Download Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics

Carla Bagnoli, “Constructivism in metaethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
(accepted August 2011, forthcoming)
Constructivism in Metaethics
Constructivism in ethics is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, for
example, truths about what we ought to do, they are in some sense determined by an
idealized process of rational deliberation, choice, or agreement. As a “first-order
moral account”--an account of which moral principles are correct--constructivism is
the view that the moral principles we ought to accept or follow are the ones that
agents would agree to or endorse were they to engage in a hypothetical or idealized
process of rational deliberation. As a “metaethical account” – an account of whether
there are any normative truths and, if so, what they are like – constructivism holds
that there are normative truths. These truths are not fixed by facts that are independent
of the practical standpoint, however characterized; rather, they are constituted by what
agents would agree to under some specified conditions of choice.
In working to provide a more precise definition of constructivism in metaethics, the
focus of this entry, one faces two main difficulties. The first difficulty is that
constructivism comes in several varieties, each of which claims a different niche
within metaethics, and some claim no space at all. The second difficulty concerns
where to place constructivism on the metaethical map in relation to realism and antirealism. These are terms of art, and it is highly contested which views count as realist
and which as antirealist.
These two difficulties will be addressed in what follows by focusing on the distinctive
questions that constructivist theories are designed to answer. Section §1 defines the
scope of constructivism in ethics, in contrast to constructivism in political theory.
Sections §§2-5 illustrate the main varieties of metaethical constructivism, which are
designed to account for the nature of normative truths and practical reasons. Section
§6 presents the main varieties of constructivist accounts of the justification of moral
judgments of right and wrong. Section §7 discusses the metaethical status of
constructivism, and its distinctive import.
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1. Constructivism: political, moral, and metaethical
2. Kantian constructivism
2.1. Kant’s constructivism
2.2. Korsgaard’s constructivism
2.3. O’Neill on abstraction and idealization
3. Aristotelian constructivism
4. Humean constructivism
5. Conventionalist constructivism
6. Constructivist accounts of moral judgments
6.1. Contractualist constructivism
6.1.1. Kantian contractualism
6.1.2. Hobbesian contractualism
6.2. Utilitarian constructivism
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Carla Bagnoli, “Constructivism in metaethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
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6.3. Society-based constructivism
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7. The metaethical status and import of constructivism
7.1. A constructivist semantics?
7.2. Constructivism in the realism-antirealism debate
7.3. Constructivism and constitutivism
Bibliography
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Related entries
1. Constructivism: political, moral, and metaethical
The term ‘constructivism’ entered recent debates in moral theory with John Rawls’
seminal article “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (Rawls 1980), wherein
Rawls offered a reinterpretation of the philosopher Immanuel Kant’s ethics and of its
relevance for political debates. According to Rawls, these debates fail to effectively
address the problem of ethical disagreements because they adopt inadequate standards
of objectivity. The inadequate standards, he explains, are metaphysical and appeal to
the independent reality and truth of values. Rawls turns to Kant in order to argue for a
conception of objectivity that is not metaphysical, but "political." He attributes to
Kant the idea that we need objective standards in reasoning to solve practical
problems about what to do (Rawls 1971, 34, 39-40, 49-52). Rawls is especially
concerned with coordination problems that arise in pluralistic contexts, wherein
citizens hold different and to some extent incommensurable moral views. Our need
for objectivity is practical: it arises in contexts in which people disagree about what
to value and need to reach an agreement about what to do.
Rawls’ leading idea is that, in justifying the principles of justice to govern the major
social institutions (what he calls the "basic structure of society"), it is not necessary to
engage in the metaphysical debate about moral truths. Instead, we need to consider
which principles all citizens could accept under idealized conditions of choice. He
calls the ideal conditions of choice the “original position” (Rawls 1971, 118-162). In
the original position, choosers are behind a “veil of ignorance” that blinds them to any
information about their identity or social position, thereby preventing them from
choosing in a partial way, based on consideration of their own interests (Rawls 1971,
136-142). This idealized procedure, or “procedure of construction,” is a device for
identifying what follows from the practical standpoint shared by citizens who accept
liberal democratic values, such as the freedom and equality of persons (Rawls 1971,
21; Rawls 1993, 26). By excluding irrelevant information, the original position
protects against bias and specifies a “public perspective” from which all citizens who
endorse liberal values can deliberate about what justice means and what just
institutions are, independently of interests that are specific to their particular position.
Judgments arrived at, or “constructed,” according to this reasoning are objective
insofar as they are acceptable to all citizens, independently of the particular position
they hold in society and the specific interests that accompany such a position.
According to Rawls, this is all that is required to address the practical problem of
disagreement and is sufficient to warrant a stable system of social cooperation among
citizens with different moral, philosophical, and religious views (Rawls 1971, 138).
Rawls’ idealized procedure, he tells us, adopts a conception of the person as free and
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equal, and he emphasizes a similar idea in his interpretation of Kant's moral
philosophy (Rawls 1971, §40; Rawls 1980). However, Rawls’ own constructivist
theory differs significantly from the sort of constructivism he attributes to Kant (to be
examined in §2.1). Rawls advocates constructivism as a political conception, which is
by design non-committal regarding ontological and metaphysical questions (Rawls
1993, 100; Rawls 1999, 395, 354) and does not rest on any claims about which moral
view is correct. By contrast, Kant’s ethical theory combines metaethical claims about
the nature of moral truths and moral obligations. Rawls’ political constructivism is
more modest than ethical constructivism in other respects. First, the scope of political
constructivism is narrower than constructivism understood as a metaethics. This is
because political constructivism concerns only the principles of justice of the basic
institutions of society, while metaethical constructivism concerns all normative
claims. Second, the audience of political constructivism is more limited, as it
addresses the fellow citizens of a pluralist democracy, rather than all rational agents
(Rawls 1987, 421-448; Rawls 1989, 473-496; Rawls 1993, 116). Third, the strategy
invoked in political liberalism is more limited. For Rawls, rational agreement is
“constructed” by imagining how citizens with liberal convictions would choose if
they were placed in the original position, where the sources of bias are blocked. If
citizens did not know their gender, religious and moral views, and social status, for
instance, which principles of justice would they accept? This thought-experiment
produces a hypothetical agreement, even among citizens who endorse radically
different values and life styles (Rawls 1985; Rawls 1987; Rawls 1993, 49). Embedded
in the setup of the original position are certain normative judgments implicit in the
public political culture of liberalism – such as claims about the nature of fair
bargaining conditions, the freedom and equality of persons, and the irrelevance of
certain traits – such as race, sex, class, and natural endowments – to the distribution of
rights, liberties, income and wealth. The relevant agreement for Rawls is among
“reasonable” fellow citizens living within the boundaries of a specific society, who
are already interested in justice and accept the burdens and standards of cooperation
(O’Neill 2003a, 2003b; Cf. Brink 1989, 303-321, 1987).
By contrast, constructivism in ethics is the view that there are normative truths about
what one ought to do, but they depend on how rational agents would reason in an
idealized deliberative situation. Disagreements about the relevant standards of
practical reasoning generate different varieties of metaethical constructivism: Kantian,
Humean, Aristotelian, and conventionalist (§§ 2-5). Some philosophers defend a
restricted form of constructivism as an objectivist method of justification for certain
normative judgments – typically, moral judgments – without taking an explicit
position about the nature of all normative truths (§6).
2. Kantian constructivism
Kantian constructivism names a family of ethical theories inspired by Kant’s ethics.
The distinguishing feature of Kantian constructivism is that it accounts for the nature
of moral and normative truths starting from considerations about the features of
rational agency. On this view, reasons for being moral do not spring from our
interests or desires; instead, they are rooted in our nature as rational agents. Insofar as
they are requirements of practical reason, moral obligations are universally and
necessarily binding for all rational beings. Because of its claim to universality,
Kantian Constructivism is the most ambitious form of constructivism.
