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Some remarks on the controversial idea of PR ethics By Cecilia Tohaneanu PhD, Prof., Christian University „Dimitrie Cantemir”, Bucharest [email protected] The future of public relations lies in ethics. Shannon Bowen Key words Ethics, public relations, communication, deontology, utilitarianism, symmetry, asymmetry, ethical counsel Abstract The paper attempts to outline the actual academic debates around the concept of PR ethics. The first part aims to show the intimate link between professionalism and ethics as well as their bearing on the reputation of the PR field. Whether and how ethical public relations are possible is the main issue analyzed in the second part of the article. The two paradigms of public relations, “the attorney-adversary system” and “the two-way symmetrical model”, are put face to face in order to better understand the arguments of their proponents as to the way of approaching the ethical matters. A main concern of the third part is to answer the question if something is wrong with situational ethics. The problem is approached in the light of virtue ethics, which is itself situational in Aristotel’s sense of the term. In the final part, the paper suggests the possibility to use W. D. Ross’s pluralist deontology as a conceptual structure from which to build a practical model for the analysis of moral dilemmas in the PR practice. Mots-clés éthique, relations publiques, communication, déontologie, utilitarisme, symétrie, asymétrie, conseil éthique Résumé Cet article se propose d’esquisser les débats académiques actuels autour du concept d’éthique des relations publiques. Dans une première partie, on veut montrer la liaison étroite entre professionnalisme et éthique ainsi que leur influence sur la réputation du champ des relations publiques. Si et comment sont possibles les relations publiques éthiques constitue la principale question traitée dans la seconde partie de cet article. Les deux paradigmes en relations publiques, l’« attorney-adversary system » et le « two-way symetrical model », sont mis en parallèle afin de mieux comprendre les arguments de leurs tenants concernant la manière d’approcher les questions éthiques. L’objectif principal de la troisième partie est de répondre à la question s’il y a quelques chose qui pose problème dans l’éthique situationnelle. Ce sujet est discuté à la lumière de l’éthique de la vertu qui est elle-même situationnelle telle qu’elle est définie par Aristote. Dans la dernière partie l’étude suggère la possibilité d’utiliser la déontologie pluraliste de W. D. Ross comme structure conceptuelle à partir de laquelle on peut fonder un modèle pratique pour une analyse des dilemmes moraux dans la pratique des relations publiques. Professionalism, ethics, and the PR’s reputation In her book Ethics in Public Relations: A Guide to Best Practice, Patricia Parsons raises the question whether public relations can be seen as a profession or simply as an occupation or a job.1 She clearly points to the intimate link between the concept of professionalism and that of ethics by showing that respecting the others and doing what is right are defining features of a profession which, in fact, convey the core of what we mean by ethical conduct. So, to be professional, public relations should be ethical. Fostering professionalism, suggests Parsons, is a way that can lead those who do public relations to an ethical approach of their work – a chance for them to be positively perceived by the public. Their current image, which is rather a negative one, would therefore be related, at least partially, to a scarce concern for the moral aspects of the field. 62 The scandals generated by the unethical practices of some organizations or PR companies culminating with the Enron’s collapse, have indeed challenged PR’s credibility. Often the PR work is associated with what is ethically doubtful such as deceit, manipulation, image management or publicity. Some critics deny the very possibility of ethical public relations since in their view the practice as such would be similar to manipulation. There is a skeptical attitude summed up by the idea that “PR ethics” is an oxymoron. No matter how inefficient such skepticism could be it however signals the actual state where public relations are still coupled with a bad reputation. “There is little doubt that the public’s image of public relations is less than spotless” Parsons was remarking in her book.2 Searching for the causes of such a negative image, looking carefully at how the public has come to view public relations as a practice lacking morality seems to have become a concern for many of the theorists of the domain. Dealing with this subject, Kathy Fitzpatrick and Candace Gauthier suggest that the charges of unethical conduct against those working in public relations result, at least partially, from a misunderstanding. It consists in confounding the PR professionals’ own values and ethics with those of the institutions they represent – a confusion that may often lead to what the authors call “guilt by association”. So, when an institution is criticized by the public for its irresponsible conduct, the blame is shared by the public relations representative – “regardless