Download Climate Change Policymaking in Germany and the USA

Climate Change Policymaking in Germany and the USA
Guri Bang Softing, CICERO, University of Oslo
(www.cicero.uio.no)
March 2002
Paper presented at the 43rd Annual International Studies Association Convention,
New Orleans, LA, 24-27 March 2002.
Panel: TA 30 Environmental Policy Making, Tuesday 8:30-10:15
Abstract
In a comparative analysis of climate change policymaking processes in Germany and the USA, the
paper explores, first, how national cost-benefit calculations and international interdependency
structures are decisive for the development of the counties’ negotiation positions in the
international climate change negotiations. This gives a rather rough picture of the environmentaleconomic interests of the countries. Secondly, therefore, the paper explores how a focus on
domestic politics can provide a supplemental, more detailed account of the climate change
policymaking process. Institutional structures and the political system of the countries influence the
scope of possibility for national climate change policy outcome, as the complicated decisionmaking process involves competing interests of political, economic and social stakeholder groups.
The distribution of power and influence between domestic actors can limit the government’s ability
to implement the climate change policy it prefers.
Introduction
Climate change scientists have found discernible evidence that the world is undergoing humaninduced global warming. This means that human behavior will have to be changed to abate the
problem by reducing emissions of harmful greenhouse gases (GHGs). This in turn means politics:
who are to take the decisions about how to change behavior, and in what way. In this paper the
research question is why two large, high emitting countries like Germany and the United States
have ended up with so different policies to address the problem?
To analyze this, I am using two established explanatory models from political science: the
unitary rational actor model (URA) and the domestic politics model (DP). From each of the models
I extract two central theoretical predictions about what influences the policymaking process. Hence,
four central elements – national cost and benefit calculations, interdependence, public demand and
support for climate policy, and governmental supply of climate policy – are considered in this paper
to analyze similarities and differences in the climate change policies in Germany and the United
States. The paper concentrates on the Kyoto protocol negotiations (1995-July 2001).
To be able to understand climate change policy choice in the two countries, it is essential to
establish a set of causal mechanisms that is assumed to influence the policymaking process. I have
chosen to use the unitary rational actor model and the domestic politics model to establish four sets
of causal configurations commonly thought to be important in this respect within the international
relations field of policy analysis.1[1] From each of the models, I extract two main assumptions.
These constitute the configurations of causes that are thought to inform us as to the rationale behind
policy choice. Degree of membership (mostly in or mostly out) in these four causal sets will be a
signal of what causal factors were important in this policymaking process in each of the countries.
The hypothesis is that the same set of causal conditions does play a role in the policymaking
process in both countries, although to a different degree.
The data consists of secondary literature (academic literature, journal articles, newspaper
articles) about the climate change policy in Germany and the USA, personal interviews with central
participants in the policymaking processes in the countries (approximately 12 interviews per
country), as well as policy documents and analyses made by actors in the policy process
(governmental documents, NGO documents).
1[1]
See for instance Harris, P. (1998): Understanding America's Climate Change Policy: Realpolitik,
Pluralism, and Ethical Norms. OCEES Research Paper, or Hasenclever, A., et al. (1997): Theories in
International Regimes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
National costs and benefits
The central issue for a rational decision-maker will be to try to balance marginal abatement costs
against marginal damage costs. The problem for most countries in the climate change context is that
it is difficult to know for certain what the damage costs or impacts of climate change will be in the
future. Hence, a direct comparison of abatement costs and future benefits of reduced damage costs
is challenging, if not impossible. A core objective - for both the USA and Germany - in the climate
change negotiations has been to work for policy solutions that can be implemented at a reasonable
cost. Economic assessments of the costs that climate policy action would incur have been produced.
The overall conclusions have been different in the two countries.
Furthermore, countries assess the difference in costs and benefits between prevention of
serious climate change effects and adaptation to climate changes. It could for instance make more
economical sense to wait and see what climate changes will entail for the country, and then adapt to
it, rather than to invest large sums of money into prevention-policy initiatives with uncertain future
benefits. The problem is, however, that uncertainty still pertains to the time-range, speed, and
gravity of future climate changes. Under uncertainty, the first choice for policy design would be “no
regrets” solutions. When the question of extra costs becomes relevant, i.e. implementing more than
no-regrets measures, the policymaker will have to consider the elements of uncertainty involved
when making cost-benefit calculus. It would be better to choose policy design that has many
advantages beyond the climate change aspect. A policy proposal is therefore more likely to find
support through serving several policy needs at the same time. Urgency and timing of the issue
obviously also plays a role here.
To assess the degree of explanatory power of these theoretical predictions on German and
US climate policy, I will consider to what extent cost and benefit calculations have been used by the
government to design domestic climate policy and negotiation positions at the international level.
The presumption is that all governments employ such calculations, and that economists will
recommend policies where the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs, as with no-regrets
policies. I then move on to assess to what degree such recommendations have lead to policy
decisions and positions that correspond with the advice. Thus, high degree of membership in this
causal set is identified as use of cost and benefit calculations when establishing policy alternatives,
combined with corresponding policy decisions. Low degree of membership in the causal set is
identified as use of cost and benefit calculations when establishing policy alternatives, combined
with non-corresponding policy decisions.
Germany
In the period 1987-1992, a very important process of issue framing took place in Germany: The
Enquete Commission,2[2] consisting of parliamentary politicians representing all political parties as
well as experts on global climate change issues, assessed both the science of climate change and
policy options through several scenarios in 6 studies. The commission recommended a 25-30%
reduction of CO2 emissions from 1987 levels by 2005. This target could be reached without any
harmful effects on the German economy provided that energy efficiency efforts, investments in
renewable energy sources, and continued use of nuclear energy became the focus of government
energy policy. The broad base of participation in the commission, and the high level of agreement
that was achieved, resulted in a very high level of acceptance and consent with the commission’s
policy advice. In December 1990, the German parliament agreed on an emissions reduction target
of 25% of CO2 from 1987 levels by 2005. The Enquete-process framed the issue, and created a base
for agreement about global warming that lasted through the 1990s.
The remarkable degree of agreement between the political parties in Germany on the high
ambitiousness in climate policy has resulted in a stable policy direction. Even when a realization
came about after the “wall fall” effect3[3] started to wear off, that reducing GHG emissions would be
more expensive for Germany than first thought, the policy direction was upheld. As such, the
precautionary principle has been at the center of climate policy strategy since the start – also this in
consistency with the recommendations by the Enquete Commission. In addition, much weight was
put on the possible positive effects that energy efficiency and new job markets could create in the
national economy. The government based much of its information and decisions it made on studies
2[2]
The German Bundestag from time to time appoints expert commissions to make assessments on complex
policy issues.
3[3]
Between 1990 and 1996 energy-related CO2 emissions in Germany fell by 10.3%. In relation to GDP CO2
emissions have fallen by 19% within the same period. The fall between 1990 and 1996 was 13.3% per person.
