aiming at virtue in plato
... SV does not by itself rule in or out any non-evaluatively described actiontype, and it says nothing about how to determine what the virtuous action
actually is, which is precisely Cleitophon’s complaint. I thus distinguish
between establishing the supreme aim of an agent’s action (which is the
Moral Beauty as An Overriding Imperative in
... philosophical traditions whose subject matter is at the center of the debate about the
nature of moral principles and motivation. At the end of this chapter, I propose
Confucian understanding of the self as situated in a societal context and argue that the
discrepancy among moral principles is only ...
The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory
... drug use, family responsibilities, and professional ethics. Can war be just? Is euthanasia ever justiﬁable? This volume focuses, however, on questions that are
more abstract than these. For example, what kinds of actions are right or wrong?
These questions may seem far removed from concrete issues o ...
Susan Wolf on moral perfection and the good life: a critical analysis
... there is also another possibility. Instead of looking for a single comprehensive system, one
can include different viewpoints. Somehow, when ideals and the good life are in question,
moral theorists tend to stick to only one system and a single point of view. But in life, there
are several aspects t ...
can a consequentialist be a real friend? (who cares?)
... words, they are too much of relevance to any kind of agent, regardless of moral
convictions. The question here is, “Can a consequentialist be a real friend?”
But what is a ‘consequentialist’? Variants on this notion are elaborated in the
debate, yet I believe ‘consequentialism’ should firstly be exp ...
Morally Permissible Moral Mistakes
... mistakes. Dreier argues that supererogation is possible because while a certain action might be
recommended “from the point of view of beneficence” that point of view ignores certain reasons,
such as self-interested reasons, which are nevertheless relevant when the agent considers what to
do. On Dre ...
Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics
... the nature of moral truths and moral obligations. Rawls’ political constructivism is
more modest than ethical constructivism in other respects. First, the scope of political
constructivism is narrower than constructivism understood as a metaethics. This is
because political constructivism concerns o ...
Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo
... with the philosophical arguments for it?9 Of course not. For whether it is ultimately
true or not, it is neither obvious nor incontestably established that regularly doing the
outward deeds required by morality comports with the weight of nonmoral reasons.
After all, regularly doing those deeds enta ...
Evolution and moral naturalism - Victoria University of Wellington
... that emerged because this way of thinking provided our ancestors with some sort of
reproductive advantage over their competition. What sort of advantage? On this point
hypotheses diverge, but what is striking about these nativist hypotheses is that they
seem entirely compatible with the error theore ...
in defence of moral error theory
... ways but they do not display the feature that moral error theorists find especially queer
about purported moral facts—they do not entail categorical reasons.
Someone might object that, e.g., logical facts do entail categorical reasons for belief.
An example might be that the fact that p and if p the ...
Is There Moral High Ground?
... we must relativize truth. The only other option is to accept both
ours and the Taliban’s claims and conclude that there are true
moral contradictions: it is both true and not true that it is good
to educate women. Pace dialethism, we should assume that true
moral contradictions are untenable. We may ...
how optional is morality
... exclusive5: insofar as motivation is moral, it cannot be self-interested.6 Importantly,
neither are they mutually exhaustive: most motivation is neither moral nor selfinterested. It does not follow and is not the case that moral motivation is incompatible
with objective self-interest, or that self- ...
Thesis edit2 - University of Tilburg
... This paper fuels the debate on the innateness of morality by testing four prominent notions
on the moral domain: i) the morality versus convention nexus (c.f. Turiel, 1979), ii) the theory of
the four moral domains (c.f. Haidt and Joseph, 2004), iii) the ‘big three’ ethics (c.f. Shweder, 2008)
and i ...
Reasons and Moral Principles
... would have done so if the circumstances had been different. Particularists can
therefore happily allow that reasons must be general in this sense.
Genuine moral principles must also be substantive or informative in some
sense that goes beyond the requisite modal implications. For instance, if “murde ...
