Download Alternate methodologies for instructional media research

Alternate Methodologies for
Instructional Media Research
ANN DEVANEY BECKER
In his recent article, "A Behavioral Perspective on Media
Selection," George Gropper (1976) presents a behavioralresponse-oriented view of media selection that will be of assistance to media researchers and designers. Noting the often
interchangeable use in media research of the terms stimulus
materials and mode of presentation, he underscores the imprecision in media terminology. Such inexactness, he
suggests, reflects fuzzy thinking about basic media terms and
about the language of the S-R model that acts as a construct
for most media research designs. Gropper's criticism is well
founded when applied to this nascent field still striving to
identify critical variables and to define its terminology with
precision. His article helps clarify a distinction between message designers and "response-oriented" designers and alerts
us to the need for exact definitions.
Following a time-honored tradition of reliance on behaviorism in media research, Gropper grounds his responseoriented concern in a behavioral frame, an S-R model. "Students," he says, "may be said to have 'learned' when, presented with a criterion stimulus, they can respond appropri-
Ann DeVaney Becker is assistant professor of curriculum and instruction and coordinator of the graduate program in educational technology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, W153706.
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ately" (p. 164). A stimulus becomes a criterion stimulus, he
explains, only after students have had repeated trials of appropriate practice in its presence. The explanation of this was
given by contiguity theorists such as Thorndike and Guthrie,
who held that a response was learned after repeated trials in
the presence of a stimulus. Gropper states that both contiguity theorists and reinforcement theorists would agree
with his definition of learning. In a broad sense all behavioral
theories are based on association by contiguity, but contiguity
theorists give the stimulus the power of control whereas reinforcement theorists give the reward the control in their
model. It is a distinction that has implications for media designers, yet it is not underscored in Gropper's article.
PURPOSE It might be appropriate at this stage of development in instructional technology to take a second look at the model that
serves as a base for most of our research--the stimulusresponse model. In this paper I will attempt to describe variables overlooked by the S-R model, to offer alternate methods
that include these variables, and to explicate one alternate
method, describing its advantages, limitations, and application to the central issues of instructional technology. I do not
suggest new research models to replace the S-R model, but
offer an alternate construct to use when needed.
BACKGROUND Behaviorists, as we know, rely on an observable or measurable action as proof that learning has taken place. A student's
oral response, body movement, or written response are
thought by classical conditioning theorists to be the result of a
stimulus or by operant conditioning theorists to be the result
of a reinforcement. We all know, however, that when a
stimulus is applied and a human responds, that response is
only the overt sign of activity. What, we might ask, is this
human practicing inwardly in the presence of the stimulus?
Does the student respond out of fear or anxiety or boredom
because he or she wants the class to end? Or does he respond
because he wants to impress the teacher or his pee~s? Or
because, she likes the subject? As learning specialists, do we
care to identify the antecedents of his response? As learning
specialists do we care about the emotional behavior we reinforce?
Emotion is not the only antecedent of a response, however.
S-R theorists assume that a response is made because of a
stimulus or because of a reinforcement. But in a natural setting such as a classroom, there is no guarantee that the mate-
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rial we identify as a stimulus is responsible for eliciting a
given response. We might assume that the stimulus is the
lecture and attempt to control that variable by scripting the
lecture. However, the stimulus might be recall of old lectures,
questions from the floor, answers given, remarks passed in
the back of the room, or textual material read. In reality it is
probably all of these or a combination of these, When the
behaviorist attempts to isolate a variable and move from the
natural setting to the laboratory, h u m a n subjects go along.
Subjects, being human, bring with them a host of intervening
variables. The power, then, of the isolated stimuli, the independent variables, becomes specious. To assume that we can
isolate and control all predictive variables in a setting with
humans is presumptuous. At best we might say that our independent variables contributed to the outcome.
The field of instructional technology is indebted to Skinner.
Whatever rigor exists in our field has come from his attempts
to describe with exactitude the process of learning and the
technology of teaching. But Skinner and other behaviorists
have borrowed from science their models to describe h u m a n
learning. Such models, which require the control of all the
variables, may be too restrictive in an area of h u m a n activity.
Problems with the model are encountered daily in research,
and I have seen it often more honored in the breach than in
the practice. The requirements of randomization are often not
met, yet statistics requiring randomization are applied. True
e x p e r i m e n t a l d e s i g n s are e m p l o y e d w h e r e quasiexperimental designs are needed. If we continually break the
rules of the S-R model in human research, we might do well
to question the model itself and not the researchers.
