Download Conceptualizing Equitable Access to Sustainable

Energy Management
and Sustainability
Conceptualizing Equitable Access to
Sustainable Development –
Rethinking Paradigms in Global Climate Talks
6th International Scientific
Conference on Energy and
Climate Change
PROMITHEAS
National and Kaposdistrian
University of Athens
October 10, 2013
Dr. Ariel Macaspac
Penetrante
Chair of Energy
Management and
Sustainability, Institute for
Infrastructure and
Resources Management,
University of Leipzig,
Germany
Search for a Political Formula
Energy Management
and Sustainability
Climate change negotiations require conceptual underpinnings to
enable a robust negotiation framework
Negotiations on technical issues often fail due to lack of guiding
principles or due to lack of consensus on guiding principles as the
negotiation process unfolds
 Guiding principles become evident only during the
negotiation process
“Consensus Diplomacy” on political formulas is necessary to structure
the negotiation process.
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Climate Change Negotiations and
Decision-Making
Energy Management
and Sustainability
3
Structure Complexity: The North-South Divide
Energy Management
and Sustainability
•
The North-South Divide has been reinvigorated as a political axis in the climate
change context and has implications for the negotiation process (see
Penetrante 2011; 2012; 2013; Sjöstedt & Penetrante 2013))
•
A new concept of the North-South divide has emerged
in the climate change context  identity-based concept
Perspectives need to be seen in an integrated manner:
For example, projections show that China, India and the rest of Asia will be the
major energy consumers in the next 50 years (Prof. Mavrakis): Question?
Aside from concerns on subsistence, when economies of these countries are
dominantly export driven to ensure low prices of commodities in developed
countries: Should we account this energy demand to these Asian4 countries?
Structure Complexity: Rules and Procedural
Justice
Energy Management
and Sustainability
There are different burden-sharing rules for distributing GHG
emission reduction targets between countries:
Egalitarian rule: Principle of equal per capita emissions
If the population of a country amounts to X% of global
population, this country should receive X% of the global
entitlements for GHG emissions.
Grandfathering rule: Principle of equal percentage reduction
of emissions
If the GHG emissions of a country amount to X% of
global emissions, this country should receive x% of the
global entitlements for GHG emissions.
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Structure Complexity: Rules and Procedural
Justice (2)
Energy Management
and Sustainability
Ability-to-pay rule: Principle of equal ratio between GDP and
abatement costs
If the GDP of a country amounts to x% of gross world
product, this country should receive entitlement for
GHG emissions such that it bears x% of the global
abatement costs for reductions of emissions.
Polluter-pays rule: Principle of equal ratio between
production-based emissions and abatement costs
If the production-based GHG emissions of a country
amount to x% of global emissions, this country should
receive entitlements for GHG emissions such that it
bears x% of the global abatement costs for reduction of
emissions.
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Structure Complexity: Rules and Procedural
Justice (3)
Energy Management
and Sustainability
Consumer-pays rule: Principle of equal ratio between
consumption-based emissions (i.e., production-based
emissions adjusted by the net trade balance in emissions of a
country) and abatement costs
If the consumption-based GHG emissions of a country
amount to x% of the global emissions, this country
should receive entitlements for GHG emissions such
that it bears x% of the global abatement costs for
reductions of emissions.
 Rules distributing costs for adaptation (including climate
refugees and food insecurity)
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Equitable Access to Sustainable Development
(EASD)
Energy Management
and Sustainability
• Introduction of EASD in the Cancun Agreements in context of a
timeframe for global greenhouse gas emissions
• UNFCCC invitation: academic discourse on how the newly agreed
principle can be conceptualized, implementented and how it can
facilitate the negotiation process (e.g., facilitation of the NorthSouth divide)  Start of informal consultation on EASD in Durban
leading to the EASD workshop during the 15th Session of the Ad hoc
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the
Convention in May 2012 in Bonn.
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Simulation Games between 2009 and 2012
• 20 simulation games with more than
300 participants (students and IPCC
scientists) in 6 countries between 2009
and 2012
• Different types of justice that may
complement or compete with each
other
Energy Management
and Sustainability
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The UNFCCC and the Question of Equity
Energy Management
and Sustainability
•
No clear articulation of the quantified meaning of equity
•
Diffuse term and its interpretation often subordinated to
national interests
•
Mere classification of countries –> Annex and Non-Annex
countries which is relevant for the Kyoto Protocol
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Going to Basics: Equity and Equitable
Condition
Energy Management
and Sustainability
• Equitable Condition:
•Optimal situation or equilibrium where actors will no longer experience distress, that is,
when they are convinced that the ratio of their input and output is generally acceptable.
