Download The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer

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International Environmental Agreements:
Does Montreal Have Lessons for Kyoto? 1
Oscar Casswell-Laird
Research Assistant
Institute of Policy Studies
IPS Working Paper 3/2008
March 2008
Abstract
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) has been
called ‘perhaps the most successful international agreement to date’ 2 . The Kyoto
Protocol (1997) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(1992), by contrast, has been plagued by a number of criticisms since its negotiation.
As a result, there has been speculation that some of the features that made the
Montreal Protocol so successful may be applied to future climate change negotiations,
in order to avoid some of the pitfalls of the Kyoto Protocol. This paper aims to assess
to what degree that is possible, through an analysis of the histories and natures of the
policy issues, and an assessment of the structural differences between the two
protocols. Key differences include the treatment of developing country parties,
encouragement of ratification and discouragement of free-riding, and the permanence
of established emission reduction targets. The paper will then draw conclusions about
what elements of the Montreal Protocol are relevant for consideration for future
climate change agreements, which elements are not, and whether the similarities of
the two issues has been overstated. In doing this it will consider how the Kyoto
Protocol might be modified to better address the complex issue of climate change,
which in some ways is substantially different to ozone depletion.
1
The author would like to thank Jonathan Boston, Ben Gleisner, Lucas Kengmana, Martin Manning,
Helen Plume and Andy Reisinger for their helpful comments on this paper.
2
Kofi Annan, quoted in The Guardian, Saturday 30 September 2006.
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Introduction
Global environmental agreements are a relatively recent phenomenon in the world of
international relations. Only since the 1980s has the world recognised the existence of
large-scale environmental problems, which require the cooperation of most or all
countries to resolve. These agreements have not always been successful, and have
often failed to address the issues which they were designed to solve. There is a
growing recognition that anthropogenic climate change is the greatest environmental
issue facing humanity today. It is crucial, therefore, that countries rise to meet this
challenge in the form of a new comprehensive and stringent international agreement,
which avoids the pitfalls that have plagued earlier negotiations.
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
negotiated in 1987, is often hailed as the greatest success story of international
environmental negotiations, so much so that it is common to see its use recommended
as a model for future environmental agreements, especially on the issue of climate
change. 3 The Montreal Protocol is seen as a success because of the role it has played
in the rapid reduction of the production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other
ozone depleting substances (ODSs), a reduction of more than 95% from 1986 levels
in 2007. It is predicted that this will have a significant effect in increasing global
stratospheric ozone concentrations back to pre-1980 levels, though because of the
long lifetimes of many ODSs this will not occur until between 2050 and 2075. This
remarkable achievement has been attributed to a number of factors, including the
flexible structure of the protocol, the emphasis placed on scientific evidence and the
role that science played in the negotiations, and the pressure that an informed public
exerted on the policy processes of many countries. The issues of ozone depletion and
climate change possess a number of key similarities, and frustration is often expressed
that successes in one area have not been matched by successes in the other.
This paper briefly summarises the histories, similarities and differences of
these issues, and assesses which of the successful features of the Montreal Protocol
can be applied to climate change negotiations. It particularly looks at the debate
around possible agreements for the period following the expiry of the first
commitment period (CP1) of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the end of 2012. First, the paper
provides an historical account of both the science and the policy response to both
ozone depletion and to climate change. Second, it analyses these histories, briefly
drawing attention to the central differences between them. Third, the paper compares
the relevant aspects of both the issues themselves, and of the two protocols designed
to address them. This includes a focus on what lessons can be learned from the
Montreal Protocol for application to climate change negotiations, and, more broadly,
to what degree it is possible to transplant elements from one international agreement
to another, given the important differences between ozone depletion and climate
change.
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For examples of this, see Barrett (1999, 2003, 2007), Benedick (1991), Esty (2007), Picolotti (2007),
Reisinger (2002), Sarma and Zaelke (2007) and Sunstein (2006).
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History
Ozone depletion and the Montreal Protocol
Scientists first suggested that manmade chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) might be harmful
to the environment in 1974. It was established that, owing to their stability, they are
able to persist in the stratosphere for many decades and upon breakdown release
chlorine atoms (Molina and Rowland, 1974). Separate research had already
determined that a single atom of chlorine released into the atmosphere is able to
destroy tens of thousands of unstable ozone molecules (O3) (Stolarski and Cicerone,
1974). The ‘ozone layer,’ a band of the atmosphere in which ozone concentrations are
high, was already recognised as vital in preventing ultraviolet (UV) radiation from
reaching the surface of the Earth. If UV radiation were to reach the ground in
significant quantities it could, it was theorised, greatly increase the rates of skin
cancer, as well as compromise immune systems, and mutate the cells of plants and
animals. Molina and Rowland’s discovery raised serious issues about the continued
use of CFCs, which at that time were extremely widespread chemicals, with a large
number of industrial applications. Their uses included aerosol propellant, insulation,
refrigeration and air conditioning and manufacture of plastic-foams. Use in 1974
amounted to over 800,000 metric tons (Chemical Manufacturers Association, 1988).
Molina and Rowland’s research was quickly analysed and expanded. Evidence
rapidly mounted that CFCs, as well as the less-used bromine containing halon
compounds (BFCs), were responsible for depletion of stratospheric ozone (for
instance, National Research Council, 1982, 1984). This evidence was not yet
definitive, however, when the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) opened
negotiations for what would become the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer in 1985. The convention, which was ratified virtually universally, was
defined by the agreement of the parties to collaborate on exchanges of science and
information, to generally undertake to limit damage to the ozone layer, and to reopen
negotiations at a later date. This convention, which shares many elements in common
with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
preceded the latter by seven years.
In the years following the Vienna Convention, evidence came to light which
suggested that the ozone layer was being depleted much more quickly and by more
chemicals than had been previously thought. A particular spur to action was the
discovery two months after the signing of the Vienna Convention of an area above the
Antarctic in which concentrations of ozone were greatly diminished (Farman et al.
1985). The ozone hole, as it came to be called, had a major influence on public
attitudes in many countries, even though the precise chemical processes responsible
remained obscure until after the Montreal Protocol was negotiated (Benedick, 1991,
pp. 18-20). Nevertheless, this, and further research into the role that ozone plays in the
atmospheric and climatic systems of the Earth kept policy attention on this issue.
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was
negotiated and signed in 1987, in Montreal, Canada. It required what were seen at the
time as radical cutbacks in the production of CFCs and BFCs. Eight major ODSs five CFCs and three BFCs - were to be reduced to 50% below their 1986 levels by
1999. The Montreal Protocol imposed these restrictions on both developed and
developing nations, although developing nations received a ten-year grace period in
order to satisfy their ‘basic domestic consumption’ (Article 5.1), and it contained
several innovative articles which allowed for cooperation and frequent renegotiation
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in response to new scientific evidence and technological innovation. It was
considered by many to be a major success.
After further advances were made in the scientific study of ozone depletion,
the Protocol was renegotiated at the second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol (MOP2) in London in 1990. This was the first of several major adjustments
that the Protocol would receive, in Copenhagen in 1992 (MOP4), Montreal in 1997
(MOP9), and Beijing in 1999 (MOP11). The London negotiation was the most major,
and included the addition of 12 chemicals to the control list, including
tetrachloromethane (CCl4) and 1,1,1-trichloroethane (C2H3Cl3), chemicals commonly
used in industry. The London amendment also increased the scale of the cutbacks of
controlled substances from 50 to 100% below 1986 levels. Subsequent negotiations
would also include a major acceleration of the schedule of the phase out, from 1999 to
1996 for many of the controlled substances. The other major addition of MOP2 was
the creation of a Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
(Article 10), the first of its kind negotiated under an international environmental
agreement, which exists to provide aid for developing countries in making the transfer
from ozone depleting substances to less harmful chemicals. This fund is administered
by an Executive Committee, made up of representatives of both developed and
developing nations, which oversees fund allocation, and resources are contributed to
the fund on the basis of the United Nations scale of assessments. The fund was
originally provided with US$160 million, with more promised by the United States of
America (US) and others for when China and India both ratified the protocol. The
multilateral fund has been replenished every three years, and has so far received
pledges of over US$2 billion.