of his or her involvement in or knowledge of alleged bad acts.”3 In other words, it is the failing of organizations to meet public expectations that implicitly affects the PR’s image. Considering some recent studies that reveal the loss of public trust in organizations, Johanna Fawkes points out the need to discern the real causes of the phenomenon from the seeming ones usually mentioned to explain it. For there is the tendency, when accounting for the low credibility of an organization, to look at the public not at the organization, as if the public would be the problem. The loss of confidence has indeed to do with how the public perceives the organizations, but this perception derives from their ethical deficit rather than from a bad communication with their publics. Clearly, the prevailing way of focusing on people’s “lack of trust” as opposed to the organizations’ “lack of trustworthiness” is an unrealistic as well as inefficient approach. It prevents any effort of organizations and PR practitioners for ethically improving their activity; possible improvements refer only to communication. As Fawkes puts it: “If the public is the problem, better communication might be the solution; but if the professions and/or organizations were to reflect more deeply on what changes they need to make, then ethics not communication is the key.”4 It should be therefore admitted that people might have reasons not to rely on public relations and to perceive them negatively. Changing this situation will only be possible when practitioners will consider ethics as a part of their field’s image. This seems to be the conclusion drawn by Shannon Bowen from her retrospective study of the factors responsible of the failure of “ethics, communication and corporate responsibility” at the famous Enron company. Her choosing to study Enron’s collapse is not accidental since, in her view, it marks the beginning of a constant weakening of public trust in organizations. In this sense, the case typically illustrates what is an unethical corporate behaviour. Does this behaviour have something to do with the organization’s idea of ethics, particularly with its vision on the role that the code of ethics should play within it? Clearly it does, as Bowen’s research proves. Thus, in the Enron case she found that the code of ethics was (ironically!) framed in legal rather than in moral terms. For example, legal requirements were given priority while “morality and honesty” were added as “secondary considerations”.5 In other words, legal correctness was prevailing over the moral one. Moreover, the ethical code stipulated that when facing an ethical dilemma, the employees should be assisted by the legal counsel, although discussing ethical concerns belongs to the PR specialist. In fact, this code has played almost no role within the organization. Prevailing legal correctness over the moral one, argues Bowen, is evidence for a “materialist paradigm that allowed a self-serving view of ethics”.6 Such a view – which works merely for a company’s benefit - pays no attention to the philosophical idea of ethics as it is described by deontology and utilitarianism and which means generalisable moral norms and, respectively, the greater good. Absence of a normative ethical paradigm capable to analyze the problems/dilemmas which confront a company can lead in the end to its moral failure and the loss of public trust. These problems cannot be placed with the legal department and equating legal analysis with ethical analysis is a serious error. 63 The legal and moral perspectives of approaching a problem are two different things. Attorneys are experts in law not in moral philosophy, insists Bowen.7 They can provide advice with respect to what is legal in a given situation, without having the competence to evaluate which of the possible ways of action is valid from the ethical point of view. The ethical analysis of alternative decisions and actions has to be placed with the PR specialist, to whom Bowen attributes the role of an organization’s “moral conscience”. Otherwise, she suggests, it would mean to abdicate from the status of ethical organization, which is what actually happens whenever the legal counsel is the one called to solve ethical problems (favouring, of course, the interests of the organization). Bowen views this legalistic orientation as the expression of a materialist vision which assumes that whatever is not illegal is (morally) acceptable or permissible. A “materialist” behaviour,8 as she calls it, is guided by the rule according to which if the law is ambiguous with respect to some activity, or if that activity is not specifically mentioned to be illegal, then it is acceptable to undertake it. The lesson to be learned from the Enron case: an organization should pursue not only legal correctitude, but also moral responsibility. In brief, the problem whether an organization is “respectable” involves both ethical and legal judgements.9 Distorting the distinction between what is ethical and what is legal by taking advantage of vagueness in legislation is offensive to the public and damaging in the long term to the organizations. How are possible ethical public relations ? Situational ethics versus philosophical/theoretical ethics Could