Download Nuclear war does not cause extinction from climate

Warming Outweighs – 2NC
Global warming destroys the planet
Dr. Brandenberg, Physicist (Ph.D.) and Paxson a science writer ’99 – John and Monica, Dead Mars Dying
Earth p. 232-3
The ozone hole expands, driven by a monstrous synergy with global warming that puts more catalytic ice crystals into the
stratosphere, but this affects the far north and south and not the major nations’ heartlands. The seas rise, the tropics roast but the media
networks no longer cover it. The Amazon rainforest becomes the Amazon desert. Oxygen levels fall, but profits rise for those
who can provide it in bottles. An equatorial high pressure zone forms, forcing drought in central Africa and Brazil, the Nile dries up and the
monsoons fail. Then inevitably, at some unlucky point in time, a major unexpected event occurs—a major volcanic eruption, a sudden and dramatic
shift in ocean circulation or a large asteroid impact (those who think freakish accidents do not occur have paid little attention to life or Mars), or a
nuclear war that starts between Pakistan and India and escalates to involve China and Russia . . . Suddenly the gradual climb in global
temperatures goes on a mad excursion as the oceans warm and release large amounts of dissolved carbon dioxide from
their lower depths into the atmosphere. Oxygen levels go down precipitously as oxygen replaces lost oceanic carbon dioxide. Asthma cases
double and then double again. Now a third of the world fears breathing. As the oceans dump carbon dioxide, the greenhouse effect increases, which
further warms the oceans, causing them to dump even more carbon. Because of the heat, plants die and burn in enormous fires which
release more carbon dioxide, and the oceans evaporate, adding more water vapor to the greenhouse. Soon, we are in
what is termed a runaway greenhouse effect, as happened to Venus eons ago. The last two surviving scientists inevitably argue, one telling
the other, “See! I told you the missing sink was in the ocean !”Earth, as we know it, dies. After this Venusian excursion in temperatures, the
oxygen disappears into the soil, the oceans evaporate and are lost and the dead Earth loses its ozone layer completely. Earth is too far from the Sun
for it to be the second Venus for long. Its atmosphere is slowly lost—as is its water—because of ultraviolet bombardment breaking up all the
molecules apart from carbon dioxide. As the atmosphere becomes thin, the Earth becomes colder. For a short while temperatures are nearly normal,
but the ultraviolet sears any life that tries to make a comeback. The carbon dioxide thins out to form a thin veneer with a few
wispy clouds and dust devils. Earth becomes the second Mars—red, desolate, with perhaps a few hardy
microbes surviving.
It’s the highest probability impact
Hanson, Goddard institute for space studies, et al, 2007
(J. Hansen1,2, M. Sato2, R. Ruedy3, P. Kharecha2, A. Lacis1,4, R. Miller1,5, L. Nazarenko2, K. Lo3, G. A. Schmidt1,4, G. Russell1, I. Aleinov2, S. Bauer2, E.
Baum6, B. Cairns5, V. Canuto1, M. Chandler2, Y. Cheng3, A. Cohen6, A. Del Genio1,4, G. Faluvegi2, E. Fleming7, A. Friend8, T. Hall1,5, C. Jackman7, J. Jonas2,
M. Kelley8, N. Y. Kiang1, D. Koch2,9, G. Labow7, J. Lerner2, S. Menon10, T. Novakov10, V. Oinas3, Ja. Perlwitz5, Ju. Perlwitz2, D. Rind1,4, A. Romanou1,4, R.
Schmunk3, D. Shindell1,4, P. Stone11, S. Sun1,11, D. Streets12, N. Tausnev3, D. Thresher4, N. Unger2, M. Yao3, and S. Zhang2 1NASA Goddard Institute for Space
Studies, New York, NY, USA 2Columbia University Earth Institute, New York, NY, USA 3Sigma Space Partners LLC, New York, NY, USA 4Department of Earth
and Environmental Sciences, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA 5Department of Applied Physics and Applied Mathematics, Columbia University, New York,
NY, USA 6Clean Air Task Force, Boston, MA, USA 7NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, USA 8Laboratoire des Sciences du Climat et de
l’Environnement, Orme des Merisiers, Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex, France 9Department of Geology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA 10Lawrence Berkeley National
“Dangerous human-made interference with climate:
a GISS modelE study,” http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2287/2007/acp-7-2287-2007.html)
These stark conclusions about the threat posed by global climate change and implications for fossil fuel use are
not yet appreciated by essential governing bodies, as evidenced by ongoing plans to build coal-fired power
plants without CO2 capture and sequestration. In our view, there is an acute need for science to inform society
about the costs of failure to address global warming, because of a fundamental difference between the threat
posed by climate change and most prior global threats. In the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and
United States, a crisis could be precipitated only by action of one of the parties. In contrast, the present threat to
the planet and civilization, with the United States and China now the principal players (though, as Fig. 10
shows, Europe also has a large responsibility), requires only inaction in the face of clear scientific evidence of
the danger.
Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, USA 11Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Nuclear war does not cause extinction from climate change
Seitz, former Presidential science advisor and keynote speaker at international science conferences, December
20 2006
(Russell, holds multiple patents and degrees from Harvard and MIT, “The ‘Nuclear Winter’ Meltdown,”
http://adamant.typepad.com/seitz/2006/12/preherein_honor.html, accessed October 18, 2007)
"Apocalyptic predictions require, to be taken seriously,higher standards of evidence than do assertions on other
matters where the stakes are not as great." wrote Sagan in Foreign Affairs , Winter 1983 -84. But that
"evidence" was never forthcoming. 'Nuclear Winter' never existed outside of a computer except as airbrushed animation commissioned by the a PR firm - Porter Novelli Inc. Yet Sagan predicted "the extinction of
the human species " as temperatures plummeted 35 degrees C and the world froze in the aftermath of a nuclear
holocaust. Last year, Sagan's cohort tried to reanimate the ghost in a machine anti-nuclear activists invoked in
the depths of the Cold War, by re-running equally arbitrary scenarios on a modern interactive Global
Circulation Model. But the Cold War is history in more ways than one. It is a credit to post-modern computer
climate simulations that they do not reproduce the apocalyptic results of what Sagan oxymoronically termed
"a sophisticated one dimensional model." The subzero 'baseline case' has melted down into a tepid 1.3 degrees
of average cooling- grey skies do not a Ragnarok make. What remains is just not the stuff that End of the
World myths are made of.
Any risk of extinction outweighs everything ***
Bostrom, professor of philosophy at Oxford, July 2005
(Nick, Transcribed from by Packer, 4:38-6:12 of the talk at http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/view/id/44,
accessed 10/20/07)
Now if we think about what just reducing the probability of human extinction by just one percentage point. Not
very much. So that’s equivalent to 60 million lives saved, if we just count currently living people. The current
generation. One percent of six billion people is equivalent to 60 million. So that’s a large number. If we were
to take into account future generations that will never come into existence if we blow ourselves up then the
figure becomes astronomical. If we could you know eventually colonize a chunk of the universe the virgo
supercluster maybe it will take us a hundred million years to get there but if we go extinct we never will. Then
even a one percentage point reduction in the extinction risk could be equivalent to this astronomical number 10
to the power of 32 so if you take into account future generations as much as our own every other moral
imperative or philanthropic cause just becomes irrelevant. The only thing you should focus on would be to
reduce existential risk, because even the tiniest decrease in existential risk would just overwhelm any other
benefit you could hope to achieve. Even if you just look at the current people and ignore the potential that
would be lost if we went extinct it should still be a high priority.
Warming ADV 1AC
Causes ocean acidification, destroying ocean ecosystems
Nicholas Kristof, NYT, “Scandal below the surface,” 10/31/2006,
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/10/31/opinion/31kristof.html?_r=1
If you think of the earth’s surface as a great beaker, then it’s filled mostly with ocean water. It is slightly
alkaline, and that’s what creates a hospitable home for fish, coral reefs and plankton — and indirectly, higher up
the food chain, for us. But scientists have discovered that the carbon dioxide we’re spewing into the air doesn’t
just heat up the atmosphere and lead to rising seas. Much of that carbon is absorbed by the oceans, and there it
produces carbonic acid — the same stuff found in soda pop. That makes oceans a bit more acidic, impairing the
ability of certain shellfish to produce shells, which, like coral reefs, are made of calcium carbonate. A recent
article in Scientific American explained the indignity of being a dissolving mollusk in an acidic ocean: “Drop a
piece of chalk (calcium carbonate) into a glass of vinegar (a mild acid) if you need a demonstration of the
general worry: the chalk will begin dissolving immediately.” The more acidic waters may spell the end, at least
in higher latitudes, of some of the tiniest variations of shellfish — certain plankton and tiny snails called
pteropods. This would disrupt the food chain, possibly killing off many whales and fish, and rippling up all
the way to humans. We stand, so to speak, on the shoulders of plankton.