The reasons for these trends are extremely varied. On the one hand, the economic reconstruction and reduced
use of CO2 intensive lignite coal in the new Länder has played a significant role in the improvement in the
whole of Germany’s emissions balance. However, including the eastern Länder into the system since October
1990 has implied a subsidy of approximately 150 billion DM per year to reconstruct that part of the country.
The economic burden of this subsidy has been on the old Länder. (Federal statistical office Germany:
http://www.statistik-bund.de/, and BMU (1997a).
from renowned economic research institutes like RWI, Ifo, FhG/ISI, and the Öko-institut.4[4] The
scenarios these institutes developed for important elements like energy consumption, employment
effects, and CO2 emissions were used as background for cabinet decisions on the German climate
protection program.5[5]
Rhetorically, the costs of abatement policy have been evaluated as minor to the importance
of taking precautionary action to prevent adverse climate changes. However, an obvious
discrepancy has occurred in German climate policy over the period after COP1 in Berlin in 1995.
Germany has been working to through the Kyoto protocol negotiations to have internationally
binding reduction targets. Germany is a party to the common greenhouse gas emission reduction
target of the EU,6[6] which is to reduce the emissions of CO2 equivalents by 8% in the first budget
period (2008-2012) of the protocol. Germany has had a leadership role in the EU on climate policy
initiatives, and on the common negotiation position of the EU in the international climate change
negotiations. Germany alone is responsible for approximately 80% of the total EU reductions,
decided by internal distributive negotiations within the EU. This underscores the pivotal role
Germany has taken on in EU climate policy.7[7] At the same time, in the domestic arena the
ambitious emission reduction target has proven to be hard to implement, despite the massive
reductions achieved in the first years after reunification. Economic recession and increased
unemployment have made that difficult.
The national costs Germany would incur by implementing the Kyoto Protocol have been
calculated to be relatively small, especially because of the potential for energy efficiency that is still
unexploited. In a 2000 study by the Fraunhofer Institute (ISI), the main conclusions are that climate
policy will have a fairly small impact on employment and economic growth, and furthermore that
energy efficiency policies will lead to more jobs and accelerated innovation processes.8[8] Under the
protocol, Germany can use a comprehensive approach towards reducing emissions, meaning that
reduction can be achieved through policy reducing emissions of six major greenhouse gases. If
reductions must be achieved through reduction of CO2 alone, the costs would probably be higher,
mainly because Germany is a large importer of fossil fuels for primary energy use. Energy
4[4]
Two central studies that have been used by the government in cost benefit calculations are the 1996
RIW/Ifo study “Overall economic assessment of CO2 reduction strategies,” BMWi Publication series:
number 414, and the 1997 FZJ, DIW, FhG/ISI, Öko-Institut study “Policy scenarios for climate protection.”
5[5]
BMU (1997b), pp. 46-47.
6[6]
Commonly referred to as the ‘EU-bubble’. Within the bubble, the EU was allowed to distribute emission
reductions between the member countries, thus achieving a flexible and cost-effective way of reaching the
target of 8% emissions reductions.
7[7]
Ringius,L (1999), p.22.
8[8]
BMU (2000), p. 40.
efficiency policy thus makes sense in Germany, and has been an important part of the 130 policy
measures described in the Climate Protection Program.9[9]
The United States
In 1993 President Bill Clinton declared that the United States would commit to stabilizing its GHG
emissions at the 1990 level by 2000. However, in a 1996 position paper explaining the U.S.
government position on climate change the expected failure to achieve the stabilization target was
spelled out directly.10[10] In the same year’s annual report of the Clinton administration’s Council of
Economic Advisors (CEA), the main policy advice was to rely on cost-effective GHG control
policies based on economic incentives to motivate the responses of the responsible GHG emitters,
as well as flexibility in the timing of emissions reductions, and to coordinate national responses in
order to avoid excessively costly outcomes.11[11] The Clinton administration followed the CEA
advice closely in its negotiation strategy during the Kyoto protocol negotiations.
In advance of the Kyoto meeting in December 1997, increased efforts were made to attain
information about costs of climate change impacts and mitigation policies. The Council of
Economic Advisors made economic assessments of the costs that climate policy action to fulfill the
Kyoto Protocol would incur for the United States.12[12] The Council’s leader gave several
Congressional hearing statements where she asserted that the United States could work to avert the
dangers of climate change, while at the same time maintain the strength of the economy.13[13] In a
1998 CEA report, the economic costs for the United States was assessed to be critically linked to
the degree of cost-effectiveness in the pursuance of emissions reductions. Also, the report made
clear how difficult it is to calculate costs and benefits of climate. The use of economic models from
OECD, IPCC, and Stanford University were central, along with other tools such as meta-analysis,
basic economic reasoning, economic indicators from the World Bank, statistics, etc. in making
these assessments.14[14] The overall conclusion was that the economic impact of the Kyoto Protocol
will be modest for the United States. This conclusion was made, however, with the assumption that
international agreement could be achieved on some of the most disputed issues in the protocol: full
emissions trading, joint implementation, and participation by key developing countries. Other
9[9]
BMU (1997a), pp. 17-24.
EPA (1996), p. 2.
11[11]
United States Government Printing Office (1995), p. 156.
12[12]
U.S. Department of State (1998).
13[13]
Janet Yellen’s testimony before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, March
1998.
14[14]
U.S. Department of State (1998), p. 39.
10[10]
economic studies, by renowned researchers like Nordhaus and Boyer,15[15] have predicted that U.S.
costs could incur up to 2-4% of GDP if emissions reductions should be achieved in the short term,
as with Kyoto.
Concerning the costs of potential damages from climate change, a new study shows that
long-term observations confirm a rapid change in the climate.16[16] The science indicates that the
warming in the 21st century will be significantly larger than in the 20th century. Temperatures in
the US will rise by about 3-5°C (5-9°F) on average in the next 100 years, which is more than the
predicted global increase. For the nation as a whole, direct economic impacts are likely to be
modest. But in some places, economic losses or gains are likely to be large. For example, crop
yields are likely to increase over the next few decades and forest productivity is likely to increase
over the short term. But sea-level rise might threaten coastal wetlands and human coastal
development, and increased precipitation and storm surges can have economic consequences in
several regions.17[17]
The policy incentives in the second Clinton administration generally followed the CEA
analysis and advice. President Clinton’s climate change policy programs were of a no-regrets
character, emphasizing the potential for both environmental benefits and economic growth through
win-win-partnerships with the private sector, states, localities, and non-governmental organizations.