those who say that “ethical PR is an oxymoron” be right? Is the idea itself of ethical public relations chimerical? The problem whether ethical public relations are possible started to be taken seriously since about the nineties, amidst a growing interest for professional ethics in general. Writing about the situation in the United States, the birthplace of PR, Cornelius Pratt was describing it in no uncertain terms: “Perhaps no subject generates more public interest in the United States than the ethics of the professions. For the public relations practice, ethics is increasingly becoming a first-order concern.”10 During the same period, Fraser Seitel11 was pointing at the issue of ethical behaviour as a central problem of public relations and claimed, even more, that the success of the field is closely connected to the way in which this problem will be answered. How is perceived the idea of PR ethics among scholars as well as within practice? From the plethora of understandings, one can discern two major different concepts.12 There is the traditional prevailing paradigm, attached to what Barney and Black have called “the attorney-adversary system” of public relations. A practitioner working within this system is supposed to be an advocate for his/her client organization and hence assume the supreme obligation to its interests “in an adversary society.” 13 According to the dominant concept, the PR practitioners are not to be conducted by a set of general rules when making decisions. Professional ethics is rather circumstancial: rules may vary from case to case, so that each decision process follows specific rules. This view has become more and more controversial over the past two decades. Critics, who take into account mainly the relativist-subjectivist implications of situational ethics, propose a different ethical approach to public relations. This is closely connected to the two-way symmetrical model of communication, or the excellence theory of public relations. Advocates of the new concept, notably James Grunig and his colleagues believe that “it is difficult, if not impossible, to practice public relations in a way that is ethical and socially responsible using an asymmetrical model”. For them, the central function of public relations is to manage the communication between an organization and its public or, more precisely, to use “research and dialogue to manage conflict, improve understanding, and build relationships with publics. With the symmetrical model, both the organization and publics can be persuaded; both also may change their behavior.”14 From this perspective, moral values and principles are considered a crucial element of organizational culture on which the way of dealing with issues management15 and decision making depend. In the normative model of public relations, they constitute the general ethical framework indispensable to a deep, rigorous and methodical analysis of the ethical aspects of a decision. To do an analysis in this way means to look at that decision from multiple perspectives, that is by considering factors which regard the publics, the organisation, and society. 64 But the situational approach involves the issues managers’ personal moral values and beliefs supposed to guide the making of a decision. Since this method is based on individual ethical frameworks, it does not require the organizational decision maker to take into account the perspectives of all the three groups and so a disregard of any of them is always possible.16 It is here that the proponents of the symmetrical communication model discover the main deficiency of the situational approach to ethics. Grunig, to whom the main merit in conceptualizing this model is attributed, argues that the most important problem for PR ethics is that of distinct loyalties: How is it possible to achieve a balance between the interests of the organization, of the different categories of public, of society, of the profession and of the individual specialist? His answer highlights the contrast between the two paradigmatic approaches to public relations ethics: “We believe”, Grunig outlines, “that the most important question for public relations ethics is the problem of divided loyalties that is inherent in public relations: How can one balance the interests of the organization with the interests of its publics, as well as the interests of society, of the public relations profession, and of the individual professional? We do not believe that pure advocacy or total loyalty to the client organization is the answer to this problem. Rather, we believe ethical principles that help one balance divided loyalties and engage in symmetrical communication provide a better answer.”17 A great part of ethical concerns is related in essence to the role of public relations in the making of decisions by organizations. In their function as “ethical conscience of the organization” or “ethical counsel” of the dominant coalition, explains Grunig, public relations become responsible for integrating moral values in organisational decisions and harmonising the interests of society with those of clients.18 Strategic decisions must take into account the values and problems of the organization as well as of the publics. From a perspective