•Inputs are each participant’s contribution to the relational exchange which entitles one to
rewards and benefits (e.g., time, effort, resources, commitment and various forms of
liabilities.
•Outputs are positive and negative externalities incurred as a consequence of this relational
exchange when achieving a common goal (e.g., financial gains, recognition, achievement of
pre-determined goals, co-benefits or “side-effects”).
• Actors seek to maximize outputs based on their inputs and the failure to do so brings
“distress”.
•When actors encounter distress, efforts are conducted to restore equity within that
relationship.
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Concept of Equity
Energy Management
and Sustainability
•Equity is highly contextual and is determined only as the decisionmaking/negotiation process unfolds: It therefore requires a dynamic
approach
•It requires a system to manage complex information that is needed by
actors to compare inputs and outputs  role of epistemic communities
very crucial
•Similar ratio among actors manifest equity, whereas actors do not need
to contribute equal amounts of inputs in absolute terms nor do they
need to receive equal rewards
•Equity covers individual capacities in contributing inputs. Distress
occurs when one actor sees another actor with similar capacities but
lower contributions and receiving similar or greater outputs from the
common project.
•More distress arises when non-contributing free-riders harvest
common benefits.
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Concept of Equity (2)
Energy Management
and Sustainability
• Distress leads to the necessity of finding efforts to restore equity, for
example, in global climate talks, where differentiated inputs are
expected among countries – depending on their level of economic
development as well as their historical responsibility and where
benefits and rewards are considered global common goods under
conditions of non-exclusivity and yet rivalry.
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Equity from the Negotiation Perspective
Energy Management
and Sustainability
Four conditions for Equity:
•When inputs and outputs are comparable.
•When fair procedures are present when establishing
mechanisms for compliance and verification.
•When equitable behavior is more profitable than inequitable
behavior.
•When there is no free-riding to ensure just and therefore
effective outcomes.
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Global Climate Optimum vs.
National Climate Optimum
Energy Management
and Sustainability
 TMC (mitigation) = TMC (damages)
• Global Climate Optimum as situation
where the total marginal costs of
preventing global temperature change
from surpassing 2°C correspond to the
total marginal costs caused by climate
damages
• National Climate Optimum as situation
where the total marginal costs of national
climate protection measures match the
total marginal costs of climate damages in
one specific country
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Outcome Complexity: Dealing with Uncertainty
in Global Climate Agreements Energy Management
and Sustainability
"We know there are known
knowns: there are things we know
we know. We also know there are
known unknowns: that is to say we
know there are things we know we
don't know. But there are also
unknown unknowns — the ones
we don't know we don't know."
Former U.S. Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld
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Outcome - Complexity
Energy Management
and Sustainability
The Known
Standard
Provision
The Known
Unknown
The
Unknown
Unknown
Contingency TRUST and
Provisions
Cooperation
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Bridging the Gap
Energy Management
and Sustainability
- Between marginal social costs and marginal private costs
- Internalizing negative and positive externalities to prevent
free-riding:
- allocating values to common goods
- exact attribution of costs to these actors causing externalities
- Compensatory character of internalizing externalities: moving
from an economic to a political paradigm: distorted internalizing
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The EASD Principle
Energy Management
and Sustainability
• Relating EASD to the global climate talks: focus not
only on the fairness of procedures and on providing
the basis for just outcomes BUT also on participation
as social peers
• Access to resources is equitable when individual
conditions that inhibit inclusion are identified and
remedied in a compensatory manner.
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The EASD Principle
Energy Management
and Sustainability
• How climate protection (CP) measures such as GHG
emission reduction can produce benefits for sustainable
development, particularly when tensions between
sustainability and development arise.
• It also addresses how the link between SD and CP can
become self-evident as a standard which raises the costs of
non-participation through network effects
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[1]
[2]
Starting year 1850, excluding historical LULUCF, data source: CAIT (WRI, 2009, 2012)
Source: (Khor, 2012)
EASD: Quo Vadis?
Energy Management
and Sustainability
Table 1: Analysis of Shares and Entitlements
Actors
(countries)
Issues
Number of countries
(percentage to total no. of
countries)
Percentage to total no. of
countries
Share of population
Historical Emission (18502000) in accumulated
numbers, in GtC
Historical Emission (18502000), contribution in
percentage to total
concentration
Cumulative global emission
per capita (1850-2008)
Developed Countries
(Annex)
41 countries
Developing Countries (Non- Total
Annex)
154 countries
195
[BASIC: 5 countries (3.2%
of all developing countries)]
21%
79%
100%
25%
75%
100%
210
55.44
[BASIC: 27]
20%
[BASIC: 50% of developing
countries’ historical
emissions]
336 Gton (28% of total) (fair
share with 75% of global
population: 904 Gt)
265
80%
878 Gt (72% of total)
(fair share with 25% of
global population: 310 Gt)
21
100%
1214 Gt
[1]
[2]
Starting year 1850, excluding historical LULUCF, data source: CAIT (WRI, 2009, 2012)
Source: (Khor, 2012)
EASD: Quo Vadis?
