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Linköping University – Master of International and European Relations Master thesis – 733A27 (30 ECTS) 23/05/2011 Evolving EU climate policy discourses and self‐representation – A study of press‐releases from Kyoto to Copenhagen. Author: Benjamin Otterbach, [email protected] Supervisor: Eva Lövbrand Word count: 24.347 ISRN‐number: LIU‐IEI‐FIL‐A‐‐11/01006‐‐SE Abstract This thesis analyzes EU international climate policy discourses around the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, its entry‐into‐force and the COP15‐negotiations in Copenhagen. Using EU‐press releases and employing Hajer’s argumentative approach, the main focus lies on discursive shifts and self‐
representation. The thesis finds considerable discursive shifts, including a changing role of science, global responsibility and the economy. Findings also include the self‐representation of the EU changing from an emerging to an established and powerful actor but with a sharp rupture after COP15. Keywords: climate change, EU, discourse analysis, constructivism, Hajer, UNFCCC, self‐representation, Kyoto, Copenhagen Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisor Eva Lövbrand for assisting me both in broad strategic and detailed questions as well as for investing much time and effort in the revision of this work over the whole process. I would also like to thank Pressbyrån for providing the coffee and Kanelbullar that made this work possible. 2 Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 2 Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 2 Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 3 1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 | Thesis aim and research questions ............................................................................................. 5 1.2 | Methodology, method and material ........................................................................................... 6 1.2.1 | A constructivist methodology .............................................................................................. 6 1.2.2 | Discourse analysis ................................................................................................................ 7 1.2.3 | EU press releases ................................................................................................................. 8 1.3 | Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 10 1.4 | Thesis outline ............................................................................................................................ 11 2 The theoretical basis ........................................................................................................................... 12 2.1 | A theoretical framework of the EU ........................................................................................... 12 2.1.1 | EU international identity and actorness ............................................................................ 12 2.1.2 | EU institutions in foreign policy and their interplay .......................................................... 14 2.1.3 | The EU as an actor in international climate politics .......................................................... 16 2.2 | The concept of discourse .......................................................................................................... 18 2.2.1 | Distinguishing general approaches towards discourse ...................................................... 18 2.2.2 | Hajer’s argumentative approach ....................................................................................... 20 3 EU climate policy discourses over time .............................................................................................. 22 3.1 | Background ............................................................................................................................... 22 3.2 | 1997/1998 – Before and after COP3 in Kyoto ............................................................................ 24 3.2.1 | Emancipation through internal and external ambition ..................................................... 25 3.2.2 | Legitimizing ambitions through science and sustainable development ............................ 27 3.2.3 | The moral responsibility for the developed world ............................................................ 29 3.3 | 2004/2005 – Before and after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol ................................ 30 3 3.3.1 | “Grown‐up rhetoric” –The EU as an established actor in the world of climate politics ... 31 3.3.2 | Legitimacy through economic and moral story‐lines ......................................................... 33 3.4 | 2009/2010 – Before and after COP15 in Copenhagen .............................................................. 36 3.4.1 | A skyrocketing coverage .................................................................................................... 37 3.4.2 | From self‐confidence to pragmatism ................................................................................. 38 3.4.3 | Legitimizing through an economic vision .......................................................................... 41 3.4.4 | Balancing the responsibilities of the developed and the developing world ...................... 42 4 Concluding discussion: Story‐lines and self‐image in flux .................................................................. 44 4.1 | Revisiting the theory ................................................................................................................. 44 4.2 | Summarizing the major findings ............................................................................................... 46 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................... 49 Annex I: list of press releases ................................................................................................................. 53 First period: 11 June 1997 – 11 June 1998 ........................................................................................ 53 Second period: 16 August 2004 – 16 August 2005 ............................................................................ 54 Third period: 18 June 2009 – 18 June 2010 ....................................................................................... 56 4 1 Introduction When it comes to international climate politics, the EU is at a crossroads today. Ever since the negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the EU has taken a leading, at times the leading role, in the negotiations over an international climate regime. While it has evolved as a partner of the USA in the initial Kyoto negotiations, steady US‐withdrawal under the Bush‐administration beginning in 2001 has left the EU as the only major leading force for several years, mostly drawing upon directional and idea‐based leadership. Accordingly, a 2008‐study undertaken among the participants of the 14th Conference of the Parties (COP14) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC shows that, while other actors such as China had been evolving, the EU position as a perceived leader at COP14 was stable and that delegates from all parts of the world except Africa perceive the EU as an important leader (Karlsson et al 2001, p.99). One year later, in the aftermath of the Copenhagen negotiations which the EU highlighted so much as the crucial conference for finding a post‐Kyoto regime, perceived EU leadership looked very different, as the following quotation from Kilian/Elgström (2010) shows: “In 2010, the outcome of COP15 in Copenhagen was seen as a signal of definite loss of leadership for the Union. Environmental NGOs blamed Europe for being ‘unable to (…) take a leading role in the run up and during Copenhagen’ (Greenpeace, 2010). By the same token, large parts of the European media found that ‘the truth about Copenhagen is that (…) the EU completely failed to show leadership on environmental matters’ (Aftonbladet, 2010).” (Kilian/Elgström 2010, p.258) The quotation summarizes a frequently heard criticism of EU international climate change‐policy in a post‐Copenhagen world. In the 2009 UN‐negotiations in Copenhagen, it is often argued, the EU was confronted with a new reality. Unlike in previous negotiations, its goals did not find their way into the final accord and its voice did not seem to matter very much in the negotiations: Neither did Copenhagen turn out to be the beginning of a binding, comprehensive and ambitious post‐Kyoto regime as the EU had wished for, nor was the EU decisively involved in the final negotiations over it. No matter if a marginalization of the EU stems from a changed international power‐landscape, internal ambiguities or too low (or even too high) ambitions, it is clear that, after Copenhagen, the EU is at a crossroads, where it must find its position in the world community again. 1.1 | Thesis aim and research questions This lack of clarity about how to conceptualize the EU as an actor in international climate politics today represents the motivation for this thesis. More precisely, the aim of this study is to better understand the way the EU (re)presents international climate change policy, and the way the EU represents itself within the area of climate politics. In order to shed light on this, this thesis analyses how EU climate discourses have been articulated before and after the Copenhagen conference. Following Maarten Hajer’s (1995) “argumentative approach” to discourse analysis, this thesis ultimately seeks to understand whether the EU‐representation of international climate change policy has changed along with the changed perceptions of the EU position in the UN climate negotiations. 5 The aim of this study is translated into the following two research questions: 
How has the EU represented international climate policy between 1997 and 2010? 
What does this tell us about the EU’s self‐image in climate politics? 1.2 | Methodology, method and material 1.2.1 | A constructivist methodology In order to answer these questions, discourse analysis will be advanced as the main method in this thesis. However, the usage of discourse as relevant material depends on and entails certain ontological and epistemic assumptions, which is why this work endorses a constructivist as well as interpretive approach. The two are briefly outlined before the method of discourse analysis is presented both as a general method and in the context of the material used in this thesis. Questions of ontology and epistemology address the questions: “What is there to be known?” and “How can we know it?” (della Porta/Keating 2008) When discourse is advanced as a concept influencing a subject’s reality, it is automatically implied that reality is not a phenomenon that is given a priori but that reality is constructed over time and always subject to change. The label of this ontological approach that underlies and supports the argumentative approach is Constructivism (sometimes also “Constructionism”). Constructivism, in general, holds that, aside from the physical reality, the world acquires meaning in social interaction only. This contradicts natural‐science approaches (such as objectivism) that see reality as something independent from our interpretation about it. Reality in constructivism is interpreted and reinterpreted (constructed) among social actors. A constructivist approach “implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision” (Bryman 2007, p.23). Discourse in turn serves as the enabler of the production of social phenomena or facts and the categorization of them – it serves as the tool that turns things into objects with meaning: “This idea that physical things and actions exist, but they only take on meaning and become objects of knowledge within discourse, is at the heart of constructionist theory of meaning and representation” (Hall 2001, p.73). Similar to the construction of meaning in social interaction, actors and their identities are also constituted by meaning structures and “shaped by the cultural, social, and political – as well as material – circumstances in which they are embedded” (Fierke 2007, p.171). Since the “structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces” (Wendt 1999, p.1) , actors are seen as social beings, empowered and constrained by the social structure of shared understandings rather than as utility‐maximizers or interest‐based rationalists. They behave based on a “logic of appropriateness” (Fierke 2007, p.170) following shared and changing values and norms rather than their pure interests. Social context and cognition are therefore more important than the rational logic of rationalist theories such as neo‐liberalism (ibid). This entails that the opportunities of agency are bridged with the coercive nature of structure, reconciling the two as mutually dependent sides of the same coin. There are different kinds of “Constructivisms” that can differ much. While all constructivists will agree on the ontological assumption of the world as socially constructed, there are different opinions on which epistemic consequences this has, particularly with regard to the role of language. Constructivism as a middle‐ground theory on the one hand acknowledges a positivist epistemology separating the researcher from the researched phenomenon and drawing on positivist methods of 6 hypothesis testing. It is therefore treating language “as a set of labels for the objective reality or for the mental processes of individuals” (ibid, p.175). Consistent constructivism does not accept the contradiction between a socially constructed world and the treatment of language as an “impartial” reflection of reality. For consistent constructivists, language is as such socially constructed and its use subject to constant change. They are therefore not seeking underlying rules in language that can be used for testing hypothesis but they are seeking a Weberian understanding (“Verstehen”) of language and its rules. Language, thereby, becomes embedded in action (ibid, p.175/176). This thesis does not treat language as a mere reflection of reality but rather as a part of reality as such. It is therefore closer to the consistent version of constructivism by endorsing an interpretive epistemology. Interpretivism is the epistemic approach that underpins the notion of subjective, constructed reality. Reality, according to interpretivism, is knowable to a certain extent, but it is always linked to human subjectivity. Unlike positivism, that demands a consequent separation of the researcher and the researched, it calls for a change of perspective in order to gain contextual knowledge and “requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman 2001, p.13). In turn, it does not allow for natural science‐like generalizations but rather for case‐specific understanding. 1.2.2 | Discourse analysis Within this ontological framework, discourse analysis will be used as method in this thesis, drawing upon press releases issued by the EU‐Commission around three different milestones of international climate politics. These milestones are located in the years 1997, 2005 and 2009. The first milestone is the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at the third Conference of the Parties (COP3) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto on 11 December 1997. This event marked the beginning of a binding multilateral regime addressing climate change, which required the EU to establish a coherent climate policy and bargaining position. The second milestone is the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005. This event marks the end of a global diplomatic effort by the EU to “save the Kyoto Protocol” after the Bush administration in spring 2001 decided not to offer its ratification to the American Congress. Finally, the third event chosen for this study is the 15th Conference to the Parties in Copenhagen in December 2009. This conference had raised high hopes for the agreement of a follow‐up regime to the Kyoto Protocol with an “expiration date” in 2012. The EU in particular had hoped for a strong binding agreement and came to the conference with an internally agreed 20%‐reduction of greenhouse gases by 2020 and a conditional 30%‐reduction if other industrialized countries were to follow. Even though Copenhagen put the issue of climate change high up on international agendas in a time of economic recession, it did not bring the envisaged break‐through and the EU had to face strong criticism for its performance. To ensure a broad contextual basis around the three events a period of 12 months is considered around each milestone. Taking this into account, the following exact dates result as the demarcation lines of each period: First period: 11 June 1997 – 11 June 1998 Second period: 16 August 2004 – 16 August 2005 Third period: 18 June 2009 – 18 June 2010 Discourse analysis has become a popular research method among social scientists, yet the term can mean very different things. The way in which discourse analysis is used in this thesis follows a post‐
7 positivist, constructivist tradition, looking for context‐related and researcher‐dependent knowledge rather than for objective, generalizable truths. As such, it defines discourse not as mere text but as “shared meaning of phenomena” (Bäckstrand/Lövbrand 2006, p.51)1. Here, the French philosopher Foucault has paved the way, understanding discourse as a body of knowledge that is detached from the text and the way something is expressed. While Foucault’s body of knowledge helps to shed light on what can and cannot be said in a given context and therefore brings in the power of knowledge, the way things are expressed can still help to understand how a preferred meaning of phenomena is promoted and another one is dismissed by an actor. A connection of the two is done by Hajer in his “argumentative approach” (Hajer 1995, p.42), the approach chosen for this thesis. Hajer does not only reconcile linguistic with institutional approaches to discourse analysis but also brings back in a notion of agency, otherwise neglected to a certain extent by Foucault2. In this way, discourse analysis allows to look at the EU as an actor taking part in the struggle over the definition of the problem of climate change, dismissing or advancing certain preferred meanings, and in turn solutions, over time. “Accordingly, policy discourses favor certain descriptions of reality, empower certain actors while marginalizing others” (Bäckstrand/Lövbrand 2006, p.52) . Besides the careful identification of policy discourses in Hajer’s argumentative approach and the respect of actors, the concept of discourse institutionalization is another reason why the argumentative approach is helpful in this thesis, tracing how certain prevalent policy discourses become mirrored in the setup of political institutions. 1.2.3 | EU press releases In order to trace the EU’s climate policy discourses following Hajer’s argumentative approach, this thesis uses press releases by the EU‐Commission as working material. Why press releases? Firstly, there is a need to reduce the sheer number of documents. This is because, even when limiting oneself to the field of climate change policy, the amount of documents provided by the EU is overwhelming. Through the years and across different institutions, the EU has produced a seemingly never‐ending repertoire of documents concerning climate change – including everything from websites, children’s books, speeches, green papers, white papers, Communications by the EU‐
Commission, memos, citizens’ summaries to directives, regulations or treaties. It is obvious that such an abundance of material needs to be delimited in a way that suits the research questions best and that matches the limited extent of these studies. Press releases are thereby a viable choice regarding both their number and length. Secondly and more importantly, press releases are directed to the public and therefore follow 
a simplified language: In contrast to internal communications, directives or green papers, press releases are made to be understood by the general public, which is especially decisive in the often very scientific field of climate change. Here, scientific facts as occurring in other sorts of documents can easily distract both the writer and the reader from the promoted policies and the standpoints of the communicator. At the same time, they are not overly simplifying as brochures or citizens’ summaries. EU climate change discourses are therefore believed to be best represented in press releases. 