This means that Clinton was able to choose policy design that had many advantages beyond the
climate change aspect. The Climate Change Technology Initiative (CCTI) is an example of
Clinton’s “no regrets” strategy towards climate change. CCTI included tax credits to serve as
incentives for deploying energy efficiency improvements and renewable technologies for buildings,
light-duty vehicles, industry, and electricity generation. Other funding covered research,
development, and deployment for energy-efficient and renewable technologies and appliance
efficiency standards. One focus of these programs is climate change; but they often have additional
benefits for improved air quality due to reductions in criteria pollutants, energy security, and
maintaining U.S. leadership in science and technology.18[18]
The new turn in US climate policy under George W. Bush – a rejection of the Kyoto
protocol – seem to underline that climate policy has to “compete” with other issues for a place on
the policy agenda. One of the reasons that Bush gave for turning away from the Kyoto Protocol was
15[15]
See Nordhaus and Boyer (1999): “Requiem for Kyoto: An Economic Analysis” in The Energy Journal,
Special issue.
16[16]
US Global Change Research Program (2000).
17[17]
US Global Change Research Program (2000), p. 7-10.
18[18]
“Analysis of the CCTI”, April 1999, Energy Information Agency.
that the United States is experiencing an energy crisis. Reduced use of fossil fuel generated energy
would, in this situation, presumably hit the economy hard.19[19] The other main reason Bush gave
was that the protocol would have an adverse effect on the national economy. Recent policy advice
on for instance the energy policy of the United States20[20] does not go specifically in depth into the
economics of climate change abatement policy.
Membership degree
The Clinton administration followed the recommendations made by the CEA. On the basis of the
above analysis, I conclude that cost and benefit estimates was important for formulating climate
policy in the United States. The CEA and the Treasury Department became closely involved in
making cost estimates for the implementation of the Kyoto protocol. Policy advice was followed,
both through no-regrets initiatives at the domestic arena, and through positions pursued in the
international negotiations. The membership degree in this set is therefore mostly in for the United
States.
In the case of Germany, we saw that the issue framing phase was immensely important for
both policy direction and level of ambitiousness. Policy advice have come from several influential
research institutes, and have shown moderate to positive effects for German economy provided that
energy efficiency and renewable energy sources have been in focus of policy choice. This policy
advice has been followed in the national climate protection program. The program has proven too
little to achieve the reduction target, and hence one could say that policy advice wasn’t followed to
the required extent. The degree of membership is therefore mostly but not fully in, as in the case of
the United States.
Interdependence
A central assumption in the Unitary Rational Actor model is that a country selects the policy
alternative that has the highest-ranking consequence in terms of the country’s goals and objectives.
In determining goals and objectives, one must look at the context in which countries operate, rather
than internal policy processes or structures. The state is the agent, and the international community
provides the structure in which the state must defend its interests21[21]. Hence, negotiation positions
19[19]
See for instance the arguments made by Vice president Cheney in “Cheney Promotes Increasing Supply
as Energy Policy” by Joseph Kahn, New York Times, May 1, 2001.
20[20]
Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group (2001): National Energy Policy.
21[21]
Allison (1971), pp 32-33.
are chosen in response to the strategic problem the nation faces and are based on the best possible
information available to the actor – about the preferences of other actors, the issue area, as well as
the range of options available. These are considerations that will be part of the negotiation strategy
of a country. To explore the degree of membership in this causal set I will assess whether the need
for a regulative international structure is reflected in the positions the country take in the
negotiations and decisions in the national policymaking process. The willingness of the countries to
sign and ratify international treaties that regulate greenhouse gas emissions is the indicator of to
what degree the country finds these international structures important to establish and participate in
to maximize national welfare, and to regulate their opportunity space. Here, I am looking at the
main arguments used during the negotiations and the national policymaking process to assess
willingness. Willingness, as defined above, is going to vary between the countries since they are
dependant on fluctuations in international markets to a varying degree. For instance, stable
international structures in form of an international climate change agreement that regulate the
important energy/environment interface would presumably mean more in terms of investment
security for industries in a small country like Norway than in the USA, since Norway is a small
open economy while the USA is a large open economy and thus less vulnerable to changes in the
markets.
High degree of membership in the causal set is characterized by high willingness to sign
and ratify treaties, indicating how important a stable international regulatory climate change
structure is for the national economy. Low degree of membership is characterized by high
unwillingness to sign and ratify treaties.
Germany
A quick glance at Germany’s ambitious national emission reduction target convince us that the
country is willing to take on a stronger climate policy than most other countries, and a
disproportional large share of the joint EU-target. Governmental documents and civil servants22[22]
point out that Germany has been occupied with the long-term in climate policy strategies. Even
though the country would potentially lose welfare in the short term by being bound by an
international treaty, it would reap benefits in the long term. This as a result of for instance benefits
that a head start in new technology markets would produce, and also benefits from building
confidence in potentially important markets in the developing world for the future. At COP5 in
Bonn in November 1999, chancellor Schröder said in his opening speech to the conference that ‘if
22[22]
BMU (1997b).
we do not embark upon climate protection now, we will loose the markets of the next century.’23[23]
He also reaffirmed Germany’s CO2 reduction target, and his ambition to keep it.
It has been a specific objective for Germany to be a leader in international climate affairs.
The country has showed strong willingness to sign and ratify treaties, and to take on tough
commitments. Environmental minister Jürgen Trittin reaffirmed this in an interview in the run-up to
COP5: “Germany will maintain its role as a front-runner in international climate protection into the
future. During the Ministerial Segment of this Conference I will firmly support the idea of other
States adopting a similarly broad catalogue of measures for climate protection as us. Measures for
energy conservation, the ecological tax reform, the promotion of renewable energies and many
further measures do not only benefit our climate, but also offer opportunities to modernize the
economy.”24[24] These statements indicate that the possibility of gains in the future is important for
the decision making in German climate policy, probably combined with the anticipation of modest
costs with implementing abatement measures, as pointed out previously.
Strategies of developing towards a sustainable development, while meeting the challenge of
globalization, incorporate the importance put on having a potent industrial sector in Germany.
Weight is put on the government’s willingness to prepare conditions that will make a strong and
vital industry sector possible today, combined with a strong climate policy.25[25] There has been
focus on the role of industry in German economy, and a debate about how one can keep the country
an attractive site for large industrial companies and future investments has been important in the
1990s. Equal market conditions have been used as argumentation for Germany’s ambitiousness and
willingness to sign and ratify the Kyoto protocol, as a means to provide stable international
conditions.
Germany is now on the verge of a new era, economically speaking, where globalization and
changing industrial relations forces the economic actors to think new thoughts. Part of this change
has been the increased environmental consciousness that has made policy-makers aware that
investments in clean technology and energy efficiency can create new markets and new jobs. The
recession that hit the German economy during the 1990s and the growing concern about the
unemployment issue have been central in this change. Industrial managers expect the government to
take action adjusted to the difficult economic situation of Germany. At the same time they call for a
more comprehensive strategy in climate policy, where all affected policy areas must be kept in
23[23]
http://www.bundeskanzler.de/03/27/
Federal Environment Minister Jürgen Trittin in Umwelt 10/99
25[25]
BMU (1997c)
24[24]
mind.26[26] For instance, the government introduced a complete liberalization of the electricity
supply market in Germany in 1999 that will force electricity suppliers to be competitive on prices.