Energy Management
and Sustainability
Table 1: Analysis of Shares and Entitlements (2)
UNFCCC (legal
Structures framework)
Processes
Parties
Parties
192 parties (191
countries and 1
regional
organization)
Industry norms and
Medium or highly
standards on environmental advanced
protection
Low or highly advanced
Negotiation mode (bilateral No clear preference on
and multilateral)
negotiation mode
General preference on multilateral
negotiation mode. Tendency for BASIC
to conduct bilateral negotiations
Coordination
Regional organizations (ASEAN,
MERCOSUR), coalitions (G77+China;
BASIC, AOSIS)
Regional organizations
(e.g. EU), coalitions
(G8,G20)
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[1]
[1]
[2]
[2]
[3]
Source: (Meinshausen, 2009)
Starting year 1850, excluding historical LULUCF, data source: CAIT (WRI, 2009, 2012)
Source: (Meinshausen, 2009)
Source: (Khor, 2012)
Source: (Den Elzen and Höhne, 2008)
EASD: Quo Vadis?
Outcomes
(emission
reduction,
carbon
budget)
Achievement of 67% probability of
limiting temperature rise to within
2°C (2010-2050)
Achievement of 67% probability of
limiting temperature rise to within
2°C (2010-2050)
Cumulative total CO2 emissions.
2000-2049 (with 25% probability of
exceeding the 2°C temp. increase
limit)
Cumulative total CO2 emissions.
2000-2049 (with 50% probability of
exceeding the 2°C temp. increase
limit)
AWG-KP’s wording of the level of
its ambition (August 2007)
Energy Management
and Sustainability
21% entitlement: 157.5 Gt
25% entitlement: 187.5 Gt
79% entitlement: 790 Gt
75% entitlement: 562.5 Gt
<
750 Gt
21% entitlement: 126 Gt
25% entitlement: 150 Gt
79% entitlement: 474 Gt
75% entitlement: 450 Gt
< 600 Gt
21% entitlement: 210 Gt
25% entitlement: 250 Gt
79% entitlement: 790 Gt
75% entitlement: 750 Gt
1000 Gt
21% entitlement: 302.4 Gt
25 % entitlement: 360 Gt
25% to 40% emission
reduction below 1990 levels
in 2020
79% entitlement: 1137.6 Gt 1440 Gt
75% entitlement: 1080 Gt
“Deviation from baseline”
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emissions
peak by
2017 to
2022 and at
least 50%
emission
reduction
of the 2000
level by
2050
Conclusion
Energy Management
and Sustainability
- A „“pure“ technical formula for distributing emission
rights is not possible
 Only a negotiated formula. Therefore, integrating
various perspectives is inevitable to ensure just
outcomes through equitable participation.
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Energy Management
and Sustainability
Maraming Salamat
Danke schön
ευχαριστίες
‫شكرا‬
•
•
•
•
•
Thank you
Gracias
спасибо
謝謝
Penetrante, A.M. (Forthcoming 2014) Strategic Facilitation of Complex Decision-Making. How Process and
Context Matter in Global Climate Change Negotiations, Wiesbaden: Springer.
Sjöstedt, G. and Penetrante, A.M. (2013) Climate Change Negotiations – A Guide to Resolving Disputes and
Facilitating Multilateral Cooperation. London: Routledge
Penetrante, A.M. (2013) Common But Differentiated Responsibilities – The North-South Divide in Climate
Change Negotiations, in Sjöstedt, G. and Penetrante, A.M. (eds.) Climate Change Negotiations – A Guide to
Resolving Disputes and Facilitating Multilateral Cooperation. London: Routledge, pp. 249-276.
Penetrante, A.M. (2012) Simulating Climate Change Negotiations. Lessons from Modeled Experience.
Negotiation Journal, 27(3), pp. 279-314.
Penetrante, A.M. (2011) Entanglement of Climate Change in North-South Relations: Stumbling Blocks and
Opportunities for Negotiation, in Richardson, K., Will, S., Liverman, D. (eds.) Climate Change Global Risks,
Challenges and Decisions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 356-359.
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