a more argumentative strategy rather than a purely informative one. By arguing, positioning and trying to convince, press releases have the potential to say more about the position and 1
2
see chapter 2.2.1 for a more comprehensive discussion over the term “discourse”. see chapter 2.2.2 for a more comprehensive outline of Hajer’s argumentative approach. 8 the situation of the communicator than a technical communication paper or a legal document. The implications on the self‐identity that shall be drawn from a general discourse about climate politics are therefore expected to be best drawn from press releases. Thirdly, press releases are mostly linked to a specific event or a specific question. Unlike brochures or other argumentative publications they do not present the big picture but rather new puzzle pieces within the picture. Hence, they can account better for changes. As in any other EU‐related issue, the main potential communicators in the field of EU climate‐change‐
policy are the institutions of the European Union, i.e. the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Parliament. Being the most “European” institution (i.e. the institution whose members are least accountable to the member states), the EU‐Commission will provide the material for this study. The Commission is the European institution least accountable to the citizens, which allows for more streamlined communication. Furthermore, as the proposer of (climate) legislation, its safeguard and a collector of information, the EU Commission has a central role in the definition of a problem. The EU‐Commission’s press service “Rapid” represents a viable source of information. This website (http://europa.eu/rapid/), run by the “Directorate General Communication”, collects press releases by the EU Commission and some other European institutions (notably the Council of the EU) since 1985 (Europa.eu (2)) and makes them easily accessible to a general public. When retrieving the press releases of the three mentioned timeframes, the documents have been delimited according to their relevance in two steps. In order to limit the overall search result to the European Commission’s press releases3 relevant to climate politics, documents have, in the first step, been searched using the keywords “climate change”. All relevant documents must include the exact match of the term “climate change” (search function: “exact match”). In order not to miss out on any relevant press releases, the search is extended to the whole text and not to the title only. This may entail however that some irrelevant press releases turn up in the result list in the first place. Such documents clearly are not concerned with climate change as such but rather use the term “climate change” in a different context, a side‐phrase, a list, etc. Therefore, as a second step, each document has been examined manually according to its relevance. In this process, documents that are clearly “off‐topic” have been sorted out. This “negative exclusion process” has been preferred to a “positive inclusion process” to ensure that even somewhat relevant documents stay within the relevant set, thereby ensuring highest cautiousness4. This proceeding gives an overall number of press releases of 245 originating from all three timeframes, whereas 130 have been examined as relevant and 115 have been disregarded as irrelevant. In more detail, over the first period between 11 June 1997 and 11 June 1998, 20 press releases met the search criteria in the Rapid‐database, out of which 4 were identified as dealing with different topics and therefore clearly irrelevant. This leaves a repertoire of 16 press releases around the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on COP3. In the second period between 16 August 2004 and 16 August 2005, 53 press releases met the search criteria in the Rapid‐database. Out of these 53 documents, 25 were identified as clearly irrelevant. This leaves a number of 28 relevant press releases around the time of the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, in the time between 18 June 3
4
Press releases by the Commission are chosen by marking the “IP”‐field under the heading “Type”. see Annex I for an overview of the documents within and outside the relevant set. 9 2009 and 18 June 2010, 172 press releases met the search criteria in the Rapid‐database. Out of these 172 documents, 86 were identified as clearly irrelevant leaving a number of again 86 relevant press releases around the COP15‐negotiations in Copenhagen. Compared to 16 (20 in total) press releases in the 1997/98‐period and 28 (53 in total) in the 2004/05‐period this represents a steep increase in the number of documents. 1.3 | Limitations Before moving to the outline, presenting how the thesis will go about to answer the research questions, it is important to consider the inherent limitations to this thesis first, laying out the questions which this work cannot, and does not aim to, answer. Since the research problem points towards a lack of understanding of the EU’s role, the aim of the studies is not to impartially investigate any shortcomings of EU climate change policy over time. Studying EU‐climate policy discourses tells us more about the EU than about climate politics. Similarly, it is not of any interest here to what extent the EU really has been a “climate leader” or has ceased to be so, for example by examining the effectiveness of its domestic climate policies or its international diplomatic efforts. Even though this thesis uses the term “the EU”, this should not be understood as an ultimate claim to investigate and understand the EU in all its complexity. Rather, for pragmatic reasons, the EU‐
Commission’s press releases will be equaled with the voice of “the EU” in the course of this study, simplifying who is speaking for “the EU”. It is therefore important to bear in mind that the EU is not the homogeneous actor as which it might appear when only looking at documents issued by the supranational EU‐Commission. It is believed, however, that approximations about “the EU” are allowed to be made and that the EU‐Commission’s documents allow better for such approximation than other EU‐institutions that are much more subjects to internal debate and incoherencies. Therefore, approximations must be allowed when drawing conclusions on the self‐identity of the EU in climate politics. There is another important note to be made in this context: Understanding self‐identity or self‐image of the EU does not mean that “European identity” is studied. It is important to note that this work seeks to derive implications on the EU’s self‐identity as a political organization; it does not seek to add to the understanding of “European identity” as such, i.e. the identity of European citizens. As a particularly controversial example of national – or better: supranational – identity, adding up to the understanding of European identity would be a too big of a task and deriving meaning from official “top‐down” EU‐publications on the identity of millions of Europeans too much a matter of speculation. Finally, there is a remark to be made about the degree to which results from this study can be generalized. Even though the material of this thesis is plain text as well as “hard” background information regarding the EU’s climate policies, the interpretation is, while based on this material, researcher‐related and therefore reflects subjective understanding. Thus, another researcher might interpret certain things differently, stress different ideas or “hear” different things when listening to the documents while still going about in the exact same way. This subjective insight is a goal of this study and its interpretative epistemology of “Verstehen”. It should therefore be underlined that no simple generalizations can be drawn from the results. They enrich the understanding of the EU climate policy discourse and its role in international climate politics and cannot represent a blueprint 10 for the understanding of another time, another organization or another policy field. Yet, they can and should give inspiration for further studies in similar fields. 1.4 | Thesis outline How will this thesis go about when attempting to answer the research questions? Following will be a brief overview of what awaits the reader: The following second chapter will present important theoretical concepts and models which are to underpin the later analysis. Namely, it focuses first on the difficulty of EU‐literature to conceptualize the EU as an actor in its own right rather than as a sum of the member states’ actions. It then lays out the concept of discourse, by giving a rough introduction to the theoretical heritage, namely to the work of French philosopher Foucault, and presenting in more detail the concept used in this thesis, Maarten Hajer’s “argumentative approach”. The third chapter is, in general, devoted to the discourse analysis of the chosen EU‐documents, presenting the periods in chronological order. It also gives a brief historical account of European and global climate policies of the years prior to and between the given events. Combining historical account and theory with the major story‐lines, it interprets them with regard to the EU’s self‐representation. The fourth chapter, the conclusion, speaks back in a first step to the presented theoretical concepts and assesses their viability. It then summarizes the evolution of the major story‐lines and points to important consistencies and disruptions in the EU’s discourse. It also sums up the findings about the EU’s changing self‐representation over time and gives food for further studies. 11 2 The theoretical basis 2.1 | A theoretical framework of the EU This work seeks to analyze EU climate policy discourses and what they imply with regard to the EU’s self‐identity. While the process of construction will be left to the discussion over the term “discourse” in the next chapter, this chapter seeks to conceptualize the EU as an actor with an identity. Knowing the way existing literature is making sense of the uniqueness of the EU represents important background information when trying to understand the way the EU represents climate policy and itself. 2.1.1 | EU international identity and actorness The area of identity is a large one and the concept has been used in many different fields of studies independent of the EU. Identity in psychology means something else than what it means in sociology and the two differ from the conceptualization of identity in the field of identity politics. The concept of corporate identity in economics is about the tools to deliberately shape an image of a corporation in the public, whereas social identity theory looks at the interdependencies of personal identity and group identity (such as, e.g., national identity). In short, concepts of identity differ greatly in the way they stress the individualistic or collectivistic side and the way they stress them as stable or floating (Karolewski/Kaina 2006, p.62). Drawing upon social psychology, we can (in line with Smith) conceive of identity here as “the images of individuality and distinctiveness (“self‐hood”) held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant ‘others’” (Jepperson/Wendt/Katzenstein, quoted in Smith 2008, p.14). Even though social‐psychological definitions of identities as this one are originally conceived for individuals, Smith states that they are equally viable for “states – and organizations composed of states” (ibid, p.15), while being open to (re‐)construction and interaction. When aiming to add to the understanding of the EU’s self‐identity, the question arises of how to understand the EU as an actor, i.e. a subject with an identity, particularly on the global scene. Therefore, different notions of the EU as an actor from the EU‐literature are first conceptualized and special regard given to its institutional landscape. It is then linked to the topic of how EU‐identity is framed in the respective literature. However, before proceeding, one needs to consider a point made by Andreatta, stating that it is “important to distinguish between those theories which analyse Europe’s role as an actor in its own right and those which conceptualize the Union as an institution whose influence is mainly felt through the foreign policies of member states” (Andreatta 2005, p.33). The focus here shall be on the former. As the EU has become more and more engaged in international politics, it has also been studied increasingly as a foreign policy actor in its own right. Most scholars agree that “the EU is both a key part of the multilateral structures of world politics, and a player of growing resource and influence in its own right” (Hill/Smith 2005 (1), p.400). However, to date there is no one satisfying concept “on the market” for the EU and what it represents on the international scene. There are attempts to conceptualize the EU’s international role according to classical concepts of nation‐states, but most scholars acknowledge today that the EU is a unique actor, internationally and domestically, which 12 does not fit the concept of a federation or a confederation to a satisfying degree (ibid). However, it is accepted that it does borrow certain features from these concepts as can be seen in the examples of trade (where it roughly follows the federal model and has the sole responsibility for external action) or the Common Foreign and Security Policy (where the intergovernmental decision‐making process points to a more confederal mechanism). Theoretical assumptions determine to a large extent how an actor is perceived, because actorness depends on the theoretical assumptions one endorses (such as realism, liberalism, critical theory…) and what “counts” as power according to these assumptions. Yet, when asking about the EU’s international actorness, varying decision‐making processes and complex international representation mandates stemming from an often shared responsibility with the member states, add up to the question of theoretical perspectives. In very broad terms, one can however point towards certain characteristics of EU actorness as represented in the literature. Firstly, traditional realist power concepts are not at the core of most EU studies. An overwhelming number of scholars agree that the EU is not a straightforward “pole” (ibid, p.394) even if substantial “diplomatic, economic, and now some limited military tools are all available to the EU” (ibid, p.451). Instead, an institutional perspective is used for analyzing the EU’s hard power, identifying “structural power” (ibid, p.404) in international institutions. This notion of power refers to the ability of the EU identified by scholars to influence the international structure, thereby affecting other actors’ choices. Secondly, a generally more liberal or constructivist perspective used across a large part of the literature seems to capture the EU‐actorness the best. Liberal literature focuses on the EU’s interests in the world, while constructivist literature stresses the image of the EU as an actor taking part in the interactive shaping of global norms and rules. Sedelmeier (2005) for example, when looking at the “EU’s specific role‐identity in its relationship with the CEECs” (p.23), argues that the EU in foreign policy represents a normative structure which affects European policy makers’ preference formation and makes certain policies impossible. Following a neofunctionalist/constructivist stance, he perceives the EU as an environment that shapes policy makers’ identities through constructed and institutionalized norms. In this model, the EU institutions shape the identities of the “real” European foreign actors and in turn their policy preferences but do not act much themselves. In this “world”, the EU Commission gets big responsibilities to “help to articulate common European interests, suggest policy options, and encourage agreement among the member states on policies that represent more than the lowest common denominator” (Smith 2008, p.8). Neofunctionalists such as Sedelmeier draw on the notion of “spill‐over”, which describes the gradual need for integration across various sectors, each integration step being a necessity created by one of the previous ones (ibid). Greater EU‐agency is incorporated in the influential concept of “normative power” by Ian Manners: “According to this view, the power of the EU lies in its ability to project its core values beyond its borders.” (Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007, p.435) Terms such as “gentle power”, “post‐modern power” and “civilian power” are also often quoted in the context (Smith 2008, p.15). Building upon an earlier concept of “civilian power” by Duchêne, Manners finds that the international power of the EU is to define what counts as “normal” rather than to use military or economic pressure. He thereby meets criticism by authors such as Hedley Bull who question the actorness of the EU by stating that they engage too much in a debate over the “state‐like features” of the EU (Manners 2002, p.239). Instead, 13 he argues, one should focus more on the international identity of the EU and how it can shape the world. There is an abundance of studies employing the normative power concept. Often, this is linked to a study of EU‐identity and European identity as normative power and identity are closely interlinked: “As Manners and Whitman argue (2003), the international identity of the EU is constructed around specific interpretations of internationally shared norms” (Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007, p.451). Smith (2008) argues that these norms include the “preference for diplomacy over coercion” (p.15), the respect for the rule of law and long‐term economic solutions, an emphasis on multilateralism and a promotion of human rights (ibid). For instance, Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007) study the EU’s role in setting up both the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol and find that EU‐identity as a normative power has evolved in both cases “against” the image of the US as the major obstructor of these norms, and that, despite little reflexivity, the EU can play a credible role in the respective regime‐making. According to the normative power concept, norms are globally promoted and, eventually, shared. Therefore, it becomes difficult to say who exports norms to whom. That is why Hill and Smith stress the interdependence between the international level and European actorness: “Thus, ‘International Relations and the European Union’ is about both the place of Europe in the world and the way the world contributes to the shaping of Europe.” (Hill/Smith 2005 (2), p.5) What’s more, they state that already the EU’s internal policy‐making process resembles a process of international relations in the traditional sense (Hill/Smith 2005 (1), p.398), which makes a clear distinction between the domestic and the international a particularly difficult endeavor in the case of the EU. While the concept of normative power puts the focus more on other actors being influenced by ideas (push‐factors), the similar (and also popular) concept of a “directional leader” focuses more on domestic policies, i.e. the attractiveness of a good example (pull‐factors). Parker/Karlsson (2010) summarize it as following: “By engaging in directional leadership, an actor works towards solving a collective problem by making the first move and providing a model others will want to emulate.” (p.927). To conclude, most scholars do not draw on consequent realist notions of power when they conceptualize the EU as an international actor, even if in economic terms the EU is sometimes called a “superpower” and the EU’s military capability is without any doubt constantly rising5. Therefore, many conceive of the EU in liberal and constructivist terms as an actor embedded in multilateral diplomacy and with an identity based on norms – often coined a “normative power”. This identity is summarized to include post‐modern objectives such as the rule of law or the respect of human rights as well as “soft” instruments such as commercial diplomacy and economic development or humanitarian aid. 2.1.2 | EU institutions in foreign policy and their interplay Before looking at the roles of EU‐institutions in foreign policy – what is meant by the term “foreign policy” in this context? Foreign policy here is not seen as dealing with traditional security‐issues only. In fact, it is not limited to security issues in general. Rather, when studying the EU’s multilateral and “soft” foreign policy, a broader definition of foreign policy makes sense. Hazel Smith’s constructivist definition seems viable here: “The foreign policy of the European Union is the capacity to make and 5
However, deployments remain, in essence, a decision left to the member states (see next chapter). 14 implement policies abroad that promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the European Union” (Smith 2002, p.8). This definition stresses the importance of the external dimension of “low politics” such as commercial diplomacy rather than the “high politics” of traditional security issues (Giegerich/Wallace 2010, p.432). Turning now to the roles of the three major European institutions in foreign policy and international relations, it gets obvious that the respective institutional framework is “complex, reflecting a variety of histories, trajectories, and innovations” (Vanhoonacker 2005, p.88). The European Commission’s role within this complex texture is most significant in the former “Community pillar”, i.e. foreign issues related to the common market, trade and the related four freedoms (Edwards 2005, p.52/53). It has the major role for initiative and implementation. In the context of Common Commercial Policy (such as trade policy), it has the task to draft the EU’s position based on the Council’s guidelines and for instance to negotiate within the WTO on behalf of the EU, while the Council adopts the outcomes and the Parliament is only informed. Yet, the Commission’s role doesn’t stop here. It is also portrayed as the actor collecting information and converting differing viewpoints into common EU‐positions in policy areas that are not clearly accountable to one decision‐making procedure. However, with the rise of the former “third pillar” for common foreign, security and defense policy (CFSP), the importance of the Council in foreign policy has risen steadily (ibid, p.57). The intergovernmental nature of the decision‐making process in this issue‐area, still predominating to date, makes the Council with the representatives of the member states the main decision‐making body in “traditional” security and defense policy. The heads of states (European Council) thereby lay out the broad guidelines; the Council of Foreign Ministers implements them (Smith 2008, p.38). This entails that “the CFSP pillar remains largely in the hands of the member governments”, making it an example for “intensive transgovernmentalism” (Giegerich/Wallace 2010, p.441). Moreover an increasing need for “trans‐pillar coordination”, i.e. coordination between different decision‐making processes, has enhanced the role of the European Council, tasking it with outlining the broad, strategic frameworks and thereby giving cross‐sectoral policies the legitimacy of the member states (Edwards 2005, p.57). The European Parliament has, since the Treaty of Lisbon, gained important decision‐making power, as most Community‐policies now pass the plenum (as well as the Council) for affirmation – the so‐called “co‐decision‐procedure”. Yet, important foreign policy issues such as security and defense do not need the Parliament’s consent. Nevertheless, the Parliament is often said to have evolved as a “grand forum” for debate (ibid) in international relations, thereby indirectly influencing decision‐makers, for example through a constant emphasis on human rights. In conclusion, with respect to formal involvement of the EU institutions in the EU’s foreign policy making, it can be stated that, “the game is primarily played by the Council and the Commission” (Vanhoonacker 2005, p.87) with the Commission being stronger in Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and the Council in Security and Defense Policy. Overarching policies touching upon different decision‐