At the same time the companies must be ready to face competition with foreign companies. This
development will probably be easier to adjust to for large energy-supply companies. In Germany
this means for the most part energy from coal-fired plants or nuclear power plants, supplied to the
grid by energy giants like RWE.
Over the last few years the economic difficulties and increasing unemployment have been
important and restrictive for climate policy choices, not least because of the chances for decreasing
competitiveness compared to major trade-partners in the world markets. This can be one
explanation to why there is a discrepancy between ambitions to be a leader internationally, and the
lack of political will for domestic implementation of CO2 reductions.
The United States
The United States has been less ambitious than Germany in setting targets and timetables for
emissions reductions. Bill Clinton stated that emissions should be stabilized at 1990 levels by 2000,
but later denounced the target. Likewise, the country took on a 7% reduction commitment by
signing the Kyoto protocol, but has later walked away from that agreement. The willingness of the
United States to sign and ratify the Kyoto protocol has of course been closely related to its contents.
Elements like a comprehensive approach to including all GHGs in the reduction efforts, the
participation of developing countries, and flexibility mechanisms to secure cost efficiency in policy
have been important. However, what we are looking for here is the degree to which the United
States has argued for the international treaty as a necessary international framework to secure own
interests.
The United States was actively involved in early critical issues such as deciding that the
intergovernmental negotiations should perform step by step thru a “framework agreement model,”
and that decision making should happen by consensus rather than majority, which gave individual
countries substantial leverage over the final outcome.27[27] In the Kyoto protocol negotiations, the
United States has been very concerned about issues such as compliance and options for flexibility in
the approach to reduce emissions.
26[26]
Interviews with a director in the coal-mining company ‘Rheinbraun AG’, Cologne, 03.11.99 and a
representative of BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie), Cologne, 16.09.97.
27[27]
Bodansky (2001), pp. 32-33.
The United States is the world’s largest emitter of GHGs. This gives the country real power
of control over the degree to which an international agreement to reduce emissions can become
effective. If the United States participates, the effect is so much larger than if the country chooses
not to participate. On the other hand, domestic politics can seem just as important precisely because
of that. And in addition, it would mean more flexibility and maximum control. One can say that the
United States in this sense have much less degree of interdependency than small countries like
Norway, where contribution to the climate change problem is so small that the country depends on
other actors to participate in a global effort to address the problem. Also, the vulnerability for
adverse climate change impacts is comparatively small in the United States. Climate change poses
no direct threat to society. This makes the country less dependant on others and less in need for
having a global treaty. The United States’ immediate interest for structural regulations at the
international level thus seems small. It is more important what happens at the domestic arena than
what happens at the international level.
This is also reflected in the positions the United States has taken in the negotiations. Focus
on flexibility mechanisms and cost efficiency in policy solutions mirrors the interests that the
country will have included the treaty. The United States has shown little leeway or willingness to
move on these key elements. In fact, at COP6 in The Hague in 2000 the United States was willing
to strand the whole negotiation process as a result of not winning through on important elements
like no restrictions on emissions trading and the right to uptake of CO2 in forest and land-use as part
of the GHG account. This is a signal of the low degree of dependency the country has of an
international treaty that regulate the framework for emissions reductions.
In spite of seemingly low interdependency, what happens in Europe, Japan, and China is
important for U.S. business. Trade with rapidly growing developing countries, like China, has
become more important, and the development of the trade and export sector in the United States has
made the country more vulnerable than earlier. Hence, in particular the United States Senate has
considered participation by the developing countries, which within a few years will contribute more
to the world total of GHG emissions than the OECD countries, a requirement for the country to
participate in an international climate change treaty.
As a dominant country in the world and in the negotiations, the United States has been able
to influence the positions of other Annex 1 countries substantially, as discussed above. The United
States has also used its influence to shape the design of the treaty itself, to secure accurate reporting
procedures to allow monitoring of the actions of all parties. Here, the United States has been a
proactive participant in the negotiations. In light of this effort and the degree to which the United
States has been able to dominate the design of the Kyoto treaty, it is a strong policy choice signaling
independence and need for national control that the United States now has rejected the treaty.
Membership degree
The United States introduced a stabilization target in 1993, but showed little willingness in
implementing policies to achieve the target. The rather high willingness to sign the UNFCCC was
qualified by the low willingness to take on binding targets and timetables. The analysis shows that
the United States showed reluctance to sign and ratify the Kyoto protocol. On grounds that the U.S.
negotiation positions were not taken sufficiently into account, the negotiations about specific
important elements in the Kyoto protocol proceeded for more than 3 years after the protocol was
signed. The United States is further away from ratifying than ever after George W. Bush rejected
the treaty in March 2001. Hence, the membership in this causal set is mostly out.
Germany has shown high willingness to sign and ratify the Kyoto protocol. Throughout the
protocol negotiations Germany has been taking a leading role, also within the EU. The EU is about
to take the final decision to ratify the protocol in March 2002. The analysis shows that changing
industrial relations and beliefs in new market conditions have been part of doing an international
framework for GHG reductions important for Germany. The membership in this causal set is mostly
in.
Public demand and support
In democratic, pluralist societies, we expect politicians and government agencies to be concerned
with the public opinion concerning the climate change policy issue. This analysis will concentrate
on two elements of societal demand and support of climate change policy. First, the DP model
predicts the distribution of damage and abatement costs in society to be important. The general
public concern about the degradation of the environmental condition of the country or any
irreversible damages must be considered and balanced against the concern of actors who will suffer
from heavy abatement costs incurred by climate change policy measures. For instance, local
business and energy interests strongly affect the way constituency-attentive politicians handle the
climate change issue.
The second relationship that the DP model predicts is that public demand and support of
climate change policy is likely to be decided by the values, interests, and knowledge of the public.
The degree to which a clean environment is valued can vary from one society to another. The level
of knowledge and interest about climate change in different groups of the society also plays a role.
Actors like the mass media, environmental organizations, political parties, and stake-holder
organizations shape and influence people’s knowledge and attention to political issues like global
warming, and must be expected to play a role in domestic policy making.
Three factors are used here to assess degree of membership in this causal set: First, I look at
the degree of public concern about global warming. Second, the degree of special interest lobbying
is assessed, and third, the degree of ENGO activism on climate change is considered. High degree
of membership in the set is equal to public pressure to employ proactive climate policy, and is
characterized by high levels of public concern combined with low degree of special interest
lobbying and strong ENGO activism, with actual positive influence on government policy positions.
Low degree of membership is equal to public pressure not to employ abatement policies, and is
characterized by low public concern about global warming, combined with high degree of special
interest lobbying and low ENGO activism resulting in actual influence on government policy
positions.