As a result of the Montreal Protocol it is believed that chlorine concentrations
in the atmosphere have reached their peak, and that ozone will begin to regenerate
over the course of this century, though it will not reach pre-1980 levels until between
2050 and 2075. This significant inertia in the environmental system arises from the
long lifetimes of most of the ODSs, and the level of damage that anthropogenic
depletion of ozone is responsible for cannot yet be definitively assessed. However, in
the US alone it is estimated that by 2165 actions to protect the ozone layer will have
prevented 6.3 million deaths from skin cancer, and produced US$4.2 trillion (NZ$5.4
trillion) in health benefits (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1999).
Climate change and the Kyoto Protocol
The process and outcomes of international climate change negotiation present a
somewhat different picture. In the case of climate change, evidence from as far back
as 1896 indicated that anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions could have a
remarkable effect on the average global temperature, with a possible increase of 5°C
if the level of CO2 in the atmosphere were to double on a sustained basis (Arhenius,
1896). This hypothesis was promptly dismissed by many contemporary scientists, but
was revived again several times throughout the twentieth century, most notably by
Guy Stewart Callendar in 1938. By 1960 the theory that anthropogenic CO2 and other
greenhouse gas emissions were having a greenhouse warming effect on the Earth was
well advanced.
This body of science was not paralleled by any major international policy
initiatives until 1979 when the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) held a
World Climate Conference, spurring international consideration of the climate change
issue. This was followed by a joint UNEP/WMO/International Council for Science
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conference in 1985 in Villach, Austria, on the ‘Assessment of the Role of Carbon
Dioxide and of Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated
Impacts’. Partially as a result of these conferences, UNEP and the WMO founded the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. This organisation was
designed for the purpose of reviewing and assessing international climate science and
assessing it for the benefit of policy makers. The IPCC has released four
comprehensive assessment reports so far. The fourth assessment report, published in
2007, concluded that:
1) the global mean surface temperature of the Earth is increasing;
2) much of this increase is due to human activity; and
3) the temperature will increase by around 3°C if CO2 concentrations double
from pre-industrial levels.
The initial work of the IPCC contributed to international discussion about the
climate issue, which culminated in the UNFCCC. This was signed at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in
1992.
This framework convention was in many ways similar to the Vienna
Convention. It acknowledged the existence of a problem, and set about defining in
general terms possible methods for dealing with it. It did not set binding emission
reduction targets, but it did suggest that it would be desirable for parties to return their
emissions to their 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Article 2). It set out a list of
principles by which the parties should be guided, including the ‘common but
differentiated responsibilities and capacities’ of states to address climate change
(Article 3.1) and the belief that, where there was the chance of serious damage, lack
of full scientific certainty should not prevent action (Article 3.3). The UNFCCC had
the advantage of almost universal participation and helped to lay the institutional
groundwork for the negotiation of what would become the Kyoto Protocol five years
later.
The Kyoto Protocol, although drawing on earlier environmental agreements
for structure and language, differed substantively from the Montreal Protocol. In the
first place its emission reduction targets were relatively modest, aiming for only a
reduction of, on average, 5% from 1990 levels in the period between 2008 and 2012.
In addition these targets applied only to the developed countries listed in Annex B of
the Protocol, a list similar but not identical to the one found in Annex 1 of the
UNFCCC. Non-Annex B parties were required to undertake a number of
responsibilities, based chiefly around reporting data, promoting technical and
scientific research, and cooperating to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, however they
were not expected to meet binding emission reduction targets. These emission
reduction targets would have been more significant if they had not also been hindered
by the fact that many countries had already emitting significantly less than their 1990
levels, particularly the former Soviet states in Eastern Europe (Benedick, 2005).
The Kyoto Protocol did not share the universal acceptance of earlier
agreements, and to date the US has refused to ratify it, ostensibly owing to the
omission of binding reduction targets for major developing economies, particularly
India and the People’s Republic of China. Australia, which had previously offered
similar objections, ratified the protocol late in 2007.
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Analysis
These brief historical accounts suggest key differences between the two issues. The
first major distinction is that the scientific analysis of the two cases occurred on vastly
different timescales. The research into the effect of CFCs and other manmade
compounds on concentrations of ozone in the stratosphere began around 1974, almost
a century after it was first theorised that human CO2 emissions could influence the
global temperature. Of course, the history of scientific progress is never a simple
matter of discovery, but it remains that the scientific community has been aware of
the theory of anthropogenic climate change at least since the 1950s.
Climate change is likely to have more radical and irreversible impacts on the
planet and human life than ozone depletion, and so a policy response can be justified
even when scientific evidence is less certain. However, for a number of reasons, the
issue of ozone depletion received more policy attention earlier than climate change
did. The reasons for the speed of evolution of the Vienna Convention and the
Montreal Protocol, relative to their climate change equivalents, are numerous and
diverse, and these will be addressed in the next section. Nevertheless, the weight of
scientific evidence for climate change has not been responded to with the promptness
that the evidence for ozone depletion was.
This difference in the level of response is at odds with the many similarities
between ozone depletion and climate change. In both cases the issue risks wide
environmental consequences and changes to the way of life of many human beings as
a result of chemical emissions into the atmosphere. Both issues defy definitive
prediction of their associated costs and impacts, but instead require estimation and
scenario-based analysis. As a result of these similarities, the agreements once
negotiated had a number of similarities, including differentiated responsibility
between the developed and developing world, a graded response, where emission
reductions begin slowly and build up over time, and periodic renegotiation and
reassessment based on the current state of scientific evidence.
However, in addition to differences in the timescale of the negotiations, the
capacities of the Protocols, once negotiated, to address their respective issues were
widely divergent. Over the course of negotiations, and the subsequent Meetings of the
Parties, the Montreal Protocol evolved into something more ambitious than many had
thought possible, enforcing immediate reductions in the use of CFCs and halons, and
requiring a very rapid, near-total phase-out of substances harmful to the ozone layer.
By contrast, the Kyoto Protocol on a similar timescale has been fraught with
problems, most notably, of course, the refusal of one of the world’s biggest emitters
of greenhouse gas to ratify. However, even if Kyoto were to receive universal
participation many argue that in its current form it would do little to stem the tide of
greenhouse gas emissions. Intuitively it seems as though it ought to be possible to
replicate the successes of Montreal in a climate change agreement, and ideally for the
period immediately following the expiry of CP1 at the end of 2012.
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Comparisons
Climate change and ozone depletion
An important question for the possibility of drawing lessons from the Montreal
Protocol for post-2012 negotiations is how similar the issues of climate change and
ozone depletion are, and whether there are any relevant differences that might make
the policy for one inapplicable to the other.
In the first case it is important to set out the complicated relationship between
ODSs and greenhouse gases. Nearly all ozone depleting substances are also
greenhouse gases. As a result, the Montreal Protocol has had the unintended effect of
slowing the course of anthropogenic global warming substantially (Velders et al.
2007). However, some non-ODS greenhouse gases, including CO2 and methane
(CH4) actually lessen the effects of chlorine on ozone, and ozone is itself a
greenhouse gas, albeit a naturally occurring one. In addition, several of the substitutes
that replaced CFCs in industrial applications, particularly hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)
and perfluorocarbons (PFCs), also have significant global warming potentials. As a
result, it was necessary to ensure that action to solve one environmental problem did
not exacerbate another.
There are also substantial differences between the emissions of ODSs and
greenhouse gases. For one, the major ozone depleting substances, CFCs,
bromofluorocarbon (BFC), tetrachloromethane, 1,1,1-trichloroethane and
hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) all had, at the time of the signing of the Montreal
Protocol, relatively limited applications. They were manufactured for distinct
purposes in discrete industries by only around 17 producers, chiefly in Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Brack, 1996). As a
result, the chief policy response took the form of incentives for industry to develop
cost effective but less environmentally harmful replacements. This is a distinct
contrast with greenhouse gases, the release of which are chiefly an unintended byproduct of a variety of human productive activities, as well as of natural processes. As
a result, a reduction in ODS production to zero was an achievable aim, and, following
the second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (MOP2) in 1990, this was
agreed as the ultimate goal of the international community. Reducing emissions to
zero would be extremely difficult in the case of anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions, owing to the close connection between many of their causes and the
current way of life of most human beings. The goals for any climate change
agreement are immediately more complex than their ozone depletion equivalents. The
emission reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol are, at this stage, modest, aiming
only for a reduction of 5% on average from the 1990 emission levels of developed
nations.
