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The Copenhagen Accord: a
significant ‘first step’ or a
disastrously missed opportunity?
Claire N Parker
Environmental Policy Consultant
[email protected]
Outline
• Background to a new global climate change
regime
• Steps towards a new global regime
• The UN framework for the negotiations
• The Bali Action Plan
• The debate 2007-2009
• Copenhagen: the process and the Accord
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Analysis of the Accord
Who got what, who lost what
What may the CPH achieve.
What did it not achieve
Background to a new global
climate change regime
The scientific analysis
• The IPCC is the recognised intergovernmental
source of scientific advice
• Its Fourth Assessment Report (AR4 2007)
forms the scientific basis for the current
negotiations
• AR4 confirms average global temperature rise
and other indicators of global warming
The scientific analysis
• The AR4 analyses the impacts for global
average temperature changes
Why 2 degrees Celsius?
2°C
The scientific analysis
• The AR4 projects global surface warming for
various emission scenarios
Non mitigation emission scenarios –
projected t⁰ increases
2°C
Source: IPCC 2007
The scientific analysis
• The AR4 establishes a relationship between t⁰
increase and stabilisation concentrations of
greenhouse gases (CO2 eq)
Important negotiation parameters
1. Limit for increase in global average
temperature
2⁰C
2. Stabilisation concentration for greenhouse
gases in atmosphere
450 CO2 eq.
3. Mid term target (2020) 25-40% below 1990
by developed countries
4. Peak year for emissions
2010-2020
5. Long term target
50% below 1990 global
80-95% by developed countries
Caveat: post AR4 (2007) scientific
findings less optimistic
• 2 ⁰C may be too high a temp increase, and
450ppm CO2eq. too high a concentration for
avoiding dangerous climate change (e.g. sea level
rise on small islands, impacts on corals1)
increasingly, there are calls for 1.5⁰C and
350ppm CO2eq.
Note : CO2 concentration is now 386ppm
• Moreover, at current emission levels, 4⁰C could
happen by 2100 (UK MetOffice, Sept 20092)
* NL publication on News in Climate Science3 reviews
post- AR4 science
(Slow) steps towards a new global
climate regime
2007- 2009
The UN process: instruments
UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change Rio, 1992
• stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system.
Kyoto Protocol , 1997
• developed countries adopt binding emission
targets, amounting to -5% over 1990
• first commitment period (CP 1) 2008- 2012
The UN process: 194 countries in
negotiating blocs
G77 + China
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AOSIS (small island states)
OPEC/Saudi Arabia
Latin America & Caribbean
African Group
LDC group
(Asian Group)
European Union
Umbrella Group (US, Japan, Canada, Norway,
Australia, New Zealand, Russia)
Environmental Integrity Group (Mexico, Korea,
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Monaco)
2007: a new post 2012 climate deal is
needed
• The Kyoto Protocol’s 1st commitment period
runs out in 2012
• The US, a major polluter and not a KP Party,
needs to be brought into an agreement
• The emissions of major emerging economies
in the developing world are rapidly rising
• The poorest and most vulnerable developing
countries are already suffering from impacts
and urgently need assistance to adapt
Dec 2007: two track negotiations given
go-ahead
1. Bali Action Plan (BAP) on new global
deal
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Mitigation
Adaptation
Finance and Transfer of Technology
Shared vision (an agreed long term 2005
mitigation target, or stabilisation goal…)
2. Renewed KP commitments post 2012
What does BAP envisage?
• for developed countries: economy-wide
reduction commitments
• for developing countries : nationally
appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs),
supported by finance from developed
countries
• Implementation of commitments, actions and
support subject to monitoring, verification
and reporting (mrv)
What does BAP envisage?
• A specific regime for Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in
Developing Countries (REDD)
• Use of market mechanisms
• Adaptation framework
• The basis for a financial mechanism that
provides new and additional finance
• A mechanism to transfer low C technology to
developing countries
• ……
2008-2009 debate
what do developing countries want?
• Developing countries point to historical
responsibility, to current per capita emissions, to
technological and financial disadvantage, to
development and poverty eradication prime goal
• They note lack of firm and sufficient reduction
commitments from developed countries
• They want their NAMAs to be 100% voluntary, only
mrv’d for externally financed action
• Target and goals for developed countries only
• Rich nations should spend 0.5% of GDP on ‘climate
action’ in developing world
2008-2009 debate
what do developed countries want?