like Grunig’s, ethics becomes a rationale for social responsibility; both ought to be parts of the normative theories about how public relations are to help the long-term decisions making by the organizations. Such a view stems from the belief that a responsible organization cannot simply rely on legal norms offered by the legal counselor: it needs ethical guidance that can only be given by the PR professionals. But, to really assist an organization to be accountable for its conduct, the professionals should dispense with the prevailing ethical paradigm of public relations as it is unsuitable for such a task. At least, this seems to be Cornelius Pratt’s indication, who notices the practitioners’ affinity for that paradigm and a lack of interest for the ethical theories relevant for public relations. Those who guide themselves on the situational ethics as a value system, Pratt explains, tend to consider, for example, that concealing the truth is not at all unethical. 19 He mentions three reasons for abandoning this approach (as being rather “anti-ethical”) – a paradigm shift he believes to allow practice getting excellence in ethics: (i) “the traditional boundary-spanning role” of the practitioners in organizations; (ii) their restricted power to influence organizational ethics that, in turn, derives from “their outlier status vis-à-vis membership of the dominant coalition”; (iii) “the lack of a full professional status for the practice”.20 Is something wrong with situational ethics? Can one really say there are solid reasons to reject situational ethics? In particular, why does Bowen see in it an expression of materialism? Indeed, in Bowen’s works materialism is another name for situational ethics. For example, when discussing the ethical paradigms used in public relations, she mentions materialism (i.e. situational ethics), deontology and utilitarianism. Since virtue ethics does not appear in this list, although it is always mentioned in literature as a major paradigm alongside the other two, it is to be supposed that for Bowen virtue ethics is the equivalent of materialism, identified in turn with the situational approach. Bowen rightly insists that while the other two have a normative character, the first is not a normative ethical paradigm. However, it appears problematic to accept her opinion that a non-normative theory is a surrogate, her argument being that such a theory would be in disagreement with the history of moral philosophy and with the manner in which the idea of ethical theory is conceived amongst philosophers. Bowen says that materialism “is not generally a normative school of moral philosophy, but an individually employed surrogate”.21 From this it would follow that in order to be authentic an ethical theory must necessarily be normative. If it were so, it would follow that we should view as a surrogate any philosophical theory that does not provide one basic principle able to unify a large variety of moral facts or beliefs and to account for people’s moral life – in short, 65 any theory that is not systematic. Aristotle’s virtue ethics, for example, is certainly such an ethical theory, as it does not suppose any unifying principle like the Kantian imperative. It offers only the general framework of ethical behaviour and by no means universally applicable rules. Probably with the exception of Rosalind Hursthouse,22 philosophers admit that virtue ethics is, in principle, not codifiable. Moreover, it is even named sometimes “situational ethics”. But this expression has no pejorative connotation. It only suggests that moral principles were conceived by Aristotle not as prescriptions applicable in any situations or circumstances but rather as guidelines or ethical background of actions. Therefore, it could be impossible to lay down general rules for assessing what is more important and hence what should be done in each situation. Different situations need particular solutions. The emphasis is not so much on norms of action, but rather on its agent, or more precisely on his virtues, coordinated, all of them by practical wisdom, or phronesis. David Ross has perfectly catched phronesis as „a kind of perception” or „direct apprehension of individual fact”23 which is closely linked to life experience. It is to this practical wisdom that Aristotle attributes the role of foundation for moral judgement. It is this „perception” that makes us able to grasp the details of particular situations and to make the final decision on what outht to be done. When people decide what course of action is right to be taken, what is apprehended is exactly the rightness of that particular act, not what generally a right act is. In other words, the rightness or wrongness of an individual act is finally intuitively apprehended, and never deducible from its falling or not falling under a universalizable rule. One can conclude that it is a lot to be learned from virtue ethics – which, again, is a situational ethics – and above all, the crucial role of judgment. It is this intuitive reasoning that the decision is finally based on. To put it in Kantian terms: principles without judgment would be empty, just like concepts without intuition. The need for judgment can hardly be eliminated by principles or