Almost as vital, perception of the issue differed between the cases, for a
variety of reasons. During the 1970s and 80s the issue of ozone depletion and the role
of CFCs became well known publicly in many western countries. This resulted in
pressure being put on governments from private citizens to enact environmental
reform. As this pressure has been significantly less in the case of climate change it is
worthwhile to examine some of the reasons for this. One likely explanation is the
psychological effect that the risk of cancer had on the populations of many countries.
During the 1970s and 1980s rates of skin cancer increased in many western countries
(Benedick 1991, p. 21). This trend probably had more to do with shifts in lifestyle and
behaviour patterns developed nations were undergoing than with the, at the time,
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negligible rates of ozone depletion. What it points to, however, is an increase in the
role that outdoor and summer activities played in the lives of many people. When it
was hypothesised that ozone depletion could lead to greater likelihood of skin cancer
it gave the populations of developed countries a personal consequence of
environmental degradation to focus on, not least because of the fears that the word
‘cancer’ evokes. This public perception of a problem led to domestic policy advances,
and hastened the course of international agreements on the issue. It is interesting to
note that this pressure was most noticeable in the US, which had hitherto been
isolated from many of the more serious effects of environmental degradation, as
opposed to in Europe, where acid rain, chemical contamination and the 1986
Chernobyl power plant disaster were more pressing on the public imagination.
This is not to say that major climatic change will not affect the developed
world, but that its possible effects seem to be harder to grasp for the general public.
This can be attributed to a number of key differences between the issues, including:
•
•
•
•
the location of impacts;
the timeframe of impacts;
the nature of impacts; and
the perception of positive impacts.
Location refers to the possible global distribution of the effects of climate
change, relative to those of ozone depletion. Owing to characteristics of the Antarctic
winter and spring which led to the ‘ozone hole’ phenomenon, the areas worst affected
by ozone depletion could conceivably be the chiefly developed countries lying closest
to the poles. By contrast the areas which will the worst affected by, and will have the
least capacity to deal with the impacts of climate change are largely in the developing
world. This factor, along with the relative concentration of ODS producers in OECD
nations, was responsible for the early disinterest of developing nations in the Vienna
Convention negotiations (Benedick, 1991). As a result, Vienna and Montreal had
fewer negotiating parties than the UNFCCC in their early stages and it is conceivable
that this had an impact on the speed at which a strong consensus was achieved.
The possible timeframe of the impacts involved was also an important
consideration for public opinion. The effect of ozone depletion on skin cancer rates
was seen as an immediately occurring problem. By contrast, the impacts of climate
change have long been regarded as a gradual process, occurring over decades or
centuries. Sea-level rise, perhaps the most easily identifiable impact of climate
change, is commonly understood as something that will only affect those living in
low-lying areas. As a result, public perception was focused to a greater extent on
ozone depletion, as an issue which was having an immediate impact on the quality of
life of people in developed countries.
Similarly the nature of the impacts played a key role in how the issue was
perceived. An increase in cancer rates is, in many ways, a simpler concept to grasp
than rising sea-levels or a shift in global weather patterns. This is true not only of
public awareness but also in terms of policy analysis. Even a subtle change in weather
patterns, for instance, will radically alter many of the Earth’s systems, with a variety
of interrelated costs and benefits. Losses of productivity owing to skin cancer-related
illness and death, while perhaps marginal to the losses from radical climate change,
are easier to quantify and predict, and require simpler analysis models. In part this has
to do with the existence of transitory positive benefits of greenhouse warming. While
these positive impacts may exist more in public perception than in reality, they have
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acted as a dampener on public pressure on this issue. This is considerably different
from ozone depletion, which possesses no conceivable up-side, and, indeed, the two
issues can be seen as at odds in this way, the one making days warmer, the other
preventing people from enjoying those warm days for fear of UV radiation.
The position of the US on these issues is worth looking at closely, owing to its
pivotal role in the Montreal Protocol negotiations, and its current refusal to ratify
Kyoto. Much of this can be traced to the economic self-interest of the country. Several
cost-benefit analyses have been done which suggest that it would have been
economically beneficial for the US to undertake its commitments under Montreal
even if no other countries had, and that it would not have been in the short-term
domestic interests of the US to ratify Kyoto even if every other nation had done so
(Sunstein, 2006, pp. 15-7, 24-8, Barrett, 1999, pp. 200-6). There are many disputes
about these figures, and a cost-benefit analysis of issues as complex as climate change
is never simple, however the view that the Kyoto Protocol would be too costly for its
benefits seems to be one that has been held by successive administrations in the US.
These differences relate to the enormous projected costs of skin cancer and
cataracts among the light-skinned population of the US as a result of ozone depletion,
and the likelihood that the US’s share of the impacts of climate change will be
minimal compared to what some other nations will have to endure. There are a
number of other reasons that the US has refused to ratify, including its internal
political process and the relationships between the fossil fuel industry and the US
administration. However, given the disparity between domestic costs and benefits, it
seems unlikely that the US will ratify the Kyoto Protocol in its current form. It is
worth noting, however, that in the case of the Montreal Protocol the costs of
implementation proved substantially less than had previously been thought, chiefly
due to technological innovation.
Kyoto and Montreal
In terms of the major differences between the agreements themselves, perhaps the
most crucial is in their treatment of developing parties. The role of developing nations
greatly expanded towards the end of the Montreal negotiations and in the subsequent
Meetings of the Parties, and their treatment under the Montreal Protocol goes a long
way toward explaining its relative success. Unlike Kyoto, Montreal extended its
emission and production targets to developing nations (Article 5 parties). However,
there is provision under Montreal for developing parties to offset their commitments
by up to ten years, in order to fulfil ‘basic domestic consumption’ needs. This was
seen as an acknowledgment of the developed world’s primary culpability in the
problem of ozone depletion and of the need of Article 5 parties for the advantages of
ODS manufacture and use, weighed against the environmental risks. Obviously this
clause has no equivalent in the Kyoto Protocol and this limits the overall effectiveness
of that agreement, not least because of the role the omission of developing countries
played in the refusal of the US to ratify. In part the differences between the two
protocols can be attributed to the level that developing nations were involved in the
respective negotiations.
The multilateral fund negotiated at MOP2 was another key response of the
Montreal Protocol to the concerns of developing parties. This fund is not without
parallel in climate change agreements, including several small funds that have been
set up under the UNFCCC to help with the adaptation of developing nations to the
effects of climate change. These include the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least
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Developed Country Fund and the Adaptation Fund. However, these funds are much
smaller than a substantial transfer of technology may require. The multilateral fund to
the Montreal Protocol was a contribution from the developed world towards the losses
that it was agreed the developing world would have to suffer to reduce their ODS
emissions. It was an elaboration of the Vienna Convention statement of ‘taking into
account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries,’
(Preamble) similar in many ways to the UNFCCC principle of ‘common but
differentiated responsibility’ (Article 3.1). Importantly, this fund was founded on the
concept of additionality, that is, that any resources allocated to the fund would be in
addition to existing aid flows.
The implementation of this fund has been a complicated process and has been
subject to much negotiation, but its establishment was recognition, at least in theory,
that the developed world, primarily responsible for ozone depletion, would contribute
to the emissions reduction costs of Article 5 parties. Obviously consideration of a
multilateral fund for climate change will be limited as long as non-Annex 1 parties are
omitted from emission reduction targets. In some ways the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) and the use of responsibility targets will function as a form of
multilateral fund, whereby the developed world can invest in emission reduction
projects in developing countries. However, as establishment of the fund was a key
incentive for Article 5 parties to ratify the Montreal Protocol, a similar mechanism for
post-2012 agreements should not be discounted, and indeed Brazil and others are
currently arguing in favour of international funding to help reduce deforestation in
developing countries in particular.
In addition to the fund there was also provision in the Montreal Protocol for
exchange of technology based on ‘fair and most favourable conditions’ (Article 10A),
a recognition of the fears of developing countries that the upgrade to less
environmentally harmful substances would be an excuse for the developed world to
resell them technological capacity which they already possessed. This fear is perhaps
as real with the change to lower carbon-emitting technology as it was with CFC
substitutes, and provision may have to be made in any post-2012 agreement to protect
non-Annex 1 parties from unscrupulous commercial practises.