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2.1. Kant’s constructivism
Whether Kant himself defends constructivism is a matter of dispute (Krasnoff 1999;
Audi 2004; Kain 2006; Irwin 2009). On Rawls’ reading, Kant’s analysis of obligation
commits him to a kind of constructivism, which is best highlighted in contrast to
competing views of moral obligations (Rawls 1980, 1989, 2000). Kant holds that all
previous ethical theories have failed to account for moral obligation because they
have failed as theories of practical reason (Kant G 4: 441-444; C2 5: 35-41, 153,
157). They fail to capture the autonomy and independence of reason, that is, its
capacity to produce objective moral ends. These theories are said to be
“heteronomous” because they deny the autonomy of reason. Kant holds that
heteronomous doctrines have skeptical implications because they cannot make sense
of the authority of moral norms. Moral norms are authoritative only if they are
“generated” by reason. Kant’s charge of heteronomy is directed against all previous
moral doctrines, but his arguments are directed against sentimentalism and dogmatic
rationalism (or intuitionism). Sentimentalism, championed by Francis Hutcheson,
David Hume, and Adam Smith, holds that ethical concepts stem from sentiments and
regards reason as incapable of moving us to action. On this view, the role of reason is
purely instrumental. That is, reason merely finds the means to satisfy the agent’s ends
and it is not capable of indicating which ends are worth pursuing. For Kant this claim
exposes sentimentalism as a heteronomous doctrine, which fails to establish the
objectivity of moral obligations. Sentimentalism treats moral obligations as
conditional upon our interests, and thus of limited authority: you have a moral
obligation to keep your promise, if (but only if) it suits your interest or desire.
Kant raises the same objection against dogmatic rationalism, championed by Christian
Wolff and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, which holds that there are real moral truths that
we apprehend by rational intuition, and independently of our conceptions of the
person (Kant G 4, 443; Rawls 2000, 50, 228). On this view, reason recognizes an
objective order of values or moral ends that exist prior to and independently of our
reasoning and of the kinds of agents we are. In discovering such ends, moral agents
do not actively exercise reasoning; they are as passive as in sensory perception. For
Kant, dogmatic rationalism fails to secure the conclusion that moral obligations have
unconditional authority over us (Kant G, 4: 441). This is because moral truths are
supposed to guide us only on the condition that we have a corresponding desire to be
guided by what is rational (Rawls 1980, 343-346; Rawls 1989, 510-513).
The critique of heteronomous doctrines is that they hold that moral ends exist and are
identifiable prior to reasoning about them. Reason can only recognize them as already
there, and can bind agents only with the help of inclination or interest. According to
Kant, this is a form of moral skepticism. Constructivism is often taken to be part of
Kant’s overall argument against skepticism (Korsgaard 1996; Schneewind 1991).
Skepticism is avoided only if reason is autonomous, and its authority does not derive
from anything outside its domain. Reason is autonomous if its authority is
underivative and its objects are constructed rather than passively recognized. The
norm governing the activity of reason must be internal and constitutive of the activity
itself, rather than dependent on any given value, interest, or desire (O’Neill 1989,
172-173). That is to say that reason is a "self-legislative activity" (Kant G 4: §2). Kant
thinks that there is only one way to produce genuine reasons, which Kant calls the
“Categorical Imperative.” The Categorical Imperative expresses the autonomy of
reason and its governing principle. But the Categorical Imperative is not a mere
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decision-procedure to determine what to do, but the “constitutive norm” of reason,
that is, the basic standard of rationality in thinking and acting (Rawls 1989, 498-506;
Rawls 2000, 166, 240-244; Korsgaard 1996, 36-37; O’Neill 1989, 18-19, 59n, 128,
180; Bagnoli 2002, 131-132; Reath 2006, 221-222; Engstrom 2009, Chapter 5; Street
2010: 364). Kant gives several specifications of the Categorical Imperative, which he
regards as equivalent (GMM 4: 421, 429, 431, 433); but at bottom, it is the
requirement that in deliberating we test our motives by considering whether the
principle they express can be endorsed as a universal law.
Critics of the constructivist interpretation of Kant’s ethics point out that the basic
argument for constructivism emerges from the analysis of obligation in Groundwork
of the Metaphysics of Morals, but there are also realist strands in Kant’s works. In the
Critique of Practical Reason, Kant refers to our consciousness of the moral law as
“the fact of reason” (Kant C2 5: 46-48). We know the moral law as a “fact”, and we
feel its pull in the guise of reverence for the law. This immediate consciousness of the
moral law also shows that we have an interest in morality, which arises independently
of self-interested motives (Kant C2 5: 42-43). Many interpreters take the argument
from the fact of reason to show that Kant’s claim about the objectivity of moral
obligations ultimately relies on perception of some moral facts (the fact of reason),
hence on a realist foundation (Ameriks 2003, 263-282; Cf. Kleingeld 2010, 55-72).
Contrary to constructivists, they deny that claims about the autonomy of reason or its
practical function commit Kant to constructivism. On their view, Kant’s defense of
the autonomy of reason takes place within a project of identifying the foundation of
morality, which is realist in spirit because it appeals to the absolute value of humanity
(Wood 1999, 157, 114; Rauscher 2002; Langton 2007; Johnson 2007; Hills 2008;
Besch 2008, 2009; Krasnoff 1999, Kain 1999, 2004, 2006; Larmore 2008, 83-84;
Irwin 2009; Galwin 2010).
Constructivists have seldom dealt with the argument from the fact of reason, or they
have downplayed its role in Kant’s general argument for the objectivity of moral
obligations (O’Neill 2002, 81–97; Łuków 1993, 204–221; Cf. Engstrom 2009, 243).
Rawls, instead, takes the fact of reason to show that Kant develops “not only a
constructivist conception of practical reason, but a coherentist account of its
authentication” (Rawls 1999, 524; Rawls 2000, 268-273). In his view, the fact of
reason indicates that the deliverances of practical reason cohere with our moral
experience. This congruence is an integral part of Kant’s vindication of ethical
objectivity, but it is no commitment to realism. Rather, it simply confirms that there is
no discrepancy between the requirements of practical reason (which are expressed by
the Categorical Imperative) and our experience of morality (Rawls 1980, 340; Rawls
1989, 523-524; Rawls 2000, 253-272, 268, 273; Cf. Kant C2, 5: 15).
Perhaps the most general source of reservations against the constructivist
interpretation is that Kant’s claims about the nature of objective moral cognitions
seem best vindicated by moral realism, while constructivism is sometimes taken to be
a form of antirealism (Ameriks 2003, 268, 274; Wood 1999, 167; Wood 2008, 108,
337, 374-375). However, as an interpretation of Kant, constructivism purports to be
an alternative to both realism (e.g. rational intuitionism) and antirealism (e.g.
sentimentalism). Both of the latter views are objected to on the ground that they lead
to skeptical conclusions about practical reason, and thus fail to justify the
unconditional authority of moral obligations (Rawls 1989, 516, 518-523; Korsgaard
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2003; Reath 2006, 222; O’Neill 1989, 206). The constructivist interpretation claims to
have the advantages of capturing the novelty of Kant’s insight about the selfauthenticating nature of reason as a self-legislative activity and also of making sense
of Kant’s conception of moral authority as bestowed through the critique of reason.
The distinctive character of Kant’s constructivism resides in the idea that reason itself
should be scrutinized by reason in order for its verdicts to be justified. Constructivists
hold that practical reason itself is constructed insofar as its legitimacy and authority
are established and instituted by reasoning, rather than by appeal to some facts about
the way the world is.
Independently of these interpretative issues, Kant’s constructivism raises issues that
are relevant to other versions of constructivism, and these will be discussed in §7.
