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Who is to Blame? Agency, Causality, Responsibility and the Role of Experts in
Russian Framings of Global Climate Change
Elana Wilson Rowe a
a
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs,
Online Publication Date: 01 June 2009
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Framings of Global Climate Change',Europe-Asia Studies,61:4,593 — 619
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EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES
Vol. 61, No. 4, June 2009, 593–619
Who is to Blame? Agency, Causality,
Responsibility and the Role of Experts in
Russian Framings of Global Climate Change
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ELANA WILSON ROWE
Abstract
This article analyses the politics of Russian climate change by pinpointing how global warming has
been framed over a seven year period in a government-owned, leading daily newspaper, Rossiiskaya
Gazeta, and how climate experts have intervened in such framings. Russia’s climate politics is first
summarised and then three framings of climate change are identified and examined. Secondly, the role
that expert voices play in the framing of climate change is discussed. The article concludes with a
presentation of key findings about scientists’ involvement in public debate and hypotheses about the
overall trajectory of Russian climate politics.
RUSSIA RATIFIED THE KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE United Nations Framework on
Climate Change (UNFCC)—a partially global mechanism designed to address climate
change via setting limits to greenhouse gas emissions—in November 2004. The
decision to ratify was based primarily on the consideration of economic benefits that
could flow from ratification, as due to a marked decrease in industrial production
during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s greenhouse gas outputs declined
significantly. This placed Russia favourably in relation to the potentially economically
beneficial carbon trading mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. Since then, however,
Russian politicians and policy makers have expressed doubts about the causes and
impacts of climate change.1
Parts of this article were produced with project funding from the PETROSAM program of the
Research Council of Norway. The project, ‘RUSSCAP—Russian and Caspian energy developments’,
is carried out by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs and
Econ Pöyry as consortium partners and also includes other institutions and researchers. I am grateful
to two anonymous reviewers, Lars Rowe, Stina Torjesen and Indra Øverland for their insightful
comments on previous drafts.
1
For example, in a 2005 press conference, Putin’s economic advisor Andrei Illarionov stated that the
‘theory of global warming is not borne out by scientific data and is, strictly speaking, charlatanism’
(Johnson’s Russia List 9169, available at: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9169-18.cfm, accessed 15
May 2006). More recently at a conference on the Kyoto Protocol, Sergei Mironov, the pro-Kremlin
speaker in the Federation Council, argued that carbon emissions did not affect the climate and, if
anything, resulted in global cooling (Moscow Times, 28 May 2007).
ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/09/040593-27 ª 2009 University of Glasgow
DOI: 10.1080/09668130902826154
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ELANA WILSON ROWE
Understanding Russia’s climate policy is important as Russia, still the third largest
greenhouse gas emitter in the world,2 will play a significant role in international
climate negotiations preceding the closure of the first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol in 2012 (Korppoo & Moe 2007). At the 2007 Kyoto Protocol negotiations in
Bali, a Russian representative from the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade
(MEDT) warned that Russia would not extend its participation in the Protocol if it
would slow Russia’s economic growth. While all Russian emission parameters are
lower today than in the 1990 Kyoto base year, which is used to set carbon allowances
and credits, they are also on the rise as Russia’s economy continues to grow
(ZumBrunnen 2009). Russia’s position on negotiations towards 2012 will of course
depend on a myriad of factors, such as how successfully Russian actors manage to
take advantage of Kyoto mechanisms that are potentially beneficial economically. It
will also depend on how climate change is presented to and understood by decision
makers and how firmly these representations are embedded in Russian political
discourse.
This article focuses on the question of climate change in political discourse by
analysing how global warming has been framed over a period of seven years in the
leading Russian state-owned daily newspaper, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, and how expert
voices (scientists, primarily) have intervened in such framings. Particular ‘framings’—
stories developed for and told in the public arena—of environmental problems are
more than just policy oriented or simplified interpretations of a distinct natural
problem. Rather, such framings are political objects built ‘upon specific models
of agency, causality and responsibility’ that delimit the range of policy options
(Jasanoff & Wynne 1998, p. 5).
In this article, I first summarise briefly Russia’s climate politics in recent years and
then draw upon the three foci—causality, agency and responsibility—to pinpoint and
unpack the politics involved in Russian framings of climate change. Secondly, the role
that expert voices play in the framing of climate change is discussed. On a general
basis, Miller and Edwards (2001, p. 14) note the ‘pervasive influence and
institutionalisation of science in modern governmental decision making. Scientific
knowledge and expertise have become enmeshed in the making of public policy,
particularly (although not exclusively) in Western democracies’. However, the
inclusion of such expertise is far from a straightforward or uniform process and the
ultimate influence of expert knowledge on policy is variable.3 There are clear
2
For a visual representation of greenhouse gas emissions by country and region based on 2006 data,
see UNEP/GRID, ‘Top 20 Greenhouse Gas Emitters’, available at: http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/
top-20-greenhouse-gas-emitters, accessed 29 September 2008.
3
The literature documenting the interface between expertise and policy making in North American,
European and international contexts is vast and a comparison between these examples and my
preliminary observations on the Russian case exceeds the scope of this article. However, Sheila
Jasanoff’s comparative work (see especially Jasanoff 2005) sheds light on some spatial and national
differences one may encounter. For example, she notes that American experts and regulators working
within the civil service are subjected to greater scrutiny than their European counterparts and tend to
rely greatly on ‘numerical assessments of risks, costs and benefits’ to demonstrate rationality and
invoke authority. By contrast, European regulators were more able to ‘support their decisions in
qualitative, even subjective terms. Expert judgement carried weight in and of itself as a basis for action’
(Jasanoff 2005, p. 18).
RUSSIAN FRAMINGS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
595
indications that this interactive relationship between science and policymaking varies
from country to country, reflecting national differences in political and social
organisation (Jasanoff 2005). However, little research has been carried out on what
kinds of national differences one might encounter at the science–policy interface
outside European or North American democracies. This article seeks to make an
initial contribution to this debate by describing the role that Russian scientists have
played in their interventions in Russian framings of climate change.
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Russia and the Kyoto Protocol
While it is not the aim of this article to summarise Russian politics specifically in
relationship to the Kyoto Protocol, as the topic is covered well elsewhere (Korppoo &
Moe 2006; ZumBrunnen 2009), some background is offered here to make the framings
outlined below more understandable. Overall, the Soviet Union, and later Russia,
played a reserved role in the negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol, on the one
hand conceding that climate change has had detrimental impacts, while on the other
hand expressing scepticism towards the anthropogenic nature of the problem. For
example, in the 1996 negotiations in Geneva, Russia sided with OPEC countries that
also held sceptical positions, but by 1998, Russia was fighting for the inclusion of
emissions-trading mechanisms, which could benefit Russia economically (Moe &
Tangen 1999, p. 9).