making processes are mostly dealt with in a ping‐pong mode between the two, giving the Council the role to lay out strategic goals and the Commission the role to break them down into policy propositions by collecting information and moderating the discussion. The EU institutions, most scholars agree, do play an important role independent of member states’ actions (ibid, p.86), while limitations to their actorness are also discussed, particularly with regard to consistency and coherence (Nuttall 2005, Smith 2008), a limitation that the Lisbon Treaty has tried to 15 tackle by creating more cross‐sectional links (Giegerich/Wallace 2010, p.453). With respect to the above described EU‐integration theories, the institutional framework sustains both an intergovernmental stance (through the setup of the Council) and a neofunctionalist stance (through the evolving and coordinating role of the Commission). 2.1.3 | The EU as an actor in international climate politics We now turn to the way the EU’s international climate policy is presented by the literature, asking the questions how EU climate policy is actually done and how effective the institutional setup is. Climate policy represents a good example of an area in which issues are crossing over the tradition demarcation lines of domestic and international policy. This is, because domestic interests and ideas become internationalized in international regimes, for instance by trying to define domestic standards as international ones or through the mere fact that pollution does not stop at any border. At the same time, international agreements strongly influence domestic policies of environmental standard. This is well coined in Harris’ concept of “environmental foreign policy”, defined as following: “Environmental foreign policy (EFP) can be conceived of as the interplay between (1) domestic forces, institutions and actors involved in environmental decision making and the implementation of environmental policies, and (2) international forces, institutions and actors […].” (Harris 2007, p.16) EU literature presents climate policy as a truly cross‐sectional and multi‐stakeholder issue, giving responsibility not only to the European Commission and the national governments but also to NGOs and industry groups. Within the European Commission, initiatives naturally do not only address issues within Directorate General Environment (DG Environment) but within most other DGs as well. Together with the more general goal of sustainable development introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam and endorsed by the Lisbon strategy as well as the “Europe 2020‐Strategy”, climate change has become present in most DGs, from DG Agriculture and Rural Development over DG Trade to DG Enterprise and Industry. This cross‐sectional character entails a wide variety of policy modes, leaving the old‐fashioned regulatory mode used in traditional environmental policy as only one amongst many. Climate change policy in the EU is therefore best perceived as a web of directives, regulations, voluntary agreements, coordination mechanisms and binding national targets – or as Berkhout puts it: “Climate policies in the EU have accumulated as a complex texture of national‐level policies and EU‐wide emission reduction” (Berkhout et al 2010, p.143). In internal climate change policy, this gives the EU Commission different roles depending on the policy area an initiative (for example as stated in the ECEP) belongs to. The regulatory mode, which has been more and more used since the 1980s, has become the dominant policy mode. It is used in single‐market issues, traditional environment‐issues and increasingly in agricultural issues, provisions co‐decision between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament and involves the Commission as an agenda‐setter and a safeguard of the legislation. At the same time, the traditional Community Method has been used less and less, with trade as the most important, yet external, example. Some important areas in climate change policy still lie predominantly at the national level. Notable examples are energy policy and taxation. Agreements in these areas have a bigger intergovernmental dimension with the European Council as the most important decision‐maker. The role of an EU‐wide energy‐policy has however constantly risen (for the last time with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty), 16 although the Commission here has only limited powers and cannot affect the national energy‐mixes directly. However, the 2008 Climate and Energy Package includes differentiated targets for renewable energy sources as well as a right for the Commission to allocate a part of the ETS certificates (Lenschow 2010, p.377). Buchan (2010, p.377) summarizes internal EU climate policy as following: “with regard to climate change, the EU is acting in what might be called a ‘revolutionary regulatory mode’”. In international climate politics, i.e. negotiations at the global level, the EU is mostly represented by the member states, i.e. the Council and here especially the presidency. The Commission as the representative of the European Community is, however, also present. Vogler (2005) explains that “under mixed competence – and especially in areas such as climate change, where Community competence is limited – the presidency, often assisted by other ‘lead’ states, has a key coordinating role.” (p.839). This has been the case in all negotiations within the UNFCCC and the negotiations of the parties to the Kyoto‐protocol. The website of the UNFCCC is explaining the special case of the EU as a party to the climate change negotiations as following: “The 27 members of the European Union meet in private to agree on common negotiating positions. The country that holds the EU Presidency ‐ a position that rotates every six months ‐ then speaks for the European Union and its 27 member states. As a regional economic integration organization, the European Union itself can be, and is, a Party to the Convention. However, it does not have a separate vote from its members.” (emphasis in the original, UNFCCC (1)) This multi‐layered and shared setup of competences between Commission, Council and the Presidency within the EU is both presented as an obstacle to and a reason for EU performance in climate change policy and implementation in the literature. Schreurs and Tiberghien (2007) stress the performing side and argue that, while supported by public opinion and normative commitment, the high number of actors has triggered EU‐action, creating an “upward‐cycle of reinforcing leadership”: “Institutionally, environmental policy is an issue where the Commission and Member States have joint competence and one where decisions in the EU Council are taken by qualified majority voting. Under these circumstances, a positive cycle of competing leadership among different poles can take place.” (ibid, p.24/25) They portray the European Commission, the European Parliament and lead states within the European Council as proactive actors, each of them striving for greater environmental profile and competing for the most “progressive” position. Thus, they highlight the importance of this institutional setup for the firm European position that eventually saved the Kyoto‐Protocol. Vogler and Bretherton (2006) argue that, despite sometimes open disagreements, there is relatively good coherence across member states and therefore within the Council. According to them, despite necessary “Herculean’ tasks of coordination” and a therefore often “primarily reactive” role, the EU had shown consistency in international negotiations (p.13). Yet, they see the consistency rather as an outcome of public support, occuring despite the institutional setup. Similarly, Haug and Berkhout (2010) stress the shortcomings of the difficult EU‐representation in international negotiations concerning climate change. They see a “lack of flexibility in negotiations” with a lot of time “wasted on coordination among European delegations and little time and resources 17 left for outreach and negotiations with partners.” (p.23/24) To exemplify this, they cite Connie Hedegaard, at that time Danish minister for Climate and Energy, and host of the 2009 Copenhagen summit: “Sometimes, we’re almost unable to negotiate because we spend so much time talking to each other.…’” (ibid, p.25) Internal division and unclear competences are therefore seen as major restraints to European agency on the international stage. On the domestic stage, they are addressing divisions within the European Council, especially since the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, as the biggest obstacles of effective EU‐action (ibid, p.26). To conclude, EU‐scholars often question EU‐actorness in climate policy, both internationally and domestically. Compared to other policy areas however, internal effectiveness and external consistency and coherence and external effectiveness of the EU are still seen as relatively high. According to Vogler/Bretherton for instance, the EU has long been present internationally as an actor in climate change, it has used key opportunities to boost an international climate regime and it has shown considerable diplomatic capabilities6 (Vogler/Bretherton 2006). Yet, whether or not this is still the case to a similar extent after Copenhagen and Cancun is an open question. 2.2 | The concept of discourse We have learnt that constructivist literature often portrays the EU as a “normative power” (e.g. Manners 2002). While this image is most probably not always realistic to the full extent, it can be stated nevertheless that the EU is stressing, probably more than other actors, the power of the idea and the good example – particularly in the field of climate change. The concept of normative power is thereby particularly interesting in relation to discourse as the two are interconnected. In line with Scheipers/Sicurelli (2007, p.453), we can understand normative power also “in terms of being an ideological power, that is, the power to shape the patterns of discourse when it comes to basic principles and values”, which puts discourse in the focus of interest. In order to study discourse, this thesis draws upon Maarten Hajer’s argumentative approach for an analysis of the chosen EU‐documents. This entails the adoption of a certain notion of discourse, which is to be presented in this section. Such a notion of discourse must be able to capture the spirit of the normative power concept and incorporate the process of the discursive subject trying to advance certain norms as well as the process of the discursive structure influencing the subject’s identity and favored norms. However, instead of rushing to the identification of the definition of the term discourse for this work, it makes sense to give a short overview of the different usages of the term “discourse” and to present the theoretical heritage of Hajer’s approach first. Here, it is mostly the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault that represents a useful theoretical foundation. 2.2.1 | Distinguishing general approaches towards discourse A delimitation of the term discourse is important for any study relying on discourse analysis as a method. Wodak illustrates this by stating that “discourse means anything from a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic‐related conversations, to language per se.” (Wodak 2008, p.1) Most of the times however, discourse is not understood as text only. Discourse and text differ on the level of analysis. While text is the media carrying information, discourse can be seen as text in 6
Vogler and Bretherton (2006) conceptualize the actorness of a protagonist as a mixture of presence, opportunity and capability. 18 context, assigning meaning to what is written, uttered or done. The way researchers employ discourse as a “meaning‐maker” thereby includes a variety of approaches and methods, including everything from working with the text only over considering a big range of contextual information up to the point of taking text as a mere collection of statements, regardless of the way they are uttered (McHoul/Grace 1995, p.37). Even if very different in their methods, all approaches share a focus not only on what is said, but how it is said, why it is said and what can/cannot be said. There is a broad theoretical basis to build a discourse analysis upon. No matter what is the goal of a discourse analysis, researchers can choose at least from the following discourse tradition, enlisted by Wetherell et al (2001): 
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“conversation analysis and ethnomethodology; interactional sociolinguistics and the ethnography of communication; discursive psychology; critical discourse analysis and critical linguistics; Bakhtinian research; Foucauldian research” (p.6) As a post‐Marxist theory, critical discourse theory represents a special post‐positivist approach with an interest in underlying power structures. Even if not identical with Foucault’s account of discourse as a repertoire of knowledge, it suits well to introduce a notion of discourse as representing and constituting reality rather than just reflecting it. Critical discourse theory is the general title for approaches that are critical towards the understanding of discourse as a mere matter of language. They stress the importance of sociological, political and power‐related characteristics over the importance of the words as represented in classic semiotic and linguistic theory. Thus, the relationship between discourse and society and the power‐relations reflected in the discourse are in focus. As critical discourse theory incorporates a wide variety of other scientific schools into the understanding of discourse, it does not have a specific research‐paradigm with a given methodological framework. It is therefore an approach rather than a school (van Dijk 1995, p.17). As the understanding of the term discourse is much larger in a critical understanding, it includes not only linguistic features such as grammar, style, rhetoric, speech acts, interactive elements but also other dimensions such as film, music or gestures (ibid). Frequent areas of interest in critical discourse analysis are the discursive constructions of power, dominance and inequality as a result of determinants such as gender, race, religion and nationality, because here “discourse is not seen as neutral but as producing power relations as people are positioned to talk” (Wetherell 2001, p.194). Preferential access to a certain discourse as well as the ability to shape the style of it can therefore be seen as a resource of power. Being concerned with these manipulative acts, critical discourse analysis digs deeper in text and talk and tries to uncover the hidden and implicit, sometimes with an ethical and normative background. To summarize: “CDA [Critical Discourse Analysis] is essentially dealing with an oppositional study of the structures and strategies of elite discourses and their cognitive and social conditions and consequences, as well as with the discourses of resistance against such domination.” (van Dijk 1995, p.19) Michel Foucault also partly looked at discourse as a constituting power, yet with a different notion of power. His understanding of the term “discourse” rejects most formalist and empirical approaches, which somewhat mechanistically conceive discourse as mere speech acts or human conversation. Instead, Foucault saw discourses as bodies of knowledge, consisting of an accumulation of statements 19 (not just verbal text but also social practices) that provide a language about a particular topic at a given point in time (McHoul/Grace 1995, p.26/Hall 2001, p.72). He was interested in the question what can and cannot be said – not what is said and how it is said. Outside discourse, Foucault argued in line with constructionist thinking, things do not have a meaning (Hall 2001, p.73). Hence, his focus was not on the communicating subject (as he rejected extreme hermeneutics and their phenomenological assumptions about the construction of subjective realities) but on the discursive structure and its boundaries. Anyhow, Foucault analyzed particular texts but even when doing so “he is more inclined to analyze the whole discursive formation to which a text or a practice belongs” (ibid, p.78). As much as he rejected a phenomenological position, he also rejected the structuralist notion of regular patterns underlying discourses and changes to them. For Foucault, change does not equal evolution or the acquisition of “better” knowledge; instead, he stresses the discontinuity of discourses over time (McHoul/Grace 1995, p.9). Looking at Foucault’s understanding of power, it can be stated that he did not see power as something directly attached to the subject. Foucault sees it instead as something inherent to discourse, i.e. not on the level of the actor but on the level of the system (“Power is everywhere”, ibid, p.39). Thus, for Foucault, the linguistic system that others study so enthusiastically is just one instance of this power. He sees power as something reflexive which ”produces subjects just as much as, or even more than, subjects reproduce it” (ibid, p.22). Foucault calls this reflexive process that constitutes subjects “subjection” (ibid). Hence, the overall question of power is not who is in power but how power installs itself (ibid, p.21), which differs from the notion of preferential access to power embedded in critical discourse theory. As Foucault’s post‐structuralist approach is essentially interested in the relationship between discourse and power, his ideas can be of high value for these studies as notions of power and powerlessness are reflected in discourse and may offer implications on self‐identity. However, as this thesis is more concerned with EU climate policy discourses rather than with an overall account of climate change discourse, we need a concept that, while acknowledging Foucault’s notion of power being discursively constructed, puts more emphasis on how this is reflected on the level of the subject7. Furthermore, as discursive shifts are in the centre of the interest here, a concept able to reflect permanence and change better than Foucault’s markedly discontinuous account is needed for this work. Consequently, Maarten Hajer’s argumentative approach has been chosen. It incorporates both points, while remaining faithful to Foucault’s work in most ways. 2.2.2 | Hajer’s argumentative approach Hajer, drawing on Foucault’s later work, underlines the practices, mechanisms and techniques that together make up a system of micro‐power within a discourse, called “the disciplines”, as a helpful notion on the way to a better incorporation of the subject. He criticizes however that these disciplines are rather something constraining than enabling, thereby marginalizing the subject (Hajer 1995, p.49). However, he finds help in the social‐interactive theory of Harré/Billig who put Foucault’s micro‐
powers in an argumentative context, stressing the importance of the subject. They see subjects as 7
There has been much criticism about the role of the subject in Foucault’s work, for example by Hollway: “Although Hollway draws extensively on Foucauldian notions, she is critical of Foucault’s theory of subjectivity. She notes a point often made about Foucault’s work that he has little space for agency or choice and implies a somewhat mechanical reproduction of discourses as though discourse is the main motor of social life with human agents following haplessly behind, forever caught in the available position.” (quoted in Wetherell 2001, p.194/195) 20 actors “active, selecting and adapting thoughts, mutating and creating them, in the continued struggle for argumentative victory against rival thinkers” (Harré/Billig, quoted in Hajer 1995, p.54). Harré/Billig help out in making discourse accountable to change as well. They bring up that rules and conventions have to be constantly “reproduced and reconfirmed in actual speech situations” (ibid, p.55). Whether or not rules and conventions are brought up and who has the ability to bring them up then becomes a study of power structures. Because of this, Hajer states that “analyzing policy papers becomes important even if they do not include ‘hard’ new proposals or legislation. It becomes imperative to examine the specific idea of reality or of the status quo as something that is upheld by key actors through discourse” (ibid). Hajer incorporates the described changes to Foucault’s more abstract work into the following definition of discourse: Discourse is a “specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995, p.44) This definition of discourse accounts for a balance between agency (through the possibility to choose from, reproduce and transform discourses) and structure (represented by the “set of practices”); it accounts for change (through the floating nature of production and reproduction) and linguistic attention (through the mentioning of “concepts and categorizations”). In this context, Hajer introduces two central concepts: “story‐lines” and “discourse coalitions”. Story‐
lines are understood as “narratives on social reality through which elements from many different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding” (ibid, p.62). As such, they are routinized ways of creating meaning about a given phenomenon. They can be joined, refuted or merged by actors and therefore are subject to discursive changes over time. By being symbolic rather than concrete, story‐lines allow different actors to talk about a phenomenon in the same way, clearing the way to discursively construct coalitions between them. Story‐lines therefore enable different actors (such as scientists, teachers, politicians, workers…) to understand each other and join a discourse coalition by agreeing that something “sounds right” even if they cannot know the phenomenon in all its details: “Story‐lines fulfill an essential role in the clustering of knowledge, the positioning of actors, and, ultimately, in the creation of coalitions amongst the actors of a given domain” (ibid, p.63). Thus, the concepts of story‐
lines and discourse coalitions allow retaining a firm idea of a subject without dismissing the discursive structure in which ideas, concepts and categorizations are produced, reproduced and transformed. With regard to discursive effects, Hajer proposes the concept of discourse institutionalization. When a story‐line becomes very strong, there is the possibility that “discourse can become structured in institutional arrangements” (ibid, p.53). In such a case, theoretical concepts of a certain dominant discourse turn into a policy (e.g. CO2‐limits for cars), affect the organization of an institution (e.g. installation of a sustainability‐division) or lead to the setting up of a whole new institution (e.g. European Environment Agency). In turn, discourses originating from such institutions will be more coherent and salient and arguing against them more difficult. 21 3 EU climate policy discourses over time Let us turn now to the identification of story‐lines, discourse coalitions and discourse institutionalization in “real life”. This third chapter is devoted to present the EU’s discourses over international climate change policy in detail. After providing background information about the field of international climate policy per se it will present the discourses of each of the three periods in a separate part. Each part will begin with an overview of the climate policy developments in the respective years before the event. 3.1 | Background Climate change has become a major meta‐discourse in European politics, public and media. While the media regularly covers a variety of topics from the destiny of small island states to the high politics of international climate negotiations, symbols such as the blue globe or dry farmlands have emerged to illustrate the abstract and far‐reaching topic of “climate change”. Against this background, it is today difficult to imagine that climate change is a relatively young topic on the EU’s screen. It has entered domestic and international politics only in the 1980s, after growing scientific concern for the effects of certain “greenhouse gases” into the atmosphere. Before global attention started to be directed towards climate change, other post‐material, environmental discourses already dominated public awareness. Let us summarize them first in brief. We can identify the birth of an environmental discourse in the Western world in the 1960s and ‐70s, often linked to a discourse opposing nuclear energy and a discourse over general power‐distance. While these discourses were “grass root‐discourses” and not widely shared by big parts of the societies, the 1972 report of the Club or Rome called “Limits to Growth” as a more established voice is often described as the decisive factor that lifted these discourses on an institutional and political level. The report identified an “environmental problematique” dealing with excessive use of resources and the problem of pollutions on one side and exponential population growth on the other. Environment came into the ministries, restricting all kinds of pollutions. Businesses and the environment were seen as separate interest areas (Hajer 1995, p.24/25). This changed in the 1980s, when the discourse of “ecological modernization” became powerful (Hajer 1995, Christoff 1996). Little by little, the framing of environmental protection as a threat to the economy was replaced by an emphasis on environmental protection as innovation – a language that also talked to business. The implementation of economic rhetoric through the calculation of costs and benefits of environmental protection left radical voices aside and slowly started to reconcile business with environment (Hajer 1995, p.26). “Discourse coalitions” of private and institutional voices (the former to push various agendas, the latter to show their ability to manage the issue) evolved and together with parts of the business world could endorse a story‐line of “sustainable development”, coined in the influential 1986 “Brundtland Report” as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). This was the final call for lagging governments to take on the issue and establish environmental ministries and policies. Similarly, the emerging European Community (later European Union) embraced the concept as an overarching goal in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht. Burchell/Lightfoot (2004) argue that this happened 22 for reasons of gaining legitimacy, institution building and internal aspirations of the respective DGs (p.333). At this time, a special discourse of sustainable development, climate change, grew to significant importance. Science helped and triggered shaping the problem as an immediate and pressing one and international action at UN‐level as well as European and national action was quickly taken and the problem was widely closed in rough terms both globally and Europe‐wide as a threat to mankind that must be limited to 2 degrees by 2050 if the most severe consequences are to be avoided. Consequently, climate policy has evolved as both a truly global and a regional topic and its cross‐