2.2. Korgaard’s Kantian constructivism
Among contemporary philosophers, Christine Korsgaard has developed the most
ambitious, and controversial, version of Kantian constructivism. She defines Kantian
constructivism as a form of “procedural realism” – the view that “there are answers to
moral questions because there are correct procedures for arriving at them”; and she
contrasts procedural realism with “substantive realism” -- the view that “there are
correct procedures for answering moral questions because there are moral truths or
facts, which exist independently of those procedures, and which those procedures
track” (Korsgaard 1996a, 36-37; see also Engstrom 2009, 119). Substantive realism
holds that there are objective criteria of correctness for moral judgments only if such
judgments represent matters of fact about the way the world is. By contrast, the
constructivist view is that there are objective criteria of moral judgment insofar as
there are objective criteria about how to reason on practical matters. There are
objective reasons that prohibit deceiving and manipulating others, but such reasons
are the result of practical reasoning, rather than discovered by empirical investigation,
grasped by the intellect, or revealed by some god. What makes this view “Kantian” is
that there is ultimately one criterion for reasoning on practical matters, which is the
Categorical Imperative. By reasoning according to this criterion, we objectively
ground moral obligation. This is to say, moral obligations are requirements of
practical reason.
Korsgaard’s case for constructivism parallels Kant’s as Rawls reconstructs it. It starts
by objecting that substantive realism fails to respond to the skeptical challenge
because it simply assumes the existence of objective standards for morality without
offering a rational basis for them. As a consequence, the realist also fails to account
for the authority of moral obligations—for why we really ought to do as morality
says. (Korsgaard 1996a; Korsgaard 2008, 234, 30-31, 55-57, 67-68). Realists are
misled by the presumption that, in order to fend off skepticism, one has to anchor
practical reasons in facts that are in themselves normative. But no appeal to such
“normative facts” can explain how they count as reasons and motivate rational agents.
Suppose we agree that it is a normative fact that deception is morally wrong. How
does awareness of this fact rationally compel us to refrain from deceiving? This is not
only a psychological question about the force that such a fact might exercise on our
minds, but also, and most importantly, a normative question that concerns their
authority.
According to Korsgaard, "the normative question" arises for humans insofar as they
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are capable of reflecting on themselves and considering their thoughts and desires
from a detached perspective. This reflective distance allows rational agents to call into
question the legitimacy of particular thoughts and desires and to suspend their pull.
Because they are reflective, rational agents have ideals about the sort of persons they
want to be, and they can guide their minds and actions accordingly. That is, they are
capable of self-governance. Like Kant, Korsgaard thinks that the appropriate form of
self-governance is self-legislation (Korsgaard 1996a, 36, 91, 231-232; Korsgaard
2008, 3).
According to Korsgaard, rational agents are guided by universal principles that they
have legislated. The appeal to self-legislation does not make the moral law coincide
with the arbitrary decisions of particular agents. The moral law is a principle of
reasoning that binds all rational agents, not a decree of any one rational agent
(Korsgaard 1996a, 36, 234-236; Korsgaard 2008, 207-229; Reath 2006, 112-113, 92170). The constructivist claim is that the moral law obliges us only insofar as it is selflegislated. This is not to say that one is bound by requirements because one legislates
them; otherwise, evil people would not be bound by the moral law (Korsgaard 1996a,
234-235; O’Neill 2003c; Reath 2006, 112-113, 92-170; Korsgaard 2008, 207-229).
Rather, one can autonomously act on such requirements only if one legislates them.
This is because universal principles guarantee that action is expressive of an agent’s
integrity, rather than merely in the service of satisfying preferences or desires. Like
Plato and Kant, Korsgaard argues that some kind of integrity is necessary to be an
agent and cannot be achieved without a commitment to morality, which is founded on
reason (Korsgaard 2009, xii, Chapter 3; Cf. Plato Republic 443d-e).
A canonical objection against the attempt to ground morality on rationality is that it
fails to account for the special bonds and ties we have with our loved ones and thus
fails to capture the nature of integrity and morality (Williams 1981). To address these
worries, Korsgaard introduces the notion of “practical identities”, which specify roles
as sources of special obligations. For instance, Adam values himself and finds his life
worth living and his actions worth undertaking under the description of being a
teacher of music, an American citizen, and Robert’s friend (Korsgaard 1996a, 101,
§3.3.1; Korsgaard 2009, 20). These practical identities govern Adam’s choices,
sustain his integrity, and are sources of specific obligations to his pupils, fellows, and
friends (Korsgaard 1996a, §3.3.1; Korsgaard 2009, 22). However, we do not have
obligations just because we occupy certain roles as teachers, citizens, or friends.
Rather, such roles become practical identities, and sources of reasons, insofar as we
rationally endorse them. Rational endorsement, in turn, requires that we test our
loyalties and allegiances according to the principle of universality, which commits us
to morality. In order to value ourselves under these specific descriptions, we ought to
value humanity in ourselves and in others (Korsgaard 2008, Lecture 6, 25-26).
Korsgaard offers what is called a ‘transcendental argument’ for this conclusion. A
transcendental argument is an argument that identifies the conditions under which it is
possible for something to be the case. Korsgaard argues that valuing humanity,
understood as the capacity for rationality, is the condition of the possibility of valuing
anything at all (Korsgaard 1996a, 121-123; Korsgaard 1998, 60-62; Korsgaard 2009).
Evaluators bestow value on objects on the basis of reasons, and thus in virtue of their
rational capacity. The value of any object thus ultimately depends on the rational
capacity of evaluators. 'Humanity' is the name of a distinctive value, which is
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unconditional and counts as the condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all.
Since humanity is embodied in all rational beings, we should value humanity in
ourselves as well as in others, on pain of incoherence. Special obligations and bonds
that derive from local identities are insufficient to sustain our integrity when they are
inconsistent with valuing humanity. For instance, the conduct of a Mafioso cannot be
coherently justified on the basis of a universal principle. The Mafioso thus fails as a
rational agent and leads a life that is not autonomous, since his life is not the product
of reflective self-government. A systematic failure to be guided by universal
principles of self-government amounts to a loss of agency. We cannot but be agents,
and thus we are necessarily bound by the norms of rationality and morality.
Korsgaard’s strategy depends on establishing that the norms of rationality and
morality can be derived from the constitutive features of agency and that agency is
inescapable. Both these claims have been attacked on grounds that will be discussed
in section 7.3.
2.3. O’Neill on abstraction and idealization
Onora O’Neill importantly departs from the versions of Kantian constructivism
discussed above because she makes no appeal to transcendental arguments and rejects
the idealized conceptions of rational agency that are at play in other constructivist
theories, such as Kant’s, Rawls’, and Korsgaard’s. She objects that idealization in
ethical theory denies the limitations and vulnerability of human agents, and thus it is
distorting and possibly dangerous. For instance, Rawls’ original position is governed
by a particular ideal, which hides some information before the construction of the
principles of justice starts. The procedure of construction is thus loaded with heavy
moral assumptions about agency and social interactions that are not true of real
agents. By contrast, O’Neill’s non-idealized constructivism starts with "abstraction,"
which is a matter of bracketing, but not denying, some predicates concerning agents.
For instance, to construct the principles of justice, she deploys very meager and
indeterminate concepts of rationality and abstracts from the circumstances of justice.
This more austere constructivism is closer to Kant’s theory (O’Neill 1988). According
to O’Neill, Kant’s constructivism is motivated by a vivid awareness of human
imperfection, finitude, and vulnerability (O’Neill 1989; 1999). Humans are prone to
mistakenly rely on claims that are not warranted, and thus they need to check and
criticize the unjustified and arbitrary assumptions they make in reasoning. In contrast
to realism, constructivism holds that the principles of reason are not available to us by
intuition or introspection. Since such principles are not simply given to us, we must
use our rational powers to figure out what these principles are. We need principles
that can guide agents who are numerous, not ideally rational and not ideally
independent of one another. O’Neill’s constructivism does not depend on any fixed
account of rationality or the degree of mutual independence of agents. She does not
aim to address the hypothetical question, 'What principles would a plurality of agents,
with minimal rationality and indeterminate capacities for independence, choose to live
by?' Rather, she addresses the question, 'What principles can a plurality of agents of
minimal rationality and indeterminate capacities for mutual independence live by?'
The Kantian answer, according to O’Neill, is that no plurality of agents can choose to
live by principles that aim to destroy or undermine the agency (of whatever
determinate shape) of some of its members (O’Neill 1988, 10; see also O’Neill 1985,
O’Neill 2003a, O’Neill 2004; cf. Darwall et al. 1992, 140).