Extinction
Robin Kundis Craig, associate professor of law at Indiana University School of Law, Winter 2003,
McGeorge Law Review, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155, p. 265-266
Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example,
besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more
“ocean ecosystems
play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks
of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but
necessary elements.” In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems
impairs the planet’s ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions
of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem’s ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, “indicating that more
diverse ecosystems are more stable.” Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interact ions and degree of
than ten times the reefs’ value for food production. Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. More generally,
interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that
maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine
ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine
many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. Thus,
ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic
At the forefront of such
arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human
activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because
it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even
though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and
value equivalents, should not be “the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit.”
policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory
We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill
the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, its
once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, “starving
out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen’s nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs
of jelly.” More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique. The Black Sea is a microcosm of what is
happening to the ocean systems at large. The stresses piled up: overfishing, oil spills, industrial discharges, nutrient pollution, wetlands destruction, the introduction of an alien species.
relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world.
The sea weakened, slowly at first, then collapsed with shocking suddenness. The lessons of this tragedy should not be lost to the rest of us, because much of what happened here is being repeated all over the world. The
ecological stresses imposed on the Black Sea were not unique to communism. Nor, sadly, was the failure of governments to respond to the emerging crisis. Oxygen-starved “dead zones” appear with increasing frequency off
the coasts of major cities and major rivers, forcing marine animals to flee and killing all that cannot. Ethics as well as enlightened self-interest thus suggest that the United States should protect fully-functioning marine
ecosystems wherever possible - even if a few fishers go out of business as a result.
Warming ADV 1AC
Emissions collapse oxygen levels killing everyone.
Peter Tatchell, The Guardian, “The oxygen crisis,” 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/13/carbonemissions.climatechange
The rise in carbon dioxide emissions is big news. It is prompting action to reverse global warming. But little or no attention is being
paid to the long-term fall in oxygen concentrations and its knock-on effects. Compared to prehistoric times, the level of oxygen in the
earth's atmosphere has declined by over a third and in polluted cities the decline may be more than 50%. This change in the makeup of
the air we breathe has potentially serious implications for our health. Indeed, it could ultimately threaten the survival of human life
on earth, according to Roddy Newman, who is drafting a new book, The Oxygen Crisis. I am not a scientist, but this seems a reasonable concern. It is a possibility that we should examine and assess. So, what's the evidence?
Around 10,000 years ago, the planet's forest cover was at least twice what it is today, which means that forests are now emitting only
half the amount of oxygen. Desertification and deforestation are rapidly accelerating this long-term loss of oxygen sources. The story
at sea is much the same. Nasa reports that in the north Pacific ocean oxygen-producing phytoplankton concentrations are 30% lower
today, compared to the 1980s. This is a huge drop in just three decades. Moreover, the UN environment programme confirmed in 2004 that there were nearly 150 "dead zones" in the world's oceans where discharged
sewage and industrial waste, farm fertiliser run-off and other pollutants have reduced oxygen levels to such an extent that most or all sea creatures can no longer live there. This oxygen starvation is
reducing regional fish stocks and diminishing the food supplies of populations that are dependent on fishing. It also causes genetic mutations and
hormonal changes that can affect the reproductive capacity of sea life, which could further diminish global fish supplies. Professor Robert Berner of Yale University has researched oxygen levels in prehistoric times by
chemically analysing air bubbles trapped in fossilised tree amber. He suggests that humans breathed a much more oxygen-rich air 10,000 years ago. Further back, the oxygen levels were even greater. Robert Sloan has listed
the percentage of oxygen in samples of dinosaur-era amber as: 28% (130m years ago), 29% (115m years ago), 35% (95m years ago), 33% (88m years ago), 35% (75m years ago), 35% (70m years ago), 35% (68m years ago),
Like most other scientists they accept
that oxygen levels in the atmosphere in prehistoric times averaged around 30% to 35%, compared to only 21% today – and that the
levels are even less in densely populated, polluted city centres and industrial complexes, perhaps only 15 % or lower. Much of this
recent, accelerated change is down to human activity, notably the industrial revolution and the burning of fossil fuels. The Professor
of Geological Sciences at Notre Dame University in Indiana, J Keith Rigby, was quoted in 1993-1994 as saying: In the 20th century,
humanity has pumped increasing amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere by burning the carbon stored in coal, petroleum and
natural gas. In the process, we've also been consuming oxygen and destroying plant life – cutting down forests at an alarming rate and
thereby short-circuiting the cycle's natural rebound. We're artificially slowing down one process and speeding up another, forcing a
change in the atmosphere. Very interesting. But does this decline in oxygen matter? Are there any practical consequences that we ought to be concerned about? What is the effect of lower oxygen levels on
31% (65.2m years ago), and 29% (65m years ago). Professor Ian Plimer of Adelaide University and Professor Jon Harrison of the University of Arizona concur.