sectional nature has brought in a wide variety of stakeholders with diverging interests. Unlike “traditional” environmental policies like addressing water quality, animal protection or forest degradation it is also a very uncertain issue with scientific interpretation being in the center of much argumentation. Moreover, the impacts of climate change are, compared to traditional environmental policies, truly global, often distant and therefore less clearly visible. These points make climate change a particularly puzzling, abstract and global issue, sometimes difficult to compare to other environmental issue areas (Harris 2007, p.18). Looking at the international institutional dimension, today’s major forum addressing climate change is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Following scientific reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UNFCCC was signed on the UN Conference on Environment and Development (or “Earth Summit”),Rio, in 1992. In 1994, 50 countries had ratified it and today, almost all countries are members to it. The members are distinguished into developed economies, economies in transition (both Annex‐I‐countries) and developing economies (non‐Annex‐I‐countries) (UNFCCC (2), p.40). In 1995, the first Conference of the Parties (COP1) took place in Berlin, followed by one COP at the end of each year. This should be kept in mind throughout the following sections where EU climate policy discourses will be analyzed, beginning with the 1997/98‐period. 23 3.2 | 1997/1998 – Before and after COP3 in Kyoto Before looking at the press releases from the first chosen period (the 12 months around the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997), let us look first at the political developments on the European scene during the (roughly) 10 preceding years, as climate change was becoming an important environmental, developmental and economic issue. We begin our story with the Single European Act in 1987. This does not mean that there were no substantial developments in environmental policy before (they were mainly internal and based on the provisions of the Single European Market), but rather points to the fact that internationally the EU did not play a major role then, as the US almost exclusively drove international environmental regimes (such as the protection of the ozone layer) (Vogler 2005, p.837). With the adoption of the 1987 Single European Act (SEA), the first major revision of the founding Treaty of Rome, the partial inactivity of the EU in environmental policy ended. The SEA assigned the Community to “preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment, to contribute towards protecting human health, and to ensure a prudent and rational utilization of natural resources” (europa.eu (2)). In environmental matters, the SEA extended the power of the European Parliament and introduced Qualified Majority Voting into the European Council (Lenschow 2010, p.311). Furthermore, it defined objectives and principles such as preventive action, rectification of pollution at the source and an obligation for the polluter to pay for the created damage (europa.eu (2)). Environmental principles were to be introduced across different sectors. This was the legal basis for policy expansion and high environmental standards set by the European Community. At about the same time, climate change came on the European Agenda, resulting in formulated “concern that human activities might be leading to an increase in global mean temperatures and alterations in the climate” (Vogler 2006, p.2). This concern found its first formal expression in the 1990 Joint Energy Environment Council that set the goal for the European Community to stabilize CO2‐emissions by the year 2000 (Berkhout et al 2010, p.145). The following 1993 Treaty of Maastricht or the “Treaty of the European Union (TEU)” committed the newly created “European Union” in article 130 even more directly to a “high level of protection” (EUR‐Lex) and integrated environmental policy objectives even stronger in other policy areas. It also named “sustainable growth respecting the environment” as an overarching principle, taking inspiration from the widely acknowledged Brundtland Report by the UN World Commission on Environment and Development (“Our Common Future”) from 1987, which introduced and defined the concept of sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Burchell/Lightfoot 2004, p.332). The TEU also strengthened the EU’s international actorness by stating the goal to “assert its identity on the international scene” (Article B, EUR‐Lex). Overall and despite the introduction of the subsidiarity principle, it strengthened the Community’s powers (Schreurs/Tiberghien 2007, p.27). The international ignition point for action against climate change was the 1992 “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro, which laid the ground for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the yearly meetings of the conference of the parties (COP), which were to become the major international fora for negotiations. The EU was present in these negotiations, both through its member states and in itself as a regional organization. 24 At home, the EU began to act soon after these initial multilateral meetings. Supported mostly by the Northern member states and eventually also the UK and by a largely favorable public opinion, the EU discovered the topic of climate change as a priority (Berkhout et al 2010, p.143). This is reflected in the fact that in 1996, the 2‐degree‐goal for the first time officially found its way on the EU‐agenda, which happened in the forefront of the UNFCCC‐negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol (a protocol under the framework of the UNFCCC), adopted at COP3 in December 1997, was to outline clear and binding emission reduction targets by the developed countries. COP1 in Berlin had previously adopted the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” among developed and developing states; COP2 in Geneva had acknowledged the need for a legally binding agreement (Harris 2007, p.11). The EU came to the negotiations with a package offer, agreed at home, including a reduction of CO2‐emissions by 15% over 5 years and compared to the 1990 emission of the then 15 member states. All EU‐members acknowledged their responsibility but different targets were assigned to the members depending on their capabilities (Burden Sharing Agreement). This made it easier for less developed EU‐members to agree to the joint offer: “According to this Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA), quite substantial reductions by the more progressive Member States gave less developed Member States ‘headroom’ to grow and increase their emissions” (Berkhout et al 2010, p.145). Despite disagreement with the US over the role of developing states, the Kyoto Protocol was eventually adopted by the Conference on December 11, 1997. It laid out binding emission reductions to its signatories and acknowledged the special situation of developing countries (both points supported by the EU). However, emission reduction targets stayed well under the EU‐goal and flexible mechanisms originally refused by the EU found their way into the agreement (Grubb/Vrolijk/Brack 1999, p.111‐114). 3.2.1 | Emancipation through internal and external ambition Turning to the press releases of this first period now, let us look at the way the EU openly describes its own role, how it spells out its ambitions and how it refers to other actors in the first period. In the wake of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was underway in 1997, one can identify a strong voice of the Commission in the documents to give environmental matters a bigger weight, particularly with regard to the international dimension. For instance, the President of the EU‐Commission, Jacques Santer sees that “environmental issues are becoming new foreign policy issues”. He wants the EU to “give a strong lead and send a clear message to the rest of the world” in this respect (IP‐97‐489)8. His Commissioner for the Environment, Bjerregaard, assents. She perceives that the international dimension must be strengthened, with special regard to climate change (ibid). As the Treaty of Amsterdam later endorsed this position, this is described as a “positive and responsible approach” and a “prerequisite for the Union to continue the leadership it has assumed in the international environmental debates on climate change and other issues” (IP‐98‐471). Even more than in the internal discussion on a stronger mandate for the EU to act in international environmental matters, one can sense an ambition to gain international profile, especially before the Kyoto negotiations. This is reflected in appeals to other actors to step up their ambitions and offers 8
For reasons of lucidity, press releases will be referenced by the code, attributed to them by the Rapid‐service, only. See Annex I for the date and title of a press release. 25 for Kyoto. Japan is called to “establish its leadership in order to ensure the success of the Kyoto conference” (IP‐97‐829), while disappointment is expressed about the “very weak level of ambition of the US”, not representing an “adequate response to the global problems of Climate Change”. The Clinton administration is accused to take too much time with its emission reductions (IP‐97‐909). Furthermore, ambition is reflected by the way other actors, in turn, are quoted to criticize the EU‐
position as overambitious: “The EU position in the negotiations has been widely debated both inside the EU and at the international level, particularly among other industrialized countries. Reactions have varied widely from positive recognition of an ambitious policy to over skeptical questioning of the technical, economic or political feasibility of the targets and in some cases outright opposition.” (IP‐97‐829) Commissioner Bjerregaard, confronted with such opposition, acknowledges that it is difficult to reach a political strategy that lives up to the EU ambitions but that it is nevertheless possible. She is quoted to dismiss “earlier allegations that the EU position was ‘unfair’ or ‘overambitious’ or ‘not realistic’” (IP‐97‐909). She concludes with the statement: “Don’t tell me other industrialized countries cannot do the same” (ibid). In these quotations (which of course did not find their way into the press releases by coincidence), one can sense on the one hand a story‐line arguing for a stronger institutionalization of the climate change discourse on a European level and on the other hand an ambition to assert the own role on the international “climate stage” vis‐à‐vis other actors. The wish for stronger institutions has to be seen in the light of the ongoing institutional changes in the EU in the 90s. After all, with the Treaty on the European Union just some 6 years old, the EU’s international profile still needed to be shaped in many respects and the Treaty of Amsterdam, which then was in the wake, represented a chance to institutionalize climate change as foreign policy on the EU‐level. The atmosphere of ambition on the other hand can be interpreted as a struggle for emancipation and may point towards a self‐image of lacking importance compared to other actors. Strong and “undiplomatic” appeals to other actors sustain this notion. The EU, it seems, is not only striving for bigger institutional capabilities here but also for stronger profile in the international discourse even if a slight minority complex might lead to over‐action comparable to the emancipation process of an adolescent. Press releases originating from the time after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol on COP3 confirm this notion of strong (in diplomatic categories maybe even aggressive) ambitions vis‐à‐vis other states. The US and Japan are for instance openly blamed for obstructing a more ambitious outcome: Commissioner Bjerregaard states that “we pushed the US and Japan as far as we could, we are sorry we could not take them further, but we chose to take the necessary extra step in order to get the best possible result for the environment.” (IP‐97‐1106) The Clinton administration is hailed for promoting “new technologies reducing greenhouse gases” while the Congress’ inclination for not providing funding is “regretted” (IP‐98‐374). With regard to the internal US‐opposition, Bjerregaard is quoted stating that “the US is by far the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gasses and ought to do more than everybody else – not less.” (ibid) Despite the characterization of other actors, particularly the US and Japan, as brake pads in the negotiations, the press releases are quick to define the EU as the leading power. The EU says for instance that it wants to “maintain the lead” (IP‐98‐374), implying that it even had been in a leading position before, and Commissioner Bjerregaard’s quotation in the context of the Amsterdam Treaty incorporating the environment into all EU policy areas shows the self‐confident, slightly arrogant self‐
image of the EU as the only ambitious and decisive actor: “We have seen it before and we may see it 26 again: Without a firm commitment – and the will to make a difference – from the European Union nothing will happen on the global scene” (IP‐98‐471) and: “Far greater global reduction efforts will be necessary and the industrialized countries must make demonstrable progress” (IP‐98‐174). To underpin the importance and the success of such “leadership by ambition”, the effects of EU‐
ambitions are frequently stated: “The EU has managed to pull the US and Japan […] to more credible targets” (Bjerregaard, IP‐97‐1106). We can therefore say that, if there has been such a thing as an “EU minority complex” before the Kyoto negotiations similar to the psychology of an adolescent trying to find his role, we can identify a notion of adolescent exuberance in the post‐COP3‐documents. Even stronger appeals to other actors such as Japan and USA point to a persisting wish for profiling, portraying “the other” as irresponsible and unambitious and the self in turn as the opposite – an “ambitious leader”. In this context, we can recall the definition of (self‐)identity as “the images of individuality and distinctiveness” building on a “significant other”. Another way in which the press releases dismiss “the other” as irresponsible is the focus on binding rules and the rule of law, which is clearly present in the press releases. Here too, appeals are strong. Already before COP3, this is evident when Environment Commissioner Bjerregaard reminds the US about its commitment under the UNFCCC‐Convention: “There is no way the European Union would encourage non‐respect of international commitments and there is no way we could reward such action” (IP‐97‐909). Later, the flexible mechanisms envisaged in the Kyoto Protocol represent a major concern in the press releases after the COP. While the EU has little by little joined the story‐line (despite a very skeptical EU‐position in the negotiations), there are many appeals to establish “strict rules”, a “step‐by‐step approach” and coherent rules and modalities (IP‐98‐498), because “the European Commission clearly recognizes the need to tighten as much as possible the rules for the various measures in the Protocol” (IP‐97‐1106), while they are expected to be “supplementary” (IP‐
98‐374) only. Emission trading is required to be subject to “enforceable, accountable, verifiable, open and transparent rules” (IP‐98‐374). Strong calls for shaping the details of the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol as strict and binding mechanisms might highlight on the one hand the EU’s somewhat inherent preference for international law, which has been described when EU‐foreign policy was conceptualized in chapter 2. Yet the sharp rhetoric vis‐à‐vis others also demonstrates once again the strong ambition of the EU reflected in the press releases of this period to gain in leadership profile and the self‐confident emancipation process on the international scene which has already been pointed towards. 3.2.2 | Legitimizing ambitions through science and sustainable development With the EU eager to take a more important role in addressing global climate change, legitimizing discourses become vital as they create understanding among citizens why so many resources are to be directed to such a relatively new topic. Science is thereby a prominent story‐line in 1997/98. The press releases take up science in order to present the urgency and therefore legitimacy of the matter. Environment Commissioner Bjerregaard is for instance quoted commenting upon the report of the Union of Concerned Scientists calling it “a wake‐up call for world leaders” and urging all parties to the UNFCCC “to carefully consider and respect this scientific advice on the devastating consequences of human‐induced global warming” (IP‐
97‐489). By somewhat dramatic words she is also quoted saying that “all the evidence suggests that we will have real problems in the future” (IP‐97‐489). 27 Just before Kyoto, a report by “1500 distinguished scientists, including the majority of Nobel laureates in science” is cited, which are urging all world leaders to “demonstrate a new commitment to protecting the global climate” (IP‐97‐829). Similarly, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is cited to confirm “the view, already held by the EU, that it is urgent […]” (ibid). In this context, terms like “wake‐up call”, “devastating consequences” and “real problems” all show the vocabulary of urgency – science as an alarm‐clock. It then seems as a matter of responsibility to take action and actors that do not look irresponsible in turn. A story‐line of scientific urgency also fits well into the rational rhetoric of binding rules. When scientific evidence is the legitimizing story‐line for urgency, sustainable development represents the legitimizing story‐line for feasibility. Sustainable development became institutionalized in the EU with the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, making it an overarching objective. Not surprisingly therefore, it takes a very prominent position in the 1997/‐98 press releases, representing one of the major “buzz‐words” across the documents. As a relatively new concept, there is much explanation about what is meant with the term. Throughout the press releases, the Commission portrays itself as the defender and the advocate of sustainable development, because “the current pattern of development too often entails conflicts between development and environment.” (IP‐98‐471) By seeking to develop “initiatives to guide sustainable development and the future of Europe into the next century” like conducting a study about the positive connection between investment in energy efficiency and employment (IP‐97‐
1065), sustainable development is rendered as a plan or even a vision for the future that is to help both the European economy and the global climate. Following the discursive framework of “ecological modernization”, which was proliferating in the 1980s and ‐90s, the story‐line of sustainable development has the potential to build discourse coalitions between otherwise unrelated (or in the worst case opposed) actors, i.e. between the “business‐world” and environmentalist milieus. Being closely linked to climate change (with climate change representing an “unsustainable trend”) it is therefore used to argue that fighting climate change is possible without harming the economy. Sustainable development serves as the term that is to remind the public of the fact that “the competitiveness of European industry is not at risk because of environmental regulations. On the contrary.” (Bjerregaard, IP‐97‐489) The most important measure of the business world, costs, is however only sparsely mentioned. There is some talk about limiting transport emissions and other measures as “cost‐effective policies” (IP‐98‐
307/IP‐98‐498) but there is always a lot of “could” and “would” in this context. Moreover, technological advances as a factor and an effect of climate protection are mentioned here and there but when they are, instead of concrete measures and roadmaps, a more “dreamy” language is used. For example, it is argued that “beyond 2010 the large scale introduction of new technologies such as hybrid cars, fuel cells and alternative fuels will significantly cut current emissions levels” (IP‐98‐307) without giving reasons why this could be the case. To summarize, sustainable development and its economic co‐benefits are emerging as legitimizing win‐win‐story‐line, but its details are not very embellished, so that sustainable development is more described as a thing of the future that is still to be developed. Together with the story‐line of scientific evidence, the message is: Fighting climate change is urgent but feasible. 28 3.2.3 | The moral responsibility for the developed world If this is the case, who then has the obligation to fight climate change? According to the 1997/98‐press releases, there is a clear moral obligation for the developed world to fight a phenomenon for which it is accountable. The press releases clearly distinguish between the historical responsibility of the developed world (“industrialized countries must continue to take the lead” (IP‐97‐829)) and the developing world, which is given “the legitimate priority needs [of developing countries] for the achievement of sustainable economic and social development and the eradication of poverty.” Therefore “industrialized countries must set the necessary example […]” (Bjerregaard, IP‐98‐374) and “continue to take the lead” (IP‐97‐829). There is reason to say that there is much moral language in the press releases of this time. For example, the “devastating consequences” (IP‐97‐909) of climate change seem to make it a question of responsibility and morality to take action. This is particularly present whenever the developed or the developing world comes into the picture. If we want to stay within the picture of the EU as an unsecure adolescent growing up, we could interpret the somewhat indistinct story‐line of historical responsibility as idealistic juvenile morality. What’s more, as it has been shown in the introduction to this chapter, the story‐line of “common but differentiated responsibilities” has been institutionalized in the final Kyoto‐agreement. Together with ambition, science and sustainable development, responsibility represents a major story‐line in 1997/98. 29 3.3 | 2004/2005 – Before and after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol In 2005, more than 6 years after the adoption at COP3, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. What had happened in between and why was there such a long delay between adoption and entry‐into‐
force? First of all, after COP3, the following COPs (COP4 in Buenos Aires, COP5 in Bonn, COP6 in the Hague/Bonn) further discussed details of the Kyoto Protocol. In these negotiations, detailed provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and the timeline were in the centre. This included the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JI) for climate projects between developed countries, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for climate and development projects in developing countries as well as emission trading (ET). COP7 in Marrakech bundled all these and many more provisions (for example about funding to developing countries) into the much recognized Marrakech Accords (Harris 2007, p.12). Marrakech opened the way for signature and ratification of the Protocol. While the EU was among the first to sign and ratify the Kyoto Protocol, others hesitated – the US being the most prominent skeptic: Even though the Clinton Administration had signed the final agreement to the Kyoto Protocol (it had committed itself to a reduction of 7%), “America” did not ratify the document due to a strong opposition in the Senate. Later, “when George W. Bush was elected president in 2000, one of his first political decisions was to withdraw the U.S. from the agreement […]” (Schreurs 2005, p.360). Nevertheless, following COPs in New Delhi (COP8, 2002), Milan (COP9, 2003) and Buenos Aires (COP10, 2004) discussed how to implement the Marrakech Accords and prepared for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, but also turned towards adaptation to the effects of climate change (Harris 2010, p.13). During these years, US disengagement discouraged other developed countries and meant a heavy backlash or the entry‐into‐force of the Kyoto Protocol. However, it also opened the stage for the EU: “Europe” successfully lobbied Japan and, later, Russia to ratify the Protocol. Consequently, the Kyoto Protocol eventually entered into force on February 16, 2005. Convincing these players was a necessity in the light of US‐abstinence, because one article of the Kyoto Protocol stated that 55% of the global CO2‐emissions of 1990 had to be represented in order for the protocol to enter into force9. At the same time, American abstinence had left the EU “the only game in town” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2001, p.13; quoted in Vogler/Bretherton 2006, p.9)10 to push for ratification. Before moving to the press releases of the 2004/05‐period, let us briefly turn to the domestic developments. While Kyoto negotiations on the international scene were under way, the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) (which entered into force in 1999), among many other things, implemented the principle of “sustainable development” and its integration into all policy areas (Lenschow 2010, p.311) to the EU, as the 1997/98‐documents already pointed towards. Climate change was then internally addressed mainly by the first European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), launched by the Commission in 2000. This happened in light of a fear over failing to meet the target of an 8%‐
reduction laid out in the Kyoto agreement. The aim of the ECCP was to “identify, develop and 9
Article 25 (paragraph 1) states: “This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” (Grubb/Vrolijk/Brack 1999, p.298) 10
quote by Jan Pronk, president of the sixth UNFCCC Conference of the Parties 30 introduce additional ‘common and coordinated measures’ in the most cost‐effective, least market‐
distorting way” (Berkhout et al 2010, p.145). At the centre of the package lied the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) which was officially launched in 2005. It appointed national governments to allocate emission certificates to its big polluters (such as industrial installations), thereby trying to tag a price to emission. In such a system, “greener” industries can – in theory – sell their certificates to companies that exceed the amount of allocated certificates. A “linking directive” allows for the combination with flexibility mechanisms outlined in the Kyoto Protocol, including “Joint Implementation” with developed countries and “Clean Development Mechanisms” in developing countries. Even though the ETS did not represent the very first trading scheme for emissions, the extent of the system, covering about half of all the emissions in the European Union, was new and the EU has often been described as a model or a “blueprint” (Boydell 2009, p.52) in this respect11. For all emissions not covered by the ETS, member states agreed to binding CO2‐reduction‐targets within the ECCP – in line with the Burden Sharing Agreement of the “EU bubble”. What’s more, a long list of other activities throughout different policy areas was included. Examples are the voluntary agreement with European, Japanese and Korean car‐manufacturers to limit emissions of vehicles, the binding targets for an increase of renewable energy and the potential use of so‐called “bio‐fuels”. Furthermore, in 2005, the Commission launched a second climate change program reviewing the first one and including for the first time carbon capture and storage as well as different adaptation mechanisms. 3.3.1 | “Grown‐up rhetoric” –The EU as an established actor in the world of climate politics How is international climate policy around these developments, especially the entry‐into force of the Kyoto Protocol, represented in the press releases? Let us look first again at the way the EU describes its own role, how it describes others and if and how ambition is reflected. In the 2004/05 period, there seems to be no doubt in the press releases that the EU has found its role as a consequent voice in favor of climate protection. EU leadership, here, does not have to be “asserted” or “defended”, it is just presented as given. The kind of leadership the press releases describe is one that is based on the good example (directional leader), the power of ideas (normative power) and diplomatic pressure, thereby taking up the major concepts of EU‐actorness presented in the EU‐literature. This is well summarized by the Commissioner for the Environment’s statement “We will continue to lead by example but we will also pressure hard for all of our international partners to come on board” (IP‐05‐155). IP‐04‐1285 states that “Leading by example, the EU has passed legislation that has already made all its provisions legally binding in the EU.” Not only the political work is portrayed as an example to the world, also its effects (or what can be perceived as its effects) serve to illustrate the credibility of the “model EU”: “Projections show EU on track to meet Kyoto Protocol emissions targets” (IP‐04‐1522) and: “This is vital if the EU is to maintain its leading role in combating the global challenge of climate change.” An increase in greenhouse gases in 2003 is acknowledged but mostly attributed to the member states who are called to “fully implement all the emission‐reduction actions agreed at EU 11