Alongside these negotiations, international scientific assessment processes have
indicated the existing or potential impacts of climate change for Russia. In terms of
positives, a warmer climate may give some regions in Russia a longer growing season
and reduce the need for heating in winter. However, it is expected that Russia will
experience greater negative impacts from global warming, such as melting permafrost
(and corresponding threats to energy and housing infrastructure), droughts, forest
fires and extreme weather phenomena (Gotz 2007; Kokorin & Gritsevich 2007;
Rosgidromet 2005). For example, Kokorin and Gritsevich (2007, p. 3) cite a study
indicating that 25% of the housing in northern cities such as Yakutsk, Vorkuta and
Tiksi could become uninhabitable within the next 10 or 20 years due to melting
permafrost. Public knowledge of these impacts appears to be fairly widespread. One
poll, conducted in June 2008 by the Public Opinion Foundation, found that two-thirds
of Russians polled believed that the climate was warming and 86% were familiar with
the notion of global warming. Of those who believed that global warming is occurring,
50% said it was completely due to anthropogenic impacts, while 30% of that group
said it was caused by a combination of anthropogenic and natural factors.4
While this knowledge of climate impacts may have played some role in shaping
Russian positions on the issue (a question that is returned to below), domestic
deliberations on Kyoto ratification covered a number of different factors. Arguments
for ratification included mitigating the impacts of climate change, economic benefits
though Joint Implementation (JI) projects,5 the sale of emissions surplus, and other
4
RIA Novosti, 23 June 2008.
JI, emissions trading and the clean development mechanism are the three flexibility mechanisms
under the Kyoto Protocol which allow signatories to achieve national emissions reduction targets in a
5
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ELANA WILSON ROWE
positive international spin-off benefits.6 Weighing against ratification were doubts
about the role of human activity in creating climate change and fears that actual
revenues from ratification would be low and costs would be high (ZumBrunnen 2009).
The Ministry of Industry and Economy and the MEDT urged Putin to ratify,
probably motivated by the potential economic benefits (Korppoo et al. 2006).
Russia submitted its formal ratification documents to the UN on 18 November
2004, enabling the Kyoto Protocol to come into force. It is reported that the final
decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was made by President Putin with the relevant
documents being sent to the government a mere three days before official government
support for the draft federal law ‘On the Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol’ was given
(Shapovalov 2004). After a slow start, including a failure to submit the required
national reports on emissions for 2005, Russia began providing annual reports on
emissions and greenhouse inventories (Korppoo & Moe 2007).7 On 30 May 2007, the
Russian government issued a decree on how the JI mechanism was to be realised in
Russia, which cleared the way (technically) for implementation (Opitz 2007).
In terms of key actors, the breadth of involvement in the process grew as climate
change issues became increasingly a part of many international forums and as the
complexity involved in ratifying and implementing the Kyoto Protocol became more
apparent. Rosgidromet, the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, played an important role in the climate change policy process, as
climate change was initially defined as a research and environmental challenge
(Haugneland 2003). Today, in realising the opportunities presented by the carbon
market and JI mechanisms, the MEDT is mandated to play the leading role in
cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pravitel’stvo RF 2007).
Framing environmental issues and the science–politics interface
Climate change science and policy tie directly in with the politics of consumption and,
in particular, energy consumption. That the framing of climate change in policy
debates is more than a translation of a natural phenomenon into layman’s terms is,
consequently, unsurprising. Big interests and fundamental practices are at stake. A
‘frame’ is understood here as a loose narrative or a story told in the public arena that is
meant to simplify complex phenomenon and experiences, speak to social, political and
cultural understandings, and present solutions that ‘convey a sense of security and
moral order’ (Jasanoff 2005, p. 23). Importantly, the representation or framing of an
potentially more cost-effective manner. The emissions trading mechanism and JI are the two of
relevance to Russia. Under the emissions trading mechanism, Russia can theoretically sell its carbon
emission surplus (a result of the post-1990 Soviet industrial decline) to other countries. JI facilitates
industrial countries’ investment in emission reducing projects (for example, energy efficiency projects in
industry) in other industrialised countries (see Korppoo and Moe (2007) and ZumBrunnen (2009) for
more details).
6
Following receipt of EU backing for Russia’s bid to enter the WTO, Putin committed himself to
‘accelerating’ the Kyoto ratification process (Golub & Muller 2004).
7
See also Natsional’nyi doklad Rossisskoi Federatsii ob ustanovlennom kolichestve vybrosov,
Moscow 2007, available online at: http://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/initial_reports_under_the_
kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/initial_report_russia.pdf, accessed 1 March 2008.
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RUSSIAN FRAMINGS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
597
environmental problem has much to say about the ways in which the problem will
be addressed. To illustrate with a more international example, Demeritt (2001, p.
328) points to some of the prevailing ideas in the scientific construction of global
warming that give us an indication of how climate change is framed internationally
and the avenues for framing (and action) not taken. Examples include the ideas
that: global warming is a human-caused environmental (rather than political or
economic) challenge; it is caused by the ‘physical properties of greenhouse gases’
(rather than ‘political or moral failings’); and experts are best placed to advise us
on the issue.
Framings of international environmental problems often have a national flavour,
despite a shared international scientific base. To take one example, Hajer (1995), in a
comparative study of the implementation of acid rain amelioration policies in the UK
and the Netherlands, found that policy makers, despite equal access to the same kind
of scientific data, interpreted this knowledge in different ways along national lines.
There is a tendency to think of internationally produced science—like the reports
produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—as a way of
inserting some ‘truths’ into the political mix and smoothing away some of the
specifically national political and economic interests and understandings that may
stand in the way of international policy consensus. This notion of scientists injecting
facts into politics is an old one that overlooks the intricate interplay between
knowledge and politics. Sociologists of science, however, have pointed to the ways in
which all science is shaped by politics in both its production and transmission and to
the constructed, consensual and negotiated nature of scientific knowledge—from
mathematics to climatology.8 As Demeritt aptly notes, ‘to insist that science is
political, in the broadest sense of that word, is not to say that science is only
political . . . It is to recognize how problematic this distinction [between politics and
science] is’ (2001, p. 309).
Science that is produced explicitly to serve policy needs often evokes greater
scepticism amongst receiving audiences (Jasanoff & Wynne 1998, p. 27). The
acceptance of international science at the national level raises questions of trust and
credibility, perhaps especially amongst those who were not instrumental in the agendasetting stage of international scientific efforts. In the case of Brazil, internationally
produced climate science met widespread suspicion amongst policy makers who felt
that ‘foreign science [was] advancing foreign interests’ (Lahsen 2004, p. 161). The same
issue can be identified within sustainable development politics in Russia, where the
notion of sustainable development and various international efforts organised around
it are seen in some circles as a ‘Western-oriented concept’ designed to ‘maintain and
promote Western global politico-economic dominance’ (Shaw & Oldfield 2006, p. 9).
Perhaps such scepticism is simply a straightforward way of rejecting inconvenient
scientific conclusions. On the other hand, the responses from Brazil and Russia also
suggest that their policy makers, perhaps from a more ‘outsider’ position, end up more
8
Literature within the sociology of scientific knowledge has grown extensively since the first scholars
pointed to the role of social practices in constituting scientific knowledge. For a general overview see:
Barnes et al. (1996) and Collins and Pinch (1998).
598
ELANA WILSON ROWE
keenly aware of the interaction between politics and science to which sociologists of
science have endeavoured to draw our attention.