the human body? Does it disrupt and impair our immune systems and therefore make us more prone to cancer and degenerative diseases? Surprisingly, no significant research has been done, perhaps on the following
presumption: the decline in oxygen levels has taken place over millions of years of our planet's existence. The changes during the shorter period of human life have also been slow and incremental – until the last two centuries
The pace of oxygen
loss is likely to have speeded up massively in the last three decades, with the industrialisation of China, India, South Korea and other
countries, and as a consequence of the massive worldwide increase in the burning of fossil fuels. In the view of Professor Ervin Laszlo, the drop in
atmospheric oxygen has potentially serious consequences. A UN advisor who has been a professor of philosophy and systems sciences, Laszlo writes: Evidence from prehistoric times indicates that the oxygen
content of pristine nature was above the 21% of total volume that it is today. It has decreased in recent times due mainly to the burning
of coal in the middle of the last century. Currently the oxygen content of the Earth's atmosphere dips to 19% over impacted areas, and
it is down to 12 to 17% over the major cities. At these levels it is difficult for people to get sufficient oxygen to maintain bodily health: it takes a proper intake of oxygen to keep body cells and
organs, and the entire immune system, functioning at full efficiency. At the levels we have reached today cancers and other degenerative diseases are likely to
develop. And at 6 to 7% life can no longer be sustained.
of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. Surely, this mostly gradual decline has allowed the human body to evolve and adapt to lower concentrations of oxygen? Maybe, maybe not.
Warming ADV 1AC
Causes methane explosions that cause global Armageddon.
Pearce, environmental consultant and BEMA environment journalist of the year, 2007 Fred, With speed and violence: why
scientists fear tipping points in climate change, p. 76-77
back in 1964, when the biggest global threat was nuclear Armageddon.
One of my favorite films is Dr. Strangelove. It was made
Directed by Stanley Kubrick, and starring
Peter Sellers as Dr. Strangelove, a wheelchair-bound caricature of Henry Kissinger, the film was a satire of the military strategy known as Mutual Assured Desttuction-or MAD, for short. The plot involved the Soviet Union's
building the ultimate defense, a doomsday device in the remote wastes of Siberia. If Russia were attacked, the device would shroud the world in a radioactive cloud and destroy all human and animal life on earth.
Unfortunately, the Soviet generals forgot to tell the Americans about this, and, needless to say, Dr. Strangelove and the American military attacked. The film ends with a deranged U.S. officer (played by Slim Pickens) sitting
Now our most feared global Armageddon is climate change.