After the official launch of the ETS in 2005, much criticism has deemed it to be ineffective due an often extensive national allocation of emission rights, making emission certificates almost valueless due to the fact that no EU‐wide emission‐cap had been defined (Vogler 2006, p.7). Nevertheless, the ETS had demonstrated that comprehensive emission trading is possible (ibid). 31 level as well as their own national measures” (IP‐05‐767). There is clear acknowledgement of the fact that, in order to be able to continue constituting a good example to others, innovation is needed. Ideas and innovation therefore take a prominent place across the press releases of this period. Especially the European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) gets much attention as a “pioneering system” (IP‐05‐624). A “push for innovation” is demanded in the Commission’s post 2012‐strategy. Proposing a strategy for the post‐Kyoto period in 2005 already can be seen as pro‐active, a notion which the press release is ready to confirm: “Already now, we need to prepare what comes after [the Kyoto Protocol, added].” (Environment Commissioner Wallström, IP‐04‐1099) New Environment Commissioner Dimas later adds: “[…] we need to work harder […]. Kyoto is only a first step – the EU is ready to discuss further‐reaching measures for the post‐2012‐period […]’” (Dimas) (IP‐05‐187). The quotations show the way in which the press releases highlight a forward‐looking notion and try to attribute to the EU the image of a responsible, pro‐active leader. However, beyond the good example and leadership by innovation the more “traditional” concept of diplomatic leadership enters the stage. For example, Russia’s eventual ratification of the Kyoto protocol is presented as an immediate consequence of diplomatic EU‐pressure: “President Prodi and the Commission have pushed the issue repeatedly in different contacts with Russian authorities over the past months. Only last week the President held a long telephone conversation with President Putin on Kyoto Protocol.” (IP‐04‐1165) Putin is praised of having sent “a strong signal of his commitment and sense of responsibility “ (President of the Commission Prodi, ibid). Moreover, Environment Commissioner Dimas gets coverage on the occasion of his visit to the US designed to “discuss action on climate change and environmental issues of common interest for EU‐US co‐
operation.” (IP‐05‐435). Afterwards Dimas shows himself “hopeful about new phase in EU‐US relations on climate change” (IP‐05‐436), after warnings of Commission President Prodi that “the United States should not abstain from the fight that is crucial for the future of mankind” (IP‐04‐1285). While this may not say a lot about the actual influence of high EU climate diplomacy, it is possible to say that direct diplomatic consultations with other actors seem to have become more recognized EU‐
capabilities and straightforward appeals to other actors (a very frequent phenomenon in the 1997/98‐
documents) have become much smaller in number and less direct in the tone. With the Kyoto Protocol entering into force, more diplomacy goes well together with an increased emphasis on multilateralism which seems to predominate compared to mere appeals in the 1997/98‐
period. Stressing climate change as a global problem (IP‐04‐1285) is increasingly present and, according to Environment Commissioner Dimas this “requires a global response, and the EU is doing its share of advancing this response” (IP‐04‐1489). The Kyoto Protocol is presented as a good example for binding international agreements and a multilateral tool: “The Kyoto protocol is the main instrument for the global fight against climate change and a good example of the effectiveness of global cooperation.” (IP‐04‐1285) A multilateral “twist” can also be identified at the occasion of the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, when the “European Commission joins 140 nations in celebrating the entry into force today of the Kyoto Protocol, which gives the international community its most powerful instrument yet to combat climate change.” (IP‐05‐187). However, even beyond 2012, the press releases say, “the EU should continue to lead multilateral efforts to address climate change […]” (IP‐05‐155). Considering the way the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, namely through truly multilateral consultations of the EU with various actors, this emphasis on multilateralism becomes more evident – it is the logical emphasis on a game in which the EU was good at the time. 32 “Global problem”, “global response”, “international cooperation”, “140 nations” and “multilateral efforts” are all defining and reoccurring terms and may point to a more outward‐looking EU that finds its own leadership position more self‐evident. At the same time, there is not such a strong emphasis on responsibility any more. Press releases do cover financial support to the developing countries (IP‐
04‐1489) and state that “the EU is committed to assisting developing countries in dealing with the effects of climate change” (IP‐04‐1437), but the prominence of the story‐line has suffered. To summarize, compared to 1997/98, the open and ambitious rhetoric has changed into more mature, settled language. The concept of leadership is no longer linked to stormy ambitions but to the notion of a good example. This story‐line of “leadership by example“ (or directional leadership, as defined in the theory section) is presented in such a reoccurring and self‐evident way that emotional calls do not seem to be necessary any more. Instead of criticizing single actors, the press releases now stress the multilateral dimension and call upon “the world” in general. This entails that the division between developed and developing world has become less sharp and responsibility is no longer openly located on the side of the developed world only – the beginning of a discursive shift. The so much stated good example, it seems, is expected to appeal to the whole world and strong enough to have an effect on others without blaming them directly. This does not seem necessary anymore as we recall the definition of directional leadership as “solving a collective problem by making the first move and providing a model others will want to emulate.” (Parker/Karlsson 2010, p.927). Thus, the good example is expected to speak for itself. Accordingly, diplomatic activities have, while becoming more present in the press releases, also become more truly “diplomatic” in their tone, i.e. more professional and less emotional. One can understand this “calming down” of EU‐rhetoric as a sign of experience and self‐confidence. To stay within the image of a human, the 2004/05‐period represents the satisfaction of a grown‐up who perceives himself as fully respected, taken seriously and who has become more self‐confident due to own achievements. Therefore, the depreciation of other actors is not “needed“ as much anymore when defining the one role. Considered that the entry‐into force of the Kyoto Protocol, so much hailed in the press releases, can be seen as a major victory of EU diplomacy, one might even more endorse an understanding of such “positive actorness definition“. 3.3.2 | Legitimacy through economic and moral story‐lines An overarching characteristic of the 2004/05‐press releases is the presence of economic terms such as “cost‐effectiveness”, “efficiency” or “competitiveness” – words that have been widely absent in the previous period. For instance, Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is not only welcomed as a decisive step to protect the climate but it is also presented as an economic opportunity. For example, Joint Implementation Mechanisms are described to attract foreign capital: “Joint Implementation projects can help Russia improve its energy efficiency and thus its competitiveness” (IP04‐1285). Concerning the domestic situation, the press releases frequently highlight that “the transition to a climate‐friendly society offers economic opportunities for the EU” (IP‐05‐155). Most of the times, these terms are mentioned in the context of the market‐based European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), which was launched in 2005. The ETS is portrayed as a tool that “will ensure that greenhouse gas emissions in the energy and industry sectors are cut at least cost to the economy” (IP‐04‐1489 / IP‐05‐9) or simply that “emissions are cut where it is cheapest” (IP‐04‐1489). The decision of the UK to take part in the ETS is presented as helping the EU “to tackle climate change in a cost effective 33 way” (IP‐05‐283). As these examples show, whenever the ETS is mentioned as a tool to tackle climate change, the press releases are quick to mention the economic reasonability behind the system. In the institutional context, the Commission is highlighted as the referee in the ETS, approving or dismissing national allocation plans of emission rights to national industries, a fact that is much communicated as it gives the EU Commission direct power to influence national economies. In this context, with regard to the rise of the story‐line of cost‐effectiveness, efficiency and competitiveness, the ETS represents a good example of discourse institutionalization, because it directly follows the economic logic that emissions are to be cut where it is cheapest and the win‐win‐rhetoric of sustainable development and ecological modernization. This is remarkable, because seven years before, this economic story‐line basically did not exist. Thus, a strong discursive shift that even allowed for institutionalization has occurred between the two periods. Thus climate protection is, throughout the 2004/05‐press‐releases, presented as something that can be achieved at low costs, while at the same time offering economic co‐benefits such as improved efficiency and competitiveness. Such story‐lines demonstrate its feasibility and add legitimacy to EU climate action. Public opinion and morality are two subordinate legitimizing story‐lines that are nevertheless fairly present. Whereas the emphasis on scientific evidence as a major 1997/98‐story‐
line has vanished, the story‐line of sustainable development has been broken down into a more concrete legitimizing story‐line of economic co‐benefits that stresses the compatibility of the environment and the economy – following the logic of ecological modernization. We should recall here that the changes or the specialization of story‐lines is not to be seen as a deliberate action of the EU‐Commission, deciding to adopt its discourse out of a given interest only. Rather, we can conceive of these changes of a general change of the discursive structure (offering rising alternative story‐lines of ecological modernization, e.g. through the engagement of business players in the climate change discussion) and a conscious emphasis on some of these alternatives on the side of the EU. A conscious emphasis on the story‐line of economic co‐benefits thereby is used to include as many actors as possible in the overall climate protection discourse, because, as “grown‐up” leader, it is now important to speak and appeal to different interest groups. Besides economic story‐lines, a talk of morality as well as a moral tonality in the language can be seen as another legitimizing story‐line in international EU climate policy. Russia’s eventual ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is for instance not only welcomed but, as a quotation of Commission President Prodi shows, represents a “strong signal of his [Putin’s, added] commitment and sense of responsibility” (IP‐04‐1165). At the same time, the United States’ abstinence is seen as a signal of irresponsibility as it is nothing less than “the future of mankind” (Prodi, IP‐04‐1285) that is at stake. Talking about the future of mankind implies an immense moral obligation to act and so climate change is often presented as “not a matter of choice, but a matter of necessity” (IP‐05‐155). Thus, morality seems to have taken over a big part of the scientific argumentative story‐line that builds on facts and figures to present the urgency and therefore to gain legitimacy to act. When the next President of the Commission Barroso wants to “save our planet for future generations” (IP‐05‐
187) and warns that “without clear political leadership and commitment to change, our children and grandchildren will not be able to enjoy the prosperity and quality of life we have today” (IP‐05‐156), there does not seem to be a big need to explain scientific evidence anymore and one can directly proceed to its moral demands to act. One could interpret the usage of moral language as a sign for a self‐image of the EU that has incorporated more self‐consciously the notion of a normative power 34 (i.e. the power to project core values beyond one’s own borders) in the light of a rising presence on the international stage of climate negotiations. Least strikingly but still important, public opinion serves as a source of legitimacy for EU climate politics in the press releases, somewhat sustaining the moral considerations. A good example is the public consultation about how to engage aviation in climate protection. IP‐05‐1024 summarizes “the message from the many citizens and organizations who expressed their views”, with a message that is “very clear”: “it is time for the air transport sector to start contributing to the fight against climate change” (Dimas). Furthermore, a “Eurobarometer” survey shows that the environment is the number one issue for citizens in the EU15‐countries (yet it is number seven in the ten new Eastern European member states). The survey is, according to Environment Commissioner Dimas “proof that European citizens care greatly about their environment” (IP‐05‐513). Another result cited from the poll is that a majority of the European citizens see environmental protection as an “incentive for innovation” (ibid), thereby sustaining the other legitimizing story‐line of economic benefit. To sum up, the major story‐lines in 2004/05 are leadership by example, multilateral presence, economic co‐benefits and moral obligation. 35 3.4 | 2009/2010 – Before and after COP15 in Copenhagen The 2009 COP15 in Copenhagen raised much hope for the adoption of a follow‐up regime to Kyoto, yet did not end in a breakthrough. Constituting the focal point of the third and last of the chosen periods, we will, also here, look at the EU’s discursive representation in the press releases from six months prior to six months after the event, i.e. the COP15‐negotiations. However, to begin let us look at the political developments in the run‐up and around the conference. After the entry‐into‐force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, UNFCCC‐negotiations were continuing, already envisaging the time after Kyoto (from 2012). COP11 in Montreal took place despite US‐
opposition; it accepted the flexible mechanisms within the Marrakech Accords and further formalized rules for the flexible mechanisms (Harris 2010, p.15). COP12 in Nairobi (2006) saw little progress but in COP13 in Bali (2007) the adopted “Bali Road Map” laid out an action plan for the adoption of a follow‐up regime by 2009 (UNFCCC (3)). COP14 in Poznan confirmed this and finished with the installation of an adaptation fund (UNFCCC (4)). Even though negotiations were slow, the 2009 Conference in Copenhagen was to be the decisive moment for a follow‐up‐regime to Kyoto. In 2008, in the forefront of the negotiations over a follow‐up‐regime of the Kyoto‐Protocol in Copenhagen, the EU tried to show determination to bring back momentum to the international negotiations. However, nine new Eastern European states had joined in 2004 and 2007 and they were expected to favor their economic development over a strong climate change package. At the same time, the financial crisis induced many countries to protect their energy‐intensive industries. As an effect, the ambitious proposal of the EU‐Commission in 2008 was watered down substantially. Nevertheless, the final agreement, the Climate and Energy Package (ECEP) – better known as the “20‐
20‐20‐package”, defined ambitious goals to (1) improve energy efficiency by 20%, (2) to increase the percentage of renewable energies to 20% and (3) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20%. All goals were to be achieved by 2020. An ETS covering more emissions (such as aviation industries) and restricting the number of EU‐wide allowances, new rules for “carbon capture and storage”, and binding reductions of greenhouse gas emissions for sectors not covered by the ETS (Lenschow 2010, p.324) were defined as important ways to achieve the 20‐20‐20‐goal, while the principle of burden sharing continuously entailed that, once again, national plans looked very different. The aspiration of the EU to put a comparably ambitious plan to the table in Copenhagen can be seen as an aspiration to continue to be (and to be perceived) a leader in this area, directed both towards “the world” and towards its own citizens. Parker and Karlsson (2010) argue that the EU is, or at least was then, striving to be a directional and an idea‐based leader in a global climate change regime, with the former being more important. In the course of the 2009 negotiations over a follow‐up regime to Kyoto in Copenhagen (COP15), these leadership ambitions suffered as much as the Copenhagen summit has suffered from a lack of success. Haug/Berkhout (2010) summarize it as following: “For the European Union, the December 2009 United Nations climate change conference in Copenhagen represents more than a grand failure of political strategy. The outcomes of the summit left European policy‐makers and the public disillusioned over the prospects for a strong and legally binding global climate change regime after 2012.” (p.21) More precisely, the final agreement, envisaging a new conference and rendering climate change mitigation a domestic issue rather than an internationally binding one, was achieved in a night‐session without a major role assigned to the EU (Stawins/Stowe 2010, p.8). Moreover, the EU‐
36 carrot to step up its own ambitions from a 20%‐reduction to a 30%‐reduction for the case that other developed countries were to follow did not prove successful. The establishment of the new “DG Climate Action” within the Commission in February 2010 (europa.eu (3)) could not change the fact that, internationally, the EU was not able to win back leadership in the following conference (COP16) in Cancun, as it still could not find support for a legally binding agreement. The outcome of Cancun still does not include any spelled out commitments of its members and, whereas it sets up a fund for helping developing countries mitigate and adapt, it does not specify how the money shall be provided (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties 2010). The international NGO “Friends of the World”, for instance, argues that “In Cancún, the EU failed to take a leading role, and was content to hide behind inaction from other developed countries such as Japan, Russia and the United States.” (Friends of the Earth Europe 2010, p.3) Hence, while an international climate protection regime may have taken a step forward in Cancun and might do so even more in the next conference in Durban (COP17), EU‐influence to this has become more doubtable with many arguing that power to lead has suffered substantially. 3.4.1 | A skyrocketing coverage The first thing that stands out when looking at the documents from the third time period is simply quantitative. The number of press releases issued by the EU‐Commission in 2009/10 represents a sharp increase compared to 2004/05 and even more so compared to 1997/98, both in terms of climate‐change‐related and unrelated (irrelevant) documents. Whereas in 1997/98, only 20 documents have been issued meeting the search criteria within the 12 examined months, this number increased to 53 in 2004/5 and even to 172 in 2009/10. Compared to the total number of documents, the number of relevant documents (excluding documents that mention the term “climate change” as a side note only) has increased less steeply, yet still significantly. The number of these documents has changed from 16 (1997/98) over 28 (2004/05) to 86 (2008/09). Consequently, the fraction of relevant documents has diminished from almost 100% to 50%. What can explain such a drastic increase? One approach to explaining this shift is to look at the changing institutional setup and expanding legal powers of the EU and the EU‐Commission. The increase of documents over these 13 years then simply represents a general broader activity of the EU‐Commission, stemming from an extended mandate. From this perspective, the Maastricht Treaty from 1992, the Amsterdam Treaty from 1999, the Nice Treaty from 2003 and the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, having each extended the role of the EU, gave it a stronger mandate and therefore more opportunities to publish. Specifically, in the field of climate change, we have seen in the historical accounts how the EU has gained competences over time. Most importantly, the 1999‐Amsterdam Treaty introduced sustainable development to the EU‐agenda and thereby extended the mandate of the EU‐
Commission as a proposer and safeguard of EU‐legislation concerning climate change. The legal approach in turn leads to another way to explain the sharp increase of the numbers of documents. This way is described with the concept of discourse institutionalization. According to this interpretation, an ever increasing presence of the climate discourse both within the EU and outside has incentivized the EU‐Commission to shift resources from other policy areas to climate change, leading to an organizational adoption within the Commission. Consequently, Directorate Generals traditionally less concerned with environmental issues such as DG Trade or DG Agriculture install divisions and offices specifically concerned with climate change in relation to their issue‐area. Such 37 created offices, agencies or secretariats would in turn publish their own press releases concerning climate change and thereby increase the overall number of published documents. Here, the best example is the establishment of “DG Climate Action” in February 2010 (europa.eu (3)). However, discourse institutionalization does not only concern organizational change within an institution but also the setting‐up of new policies and a shifting focus within existing policy‐areas. “Climate change” as a term, then appears in the context of newly created climate policies as well as in the context of other policies, thereby changing from the special term of a few mandated officials into a must‐have to include in a press‐release – something that must be considered in the process of the formulation of a policy, a communication or just a piece of news, even when not directly related to climate change. Taken together, the legal and discursive approach can well explain the picture of the increasing importance of climate change over the time‐span of 13 years. They are two sides of the same coin as institutions can spur a certain story‐line, while a story‐line can also trigger institutional change. Together, they can illustrate the rise of climate change as a cross‐sectional topic to an extent where it defines a part of the EU’s raison‐d’être. 3.4.2 | From self‐confidence to pragmatism Besides the sheer number of documents there are other striking characteristics regarding the major story‐lines inside this high number of press releases. Let us look first at the more obvious role‐
description of the EU and the way it is changing during the period. Setting up conditions for own action is a very present characteristic of the 2009/10‐documents. This conditional offer is portrayed as the carrot that can move other actors to higher reductions. Prior to the Copenhagen‐negotiations, the papers frequently highlight the offer of a 30%‐reduction of greenhouse gases (compared to the unconditional 20%‐reduction), which will only be taken if “other industrialized countries agree to make comparable reductions and economically more advanced developing countries contribute adequately to a global deal” (IP‐09‐1361). The insistent way in which the incentive is offered in the case that “partners in both the developed and the developing world take on their fair share of the global effort” (IP‐09‐1867) allows the conclusion that conditionality is seen as a very powerful incentive to influence the COP15‐negotiations. What’s more, by stating that the EU is “ready to scale up [our] emission reduction to 30%” (ibid), the credibility of the conditional offer is pushed. An actor who is putting up conditions for (further) own action can be seen as having a very strong self‐image, because he is counting on own power and importance to make other actors “move”. We can therefore understand the EU’s self‐representation before Copenhagen as a “climate heavy‐weight”; an accepted, powerful and crucial player in the global arena. However, after Copenhagen, the issue of conditionality is losing significance – little surprisingly if one takes into account the outcome of the conference. Instead, the Commission issues a press release presenting “an informed debate on the impacts of the move to 30% EU greenhouse gas emissions cut if and when the conditions are met” (IP‐10‐618), thereby opening the floor for potential discussion about the sense of the conditionality. By framing the move as a “political decision”, it plays the ball to the deciding EU‐bodies. Besides the “conditionality‐carrot”, one can identify the self‐conscious rhetoric of an established and self‐confident actor and “the good example” prior to the Copenhagen meeting, firmly advancing demands and calls towards others, thereby continuing the 2004/05‐story‐lines of structural and directional leadership. However, one can also sense a feeling of realism and impatience emerging in the press releases as COP15 is advancing. 38 Prior to Copenhagen, the EU is mostly described as playing a “leading role in the global fight against climate change” (IP‐09‐1141), even though it is recognized that “reaching an international agreement is a formidable political challenge”, in which it is “more important than ever for the EU to assert its leadership role” (IP‐09‐1561). Here, having to “assert” the leadership‐role leaves room for interpretation that this role is beginning to be questioned by others – the inconspicuous beginning of a discursive shift towards greater modesty. Yet, at this point the press‐releases still seem relatively sure of the EU’s role as a leading player, particularly by stressing its achievements: The EU is seen, for instance, as being “on track to deliver on its Kyoto Protocol commitments” and thereby cementing “the EU’s leadership in delivering on [our] international commitments” (Dimas, IP‐09‐1703). It is also said that the EU has “shown that it can successfully decouple its emissions from economic growth” (IP‐09‐1260). It therefore sees credibility on the side of the EU, delivering on commitments like a reliable business partner respects a contract. Even the European Commission itself is shown as a good example being “greener than ever” (IP‐09‐1349) after internal action within the organization. With this perceived credibility, the EU is demanding for a “comprehensive, ambitious, fair, science‐based and legally binding global treaty”(IP‐
09‐1867) to be signed in Copenhagen, sustaining the theoretical conception of the EU as an actor embedded in tight multilateral law. However, a notion of realism seems to make its way into the press releases closer to Copenhagen. For example, the goal of a comprehensive, ambitious, fair, science‐based and legally binding treaty is watered down into the goal to “make as much progress as possible towards a full treaty” (IP‐09‐