Germany
The environmental awareness in Germany was growing in the 1980s and early 1990s, much as a
result of concern about dying forests (Waldsterben), growing air-pollution in the cities and other
urgent environmental issues. From 1986 the German public concerns about climate change
continued the trend of growing environmental awareness. The environment was, as in many other
Northern European countries, at the top of the agenda in the public debate of the late 1980s. Most
people were concerned about the environmental condition of our earth, and signalized to politicians
through polls that this topic should be high on the agenda. At the time, the domestic distribution of
costs and benefits was relatively roughly estimated and hard to determine exactly. Coupled
together, these two elements probably contribute to explain why there was such a broad consensus –
also in the general public – in Germany about taking on a very ambitious CO2 reduction target.
Over the last five-six years, as the economic growth has slowed, the public seems less
willing to accept regulations that affect their own welfare directly. For example there has been
considerable opposition to the ecological tax reform introduced by the government in April 1999.
After 1995 climate change has lost as an issue on the political agenda, when during the 1990s the
more urgent issues of unemployment and social welfare have gained importance with politicians.
Combined with the fact that the climate change issue contains a high degree of scientific uncertainty
over the consequences, time frame and costs of global warming, policy-making on this issue has
become increasingly difficult for the government. At the same time, the Kyoto protocol negotiations
have made it increasingly clear that a broad range of actors and sectors will be affected in the future
if adverse climate changes are to be curbed. As the attention shifted towards more specific policy
measures, more domestic actors understood that their interests were at stake, and that policy
measures could be potentially costly. This triggered a phase of the policy process where we have
seen a greater involvement and opposition to climate policy measures from a varied range of
interests like industry groups, trade unions and the automobile organizations that had earlier been
surprisingly in agreement with the government.
The industry sector has been very important for the German economy after the Second
World War, and industrial organizations like BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) and
DIHT (Deutsche Industrie und Handelstag) have been active participants in the national debate
about climate policy initiatives. Industry is the source of about 14% of CO2 emissions in Germany,
and consumes about 17% of final energy.28[28] The potential costs that would be inflicted on the
industry sector by the Kyoto protocol commitments induced them to be active in lobbying the
government. The distribution of power and influence also matter here, and the large companies in
industries like automobile, chemicals, and coal have good connection into the two major political
parties (SPD and CDU). Industrial managers admit that their influence on climate policy is
substantial.29[29] To support this, consider the voluntary agreement announced by the industry in
1995/96, where industrial associations representing 4/5ths of final industrial energy consumption
committed themselves to reduce CO2 emission by 20% within 2005 from 1990 levels. The
agreement came after intensified planning of a CO2 tax in the Federal Ministry of Economics and
Technology (BMWi) prior to 1995, and was hastened because of the upcoming COP1 hosted by
Germany in Berlin.30[30] The voluntary agreement thus had the effect of reducing the potential
conflict level between the government and the industry, as both parts needed a new policy solution
that they could agree upon. In achieving this, the long standing tradition of good industrial relations
and policy consensus in Germany seem to have been important, together with the importance of the
organizational-corporate channel in German politics.
28[28]
BMU (1997a).
Interviews with a director in the coal-mining company ‘Rheinbraun AG’, Cologne, 03.11.99 and a
representative from the Association of German Electricity Supply Companies (VDEW), Bonn, 01.06.99
30[30]
Interview with representative from the Association of German Electricity Supply Companies
(VDEW), Bonn, 01.06.99
29[29]
When the climate policy issue was introduced on the agenda in Germany, the actors who
were most dominant were scientists, environmental agencies, the Green Party and the media. The
environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) were not so active in this initial phase,
because they have traditionally been working primarily with local or national issues.31[31] This has
changed during the 90’s, as there has been a development towards more professionalisation of the
environmental movement in Germany, with increased use of scientific expertise in the
organizations.32[32] This has lead to a turn away from confrontations and more effort towards
cooperation strategies with the government The Green Party had a strong position in the public
debate, supported by an active press functioning as a transmitter for new knowledge to the public.
Counter-forces have traditionally been the pollution intensive industry and the trade unions. After
the Kyoto protocol negotiations got under way in 1995, German ENGOs became more involved in
the debate, as they became aware that climate change is one of the most serious environmental
problems.33[33] ENGOs have been mostly satisfied with Germany taking on a leading role in the
international negotiations, but have been more critical to the speed of implementation of domestic
policies. The argument has been that the reduction target can be met only if the government shows
higher willingness to take domestic action.
In a situation of larger degree of involvement from several domestic actors, a process of
redefinition of the policy problem occurred, so that climate policy became just as much a matter of
energy policy, transportation policy, etc. The redefinition of the issue and the take-over by sector
agencies tend to reinforce each other.34[34] Hence, the calculus of behavior by domestic sub-actors
can lead to a lack of ability by the government to implement a preferred climate policy.
The United States
The United States is slowly moving in the same direction that Europe has done when it comes to
heightened environmental concern, but has still not come as far along in that development.
Americans tend to think of the climate change issue as a vaguer, long-term issue than air-pollution
or water/sewer issues that affect people right here and now. Hence, they are skeptical towards
accepting climate change regulatory policies or environmental taxes on for instance gasoline. If you
ask if people are willing to pay 15 cents, or 18 or 25 cents more per gallon of gasoline to help
31[31]
Beuermann and Jäger (1995), p. 212.
Brandt, K.W: (1999): ‘Dialectics of Institutionalization: The Transformation of the Environmental
Movement in Germany’, in Environmental Politics, Vol. 8, No. 1.
33[33]
Interview with representative from the ENGO “Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung”, Bonn, 03.11.99.
34[34]
Underdal (1998), p. 17.
32[32]
combat climate change a majority would be negative. In general, it seems support for the
environment among Americans is very broad, but it is not very deep, i.e. people are unwilling to
sacrifice a lot to protect the environment. If asked, people would probably agree that global
warming is a problem. But the public opinion does not demand actions, and politicians
consequently avoid sticking their necks out, and are doing as little as possible for the time being. In
a 2000 Gallup poll 71% of respondents say that they are either active participants in the
environmental movement or sympathetic to the movement. 40% also express a great deal of worry
about the greenhouse effect, while 32% worry a fair amount.35[35] In a 1999 Gallup poll, however,
Americans are evenly divided between those who consider themselves environmentalists, and those
who do not. 50% say yes, 49% say no.
After the second IPCC report in 1996, the “war of public perception” has changed.
Although “skeptics”36[36] are still present in the media, the majority of newspaper articles and media
coverage portrays global warming as a serious problem that must be dealt with. For instance, PBS
television had a two-hour special during spring 2000 where the problem was thoroughly analyzed,
and where both mainstream and skeptic scientists had their say. Also, in Congressional hearings the
witness list is not filled with “skeptics” like it used to be. Now, Senators and Congressmen are more
willing and interested to hear both sides.
In the United States, lobbying is part of the pluralist nature of the political system. Local
business and energy interests strongly influence the way politicians handle the climate change issue.
The differences in potential costs of climate policy in the various states are large. Local electoral
processes and interest group pressures, as well as the need to raise large sums of money for reelection campaigns, make politicians respond to interests and concerns different from those
affecting the nation as a whole. After the 2000 election, newspaper commentators have pointed out
that, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, $10 million out of $14 million in political
contributions from oil and gas companies to the election in 2000 went to Republican
candidates.37[37] The enormous economic importance of the energy industries – oil and coal – has
traditionally given these industries power to influence policymaking, both in fossil fuel rich regions
35[35]
The Gallup Organization, 2000: “Earth Day Poll” conducted April 3-9.
