmospheric levels of CO2e below 475 parts per million? There is no straightforward answer to this question either in theory or practice. Theoretically speaking, there is at least some reason to think that climate regimes incorporating global emissions trading will be more likely to achieve this objective than those without. The basic idea is that a global emissions trading mechanism will minimise the costs associated with achieving any prior determined carbon budget by minimising the costs of compliance for all users. Once permits have been distributed, they will, according to conventional economic theory, flow to their highest valued user. Those users who derive less value from the use of their permits than their market value (mostly developing countries) have an incentive to sell them to those that value them more highly (mostly developed countries) with the result that a costless trade-off between efficiency and equity is achieved. Emissions trading, then, provides a mechanism for introducing a global price for carbon and other greenhouse gases thereby facilitating global emissions reductions at the least economic cost for users of the atmosphere (Stern, 2006, pp.371ff). The growing interest in market-based solutions to environmental problems reflects a clear shift away from ‘command-and control’ mechanisms after many years of refinement in theoretical circles (Mehling, 2005; Stewart, 2001). Command-and-control 3 mechanisms (such as mandatory environmental performance targets) are those that ‘depend upon government agencies to define both the goals [of environmental policy] and the means of meeting them’ (Tietenberg, 2005, pp.167-8). Such approaches can be cumbersome and bureaucratic, particularly when applied to environmental problems of the scale of global climate change. They imply that the most efficient approach to climate change would be for a regulatory body to both set and enforce emissions targets over some specified time period for all users of the atmosphere. Yet, if the ultimate goal is the protection of a valuable environmental resource in the most efficient manner possible, and not to fetishise the role of regulatory bodies to frame and deliver valued aims, market-based solutions seem an essential compliment to conventional regulatory measures (Stewart, 2001; Mehling, 2005; Parry, 2005). In practical terms, however, the evidence for the efficiency of emissions trading is mixed both in terms of its historical operation in other sectors and its current operation in the emerging global carbon market dominated by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). It has been suggested that permit trading has lowered compliance costs relative to traditional performance targets, enabled the setting of earlier deadlines for the achievement of environmental objectives, and resulted in environmental objectives being reached more frequently when they have been developed to protect environmental resources such as fish stocks and air quality (Tietenberg, 2005). Evidence from the initial period of the ETS, however, suggests that to be sufficiently popular amongst existing users, any viable trading system will be too toothless to bring about any of these putative benefits. In the case of the ETS, the key limitations have been that: (i) only a small proportion of the possible user-base is included - some 11,000 firms representing less than 50% of the EU’s total CO2 emissions; (ii) household and transport emissions are excluded from the system; (iii) permits were allocated to users without charge according to the ‘grandfathering’ principle thus missing out on possibility of using revenue from allocation to reduce poverty to bolster adaptation funding; (iv) initial targets were far too easy to meet with the result that many users received massive windfalls after selling off excess permits; and (v) users were allowed to raise their prices to reflect the value of the permits which were gained at no cost. Such obvious failings do not, of course, mean that the creation of markets for tradable emissions allowances have no role to play in fulfilling the safe atmosphere principle. But they certainly point to a different set of risks than those arising for command-and-control measures. P2: Effective and Equitable Adaptation Robust policies and mechanisms of climate adaptation are essential to reduce negative impacts that cannot be avoided through mitigation as well as to capture any benefits arising from localised climate change. Among the innovative adaptation possibilities discussed in the literature include the refinement or extension of existing funding streams such as the Global Environmental Fund (GEF) or inaugurating new funding streams such as levies on air travel (Stern, 2007, pp.622ff). Emissions trading is mainly targeted at rendering mitigation more cost effective, yet it may also have a bearing on the effectiveness of adaptation. Although these two components of climate policy are usually treated separately, they are at a deeper level interlinked since measures of adaptation will be more expensive, less effective or potentially futile without corresponding mitigation (Stern, 2007, p.460). Emissions trading, then, by increasing the efficiency of mitigation, could also be expected to reduce the costs of adaptation (Stern, 2007, pp.622ff). Emissions trading provides new opportunities for revenue generation for adaptation that may prove more palatable to 4 key users than direct aid transfers, either through redistribution of the revenue from the initial allocation of permits or through continuous taxation on credit or emissions trading. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, makes provision for an adaptation fund comprised of 2% levy on most CDM transactions. I would suggest that it is a natural move to extend this levy to all cap-and-trade and credit mechanism transactions to harmonise adaptation and mitigation policy. But the sheer scale of the problem means that emissions trading, even on the most optimistic view, can only ease the pain of adaptation. The real challenge is to for such novel mechanisms to join, not supplant, traditional command-and-control regulatory mechanisms (Parry, 2005). Perhaps the boldest approach to this problem of coordination would be to create a new global adaptation fund merging revenue from existing funding streams (such as the GEF and CDM) with a new GDP-based levy on developed countries to reflect their wealth and historical responsibility for climate change. This idea has been discussed briefly by some writers (Stern, 2006, p.628) and could be linked to the principle that each individual has a right to an equal share in the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere. P3: Affordability According to the affordability principle, the adoption of a post-Kyoto climate architecture should not be excessively costly in terms of compliance for existing or subsequent generations. Complex issues arise here as estimating the social and economic impacts of alternative architectures rests on accurate projections of climate change for different levels of CO2 as well as models of development, population growth and migration – all of which are subject to huge uncertainties (Tol, 2002; Stern, 2007). Developing the affordability principle is further complicated by issues of intergenerational equity, sustainable development and global poverty reduction. It seems clear, however, that no architecture that leads to a country being unable to provide for the basic needs of its existing and future citizens as a result of fulfilling climate commitments will generate the necessary allegiance and legitimacy to be viable. Issues of affordability and legitimacy colour all attempts to construct solutions to largescale environmental problems, yet there are two basic elements to the affordability principle that are unique in the case of climate change policy. First, the scale of the problem invites an analysis that goes beyond traditional command-and-control approaches that could involve huge economic and administrative costs (Tietenberg, 2005, pp.167-8). Second, uniquely for an environmental pollution problem, the nature of the greenhouse effect is such that it is irrelevant where cuts in greenhouse gases are made (or by whom) if the fundamental aim is to avoid dangerous climate change. Enthusiasts, of course, claim that cost effectiveness is the real strength of emission trading. Traditional economic theory suggests that a global tradable permits system will lower the overall costs of climate mitigation for all users by encouraging emissions reductions where the marginal cost of abatement is lowest. While it is difficult to put an accurate figure on the benefits of moving to a comprehensive global emissions market, some suggest it could prove as much as 50% cheaper in the long-term than a purely command-and-control approach. Putting aside doubts concerning the many theoretical assumptions made by emissions trading optimists, and the mixed evidence from past trading mechanisms designed to protect the value of other environmental resources, there are more intrinsically ethical issues at stake here. I would argue that to fully evaluate the costs of adopting a global emissions trading mechanism we need to expand the discussion to include the idea of ‘normative costs.’ A clear normative cost of market environmentalist solutions to 5 climate change is that they finesse the question of historical responsibility for the problem’s emergence. Emissions trading may be a cost effective way of reducing global greenhouse emissions but a solution that does not cohere with the ethical convictions of users concerning causal and moral responsibility is not only risky in terms of long-term compliance but also potentially damaging for the self-respect of citizens, particularly existing and future citizens of developing countries. P4: Universal Participation and A Fair Distribution of Political Influence. According to the universal participation principle, members of all countries should be represented in the construction of the global climate architecture and its mechanisms and policies; and while future generations cannot participate directly, their interests should also be taken into consideration at all times. Great practical and conceptual difficulties arise in making the voice of developing countries and future generations heard in the climate policymaking process. One problem concerns the location of the appropriate level of human agency that should be represented, whether it is individual persons, corporations, or nations - or a combination of these (Caney, 2005). Another problem concerns the way in which future agents can be represented when their interests are as yet unclear (Page, 2006). These issues have often been ignored, but are pivotal to the construction of a climate architecture that will be regarded as equitable and efficient in the longer-term. The mechanism of emissions trading seems, at best, quite indirectly linked to participatory concerns. Emissions trading mechanisms are designed to be procedurally fair in the sense that all eligible users have access to the market and can buy and sell allowances according to pre-specified rules. Few argue, however, that emissions trading is an equitable solution to climate change independently of its efficiency in preventing dangerous climate change or that its value can be tied to its emergence from a transparent and open policy debate amongst users of the atmosphere. By contrast, it is clear that all of the Kyoto architecture’s ‘flexible mechanisms’ were championed by a group of disproportionately influential developed countries against the wishes of a number of developing countries (Mehling, 2005); and the introduction of emissions