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The process of figuring out what the principles of reason are is avowedly circular;
only reason itself can verify the credentials of its own claims. O’Neill argues that this
circularity is not vicious because the process of verification can be reflexive, as it
involves reason critiquing the claims of reason itself. More specifically, the critique of
reason uncovers a basic principle of reasoning: we should rely only on those
principles that other rational agents can share. This is a minimal requirement of
universality, which demands that we test the credibility of our claims by considering
whether they could be endorsed by all relevant others. The authority of reason is thus
conferred by public communication among free rational agents, and it consists in the
fact that the principles that govern our thoughts are neither self-serving nor selfdefeating. We find out what these principles say by submitting our claims to free and
critical debates, which constitute “the public use of reason” (O’Neill 1989, 70-71,
206). For instance, the principle that we ought not to harm, coerce, or deceive is a
normative principle constructed out of an intersubjective account of practical reason.
Since the critique of reason is a continuous, progressive, and reflexive process, on this
constructivist account reason appears to have a history, which coincides with the
development of practices of tolerance and mutual recognition (O’Neill 1999, 174;
2002). O'Neill’s account does not yield any fully shaped system of moral knowledge;
and it provides no algorithm for determining a system of morality. But it promises to
vindicate reason's ability (and right) to distinguish sound justifications from mere
rationalizations.
O’Neill’s defense of the virtuous circularity of constructivism raises issues that are
relevant to constructivism in general, and that will be addressed in sections 7.2-3.
3. Aristotelian constructivism
Aristotelian constructivism is the view that normative truths are grounded in an
account of practical reason that incorporates substantive standards about leading a
good life (Lebar 2008). This variant of constructivism invokes the tradition of Ancient
eudaimonism, and defines the good life in terms of virtuous rational agency
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V 1 1129b2-7, III 4 113a32). Like the Kantian
varieties of constructivism, Aristotelian constructivism appeals to constitutive features
of practical reason; but, in contrast to Kantians, Aristotelians hold that these
principles of sound practical reason are grounded on a substantive account of the good
life. To identify such substantive standards, Aristotelian constructivism starts with an
account of our rational animal nature, which is distinctively plastic and educable. The
key feature of this account is the claim that practical rationality does not merely direct
our affective responses toward adequate objects but also structurally transforms our
sensibility.
The negative case for Aristotelian constructivism consists in the critique of Kantian
constructivism as incapable of offering a credible alternative to moral realism. On his
defense of Aristotelian constructivism, Mark Lebar objects that the Kantian attempt to
anchor normative truths in some transcendental ideal is a tacitly realist move (Lebar
2008). Whether this charge has merit and Aristotelian constructivism has some
decisive advantages over Kantianism depends on three related issues: (i) whether
Kantian constructivism necessarily needs a transcendental foundation (cf. §2.3); (ii)
whether claims about the structure of reason commit one to realism, and (iii) whether
Aristotelian constructivism avoids the problem of circularity that arises for Kantian
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constructivism with distinctive strategies (§§3.3, §7.2). Like the Humean and Kantian
varieties of constructivism, Aristotelian constructivism appeals to constitutive features
of practical reason, and like Kantian accounts, it promises to secure a strong objective
basis for substantive moral norms by showing that they are grounded in principles of
reason.
4. Humean Constructivism
A recent variant of constructivism that is gaining popularity is inspired by David
Hume and is thus named “Humean constructivism” (Bagnoli 2002, 131; Street 2008,
2010; Velleman 2009; Lenman 2010). In contrast to Kantians, Humean constructivists
offer a more relativistic account of the nature of normative truths, according to which
the truth of a normative claim consists in its being entailed from the evaluative
standpoint of particular individuals. The starting points of rational deliberation are
contingent commitments, and practical concerns of actual agents (Lenman 2010, 180181). Consequently, on this view, “truth and falsity in the normative domain must
always be relativized to a particular practical point of view” (Street 2008, 224).
Humeans propose a procedure of construction that invokes normative standards that
are not epistemic; these standards do not draw their authority “from their reliability in
disclosing to us an independently constituted domain of moral truth but rather from
their bearing on the distinctive practical concerns to which morality speaks” (Lenman
2010, 180).
The case for Humean constructivism rests on the inadequacy of competing views: “it
is what we are forced to by the untenability of realism plus the failure of Kantian
versions of metaethical constructivism” (Street 2010). In contrast to realism, Humean
constructivism builds upon the Kantian insight that normative truths are not simply
“out there,” as realists suppose, but instead follow from the so-called practical
standpoint, which is the standpoint of anyone who values anything at all. The
standards of correctness in normative judgment are generated by the attitude of
valuing just as such (Street 2010, 369). Humean constructivism thus relinquishes the
realist claim that normative truths are independent of the deliverances of practical
reasoning. But it also abandons the Kantian claim that the demands of morality are
requirements of practical reason. Some argue that the constitutive norms of practical
reason may favor morality, but do not require it (Velleman 2009, 150-154; Lenman
2010, 192). Humeans maintain, contrary to Kantians, that an internally coherent
Caligula who values torturing people for fun is conceivable. Such a person would
have reasons for torturing people, which is just to say that the value of humanity is not
a constitutive norm of reasoning (Street 2010, 371). Humean constructivism thus
rejects the Kantian claim that there are universal moral norms that bind all rational
agents. Street argues that “the substantive content of a given agent’s reasons is a
function of his or her particular, contingently given, evaluative starting points” (Street
2010). She does not exclude the possibility that there are some universal (normative
and moral) truths, but if there are, they have to be produced from the potentially
different practical standpoints of the agents whose reasons are in question. The
possible agreement among various practical standpoints is not guaranteed by facts
about the nature of reason or the principles of reason that are authoritative for all
rational agents. Humeans hold that there is nothing alarming about the sort of
relativism that their position implies (Street 2008a, 245; Velleman 2011). They also
suggest that we can count on significant moral agreement based on contingent facts
and the existence of a shared human nature.
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5. Conventionalist constructivism
Perhaps the oldest form of constructivism is conventionalism, the view that moral
claims are based on social conventions, that is, they are constructed by the actual
agreement of some groups within specific traditions. Conventionalist constructivism
makes the truth of moral claims and the standards of correctness of what one ought to
do relative to specific groups or practices; it is thus a form of relativism (Westermark
1932; Harman 1984; Wong 2008). There are constraints on the way moral agents are
supposed to form their moral convictions; but such constraints are generated by
conventions rather than by universal features of practical reason. The main argument
for conventionalism is that it makes sense of persistent and widespread
disagreements, which shows that there are no shared principles of practical reason (cf.
Velleman 2011). While relativist, this variety of constructivism can explain and
justify large areas of moral accord within groups. For instance, it explains why sex
with minors is largely agreed to be morally objectionable within contemporary liberal
societies but morally permissible within some traditional societies.
6. Constructivist accounts of moral judgments
Some constructivist theories define their aim more narrowly: they seek to provide
objectivist accounts of the basic principles of morality, rather than of all normative
truths.
6.1. Contractualist constructivism of moral judgments
Most constructivists hold that moral reasons are the product of an agreement that is
best captured in terms of a hypothetical contract (Rawls 1980, Scanlon 1998, Hill
1989, Hill 2001). “Contractualism” is thus the normative theory that is typically
associated with constructivism, even though it is not accepted by all Kantians (cf.
O’Neill 1988, 10; O’Neill 1985, 2003a, 2003b). Hobbesians do not use the term
‘constructivism’, but they use a similar notion of hypothetical contract to explain the
nature of morality and of moral truths.
6.1.1. Kantian contractualism
Thomas Scanlon defends a restricted constructivist account of justification for a
specific class of moral judgments of right and wrong (Scanlon 1998, 11–12; Chapter
4, §7.2.). Scanlon rejects Kantian constructivism as a broad metaethical view on the
grounds that moral matters cannot be resolved by appealing to the bare structure of
rationality (the constitutive norm of practical reason) and instead need to be addressed
by engaging in substantive arguments (Scanlon 2003b, 14-15). His aim is to elucidate
the truth of claims concerning right and wrong in terms of their being entailed from
the point of view of a certain contractual situation.