Scientists skeptical to the theory about human imprint on climate changes had the opportunity to attract a
lot of attention in the public debate in the agenda setting phase, both in congressional hearings before a range
of committees, and in the news media. “Skeptics” actively informed about the uncertainties still facing
climate change research, especially focusing on the pertinence of the computer models used by atmospheric
scientists to predict the effect of GHG increases in the atmosphere, and whether temperature increases can be
related to human activities or are the result of natural variations in the atmosphere.
37[37]
See for instance “The President who bought power and sold the world” by Ed Vulliamy, The Observer,
April 1, 2001.
36[36]
and nationally. Hence, energy companies like Exxon and Western Fuels have made up the backbone
of one of the most influential interest advocacy groups: The Global Climate Coalition (GCC). It has
230 000 companies as members. The organization has a lot of weight on Capitol Hill.
One of the most remarkable efforts to influence the public opinion on climate change was
organized in the fall of 1997, in the run-up to the Kyoto conference. Hundreds of advertisements
focusing on the uncertainty of the science and the potential costs of a Kyoto agreement were printed
in the United States news media, in addition to paid television advertisements. Approximately $150
million was spent by organized business interests on this campaign informing about their views on
global warming. The Global Climate Coalition organized the campaign with the aim to portray the
Kyoto Protocol as flawed, and economically harmful to the American society.
At the Kyoto Conference, stakeholder organizations were well represented and made
contacts and efforts to influence the U.S. position at the talks. Together with senators and
congressmen that have expressed strong negativity to the Kyoto protocol, the GCC, the American
Petroleum Institute, and other influential stakeholder organizations represented a strong reminder to
the Clinton administration officials in the negotiation delegation about the sentiment at the U.S.
domestic level.
It had been an advantage especially for the GCC that they portrayed to be talking on behalf
of the entire American industry up to early in 1998. After the Kyoto meeting, however, this
changed. More and more industry associations broke off with the GCC. The sentiment changed as
more and more businesses realized that some kind of regulation will eventually come, and that they
would be better off trying to actively be part of shaping future policy and regulations rather than
just protest against it. Hence, the GCC lost power, while the Pew Center, the International Climate
Change Partnership and other organizations organizing more proactive firms and industries gained
members and influence. The signing of the Kyoto Protocol has had the effect that major stakeholder
groups are convinced that some kinds of policy action or regulations are going to be introduced.
They must be prepared and try to shape the policy choices that are going to be made. Therefore
constructive participation has become important. For multinational corporations this has become
important regardless of whether the United States is going to ratify the Kyoto protocol, since they
have to take actions into consideration because of what happens in other countries too.
The United States has a flourishing number of ENGOs, in all kinds of political shades. The
more radical organizations, such as Greenpeace and Earth First, have used direct action and civil
disobedience to attract attention, while the more moderate organizations, such as the Sierra Club
and Environmental Defense, have used lobbying, science and lawsuits as means of information.
Monitoring legislative proposals and campaigning for implementation have been important national
efforts. Environmental Defense and WWF have been particularly active in using science as a means
of influencing both the U.S. negotiation position and the international negotiations agenda. For
example, Environmental Defense has developed expertise in understanding and promoting
emissions trading as a solution to achieve cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions. Together
with the WWF and the EDF, the Sierra Club is perceived to be among the most influential ENGOs
in the United States on the climate change issue. The WWF is one of the largest ENGOs in
membership numbers, and has established itself as an expert in the international negotiations,
interpreting the positions and proposals of delegations at important meetings.
Membership degree
We have seen that public concern for climate change issues in the United States was lower than for
immediate issues such as water and air pollution, and that public concern has been quite low
compared to other OECD countries. The ENGOs have gained a higher level of influence over the
years that the climate change issue has developed in the United States, especially as they developed
expertise in essential areas like emission trading and joint implementation. However, heavy
lobbying efforts by economically important business and industry actors had more influence on
policy direction. Business stakeholder lobbying lost some of their lever as they could no longer
stand together as a united interest block. However, oil and coal industries seem to have regained
powerful influence channels into the new Bush administration. The membership in this causal set is
therefore mostly out.
In Germany, public awareness about environmental issues and climate change has been
much higher than in the United States, although the willingness to pay for abatement policies has
fallen as unemployment has increased and the economy has become strained. Stakeholder groups
have had substantial influence in finding policy solutions, for instance the voluntary emissions
reductions agreement from 1995/96. ENGOs have been mostly satisfied with Germany taking on a
leading role in the international negotiations, but have been more critical to the speed of
implementation of domestic policies. The membership in this set is mostly in.
Governmental supply
Although governments are influenced by the public in the decision making process, it is even more
important to learn about own preferences and political agendas. Governmental supply of policy
alternatives is here assumed to be a function of at least three determinants:38[38] First, the design of
the political system of the country is important, in that the distribution of power between the
legislative and executive branches of the governing system is designed in a particular way that
restrict the options and access for influencing policy choice. Second, the distribution of power and
influence among the different agencies of government can affect the governmental supply of policy.
Issue specialization often makes some ministries or agencies dominate the participation and
influence in the policy process. How influential a ministry or agency is depends on factors like staff
size on the issue within the agency, as well as budget size and the political clout of the agency’s
staff. Third, the government’s control over state policy is assumed to be important. Factors like the
degree of internal unity in the administration, the cooperative relationship with the political
opposition, and the political authority of the head of government can be decisive for ability to reach
good policy alternatives and agreement among the many domestic political actors.
Assessment of the degree of membership in this causal set will be based on three factors:
First, the degree to which political system design result in ability for one governmental branch
(executive or legislative) to dominate the policymaking process. Second, the degree of cooperation
or conflict about climate change issues between government agencies, and third the degree of
cooperation or conflict between political parties. High membership is equal to a high degree of
consistent governmental supply of policy choice, and is indicated by executive domination,
interministerial cooperation, and stable cooperation/coalitions between political parties. Low
membership is equal to non-coherent governmental supply of climate policy, and is characterized
by high degree of legislative domination over the executive, interministerial conflict, and lack of
stable coalitions between political parties.
Germany
The formal decision-making system is rooted in the federal, parliamentary democratic state system
that West Germany has had since World War 2. The political parties have had a strong role in this
parliamentary system. The establishment of a stable democratic order based on the model of the
“social market economy” underpinned by legal regulation, free collective bargaining and codetermination has been a success for Germany.