norms, [what] which implicitly means that good character matters. And, if this is admitted, why not assume the worth of moral character as a meta-principle for ethical reasoning? But virtues are certainly the product of education, and people, as emphasized by Aristotle, should continually strive to improve themselves. This is a point that actually fits Bowen’s view on how public relations can get ethical and where she might be right. For she seems to claim that personal value systems (hence, situational ethics) cannot be a reliable basis for ethical public relations if not shaped and refined through a disciplined instruction whose important part should be ethics. Dissatisfied with the actual level of ethical education in the field24, Bowen pleads for a scholarly, methodical training in moral philosophy able to develop basic competences required by ethical decision making. There is a need for practitioners who are “well versed in ethics and moral philosophy”, she insists, being convinced that this is the only way to rebuild the credibility of PR and to reach excellence in this field. Issues management, continues Bowen, presupposes a high ethical training, those who have this competence are better equipped to make ethical decisions – and making ethical decisions is “vital for public relations, because this is our moral obligation”.25 Surprisingly, several approaches to the ethics of communication, including Bowen’s deontological model, take the systematic moral education as their underlying supposition while Aristotle’s theory, where it comes from, is rarely mentioned.26 There are however, to my knowledge, a few notable exceptions in literature where virtue ethics bears fruit. One of these is the concept of ethical persuasive communication proposed by Sherry Baker and David Martinson. The five principles of the so-called TARES test (truthfulness, authenticity, respect, equity, social responsibility) are focused on the author of the message or the person who is the communicator. For example, authenticity, defined as “personal integrity and virtue” requires the communicators to believe sincerely themselves in the product or service they promote or in the idea/cause they defend. 27 Therefore, ethical persuasion is closely linked to cultivating/developing dispositions, motivations and attitudes indispensable to correct, just actions. But such a requirement is an echo of Aristotle’s theory from which we learn that what we do depends to a great extent on who we are: we can achieve the correct thing only when we have the necessary dispositions and intentions to do the correct thing, when we are inclined to act morally. Another example is Richard Johannesen, whose name is associated with the first attempts of exploring the ethical implications of the various experiences in human communication. His concept of ethical communication (equivalent to dialogic communication) combines aspects of deontology and 66 and virtue ethics. On the one hand, it assumes the Kantian imperative of treating man as goal, which Johannesen translates into a standard that guides the conduct of the participants to the process of communication. Thus, he asks the communicator not to consider those whom he addresses as “things” to be exploited in order to serve his own interest, but on the contrary, to treat them with respect, that is as “persons”.28 On the other hand, Johannesen enthusiastically embraces Karen Lebacqz’s statement about the relevance of character for the moral evaluation of individual acts and actions: “Each choice about what to do is also a choice about whom to be - or, more accurately, whom to become."29 Concluding remarks The question whether ethics involves advocacy or counseling from an impartial position appears to be closely linked with another one: Which moral philosophy/theory could better match this double function of public relations and how to use it as practical/applied ethics? As it appears from literature, a tendency seems to be manifest among those interested in the subject, namely to believe that truth only lies, and is to be found, in one of the two normative ethical theories: deontology or utilitarianism. Concerning virtue ethics, as already remarked, it is rather ignored. Such preconception mostly prevents the efforts to construct a practical model that could actually help PR professionals to decide what is ethical and what is not. There are complaints concerning the absence of a common framework for ethically guiding the conduct of practice. Fitzpatrick and Gauthier view almost a theoretical void in this respect, despite the plethora of projects that unfortunately have remained unfinished. Understanding that all such efforts are devoted to found public relations as a reliable profession, they argue that, “A big step in achieving that goal would be the development of a universally accepted theory of public relation ethics. […] In fact, a review of public relations textbooks led one scholar to conclude that, there is no accepted conceptual framework from which to study public relations ethics”.30 Grunig and his scholars group insist that such fundamental theoretical structure can only be constructed starting from the major moral philosophies. Arguing for the idea of a normative theory of public