1867). IP‐09‐1297 identifies an “impasse” in the wake of the negotiations, which the EU wants to break by coming forward with a “finance blueprint” for developing nations (IP‐09‐1297). There is also much discontent with the negotiation rounds preceding COP15 in Copenhagen. Here, the EU seems like a nagging mother (a sign of nervousness?), complaining about “a negotiating text on the table of more than 250 pages, poorly structured and full of brackets” (IP‐09‐1361). In line with such discontent, the EU is not satisfied with the ambition of other countries, without always naming them. Environment Commissioner Dimas’ quotation expresses such discontent: “I am now looking to our partners in both the developed and the developing world to bring much greater urgency and ambition to the table” (IP‐09‐1361), while again highlighting that “the EU is pressing for an ambitious and comprehensive deal” (ibid). In general, appeals to the world and other countries are proliferating prior to COP15. Commission President Barroso (“We must seize this chance […] before it is too late.” (IP‐09‐1867)) and Environment Commissioner Dimas (“This is a timely message to the rest of the world” (IP‐09‐1361)) are most frequently quoted. They claim that “statements […] need to be turned into concrete actions" (Dimas, ibid). Countries with "weak targets" are "urged to improve them", but again without naming these countries (IP‐09‐1876). Things seem to change dramatically after COP15. The number of press releases talking about global climate change negotiations is, compared to the pre‐COP‐period, surprisingly small. Whereas the adoption and the entry‐into‐force of the Kyoto‐Protocol have both kept up or even pushed coverage on climate change, we can thus see the opposite development after COP15 – the topic seems to be avoided after the event. Wherever Copenhagen is mentioned anyway, it is done so in a very factual language – The time of dramatic appeals and calls for urgent action seems to be over. For instance, a high diplomatic meeting between US and EU‐delegates ends in the dry statement of "the importance 39 of adaptation, of reducing emissions from deforestation, and of mitigation" (IP‐10‐463). The atmosphere of departure has, it seems, turned into an atmosphere of realism and pragmatism, in which even adaptation gets a prominent position. The new focus is on building confidence to "bolster the EU's outreach" (IP‐10‐255). What's more, there is a stronger focus on domestic action after the COP‐negotiations, as the following quote from Barroso shows: “Even if the Copenhagen Accord fell short of Europe’s ambitions, the increasing support for it around the world gives the EU the opportunity to build on this and channel it into action. The most convincing leadership Europe can show is to take tangible and determined action to become the most climate friendly region in the world” (IP‐10‐255). Even if he further states that the EU Commission is “determined to keep up momentum for global action on climate change” (ibid), the realism and almost disappointment is visible when reflecting that “EU is ready but the world might not be” (ibid). The new focus on domestic action is obvious in Climate Action Commissioner Hedegaard’s comment on the further role of the EU: “With negotiations on a global climate agreement for the post‐2012 era continuing, showing that Europe is able to deliver on our commitments under Kyoto is of paramount importance” (IP‐10‐659). A modest work on the own domestic actions seem to be the main remaining tool of influence identified in the post‐Copenhagen press releases. The term “leadership” is used very little. Accordingly, when analyzing the prospects of an unconditional move to a 30%‐reduction it is warned that the EU’s lead in green growth “cannot be taken for granted as international competition becomes fiercer” (IP‐10‐618). In summary, the 2009/10‐press‐releases present the EU climate‐leadership as natural at first, with a conditional incentive perceived as very powerful, and the “model EU” in the middle of the communication. It seems that the 2004/05 story‐lines of leadership by example (directional leadership) and structural leadership have established itself and are extending to some extent over to the pre‐COP15‐period. Yet, as Copenhagen is approaching, the language gets more realistic concerning global efforts, more cautious concerning the prospects of the COP‐negotiations and more impatient in their appeals to the world. Yet, the attractiveness of EU‐leadership is not yet questioned and the notion of a powerful leader is reflected in the prominence of the EU’s conditional offer and the demonstrated belief in its effectiveness. After leadership by ambition and leadership by example, this first part of the 2009/10‐period therefore interprets the concept of leadership more in terms of power – a concept that could be coined “leadership by soft power”. After Copenhagen, however, this story‐line suddenly seems old‐fashioned. The few documents that have been published are rather focusing on the internal dimension of climate change. They mirror a feeling of disillusioned retreat, summarized in the sentence “EU is ready but the world might not be” (IP‐10‐255). The term leadership is abandoned and replaced by “momentum” which needs to be kept up. This strong discursive shift in the period’s press releases point to a strong turning point in the EU’s self‐image. Whereas the notion of the mature, self‐confident multilateral leader (the “grown‐up”) seems to be prevailing in the pre‐Copenhagen‐time, this self‐image has apparently been challenged by disappointed expectations in the aftermath of the Copenhagen‐conference. After the conference, disillusion replaces self‐confidence and the story‐line of a powerful leader, most prominently reflected in the conditionality clause, seems to have disappeared. 40 3.4.3 | Legitimizing through an economic vision The 2009/10‐press releases take the "low‐carbon‐economy" as a very central concept linked to climate protection. The long‐term economic benefits of a low‐carbon‐economy, including "green jobs" (IP‐09‐977), "green growth" (IP‐09‐1188) and "first‐mover‐advantages" (IP‐09‐1272), serve to legitimize EU‐action against climate change by presenting action not only as an environmental necessity but also as an economically beneficial trend. The story‐line of low‐carbon‐economy has thereby to a large extend replaced the broader story‐line of sustainable development (1997/98) and, to some extent, economic co‐benefits (2004/05) as the major economic legitimizers. Sustainable development in turn is not as present any more and appears mostly as something that the EU has already implemented. IP‐09‐1188 shows that, whenever it is mentioned, the low‐carbon‐economy is "stealing sustainable development the show": “In recent years the EU has mainstreamed sustainable development into a broad range of its policies. In particular, the EU has taken the lead in the fight against climate change and the promotion of a low‐carbon economy.” (IP‐09‐1188) The COP15‐negotiations are framed as a major opportunity "to draw the roadmap to a global low‐
carbon society, and in so doing unleash a wave of innovation that can revitalize our economies through the creation of new, sustainable growth sectors and 'green collar' jobs" (Barroso, IP‐09‐1867). The Commission also calls for strong internal funding to "change an energy model based on polluting, scarce and risky fossil fuels, into a clean, sustainable and less dependent one.” (IP‐09‐1431) Positive wording such as "unleash a wave of innovation" and "clean, sustainable and less dependent" thereby serves to present the low‐carbon‐economy as an attractive vision – it abandons at the same time the “win‐win‐rhetoric” or earlier periods by focusing on the “economic win”. This also draws upon a notion of climate protection as something fashionable, young and creative, which the EU is both using and promoting. One can identify a tendency to blend climate change with notions of lifestyle throughout the press‐releases prior to Copenhagen. A prominent example is the cooperation with the music channel MTV (IP‐09‐1141: “Climate change: EU and MTV enlist international artists to mobilize youth audiences in run‐up to Copenhagen climate conference”) in order to raise awareness among younger people. Climate change, it seems, is seen by the EU as a viable topic to profile and “market” itself. Even though full achievement of the low‐carbon‐economy is often described to be expected by 2050 only, the press‐releases mostly refer to the Europe 2020‐strategy which is to "make EU a smarter, greener social market" (IP‐09‐1807). To achieve this goal, technological innovation is portrayed as the tool to "stimulate growth, create new jobs and services and help the EU meet climate change goals." (ibid) Opposite development, however, is presented as the decline of Europe (ibid). While “green” growth and jobs are thus the major “buzz‐words” of the low‐carbon‐economy story‐line, they are more visionary in their appeal to the overall economy than mere energy efficiency and can therefore no longer be seen as co‐benefits only. Yet, the low‐carbon‐economy is not only presented as a beneficial development but also as a goal that everybody needs to work hard for. Businesses are therefore included in the press releases more openly and frequently than ever, for example when “Commissioner Hedegaard invites EU business heads to round table on maintaining low‐carbon leadership” (IP‐10‐565). As we have seen, the “business factor” in climate change is generally very present and the impact of climate change policies on European businesses is discussed in a straightforward and open way. Taking jobs as an example, it is acknowledged that, while jobs are created through climate protection policies, jobs are also lost. In addition, “green skills” are needed to 41 “do the same jobs with less CO2” (IP‐09‐977). Another example is the phenomenon of “carbon leakage”, which describes the movement of energy‐intensive and therefore climate‐harming industries to places where energy is cheaper, thereby not contributing to a net reduction of greenhouse gases. Carbon leakage as a business‐centered concept gets prominent coverage in the press‐releases, for example when it is spoken about member states proposing lists of exposed sectors (IP‐09‐1338) or when it is assured that carbon leakage is considered in the Commission's 30%‐
Communication (IP‐10‐618). This shows that, while business responsibilities are addressed more openly, business‐interests are also considered more openly. Here, “carbon capture and storage” (CCS) can be seen as a viable example. Being a controversial technology as it does not incentivize emission‐reductions, the press‐
releases nevertheless identify CCS as a “bridge technology” that “could make a significant contribution by mitigating the greenhouse gas emissions produced” (IP‐09‐1022). Other than economic visions, the 2009/10‐press releases do not feature science as a major legitimizing story‐line. Even though it does occur in the big number of documents, for example when the EU‐Commission's acceptance for the IPCC is hailed (IP‐09‐1609) or when Barroso stresses the importance of science at the G8‐summit (IP‐09‐1090), scientific evidence does not have a central position any longer in arguing for climate protection or in justifying urgency and gaining legitimacy. This is in line with a trend already identified in the 2004/05‐documents, which saw climate science as a less important legitimizing story‐line compared to 1997/98. Even more than in 2004/05, convincing others about the urgency of the matter seems unnecessary around COP15. Instead the press‐releases highlight the attractiveness of the vision “low‐carbon‐economy” and its economic benefits, which has moved the focus from urgency (pull‐factor) to feasibility and opportunity (pull‐factor). The very present “business language” in the press releases may also point towards a changed self‐
image. Other than the aggressive environmentalist it has represented in 1997/98 and the experienced multilateral lobbyist it has represented in 2004/05 it is now representing a powerful businessman who has fully internalized economic opportunities of climate protection, which fits together well with the above identified self‐image as a powerful climate leader – at least before COP15. 3.4.4 | Balancing the responsibilities of the developed and the developing world While the story‐line of a low‐carbon‐economy is predominantly used to legitimize climate protection vis‐à‐vis the European citizens, who is held responsible in the 2009/10‐press‐releases for fighting climate change globally? Here also, we can identity a discursive shift compared to previous press releases. When Environment Commissioner Dimas is quoted prior to the preparatory COP‐meeting in Bangkok with the words “I am looking to our partners in both the developed and the developing world to bring much greater urgency and ambition to the table” (IP‐09‐1361), one can identify a more “balanced” account of global responsibility reflected in the 2009/10‐press releases. On the one hand, the documents still see big historical responsibilities on the side of the developed countries when they, for instance, present the EU's readiness to provide fast‐start‐funding to developing countries prior to and after Copenhagen (“essential to the EU's credibility” (IP‐10‐255)) or speak about Bangladeshi villagers as victims of climate change who “constantly need to seek shelter from cyclones” (IP‐10‐642). On the other hand the press releases underline that “action by developed and developing countries alike is essential to ensure global warming is kept below the danger level of 2ºC” (IP‐09‐1022). Furthermore, it is distinguised between “developing countries” and “emerging countries”: “The EU recognizes the 42 need to increase confidence between industrialized, emerging and developing countries[...]” (IP‐09‐
1302). The term “emerging countries” is thereby a new phenomenon and these emerging countries are assigned much greater responsibilities than before, which is visible in direct diplomatic meetings with China (IP‐09‐1835), India (IP‐09‐1042), Russia (IP‐09‐1724) or at the G8‐summit in L'Aquila, Italy (IP‐09‐1090). Moreover, financing of climate adaptation is perceived as a shared responsibility and no longer a responsibility of the developed world only: “Much of the finance needed will have to come from domestic sources and an expanded international carbon market [...]” (IP‐09‐1297). The emergence of the story‐line of shared responsibility thereby represents a strong discursive shift compared to the previous periods where the EU generally perceived itself as the advocate of the developing world (even though the prominence of the issue has gone down in 2004/05). Now, the simple distinction between the guilty developed world (the Annex I‐countries) and the innocent developing world (the non‐Annex I‐countries) is abandoned and responsibility is being perceived in a more differentiated way, for example with the new term “emerging countries” as a middle‐ground concept. Summing up the 2009/10‐period, the major story‐lines identified in this period are powerful leadership, turning into a more realistic and inward‐looking pragmatism, the low‐carbon economy and its related business‐opportunities and the shared responsibility between the developed and the developing world. The EU’s self‐representation can be seen as a self‐confident and powerful global leader before COP15, constantly considering the role of business (an established business man to stay within the image of a human being), and a disillusioned, inward‐looking pragmatist after COP15 – a development representing a drastic change in self‐image. 43 4 Concluding discussion: Story‐lines and self‐image in flux The foregoing discussion of the EU‐Commission’s press releases from 1997/98, 2004/05 and 2009/10 has unearthed a number of interesting story‐lines. Some of them have “survived” the years and may have been adapted to a changing discursive structure; some of them have ceased to appear over the years while some of them have arisen at some point. Content‐wise, they can be distinguished into story‐lines that describe the EU’s role in international climate politics and story‐lines that deal with international climate policies – yet both groups are, as a matter of fact, closely interlinked. 4.1 | Revisiting the theory At this point, it makes sense to look back to the theoretical framework in a more explicit way. Which concepts of Maarten Hajer’s (1995) argumentative approach have been most present and helpful and what do the identified discourses and their shifts tell us about conceptualizations of the “actor EU” as presented in the theory‐part? Hajer’s concepts of story‐lines, discourse coalitions and discourse institutionalization have proved to be very helpful in this thesis. As story‐lines are symbolizing and, to some extent, simplifying discourses that allow different actors to agree that something “sounds right”, they are perhaps most obvious in press releases, trying to persuade press and public that the EU’s climate policies sound right. The example of the story‐line of scientific urgency shows this: Climate science is a very complicated field with theses, anti‐theses, projections, scenarios and so on. This complexity is broken down in the 1997/98‐press releases, not as a difficult academic struggle for truth, but as an alarm clock, symbolizing the urgent need for immediate action. This problem‐definition is easily understandable for non‐climate scientists. Another example of a powerful symbol within a story‐line is the 2004/05 representation of the ETS as the ultimate tool for cost‐effectiveness. In this case it is the EU that joins a story‐line of cost‐effectiveness to cut emissions “where it is cheapest” (IP‐04‐
1489). Even though the ETS has faced much criticism and initially covered only around half of all emissions, its symbolization as a cost‐effective tool for climate protection might appeal to, for example, both a businessman and a progressive environmentalist in the same way. This brings us to the concept of discourse coalitions. Even though this study only looks at EU‐
discourses, considering provided background information nevertheless allows identifying discourse coalitions to a certain extent. The story‐line of cost‐effectiveness for example points towards a discourse coalition in 2004/05 and 2009/10 between the EU, the European economy and, in parts, the United States as the major proponent of flexibility in the negotiations. This discourse coalition is not present yet in the 1997/98‐period, where the very skeptical EU‐position towards flexibility measures rather points to a discourse coalition with more fundamental environmentalists and NGOs, also reflected by the insistence on the responsibility of the developed world and binding targets. In this coalition, the EU shared skepticism about flexibility measures as loopholes and distraction from “real” action. As the press releases showed, this discourse coalition however much looser in the following periods, which does not only apply to the economy‐part but also to the responsibility‐part. Here, the EU has changed from an ambitious advocate of the developing world to a more balanced story‐line of shared responsibility, thereby joining in parts a discourse coalition of other developed countries led by the USA. We can see here that the concept of discourse coalitions is a very helpful one to “glue together” different actors and therefore broaden the scope of study. As this thesis was concerned 44 with the EU’s discourse only, the concept could, however, not be applied to the full extent, because notions of discourse coalitions have to rely on background descriptions of other actors rather than on their first‐hand discourse. Background information also helps to apply the third of Hajer’s concepts, called “discourse institutionalization”. This term describes the “incarnation” of a story‐line into the organization, setup or policy outcome of an institution. The most prominent example here is the setting‐up of “DG Climate Action” within the Commission in 2010, which represents the general rise of the topic of climate change over the periods (e.g. illustrated by the number of documents) and the evolution of climate change as a stand‐alone topic rather than a subtopic of environmental protection. Another good example is the launch of the ETS in 2005, which can be seen as a direct institutionalization of the story‐line of cost‐effectiveness, described above. It has been mentioned that this story‐line rests upon the rationale of the meta‐discourse of “ecological modernization”, which began to rise in the 1980s and had not yet become institutionalized in the 1997/98‐period. Together, Hajer’s argumentative approach with its three key‐concepts has proven to be helpful in this work. At the same time, the findings (changing and interlinked story‐lines and discourse coalitions and their institutionalization) sustain the theoretical premises of Hajer’s approach. EU‐theory represents the second interest in this discussion. Here, it is of general interest whether the conceptualizations of the EU “on the market” have proven to be viable and to what extent different notions of EU‐actorness can be sustained after an analysis of its international climate policy discourses. It has been stated that most scholars today perceive of the EU as a “player of growing resource and influence in its own right” (Hill/Smith 2005 (1), p.400). The discourses in the press releases sustain this notion of independent actorness as there are only very few references to the member states (and if so, the Commission is presented as the referee over their national plans). Accordingly, the press‐
releases do not draw on member states’ legitimacy – for example when urging others to act or upon diplomatic consultations. It can therefore be stated that the EU speaks as an independent and self‐
confident player and in turn perceives itself as one. However, this does of course not mean that we can just approximate the EU’s actorness in international climate politics to a “traditional” nation state (this assessment should perhaps be left to studies of international climate politics). After acknowledging the EU as an actor in its own right, what can be said about the international identity of this actor as represented in the discourses? Identity has been defined as a social psychological concept including notions of “individuality and distinctiveness” and “significant others” (see chapter 2.2.1 for the definition). The question of who is the EU’s significant other in international climate politics seems easy: As a matter of fact, the US is often characterized as the most important “other”, for example when criticizing its “weak level of ambition” (IP‐97‐909) in 1997, its abstinence from the negotiations (IP‐04‐1285) and its “non‐respect of international commitments” in 2004. There are also other prominent “others” like Japan (in 1997/98) or Russia (in 2004/05), yet the overall presence of the other as the “bad guy” is much diminishing over the three periods. Here we can point to the emerging discourse coalition between the EU and the US over flexible measures and the role of the economy. However, it is also evident that fewer appeals to the “others” stem from a more positive identity, i.e. an identity that relies more on characteristics of the “self”. Here, the general idea of EU‐identity as a multilateral actor embedded in diplomacy and international law is supported, as especially the 1997/98 and 2004/05‐documents mirror strong story‐lines of binding rules and multilateral engagement and thereby post‐modern objectives and instruments. This is in line with 45 concepts such as Sedelmeier’s (2005) “normative structure” and Manner’s (2002) concept of “normative power”. Whereas the normative‐structure concept describes a diffusion of norms, the normative power‐concept describes their active and successful promotion in the world. The latter can thereby be identified most clearly in the pre‐Copenhagen period, where notions of power translated into conditional offers. However, the abrupt disillusion and the focus on the domestic arena after COP15 raise doubts about the EU’s perceived normative influence in international climate politics since 2010. Finally, the concept of “directional leadership” describes well the self‐representation of the EU as an actor in large parts of the press‐releases. “Leading by example” and “innovation” are very prominent terms especially in 2004/05 with the launch of the ETS representing the most advanced achievement of the “model EU”. After Copenhagen, directional leadership is, while linked to doubts, still present when the EU states that the most convincing leadership is “to take tangible and determined action to become the most climate friendly region in the world” (IP‐10‐255). Therefore, more than the “normative power”‐concept or the post‐modern identity, directional leadership has “survived” COP15. This discussion of EU‐actorness as represented in the international climate discourse points out that most EU literature is not conceiving of the EU as an actor in traditional realist terms for good reasons. The definition of what the EU in the international (climate‐) arena exactly is, if not a state, is a tricky one – both in large parts of the literature and in this work. A good alternative way seems to be to define the EU in more constructivist terms as an actor characterized by its identity and norms rather than a “pole” in the world. 4.2 | Summarizing the major findings To conclude this work, let us return to a summary of the most important findings drawn from the material. Before moving over to the major story‐lines, it is important to recall that the discourse studied here is not a reflection of international climate politics as such. Rather, the studied discourse reflects the way the EU gives meaning to the physical and social reality of climate change and international climate politics (compare Hajer’s definition of discourse in chapter 2.2.2). Therefore, the studied discourse tells us more about the EU than about climate politics. It is also important to note once again in this context that the EU does not invent certain story‐lines just because they “fit best”. Instead (and in line with Hajer and Foucault) it is subject to a set of discursive practices which restrict the way story‐lines can be produced, reproduced and transformed (compare chapter 2.2.2) and thereby indirectly dependent on other actors’ discourses. The best way to go about in a summary is to recall what was initially asked. Two research questions were posed in the beginning, of which the first one was How has the EU represented international climate policy between 1997 and 2010? The following four points shall give a brief résumé of the EU’s international climate policy representation: 
Firstly, the concept of climate‐leadership draws through the press releases on a meta‐policy level, yet through different story‐lines. The first period very rarely brings up the term “leadership”; ambitious rhetoric and frequent and open appeals to other actors can, however, be seen to imply the EU’s struggle for a strong international profile and eventually climate leadership – a notion that has been coined “leadership by ambition” in this work. 46 Around seven years later, upon the entry‐into‐force of the Kyoto Protocol, a clear story‐line of leadership is firmly embedded in the press‐releases with “leadership by example” being the most frequently used term. The press‐releases around COP15 in 2009/10 then give a twofold image. Whereas leadership is being enriched with a notion of power and “structural leadership” and generally continued before the Copenhagen‐conference, there is little evidence for a continuation of the story‐line after the event. Instead there is an emphasis on domestic issues rather than global politics. 