There has been executive dominance, since majority coalitions have been in power in the
cabinets of the Federal republic. In other words, the majority of the parliament has the same
political platform as the cabinet, and hence works cooperatively together. The personal authority of
38[38]
Parts of this discussion are built on Underdal and Hanf (2000): International Environmental Agreements
and Domestic Politics: The case of acid rain, pp. 66-70.
the head of government is likely to be an element in understanding the executive’s control over the
policymaking process. Chancellor Kohl had a personal interest in the climate change issue, and he
took initiatives that pushed the policy process forward. For instance, his speech at the COP1 in
Berlin is regarded as decisive as an incentive to the elaboration on domestic strategies. And he said
several times that it was Germany’s goal to reach a real obligation for the industrialized countries in
the negotiations about a Kyoto Protocol.39[39]
Although the Länder are generally relatively autonomous, in environmental policy there is a
hierarchical relation between the Länder and the federal government, which makes the government
largely responsible through the division of jurisdiction. The federal Basic Law, as well as the rule of
‘competing’ legislation and the right to issue framework legislation, makes federal jurisdiction rule
over Länder jurisdiction in most parts of environmental policy. The implementation of both federal
and Land legislation is almost entirely a matter for the Länder with their two or three-tiered
administrative structure.40[40] High degree of centralization of formal authority at the federal level is
expected to facilitate the implementation of a climate policy. In Germany, the Länder has a certain
degree of independence, but most of the German climate policy measures are federal ordinances
that apply in all Länder. However, some effects can be seen of vertical fragmentation, for instance
in Nordrhein Westfalen where the Land-government continue to subsidize the coal industry while
the federal government are reducing its coal subsidies.
After the UNCED conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, Germany took on a leading role in
the negotiations, and more domestic governmental agencies became involved. An inter-ministerial
group (Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe “CO2 Reduktion”) was given the responsibility of working
together to develop a climate policy strategy, and to report to the government every second year on
progress and suggestions for new policy measures. The involvement of several ministries inflicted
on the policy process in relation to the relative strength of the different branches of government.
Elements like the institutional capacity and degree of involvement became important for the degree
of influence over policy formulation and implementation. In Germany, the environmental ministry
(BMU) has had a coordinating role in the development of both the country’s negotiation position
and in the national implementation work. But the BMU has had a weak role in comparison to the
ministries of economy (BMWi), transport (BMVBW), and building (BMBF). The BMU has a small
budget, only 0.7% of the total, and a small staff. More people work on climate related issues in the
BMWi than in the BMU. In addition, there has been a conflict of sector interests within the interministerial group. Particularly the first two reports to the government were difficult to reach an
39[39]
40[40]
Interview with a civil servant at the Chancellors Office, Bonn, 02.06.99
BMU (1997b), p.13.
agreement on, as they introduced many new measures and proposals affecting sector interests
within the ministries.41[41]
The coalition between CDU and FDP between 1982 and 1998 seem to have been a
relatively harmonious collaboration. The new red-green coalition government, however, have had
internal differences of opinion. Regarding climate policy, there have been internal disagreements
about which policy measures are most adequate: energy savings or clean energy investments. This
is a disagreement that goes between the Green Party allied with the left wing of SPD against the
right wing of SPD. There is also a friction between the Greens and parts of the SPD that are
criticized for being too closely connected with the coal and automobile lobbies.42[42]
One of the most remarkable features of the climate policy in Germany has been the high
level of agreement across traditional political dividends. There has mostly been a high degree of
bipartisan support for climate policy decisions. The opposition parties through most of the 1990s
(SPD and the Green Party) did to a large degree support the Kohl government decisions. They
criticized that the implementation was too weak, but agreed to the general policy direction. This
bipartisan support continues today: apart from criticism against the ecological tax reform, the
opposition parties (now the CDU and FDP) support the government’s climate policy direction.
The United States
Climate policymaking has been affected by the constitutional separation of powers. The right to
negotiate a climate change treaty is in the hands of the administration. However, the rights of the
Congress are to give advice and consent to the administration during treaty negotiations, and
ultimately approve any agreement. Under Clinton’s 2nd administration, the Democratic Party was in
minority position. Congress was very active but not very cooperative towards the administration in
climate change issues. For instance, Congress issued several resolutions, even one about how the
negotiations themselves should proceed. In a vote 95-0, the senate in 1997 stated their indications
that they will not ratify a climate change treaty that doesn’t have a minimum representation of
developing countries (the Byrd-Hagel resolution). The senate also passed several resolutions and
bills that severely limit the ability of agencies involved in climate policy to proceed with policy
implementation. For instance, funding has been cut that have resulted in agencies like EPA and
DOE to be unable to do analysis of options that have been considered under the Kyoto protocol.
The United States is lacking a domestic implementation strategy on key issues such as
emissions trading, in some areas neither the administration nor the Congress have a clear view of
41[41]
42[42]
Interview with two civil servants at BMWi, Bonn, 23.09.97.
Interview with a scientific advisor for the parliamentary group of the Green Party, Bonn, 02.06.99
what policies should be implemented domestically. For instance, it was hard to develop a position
on emissions trading in the international negotiations. The United States was very active in pushing
for emissions trading, and did an active job in informing the international community. But at a
certain level of details it became difficult to proceed, because the country didn’t want to restrict its
ability to have maximum flexibility about how a trading system should be implemented
domestically. That prevented the United States from wanting to make decisions at the international
level that would avert it from making domestic implementation decisions one way or the other.
The personal authority of the head of government is likely to be an element in
understanding the executive’s control over the policymaking process. The president’s power rests to
a certain extent on his ability to persuade the public that he is on the right course. With a split in the
American public on whether climate change is a real problem, President Clinton had difficulties
with this persuasion. Also, his authority was strongly reduced after the impeachment process, which
affected all policy areas. George W. Bush may also run into problems on this account, because of
the massive critique he has met both at home and abroad – a critique he perhaps underestimated
prior to his decision to withdraw the support of the United States of the Kyoto protocol. For
instance, a poll from ABC News showed that 61% of Americans think the United States should join
the treaty, while 26% think it shouldn’t. In the Republican Party, 52% supports joining the treaty
while 37% oppose it.43[43] However, Bush has presented an alternative approach to the Kyoto
protocol in February 2002, and can thus gain support for taking action on the problem – although
many have been critical to the new climate policy approach.
The liability clause affects the relationship to other countries that may not be equally
strongly bound by their court systems to achieve whatever obligations they agree to internationally.
This may be one of the reasons why the United States has been reluctant to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, and also why Bush has rejected the treaty. The way the domestic legal system would
operate within each country may thus influence a country’s willingness to make commitments to
other countries. Countries that can credibly promise to be more bound by the treaty by their own
domestic legal systems might be seen as more attractive partners by other countries.
Within the government three core agencies have been heavily involved in climate change
policymaking since climate change became an issue - the Department of State, which has the lead
on all foreign policy issues, the EPA, which has been a driving force on the emissions trading issue
as a result of their domestic experience with the SO2-program, and the Department of Energy.
Those three agencies were the most involved, with biggest interest and a history on the issue.
43[43]
ABC news.com: “Global Warming Trend,” by Dalia Sussman, April 17, 2001.