relations that has to integrate ethics as its fourth dimension, Grunig explains what should be done firstly: “[…] Most important, we must build our theories of ethical public relations from established philosophical theories of ethics - something rarely done in the literature on public relations ethics.”31 However, as noted above, this framework is understood in alternative terms, as being either ontological or utilitarian while a more correct and useful approach lies beyond this alternative. This is all the more true if considering the nature of public relations that scholars are quite conscious of. Pratt and Bowen, to mention only them, fully realized that public relations is overwhelmed with moral dilemmas that professionals must face, particularly when embarked on the role of ethical counselors. In spite of this, Bowen has taken Kantian deontology as a “powerful framework” for the analysis of moral dilemmas and refused to make use of the utilitarian theory. It might be that, when rejecting this theory, scholars, or at least some of them, equate it with Bentham’s view - what is, surely, wrong. There is the so-called “rule- consequentialism” (in contrast to “act-consequentialism”)32, which is a quite viable version of utilitarianism, in that it is less permissive than Bentham’s theory and more flexible than Kantian deontology. It seems that such variants, indeed relevant for guiding the conduct of PR professionals, have not yet been explored; and this is due to the simple fact that all teleological (consequentialist) theories are believed to stay indistinctly under the same hat of classical utilitarianism. Probably such confusion could explain why Richard Nelson,33 for example, deems as morally wrong to do “flexible choices” relied on teleological reasons. But, could it be possible to make decisions without assessing their potential consequences? Prudence is not necessarily something wrong, as one sometimes believes to be – namely, egoism. It rather involves acting on our thoughtful judgments (evaluations) which means considering all those potentially affected by that act. In fact, deontology and consequentialism alike have drawbacks and advantages. However, in its Kantian absolutist version, it is probably the least appropriate to be applied to the public relations and, in general, to the real moral life: it could rather generates dilemmas than solve them. Maybe, one should think of an ethics of public relations that could make room for the right as well as for the good. This means an ethics able to account for both of the two facts: (i) that sometimes professionals ought to breach a moral norm in order to prevent a bad consequence; 67 (ii) that they continue to be attached to that norm and to value it. Therefore, the PR professionals are to be required to taking into account, besides deontic reasons, the outcomes of their acts. For, as Ross was saying, “it is our duty to do what is beneficent, as it is our duty to do what is just.”34 This kind of theory can certainly be inspired from Ross’s pluralist deontology that is worth searching. Otherwise, former attempts to use this ethical theory already exists; for example, Cristopher Meyers’s35 method of approaching to media ethical dilemma through a strategy based on the theoretical framework of Ross’s deontology. NOTES 1 See Parsons, P. J. (2008). Ethics in Public Relations: A Guide to Best Practice (2nd ed.), London: Kogan, 9- 10. 2 Parsons, P. J. (2008). Ethics in Public, 5. Fitzpatrick, K. & Gauthier, C. (2001). Toward a Professional Responsibility Theory of Public Relations Ethics, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 45(2&3), 195. 4 Fawkes, J. (2012). Interpreting Ethics: Public Relations and Strong Hermeneutics, Public Relations Inquiry, I(2), 118. 5 Bowen, S. A. (2010). Almost a Decade Later: Have We Learned Lessons From Inside the Crooked E, Enron?, Ethical Space: The International Journal of Communication Ethics, 7(1), 29. 6 Bowen, S. A. (2010). Almost a Decade, 31. 7 Bowen, S. A. (2010). Almost a Decade, 32. 8 Bowen, S. A. (2010). Almost a Decade, 34. 9 Bowen, S. A. & Heath, R. L. (2006). Issue Management, Systems, and Rhetoric: Exploring the Distinction Between Ethical and Legal Guidelines at Enron, Journal of Public Affairs, 5, 86. 10 Pratt, C. B. (1993). Critique of the Classical Theory of Situational Ethics in U.S. Public Relations, Public Relations Review, 19(3), 219. 11 Fraser Seitel is the founder editor of the American Society of Public Relations journal, The Strategist, author of the eleven issues work The Practice of Public Relation, published originally in 1992. 12 An edifying overview of the two main PR paradigms, particularly their inherent philosophies, or worldviews, can be found in Grunig, J. E. & White, J. (1992). The Effect of Worldviews On Public Relations Theory and Practice, in Grunig, J. E. et al. (Eds.), Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 13 Barney, R. D. & Black, J. (1994). Ethics and Professional Persuasive Communications, Public Relations Review, 20(3), 239. 14 Grunig, J. E. & White, J. (1992). The Effect of Worldviews On Public Relations Theory and Practice, in Grunig, J. E., Dozier, D. M., Ehling, W. P., Grunig, L. A., Repper, F. C., White, J. (Eds.), Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 39, 40. See also Grunig, J. E. (1984), Organizations, Environments, and Models of Public Relations, Public Relations Research & Education, 1 (1), especially 6. 