Download Global Climate Change: Electric Power Options in India

Global Climate Change Negotiations:
A Perspective on Intergenerational and Social Equity
P.R. Shukla
NORTH-SOUTH EQUITY: UNFCCC
Article 3.1
 “common
but differentiated responsibilities”
Article 3.2
Special attention and considerations for parties:


“that would have to bear a disproportionate or
abnormal burden under the Convention”
“vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”
Canada
USA
Australia
Japan
Former USSR
EU12
Other Europe
Latin America
Other Asia
China
India
Africa
Carbon emissions per Capita (tC/cap)
Carbon Emissions per Capita (1993)
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Historic CO2 and Methane Contribution 1800-1988 (%)
Region
Industrial
CO2
33.2
Total
CO2
29.7
CO2 +
CH4
29.2
1
OECD North America
2
OECD Europe
26.1
16.6
16.4
3
Eastern Europe
5.5
4.8
4.7
4
Former USSR
14.1
12.5
12.4
5
Japan
3.7
2.3
2.3
6
Oceania
1.1
1.9
1.9
7
China
5.5
6.0
6.3
8
India
1.6
4.5
4.8
9
Other Asia
1.5
5.0
5.2
10
N. Africa & Mid-East
2.2
1.7
1.8
11
Other Africa
1.6
5.2
5.2
12
Brazil
0.7
3.3
3.3
13
Other Latin America
3.2
6.5
6.5
Developed Countries (1-6)
83.8
67.8
66.9
Developing Countries (7-13)
16.2
32.2
33.1
EFFICIENCY: UNFCCC
Article 3.3
“policies and measures to deal with climate
change should be cost-effective so as to ensure
global benefits at the lowest possible cost”
Why Delay Mitigation Actions?
Future Generations shall be:
 Affluent
 More Capable
 Knowledge
 Technologies
BURDEN SHARING AGREEMENT:
Developing Country Concerns

UNFAIR BACKGROUND CONDITIONS

ASYMMETRY OF EMISSIONS & IMPACTS

UNFAVOURABLE TIMING
Intergenerational Concerns

Total Burden Sharing
 Mitigation
 Impacts
 Risks (including extreme events)

Minimize Welfare Losses
 Burden Sharing based on Income
Equity Principles: The North - South Divide
North


South
EFFICIENCY
(MARGINAL COST)
 HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY
GRANDFATHERING
 OBLIGATION TO PAY
 BASIC NEEDS
 ABILITY TO PAY
 RAWLSIAN CRITERIA
 PER CAPITA ENTITLEMENTS
(EGALITARIAN)
Cumulative Carbon Emissions(1991 to 2100)
for IPCC - IS92 Emission Scenarios
Emissions
Scenario
IS92a
IS92b
IS92c
IS92d
IS92e
IS92f
Cumulative Emissions: 1991 - 2100
(Giga Ton Carbon)
1500
1430
785
975
2187
1845
Cumulative Carbon Emissions (1991 to 2100):
“S” and “WRE” Concentration Stabilization Trajectories
Cumulative Carbon Emissions (GT Carbon)
Stabilization
Target
“S” Trajectory
“WRE” Trajectory
450 ppmv
628
714
550 ppmv
872
1043
650 ppmv
1038
1239
750 ppmv
1194
1348
Mitigation Needed for Stabilization
(from 1990 to 2100)
Stabilization
Target
Mitigation Needed
for IS92 Case
(Billion Tons of Carbon)
450 ppmv
872 -786
550 ppmv
628 - 457
650 ppmv
462 - 261
750 ppmv
306 - 152
Convergence of Per Capita Emissions
Conventional Concept
2.0
Industrial Countries Emission Profile
Convergence Target
0.7
0.3
Developing Countries Emission Profile
2000
2050
Years
2100
Equitable Convergence
2.0
Industrial Countries Emission Profile
Convergence Target
0.7
0.3
Developing Countries Emission Profile
2000
2050
Years
2100
Gain/Loss for India under Different
Permit Schemes
80
• Distribution matters
40
US$ Billion (1993)
• India’s gains/ losses
can be several % of
GDP
60
Per capita
20
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
-20
-40
-60
-80
Grandfathered
PROTOCOL WITH INCOME BASED ENTRY
AND TECHNOLOGY CONDITIONS
EQUITY CRITERIA

Non- Annex I enters when income (in PPP) equals 2020 Annex I Income
TECHNOLOGY CONDITIOS (Annex I to implement after 2020)

New Fossil Power Plants to scrub and dispose carbon from exhaust

New Synthetic fuels to capture and dispose carbon released in
conversion
WHEN SOME NON-ANNEX JOIN IN?

China in 2045; India in 2062
EFFICIENCY

30 percent expensive than most cost-effective mitigation
SEPARABILITY OF
EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
COASE THEOREM
Stipulates
in absence of transaction costs, market
exchange will lead to efficient resource
allocation regardless of distribution of rights
Implies
the process of minimizing burden size is
independent of the burden sharing scheme
SEPARABILITY OF
EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
COASE THEOREM:
TWO INTERPRETATIONS
1. Neo-Classical/ Northern World View
Equity is irrelevant to global co-operation
2. Developing Country Perspective
Efficiency is simple - just needs agreeing on
instruments.
Equity (sharing of burden) is vital
Sharing the Burden
1. Stabilization Burden shall be substantive
2. Significant mitigation shall be in NA-I
(“Where” Flexibility for Cost Effectiveness)
3. Transition from Cost to Welfare Effectiveness
(“Justice” in Burden sharing is vital)
Conclusions: A Fair Agreement
Burden Sharing
 Explicit Burden Sharing Regime
Fair Competition
 Polluter Pays
 Market Price for CDM Mitigation
Minimize Welfare Losses
 Ability to Pay
 Compensation for Impacts
Precautionary Principle
 Hedge against extreme events
 Protect most vulnerable
“It is the nature and the advantage of
strong people that they can bring out
the crucial questions and form a clear
opinion about them. The weak always
have to decide between alternatives
which are not their own.”
Dietrich Bonhoeffer
German Philosopher, anti-Nazi thinker (executed in Flossenburg
concentration camp, April 9, 1945)