But reason to fear truly does lurk in the frozen bogs of western Siberia. There, beneath a largely uninhabited wasteland of permafrost,
lies what might reasonably be described as nature's own doomsday device. It is primed to be triggered not by a nuclear bomb but by
global warming. That device consists of thick layers of frozen peat containing tens of billions of tons of carbon. The entire western Siberian peat
bog covers approaching 400,000 square miles-an area as big as France and Germany combined. Since its formation, the moss and lichen growing at its surface have been slowly
absorbing massive amounts of carbon from the atmosphere. Because the region is so cold, the vegetation only partially decomposes,
forming an ever-thickening frozen mass of peat beneath the bog. Perhaps a quarter of all the carbon absorbed by soils and vegetation on the land surface of Earth since the last ice
age is right here. The concern now is that as the bog begins to thaw, the peat will decompose and release its carbon. Unlike the tropical swamps of Borneo. which are
degrading as they dry out, and producing carbon dioxide, the Siberian bogs will degrade in the wet as the permafrost melts. In fetid swamps and lakes
devoid of oxygen, that will produce methane. Methane is a powerful and fast-acting greenhouse gas, potentially a hundred time more
potent than carbon dioxide. Released quickly enough in such quantities, it would create an atmospheric tsunami, swamping the planet
in warmth. But we have to change tense here. For "would create," read "is creating.
astride a nuclear bomb as it is released into the sky above Siberia. The end of the world is nigh, as the credits roll.
The terminal impact is earth becomes devoid of all life.
Dr. John Brandenberg, Physicist, DEAD MARS, DYING EARTH, 1999, p. 232-3
The world goes on its merry way and fossil fuel use continues to power it. Rather than making painful or
politically difficult choices such as inventing in fusion or enacting a rigorous plan of conserving, the industrial
world chooses to muddle through the temperature climb. Let’s imagine that America and Europe are too
worried about economic dislocation to change course. The ozone hole expands, driven by a monstrous synergy
with global warming that puts more catalytic ice crystals into the stratosphere, but this affects the far north and
south and not the major nations’ heartlands. The seas rise, the tropics roast but the media networks no longer
cover it. The Amazon rainforest becomes the Amazon desert. Oxygen levels fall, but profits rise for those who
can provide it in bottles. An equatorial high pressure zone forms, forcing drought in central Africa and Brazil,
the Nile dries up and the monsoons fall. Then inevitably, at some unlucky point in time, a major unexpected
event occurs—a major volcanic eruption, a sudden and dramatic shift in ocean circulation or a large asteroid
impact (those who think freakish accidents do not occur have paid little attention to life on Mars), or a nuclear
war that starts between Pakistan and India and escalates to involve China and Russia… Suddenly, the gradual
climb in global temperatures goes on a mad excursion as the oceans warm and release large amounts of
dissolved carbon dioxide from their lower depths into the atmosphere. Oxygen levels go down as oxygen
replaces lost oceanic carbon dioxide. Asthma cases double and then double again. Now a third of the world
fears breathing. As the oceans dump carbon dioxide, the greenhouse effect increases, which further warms the
oceans, causing them to dump even more carbon. Because of the heat, plants die and burn in enormous fires
which release more carbon dioxide, and the oceans evaporate, adding more water vapor to the greenhouse.
Soon, we are in what is termed a runaway greenhouse effect, as happened to Venus eons ago. The last two
surviving scientists inevitably argue, one telling the other, “See, I told you the missing sink was in the ocean!”
Earth, as we know it, dies. After this Venusian excursion in temperatures, the oxygen disappears into the soil,
the oceans evaporate and are lost and the dead Earth loses its ozone layer completely. Earth is too far from the
Sun for it to be a second Venus for long. Its atmosphere is slowly lost – as is its water—because of the
ultraviolet bombardment breaking up all the molecules apart from carbon dioxide. As the atmosphere becomes
thin, the Earth becomes colder. For a short while temperatures are nearly normal, but the ultraviolet sears any
life that tries to make a comeback. The carbon dioxide thins out to form a thin veneer with a few wispy clouds
and dust devils. Earth becomes the second Mars – red, desolate, with perhaps a few hardy microbes surviving.
AT: Nuclear War Causes Warming
Nuclear war doe not contribute to global warming.