Scanlon’s view rests on the contractualist formula according to which an act is wrong
if its performance under the circumstances would be prohibited by any set of
principles that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced,
general agreement. This test of rejectability specifies the content of moral principles
and tells us why it is rational for us to adopt them. The correctness of moral principles
is explained in terms of a hypothetical agreement among the relevant set of
individuals specified in terms of their motivation and the process of reasoning they
employ. The criterion of rejectability is not simply evidence for true or correct moral
principles; rather, the correctness of moral principles is constituted by the fact that
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they would be agreed upon in the specified circumstances. There are no correct moral
principles independently of the rational agreement that the criterion of rejectability
specifies. The property of rightness is constituted by what a group of reasonable
agents, under certain specified conditions, would find non-rejectable (Scanlon 1998,
380 n. 48).
The test of rejectability is compatible with several kinds of disagreement about right
and wrong, in particular, with disagreement about the standards for assessing conduct,
and about the reasons for supporting these standards. To acknowledge the latter sorts
of disagreement does not lead to relativism: it does not entail that there is no answer
to the question of which side is correct about the reasons people have or that all
answers are equally valid.
6.1.2. Hobbesian contractualism
Hobbesian contractualism is akin to Kantian constructivism in two respects. First, it
views morality as a rational constraint on our interests; and second, it holds that
morality is generated out of mere considerations of rational choice (K. Baier 1958,
1995; Gauthier 1974, 1986). The correct moral principles are those that would be
produced by rational agreement because they are mutually advantageous. As in the
case of Kantian constructivism, rational agreement does not simply show which moral
principles are correct; rather, the correctness of moral principles is constituted by the
fact that they would be agreed upon in the specified circumstances. In contrast to
Kantian constructivism, however, Hobbesian contractualism does not assume an
initial disposition to morality; rather, it starts from the assumption that there is a
natural presumption against morality, because we are all self-interested. Rational
agreement is a hypothetical agreement among real, self-interested individuals who are
cooperating to further their own interests. If rational agents act in pursuit of their
individual advantage, why do they come to recognize moral constraints on their
deliberation? They do so because they agree that the best way to pursue their interests
is by introducing impartial restrictions on what to do. While Kantian constructivists
build a moral dimension of impartiality into their understanding of reason, Hobbesian
contractualists hold a non-moralized conception of rationality understood as the
capacity effectively to satisfy one’s interests. Cooperation depends neither on
common objectives nor on moralized features of rationality, but on common
principles of action, determined by agreement. On this view, then, morality and selfinterest are ultimately not in conflict.
6.2. Utilitarian Constructivism
While constructivism does not mandate any specific normative ethics and is often
found combined with contractualism, as on the Scanlonian and Hobbesian models,
some have suggested that Utilitarianism is a natural candidate for being paired with
constructivism (Cf. Rawls 1971, 251 fn. 29; O’Neill 2009, §2; Timmons 2003, §1).
R.M. Hare is probably the Utilitarian philosopher whose view most deserves the label
“Utilitarian Constructivism” (Richards 1988). Hare recognizes that his theory about
the constructive justification of moral judgments is structurally similar to Rawls’,
though it arrives at utilitarian results. He objects that Rawls' approach escapes
utilitarianism by “a very liberal use of intuitions” and that the appeal to intuitions has
no credibility (Hare 1989, 214; Hare 1983, 147-148). To objectively ground moral
obligations, one must deploy a deliberative procedure free from intuitions. Hare’s
ambition is to ground Kant’s insight about universalization on the logical grammar of
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moral language (Hare 1952, 1963, 1981, 1997). The Kantian requirement of
impartiality, according to Hare, can be justified by considerations about the meaning
of the concepts, rather than a moral assumption. Moral constraints about deliberation
are constructed out of a formal procedure, more precisely, what Hare describes as a
form of moral reasoning, that combines the semantic feature of universality with
another semantic feature, which Hare calls “prescriptivity,” that is, the tendency of
moral judgments to prescribe or express a preference for a certain course of action.
While this procedure of construction is morally neutral, it is nonetheless of practical
importance in that it generates utilitarianism. On the basis of semantic considerations,
plus criteria for selecting morally relevant features of the situation, the moral agent is
led to considerations about how all sentient beings are affected by his action. In his
early work, Hare held that utilitarian arguments can solve conflicts between
preferences, which concern people’s interests, but have no power to decide conflicts
between ideals, which concern human excellences rather than human interests; thus,
they have no power to convince the "fanatic," the person who clings to an ideal
regardless of its effects on people’s interests, anymore than they can convince the
immoralist (Hare 1963, 157-185). To this extent, Hare agrees with Humean
constructivists that fictional Caligula cannot be forced to enter morality on pain of
inconsistency. In his later works, however, Hare defends a more ambitious view,
which purports to solve all moral conflicts, including conflicts between ideals, by
treating conflicts of ideals as simply another kind of conflict among preferences,
which moral reasoning can resolve (Hare 1981).
6.3. Society-based constructivism
Society-based constructivism – elaborated by David Copp – holds that there are true
moral standards, which are the output of a decision procedure that takes into account
the needs and values of the society and facts about the society’s circumstances (Copp
1995, 2007). Accordingly, the theory holds that moral truth depends on what would
be rational for societies to choose. Copp’s view shares some important features with
Kantian constructivism. First, society-based constructivism holds that societies need
their members to endorse some suitable moral code in order to facilitate cooperation.
It thus takes morality to be a cooperative enterprise, and implies that the need for
objective moral standards is practical (Rawls 1980, §1). Second, this view explains
the nature of moral truth in procedural terms, and thus it implies that there are no
moral facts independently of the procedure (Rawls 1980: 307). Third, it also shares
the Kantian view that to be adequate, any metaethics should make sense of the
normativity of moral claims and their practical relevance (Copp 2007, 4-7). This is
not taken to imply that we are bound by moral obligations insofar as we are motivated
by them. On the contrary, society-based constructivism holds that we are bound by
moral obligations independently of our actual motivational states. Finally, societybased constructivism also claims that any plausible metaethics should be at least
compatible with naturalism.
However, society-based constructivism differs from Kantian constructivism because
of its different account of the decision procedure from which moral standards are said
to result, and because it offers a different explanation of normativity. While the
procedure specifies a function of practical rationality, it does not commit to any
specific view about autonomy. This difference has important consequences.
Unlike Kantian constructivism, society-based constructivism does not hold that only
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autonomist doctrines make sense of normativity (cf. §2). It also does not hold that
constructivism is the only kind of theory that explains normativity. Copp claims that
there is a subtler and more interesting difference between constructivist and realist
views that make sense of normativity, and views that cannot make sense of
normativity. In contrast to the (Kantian and Humean) antirealist varieties of
constructivism, Copp defends society-based constructivism as both a decisively realist
and naturalistic theory. It is realist insofar as it claims that moral propositions are
truth-evaluable, and that some moral properties are instantiated; and it is naturalistic
because it claims that such moral properties are natural (Copp 1995). However, Copp
agrees with Kantian and Humean constructivism on a more modest claim, which is
that normativity eludes mind-independent realism.
7. The metaethical status of constructivism and its import
While constructivism is recognized as a prominent and distinctive position in political
philosophy, scholars are divided about its metaethical status and relevance. The
appeal of constructivism is often thought to consist in its promise to offer a minimalist
account of moral objectivity, which retains the benefits of non-naturalist realism
while avoiding its epistemological and ontological costs (Darwall 1992; ShaferLandau 2001; Timmons 2003; Hussain & Shah 2006; Enoch 2009). But this is hardly
distinctive of constructivism as such. Naturalist realism, an alternative to
constructivism, also promises objectivity without the epistemological and ontological
costs of non-naturalist realism. And defending the correctness of moral judgments on
non-ontological grounds has been a constant preoccupation of antirealism (Hare 1952,
1963, 1981; Wright 1992, 6 ff.). Of course, in contrast to antirealists, Kantian
constructivists do not see their conception of objectivity as weak or minimalist,
because it appeals to the underivative authority of reason (O’Neill 1989). But some
critics doubt that the constructivist conception of objectivity answers any interesting
metaethical questions and argue that it pertains instead to normative ethics. In
assessing the metaethical relevance of constructivism, critics tend to focus on three
issues: the question whether constructivism offers a distinctive semantics (§7.1);
whether it succeeds at steering a middle way between realism and antirealism (§7.2.),
and whether its appeal to constitutive norms in practical reasoning and in the theory
of rational agency is tenable (§7.3).