The different treatment of developing countries in the agreements is
illustrative because of its likely position as one of the key issues for post-2012
negotiations. Increasingly the binary distinction between developed and developing
nations is falling out of favour; however it is clear that in the coming negotiations
non-Annex 1 parties may have to take on some form of commitment, especially if any
future agreement is to have the support of the US. Whether it is practical to follow the
model of the Montreal Protocol is another matter. The ten year grace period was
appropriate for the issue of ozone depletion due to the unwillingness of Article 5
parties to invest in what was soon to become obsolete technology. In this, the
agreement was enhanced by trade controls it introduced, which prevented export or
import of controlled substances, or products containing or manufactured with them,
between parties and non-parties. While the certainty of greenhouse gas emission
reductions in the future may dampen investment into emission heavy industries and
hasten the search for cleaner technologies, this effect is likely to be much less
pronounced when it comes to climate change than it was following the Montreal
Protocol, owing to the difficult of imposing trade restrictions in the former.
In the case of climate change agreements, ‘leakage’, where production is
shifted to non-parties or to parties with less stringent commitments, is possible, due in
part to the large number of causes of greenhouse gas emission. As such, a ten year
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grace period for some may simply set back the course of emission reductions by ten
years, as production is shifted from the developed to the developing world. This may
even have the effect of worsening climate impact in the short term, as production is
forced into less emission efficient contexts. In many ways CP1 functions as a form of
grace period, where commitments apply to developed but not to developing nations,
albeit with less certainty for the time ahead. The exact level to which leakage occurs
once Annex 1 parties begin to enact restrictions on industry remains to be seen. This
is further complicated by the fact that the distinction between Article 5 and nonArticle 5 parties to the Montreal Protocol was based on production levels, while the
distinction between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 parties to the UNFCCC is not. China
and India, for example, both have emission levels comparable to many Annex 1
parties, which further compound the need for emission reductions to be extended to
non-Annex 1 parties.
The distinction between the ten year grace period granted under the Montreal
Protocol and CP1 of the Kyoto Protocol has its origins in the way those agreements
are structured. In effect, the emission reductions negotiated under Montreal were
long-term, and so offered greater certainty and capacity for industry investment, while
the Kyoto reductions apply only for the period from 2008 to 2012. This means that the
ODS emission reductions could be postponed for Article 5 parties, while with Kyoto
as it currently stands this would be impossible. Not only does the CP1 period provide
disincentives for investment into carbon reduction methods at both national and
private levels, it also prevents the establishment of a grace period of the type
negotiated at Montreal. Many parties are now calling for long-term reduction targets
to be included in a post-2012 agreement.
Some kind of multilateral fund seems a more likely mechanism to be
incorporated in some form into the post-2012 climate negotiations. In the action plan
decision to the recent 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali,
Indonesia there is prominent mention of the provision of financial mechanisms for
both mitigation and adaptation to climate change, and already small funds exist to
help with the adaptation needs of developing nations. However, the way in which any
such fund would interact with the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol, and the various
regional carbon trading schemes would have to be analysed carefully. Subsidisation,
in the form of the Multilateral Fund, may interfere with the hoped for efficiency of
these market mechanisms, which may lead to fewer overall reductions than might
have otherwise occurred. Perhaps more worryingly, at the time of the negotiation of
the Montreal Protocol the US almost withdrew its support for the Multilateral Fund,
based on the fear that it would be treated as precedent setting, especially for the issue
of climate change, which was suspected to be very costly. The initial multilateral fund
for Montreal was US$400 million, a negligible amount compared to what might be
necessary for climate change mitigation. As a result, the final text of the Montreal
Protocol specifies that “The financial mechanism set out in this Article is without
prejudice to any future arrangements that may be developed with respect to other
environmental issues.” (Article 10.10) The choice may well come down to a major
Multilateral Fund being negotiated on the one hand, and the participation of the US on
the other, in which case preference would likely be given to the latter. It is important
to note also that it is a significantly simpler matter to establish a multilateral fund for
the replacement of one technology with another, than to provide one for an issue with
as many variables and forms of emission as climate change. It may be more
appropriate to provide a collection of smaller funds than one broad mechanism.
12
In addition to concerns of justice, these various concessions for developing
states acted as incentives for the ratification of the agreement. Indeed, the scale of
contributions to the Multilateral Fund was explicitly gradated, with more promised if
and when both China and India ratified the agreement. The overall incentive structure
of the Montreal Protocol is commonly seen as one of its major strengths (Barrett,
2007, Esty, 2007, p. 266). In addition to providing access to the Multilateral Fund and
to technology transfers, Montreal also placed restrictions on trade in controlled
substances with non-parties (Article 4). In this way it privileged those that ratified the
agreement and fulfilled their obligations under it in a way that the Kyoto Protocol
currently does not.
Furthermore, the imposition of trade sanctions against non-parties acts as a
deterrent against the practise of ‘free-riding’. The fact that the environment is a global
commons means that it is rational for states to minimise their contributions toward its
upkeep, and to reap the rewards of the actions of other states. Restriction on trade
with non-parties helps to limit this by encouraging full participation, which also has
the effect of limiting the export of polluting activity to nonsignatories. The Kyoto
Protocol does not have a method for the prevention of free riding, unless, as Barrett
(1999, p. 212) suggests, the minimum participation clause (Article 25.1) is considered
such a mechanism. This paragraph prevents the agreement from entering into force
until it has received ratification from at least 55 parties, totalling at least 55% of the
carbon emissions of 1990, and was preceded by a similar requirement in the Montreal
Protocol. The difficulty with relying on minimum participation to prevent free riding
is that it will only have an effect before the agreement’s entry into force. Since Kyoto
has received the requisite number of ratifications there would be little incentive for
those who remained outside the protocol to ratify, since they will benefit from others’
actions at no cost to themselves.
Under the Montreal Protocol emission limits were permanent, in that they did
not have an expiry date, while the Kyoto limits apply only for CP1 from 2008 to
2012. In addition, from its beginning Montreal presented a graduated set of
reductions, which began modestly and built up over time. This permanence provides a
key advantage, in addition to increasing the confidence of investors and policymakers
by presenting a future where emission reductions are a certainty. Permanent emission
limits substantially enhanced the capacity of the agreement to be renegotiated, a major
advantage when dealing with rapidly altering environmental science. Under the Kyoto
Protocol in its current form, the short timescale of CP1, combined with the
impermanence of the reduction levels, and the uncertainty of what the post-2012
regime may look like, have the effect of setting the schedule of negotiation based on
the structure of the agreement itself, rather than on the emerging scientific consensus.
A key reason for the relative success of the ozone regime were the amendments to the
Montreal Protocol generated from MOP2 and MOP4, based heavily on new science
which pointed to the ozone layer being depleted more rapidly than had been
previously thought. This innovation would arguably prove more useful in the case of
climate change, owing to the fragility of many natural processes, including the speed
at which the Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets melt, and the relative irreversibility of
major climatic change.
Added flexibility will be especially pertinent if a commitment period longer
than the five years of CP1 is negotiated for the years following 2012. A longer
commitment period would have several advantages and may prove to be a popular
option, but would limit the capacity of the international community to respond to new
scientific evidence. That said, frequent renegotiations could well prove to complicate
13
existing reduction targets, reduce confidence and muddy the water to too great an
extent, given the range of variables involved in the climate change issue. The extent to
which Kyoto can learn from Montreal in this regard will depend heavily on the final
structure of the agreement, and capacity to renegotiate may have to be sacrificed in
favour of boosting investor confidence.
A dissimilarity that requires highlighting is the different interest group
structures pertaining to the two agreements. Many of the successes of Montreal have
stemmed from the fact that CFC production in particular was, in the 1970s, focused in
a small number of companies concentrated primarily in OECD nations. Fewer
stakeholders stood to lose from restrictions on ODSs than the number that stand to
lose from restrictions on carbon emissions. Furthermore, growing public awareness
and activism caused several states, including the US, Canada, the Netherlands and
Sweden to undertake unilateral restrictions of the use of ODSs in aerosols. This
comparatively minor step had the effect of bringing the ODS producing industry
contained in those countries more in line with the desires of international
policymakers, as they wished to have their competitors in other countries subject to
the same restrictions that they were. As a result, the political economies of the two
issues are radically different, and this must necessarily make some of the more
successful features of Montreal inapplicable to Kyoto.
Lessons
Given the number and significance of the differences between ozone depletion and
climate change, the amount that can be learned from the example of the Montreal
Protocol for future climate change negotiations is limited. For instance, it may not be
possible to transplant completely the treatment of developing country parties under
the Montreal Protocol, including the 10 year grace period and the multilateral fund,
for reasons already discussed. What may be more relevant is to discuss ways in
which the same effect may be achieved within the particular context of the climate
change issue.