trading through the EU ETS involved little or no public consultation or debate (FEASTA, 2006). Yet, there are some potential advantages in emissions trading from the procedural perspective. First, the benefits of emissions trading mechanisms can be restricted to users operating within countries that have ratified the global climate architecture in order to encourage participation. Second, the emissions trading elements of Kyoto are voluntary in the non-trivial sense that users can opt either to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or purchase permits (or adopt a combination of these strategies over time). It might, therefore, be thought to encourage user autonomy in terms of meeting carbon budgets. Third, emissions trading stops short of privatising the atmosphere in the sense of generating absolute property rights to pollute the atmosphere. Rather, it grants access to the absorptive properties of the atmosphere to a pre-specified degree with the clear implication that more stringent caps on emissions can be adopted by a future architecture without paying full compensation for withdrawing a portion of any party’s authorization to emit. Fourth, emissions trading mechanisms can allow for change in the details and process of permit trading in subsequent rounds in response to new research on science, equity and efficiency. In this way, they are more flexible in responding to the needs and interests of future users than some command-and-control approaches to climate mitigation. Fifth, the user base might be expanded so that emissions permits are 6 distributed equally amongst all living persons so as to reflect the principle of equality in the distribution of the absorptive properties of the atmosphere (FEASTA, 2006). There are two problems, however, which threaten the procedural equity credentials of any emissions trading scheme. The first involves the dangers of transferability. Unrestricted transfer can lead to the concentration of permits into the hands of a minority of users with detrimental effects on social cohesion, competitiveness and equity. Users that accumulate large numbers of permits can use their holdings as leverage to gain economic and political influence over other markets, particularly if they decline to sell excess permits to perceived rivals (Tietenberg, 2005, pp.186ff). The second is the problem of initial allocation. Distributing permits free-of-charge is potentially burdensome for future generations in that it magnified the already influential position of existing generations of users. It is very hard to remove this bias, even in the absence of grandfathering since on all schemes the price of carbon allowances is likely to rise significantly over time. P5: Fair burden sharing According to the fair burden sharing principle, the costs associated with implementing the emerging global climate architecture should be fairly distributed reflecting key norms of global and intergenerational equity. This principle, confirmed in several paragraphs of the UNFCCC, should be adopted for both intrinsically ethical reasons and also because no global climate architecture will succeed in attracting the compliance required in its absence (Neumayer, 2000). There is a clear need, however, to investigate the conceptual and normative basis of the burden sharing principle specified in the UNFCCC according to which the developed countries should shoulder the main burden of climate policy in line with their wealth and special historical-ethical responsibilities (Article 3.1, UNFCCC, 1995, p.5). This is because the notion of ‘common and differentiated responsibility’ can be developed in terms of a focus on three key aspects: (i) a user’s ability to pay a full share of the cost of tackling climate change; (ii) a user’s historical and ongoing responsibility for the emergence of the climate problem; and (iii) the benefits a user derives / has derived from activities that contribute to climate change. A widespread assumption in the literature is that emissions trading is neutral amongst competing accounts of burden sharing. Trading is here conceived as merely a ‘delivery vehicle to help operationalize equity proposals’ (Baumert et al, 2003, p.138) regardless of how equity is defined. Moreover, much of the ethical literature has assumed that the above three approaches converge in identifying the developed countries, cleanly and persuasively, as those responsible for managing and financing climate policy (Shue, 1999; Singer, 2002). However, the subtle differences and conflicts amongst these approaches - as well as the possibility that might be merged into a single approach have yet to be fully explored (Caney, 2005). This problem cannot be resolved here, but I would suggest that there is much to be gained from distinguishing between the method adopted to identify the key burden-bearers from the method adopted to specify the nature of the burden borne. The thought is that while ‘ability to pay’ considerations can be used to identify the users who should shoulder the burdens of tackling climate change, the specific demands we can legitimately make on each user should be specified by a mixture of the ‘historical responsibility’ and ‘beneficiary pays’ principles. A number of issues need further thought, here, but perhaps the most crucial is the initial allocation method. While there has been discussion of the relative efficiency of the alternative methods, there has been much less discussion of the ethical issues involved. 