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Agency, causality and responsibility in three framings of climate change
As the previous section attests, framings of an environmental–political problem are
not accidental and are shaped by all kinds of interests as well as dispositions that
steer perception at a less than conscious level. Furthermore, the scientific uncertainty
involved in complex, global climate science creates opportunities for competing
social actors ‘to appropriate and promote readings consistent with their policy
interests’ (Jasanoff & Wynne 1998, p. 15). In this section, Russian readings of
international science, domestically produced science and climate politics as a whole
are analysed through the identification of dominant modes of framing climate
change.
Through a close reading of Rossiiskaya Gazeta’s coverage of climate change
between 2000 and 2007, three frames emerged, which I term the ‘international’,
‘cyclical’ and ‘causally agnostic’ frames. None of these frames contest the idea that
the global climate is changing, although they differ on several key points relating to
politically important questions of causality, agency and responsibility. To elucidate
these important variations, each frame is analysed for its understanding of the
following questions: what causes global climate change (causality); who can do
something about climate change (agency); and who is obligated to take action
(responsibility)? Throughout this article, the interplay between the three frames and
the strength of their position in relationship to one another and over time are
assessed.
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, founded in 1990, is owned by the Russian government, and in
addition to more standard journalistic fare, publishes information for the Russian
government, such as committee lists and new legislation. In this way, the newspaper is
oriented towards readers who find such information of interest or use, such as those
who either work in or intersect with Russian politics or state bureaucracies. Its
circulation is above 400,000 (in contrast to another leading daily Izvestia which has
around 250,000). The newspaper characterises its readership as ‘even-tempered adults
inclined to conservative views’.9 As this article aims to trace the interaction between
scientific knowledge and policy making rather than, for example, to reflect on the
breadth of Russian discourses on climate change more generally, the official, relatively
conservative status of the newspaper is an advantage. The arguments and voices
included in its pages are likely to be oriented towards and to be considered acceptable
by officialdom.10
9
‘About the Newspaper’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, available at: http://www.rg.ru/about.html, accessed 27
July 2008.
10
A similar pre-study was carried out on the Russian business daily, Kommersant’. However, there
were too few articles on climate change to achieve a broad understanding of how climate change was
framed there. Overall the Kommersant’ coverage tended to focus, particularly in 2005 and onwards,
after the Kyoto Protocol ratification, on JI projects, business concerns and developing legislation that
would enable joint projects.
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RUSSIAN FRAMINGS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
599
In selecting newspaper articles for analysis, the Rossiiskaya Gazeta website was
searched for articles including (in various grammatical declinations) the words
‘izmeneniya klimata’ (‘climate change’) and ‘kiotskii protokol’ (‘Kyoto Protocol’). This
search resulted in 82 articles in Russian from a seven-year time period, which were then
analysed for their coverage of climate change, with particular attention paid to the
kinds of actors intervening in the debate. In identifying the frames, I began with the
period 2000–2004 to build an understanding of the Russian debate before the Kyoto
ratification.11 I found that within each frame there were three distinct groupings
when it came to the question of what causes global climate change: those stressing
the greenhouse effect and human activity; cyclical variations in climate; and an
amalgamation of both. There were also a number of subsidiary positions relating to
these groupings, which I argue are substantive enough to be understood as frames.12
The fate of the three frames was then traced through the post-Kyoto ratification
coverage (2004–2007) in which no substantively new frame was evident, although the
third and most ‘robust’ frame underwent further development. More generally, there
are broad changes in the coverage between these two time periods. The latter period
distinguishes itself with first, an increasing number of articles where climate change
was discussed in relation to key international events (Davos, G8, EU, UN); second the
first links between geopolitics and climate change are made in relation to Arctic
offshore resources and shipping (Chichkin 2005; Sorokina 2006; Anisimova 2007;
Sorokina 2007a); and third a more international orientation, covering global climate
impacts and other countries’ climate change politics including Zorin (2006) on Africa;
Sorokina (2006) on US and UK climate politics; as well as Lashkina (2007), Egorov
(2007a, 2007b) and Yuri’eva (2007b).
TABLE 1
OVERVIEW
OF
FRAMES
Frame
Causality
Agency
Responsibility
International
Greenhouse effect,
anthropogenic
All developed countries
Cyclical
Nature’s cycles
(solar, orbit)
Governmental efforts
to reduce emissions
(Kyoto Protocol)
Climate change cannot
be stopped
Adaptation to modest,
gradual changes needed
Causal
agnosticism
2000–2004
Both with greater
emphasis on:
cyclical nature
of climate
greenhouse effect
Experts providing
clearer assessment
reducing emissions
should help
US needs to ratify
2005–2007
11
Governments when it comes
to adaptation
All major emitters (developing
and developed alike)
There are relatively few articles from the earliest period of 2000–2002.
Often it is possible to point to one vivid quote or a set of articles that may constitute and support a
particular point, in which case specific references are included in the description of the frames below.
On some of the broader observations relating to a large number of articles, no specific references are
given. Instead, all articles included in the study are listed in the reference list.
12
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ELANA WILSON ROWE
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The international frame
Most of the premises of this frame relate well to the international suppositions
identified above (Demeritt 2001). These include an emphasis on the anthropogenic
nature of climate change, its basis in the greenhouse effect and the centrality of experts
and international cooperation in addressing the problem. This frame is by far the
weakest, with some coverage in the first time period (2000–2004), and few articles or
interventions that could be directly tied to this frame in the later time period. Overall,
the debate here was less lively and often consists of straightforward coverage of the
release of various international reports on climate change, particularly in the 2005–
2007 period.
In terms of causality, this frame centred on the greenhouse effect (the impact of
higher amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere) and related these high
concentrations of CO2 to human, and industrial activity. The frame was particularly
international in its orientation, including coverage of wider European climate impacts
(Lukyanov 2000; Valentinov & Sokolova 2000). This is in contrast to other frames,
which remained decidedly more Russia-focused in their attention to impacts,
particularly in the earlier period.
When it comes to agency, this frame did not explicitly mention solutions or political
steps that should be taken to address climate change. For example, an article by
Lukyanov (2000) was very international in its orientation, drawing upon reports
issued by a foreign NGO (World Watch), enumerating global impacts, and stating that
climate change had anthropogenic roots. It did not, however, refer to the Kyoto
process or point to political issues, although one could argue that the frame is oriented
implicitly towards the Kyoto Protocol, given the frame’s emphasis on the causal role
of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
In keeping with the structure of the Kyoto Protocol, responsibility for addressing
climate change rests with developed countries. For example, in an article that reported
on the work of British specialists who argued that poor countries are suffering because
wealthy industrial states are destroying the climate, Georgii Golitsyn, Director of the
Institute of Atmospheric Physics of the Russian Academy of Science (RAS), noted
that ‘of course to blame the UK alone for its industrial emissions leading to the hunger
pains of millions of people in poorly developed countries is just incorrect . . . the claim
needs to rest on all developed countries’ (RG 2000). In the period 2005–2007, coverage
relating to this frame was low, including, at most, three articles (Yur’ieva 2007a;
Egorov 2007a; Sevryukova 2007) referring to international processes by summarising
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports. In the 2005–2007 period
this frame can be seen to merge into the most dominant of the three frames—the
causal agnosticism frame—since the incorporation of the greenhouse effect and
the role of human activity as key causal factors in this third frame overshadows the
international frame as a discernibly separate approach.