I see a parallel in another restrictive model applied to humans. Barbara Tuchman (1975) points it out in "Hazards on
the Way to the Middle Ages." Chivalry and strict Christianity
were ideal models for medieval man. Yet,
Both these sets of ideas were taken for granted--though not without
dissent--and, at the same time, were normally and regularly violated every day by everyone to whom they applied. To do otherwise
was impossible because the Church set itself, at least in theory,
against the natural instincts of sensual man and economic man, and
chivalry was a glorious ideal that honored man's self image more
than it suited his daily habits. (pp. 73-74)
How the S-R model is like chivalry is not apparent. The
former is based on concrete data while the latter is based on
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abstractions such as honor and loyalty. But they do share this
characteristic: both are ideal instead of real when applied to
people. Identification of learning as only a response to a
stimulus ignores the "natural instincts of sensual man." The
S-R model is not, therefore, unlike the requirements of
chivalry in the Middle Ages. It honors a scientific ideal, but
does not suit daily classroom practice or habits.
NEGLECTED What aspects of our "natural instincts" and daily classroom
VARIABLES habits does the S-R model ignore? I would like to consider
intention, action, and situation as three variables inherent in
learning behavior but neglected by behaviorists.
INTENTION That an act is preceded by an intention, a purpose, a meaning
is neither an uncommon nor new notion. The 10th century
Arab philospher Avicenna (Pegis, 1948) devised an order of
intention that became the scholastic explanation in the Middle Ages for human perception. Intention implies an inner life,
and for centuries philosophers and, later, psychologists have
attended to that inner life. Brunswik (1952) mentions that
Brentano considered the psychological act of intentionality to
be the central focus of psychology. Likewise, William James
would not h a v e devised his "stream of thought" without
placing emphasis on intentionality. An entire genre of novels
attempts to illuminate the workings of the inner person and
considers the subject of human intention in a stream-ofconsciousness mode.
Earlier behaviorists were aware of the inner life of individuals, but were concerned with observable movements to
which they could ascribe precise physical terms. Intention
was a vague human function that was not admissable as an
object of scientific inquiry and was sometimes pushed to extremes. Brunswik points out that such early behaviorists as
Watson stated that consciousness does not exist. Watson attempted to explain thinking as "laryngeal habits" or implicit
verbalization. Later, Hull (Taylor, 1964) confronted the problem of the inner life by lumping terms such as desire, purpose, and meaning under the category of needs or drives. As
in earlier stages, he attempted to reduce human functions to
physical terms. It would be naive to say that behaviorists do
not recognize the existence of an inner life, but it is important
to note the point at which they start. The concepts of imprinting and shaping suggest an outward force working on an
empty circuit. It is a sophisticated rendering of the tabula rasa
concept and is overtly mechanistic.
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To offset Watson's broad use of license in explaining the
term "thinking," neobehaviorists have attended to some
functions of the inner life. Tolman's (1935) attention to purposive operation led to his suggestion of cognitive mapping.
Attempts to work with his intervening variables have to date,
however, been frustrating at best; current research in aptitude treatment interaction bears this out. The continued effort on the part of the behaviorists to explain the macro problem of learning in micro physical terms is a reduction of the
complex concept of behavior.
If we believe that the learner has an inner life, gives meaning to outward acts, and expresses purpose in movement, then
we will wish to include intention as a variable in future research designs. We will face the same problems of describing
and recording intention that the behaviorists did. There are
avenues open to us, however, and I will discuss some new
methodologies later.
We often overlook an approach to the recording of intent
that is obvious. Langer (1970), in noting the artificial behavior
brought about by placing a human in a laboratory setting,
states that by applying the S-R model we ignore that special
function that makes the human species so different from
other animal species--language.
For the revelation of subjectively felt activities through speech is not
a simple exhibit from which the observer infers the action of external
stimuli on the observed organism. (p. 37)
Language does allow the subject to join the observer in describing subjectively felt activities. But language comes complete with barriers, not the least of which is ambiguity. If
we consider that some psychologists, e.g., Karl Bfhler and
Kurt Koffka (Arnheim, 1969), have already used a verbal description of inner thought delivered by subjects t o posit their
theories, then we can see its feasibility.
If we can break from the mold of behavioral thought, we
might accept the premise that a person's inner or outer acts
may be described in nonquantifiable terms. Russell
(Brunswik, 1952) believes that the use of numbers to describe behavior is not necessary. Our language offers us sufficient descriptions, (such as "under," "above," "uncle,"
"aunt") for observation. Langer (1970) also comments on the
undue fetish with measurement.
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Mathematization of behavior is the work, or better the dream, of
non-mathematicians who borrow single expressions or propositions
from an alien field such as physics just because they look similar to
some conceptual constructs in their own field. (p. 41)
AC~ON
Language, I believe, may not only be an approach to "intention," but may also be all that is required of the researcher in
describing that intention.