7.1. A constructivist semantics?
Constructivists have not offered a distinctive account of the meaning and logical
behavior of moral and normative terms and concepts. Absent a distinctively
constructivist semantics, some think that constructivism is best understood as “a
family of substantive moral theories” (Darwall et al. 1992, 140; Hussain & Shah
2006; Enoch 2009). On this view, constructivism does not compete with antirealism
or with realism, and its metaethical relevance is rather doubtful.
For some constructivists, lack of interest in semantics is motivated by the conviction
that the semantic task with which metaethics is mostly preoccupied is positively
misguided (Korsgaard 1996a, Korsgaard 2003; Street 2007, 239). The philosophical
issue worth worrying about is normativity, and this is not something that we can
explain solely on the basis of semantics. Rather, explaining normativity requires
philosophers to engage in other sorts of philosophical investigation, for instance
investigation into the idea of autonomy and rationality (Korsgaard 1996a).
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While preoccupied with explaining normativity, other sorts of constructivists also
recognize that the semantic task is worthwhile. In fact, they take themselves to
discharge the semantic task with their account of what is constitutive of the attitude of
valuing (Bagnoli 2002, Street 2010). By identifying the constitutive norms that one
must be following in order to count as a valuer at all, constructivists have sketched a
so-called “inferentialist semantics” for normative terms: the meaning of normative
terms is explained by identifying the kinds of inferences (for example, about means
and ends) one must be making in order to count as employing normative concepts at
all” (Street 2010, 239-242).
This reply commits the constructivist to showing that her constitutivist proposal has
some advantages over its competitors. Here we shall consider only the alleged
advantages of constructivism over expressivist strategies for explaining the meaning
of the normative terms. Bagnoli argues that these advantages concern moral
phenomenology; that is, constructivism best captures the experience of moral agency
and the categorical authority of moral norms (Bagnoli 2002, Bagnoli 2011a). Street
holds that the expressivist strategy fails because the state of mind expressed by
normative terms cannot adequately be located without implicitly trivially relying on
the very normative concepts the expressivist tries to explain (Street 2010, 239-242).
More specific objections are made against Blackburn’s quasi-realism, the view that
moral discourse behaves as the ordinary moral realist says, but without the ontological
commitments of moral realism (Blackburn 1984). Some constructivists have entered
the ongoing dispute about the capacity of quasi-realism “to earn its right to truth”
(Wright 1985, Skorupski 1999). Bagnoli notes that quasi-realism is beside the point if
moral judgments are truth-evaluable, but they do not represent facts of the world
(Bagnoli 2002, 130-132). Street argues that quasi-realism ultimately leads to the
incoherent view that value is mind-independent while projected by valuing creatures
(Street forthcoming).
A more specific question is whether constructivism is committed to any theory of
truth. According to some constructivists, moral norms develop over time, as result of
ongoing rational deliberation and revision. For Kantians, the possibility of revision is
connected to the claim that reason is subject to self-scrutiny (O’Neill 1992). Some
constructivists are considering whether this claim can be reconciled with the idea that
there are moral truths and the idea that moral judgments are truth-apt (Richardson
forthcoming). While there is not yet a full-fledged constructivist semantics, there are
some attempts to deal with these issues (Richardson forthcoming; Misak 2000).
7.2. Constructivism in the realism-antirealism debate
Even if constructivists could offer a semantics for normative terms and reconcile their
view that moral norms are constructed with the truth-aptness of moral statements,
some critics would argue that constructivism nevertheless fails to offer a genuine
alternative to realism and antirealism. A reply to this objection, then, would require
situating constructivism on the current metaethical map, bearing in mind that the
constructivist project, which starts as an account of the scope of practical reason and
the nature of practical reasons, is broader than a purely semantic investigation. Efforts
to place constructivism in relation to realism and antirealism are complicated by the
fact that there are different definitions of 'realism' (Dancy 1986; Sayre-McCord 2009;
Miller 2010, Royce 2009). Realists agree that (a) moral discourse shares the same
semantics as non-moral discourse, (b) there are moral properties, such as rightness, (c)
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moral properties are sometimes instantiated, and (d) moral predicates express
properties. But there is a disagreement whether in order to be a form of realism, a
theory must hold a stronger claim that (e) moral properties and moral relations are
“mind-independent” (Dancy 1986).
A further division, internal to realism, concerns the commitment to naturalism, which
includes the claims that (f) moral properties are like any ordinary property and have
the same metaphysical status as non-moral properties, whatever that is, and that (g)
moral assertions express ordinary beliefs regarding the instantiation of these
properties.
Constructivists take different stands in the realism debate. Current Humean
constructivists decisively side with antirealism (Street 2008; Lenman 2010, 181;
Velleman 2009). Nevertheless, they take their view to differ from other forms of
antirealism.
Aristotelian and Hobbesian constructivists share naturalistic claims (f) and (g).
However, in contrast to realism as some characterize it, these constructivists reject (e),
holding that the instantiation of moral properties depends on subjective features of our
sensibility or rational agency, rather than being mind-independent (Lebar 2008; Copp
1995, 2005, 271).
The position of Kantian constructivism with regard to the realism-antirealism debate
is more complex. Some Kantian constructivists bracket the ontological question of the
nature of normative truths and disengage from metaethics (Rawls 1980; Hill 1989,
2001, 2008). Others side with realism about reasons, even though they defend a
restricted constructivism about moral judgments (Scanlon 1998; Scanlon 2003b, 18).
The most ambitious versions of Kantian constructivism, however, attempt to carve out
a position between realism and antirealism (O’Neill 1988; Korsgaard 1996a, 36;
O’Neill 1989, 206).
One attempt to distinguish constructivism from both realism and anti-realism appeals
to the function of concepts (Korsgaard 2003). Korsgaard points to an assumption she
believes that realists and antirealists share and that constructivists reject, namely, that
the primary function of concepts deployed in judgments that can be true or false is to
represent things as they are, so if normative judgments are true, they must represent
something real out there in the world. By contrast, constructivists think that normative
concepts, which are deployed in judgments that can be true or false, have a practical
function: they name solutions to practical problems, rather than represent features of
reality (Korsgaard 2008, 302 ff.). For instance, the concept of equity does not stand
for a property; instead, it proposes a response to the practical problem of how to
distribute goods. Korsgaard draws the contrast between constructivism and other
metaethical theories as follows. Unlike substantive realism, which holds that moral
judgments are true insofar as they represent a mind-independent normative reality,
and antirealism, which denies that there are normative truths because it denies that
there are normative properties, constructivists hold that practical judgments can be
true or false without representing mind-independent normative facts about the world
(Korsgaard 2003, 325 n. 49).
This way of characterizing constructivism, however, fails to neatly mark the contrast
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between constructivism and several other sorts of metaethics. First, Korsgaard’s
characterization takes realism to be committed to the claim (e) about mindindependence. But not all define realism in this restrictive way (Sayre-McCord 1988).
When realism is defined more capaciously, it includes views according to which
moral judgments are made true by properties that depend on some mental states.
Second, Korsgaard’s way of drawing the contrast seems to overlook the fact that
some contemporary versions of antirealism do not deny that moral judgments are
truth evaluable. Instead, they adopt a deflationary conception of truth as a semantic
notion (Wright 1985; Wright 1992).