In a discussion of what lessons can be learned from the Montreal Protocol for
climate change negotiations, eleven central areas must be addressed. These areas are:
1. The difficulty of learning lessons;
2. compliance enforcement;
3. leakage and trade issues;
4. commitment period duration;
5. the role of the United States of America;
6. sectoral agreements;
7. negotiating parties;
8. the role of industry;
9. public opinion and consumer behaviour;
10. treatment of developing country parties; and
11. technological innovation.
These are discussed in more detail below.
14
The difficulty of learning lessons
For a number of reasons the possibility of learning from the Montreal Protocol is
more limited than perhaps intuition suggests that it should be. This is because, despite
the similarities between the issues of ozone depletion and climate change, there are a
number of crucial differences. Some of these differences have been discussed earlier,
and they include:
•
•
•
•
•
significantly different interest group structures;
wide disparities in the number of affected parties;
the radically different natures of the controlled substances;
differences in the timeframe, scale and regional coverage of expected impacts;
and
differences in the public perception of the issues.
These differences often preclude a simple transfer of features from one
agreement to the other. This is not to say that those authors who have suggested that
climate change negotiations would benefit from the example of Montreal are
necessarily incorrect, but that they may have overstated the similarity between the two
protocols. This section is discusses the areas where it has been suggested that the
Kyoto Protocol and climate change negotiations in general can learn from the
Montreal Protocol. It also considers whether or not the major differences between the
issues prevent lessons from being drawn, or whether there are practical ways in which
negotiating parties might enhance any future multilateral climate change agreement
by bringing it more into line with the Montreal Protocol.
Compliance enforcement
According to Barrett (2007), ‘Montreal created strong incentives for participation and
compliance – a combination of carrots and sticks’. These included a list of possible
actions that might be taken against parties that failed to ratify the agreement or to
meet their commitments under it, including ‘assistance, including ‘”technology
transfer and financial assistance”; “issuing cautions”; and “suspension…of specific
rights and privileges under the protocol…”’ (Barrett, 1999, p. 213) Barrett’s
implication is that mechanisms for compliance enforcement are something that the
Kyoto Protocol lacks. This has been echoed by Esty (2007), who has said ‘the
Montreal Protocol provided a bunch of both carrots and sticks to promote ratification
of the treaty and adherence to its terms’ (p. 266), and by Sarma (2007) who makes
particular reference to the non-compliance procedures’ emphasis on assistance first,
followed only subsequently by suspension of rights.
Barrett’s criticism was more relevant when he published it in 1999 than it is
currently. The Kyoto Protocol as it stands is not without methods for compliance
enforcement. It possesses a Compliance Committee, made up of a facilitative branch
and an enforcement branch, roughly equivalent to Barrett’s ‘carrots and sticks’
respectively. This committee was agreed to at the seventh Conference of the Parties to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 7) in 2001 and
established at the first meeting of the parties under the Kyoto Protocol in Montreal,
Canada, 2005. This mechanism seems almost as strong as its equivalent in the
Montreal Protocol. What is lacking from Kyoto, but present in Montreal, however, is
the provision for trade restrictions, which are discussed below.
15
Leakage and trade issues
In order to ensure participation and prevent leakage the Montreal Protocol imposed
restrictions on trade in controlled substances, and on products manufactured with or
containing controlled substances. Barrett (1999, pp. 212-5) has identified this as a key
element which the Kyoto Protocol lacks. To quote, ‘The Montreal Protocol has a
number of mechanisms that limit leakage.’ (p. 215) These are:
1) That it discourages the relocation of industry by banning imports of controlled
ODSs.
2) That ‘the agreement requires that parties undertake “to the fullest practicable
extent to discourage the export to any State not party to this Protocol of
technology for producing and utilizing controlled substances”’ (Article 4.5,
quoted in Barrett, 1999, p. 215).
3) That it deters free-riding thereby limiting the possibility of leakage.
It has also been suggested that negotiators originally omitted enforcement
mechanisms from the Kyoto Protocol because it was assumed that they could add
them later (Barrett, 2003, p. 362).
Imposing restrictions on trade in CFC and other ODSs is considerably more
feasible than restricting traffic in greenhouse gases, which are not traded, or in
products which have resulted in their emission, which amounts to virtually all tradable
commodities. If restrictions were to be imposed they would potentially have to be
limited to the worst offending products, in terms of CO2 emissions. However, any
restriction on trade in oil, coal or automobiles, for instance, would almost certainly
prove to be widely unpopular and economically disruptive. A more feasible
proposition, given this, is that restrictions would be imposed on trade between parties
and non-parties to the protocol, analogous to Article 4 minus Article 4A of the
Montreal Protocol. This imposition would only be practical, however, if the treaty
received wide ratification especially among the major economies. If, as is currently
the case, the US was to refuse to ratify a future agreement, any Montreal-style
prohibition on trade with non-parties would necessarily be difficult. A more likely
option may be to impose tariffs on imports from non-signatories, in order to fully
account for their industries’ relative advantage and free-riding (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 2),
and this would fulfil a similar purpose to Montreal’s flat restrictions. A necessary
prerequisite for this would be the extension of binding targets to developing country
parties.
The restrictions on trade also have the effect of deterring the practice of freeriding. Barrett has said that ‘Montreal deters nonparticipation by restricting trade
between signatories and non-signatories, whereas the Kyoto Protocol does not contain
a free-rider deterrent.’ (1999, pp. 211-2) Barrett emphasises the synergy of trade
sanctions with a minimum participation clause, and, while noting that Kyoto
possesses a minimum participation requirement but no provision for trade restriction,
draws attention to the inadequacy of minimum participation alone to deter free-riding.
Again, though, this runs into the problem of how to restrict trade in greenhouse gas
emitting substances and commodities. Placing tariffs on imports from non-signatories,
as Stiglitz suggests, would deter free-riding, but could only be effective if the
agreement had already received wide ratification, though a minimum participation
requirement would have some influence in that regard.
16
Although trade restrictions may prove to be unworkable, there will be a need
for deterrence of free riding in a post-2012 agreement. This has not yet proved to be a
major issue for Kyoto, owing to its broad participation. Nonetheless, it is likely that a
more stringent agreement would entail more countries who wish not to participate,
and, in any case, broad participation should be encouraged, which may make the
inclusion of free-riding deterrents desirable. As to what form these deterrents might
take, the Montreal Protocol provides little guidance. Under the regulations of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) subsidisation of industry is prohibited in most
cases, and Stiglitz (2006, p. 2) has been argued that allowing firms to not pay the full
cost of the environmental damage of their emissions is a form of subsidisation. It is
suggested that action could be taken within the WTO framework to restrict those not
party to climate change agreements, or not willing to include the appropriate costs of
environmental externalities in the cost of greenhouse gas polluting, provided the
polluting nations were also party to the WTO. In particular, the implication is that
major nations could bring a case against the US on the grounds that refusal to enact a
sufficiently strong tax on emissions constitutes an industry subsidy. This is one of a
number of possibilities, but it should be noted that this was posited in the context of a
broad, global tax on greenhouse gas emissions. However, this and other trade
restrictions would serve to bring a future climate change negotiation closer to the
example of the Montreal Protocol.
Commitment period duration
One relatively simple feature that was included in the Montreal Protocol was that the
emission reduction targets it contained were considered permanent, ‘whereas those
covered by the Kyoto Protocol run only until 2008-2012’ (Barrett, 1999, p. 211).
According to Barrett, this enhances the credibility of Montreal’s caps. The Kyoto
Protocol does contain provision for intertemporal trading. However, Barrett argues
that ‘unless countries know what future constraints will be, they will not know the
value to them of making investments today.’ (1999, p. 213) Under the Kyoto Protocol
in its current form there is uncertainty about whether or not emission reduction targets
will be extended into the next commitment period following 2012. To a certain extent
this is a linguistic distinction, as even permanent caps are still able to be subsequently
modified, as Montreal has shown. However, the earlier emission reduction caps are
negotiated, the more long-term investment into decarbonisation will occur, even if
these caps are set many years in the future.