Secondly, science and economy, the two major legitimizing story‐lines for climate policies, are much present, while dynamism over time is probably the greatest. Whereas the EU legitimizes climate policy with the story‐line of scientific evidence and related urgency first (1997/98), it then shifts concern to story‐lines of economic feasibilities. Already in 1997/98, sustainable development enters the stage as a story‐line of ecological modernization, suggesting an opening‐up of the EU to new discourse coalitions in the world of economy. While the prominence of science suffers in the following period, the 2004/05‐releases see an ever increasing emphasis on the economic co‐benefits of climate protection (such as energy efficiency and cost‐effectiveness), a story‐line that is substantiating and concretizing the one of sustainable development and whose most prominent institutional effect is the much hailed ETS. This development is becoming even more visible in the 2009/10‐period, where the visionary story‐line of a “low‐carbon economy” is turning the concept of economic co‐
benefits into the basic rationale of a whole new economic system. This dramatic uprising of economic story‐lines points to a changing overall discursive structure, in which climate change is entering all different kinds of policy‐areas – as reflected in the 2008 European Climate and Energy Package (see 3.3). 
Thirdly, “traditional” EU story‐lines in international policy such as multilateralism, international law and strict rules are present at some points. An emphasis on multilateralism is most clear in the 2004/05‐press releases, which is comprehensible in the light of the Kyoto Protocol entering into force through multilateral consultations and the wide abstinence of the US from any multilateral negotiations. Emphases on strict rules are on the other hand most prominent in the 1997/98 and 2009/10‐periods, which is in both cases related to the setting‐up of a global climate regime. 
Fourthly, the question of responsibility characterizes the climate policy discourses over time in different ways. Here, one can identify a certain consistency over time in that the developing countries are assigned a certain “moral advantage” compared to the developed world. The 1997/98‐documents even represent the EU as the advocate of the developing world. However, the 2009/10‐press releases see a changing picture, with climate policies being represented more as a responsibility of the whole world and the upcoming framing of new “emerging economies”, combined with certain assigned responsibilities. The second research question was What does the representation of international climate policy tell us about the EU’s self‐image in climate politics? Again, four points attempt to wrap up the EU’s self‐image: 
Firstly, the most obvious implications on the EU’s self‐image can be drawn from its representation of climate leadership. The EU’s ambitious and undiplomatic struggle for 47 importance in the first period (1997/98) points to a self‐image as an underrepresented and underestimated actor not yet taken seriously in the world – emblematized in these studies by the image of an adolescent trying to find and assert its role in society. The second period (2004/05) with its more settled and diplomatic language and frequent mentioning of EU‐
climate‐leadership however points to a changed self‐image of an established actor, embedded and accepted in the world or – to stay within the metaphor – the self‐image of a more experienced, self‐confident grown‐up who has found his place in society. This self‐
confidence is raising notions of power in the third period (2009/10), pointing to an ever increasing self‐image of a crucial actor in global climate politics – or the mature, self‐
confident grown‐up leader. The second part of this period (after COP15), however, represents a stark contrast with self‐confidence seemingly being on an all‐time low. Instead, disillusion and a focus on the inward dimension point to a perturbed self‐image questioning the own role. 
Secondly, faced with the actual implementation of climate protection measures in the second and third period (2004‐2010), economic topics become part of the EU’s self‐image. This steeply increasing framing of climate protection as an economic issue points to the “emancipation process” from an innocent environmentalist to a responsible heavy‐weight who must consider many different perspectives, including both the environmental and the economic perspective. This development goes on to the point where the economic win seems to make up an slightly larger part of EU‐interest. 
Thirdly, the changing account of global responsibility, assigning the developing and “emerging” world more responsibility over time, points to a changing self‐representation of the EU from an emerging idealistic to a more pragmatic actor. In some way this is also represented by the emergence of economic issues. 
Fourthly, a strong emphasis on multilateralism, binding rules and international law sustains concepts in EU‐literature of “soft”, “gentle” or “normative power”. This suggest that the EU’s self‐image also relies to some extent on these approaches as an alternative global player, distinguishing itself from the perceived opposite approach represented by the USA. As these concluding remarks show, the study of evolving story‐lines and self‐image has added up to the understanding of the EU as an actor in international climate politics with the Copenhagen‐
conference representing the sharpest rupture in the EU’s self‐representation. The study shows that, in international climate politics, the EU really is at a crossroads since Copenhagen. It seems unclear what exactly the EU wants and what it thinks is its role. The EU should therefore more clearly define its own role and set policy priorities. Questions that should be answered in this process include: Leadership by example or structural leadership/leadership through power? More binding rules or flexible provisions? Differentiated or common responsibility? Always win‐win or priority for economy/climate? Always multilateral or also bilateral? ... Further studies could therefore focus exclusively on the EU’s climate policy discourse after COP15 and answer questions such as: How much are the “old” story‐lines still being used? Which new story‐lines are entering the stage? 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IP‐97‐489 IP‐97‐551 05/06/1997 23/06/1997 IP‐97‐777 08/09/1997 IP‐97‐781 IP‐97‐790 09/09/1997 12/09/1997 IP‐97‐829 01/10/1997 IP‐97‐909 23/10/1997 IP‐97‐1004 18/11/1997 IP‐97‐1065 02/12/1997 IP‐97‐1080 IP‐97‐1106 03/12/1997 11/12/1997 IP‐98‐34 14/01/1998 IP‐98‐307 31/03/1998 IP‐98‐374 28/04/1998 IP‐98‐471 27/05/1998 IP‐98/498 03/06/1998 World Environment Day
Denver Summit (June 20‐22, 1997) ‐ Statement by Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission Commissioner Bjerregaard meets with Environment Ministers from the CEECs The Commission finances the creation of 31 energy agencies in 1997 Energy and local authorities: Energy management, local development and employment Rhodes (Greece), 3 October 1997 The Commission adopts Communication on Climate Change ‐ The EU Approach for Kyoto US position on Climate Change ‐ reaction from Commissioner for the Environment, Ritt Bjerregaard: An Energy Framework Programme for greater transparency, simplification, efficiency and coordination Major study launched on employment effects in the European Union of investments in energy efficiency European Commission Proposes New NOx Emission Standards for Aircraft
Climate Change : “Kyoto proved to be an important first step to reverse the upward trend in the emissions of greenhouse gases” Commission approves new proposal for Fifth Framework Programme for research and development Commission outlines measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from transport Commissioner Bjerregaard signs the Kyoto Protocol in New York on behalf of the European Union Partnership for Integration: Commission presents strategy on integration of environment into other policy areas Climate change – The Commission presents the first steps in the post‐
Kyoto strategy to meet the commitments of the European Union Irrelevant set IP‐97‐786 11/09/1997 IP‐98‐24 IP‐98‐42 IP‐98‐382 13/01/1998 16/01/1998 29/04/1998 Australia‐EC Ministerial Consultations
Joint communiqué JAPAN‐EU SUMMIT: JOINT PRESS STATEMENT
European Commission support for Barents Euro‐Arctic Council Preliminary Draft Budget 1999: Political priorities achieved in a rigorous framework 53 Second period: 16 August 2004 – 16 August 2005 Code Relevant set Date Title IP‐04‐1099 14/09/2004 IP‐04‐1115 20/09/2004 IP‐04‐1165 30/09/2004 IP‐04‐1250 20/10/2004 IP‐04‐1285 IP‐04‐1437 22/10/2004 03/12/2004 IP‐04‐1489 15/12/2004 IP‐04‐1522 21/12/2004 IP‐04‐1523 21/12/2004 IP‐05‐9 06/01/2005 IP‐05‐155 09/02/2005 IP‐05‐156 09/02/2005 IP‐05‐187 IP‐05‐269 IP‐05‐281 16/02/2005 08/03/2005 11/03/2005 IP‐05‐283 IP‐05‐416 11/03/2005 12/04/2005 IP‐05‐422 IP‐05‐435 12/04/2005 15/04/2005 IP‐05‐463 20/04/2005 IP‐05‐513 29/04/2005 IP‐05‐602 IP‐05‐624 IP‐05‐727 IP‐05‐762 25/05/2005 27/04/2005 14/06/2005 20/06/2005 IP‐05‐767 21/06/2005 IP‐05‐990 20/07/2005 Commission launches stakeholder consultation on future climate change policy Global efforts for the environment: Commission and UNEP to reinforce co‐operation The Commission hails the proposal of the Russian government to ratify the Kyoto protocol Emissions trading: Commission clears 8 more plans paving the way for trade to start as planned Climate Change: Russian Parliament clears the way for the Kyoto Protocol UN conference on climate change: EU set to keep momentum in the global fight against climate change Commissioner Dimas presents EU Emissions Trading Scheme for the first time to a global audience and pledges financial support for UNFCCC Registry System Climate change: Projections show EU on track to meet Kyoto Protocol emissions targets Emissions registries: Commission adopts rules to ensure emissions trading market reaches its full potential Emissions trading: On the eve of kick‐off of the scheme Commission cleared 5 more plans Climate change: Commission outlines core elements for post‐2012 strategy The European Commission sets a positive agenda for the 2005 review of the Sustainable Development Strategy Climate change: Commission hails entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol Emissions trading: Commission decides on Polish allocation plan Commission consults Europeans on how to cut climate change impact of airplanes Commission welcomes UK NAP Decision Climate change: Commission starts legal action against three Member States for not reporting emissions Emissions trading: Commission approves Czech allocation plan Commissioner Dimas visits US to discuss climate change and sustainable development Commissioner Dimas hopeful about new phase in EU‐US relations on climate change Europeans want policy makers to consider the environment as important as economic and social policies Emissions trading: Commission approves Italian allocation plan Environment: Green Week 2005 gets to grips with climate change Emissions trading: Commission kicks off review of the EU system Emissions trading: Commission approves last allocation plan ending NAP marathon Climate change: More coal use pushes up EU greenhouse gas emissions in 2003 Commission authorises the climate change levy rebate for the agriculture 54 IP‐05‐1024 29/07/2005 Irrelevant set IP‐04‐172 07/09/2004 IP‐04‐1087 09/09/2004 IP‐04‐1089 09/09/2004 IP‐04‐1152 29/09/2004 IP‐04‐1231 14/10/2004 IP‐04‐1293 25/10/2004 IP‐04‐1394 IP‐04‐1495 IP‐05‐43 23/11/2004 16/12/2004 14/01/2005 IP‐05‐51 17/01/2005 IP‐05‐96 26/01/2005 IP‐05‐125 01/02/2005 IP‐05‐284 11/03/2005 IP‐05‐318 16/03/2005 IP‐05‐522 IP‐05‐534 03/05/2005 03/05/2005 IP‐05‐597 24/05/2005 IP‐05‐721 IP‐05‐738 IP‐05‐753 13/06/2005 15/06/2005 17/06/2005 IP‐05‐841 IP‐05‐852 29/06/2005 06/07/2005 IP‐05‐856 06/07/2005 IP‐05‐988 IP‐05‐1015 20/07/2005 28/07/2005 sector in the UK Climate change: public consultation underlines support for tackling aviation’s contribution Commission grants 52 million euro to boost use of GRID – tomorrow’s Internet LIFE Environment 2004: Commission supports 109 environmental innovation projects with €76 million LIFE Third Countries 2004: Commission funds environment projects in third countries with close to €8 million LIFE+: Commission proposes new streamlined funding programme for the environment Climate change: Commission welcomes political agreement in the Council to reduce emissions of fluorinated greenhouse gases Free movement of goods: Commission seeks information on extensive product bans from Denmark and Austria EU‐Russia Summit in The Hague, 25 November 2004 Breakthrough in environmental monitoring from space Greece: Commission pursues legal action in three cases for breach of EU environmental law The European Commission supports the UN Disaster Reduction Conference in Kobe “Release Europe’s enormous untapped potential” says President Barroso in presenting the European Commission’s strategic objectives for the next 5 years Green Week 2005: Commission invites school children to participate in competition The Commission proposes to prepare an EU Action Plan for Sustainable Forest Management The European Commission notifies Member States on delays in implementing European legislation on biofuels EU‐Russia Summit in Moscow 10 May 2005
Commissioner Ferrero‐Waldner in Kyoto for the ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting, 6‐7 May 2005 European Commission and UNEP co‐operate to address global environmental threats EU‐China Environment Dialogue: Chinese Minister Xie to visit Brussels Commission Adopts Strategy for Successful 2005 UN Summit EU‐Canada Summit to reaffirm commitment to fighting climate change and strengthening the United Nations EU and India launch new co‐operation on energy European Commission sends Reasoned Opinions to 9 Member States for failure to implement European legislation on biofuels Joint Statement on the meeting between Andris Piebalgs, Commissioner responsible for Energy, and Thorhild Widvey, Norwegian Minister of Petroleum and Energy Flood protection: Commission consults public on EU action programme
Commission consults public on how to protect soil across the EU 55 Third period: 18 June 2009 – 18 June 2010 Code Relevant set Date Title IP‐09‐969 IP‐09‐977 IP‐09‐1022 19/06/2009 22/06/2009 25/06/2009 IP‐09‐1038 IP‐09‐1042 IP‐09‐1076 25/06/2009 26/06/2009 02/07/2009 IP‐09‐1090 06/07/2009 IP‐09‐1113 10/07/2009 IP‐09‐1115 10/07/2009 IP‐09‐1118 13/07/2009 IP‐09‐1122 13/07/2009 IP‐09‐1141 15/07/2009 IP‐09‐1148 16/07/2009 IP‐09‐1179 22/07/2009 IP‐09‐1188 IP‐09‐1201 24/07/2009 29/07/2009 IP‐09‐1260 31/08/2009 IP‐09‐1272 03/09/2009 IP‐09‐1273 03/09/2009 IP‐09‐1280 08/09/2009 IP‐09‐1297 10/09/2009 IP‐09‐1302 11/09/2009 IP‐09‐1317 IP‐09‐1328 15/09/2009 16/09/2009 IP‐09‐1329 IP‐09‐1338 17/09/2009 18/09/2009 IP‐09‐1349 23/09/2009 Green Week 2009: Climate change – act and adapt EU examines impact of climate change on jobs
Carbon Capture and Geological Storage (CCS) in emerging developing countries: financing the EUChina Near Zero Emissions Coal Plant project EU adopts new rules strengthening the internal energy market EU‐India Troika to set an ambitious agenda for the next EU‐India Summit
Hydrogen buses, clean power stations and greener laptops: Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Technology Initiative launches a €140 million call for proposals for cutting‐edge research President Barroso at the G8 summit in Italy from 8th to 10th July 2009: Shaping sustainable responses to global challenges together Union for the Mediterranean: Commission increases its contribution to priority projects The European Union confirmed its position as the world's leading development aid donor in 2008 Environment: Many of Europe's most vulnerable species and habitats under threat Louis Michel calls for renewed efforts from EU Member States to meet aid targets following G8 Climate Change: EU and MTV enlist international artists to mobilize youth audiences in run‐up to Copenhagen climate conference State aid: Commission authorises support of up to €170 million for two investment projects in Polish energy sector Commission adopts four ecodesign regulations that will save the equivalent power consumption of Austria and Sweden Commission takes stock of progress on sustainable development Europeans overwhelmingly consider the environmental impact of products they buy Climate change: Commission welcomes provisional 2008 data showing further EU progress towards Kyoto targets European Commission President José Manuel Barroso proposes a partnership for progress and ambition to the European Parliament Commission supports UN World Climate Conference: Realizing a Global Framework for Climate Services Commission allocates a further 53 million euro in humanitarian aid for drought response in Africa Climate change: Commission sets out global finance blueprint for ambitious action by developing nations Second EU‐South Africa Summit to Tackle Climate Change and International Financial Crisis European Mobility Week 2009: 'Improving City Climates' Environment: European Union hails universal ratification of the Montreal Protocol on protecting the ozone layer EU policies are more coherent for development Emissions trading: Member States approve list of sectors deemed to be exposed to carbon leakage Commission greener than ever