The cyclical frame
This frame is the second most prevalent one in both the pre-Kyoto and post-Kyoto
ratification periods and is almost exclusively the preserve of scientific voices, reporting
RUSSIAN FRAMINGS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
601
on their research results and ideas about what is driving climate change. It stresses the
cyclical nature of climate change and could be summed up by the slogan ‘there is
nothing we haven’t seen before’. Within this frame, the cause of climate change had
nothing to do with human activity and the greenhouse effect, but rather, climate
change was simply part of the cyclical nature of climate, stemming from other natural
processes such as the orbit of the earth or changes in solar activity. One early example
of this was the intervention of Professor Valerii Byurdrakov who argued:
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Nothing in particular is happening overall. Simply the climate of the planet every four million
years goes through periods of warming and cooling. Faced with cooling the majority of living
things will die out, but that is not going to threaten us, because we’re on our way towards
warming . . . [and] there is still time remaining to think up something. (RG 2002a)
As another scientist, Kotlyakov, put it : ‘Cycles are the primary rule of nature. In
the history of the Earth there have been ice ages . . . and warm periods’ (Medvedev
2007a). The arc of narrative within this frame often begins in the distant past, with
other historical periods of warming and cooling vividly described by scientists from a
number of Russia’s leading institutes. To take one instance, an article in RG reported
the following answer by meteorologist and Deputy Director of Science at the Institute
of Geography (RAS) Aleksander Belyaev in response to the question of why warming
is occurring and if it was related to the sun:
This is the question of questions! Half of the scientists, working in this area, share the point of
view that global warming is happening [because of the greenhouse effect] . . . Their opponents
say, ‘Excuse me, please . . . changes have been observed in the course of the Earth’s evolution,
even when there was no technological progress. There were ice ages, between ice-ages, and,
when the dinosaurs were alive, the temperature was five degrees higher than today. Possibly,
there is some other kind of explanation?’ Two weeks ago, we heard the propositions of Swiss
astronomers who said that phases of warming and cooling in the past thousands of years are
related to solar activity. (Romanova 2004)
In 2007, a new twist was introduced into this frame with the suggestion that
changing solar radiation and sun cycles meant that the world should actually be
prepared for global cooling. These interventions were based on research results that
indicated that solar intensity had reached its peak and would begin to decline
(Anisimova 2007a; Galin 2007; Medvedev 2007a). In this context, the interventions of
scientists in this cyclical frame became more oriented towards directly debunking the
premises of the international frame. One scientist, Khabibullo Abdusamatov, at the
Pulkovo Observatory, while presenting his work on sun intensity cycles, was reported
by RG as follows:
Personally I’m certain that the prognoses about the melting of polar glaciers and
permafrost . . . are not founded . . . [A]n opposite process [of cooling] will start soon . . . By
the way, American researchers looking at Mars documented that in the same period as the
Earth’s [warming] (1999–2005) there was a distinct warming [on Mars]. And there isn’t any
kind of industrial activity there like we have on Earth—it is because the sun is shining on both
of them. (Anisimova 2007a)
602
ELANA WILSON ROWE
Global warming in this frame is clearly embedded in a long historical arc of change
and the impacts of warming are most often predicted to be modest and gradual. The
focus is national and on changes likely to be experienced by Russia (rather than global
change or changes in other regions). They are often also presented as cyclical in
nature. To take one instance, an article by Anisimova (2007b) reported that, according
to Sergei Frolov of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, while some specialists
argue that global warming would result in further reductions of sea ice,
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Other specialists, on the side of theories of cyclical variation in ice cover, consider that in the
near future the ice cover will return to a medium, multi-year norm and perhaps grow beyond
that. I share their opinion. It seems to me that nature’s mechanisms of self-regulation operate
on such a global level, that no activity of humankind is capable of resulting in any influence
on natural processes. We just still understand poorly these mechanisms . . . Ice in the Arctic
isn’t going anywhere.
When it comes to agency, in this frame the Kyoto Protocol would seem to be
irrelevant, as emissions of greenhouse gases have nothing to do with the problem at
hand. In the cyclical perspective the earth is often seen as a flexible organism that has
coped with climate change in the past and will be able to cope again. In 2003, one
article put it this way: the ‘earth is a self-regulating living organism. The problem is
not how much CO2 is in the atmosphere, but rather how the living nature of the planet
reacts’ (Suprunova 2003a).13 As climate change was seen as a natural, inevitable
variation creating gradual impacts in this frame, the few references to action to be
taken regarding global warming were oriented towards the eventual need for some
adaptation.
Responsibility in this frame cannot be assigned to anyone as climate change is
presented as a natural process. Some responsibility, though, seems to rest with
scientists in that they should continue to work on understanding the changes at hand
and government in developing adaptation plans for the distant future.
The causally agnostic frame
This frame is dominant in terms of the amount of space it occupies in the general
coverage in Rossiiskaya Gazeta. It includes a number of interventions from state actors
(Rosgidromet and related institutes,14 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and
engages thoroughly with political and economic questions relating to climate change,
often presenting climate change as a political and economic problem, as well as an
environmental and scientific problem. This frame often pointed to two factors causing
climate change: natural factors such as the earth’s orbit and changing solar patterns;
and the greenhouse effect and anthropogenic influences. In the period 2002–2004,
there was more of an orientation towards natural and cyclical explanations, including
13
See also Romanova (2004).
Within the Soviet system, research was carried out under the Academy of Sciences system, in
universities and within ministerial research establishments. The Russian research world is still
organised similarly, explaining why a governmental body such as Rosgidromet for example, has a
number of research institutes within it.
14
RUSSIAN FRAMINGS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
603
the idea that greenhouse gases were possibly making climate change more acute (RG
2002a; Suprunova 2003b; Romanova 2004). For example, when asked by a journalist
about the extent of human influence on climate, a Rosgidromet representative
highlighted both a modest role for humankind and the complexity of the climate:
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[Human influence] is not as big as it is said to be. Society is captivated by one idea: mainly the
reduction of emissions, even though authoritative research has come to the opinion that
stopping emissions of greenhouse gases and even stabilising their concentration in the
atmosphere at a low level couldn’t prevent climate change . . . Climate change is a result of
complicated natural factors, and humankind in this process has a modest role. It’s more
important for humankind to use their capacity to adapt to conditions of a changing climate in
a timely fashion. It is not within our powers to stop the changes. (Tolstov 2004)
In the period 2005–2007, one could argue that the positions of experts in this frame
were reversed, although the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol seemed to have reduced
some of the heat of the causality debate within Russia. When causes were discussed,
space remained for mixed causality between natural factors and the greenhouse effect,
although the stress was clearly placed on anthropogenic causes of climate change
(Dmitirieva 2005; Yakovenko 2005; Ogil’ko 2007; Yur’ieva 2007a; Egorov 2007a). For
example, in a conversation with Roman Vilfand of Rosgidromet (Ogil’ko 2007),
Vilfand noted calmly: ‘Increases in temperature are related to global warming, which
resulted from a number of factors: that’s human activity and other natural factors.
But, I think, that there won’t be any catastrophes in the near future’.