Obviously permanent emission reductions are significantly harder in the case
of greenhouse gases than ODSs, as there are more factors to be managed, and it is not
simply a matter of shutting down productive capacity. However, a change in the
Kyoto Protocol to emphasise the long-term nature of reductions, and to establish
permanent national emission caps, even if only provisional, would spur investment
into cleaner technologies, and also allow for a staggered approach to the timeframe of
targets, as in the Montreal Protocol. Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol could benefit
from an explicit understanding that the first emission reductions are minimum levels
which would be maintained and increased at an established rate. In fairness, the
Montreal Protocol in its original form would have done almost as little for the
problem of ozone depletion in the long term as the Kyoto Protocol does for climate
change. Where the two have been seen to differ is in the capacity for the reduction
targets to be rapidly strengthened following their entry into force (Barrett, 2003, p.
374).
17
In part, this difference is related to the general difficulty of obtaining a strong
consensus in climate change negotiations, owing to the large number of factors to be
managed, and the number and ambivalence of many negotiating parties. There is
some doubt about whether a longer commitment period than the five year CP1 could
be negotiated, given these constraints. In an ideal post-2012 agreement, however, any
designs for reducing emissions would be explicitly long-term, if not permanent, ones.
The role of the United States of America
A key point that follows from Montreal and Kyoto is that countries seem unlikely to
ratify an agreement unless there is significant domestic benefit for them doing so.
This can be extrapolated from the varying attitudes of the US, as well as of Europe,
which fought against strong controls on ODS emissions (Benedick, 1991), but has led
the charge in favour of greenhouse gas reductions. This change can be attributed in
part to the relative advantage of European countries in the cost of cutbacks, which
will lead to benefits as a result of CO2 trading mechanisms (Sunstein, 2006).
Sunstein (2006, pp. 35-6) has pointed out that ‘for global environmental
problems, above all climate change, no international agreement is likely to be
successful unless the United States can be persuaded that it will not lose much more
than it will gain.’ As regards ozone depletion, several analyses have shown that it
would have been economically sensible for the US to meet their obligations under the
Montreal Protocol, even if no other nations had done so (Murdoch and Sandler, 1997).
This presents a stark contrast with climate change, where the costs are estimated to be
several orders of magnitude larger, and where the bulk of the damage will fall outside
the US. The position the US takes towards these agreements is important, because it
represents a significant portion of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, just as it
represented the bulk of the world’s production of CFCs and other ODSs. The progress
that it can achieve when it undertakes unilateral action and takes a lead in multilateral
negotiations is considerable, as was seen in the Montreal Protocol. Its attitude toward
international environmental agreements is generally dependant on how it weighs the
costs of compliance against the domestic benefits of the agreements acceptance.
The lesson that Sunstein draws attention to is that any climate change
agreement must present clear benefits if the US is to play an active role. This has not
happened with the Kyoto Protocol. In order to present an attractive option, the costs
associated with meeting treaty obligations must be reduced, or the benefits of its
implementation must be increased, or the costs of non-participation (i.e. free-riding)
must be increased. Cost limitation may be managed through effective, global cap-andtrade mechanisms, in order to maximise the relative advantage of reductions. In terms
of increasing perceived domestic benefits, greater public pressure on policymakers
will increase the electoral desirability of action on climate change, and a publicly
driven reduction in the consumption of greenhouse gas will make action more
economically viable.
National self-interest is obviously an issue that will have to be overcome for
all states. The reason this section has focused on the US is that it is an important actor
in the issue of climate change, who, because of a number of factors, has refused to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol. For the period following the expiry of CP1, the issue of
domestic cost-benefit considerations will have to be addressed for all states, and each
will likely require different action to solve. In the future it may be that the
participation of China and India will be as important to secure as that of the US.
18
Sectoral agreements
The success of the Montreal Protocol lies not just in the effect it had and is predicted
to have on the ozone layer, but also in its impact on the global climate. Despite the
complicated relationship between ozone and ODSs and the global climate, it is
believed that the Montreal Protocol will be responsible for more emission reductions
during CP1 of the Kyoto Protocol than Kyoto will itself (Velders et al. 2007). This
remarkable conclusion has drawn attention to the possibility of sectoral agreements,
of which the Montreal Protocol is a form. As they are usually propositioned, sectoral
agreements would focus on regulating industries or sectors worldwide. Benedick
(2005) has drawn a contrast between the Montreal Protocol, which was negotiated by
around 30 countries with relatively few non-governmental observers, and the Kyoto
Protocol, which involves around 190 nations and many observers. The suggestion is
that smaller negotiations will aid the negotiating process and so Benedick advocates
for disaggregating climate issues so that they can be addressed by smaller groups,
possibly by region, or like-minded groupings, with the goal of creating a number of
parallel agreements (2005, p.17). This is a controversial proposition. However, the
smaller number of negotiating parties allowed for a less complicated negotiation
process in Montreal. This in turn led to the swifter imposition of more stringent
controls than would otherwise have been possible. Perhaps a lesson for climate
change negotiations is to focus to a greater extent on better environmental practise in
separate industries, in addition to overall national targets.
Negotiating parties
Even if broader economy-wide agreements are preferred, limiting the number of
negotiating parties in future climate change negotiations may still seem attractive.
This would be significantly harder to do with climate change negotiations than it was
with the Montreal Protocol. Climate change affects all parties to one degree or
another, and action from a large number of actors will be required to reduce global
emissions and stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. As a result,
the inclusion of representatives from practically all governments in the negotiating
process will be necessary, together with representatives from a number of major
NGOs. The structure of the formal negotiating process will bear the burden of
mitigating this, though in this regard the Montreal Protocol offers little that has not
already been adopted.
A point that is often made about the Montreal Protocol is how it was able to
adapt to new scientific evidence through renegotiation (Benedick, 1991, Sarma,
2007). Sarma suggests that the ‘Best’ can often be ‘enemy of the Good’ and that the
Montreal Protocol in its early stages focused more on drawing all major players into
the framework, and then increased their reduction commitments subsequently. To a
certain extent the UNFCCC framework has already drawn on Montreal here, with
frequent Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and Conferences of the Parties serving as
Meetings of the Parties (CMPs). However, this is another area where the commitment
period duration plays an important role, as the more certainty there is for the period
ahead, the easier it is to modify the existing agreement, and the more time can be
devoted to renegotiation.
19
The role of industry
An area in which the Montreal Protocol was particularly successful was in its
achievement of a relatively positive response from the main industry stakeholders,
chiefly CFC manufacturing companies. This allowed for more rapid development of
alternatives to ODSs and for less concerted opposition from ODS producing
industries to the protocol. This is a sharp contrast to climate change negotiations,
where affected industries have long opposed restrictions. Obviously the potential for a
lesson for post-2012 negotiations here is limited; however, what the Montreal
example points to is the desirability of limited industry involvement in the
negotiations, as well as the need to focus on unilateral action, in order to bring certain
segments of industry in line with policymakers. At the time of Montreal, ODS
producing industry based in the US and other places was already subject to certain
restrictions, particularly on the use of CFCs in aerosols, and as a result it was in their
competitive interest to back restrictions which would limit their international
competitors in similar ways. In fact, at the time of the signing of the Montreal
Protocol the first alternatives to CFCs were already available. Barring any major
upheaval in US policy following the 2008 presidential election major unilateral action
is unlikely to occur for climate change, but it is important to note the detrimental
effect that industry representatives and interest groups can have on the course of
negotiations. The involvement of industrial groups and other NGOs has been
identified as a key strength of the Montreal negotiations (Benedick, 1991, p.206), but
in the case of climate change significant work must be done in order to bring key
industry groups on side with the negotiations. One option is to ensure that lobbying by
carbon-intensive industries viewpoints with is countered by other industries and
financial service sectors that stand to gain from emission reductions and carbon
trading.
Public opinion and consumer behaviour
The role of industry also emphasises the impact that consumer activism is able to have
on the course of international environmental agreements. A key reason that industry
groups were willing to permit large-scale cutbacks in ODS production, especially in
the US, was that sale of CFC-based aerosols had already fallen heavily, as a result of a
drop in consumer demand prompted by environmental awareness. The current case
for climate change is perhaps more analogous to the situation in Europe during the
Montreal negotiations, with relatively little consumer pressure and organised private
interest groups exerting influence on behalf of emission-intensive industries. The
impact of public concerns about climate change on purchasing behaviour would have
a significant influence on the willingness of industry representatives and policymakers
to take unilateral action on climate change. However, reducing personal CO2
emissions would most likely require a greater change in lifestyle for most consumers
than a boycott on aerosol sprays might. That said, even a small shift in consumer
behaviour in the US, for instance, could cut emissions substantially. The importance
of public opinion is one of the more salient lessons that those in favour of greenhouse
gas reduction could learn from the Montreal Protocol negotiations, and it may be
necessary to raise public awareness of climate change issues in order to affect major
policy changes.