Constructivism agrees with forms of realism that hold that moral truths are not
independent of the evaluative standpoint (McDowell 1985; see also Wiggins
1976a,b). Constructivism also appears to agree with a form of antirealism called
“expressivism,” which holds that normative terms function to guide action rather than
represent matters of fact and are used to express states of mind that differ from belief
(Blackburn 1988, 169; Gibbard 1990, 107-108; Gibbard 1998, 183-184; Korsgaard
2003; Street 2009; Korsgaard 2009, 309). At most, then, constructivism stakes out a
middle ground between forms of realism that are committed to mind-independent
normative truths and forms of antirealism that deny there are any normative truths.
Korsgaard’s general point is that by focusing on questions of meaning, the
expressivist fails to make adequate sense of normative discourse, which requires a
different sort of philosophical investigation about the sources of normativity
(Korsgaard 1996a). According to constructivists, normativity is related to our capacity
for self-reflection and autonomous agency. It is in virtue of this capacity that we
reason and act for reasons. This constructivist view is also proposed in contrast to the
realist claim that there are reasons independently of these capacities. For some
realists, normativity should be taken for granted and needs no philosophical
explanations (Scanlon 2008; Shafer-Landau 2003). Constructivists share the
antirealist claim that normativity is not a feature that things possess or that can be
identified independently of the practical standpoint that we occupy as evaluators.
However, the interesting disagreement between constructivism and competing views
concerns what counts as the adequate philosophical explanation of normativity
(Enoch 2011a; Copp 2010).
7.3. Constructivism and constitutivism
Constructivists tend to agree that the importance of constructivism does not depend
on its specific contribution to the realism-antirealism debate. It resides in the insight
that the nature of practical truths should be explained in terms of the constitutive
features of practical reasoning. But critics argue that the constructivist conception of
practical reasoning is either circular or parasitic on independent moral values. The
objection often takes the form of a metaethical dilemma analogous to the dilemma
discussed by Plato in the Euthyphro (10a). Either the practical standpoint is subject to
moral constraints or it is not. If it is not, then, “there is no reason to expect that the
principles that emerge … will capture our deepest convictions, or respect various
platitudes that fix our understanding of ethical concepts” (Shafer-Landau 2003, 42). If
it is, then the constraints are not themselves constructed and acceptance of them
commits one to realism (Shafer-Landau 2003, 42). Constructivism thus either grounds
moral truths on arbitrary standards or collapses into realism.
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There are two canonical constructivist strategies for replying to the Euthyphroanalogous objection. These strategies respond to different construals of the objection.
First, the objection can be construed as motivated in part by the fact that some
constructivists rely on moral intuitions in justifying their views. Their reliance on
intuitions can appear to involve reliance on an “unconstructed” set of normative
constraints on theorizing. Constructivists reply, however, that the objection calls into
question the role of intuitions more generally and thus raises methodological issues.
Constructivists and some of their critics disagree about the role to accord to intuitions
in the practice of rational justification. According to Scanlon, a valid method of
justification in ethics consists in testing the congruence between theoretical
assumptions and intuitive moral judgments, that is, judgments to which we normally
accord initial credence. Such intuitive moral judgments play a role in constructivist
justification, even though they do not serve as an external foundation for morality.
The disagreement between constructivists and their critics partly concerns whether to
avoid appealing to intuitive judgments. For Scanlon, however, this is not a goal we
should pursue, as it is both doubtful that we could avoid all appeal to intuitions and
unpromising (Scanlon 1998, 241–247; 2003a). This is because, Scanlon holds, the
purpose of theorizing in ethics is partly interpretative and partly normative. The
constructivist project is to advance our understanding of moral principles and their
limits by “clarifying our understanding of the reasons that make familiar moral
principles ones that no one could reasonably reject” (Scanlon 1998, 246-247; 2003a,
429-435).
Not all constructivists view intuitions as playing a role in rational justification (Hare
1983; O’Neill 1989). But all agree that an adequate metaethics should not be totally
reformist; it should be congruent with common understandings of morality.
Second, the objection can be construed as motivated by the fact that some
constructivists appeal, in developing their views, to the idea that the norms of rational
choice have a constitutive status. This is the route taken by all theories that base the
standards of morality on the structural features of practical reason (§3, §5, §6.1, §6.3).
It can again seem to involve appeal to an “unconstructed” set of normative
constraints. Constructivists reply to the Euthyphro’s objection that the appeal to such
constraints is neither arbitrary nor does it commit constructivism to moral realism. It
is, rather, an appeal to shared features of practical rationality.
Critics object that the appeal to constitutive norms of rationality merely shifts the
problem to the level of practical reason. How does constructivism justify the norms it
claims to be constitutive of practical reason? Again, either they are arbitrary or they
are realist and depend on some normative features of reality. The underlying
suggestion is that when Kantian constructivism appeals to constitutive standards, to
do so is only to leap into realism about rational agency, since such standards invoke
values that are not themselves constructed.
Korsgaard’s argument for the value of humanity is the target of more specific
criticisms. Critics argue that the Kantian appeal to transcendental arguments is a
decisive step toward realism (Crisp 2006, 52-55; Larmore 2008, 121; Galvin 2010).
Korsgaard holds that in order to value ourselves we need to value humanity. But it is
not logically necessary that the condition of a thing’s value be valuable itself
(Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000; Kerstein 2001; Ridge 2005; Coleman
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2009). Humanity may lack value even though it is the condition of possibility for the
value of ourselves or our practical identities. The Kantian constructivist defense of the
objectivity of moral obligations appears to be based on a realist premise, that is, the
absolute value of humanity. If so, then constructivism does not offer a distinctive and
novel reply to skeptical challenges.
While this criticism is addressed especially to Kantian constructivism, it threatens
other sorts of constructivist views that appeal to constitutive norms of reasoning
(Ripstein 1983; Enoch 2006; Enoch 2011b). These are norms that not only regulate
but that also constitute the activity of reasoning. The constitutivist claim is partly
normative and partly descriptive: it says both that there are norms that account for
what it is to reason correctly about practical matters, and also that that these norms
distinguish practical reasoning from other kinds of mental processes and activities.
This way of understanding the constitutive norms raises a further objection: if they are
partly descriptive, in what sense are they not part of the world? The issue is whether
constructivism differs from realism about constitutive norms.
Is there anything ultimately at stake in calling the appeal to constitutive norms realist,
rather than constructivist? Arguably, what is at stake is whether or not we fail to
recognize a distinctive way of completing our quest for objective reasons. Kantians
claim that we should distinguish between two distinct ways of answering our quest for
objective reasons. In addressing the question “Why does x count as a reason for doing
y?” both realists and constructivists deploy unconstructed or underived elements.
Non-naturalist realists say: “It just does,” it is “simply true” that facts such as x count
as a reason for doing y, and “there won’t be any illuminating explanation of what
makes them true” (Shafer-Landau 2003, 47, 48). With this answer the non-naturalist
realist grounds the authority of moral judgments on the authority of other more basic
judgments, which cannot be further justified.
Naturalist realists ground the authority of moral judgments in a different way. They
hold that normative facts are just natural facts that can be investigated by ordinary
empirical methods, for example, facts about the responses of agents under idealized
(naturalistically described) circumstances (Firth 1952; Railton 1985). Constructivists
would not endorse this variety of naturalism. Constructivism of the kind that appeals
to norms that are constitutive of the activity of practical reason is non-reductive. The
key to this kind of constructivist proposal is not the reduction of moral properties to
natural properties; rather, the key is a self-authenticating account of the standards of
practical reason. For constructivism there are constraints on the kinds of acts that a
rational agent would perform, but such constraints are selected on normative grounds,
as a result of practical reasoning. To justify moral obligations as requirements of
practical reason is a thoroughly normative enterprise. Whereas non-naturalist realists
insist on the self-evidence of certain normative truths and naturalist realists emphasize
the causal processes that lead us to value something, constructivism focuses on what
is entailed from the standpoint of evaluators like us (O’Neill 1989; Korsgaard 2003,
2009; Street 2010; Velleman 2009). For the Kantian constructivist in particular, the
only legitimate source of authority is the scrutiny of reason. Moreover, while
reductionism of the kind sketched above focuses on the causal processes that lead us
to value something the way we do, constructivism of the kind at issue here focuses on
what is entailed from within the standpoint of evaluators like us (O’Neill 1989;
Korsgaard 2003, 2009; Street 2010; Velleman 2009).