In its discussion of the impacts of climate change, contributions in this frame usually
list both positives and negatives in keeping with the international and regional
assessments summarised above. In the pre-Kyoto period, the focus remained primarily
on impacts for Russia with little discussion of the global or other regional
consequences of climate change. However, there was serious discussion of the impact
on Russia, with little to suggest that warming could be generally positive for Russia.
For example, in an interview with Suprunova (2003b), Yurii Izrael, then director of the
Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Climatology and Ecology and a long-time
Russian IPCC participant,15 noted that ‘even if the climate becomes pleasant—say if it
is 258C on Yamal, that doesn’t mean that palm trees will grow there’. At the same
time, the contributions in this frame remained strongly oriented away from
‘catastrophe’ discourses, with extensive discussion of how the impacts of climate
change would not be disastrous and they could be understood in some ways as local
problems (Ogil’ko 2007; Averbukh 2003; Novoselova 2005).
Given the dual causality encompassed within this frame, the question of agency
remained difficult to discuss. Dual causality leads to a sense that something is
happening and some action should be taken, but it remains unclear what kind of
action would be most effective. In the pre-Kyoto ratification period, the focus of calls
for action entailed acquiring better answers about climate change from both national
and international experts, and most stress was placed on issues to be tackled through
further research and deliberation, including whether the Kyoto Protocol could be
15
Izrael was likely to have been instrumental in the 2004 Russian Academy of Sciences decision not
to support ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (ZumBrunnen 2009; Korppoo et al. 2006).
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ELANA WILSON ROWE
effective in reducing the greenhouse effect, and to what extent the Protocol would have
negative economic impacts (RG 2002b; Averbukh 2003; Smol’yakova 2004). For
example, Aleksandr Bedritskii, of Rosgidromet, argued that there were too many
unanswered questions about the Kyoto Protocol:
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And when business representatives tell the scientists, ‘You wrote in the convention that it is
necessary to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a safe level. But where is it, this level?’ the
scientists couldn’t answer. Research had not yet determined this level. How is business going
to take such a risk when the goal of the process [of emissions reduction] isn’t even clear? (RG
2002b)16
On the other hand, when the ‘causality by natural factors’ hypothesis gained the
upper hand in debates, the Kyoto Protocol could also be presented as having a
negative effect. It was criticised roundly for being founded on shaky science,
romanticism and populism, and for being an ineffective mechanism that was imposed
on Russia by European powers (Yurkov 2003; RG 2002b; Valentinov & Sokolova
2000; Suprunova 2003b; Smol’yakova 2004). A 2003 article explaining why Russia
would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, noted that ‘the earth is a self-regulating organism
[and] without 100% scientific evidence . . . of the greenhouse effect . . . mankind
should not interfere with global processes. Our interaction with nature calls forth so
many questions that 100 wise men couldn’t answer them’ (Yurkov 2003).
After Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and particularly because Russian
ratification brought it into force, much emphasis was put on Russian agency, namely
the ability of Russia to play an important role in the politics of climate change. Some
voices, notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasised this point—that climate
change is an international political issue in which Russia has played a constructive and
leading role (Yakovenko 2005). In this way, Russia’s participation in climate change
politics probably has more to do with the role Russia chooses to play internationally
than with the scientific evidence about climate change. By 2007, the Kyoto Protocol
itself, while still seen as having some ability to ameliorate climate change (Shestakov
2005a), is characterised as a ‘collective start’ that may not be capable of fully solving
the problem, primarily due to the lack of participation of developing countries
(Yakovenko 2007).
Increasing doubt about the relevance of the Kyoto Protocol in 2007 was
accompanied by the emergence of more discussion about other mitigation efforts,
primarily climate manipulation. These include using reflective mirrors or various kinds
of aerosols injected into the atmosphere to deflect the sun’s rays and precipitate
cooling. The idea of climate modification corresponds well with the Soviet tradition of
finding technical solutions to social and economic problems (Graham 1990), although
the attention paid to climate modification is growing in Western scientific circles as
well (Economist 2008). It is notable, however, that this discussion seems to be
primarily a one-man show led by climate scientist Yurii Izrael, with some additional
international voices working on similar issues (Merkulov 2006; Medvedev 2007a,
2007b). At the same time, the discussion within this frame of Izrael’s ideas for climate
16
See also Smol’yakova (2004).
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605
manipulation is often paired with research suggesting that such manipulation would
be ineffective (Medvedev 2007b).
Discussion of responsibility for global warming, however, in contrast to the
questions of causality and agency, comes across clearly with none of the dualisms
discussed above. In the pre-Kyoto ratification period (prior to 2004), a preoccupation
of a great deal of the coverage in this frame was the fact that the US had withdrawn
from the Kyoto Protocol, giving Russia pause. In this way, a great deal of the
responsibility rested with the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter with all other
questions and debates about responsibility rendered moot by the lack of American
involvement. Responsibility also rested on experts (international and national) to
deliver better and more certain answers about the scientific basis of the Kyoto
Protocol and its economic impacts. By 2007, although lack of ratification from the US
and Australia as developed countries and major emitters remained an issue, the focus
had shifted. Russian decision makers systematically expressed doubts about the
effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol because developing countries that were major
emitters (including China, India, Korea, Mexico and South Africa) were not obligated
to reduce emissions (Yakovenko 2007; Makarichev 2007; Sevryukova 2007). In an
article written by Alexandr Yakovenko (2007), deputy minister within the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA), this point comes across clearly:
The situation in which a number of countries consciously take upon themselves obligations
for the limitation of greenhouse gas emissions and place themselves . . . in disadvantageous
circumstances in relationship to other countries, not placed under limitations, cannot
continue for long. Russia has always come out in favour of and will continue to come out in
favour of the strengthening of . . . an international regime . . . of a universal character.
2008 and beyond
As argued above, there are two frames remaining that have continued to change and
attract attention throughout the period studied—the cyclical and causal agnosticism
frames. The cyclical frame seems to be the realm primarily of Russian scientists either
presenting new research or expressing disagreement with the international climate
change consensus. This frame clearly shapes the third and most substantial causal
agnosticism frame and seems to temper some of the scientific messages about
anthropogenic climate change coming from the international level. However, the
cyclical frame remains weak on key questions of agency and responsibility and in
covering the spectrum of the economic and political problems to which climate change
now relates. This suggests that this framing is unlikely to have a high level of relevance
to Russian decision makers. Its persistence, however, points to what might be quite
deep roots behind Russian political and scientific scepticism towards international
climate science.17
17
This scepticism may have something to do with the politics and economics of international
scientific production. David Demeritt (2001), in his study of the organisation of the science of global
warming, argues that an emphasis on costly scientific methods such as global climate modelling raises
issues of exclusion in international scientific exercises. Scientific dissent overall, as Bruno Latour
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ELANA WILSON ROWE
That the causal agnosticism frame expanded to encompass both schools of thought
on causality and, in the post-Kyoto ratification period, diminished the overall
relevance of the causal debate itself suggests that the issue of climate change in Russia
has grown beyond the environmental and research problem it once was. By 2007,
questions of responsibility for emissions reduction and of the political and economic
consequences of international climate politics had become the most prominent.18 At
the same time, however, scientific voices remained at the heart of all three Russian
climate change frames. The nature of the role of the expert as framer is the topic of the
following section.