Reisinger (2002, p. 4) has suggested the need to differentiate between
emission reduction and lifestyle change. ‘The experience with the development of
20
CFC replacements shows that consumer resistance against eliminating the “offending
activity” shrinks to virtually nil, and can even result in active support of new,
environmentally friendly alternative products and processes, if the message can be
transmitted that the “lifestyle” is not automatically in question.’ As a result, Reisinger
urges that solutions to climate change ‘step outside their sometimes Spartan and
zealously green image’. Again, because of the nature of the controlled chemicals, this
was a simpler matter in the case of ozone depletion. The ODSs controlled by the
Montreal Protocol were used for discrete purposes and were chiefly manmade.
Furthermore, as important as refrigeration and telecommunications may be, they are
relatively trivial next to energy generation and other greenhouse gas releasing activity.
In order to reduce impacts on lifestyle in industrialised countries all that was needed
was the development of cleaner alternatives to offending substances. This is unlikely
to be such a relatively simple matter in the case of climate change. The development
of alternative methods of energy generation or CO2 capture and storage, for example,
may take longer with more short-term impacts on lifestyle. Negotiators and
policymakers should strive to minimize these. But this will be difficult. For instance,
if a global tax was placed on CO2 emissions, as Stiglitz (2006) has suggested, carbonintensive lifestyles would necessarily be affected to some degree.
Treatment of developing country parties
As to whether greenhouse gas emission reduction targets should be set for developing
country parties, and what form those targets should take, the example of the Montreal
Protocol is somewhat limited in its applicability. While the shared burden between
developed and developing countries was crucial for the success of Montreal, the
protocol was structured considerably differently from the way Kyoto currently is. In
particular, the distinction between Article 5 parties and non-Article 5 parties was
based on the rate of emissions per capita rather than explicitly on gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita (Article 5.1). As a result, those that were permitted a grace
period in their emission reductions were necessarily those with lower emissions in the
first place. It is true that the binary distinction between developed and developing
nations is becoming increasingly problematic, but whether states could be
differentiated based solely on their level of per capita emissions following 2012 is
uncertain. It would require complex negotiations, especially as it would necessitate
the major developing economies taking on certain kinds of commitments.
According to Benedick (2005, 17), ‘the ozone experience also demonstrated
that developing nations will only accept environmental commitments if they are
assured access to new technologies.’ Similarly, Picolotti (2007) has raised the use of
the multilateral fund for technology transfer as an area where Kyoto could learn from
Montreal. Sarma and Zaelke (2007) have emphasised the need in the UNFCCC for a
panel of technical experts to oversee issues arising around technology transfer from
developed to developing parties. As well as making binding emission caps seem more
attractive to developing parties, provision for technology transfer would go some way
to addressing normative concerns about burden sharing and the need to account for
the fact that historically the bulk of polluting has been done by the developed world.
In the Montreal Protocol technology transfer fell chiefly under the multilateral fund,
which went some way to alleviate the costs of developing country parties purchasing
technology protected by intellectual property rights. For reasons already discussed, a
broad multilateral fund becomes a more complicated proposition for climate change,
as the costs are likely to be several orders of magnitude greater. Nevertheless, Sarma
21
and Zaelke downplay the influence that intellectual property rights will have on the
transfer of technology between states. It is likely that subsidised transfer of
technology from industrialised nations will be fundamental to developing country
parties meeting any obligations they may take on for climate change.
Technological innovation
The key role played by scientific development in the phase-out of environmentally
harmful substances was emphasised by the Meetings of the Parties subsequent to the
Montreal Protocol. In part, the rapid increase in the speed and degree of emission
reductions was due to chemical substitutes for ODSs proving cheaper than had been
originally thought likely. According to Reisinger (2002, p. 4), ‘the rapid progress of
solutions in either CFC replacements or energy efficiency and alternative energy
sources demonstrate that induced technological change can rapidly and significantly
lower projected costs and increase capacity.’ Encouraging investment into research
and technology can significantly reduce the costs of both mitigation of and adaptation
to climate change, just as they did for ODS abatement.
The uncertain costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change are closely
related to uncertainty surrounding the future of scientific advances in these fields.
Despite this, in recent years leading scientific nations have reduced their investment
into energy technology research (Benedick, 2005). If the successes of Montreal are to
be replicated, a necessary precursor will be substantial scientific and technological
innovation. If technological innovation is able to reduce the costs associated with
reducing emissions, a broad and successful negotiation is more likely. However, to a
certain extent the situation is circular, as policymakers may be unwilling to commit
large sums to science and technology if they are unwilling to support an agreement on
climate change. In addition, a long-term agreement would greatly increase the
chances of substantial investment into emission reductions. It may be that a strong
agreement will be the necessary precursor to technological innovation, and not the
other way around. In that case, policy attention should be given to securing broad
participation despite the reservations of some parties to the projected costs of limiting
emissions.
Conclusions
The degree to which it is possible to apply lessons from one international
environmental agreement to another is dependant upon the similarities of the issues
they address. In the case of ozone depletion and climate change there are many
similarities, but also important differences, which hinder the simple transplantation of
ideas from one to the other. Put bluntly, ozone depletion is a generally simpler issue
to conceptualise and deal with in a policy context, with fewer relevant interest groups,
fewer emission sources to be targeted, and a greater number of cost-effective
alternatives to emission. As a result, the issues that must be dealt with in climate
change agreements will necessarily be more varied and complex than their ozone
depletion equivalents. To a certain extent the idea that it is a simple matter to apply
lessons from one agreement to another has been overstated in the literature.
This is not to say that the one has no relevant lessons for the other. On the
contrary, the Kyoto Protocol could well benefit from a careful application of some of
the features that made the Montreal Protocol so successful. The most important
lessons for post-2012 climate change negotiations are:
22
1. Any mechanisms developed to reduce global emissions should be long-term, if
not permanent, in nature, so as to increase certainty and predictability.
2. Any effective and acceptable agreement requires the inclusion of methods to
prevent leakage and ensure compliance. The exact form these take will be
dependant on the form of the agreement.
3. The US must be brought on board, or at least commit to making a comparable
effort to reduce emissions, to any post-2012 agreement.
4. For major emitters, the domestic benefits of a post-2012 agreement must
outweigh the costs of taking action (or the cost of free-riding must be
increased).
5. In addition to a broad agreement, parties should work towards negotiating
smaller sectoral agreements, which would work in tandem with the major
agreement, but which may be easier to negotiate and where substantive
progress may be achieved more quickly.
6. Greenhouse gas emission reductions ought to be separated from major lifestyle
upheaval, as much as is possible. Where lifestyle change is unavoidable, it
should be introduced as gradually and gently as is consistent with emission
reduction timetables.
7. Effort should be made to lift public awareness of the issues relating to climate
change, so that public opinion can influence government and consumer
behaviour will drive the behaviour of industry.
8. Provision should be made to subsidise, at least in part, technology transfer
from industrialised to developing nations.
9. Major developing economies must undertake to limit emissions. In the interest
of achieving consensus, and to satisfy normative concerns, these undertakings
will have to be differentiated in some way from those of developed country
parties.
10. There is a need for substantial investment in the development of new
technology both to mitigate and adapt to climate change.
It is not sufficient merely to highlight differences between the protocols. What
is needed is a systematic assessment of how the advantages of one could be modified
to become applicable to what is, in many ways, a significantly different issue.
Although these issues have been covered only briefly here, it has been illustrated how
complex many of these questions are. Furthermore, it is not enough that policymakers
be made aware of the Montreal Protocol and the reasons for its success. They must
also be cognisant of the major differences between the two issues and the way in
which these differences have influenced and continue to influence the respective
policy responses.
It is difficult to predict precisely what form of agreement will be negotiated
for the period following the expiry of CP1. The degree to which it will be possible to
draw on the example of the Montreal Protocol will be dependent on the practical
realities of the negotiations. The issues suggested here will be appropriate to a Kyotostyle multilateral agreement, but there is no guarantee that that is what will be
achieved. Whatever is agreed upon, however, certain issues, for instance the role that
developing country parties should take, will have to be dealt with. In this regard the
Montreal Protocol can provide an example, not perhaps in terms of specific policy
options, but rather in so far as it has demonstrated what is necessary for an
international environmental agreement to succeed in its aims. The negotiators of the
23
Montreal Protocol were able to develop an impressively strong agreement, which still
achieved broad participation and consent; it is this that a post-2012 agreement should
seek to emulate. In this paper several of the structural elements that were necessary
for this have been addressed. Rather than simply seeking to adopt these, however,
negotiators should attempt to find ways of attaining the same ends within the often
quite different issue of climate change.