• Developed countries want developing
countries’ NAMAs registered, quantified,
mrv’d
• They want major emerging economies to take
on commitments – China, India, South Africa,
Brazil, Indonesia, Korea….
• They link financial support to mitigation
results (except for poorest)
Debate on the reduction targets
• EU commits to 20% reduction below 1990 by 2020
(30% if a satisfactory global deal is reached) and
80% by 2050
• Debate severely hampered by waiting for the US.
Legislation passed by House June 09 incl. plans to
cut emissions by 17% below 2005, which is 3-4%
below 1990 – no firm international commitments
• All ‘US allies’ in Umbrella Group make late-in-the
process commitments, conditional on developing
countries’ mitigation action
Pledges and commitments
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Australia (May 09): 15% below 2005 by 2020
New Zealand (Aug 09): 10-20% below 1990
Japan (Sept 09): 25% below 1990
Norway (Nov 09) : 40% below 1990
Russia (Nov 09): 20- 25% below 1990
All these pledges are conditional on CPH deal
involving all major emitters’ or, for Russia,
‘aspirational’
These + EU’s do not amount to the min 25%
below 1990 advised by IPCC
In any case, caveat numbers
• The Kyoto ‘model’ relies on aggregate
reduction numbers
• It allows some of the reductions to come from
– ‘flexibility’ mechanisms, i.e. action outside the
country which is then credited
– accounting for carbon ‘sinks’ in the country itself
(forests, agriculture)
• It hides changes in output, fuel conversion
• It does not necessarily reflect the extent to
which the economy is being ‘decarbonised’
Bangkok, October 2009,
coup-de-théâtre
• The US proposes a new regime which differs in its
essence from the one envisaged so far:
– replaces Kyoto Protocol
– based on bottom-up pledges from countries
(developed and developing), as part of low C
strategies, to be reviewed at [x-2?] years
intervals
– puts a centralised mrv at its core: assessing
results in terms of CC, plus economic
considerations
‘Economic growth is inevitable, but that may change’
George W Bush
• The US proposal is to create a ‘continuum’
between developed countries; major or
‘wealthy’ developing countries; the majority of
the other developing countries; and the
poorest (least developing countries, most
African countries, the small islands)
• EU (reluctantly) agrees provided some
modulation
• Developing countries reject- want to keep
Kyoto, plus ??? vague about the rest
• Process is thrown off course, the ‘texts’ don’t
progress, the positions harden
Copenhagen:
the Process and the Accord
One month before CPH
Barcelona, November 2009
• Still no agreement on US proposal/ keeping KP
• Still no usable text(s) from BAP or KP
processes
• Legally binding agreement in Copenhagen is
no longer possible. Instead , a politically
binding agreement….……meaningless in legal
terms but but still key to keep leaders
accountable
• Decisions on a timetable for negotiating a
legally binding agreement
A rush of targets from US and the
major developing countries
• US: emission cuts 17% below 2005 by 2020 (eq. to
3-4% over 1990), 42% by 2030, 83% by 2050
• China: carbon intensity cut to 40 to 45% below 2005
by 2020
• India: carbon intensity cut to 20-25% below 2005 by
2020
• Brazil: emissions cut to 36-39% below 1994 by 2020
deforestation in Amazon cut by 80% by 2020
• South Korea: emissions cut to 4% below 2005 by
2020 (eq. to 30% over BAU )
• Indonesia: emissions cut below the
current emissions baseline (‘BAU’) of 2641% by 2020 (cuts in deforestation a large
part)
• Mexico: emissions cut below the current
emissions baseline (‘BAU’) of 30% by 2020
• South Africa: emissions cut below the
current emissions baseline (‘BAU’) of
around 34% by 2020 and by around 42%
by 2025.
In the absence of useable texts, a draft
by the DK Presidency, which is leaked
and creates a diplomatic incident
• Draft on limited number of core issues
(mitigation, finance) was the result of
consultations with first 20, later 40 delegations,
deemed key to the outcome of CPH
• Proposals in it were much in line with the
developed countries’ (mainly US) concepts
• Called for commitments on emission reductions
from developing countries
• Offered a (not overly generous) financial deal
Developing countries denounce DK draft
• Lack of transparency, biased Presidency,
attempts to divide the G77/ China Group
• China, India, Brazil, and South Africa (BASIC)
draw up ‘red lines’ beyond which they will not
negotiate
• Africa, LDCs, SIDS get own controversies going
• Three processes in parallel, drafts, counterdrafts…. positions entrenched on all sides,
disputes over procedure, walk-outs
The last 48 hours
• Heads of State are now in CPH and want ‘results,
now!’