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Framers: when and how do experts intervene?
Experts and scientific knowledge are an integral part of policy making in modern states.
However, the ways in which science and scientists are incorporated in the political
process varies nationally and has much to do with culturally specific practices and
norms for expert intervention (Miller & Edwards 2001, p. 15; Jasanoff 2005).
Historically, some eminent Soviet scientists were able to influence governmental
decision making, most notably in the case of nuclear weapons testing. However,
scientists were only successful in using their scientific expertise to influence government
action when a given issue, such as nuclear testing or environmental problems, was
already on the political agenda (Graham 1990; Roberg 1998). In the waning years of the
Soviet Union, Soviet scientists increasingly participated in international scientific
endeavours and environmental regimes, creating new competencies in Soviet and
Russian science (Kotov & Nikitina 1998). At the same time, science suffered during the
post-Soviet transition as a result of a decline in federal funds for science by 75%
between 1991 and 1994; and it continued to be funded at that lower level in subsequent
years (Gerber & Yarsike Ball 2002). Despite the funding crunch, however, the development of new scientific competencies and greater international experience may have
put Russian scientists in a better position to influence decision makers facing complex
transnational problems—a possibility that has yet to be explored in the Russian
context.
In order to explore the role that Russian experts may play in influencing policy
making, it is necessary to examine the involvement of science and scientific voices in
the three frames outlined above. In particular, three questions are used to analyse the
asserts, can be expensive: ‘It appears that arguing is costly. The equal world of citizens having opinions
about things becomes an unequal world in which dissent or consent is not possible without a huge
accumulation of resources which permits the collection of relevant inscriptions’ (1987, p. 69). Some of
the dissent forming the cyclical frame may in part be related to some Russian scientists’ frustration and
scepticism resulting from exclusion from the expensive, technocratic methods that have been central to
the international processes of climate science.
18
More recently, climate change gained an additional political layer by being linked to a favourite
project of the Russian government—energy security. For example, at President Dmitry Medvedev’s G8
debut in July 2008, he clearly bundled these two issues together, echoing Russia’s (relatively failed)
attempt to promote energy security as a central issue of the 2006 chairmanship. Medvedev noted: ‘For
Russia, the matter of energy is in a significant measure a matter of energy effectiveness . . . In the final
analysis [improving Russia’s energy effectiveness] will help the solution of the global task related with
change of the climate and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions’ (Itar-Tass, 9 July 2008).
RUSSIAN FRAMINGS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
607
frames in order to illustrate the role of scientists in policy making (Jasanoff 2005, p.
260): first, what kind of knowledge is seen as needed for policy making; second, whose
responsibility is it to produce such knowledge; and third, in what way is this
knowledge to be expressed?
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What kind of knowledge is necessary?
The ambivalence about what is causing climate change that was so evident in the third
frame outlined above, as well as the economic incentives that motivated Russian
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, raise the question of how decisive scientific
knowledge has been in Russian climate-change policy making. Understanding the
Kyoto Protocol as an economic mechanism—ascertaining the potential benefits or
drawbacks it could have on the Russian economy—seems to have been the first priority.
Here it can be seen that the continuing divergence of opinions in the domestic climate
science debate about causes and impacts, illustrated above by frames two and three, did
not, in the end, hinder ratification. As shown above, in 2007 there was much more
discussion about the design and the distribution of responsibility within any mechanism
designed to cap emissions than there was about the validity of the international climate
science consensus or about specific domestic debates concerning causality and impacts.
This, along with the dearth of media coverage of Russian politicians creating policy for
coping with domestic climate change impacts, suggests that questions of political and
economic punishment and reward at the international level outweigh the scientific
specificities of the problem itself.
At the same time, as seen in Figure 1, the level of scientific input as a group is clearly
higher than all other kinds of interventions.19 This can be seen from the pre-Kyoto
ratification deliberations. As mentioned above, the decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol ultimately came directly from Putin and relevant legislation was quickly rubberstamped by the government. Nevertheless, during the governmental ‘deliberations’
prior to approving the legislation, two scientists were involved: Aleksandr Bedritskii,
head of Rosgidromet, testified in favour while Russian Academy of Sciences member
Yurii Izrael argued that the Kyoto Protocol had limited capacity to actually address
global warming (Shapovalov 2004). While it remains difficult to ascertain the actual
influence of Russian experts on policy making on this basis, one can nonetheless say
that scientists and scientific knowledge seem enshrined in the domestic climate change
debate, and that their presence appears to be deemed necessary and appropriate.
A more specific indication of what kind of scientific knowledge is necessary relates
to the time horizons relevant to policy making, namely Russian policy makers’ desire
for Russia-specific, short-term scenarios. In 2005, Rosgidromet attempted to address
this need by publishing a national assessment of how climate change would affect
various regions of Russia in the short term. This document noted that long-term
scenarios were provided at the international level (by the IPCC assessments among
others), but that the strategic report itself was meant to provide more of a short-term
19
In looking for and counting different ‘voices’, I essentially kept track of how many times
individuals or institutions intervened in Rossiiskaya Gazeta coverage. Such interventions could be, for
example, direct interviews with relevant actors or references to particular experts, research or reports.
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608
ELANA WILSON ROWE
Note: In this chart, the category ‘scientists’ includes all scientific voices (national, international,
governmental, academic/independent). ‘Politicians’ includes both national and international governmental
actors, while ‘other’ captures business and NGO voices.
FIGURE 1. CATEGORISATION
OF
TYPES
OF INTERVENTIONS IN
INTERVENTIONS, YEAR)
ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA (NUMBER
OF
prognosis of immediate impacts over the next 10 years, as well as providing more
specific information as to how these changes would be distributed over the varied
geography of Russia (Rosgidromet 2005). The need for and difficulties involved in
creating shorter term scenarios for policy makers were also brought out by scientists
Yurii Izrael and Vladimir Kattsov in a 2007 newspaper ‘panel debate’ about climate
change (Medvedev 2007b). Izrael noted that policy makers need to know more than
the overall trend of warming; they need to know what is going to happen in the next 10
or 15 years. However, as Kattsov commented, it is ‘a lot easier to establish a prognosis
of the median temperature over 100 years, than over 10’. In this exchange, it is clear
that the scientists see themselves as having a policy-related role, even if that role is
sometimes difficult to fulfil.
Whose responsibility is it to produce policy relevant knowledge?
While the actual influence of experts on political decision making certainly varies
according to setting and issue area, the notion that science is meant to play a role in
politics is relatively well enshrined in modern states. Experts and expert knowledge
are expected to contribute to public political debate and policy formation. They are
meant to provide informed insight and to satisfy ‘the desire for order in the
management of uncertainty. Experts therefore have to be accountable as well as
knowledgeable’ (Jasanoff 2005, p. 267). In other words, scientific knowledge and
those who provide it, in order to influence the policy-making process, have to be
believable and trustworthy (or at least in a position in which they could be called to
account should they not be). The need to hold scientists accountable certainly is a
simpler task when science is carried out at the domestic level by domestic actors.