The Moral Theories of Kant and Hume
... same in every rational being is the foundation of what is deemed to be
a perfect form of moral community. The ground of self-esteem in critical
morality, however, not only does not oppose one to others but affirms
something which, Kant holds, is identically realized in all rational
beings. In contra ...
Normative Ethics, Normative Epistemology, and Quine`s Holism
... independent course of observable nature, we can judge the morality of an act
only by our moral standards themselves; adding that science \"thanks to its links
with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth; but a
coherence theory is evidently the lot of ethics\".15 However, ...
The Rosewood Report on Practical Wisdom
... proposed definitions that include normative terms. Both Eddy and Valerie see wisdom as importantly
related to what it is to live well, to achieve things in life that are good or worthwhile. Some of the
psychologists in the group worried about how to operationalize and test conceptions of wisdom that ...
On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism
... ease, and a wrong judgment or opinion. In his view, the moral sense is
originally infallible, but some external causes can distort it.
If this is the case, some standard is necessary to identify the distortion. This standard must be different from the moral sense because the
moral sense alone cannot ...
Rightness and Responsibility
... with moral requirements to the extent they are deliberating correctly and are
otherwise practically rational. The condition of correct deliberation rules out
cases in which an agent does not acknowledge the truth of moral judgments or
does not acknowledge that such judgments have normative significa ...
Intuitive Methods of Moral Decision Making, A
... source of moral objectivity and reasons for what we ought to do. I will address this
concern later in the paper.
The error with the first point is the confusion between a pedagogical approach
to applied ethics and actual moral decision making.13 In order to be applied, general
moral principles need ...
... Plausibly, some of the resistance to Singer’s conclusions about our duties of
beneficence derives from philosophical intuition, not mere self-interest. But
what intuition are skeptics reacting to? It may be an intuition about the scope
and content of moral requirements to the effect that morality do ...
Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of
... why the demandingness objection is typically considered as exclusively targeting consequentialism. Recall our original question: why is only consequentialism targeted in this way? It seems that other moral theories are comparably
demanding. Take two popular alternatives to consequentialism. Deontolo ...
Aristotle and the Early Stoics on Moral Responsibility
... first for those studying virtue and second for legislators for assigning honor and punishment (1109b30-35,
quoted above). Both these reasons involve only adult humans. In NE 3.2-3 Aristotle turns his analysis to
the activity peculiar to adult humans, “choice” (proairesis). Choice is a sort of volunt ...
Carving a Niche for Immoderate Moral Realism
... tell us what makes the lower-tier truths true. If Wedgwood is right to think of our theories as
inferences to the best explanation of our lower-tier moral beliefs, however, our general moral
beliefs are epistemologically or justificatorily substantive.3 They form the foundation upon which
we base ou ...
Virtue ethics (or aretaic ethics /ˌærəˈteɪɪk/ from the Greek arete) emphasizes the role of one's character and the virtues that one's character embodies for determining or evaluating ethical behavior. Virtue ethics is one of the three major approaches to normative ethics, often contrasted to deontology, which emphasizes duty to rules, and consequentialism, which derives rightness or wrongness from the outcome of the act itself.The difference between these three approaches to morality tends to lie more in the ways in which moral dilemmas are approached, rather than in the moral conclusions reached. For example, a consequentialist may argue that lying is wrong because of the negative consequences produced by lying—though a consequentialist may allow that certain foreseeable consequences might make some lying (""white lies"") acceptable. A deontologist might argue that lying is always wrong, regardless of any potential ""good"" that might come from lying. A virtue ethicist, however, would focus less on lying in any particular instance and instead consider what a decision to tell a lie or not tell a lie said about one's character and moral behavior. As such, the morality of lying would be determined on a case-by-case basis, which would be based on factors such as personal benefit, group benefit, and intentions (as to whether they are benevolent or malevolent).