7 This reflects an assumption that the method of allocation has no bearing on the final efficiency of emissions trading to deliver optimal cuts in greenhouse emissions (Stern, 2006, pp.379ff; Baumert et al, 2003). Although many discussions of emissions trading assume a costless trade-off between equity and efficiency, it has been noted that an emissions trading conundrum arises in the face of the initial allocation decision. Put crudely, distributing permits free of charge to the first generation of traders facilitates efficiency by increasing interest in the market while undermining burden sharing equity by increasing spatial and temporal inequality. By contrast, other methods of allocation (such as auctions or lotteries) can be used to enhance burden sharing equity but only at the cost of undermining efficiency by jeopardising the motivational benefits of grandfathering for early adopters. To recap, the advantage of emissions trading is that users who reduce their emissions and sell permits are rewarded for their environmentally sustainable behaviour by revenues from selling their permits. In a sense, this rewards environmental responsibility and so could be seen as enhancing fair burden sharing. However, there are some serious drawbacks. First, emissions trading, in distracting the attention of policymakers away from the issue of who has the responsibility to deal with climate change and towards the issue of how the problem can be most efficiently managed, violates the ‘historical responsibility’ and ‘beneficiary pays’ approaches to burden sharing, and is a very approximate modelling of the ‘ability to pay’ approach even when developing countries are exempted from binding emissions targets. We have already seen that grandfathering has a tendency to create inequitable windfalls for existing, heavily polluting, users (Parry, 2005, pp.234ff; Nash, 2000). Auctioned or lottery-based permits are not subject to this effect but still distract attention from the ethical question of who should shoulder the main burdens. This suggests that emissions trading will be most effective, and achieve most support, when there is no clear or significant differentiated responsibility for the degradation of an environmental resource or where this differentiated responsibility is impossible to translate into policy, neither of which hold in the case of climate change. Second, there is something ethically dubious in allowing key polluters to offset their damaging emissions by purchasing permits from users operating in other nations. It seems to make a mockery of the moral responsibility that polluters have to clear up the mess they make themselves. Whereas it may not make a physical difference to the atmosphere how global greenhouse emissions are reduced, that is, abandoning principles of historical responsibility and shared sacrifice is morally problematic (see Nash, 2000; Sandel, 2005). It will almost certainly be politically problematic as well since no global architecture will achieve the required levels of intergenerational compliance if it is perceived to be morally flawed by large numbers of present and future users of the atmosphere. This, and other problems outlined above, leads me to conclude that conflicts between equity and efficiency cannot be fully resolved by any emissions trading programme. References Alley, R. et al (2007) ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Athanasiou, T. and Baer, P. (2002) Dead Heat: Global Justice and Global Warming (New York: Seven Stories Press). Banuri, T., Göran-Mäler, K., Grubb, M. Jacobson, H.K. and Yamin, F. (1996) ‘Equity and Social Considerations’, in James Bruce et al (eds) Climate Change 1995: 8 Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 79-124. Baumert, K.A., Perkaus, J.F. and Kete, N. (2003) ‘Great Expectations: Can international emissions trading deliver an equitable climate regime?’, Climate Policy, 3, pp.13748. Caney, S. (2005) ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’, Leiden Journal of International Law 18, pp.747-75. Foundation for the Economics of Sustainability (FEASTA) (2006) ‘The Great Emissions Rights Give-Away’, FEASTA Bulletin: 3 March 2006, pp. 1-8 (http://www.feasta.org/documents/newsletters/newsmarch06.htm). Mehling, M. (2005) ‘Emissions Trading and National Allocation in the Members States: An Achilles Heel of European Climate Policy?’, Yearbook of European Environmental Law, 5, pp.113-56. Nash, J.R. (2000) ‘Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowance and the ‘Polluter Pays’ Principle’, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 24, pp.465535. Neumayer, E. (2000) ‘In Defence of Historical Responsibility for Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, Ecological Economics 33, pp.185-92. Paavola, J. and Adger, N.J. (2006) ‘Fair Adaptation to Climate Change’, Ecological Economics, 56(4), pp.594-609. Page, E.A. (2006) Climate Change, Justice and Future Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). Page, E.A. (2007) ‘Equity and the Kyoto Protocol’, Politics, 27(1), pp.8-15. Parry, I.W.H. (2005) ‘Fiscal Interactions and the case for Carbon Taxes over Grandfathered Carbon Permits’, in D. Helm (ed) Climate Change Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.218-37. Sandel, M. (2005) Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Schellnhuber, H.J.(ed) Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change (Cambridge: CUP). Sorrell, S and Sijm, J. (2005) ‘Carbon Trading in the Policy Mix’, in D. Helm (Ed), Climate Change Policy, pp.194-217. Shue, H. (1999) ‘Global environment and international inequality’, International Affairs 75(3), pp.531-45; Singer, P. (2002) One World (London: Yale University Press). Stern, N. (2007) The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Stewart, R.B. (2001) ‘A New Generation of Environmental Regulation’, Capital University Law Review, 29 (2001-2002), pp.21-182. Tietenberg, T. (2005) ‘The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting Commons’, in D. Helm (ed) Climate Change Policy, pp.167-93. Tol, R. S.J. (2002) ‘Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change’, Environmental and Resource Economics 21, pp.47-73. United Nations (1995) UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (London: HMSO).