Unsurprisingly, Rosgidromet has had a lasting, leading role in the production of
RUSSIAN FRAMINGS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
609
scientific knowledge about climate change, while various institutes within the
Russian Academy of Science have also played a consistent, if lesser, role. As
mentioned above, international efforts in environmental science, such as the
international work on sustainability, have raised a measure of suspicion amongst
Russian decision makers. In the post-Kyoto ratification period this scepticism makes
the prominent ‘internationalisation’ of the debate noteworthy, especially with regard
to the increase in international interventions as well as the greater coverage of global
impacts (see Figure 2).
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In what way is scientific knowledge to be expressed?
Jung (1999, p. 4) notes that scientists involved in policy-oriented research or
communication processes may not be committed to any particular policy outcome.
Rather, they have a ‘professional interest in protecting their claim to authority over
fact making. This authority, however, depends on the perceived neutrality and
objectivity of the produced knowledge’. This gives importance to the way in which
scientific knowledge is expressed publicly. In the Russian context, such a pursuit of
neutrality is evident when scientists engage with the media through their emphasis on
complexity and refusal to paint individual scientific cases with a broad narrative brush.
For example, as mentioned above, scientific voices in the Russian climate change
debate often seem reluctant to link observed changes (like reduction in Arctic sea ice
or warming of oceans) to more broadly observed global warming (Dmitrieva 2005;
Shestakov 2005a; Anisimova 2007b; Skalina 2007). To take one example, Roman
Vilfand of Rosgidromet, when asked by a journalist if ocean warming overall was
related to global warming, replied: ‘the question is still open . . . The problem is that
Note: This chart is a breakdown of scientific interventions, weighing international interventions (including
international scientists as well as references to internationally produced reports) against domestic scientists
and their work.
FIGURE 2. INTERNATIONAL
VERSUS
DOMESTIC SCIENTIFIC INTERVENTIONS
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ELANA WILSON ROWE
the ocean has its own laws, they are poorly studied and research of a larger scale, at
the moment, is only beginning’ (Medvedev 2005).
The importance of avoiding speculation and oversimplification was tackled
explicitly by Professor Mikhail Petrosyans, head of the Department of Meteorology
and Climatology at the Moscow State University:
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When we talk about the weather that will be on the planet within 50 years and even more so
100 years, scientists often run into idle speculation. For example, in relation to the Russian
North, the growth of average temperature and the melting of permafrost is often predicted.
However, specific research on this question has not been carried out. For that reason, how
serious the consequences of these processes turn out to be is difficult to predict. (Shestakov
2005a)
This reluctance to speculate and the focus on detailed understanding and case-by-case
assessment of potential climate impacts may also indicate an unwillingness to provide
simplified narratives for the public sphere and by extension for policy makers. Perhaps
the more consolidated narratives forwarded by the IPCC, for example, proved
themselves more amenable to the public sphere and to policy making, partly
explaining the surge in international voices outlined in Figure 2 above.
At the same time, it was noticeable in 2006 and 2007 that some of the alternative
theories forwarded by Russian scientists began to be criticised for providing
confusing input to the political debate. For example, following an article on a
Russian scientist who questioned the relationship between climate change and the
greenhouse effect (arguing that climate change causes the greenhouse effect, rather
than vice versa), Rossiiskaya Gazeta published the following critical remark by
Vladimir Zakharov, a developmental biologist and Chair of the Environment
Commission in the state-created ‘Public Chamber’ for civil society (Obshestvennaya
Palata):
You do not need to mix scientific research of the most complicated problems of changing
climate with the realisation of discrete political decisions. By the way, global warming and the
anthropogenic impact on climate are no longer argued against by anyone. The permissibility
for realisation of Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, designed to stop negative impacts on the
environment, do not elicit doubt from ecologists and economists. (Yurkov 2006)
The detailed, and often slightly contradictory contributions of Russian science, are
cast by Zakharov as quibbling and not of use to the political process underway.
Another such example from 2007 was the response by Valentin Meleshko of
Rosgidromet to research presented by the Pulkovo Observatory, which put forward
the idea that the sun is causing climate change and that the world should brace for
global cooling, rather than global warming:
The fact of global warming does not raise doubts amongst the leading scientific authorities of
the world. Various alternative hypotheses, as a rule, have no scientific basis, but are actively
discussed in society and disorient the leadership of the country. Among these is the oft
remembered hypothesis about the dominant role of solar activity. (Anisimova 2007a)
These comments seem to suggest that the space for public scientific dissent on the issue
of climate change is perhaps decreasing and that scientists in a position to influence
RUSSIAN FRAMINGS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
611
policy may be attempting to close ranks and present a more consolidated public
narrative about climate change, like those produced at the international level.
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Conclusion
In many ways, the role that scientists and scientific knowledge have played in shaping
Russian climate change frames corresponds rather neatly with Barry Barnes’
description of a ‘decisionistic’ society, in which experts are ‘on tap but not on top’
(Barnes 1985, p. 99). Within the coverage of Rossiiskaya Gazeta and on the issue of
climate change alone, the prominence of scientific voices is undisputable. At the same
time, within this debate the relevance of science can be said to have waxed and waned.
While scientific debate, particularly around the issue of causality, was lively and
heated before the Kyoto Protocol was ratified, the intensity of debate diminished after
Russia’s international political position on the issue became clear. One conclusion that
could be drawn here is that the contribution of Russia’s scientists to policy making is
at its peak preceding decisions on issues where science is of relevance (for example,
environmental issues) that play out partly in the public sphere. However, despite
apogees and nadirs, the basic presence of scientific voices in the climate change debate
on the pages of Rossiiskaya Gazeta remained relatively high (see Figure 1) and the
appearance of consulting with and drawing upon expertise in policy making seems to
be a part of Russian political culture.
The cooling of the causality debate after Kyoto ratification also points to a divide
between domestic and international science. The plethora of domestic, scientific
voices often expressing views contrary to international scientific efforts suggests that
domestic science had an especially important role to play in the pre-Kyoto
ratification period when Russia was considering a position at odds with the
international (or at least European) consensus. The increasingly prominent place of
international scientific interventions (be it specific by international scientists or IPCC
reports) in the post-Kyoto phase seems to be the inverse reaction (see Figure 2). I
would argue that some of the attempts to counteract the interventions of scientists
with alternative climate change theories are perhaps part of an effort to streamline
and discipline Russian scientific contribution to domestic climate change policy in
order to match the tidy, useful policy narratives offered by international science. In
the pre-Kyoto ratification period, climate change contrarianism may have seemed to
be enough of a contribution to the debate. In a post-Kyoto ratification period,
Russian scientists may have to work harder to keep their research and themselves
relevant. As Nowotny et al. (2001, p. 226) argue, narrative—that is the creation of a
logical, simple storyline out of complex reality—is ‘one of the central ways in which
the voices of experts are orchestrated’ and an important tool in the ‘power of
persuasion’.
In trying to consolidate the scientific narrative and make a clearer contribution to
policy, Russian scientists may be working to ensure that science is seen as relevant to
and useful for ongoing policy making on climate change in the longer term. Although
Russian politics is comparatively centralised, with key figures, such as the president
and prime minister, playing central roles, the creation and implementation of policy is
an inherently complex process necessitating the involvement of multiple actors.