15 Beyond the several definitions of an issue in literature, there is one common trait emphazised by almost all of them: an issue is a disputabile question of fact, value or policy that arises whenever there is a gap between an organization’s actions and its publics’ expectations. Issue management deals with solving this kind of problems, ultimately aiming to close that gap. See Heath, R. L. (1997) Strategic Issues Management: Organizations and Public Policy Challenges, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 4; Chase, H. W. and Crane, T. Y. (1996), Issue Management: Dissolving the Archaic Division Between Line and Staff, in Dennis L. B. (Ed.), Practical Public Affairs in an Era of Change, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 130. 16 Bowen, S. A. (2005). A Practical Model For Ethical Decision Making in Issue Management and Public Relations”, Journal of Public Relations Research, 17(3), 212. Typically, such approach is embraced by the partisans of the asymmetrical model of public relations. Bowen deems it as incoherent and entailing negative consequences on the credibility and reputation of organizations. 17 Grunig, L. A., Grunig, J. E., Dozier, D. M. (2002). Excellent Public Relations and Effective Organizations: A Study of Communication Management in Three Countries, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 556. 18 The PR function of public conscience of an organization is maintained by Ryan, M. and Martinson, D. L. (Ryan, M. & Martinson, D. L. (1983), The PR Officer as Corporate Conscience, Public Relations Quarterly, 28(2), 3 Paper published in Romanian Journal of Journalism & Communication, Nr. 1-2 (44), 2014, pp. 62-70. ISSN 1842-256X and, respectively, by Heath, R. L. (Heath, R. L. (1994) Management of Corporate Communication: From Interpersonal Contacts to External Affairs, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 68 19 Pratt, C. B. (1993). Critique of the Classical Theory of Situational Ethics in U.S. Public Relations, Public Relations Review, 19(3), 200. 20 Pratt, C. B. (1993). Critique, 222. Bowen shares Pratt’s view, showing that acting as ethical conscience can only become a common practice when public relations professionals are allowed the access to strategic decisionmaking. Consequently, they should strive to gain membership in the dominant coalition. Ethical conscience, she says, should be normatively located “within the top echelon of public relations function”. See Bowen, S. A. (2008) A State of Neglect: Public Relations as Corporate Conscience or Ethics Counsel, Journal of Public Relations Research, 20, 272. 21 Bowen, S. A. (2002). Elite Executive in Issue Management: The Role of Ethical Paradigms in Decision Making, Journal of Public Affairs, 2(4), 270-283. 22 For details see Hursthouse, R. (1999) On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 23 Ross’s pluralist deontology has in part inspired itself from Aristotle’s ethics. Sir David Ross (1995), Aristotle, London and New York: Routledge, (6th ed.), 227. See also 226 and 228. 24 Bowen refers, for example, to the lack of a “formal ethics program”, of a “decision-making model” within the organizations, or the insufficient ethical training of the managers for the ethical analysis of conflict situations and decision making. See Bowen, S. A. (2005) A Practical Model For Ethical Decision Making in Issue Management and Public Relations”, Journal of Public Relations Research, 17(3), 212. 25 Bowen, S. A. (2004). Expansion of Ethics as the Tenth Generic Priciple of Public Relations Excellence: A Kantian Theory and Model for Managing Ethical Issues, Journals of Public Relations Research, 16(1) 87. See also 79. 26 One should, however, recall that a purely normative theory such as Kantian deontology includes moral improvement (that is virtues) in the system of moral duties. 27 Baker, S. & Martinson, D. L. (2001). The TARES Test: Five Principles for Ethical Persuasion, Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 16(2&3), 161. 28 Johannesen, R. L. (1996). Ethics in Human Communication, (4th ed.), Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 69. 29 Johannesen, R. L. (1991). Virtue Ethics, Character, and Political Communication, in Denton Jr., R. E. (Ed.), Ethical Dimensions of Political Communication, London: Praeger Publishers, 75. 30 Fitzpatrick, K. & Gauthier, C. (2001). Toward a Professional …, 195. 31 Grunig, L. A., Grunig, J. E., Dozier, D. M. (2002). Excellent Public Relations and Effective Organizations: A Study of Communication Management in Three Countries, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 555. 32 Cf. Hooker, B. (2002) Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 33 Nelson, R. A. (1994). Issues Communication and Advocacy: Contemporary Ethical Challenges, Public Relations Review, 20(3), 228. 34 See Ross, W. D. (2002). The Right and the Good (Stratton-Lake, P., Ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 52-53. 35 For details see Meyers, C. (2011). Reappreciating W. D. 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