• A group, deemed ‘representative’, of 20 HoS plus
9 other HoD negotiates an agreement, in parallel
to wider negotiations
• Bilateral and smaller meetings in margins
• Endgame is between US and BASIC countries,
mainly China
• EU sidelined (‘not in the room’ when deal was
done)
• Chinese concede on transparency- US drops long
term global goal, legally binding agreement, and
offers money
The Copenhagen Accord emerges:
what is in
• Aspirational 2⁰C target, ‘peak as soon as
possible’
• A pledge-and-review process of
– Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for
2020 by developed countries (yet to be filled in)
– Nationally appropriate mitigation actions of
developing country Parties (yet to be filled in)
to be reported every 2 years
what is in (cont’d)
• Full and robust, international mrv system for
developed countries, domestic mrv plus “international
consultations and analysis” for developing
• Financial package of $30bn for 2010-11-12 and
agreement on $100bn/yr by 2020, from public and
private sources to assist developing countries to adapt,
to reduce deforestation and to de-carbonize their
development
• REDD regime to be established
• A mechanism for North-South transfer of technology
• Adaptation, with response measures
• Use of markets
…and what is missing
• No quantified levels of collective ambition for
emission reductions (2020, 2050).
– but 2050 ‘goal’ to be reviewed 2015, incl.
consideration of 1.5⁰C limit
• No year for peaking of emissions
• No deadline for/commitment to a legally
binding agreement –no compliance
mechanism
At the very end, lack of consensus….
the ‘take note, opt in’ deal
• In plenary, a few countries (ALBA group and
Sudan) question legitimacy of CPH Accord
• UNFCCC process adopts agreements by
consensus: DK President feels COP cannot
adopt CPH accord
• after a chaotic night, COP ‘takes note’ of the
Accord
• countries will be asked to adhere to it, and to
fill in their targets by 31 Jan 2010
Who got what?
• The USA obtained much of what it wanted:
bottom-up scheduling (pledges)
no compliance mechanism
sufficient transparency from China et al.
not tying Congress to financial deal
• However, USA could not change the ongoing differentiation
between developed/ developing countries
• China had the upper hand, only concession being transparency
(in exchange for securing financial aid for other, poorer
developing countries and leaving any targets out). It reaffirmed
(11 Jan) that it was satisfied w Accord and ‘had shown that it
would not be pushed around’. It sees as essential for the US to
make cuts ‘comparable of those of other developed countries’.
Who lost what?
• EU lost its ‘leadership’: future regime likely to be
modelled on US vision – i.e. no ‘binding
international commitments’ with compliance
regime
• EU also lost the overall reduction ‘numbers’ by
2020 and 2050, but it got transparency and the
prospect of US legislation
• All vulnerable countries lost security these
numbers would have provided
• SIDS lost their quest for immediate action
towards 1.5⁰C
What may the CPH Accord achieve?
• If (1) Accord is signed by the majority of
countries, and targets/ action are sufficiently
‘strong’, (2) US legislation is passed in 2010
and (3) the financial promises are fulfilled and
additional to development aid…
• …then the Accord will go some way to harness
the potential of developed and developing
countries to address climate change
• It will leverage substantial finance for
developing countries, including for halting
deforestation and protecting forests
The CPH Accord does not achieve
sufficient and rapid response to the
climate crisis
In addition:
• Business lacks the regulatory certainty to drive
low C investment
• The ‘multilateralist’ approach to the climate
change issue and the credibility of the UNFCCC
process are damaged
• CPH confirmed the ‘new bipolar order’ whereby
the US has to share hegemony w China
• the EU, India, Russia, Japan relegated to ‘second
league’ players and lost the initiative
Projected result of current mitigation
pledges
See Climate Action Tracker developed by Climate
Analytics, Ecofys and the P I K
• http://www.climateactiontracker.org
References
1. Obura, D et al. Marine Pollution Bulletin 58 (2009) 1428–1436
2. http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climatechange/news/latest/fourdegrees.html
3. News in Climate Science and Exploring Boundaries, Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), Bilthoven, November
2009, PBL publication number 500114013
4. Slide 23
UNEP/GRID-Arendal, National carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
per capita, UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library,
http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/national_carbon_dioxide_co2_
emissions
Thank you