Rhett Butler, Mongabay, “Nuclear war could cause global cooling (i.e. block global warming),” 12/11/2006,
http://news.mongabay.com/2006/1211-nuclear.html
Nuclear war would disrupt global climate for at least a decade according to new research presented Dec. 11 at
the annual meeting of American Geophysical Union in San Francisco. The research, based on findings from
historic volcano eruptions, found that a small-scale, regional nuclear war could produce millions of tons of
"soot" particles that could block solar radiation, in effect, cooling the planet. "We examined the climatic
effects of the smoke produced in a regional conflict in the subtropics between two opposing nations, each using
50 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons to attack the other's most populated urban areas," said Alan Robock, a
professor in the department of environmental sciences at Rutgers University. "A cooling of several degrees
would occur over large areas of North America and Eurasia, including most of the grain-growing regions. As in
the case with earlier nuclear winter calculations, large climatic effects would occur in regions far removed from
the target areas or the countries involved in the conflict." The team, also including scientists from the University
of Colorado at Boulder (CU-Boulder) and UCLA, say the global impact of nuclear would be akin to climate
disruptions caused by volcanic eruptions which cool the planet by releasing tons of particulate matter into the
atmosphere. They cite the 1815 eruption of Tambora in Indonesia as an example. "The 1815 eruption of
Tambora in Indonesia — the largest in the last 500 years — was followed by killing frosts throughout New
England in 1816, during what has become known as 'the year without a summer,'" said a statement from
Rutgers. "The weather in Europe was reported to be so cold and wet that the harvest failed and people starved.
This historical event, according to Robock, perhaps foreshadows the kind of climate disruptions that would
follow a regional nuclear conflict." "With the exchange of 100 15-kiloton weapons as posed in this scenario,
the estimated quantities of smoke generated could lead to global climate anomalies exceeding any changes
experienced in recorded history," Robock said. "And that's just 0.03 percent of the total explosive power of the
current world nuclear arsenal." The climate effects of particulate matter are of increasing interest to climate
scientists. Some researchers have postulated that a similar release of sulfate aerosols into the atmosphere could
be used in a worst-case scenario to block global warming.
Collapse Solves Warming – 2NC
Recession slows consumption and production, stopping emissions
Farnish, environmental writer and activist and founder of Green Seniors, 3/17/2008
(Keith, “Global Recession: Global Breathing Space,” http://www.blog.thesietch.org/2008/03/17/globalrecession-global-breathing-space/)
Was it just my imagination, or did I hear a small ripple of applause from the forests, the wetlands and the
glaciers, as the news of the collapse of Bear Stearns leaked into the public realm? There are many precursors of
economic collapse; one is the sudden upturn in the price of gold, another is a rise in the little known “skyscraper
index” — both of which signal the move by the wealthy to invest their money into things that may hold their
value longer than pieces of electronic data whizzing around the networks of the world’s investment banks and
clearing houses. No one will be surprised that Bear Stearns’ collapse means recession is imminent, and the
investors are popping Prozac like cups of coffee. And that ripple of applause? It’s because with recession
comes a drop in consumer spending, a reduction in the number of goods being made and moved around the
world, a slump in the sale of houses, vacations, big cars, air conditioning, patio heaters: a downturn in the
carbon engine that has, for the last three decades been driving the global temperature inexorably upwards
as the amount of money swilling around in the consumer economy keeps growing. Recession stops
greenhouse gases being emitted. This is no piece of environmental wishful thinking. While researching A
Matter Of Scale, I discovered that the link between global trade and carbon emissions was closer than I had ever
suspected.
Studies prove
Foley, staff writer for the AP, October 9 2007
(http://news.wired.com/dynamic/stories/C/CLIMATE_CHANGE?SITE=WIRE&SECTION=HOME&TEMPL
ATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2007-10-09-10-11-24, accessed October 20 2007)
Worldwide economic growth has accelerated the level of greenhouse gas emissions to a dangerous threshold
scientists had not expected for another decade, according to a leading Australian climate change expert. Tim
Flannery told Australian Broadcasting Corp. that an upcoming report by the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change will contain new data showing that the level of climate-changing gases in the atmosphere has
already reached critical levels. Flannery is not a member of the IPCC, but said he based his comments on a
thorough review of the technical data included in the panel's three working group reports published earlier this
year.
Ecological sustainability and human survival require economic collapse
Dr. Barry, President and Founder of Ecological Internet and PhD in Land Resources from UW-Madison,
1/14/2008
(Glen, “Economic Collapse and Global Ecology,” http://www.countercurrents.org/barry140108.htm)
A successful revolutionary response to imminent global ecosystem collapse would focus upon bringing
down the Earth's industrial economy now. As society continues to fail miserably to implement necessary
changes to allow creation to continue, maybe the best strategy to achieve global ecological sustainability is
economic sabotage to hasten the day. It is more fragile than it looks. Humanity is a marvelous creation. Yet her
current dilemma is unprecedented. It is not yet known whether she is able to adapt, at some expense to her
comfort and short-term well-being, to ensure survival. If she can, all futures of economic, social and ecological
collapse can be avoided. If not it is better from a long-term biocentric viewpoint that the economic growth
machine collapse now, bringing forth the necessary change, and offering hope for a planetary and human
revival.