Another neglected variable in the S-R model is that of action.
I define action as h u m a n movement that is preceded by intention, the origin of which is choice. In choosing to discuss
action as a variable, I wish only to raise an issue that is old in
the arena of learning t h e o r y - - t h e origin of action. I do not
wish to refute ultimately the behavioral view of movement, to
offer a treatise on free will, nor to discuss the degrees of freedom of choice open to us as humans, but simply to offer
another way of thinking about "action" as a variable to employ in future media research design.
There is an old line of thought in philosophy that considers
action to be voluntary. Many philosophers, from Aquinas to
Fichte and Alexander (Pegis, 1948; Wright, 1941), have presented varying views on the meaning of voluntary. It appears, however, that they agree on one aspect of the concept
of action--the identification of the end of an act. Noting that
people can recognize and move toward an end, they speculate that the origin of this movement is within individuals
themselves. Even when the ends are few and undesirable,
one can choose not to act.
When considering the action of a subject, behaviorists
focus on the motor behavior or body movement since these
things can be described in physical terms. Their notion is
more one of reaction to a stimulus rather than action and
stems from a belief in outer control rather than inner control
of movement. Imprinting is basic to the S-R model. Yet their
concept of action is not simplistic. Hull writes in Principles of
Behavior:
The present approach does not deny the molar reality of purposive acts (as opposed to movements) of intelligence insight, of goals,
of intents of strivings, or of value; on the contrary, we insist upon
the genuineness of these forms of behaviour. We hope ultimately to
show the logical right to the use of such concepts by deducing them
as secondary principles from more elementary objective primary
principles. (Taylor, 1964, p. 114)
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Hull gives "purposive acts" a dutiful nod by pointing out
that they exist. He hopes to include them at some future date
in the S-R model. And then, he hopes to include them as
secondary principles since they lack objectivity. It appears
that the principle guiding his thinking was objectivity. Acts
that could be recorded objectively must be of higher importance in human learning. In many cases it could be that the
quantifiable part of an act, the overt movement, is the least
important aspect of the action. What we as teachers or learning theorists often want to know is what was the meaning,
the purpose, of an act. H o w was this act devised?
Taylor also comments on the behaviorist view of action:
They [the behaviorists] do not want to deny that our ordinary
action concepts have a utility in ordinary language. But they will not
accept what is implicit in our ordinary notion of action, that it must
be explained in terms of purpose and cannot be explained by connections between 'receptor impulses' and 'movements.' (p. 114)
Alternate views of the concept of action are available to us,
not only from philosophers but from modern learning
theorists as well. Wertheimer and Kohler (Wilson, Robeck, &
Michael, 1969) and other gestalt psychologists name insight
and intuition as antecedents to action. Wilson et al. cite a
famous study reported in The Mind of a Gorilla in which
Yerkes writes that a gorilla solved the problem of reaching a
banana placed in a pipe by insight: he pushed it out with a
common garden hoe; he had received no stimulus from the
outside. This finding is interesting; it and those of other
studies probably indicate the existence of insight in lower
primates. However, generalizing across species does not appear to be valid, and I can't believe that we will find our
answers to questions about learning by studying subhumans.
If we choose to regard action as movement that is inner
directed and not as reaction, how can we employ it as a variable in future research designs? We could observe and record
human actions that occur during a learning event just as researchers in other disciplines dealing with humans (sociology
and anthropology) observe and record the action of humans.
There may be no need to quantify the actions of humans. And
if we agree with Russell, we will find our own language precise enough for recording action during a learning event.
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SITUATION The third important variable excluded in the S-R model is
situation. 1 Dewey (Ratner, 1939) explains:
Situation is not a single object or event or set of objects and events.
For we never experience, nor form judgments about objects and
events in isolation, but only in connection with a contextual whole.
This latter is what is called a situation (p. 891).
Under the S-R model, data are gathered in laboratory settings
in which variables are isolated and controlled. Isolation and
control are deliberately employed to allow only one relationship to be investigated, that of the independent to the dependent variables. The fact that these variables may be situated in
a field and exist only because of that field is ignored.
In his definition Dewey placed emphasis on the relativity of
objects, actions, and events. If we are to record an action
during a learning event, that action must be described in
relation to the field in which it exists. An action must be
described in relation to the meaning given it by the actor, in
relation to the learning event, and, indeed, in relation to the
goals of the institution in which it takes place. Gestaltists
have always perceived events or figures only as a part of a
whole field or ground (Wilson et al., 1969).