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25
Appendix I: Chronologies
Chronology of the science relating to anthropogenic depletion of the
stratospheric ozone layer:
1970 – P.J. Crutzen publishes ‘The influence of nitrogen oxides on the atmospheric
ozone content’, which suggests that human activity could have a depletory effect on
the ozone layer.
1973-4 – Richard Stolarski and Ralph Cicerone conduct research indicating that the
release of chlorine into the atmosphere may act to destroy ozone molecules.
1974 – M.J. Molina and F.S. Rowland publish ‘Stratospheric sink for
chlorofluoromethanes: chlorine atom-catalyzed destruction of ozone.’ This research
demonstrates that CFCs persist for many decades on average in the stratosphere and
upon breakdown release large amounts of chlorine.
1975, September – The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) funds a
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) technical conference on the implications
of this research.
1977, March – UNEP and the WMO establish the Coordinating Committee on the
Ozone Layer (CCOL). This committee is responsible for bringing together scientists
and preparing regular submissions for UNEP and governments on the evolving
science.
1985, May – Farman et al. publish ‘Seasonal depletion of ozone’, the first observation
of the Antarctic ‘ozone hole’ phenomenon.
1986 – UNEP and the WMO publish Atmospheric Ozone 1985: Assessment of Our
Understanding of the Processes Controlling its Current Distribution and Change, a
comprehensive study of the factors affecting stratospheric ozone concentration levels.
1986, June – UNEP and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency sponsor a
conference on risks to human health and the environment from ozone loss and climate
change.
1988, March – The Ozone Trends Panel publishes more evidence of the links between
CFCs and ozone depletion.
Chronology of the policy relating to anthropogenic depletion of the stratospheric
ozone layer:
1977, March – UNEP sponsors a meeting of governments in Washington which
produces a ‘World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer’ and recommends that
negotiations begin for an ozone protection treaty.
1977, August – An ozone protection amendment to the Clean Air Act is passed by the
United States Congress in response to public pressure.
1978, March - The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency initiates a unilateral ban on
CFCs for non-essential aerosol uses. They are followed in this by Canada, Norway
and Sweden.
1978, December – Second international conference on the ozone layer is held in
Munich.
1982, January – UNEP convenes an Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical
Experts for the Preparation of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of
the Ozone Layer.
1982-5 – This Working Group negotiates a convention on research and monitoring of
ozone levels.
26
1985, March – The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer is
signed.
1987, June – The Venice economic summit names ozone depletion the most important
environmental issue.
1987, September – The Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone
Layer is signed.
1988, March – DuPont announces a phase-out of CFCs.
1989 – The Montreal Protocol enters into force.
1990, June – Major revisions to the Montreal Protocol are negotiated in London.
These include the addition of 12 ozone depleting substances to the control list, a
moving forward of elimination dates and the extension of the eventual reduction of
ODSs from 50 to 100%.
1992, November – Further amendments and strengthening of the Protocol is agreed
upon in Copenhagen.
Chronology of the science relating to anthropogenic climate change:
1824 – Joseph Fourier discovers that the composition of gases in the atmosphere may
influence the temperature of the Earth.
1859 – John Tyndall demonstrates the capacity of water vapour and carbon dioxide
(CO2) to trap heat waves.
1896 – Svante Arrhenius and Arvid Högbom theorise that human emissions of CO2
may have an effect on global temperature.
1938 – Guy Stewart Callendar establishes a warming trend, and demonstrates that
concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere had increased by around 10% in a hundred
years.
1945 – The United States Office of Naval Research begins funding a large number of
scientific fields, many of which are useful for climate change.
1955 – Hans Suess announces his discovery of fossil carbon from coal and oil in the
atmosphere.
1955, December – Suess and Roger Revelle conduct research which indicates that the
oceans are only able to absorb around 10% of CO2 released into the atmosphere, not
nearly all of it as had been thought.
1956 – Gilbert N. Plass proves that CO2 interferes with infrared radiation in a way that
could increase the temperature of the Earth over time.
1960 – Charles David Keeling establishes that the average level of CO2 in the
atmosphere is increasing over time.
1968 – Several studies suggest that global temperature rise could melt the Arctic and
Antarctic ice caps, causing sea levels to rise dramatically.
1975 – Manabe and Richard Wetherald publish a model which demonstrates that
under a doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere the Earth could be several degrees warmer.
1980 – Veerabhadran Ramanathan publishes estimates of the contribution to the
greenhouse effect of other gases, specifically methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC).
1980-5 – Antarctic ice drilling demonstrates that atmospheric CO2 levels increase and
decrease in levels roughly parallel to fluctuations in global temperature.
1990 – The first report of the IPCC is released. It suggests that warming has been
occurring, and that future warming seems likely.
1995 – The second report of the IPCC is released. It declares that serious warming is
likely in the coming century.
27
2001 – The third report of the IPCC is released. It declares that a warming of the
Earth unprecedented since the end of the last Ice Age is 95% likely.
2002 – Studies indicate that pollution may have slowed the pace of global warming,
but that levels of pollution are decreasing.
Chronology of the policy relating to anthropogenic climate change:
1970, April – First Earth Day is held. The environmental movement begins to react to
fears of global environmental degradation.
1971 – An international Study of Man’s Impact on the Climate (SMIC) is held in
Stockholm. It reports that there is a serious danger of human influence on the
environment.
1978 – The U.S. Congress passes the National Climate Act, collecting climate science
research into a single government office.
1985 – A meeting of scientists in Villach calls on governments to consider an
international agreement on the issue of climate change.
1988 – UNEP and the WMO found the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), an organisation responsible for collating climate change science in an
accessible form for policymakers.
1988 – A World Conference on the Global Atmosphere: Implications for Global
Security is held in Toronto. Attendees call for an agreement on climate change to
parallel the recently signed Montreal Protocol.
1988, December – A resolution of the United Nations General Assembly calls climate
change a “common concern of mankind” and calls for a global response.
1989 – The European Community announces it will support an international
agreement to deal with climate change.
1989 – Representatives of fossil fuel and other industries form a Global Climate
Coalition, in order to lobby against climate change regulation in the US.
1992 – The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is
signed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro.
1995 – Negotiations begin on a protocol to the UNFCCC in Berlin.
1997 – The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC is agreed.
2001 – The 7th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (Marrakech, 2007) agrees
most of the rules for the Kyoto Protocol.
2005 – Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development
initiated by the Group of Eight (G8).
2005, February – The Kyoto Protocol enters into force.
2005, December – The first Meeting of the Parties under the Kyoto Protocol adopts
the rules for the Kyoto Protocol
2005, December - The first Meeting of the Parties under the Kyoto Protocol launches
a negotiation on post-2012 commitments for developed country Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol.
2006, January – Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
established.
2007, December – the 13th Conference of the Parties under the UNFCCC agrees to the
Bali action plan on long term cooperative action under the Convention, part of the
negotiations for a post-2012 climate change agreement.
28
Appendix II: The greenhouse warming potential (GWP) of
some Montreal controlled gases
Substance
Thichlorofluoromethane (CFC-11)
Dichlorodifluoromethane (CFC-12)
1,1,2-Trichloro-1,2,2-trifluoroethane (CFC-113)
1,2-Dichloro-1,1,2,2-tetrafluoroethane (CFC-114)
1-Chloro-1,1,2,2,2-pentafluoroethane (CFC-115)
Bromochlorodifluoromethane (halon-1211)
Bromotrifluoromethane (halon-1301)
Dibromotetrafluoroethane (halon-2402)
Chlorotrifluoromethane (CFC-13)
Tetrachloromethane
1,1,1-Trichloroethane
Difluorochloromethane (HCFC-22)
1,2-Dichloro-1-fluoroethane (HCFC-141b)
1-Chloro-1,1-difluoroethane (HCFC-142b)
GWP1
4,600
10,600
6,000
9,880
7,250
1,300
6,900
1,620
14,000
1,800
144
1,700
700
2,400
P
Source: IPCC, 2001
1
Global Warming Potential is measured relative to CO2 which has a GWP of 1. These figures are 100
year potentials.