19
Carla Bagnoli, “Constructivism in metaethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
(accepted August 2011, forthcoming)
Some sorts of constructivism, such as society based constructivism, are openly
defended as realist and naturalist (Copp 1995, Copp 2007). And all constructivists
endorse a broad commitment to naturalism, understood as the claim that a plausible
account of moral discourse should be compatible with the scientific conception of the
world (Korsgaard 1996a, 5; Street 2010; cf. Copp 2007, 278-9). In fact, some Kantian
constructivists claim that their ethics of autonomy is the only one fit for naturalism
(Korsgaard 1996a, 5).
Nevertheless, constructivism claims to offer a distinctive way of accounting for
objective reasons. Constructivism relies on a self-authenticating account of the
standards of practical reason. In contrast to some kinds of realism, constructivism
does not seek axioms or first principles or objective values on which to ground moral
truths. Rather than providing an external foundation for morality, it holds that in
forming our intentions and beliefs, we are answerable to criteria of correctness that
are internal to and constitutive of the very exercise of rationality (Korsgaard 2008, 1315, 110-126, 207-229). In the Kantian case, for instance, the categorical imperative
makes explicit the ideal of moral and rational agency by specifying the requirements
of practical reason. Such requirements are not premises in practical reasoning but its
norms.
Whether successful or not, the appeal to self-authenticating reason is supposed to
provide an alternative to either realism about objective justification or the skeptical
denial of it. Constructivist justification is objective but internal to the practice of
valuing.
The question is how exactly the constructivist idea of the underived authority of
reason escapes the original problem of circularity. Ultimately, the worry is that
constructivism builds upon moral assumptions it never justifies. For instance, Kantian
constructivism appears to be grounded on the value of moral impartiality, that is, the
demand of equal respect for persons (Scanlon 1998, 22-33; cf. 287-290; Rawls 1993,
38-54). The worry is that, in the final analysis, constructivism is vacuous because “its
test yields results only by presupposing moral views which can only be established
independently of it” (Raz 2003, 358; Timmons 2003). Furthermore, there is “no nonquestion-begging feature to which the constructivist can help herself in breaking
symmetry among the various competing sets of constructed principles” (Timmons
2003, §3).
Kant and Kantian constructivists are keenly aware of the air of paradox surrounding
the claim that the moral concepts, such as good and evil, are not determined prior to
engaging in practical reasoning, but only as a result of engaging in practical reasoning
(Kant C2, 5: 62 ff.). Practical reasoning does not serve the purpose of discovering a
moral order of values. Nonetheless, for Kantian constructivists there is some sort of
moral knowledge (Rawls 2000, 148, see also 218). So the worry is that one seems to
know in advance what the constructivist doctrine must look like (Rawls 2000, 274).
This is unsurprising, however. According to constructivists, the vindication of reason
is “avowedly circular” (O’Neill 1989, 173; Rawls 1989, 517-528). As O’Neill
remarks: “If the standards of practical reasoning are fundamental to all human
reasoning, then any vindication of these standards is either circular (since it uses those
very standards) or a failure (since it is not a vindication in terms of the standards that
20
Carla Bagnoli, “Constructivism in metaethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
(accepted August 2011, forthcoming)
are said to be fundamental)” (O’Neill 1989, 29). This kind of reply is offered not only
by Kantians, but also by Humean constructivists (Velleman 2009, 138-141).
This brings us to a final set of related objections concerning the constitutivist strategy
that derives norms of morality from the basic features of rational agency. Critics raise
three objections. First, some critics contend that the Kantian model of rational agency
is not rich enough to drive particular agents toward morality (Cohen 1996; Bratman
1998; Gibbard 1999, 149, 152-153; Fitzpatrick 2005; Setiya 2003, 2007; Bagnoli
2009c). Humean constructivists (Street 2008; Velleman 2009, 2011) and some
contractualists (Scanlon 2008; Hill 2008) offer similar grounds for rejecting Kantian
constructivism about practical reasons. They both deny that moral obligations can be
derived from universal features of bare rationality and also deny that appeal to
constitutive norms of rationality is sufficient to solve moral disputes.
The differences among these views can be illustrated by comparing their respective
diagnoses of a fictional Caligula whose state of mind is completely coherent but who
values torturing people for fun (Street 2010, 371). For realists, he is in error about
some true moral value. There are some reasons—for example, the reason not to
torture others for fun—that we have quite independently of our evaluative attitudes
and practical reasoning. Kantians agree with realists that fictional Caligula has no
good reasons for torturing anyone, but differ in explaining why this is so. Some
Kantians think that fictional Caligula is incoherent, even though not obviously so. His
incoherence can be shown by spelling out the norms that are constitutive of valuing.
Such constitutive norms entail valuing humanity, and this shows that fictional
Caligula is making a mistake by his own lights, even though he may never realize this
due to poor reflection, ignorance of the non-normative facts or some other limitation
(Korsgaard 1996a, 121-123). A more modest Kantian argument establishes that an
internally coherent Caligula is conceivable, that is, he can be thought without
contradiction, but it is incompatible with the peculiar conditions of moral sensibility
(Engstrom 2009, 243, § III.7; Bagnoli 2009c; Engstrom 2011; Bagnoli 2011b). On
this view, there are no reasons to torture others. By contrast, Humean constructivists
hold that an internally coherent Caligula is possible and that such a person has reasons
for torturing others.
While Kantian constitutivism faces objections peculiar to it because of its appeal to
the value of humanity, other objections apply to all sorts of constitutivism. Critics
object that the very idea of constitutive standards is paradoxical. Constitutive
standards are supposed to be partly descriptive of the very activity that they have to
assess; it thus is unclear whether and how they can be violated (Cohen 1996, 177;
Lavin 2004; Kolodny 2005; FitzPatrick 2005). For an agent to be correctly said to
have norms, she must be able to break those norms. But if those norms are
constitutive of reasoning, it is unclear how one can break them by reasoning. If
constitutive norms cannot be violated, constitutivism implausibly implies that only
perfect agents can exist, and thus immoralism and irrationality are impossible. In her
most recent works, Korsgaard replies that to count as acting at all, we must at least be
trying to follow the principles of practical reason, but she allows that we may fail to
do so adequately or fully (Korsgaard 2009, 45-49; Korsgaard 2009, 159-176; cf.
Barandalla and Ridge 2010).
The constitutivist strategy partly depends on the claim that agency is inescapable,
21
Carla Bagnoli, “Constructivism in metaethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
(accepted August 2011, forthcoming)
since we cannot but act. Some critics object that agency (on the constitutivist
construal) is as optional as any other activity (Enoch 2006, Enoch 2011b). In reply to
this objection, constitutivists argue that agency is unlike any other activity. It is
possible to reflect on ordinary activities while disengaging from them. By contrast,
agency continues to operate even when the agent is considering whether she is
justified in engaging in activity (Velleman 2000: 30-31; 142; Velleman 2004: 290;
Ferrero 2008; Velleman 2009). In this sense, agency is not optional.
These debates show that constructivism faces serious challenges, but also that it has
been successful at least in making new places for reflection in metaethics.
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Other Internet Resources:
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29
Carla Bagnoli, “Constructivism in metaethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
(accepted August 2011, forthcoming)

of
O’Neill, O. 1998, “Constructivism in ethics,” Routledge Encyclopedia
Philosophy,
E.
Craig
(ed.),
London:
Routledge.
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L014

Author welcomes suggestions.
Related entries: Metaethics, Cognitivism, Realism, Anti-Realism, Practical
Reason, Normative ethics, Political Constructivism, John Rawls, Reflective
Equilibrium
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank Robert Audi, Annalisa Coliva,
Bradford Cokelet, Luca Ferrero, Richard Galvin, Christine M. Korsgaard, Mark
Lebar, Elijah Millgram, Andrews Reath, Henry Richardson, Michael Ridge, Robert
Stern, and especially David Copp and Connie Rosati for their invaluable comments on
several earlier drafts.
September 1st, 2011
Carla Bagnoli
30