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Identifying how scientists have played a role in framing the climate debate is,
hopefully, an initial contribution to the development of a more nuanced picture of
Russian policy making.
In terms of Russia’s climate change policy and politics overall, the three frames
point to some broader trends and features of the debate that may influence Russian
positions within international cooperation. The two more dominant frames described
above certainly contain no enduring representations of climate change as global
catastrophe or a common responsibility. Again, the sticking point in international
negotiations in the coming years seems likely to centre on the question of the
participation of developing countries and major emitters in any global mechanism in
measures on climate change, rather than the issue of climate science itself. This raises a
key question: would Russia—given its super-power aspirations, rhetoric about
constructive contributions to international cooperation, and vast territory already
affected by melting permafrost and droughts—actually walk away from international
cooperation around climate change?
I would argue that this is unlikely for two reasons, although it is equally unlikely
that Russia will be an easy partner. First, the politics of climate change are now seen as
intertwined with Russia’s international political and economic interests. In many
ways, the politicisation and economisation of the climate change question may serve to
keep the issue on the Russian agenda. This harkens back to the Soviet period, during
which environmental cooperation was seen as falling within the realm of the state’s
‘high political’ engagement with the West and valuable as one way of maintaining
interaction with other states (Victor et al. 1998a, p. 24; Kotov & Nikitina 1998, p. 519).
As Oldfield et al. (2003) note, there is an overall low priority assigned by Russian
decision makers to environmental issues, particularly when environmental concerns
would interfere with other pressing political–economic interests. In this light, the fact
that climate change is now certainly an issue of high politics and an issue at all of the
‘great-power clubs’ that Russia prioritises can be seen as positive (Wilson Rowe &
Torjesen 2008).
A second reason why it would be a surprising move for Russia to abruptly
withdraw from global climate change mechanisms has to do with the changes over
time observable within the third frame—the ‘official’ frame. The way in which this
frame eventually incorporated the key tenets of the ‘international frame’ and
succeeded in combining them, however ambivalently, with some key domestic
beliefs, particularly about causality, suggests that Russia has succeeded in
developing a ‘domesticated’ version of international discourse. Bernstein (2000,
pp. 500–01) argues for the importance of international ideas and norms coming to
align with existing social structures and practices (political, economic, ideational) in
slow and ‘evolutionary’ change. The shifting within the third frame could certainly
be read as such an evolutionary change—the development of a domestic discourse
on climate change that incorporates some key aspects of, and is designed to speak
to, international debates. In other words, the dominant policy framing of climate
change in Russia may not be a carbon copy of other European countries’ or
international framings, but it is closer to them than it used to be.
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
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Appendix: Voices in the climate debate
Scientists (Russian)
Rosgidromet
Foreign scientists/International science (IPCC)
Ministerial/Duma/regional
Business
Putin/Kremlin
Foreign politicians
NGOs (reports)
Total interventions
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2
1
1
3
1
1
5
2
3
3
4
3
4
2
1
8
6
18
4
1
1
1
16
1
1
2 (R)
8
1
3
5
14
2
2
2
42
2002
Scientists (Russian): Russian physicist Valeriy Byurdrakov; Georgii Golitsyn,
Director of the Institute of Atmospheric Physics of Russian Academy of Science
(RAS)
Rosgidromet: Alexander Bedritskii
Foreign scientists: Khzien-Bang Oi, American scientist
Putin/Kremlin: Vladimir Putin
NGOs: World Watch report; WWF report
2003
Scientists (Russian): Yurii Izrael (Rosgidromet/RAS) 6 2; Oleg Belotserkovskii
(RAS)
2004
Scientists (Russian): Alexander Belyaev (Deputy Director of Science at the Institute of
Geography at RAS)
Rosgidromet: Bedritskii
Ministerial/Regional/Duma: Konstantin Kosachev, Duma representative
Putin/Kremlin: Andrei Illarionov, Kremlin advisor
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2005
Scientists (Russian): Izrael; Alexander Kislov, MGU Professor; scientists from RAS
and MGU (including Kislov and Boris Revich, Head of Science at the Centre for
Demography and Human Ecology of RAS); Gennadi Dmitriev, Roskosmos;
Mikhail Petrosyans, Head of the Department of Meteorology and Climatology,
Moscow State University
Rosgidromet: Roman Vilfand, Director of Rosgidromet; A.I. Vinogradov, Deputy
Head of Rosgidromet
Foreign scientists: scientists at the Centre for Climatic Research at the University of
East Anglia and the British Meteorological Bureau; American physicist Fred
Zinger; IPCC
Ministerial/Regional/Duma: Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Emergency Situations; Sergei
Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Aleksandr Yakovenko, Deputy Minister MFA
Foreign politicians: Kofi Annan
2006
Scientists (Russian): Izrael; Russian scientist M. Budyko; Rustem Khamitov,
Rosvodresursov; Aleksandr Minin, scientific worker at the Institute for the Global
Climate and Ecology of Rosgidromet/RAS
Rosgidromet: Bedritskii (62); Boris Lekontsev, regional Rosgidromet of Altai krai
Foreign scientists: Roger Antsel of the University of Arizona; Oxford scientist Norman
Myers; UK scientist Sir John Houghton; World Meteorological Organization data/
report
Ministerial/Regional/Duma: Shoigu; Vladimir Zakharov, representative to the
Commission on Ecological Security and Protection of the Environment of the
Public Forum of the RF
Business: Nicholas Stern of the World Bank
Foreign politicians: Tony Blair
NGOs: UK organisation Tearfund report
2007
Scientists (Russian): Leonid Lukin, Head of the Laboratory of the Ecology of the Sea
at the Institute of Ecological Problems of the North of RAS; Institute of Global
Climate and Natural Ecology (Rosgidromet/RAS); Khabibullo Abdusamatov,
Head of the Laboratory on Cosmic Research at Pulkovo (RAS); physicist Vladimir
Kattsov; Izrael; Golitsyn; Boris Revich, Human Health Institute of RAS; Center for
Demography and Human Ecology
Rosgidromet: Sergei Frolov, Head of the Laboratory of Ice Movement at the Arctic
and Antarctic Scientific-Research Institute; Alexander Egerov of the Arctic–
Antarctic Institute; scientists from the Voiekov Observatory; Roman Vilfand,
Rosgidromet; academician Vladimir Kotlyakov, Head of the Department of the
Voiekov Geophysical Observatory of Rosgidromet; Alexander Khlepnikov, Arctic–
Antarctic Institute
Foreign scientists: IPCC 6 7; American scientists from the Center for Atmospheric
Research; Roger Eindel from Arizona University; Australian scientist Tim
Flannery; UN report ‘Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided
RUSSIAN FRAMINGS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
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World’; French scientists; UK scientists; James Hansen at NASA; UK Hadley
Centre; Union of Concerned Scientists (USA); scientists at the University of
Colorado–Boulder; scientists from NASA
Ministerial/Regional/Duma: Shoigu; Yakovenko; Sergei Mironov, Federation Council; Alexander Novak, Governor of Krasnoyarsk krai
Putin/Kremlin: Putin
Foreign politicians: George W. Bush; Angela Merkel
NGOs: NGO ‘Zashchita Prirody’; Society for Governmental Accountability (USA)