Immediately prior to Kyoto and thereafter, there was more involvement from other agencies. Two
in particular have been very important: the Treasury Department and the Council of Economic
Advisors. Both have been very influential because of the credibility they bring when it comes to
economic analysis and hence serving the need the Clinton administration had to be able to go to
Capitol Hill and present credible cost estimates for the Kyoto protocol.
Under the Clinton administration an inter-agency working group met every week in
Washington. This was a general policy group, led by the State Department and with the
participation of all agencies involved in climate change policymaking: EPA, DOE, USDA,
Treasury, USDOT, NOAA, etc. The meetings in this group was a mix between a kind of
stocktaking exercise, just to keep people aware of what was going on in the international process,
and a lot of reporting, where agencies report on what meetings they had and what was going on.
Because the policy-issues have become so complicated there usually were separate meetings on for
instance a particular emissions trading issue, and a separate meeting on CDM baselines.
The inter-agency climate change process has been fairly balanced in that it seems to have
been a consensual process. There has been a fairly equal balance of power and no one agency has
completely been able to push or run a process. On the other hand, occasionally one agency can be
more influential because it has more resources to bring to bear; it can do more analysis, it can have
more people involved, it can talk to more people outside the agency, and positions frequently could
go one way or the other because of that. One agency can have one person working on the issue,
while another agency can have lots of people working on it; they can usually back their position up
with data and statistics. For instance, air pollution, clean air, and air quality information is provided
by the EPA's Office of Air and Radiation (OAR). OAR develops national programs, technical
policies, and regulations for controlling air pollution and radiation exposure. OAR is concerned
with pollution prevention, indoor and outdoor air quality, industrial air pollution, pollution from
vehicles and engines, radon, acid rain, stratospheric ozone depletion and radiation protection.
Finally, the agencies work under different roles. For instance, the EPA is an environmental
agency, and it is supposed to be more concerned about the environment. On the other hand, the
State Department is more worried about the politics. The State Department is responsible for the
negotiations, and hence the agency that is going to be called to the Hill if the United States does
agree on an international treaty that the Senate has advised against. The State Department also has
to be more neutral because it is supposed to represent the combined, common view of all the
agencies. It cannot go against the wishes of the other agencies.
Members of Congress are likely to be more concerned with local, regional and economic
impacts of environmental and resource policies than with their ultimate benefits to the nation as a
whole. In Congress, the Republicans don’t benefit from pushing the issue since they can get
attacked for their environmental record in general. Also, corporate interests are some of the most
potent in the policy process, and they traditionally support the Republican Party. Republican
interviewees in Congress claimed that there is a fairly strong bipartisan consensus on the climate
change issue, and the Byrd Hagel resolution was used as an example of this. However, it was
claimed that there is a more intense skeptic feeling on the part of conservative Republicans, who
have less faith in international fora and protocols of the sort that Kyoto represents. Democrat
interviewees on the other hand claim that global warming has become a very partisan issue. These
sources refer to the close contact between the GCC and other stakeholder groups with the
Republicans in Congress as a reason for the increased partisanship. The example they use is that the
key issue for the Senate concerning the Kyoto protocol was really developing country participation.
In other words that it is a global problem and that the solution should be global. Some of the
Republicans have very deliberately, and with a lot of support from some of the industry that is
opposed to any action on climate change, interpreted the clause about participation of developing
countries in the Byrd-Hagel resolution in much greater detail than the majority of people from both
parties who voted for it would have interpreted it. Whether or not climate change has come down to
a partisan issue seem to be dependant on who you talk to. More important than party affiliation can,
in many cases, be the interests and circumstances in the politicians’ constituency.
Membership degree
The legislative branch dominated over the executive branch in U.S. climate change policy.
Congress actively limited the Clinton administration in implementing policies that could be taken as
a backdoor implementation of the Kyoto protocol. There was a high level of interagency
cooperation, and the partisanship in Congress was enforced after the impeachment case of Clinton,
but also as a result of Senators feeling deprived of their right to advice and consent to the
administration in the Kyoto negotiations. Membership in this set is mostly but not fully out for the
United States.
In Germany, there has been executive domination over the legislative. The interministerial
cooperation has mainly been harmonious with relatively low degree of disagreement between
central ministries, although the BMU has been pushing to take on more measures than the BMWi.
There was a high degree of correspondence and agreement between the major political parties
during the 1990s about the general direction of the climate change policy. Membership in this set is
therefore mostly in.
Conclusions
The perception that emissions reductions would be costly has prevailed in the United States, and
that costs would outweigh the benefits. The combination with the observations done when it comes
to public demand and support for proactive climate policies, where we saw that the pressure have
gone the other way, i.e. that low degree of public awareness and pressure combined with high
degree of potent, resourceful stakeholder lobbying and limited influence for the ENGO movement,
have reinforced the impression that also domestic distributions of costs indicate a restrictive attitude
to a climate treaty focusing on emissions reductions in the short term for the United States. Even the
balance of power in the political system of the country supports the restrictiveness. The focus in this
analysis was put on the locally oriented and constituency attentive politicians in Congress, and the
way they are influenced by local and regional interests have been important in the decision-making
process. In that way the design of the political system – where legislative dominance over the
executive has been the case – has been an important factor. To further conclude from the analysis,
we saw that the United States is less interdependent than Germany. Based on less willingness to
sign and ratify climate treaties, we saw that the country had less perceived need for an international
framework to address the climate change problem.
The balance of costs and benefits was an important factor also in German climate
policymaking. However, since the conclusions from renowned researchers were that costs would be
fairly modest, Germany had the opportunity to seek a more challenging policy than the United
States. The modest cost frame was one important factor to influence the process, but must be
considered in combination with strong public pressure to address global warming, and relatively
high degree of agreement even between stakeholder lobbyers and the government about the need to
address the problem. All in all the analysis show that both the cost-factor and high degree of public
demand and support pointed in the direction of a proactive climate policy in Germany. The
distribution of costs and power between domestic actors has made that kind of role possible for the
German government. To support the direction of policy, the executive branch could dominate the
legislative branch since it has emanated from majority coalitions in the parliament, and have the
same political platform. There was also a broad bipartisan agreement in Germany. Both of these
elements have been pointed to in the analysis as contributors to the high ambition-level in German
climate policy. Interdependency was also an element that influenced the policy in the same
direction. Germany showed high willingness to sign and ratify the Kyoto protocol, which has been
interpreted here as a signal of the perceived need the country had for an international framework to
regulate and harmonize climate policy.
The analysis pointed out that the four elements under consideration here had a different
degree of influence on the policy process in Germany and the United States. In both countries, there
was substantial use of cost and benefit calculations when decisions were made. However, to get a
more detailed view of other important element in the process, it was an advantage to also take into
account predictions made by the domestic politics model. In the comparison made here, we could
obtain detailed and useful information about elements such as public demand and political system
design that helped deepen our understanding of why climate policies have become so different in
two countries that are both major international actors and large emitters of greenhouse gases.
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