Even though S-R theory is a theory of "connectors" and
"receptors," it investigates isolated relationships. Taylor
(1964) indicates that behaviorists attempted to avoid describing things in an "intentional environment" because the
meaning of that environment could not be described in the
language of physical science.
If we attend to situation, there is a possibility of accruing
situated knowledge rather than isolated facts.
ALTERNATE Instructional media hypotheses tested within the S-R model
METHODS presuppose a theoretical construct. For the S-R model, that
construct is classical or operant conditioning. A theoretical
framework for instructional media has not emerged from experimental probes. That may not be surprising, however,
when we consider that serious instructional media research
began only during World War II. The field is young. Hempel
(1952), in discussing concept formation in science, points out
that the earlier stages of a field are characterized largely by
1Charles Taylor considers the variables of action and situation unacceptTaylor's categorization of these two variables,
able to Skinner. I have used
but not his definitions.
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observation and data that have a low level of generalization.
Instructional technology findings to date have little generalizability, but not because we have employed a model in
which the variables are difficult to replicate. It is because we
posit particular experimental hypotheses without a theoretical construct. Such constructs evolve slowly in a field and
come from observation of instructional events in which media
are employed. If media theory can be gleaned from natural
instructional settings, that theory may produce some variables that would be ready for testing in an experimental setting. Variables that need continued scrutiny in the natural
setting may also be identified. Perhaps we have put the cart
before the horse.
The problems encountered by media researchers employing true experimental designs were succinctly summarized in
Clark and Snow's (1975) article on this topic. They found
certain problems in the media studies they surveyed. Those
studies employing true experimental designs did not randomly select their sample, nor did they employ a control
group. Media studies continually sacrifice external validity for
internal validity. 2 Clark and Snow cite numerous educational
researchers (for instance, Cronbach, Campbell, and Bracht)
who have become disillusioned with the strictures of true
experimental designs. Suggestions for change range from use
of quasi-experimental designs to Clark and Snow's idea of
testing in natural settings. Helpful experimental designs in
which a priori stimulus variables (i.e., media factors) and
criterion variables (i.e., response to behavior) are detailed.
Discussion of behavior, however, still assumes an operant
conditioning construct. And the delineation of narrow a
priori categories, no matter h o w helpful to an observer, may
direct attention away from the meaningful aspects of behavior.
In 1973 Charles Hoban, addressing members of the Association for Educational Communications and Technology,
called for a moratorium on the types of experimental studies
conducted in the media field. He asked us to stop and look at
where we were. He asked Us to examine the effects of prolif-
2If the assumption of a given statistic, such as ANOVA, is randomization,
and there is neither random selection of sample nor assignment to treatment,
there is not, I would argue, internal validity. If that is true, many media
studies have neither internal nor external validity.
AV COMMUNICATIONREVIEWSUMMER1977 : 190
eration of hardware in the schools. He suggested that we use
in-depth case studies and longitudinal studies to do this.
We have at our fingertips the tools necessary to collect a
great deal of information--information about the effect of
hardware on the school culture, about the information explosion caused by the software, about the types of knowledge
transmitted through media, about h o w children interact with
media, about h o w children interact with teachers and peers in
a classroom that employs media. We also have the tools to
investigate the traditional question of h o w children learn
through media.
Much of this information is available to us through application of the techniques of field research. A case study could
use interviewing, in-depth interviewing, records or document surveys, direct observation, indirect observation, or
participant observation. Or it could use any combination of
these techniques.
OBSERVATION For decades anthropologists and sociologists have used observation as a valid technique for accruing knowledge about
humans. Some educational researchers, including Piaget,
have used it as the basic tool for assembling their theories on
learning. Not only is observation a logical tool in the social
sciences, but it is basic to our traditional view of science as
well. Jersild noted that "direct observation is the oldest and
remains the commonest instrument of scientific research"
(Herbert, 1970, p. 127).
What constitutes observing activity? Wittgenstein (1963)
gives a rough definition when he notes that a person is observing "when he puts himself in a favorable position to receive certain impressions in order to describe what they tell
him" (p. 187). An observer, surveying the complexity and
richness of a natural setting, is able to relate what story the
facts are about to tell, since facts in observation are not isolated. This technique provides greater opportunity for a
situated knowledge about a field, rather than a collection of
isolated facts, to develop.
If we consider action or purposive movement to be one of
the variables included under observation, we might say that
the action may be recorded by eye or camera or, to check
reliability, by both. Notes could be taken by hand and/or recorded on audiotape. To discover the intent of an action we
may, as Langer (1967) suggests, use language. We could
interview the children involved. Verbal interaction with other
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children or with the teacher may also give clues to intention.