56 IP‐09‐1355 24/09/2009 IP‐09‐1361 25/09/2009 IP‐09‐1379 30/09/2009 IP‐09‐1411 05/10/2009 IP‐09‐1430 07/10/2009 IP‐09‐1431 07/10/2009 IP‐09‐1436 07/10/2009 IP‐09‐1493 08/10/2009 IP‐09‐1494 08/10/2009 IP‐09‐1498 09/10/2009 IP‐09‐1506 13/10/2009 IP‐09‐1561 21/10/2009 IP‐09‐1576 23/10/2009 IP‐09‐1605 28/10/2009 IP‐09‐1609 28/10/2009 IP‐09‐1611 28/10/2009 IP‐09‐1652 29/10/2009 IP‐09‐1660 30/10/2009 IP‐09‐1664 03/11/2009 IP‐09‐1674 IP‐09‐1678 IP‐09‐1703 04/11/2009 05/11/2009 12/11/2009 IP‐09‐1709 13/11/2009 IP‐09‐1710 13/11/2009 IP‐09‐1724 IP‐09‐1733 17/11/2009 18/11/2009 IP‐09‐1807 24/11/2009 IP‐09‐1835 27/11/2009 IP‐09‐1858 02/12/2009 Emission Trading System: Statement by Commissioner Stavros Dimas on the Court rulings relating to the Commission Decisions on the Estonian and Polish National Allocation Plans for 2008‐2012 Climate change: Bangkok meeting must make decisive progress towards ambitious global deal Commission takes action to make urban travel greener, better organised and more user‐friendly Climate Change: EU, MTV and Backstreet Boys mobilise youth before UN conference in Copenhagen How is Europe doing in clean technologies? Visit the new Commission's online assessment system Investing in the future: Commission calls for additional €50bn in low carbon technologies Mayors from Europe and America join forces to fight against climate change European Development Days 2009 : Climate change, economic crisis, citizenship and development Commission goes step further in developing renewable energy with Mediterranean and Gulf countries ICT sector to lead the way on climate and energy targets, says European Commission The Commission and 22 world leaders explore ways for the viability of Carbon Capture and Storage Environment Council: Commission welcomes Council conclusions on the EU position for the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference Environment: Commission launches search for European Green Capitals 2012 and 2013 Commission proposes legislation to limit the CO2 emissions from light commercial vehicles Climate change: Commission welcomes IPCC decision to grant EC full participation EU space missions to strengthen earth observation for Climate and Security Energy Star: EU Commission and the US reinforce the energy efficiency standards for displays Commissioner Piebalgs receives the first 39 Energy Action plans under the Covenant of Mayors EU‐US Summit in Washington puts global challenges at centre of discussion New EU‐US Energy Council to boost transatlantic energy cooperation The EU‐India Summit to focus on climate change, energy and trade
Climate change: Progress report shows EU on track to meet or over‐
achieve Kyoto emissions target IEA's World Energy Outlook 2009 confirms EU energy and climate policies are on the right track Environment: Keeping ecosystems healthy makes economic sense and is vital to control climate change, says Commissioner Dimas EU‐Russia Summit on 18 November in Stockholm Commissioner Piebalgs welcomes political agreement on energy performance of buildings Commission launches consultation on EU 2020: a new strategy to make the EU a smarter, greener social market EU‐China Summit to focus on efforts in striving for ambitious deal on climate in Copenhagen Eurobarometer: Climate change the second most serious problem faced by the world today 57 IP‐09‐1867 02/12/2009 IP‐09‐1886 IP‐09‐1896 07/12/2009 09/12/2009 IP‐09‐1922 15/12/2009 IP‐09‐1945 16/12/2009 IP‐09‐1958 IP‐09‐1960 17/12/2009 21/12/2009 IP‐09‐1997 IP‐10‐32 IP‐10‐97 22/12/2009 19/01/2010 28/01/2010 IP‐10‐111 01/02/2010 IP‐10‐164 17/02/2010 IP‐10‐207 01/03/2010 IP‐10‐255 09/03/2010 IP‐10‐271 IP‐10‐273 12/03/2010 12/03/2010 IP‐10‐327 19/03/2010 IP‐10‐410 09/04/2010 IP‐10‐461 23/04/2010 IP‐10‐463 25/04/2010 IP‐10‐473 IP‐10‐486 IP‐10‐490 IP‐10‐565 28/04/2010 03/05/2010 04/05/2010 12/05/2010 IP‐10‐584 19/05/2010 IP‐10‐618 26/05/2010 IP‐10‐642 IP‐10‐659 31/05/2010 02/06/2010 IP‐10‐714 10/06/2010 IP‐10‐729 14/06/2010 Copenhagen conference must produce global, ambitious and comprehensive agreement to avert dangerous climate change Number of signatories to Covenant of Mayors reaches 1000! Commission approves over €1,5bn for 15 CCS and off‐shore wind projects to support European economic recovery European Commission and European Investment Bank launch European Local Energy Assistance (ELENA) facility Rural development: vote on latest modifications of rural development programmes to address new challenges EU Budget 2010: investing to restore jobs and growth Horn of Africa: Commission allocates €50 million in humanitarian aid for drought‐affected people Environment: Council Conclusions
What next for biodiversity protection in the EU? Climate change: European Union notifies EU emission reduction targets following Copenhagen Accord Commission provides almost €7.3 million to reduce the impact of natural disasters in Central Asia Commission creates two new Directorates‐General for Energy and Climate Action European Commission launches public debate on protecting Europe's forests against climate change Climate change: European Commission sets out strategy to reinvigorate global action after Copenhagen Soil biodiversity: the invisible hero Sustainable Consumption and Production: Commission launches handbook on how to assess the environmental impact of products Renewed impetus in the fight against poverty: the EU and ACP states initial the revised Cotonou Partnership Agreement Environment: Six finalists vie for title of European Green Capital 2012 and 2013 EU Commissioner Piebalgs in Washington to relaunch the Development dialogue with the USA and to attend the World Bank Development Committee Meeting Outcome of re‐launched EU‐US Development Dialogue: towards joint action on Millennium Development Goals, Food security and Climate change Clean and energy efficient vehicles: European Commission tables strategy EU conference: 500 cities pledge to reduce CO2 by more than 20%
New atlas underlines significant role of northern soils in climate change Climate change: Commissioner Hedegaard invites EU business heads to round table on maintaining low‐carbon leadership Commissioner Oettinger hails adoption of the Energy Labelling Directive by Parliament Climate change: Commission invites to an informed debate on the impacts of the move to 30% EU greenhouse gas emissions cut if and when the conditions are met Global Climate Change Alliance regional conference for Asia Climate change: Commissioner Hedegaard welcomes fall in EU greenhouse gas emissions for fifth year running Europe launches major joint research effort to ensure food security in the face of climate change and rising demand European Investment Bank and European Commission to explore EU climate finance initiative 58 Irrelevant set IP‐09‐952 18/06/2009 IP‐09‐964 IP‐09‐968 18/06/2009 19/06/2009 IP‐09‐986 IP‐09‐1039 IP‐09‐1084 23/06/2009 25/06/2009 03/07/2009 IP‐09‐1154 IP‐09‐1205 16/07/2009 30/07/2009 IP‐09‐1281 09/09/2009 IP‐09‐1305 IP‐09‐1320 11/09/2009 15/09/2009 IP‐09‐1356 25/09/2009 IP‐09‐1385 IP‐09‐1401 30/09/2009 02/10/2009 IP‐09‐1424 IP‐09‐1435 06/10/2009 07/10/2009 IP‐09‐1502 IP‐09‐1512 13/10/2009 14/10/2009 IP‐09‐1520 14/10/2009 IP‐09‐1530 15/10/2009 IP‐09‐1560 IP‐09‐1568 22/10/2009 22/10/2009 IP‐09‐1646 IP‐09‐1648 29/10/2009 29/10/2009 IP‐09‐1673 IP‐09‐1702 IP‐09‐1740 04/11/2009 12/11/2009 19/11/2009 IP‐09‐1743 19/11/2009 IP‐09‐1771 19/11/2009 IP‐09‐1773 19/11/2009 IP‐09‐1795 20/11/2009 IP‐09‐1803 23/11/2009 IP‐09‐1811 24/11/2009 When your yogurt pots start talking to you: Europe prepares for the internet revolution European Commission welcomes outcome of ITER Council Brazilian journalist Raphael Gomide is new winner of the Lorenzo Natali Grand Prize 2008 EU and Australia boost bilateral trade, call for Doha deal The EU establishes a common binding framework on nuclear safety The European Commission allocates €40 mio to multi‐country projects in Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus Waste: Commission calls time on sub‐standard landfills in the EU EU‐African Union Scientific Partnership: €63 million to support research for Africa Commissioner Ashton says confidence the key to enhanced EU‐China trade relationship EU strategy to improve maritime governance in the Mediterranean Sea State aid: Commission authorises UK to grant a £60 million repayable advance for R&D activities by GKN 25 September: Meet scientists in 200 cities, 30 countries ‐ it's European Researchers' Night! Commission lays out a new vision for EU‐Latin America relations OPEN DAYS 2009 – European Week of Regions and Cities (5‐8 October): gearing up for the biggest event in the EU Regional Policy calendar European Research: experts call for a new renaissance Trans‐European Transport Network Coordinators present their annual report and a common Position Paper Paweł Samecki hosts 4th EU‐China high‐level meeting on regional policy Paweł Samecki attends the XV Conference of Presidents of the Outermost Regions, Gran Canaria (15‐16 October) Environment: Commissioner Dimas to hold internet chat on Blog Action Day '09, Thursday 15 October The Integrated Maritime Policy for the EU – priorities for the next Commission EU to reinforce transport cooperation with Africa Rural development: first wave of approvals of national/regional proposals for using funding from CAP Health Check and European Economic Recovery Plan Commission to provide €200 million for nearly 200 new LIFE+ projects A "BONUS" for the Baltic ‐ €100 million for new Joint Baltic Sea Research Programme EU gives € 200 million support to increase energy access in ACP countries
Manifesto for Creativity and Innovation in Europe Commission adopts communication on releasing the potential of public private partnerships Commission rewards European organisations for outstanding environmental management Nigeria signs € 677 million European Development Fund agreement to support governance, trade and peace actions Commission acknowledges ITER Council's outcome and the steps taken towards a realistic scenario Waste management: Commission calls for better implementation of EU waste law by Member States European labour markets deeply hit by crisis, but more resilient than expected Third Civil Protection Forum: developing Europe's resilience to disasters 59 IP‐09‐1813 24/11/2009 IP‐09‐1855 01/12/2009 IP‐09‐1873 IP‐09‐1894 03/12/2009 09/12/2009 IP‐09‐1905 IP‐09‐1932 11/12/2009 15/12/2009 IP‐09‐1950 16/12/2009 IP‐09‐1963 IP‐10‐14 IP‐10‐46 17/12/2009 13/01/2010 25/01/2010 IP‐10‐102 29/01/2010 IP‐10‐154 11/02/2010 IP‐10‐177 IP‐10‐200 24/02/2010 26/02/2010 IP‐10‐221 02/03/2010 IP‐10‐254 09/03/2010 IP‐10‐283 IP‐10‐336 IP‐10‐341 16/03/2010 22/03/2010 23/03/2010 IP‐10‐344 IP‐10‐357 24/02/2010 24/03/2010 IP‐10‐391 30/03/2010 IP‐10‐403 IP‐10‐405 31/03/2010 06/04/2010 IP‐10‐411 09/04/2010 IP‐10‐419 IP‐10‐450 IP‐10‐451 12/04/2010 21/04/2010 21/04/2010 IP‐10‐465 IP‐10‐468 IP‐10‐475 26/04/2010 27/04/2010 28/04/2010 IP‐10‐480 29/04/2010 IP‐10‐518 05/05/2010 IP‐10‐545 06/05/2010 Rural development: latest approvals of proposals for using funding from CAP Health Check and European Economic Recovery Plan European Commission welcomes the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. EU‐Ukraine Summit on 4th December in Kyiv Commissioner Samecki addresses major conference on cohesion policy and territorial development in Kiruna, Sweden (10‐11 December) What has the EU done for you over the past year? State aid: Commission endorses €33.8 million public R&D funding for Diehl Aircabin European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) launches the first three Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs) EU and Canada sign Air Transport Agreement
Commission authorises Hungarian fiscal aid for transport coordination New study on "Public Goods provided by Agriculture in the European Union" Rural development: €5 billion in total injected into rural development programmes following last vote on Health Check and Recovery package changes European Commission: Nitrate pollution falling, but greater efforts still needed to meet water quality standards across the EU EIB, European Commission welcome report on EIB external lending
Progresses in the negotiation between the EU and Central American region bring us closer to a conclusion of the association agreement in Madrid in May EU strengthens the European Neighbourhood Policy with increased funding for the period 2011‐2013 State aid: Commission approves €30 million German support for ArcelorMittal Eisenhuettenstadt's "Top Gas Recycling" project Environment: Dragonflies, beetles and butterflies on Red alert World Water Day 2010: A red letter day for Europe's waters The European Commission launches environmental flagship project under the Eastern Partnership Environment: Gävle wins European Mobility Week Award 2009 Europe in your school: Commissioner Vassiliou launches 2010 Spring Day for Europe campaign Public opinion in the European Union is broadly favourable to European agricultural policy and support for farmers Global Health: Commission calls on EU to gear up on health actions
Commission services issue an analysis of the main innovative financing options Eurobarometer: Europeans not well informed about biodiversity loss. European Commission launches campaign to raise awareness The future of European agriculture policy Call for a public debate Commission tables proposal for the EIB external mandate until 2013 Development aid and Millennium Development Goals: Commission calls Member States to get back on track for more and better aid President Barroso's visit to China, 29 April – 1st May EU draft budget 2011: The future beyond the crisis Commissioner Georgieva discusses future cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Commissioner Vassiliou welcomes Chinese commitment to cooperation on education, culture and youth New survey reveals wide differences in how European citizens view quality of life in their cities First visit of EU Commissioner Piebalgs to Ethiopia and the African Union 60 IP‐10‐552 10/05/2010 IP‐10‐566 12/05/2010 IP‐10‐577 18/05/2010 IP‐10‐578 18/05/2010 IP‐10‐581 19/05/2010 IP‐10‐595 21/05/2010 IP‐10‐598 21/05/2010 IP‐10‐611 IP‐10‐634 IP‐10‐639 IP‐10‐649 IP‐10‐657 26/05/2010 28/05/2010 31/05/2010 01/06/2010 02/06/2010 IP‐10‐686 03/06/2010 IP‐10‐692 04/06/2010 IP‐10‐706 09/06/2010 IP‐10‐716 10/06/2010 IP‐10‐728 IP‐10‐750 14/06/2010 16/06/2010 IP‐10‐762 18/06/2010 EU and South Korea sign a new framework agreement for bilateral relations Five years of European Neighbourhood Policy: more trade, more aid, more people‐to‐people contacts Environment: Water scarcity and droughts – a major concern for many areas in Europe Environment: New Commission strategy aims to get even more from bio‐
waste Digital Agenda: Commission outlines action plan to boost Europe's prosperity and well‐being European Commission convenes legal expert group to seek solutions on contract law First visit of Commissioner Piebalgs in Indonesia to sign EU‐funded programme in Education and to participate to the Asia‐Europe Meeting (ASEM) development conference For two days, the outermost regions are at the heart of Europe EU‐Russia Summit on 31 May – 1 June in Rostov‐on‐Don Commissioner Piebalgs attends Africa‐France Summit EU and Russia launch new partnership for modernization Environment: Calls for taxation regimes to reflect impacts on the environment Environment: Six Member States face Court for failing to put EU laws on their statute books Meeting between the European Commission and the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa Digital Agenda: Commission welcomes launch of supercomputing infrastructure for European researchers Boosting competitiveness and innovation, € 324 million for space and security research Space applications: a market for the taking
European Commission Vice‐President Antonio Tajani welcomes today’s approval by the European Parliament of the Regulation on the European Earth monitoring Programme (GMES). World Refugee Day, 20 June 2010 – Joint Statement by Commissioners Malmström and Georgieva 61 Upphovsrätt
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