The advantage of observation, however, is that action is
never recorded without the intention of the act being noted.
Problems With
Observation: Style
of Recording
If we wish to observe systematically the dimensions of behavior we have classified in a priori categories, we may devise
our own instrument or use instruments available to us, such
as Flanders or Bales Interaction Analysis categories. We run
the risk, however, of again picking up isolated, not situated,
knowledge and interposing numbers between us and the behavior to be recorded. We are, then, at one remove from the
setting.
Lytton (1971) cites a number of observational studies in
which a posteriori categories were devised for sorting and
classifying the behavior recorded. It seems a reasonable approach and may sometimes be necessary as long as numbers
do not obscure the intent of the behavior. We might say that
in this approach the observer allows the patterns of the
events to emerge. But even though the categories were determined later, the researcher or observer had a private "set"
for observing. The mind is not a tabula rasa. Each observer
has a personal construct from which to draw theories of learning, child development, and social interaction. And each observer starts with an objective or a question (e.g., "To what
do children attend while watching filmstrips?") The construct
has obviously supplied ideas about the actions that would
make up attentive behavior. Loose dimensions of behavior,
then, have been conceputalized a priori.
Categories may be too restrictive, however, for recording
some types of behavior, since details are lost in categories and
some information tends to become distorted. To ferret out the
intent of an act, an observer could record opposing actions.
The behavior of children "turned on," or made overly active,
by television could be described in comparison with the behavior of other children in the same setting who become passive while viewing TV. The pedagogical styles of those
teachers w h o never use media, as opposed to those who do,
could be described. This technique of recording opposing action was employed in an observational study of teaching and
learning in English primary schools (Berlak, Berlak,
Bagenstos, & Mikel, 1975). The authors recorded their observations within a framework of tensions or dilemmas
suggested by their objectives. Their tensions were: 1) teacher
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Bias
Reliability
making learning decisions for children versus children making learning decisions; 2) intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation; 3) teacher setting and maintaining standards for children's learning and development versus children setting their
own standards (p. 216).
Recording, however, need not be restricted to categories or
opposing motive forces. Historians, novelists, and journalists, among others, have been recording h u m a n behavior
for centuries. Narrative techniques probably give the fullest
picture of what has occurred during an event, but they are
seldom if ever used by educators. They might best be used
when molar variables are employed. The description could be
available later for interpretation. Narration lends itself as a
style for participant observers.
Recording style must suit the objectives of the study, but no
matter which style is selected there will always be recorder
bias. We will always see reality through someone else's eyes.
Not only will there be observer bias, but there may also be a
reciprocal effect between the observer and the observed.
Herbert (1970) comments on this effect, noting that the bias
may come from either party: the researcher may expect certain behavior of the children being observed and thus interpret their actions incorrectly; or the children may display a
different set of behaviors for the researcher than they would
for their teacher.
That bias exists in observational studies is obvious, but
instruments employed in S-R experimentation distort the
findings in a covert manner. Distortion in S-R experimentation is also a function of the model, which purports to control
the intervening variables in a human setting. Overt bias in an
observational study may be regarded as an advantage. Instead of being subject to the objective recording of facts, we
gain a description of the relative positions of intention, action, and situation.
Medley and Mitzel (1963) name three types of reliability to be
considered in an observational study: agreement between different observers at different times; agreement between different observers at the same time; and agreement between
the observations made by the same observer at different
times.
Precise and similar training for all field observers would not
guarantee interobserver agreement but would certainly enhance it. Caldwell and Hersher (Lytton, 1971) note that in-
ALTERNATEMETHODOLOGIESFOR INSTRUCTIONALRESEARCH : 193
terobserver agreement can be increased by discussion of the
language of the variables being employed. A practical method
of increasing not only interobserver reliability but all reliability might be to videotape 10 percent of the total observations
and submit the tapes to a "panel of experts."
Low reliability caused by instability in reports of behavior
sampled over time tends to be high. Lytton suggests that the
number of samples be increased to combat instability.
Goodenough, he notes, showed that "maximum stability is
achieved over time when observations are carried out on similar occasions at the same time of day" (p. 673). An important
reliability check that I believe cannot be overlooked is the
asking of the children or the actors for their interpretations of
the event.
We continually talk about the gaps that exist in the media
field between the researcher and the teacher, between the
researcher and the media designer, between the researcher
and the pupil. Perhaps the gap is inherent in our separate
functions. Perhaps it is not. Observation is not a panacea for
our problems, but it offers an opportunity to experience the
action of a natural setting. It takes us back to the classroom. It
is an alternative to, not a replacement of, the S-R model, and I
have attempted to present it as such.
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