Growth Causes Warming
Growth makes anthropogenic warming inevitable – tech doesn’t solve.
Cohen 10 (Dave, columnist for Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, “Economic Growth And
Climate Change — No Way Out?” February 2, http://peakwatch.typepad.com/peak_watch/2010/02/economyand-climate-no-way-out.html
Humankind has reached a fork in the road. The business-as-usual path implies robust economic growth with a
rise in the carbon dioxide emissions that contribute to anthropogenic climate change. The other path, whatever
its actual form turns out to be, shuns business-as-usual in an attempt stabilize greenhouse gas levels (mainly
carbon dioxide CO2) in the Earth's atmosphere (e.g. at 450 ppmv, parts-per-million-by-volume) to avoid
catastrophic warming (e.g. > 2°C). Considered alternatives invariably lay out a vision of the future in which
emissions steadily decline while economies continue to grow. Is such a vision realistic? This essay questions
standard assumptions underlying this "have your cake and eat it too" view. 1. The Economy/Climate Dilemma
The Energy Information Agency's special October supplement to its monthly Short-Term Outlook projected
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the United States in 2009 to fall 5.9% compared to the previous year's
levels. The December STEO report revised the figure upward to 6.1%. Based on the EIA data, Reuters'
Recession puts U.S. halfway to emissions goal calculated that 2009 U.S. emissions were a whopping 8.9%
below 2005 levels.
Obama is expected to pledge next week at a U.N. climate meeting in Copenhagen that the
United States will cut output of gases blamed for warming the planet, including carbon dioxide, roughly 17
percent below 2005 levels by 2020.
On Tuesday the Energy Information Administration said in a monthly
outlook that U.S. carbon dioxide output in 2009 will fall about 6.1 percent to 5.45 billion tonnes as the recession
cuts demand for coal used to generate electricity.
That was about 8.9 percent below the 2005 level of 5.98
billion tonnes, putting the U.S. on track, at least for now, to reach Obama's goal. The International Energy
Agency's 2009 World Energy Outlook estimated that globally, CO2 emissions fell 3% in 2009 compared with
the previous year. One might have thought that global warming activists would be jumping for joy, but the news
brought no rejoicing. The reason for their reticence was not hard to find. From Reuters again—
"Losing
weight by starving is different than shedding pounds through exercise," said Kevin Book, an analyst at
ClearView Energy Partners, LLC.
He said as the economy recovers electricity demand should rise, pushing
up emissions from that sector. That will require the world's second largest emitter of greenhouse gases after
China to move faster to low-carbon sources like renewable energy if Obama's short-term goal is to be met, he
said. While it is debatable how soon prosperity will return to the United States, the corrective to anthropogenic
climate change seems abundantly clear: shrink the economy. This solution is both politically and socially
unacceptable. It is even unthinkable. This passage from the Nature opinion piece Let the global technology race
begin by Isabel Galiana and Christopher Green introduces some key concepts while also hinting at why the
assumption of future global economic growth can not be questioned.
To describe the required trade-offs of
any climate policy, analysts use the Kaya identity
C = P × (GDP/P) × (E/GDP) × (C/E)
which relates
carbon emissions, C, to its four driving factors: population (P); per capita gross domestic product (GDP/P);
energy intensity of the economy (E/GDP); and emissions per unit of energy (C/E).
Conventional climate
policy considers only the emissions, C, and the political will needed to achieve reductions, but ignores the
driving factors. Policy-makers are understandably reluctant to use population or economic growth to reduce
greenhouse-gas emissions; hence policy should focus on the technological drivers. A useful way of looking at
these is by combining E/GDP and C/E to yield the economy's carbon intensity (C/GDP).
In recent decades,
although global GDP has grown at about 3% per year and global carbon intensity has declined by about 1.4%
per year, emissions have grown well in excess of 1% per year. In view of this, the proposal by the Group of 8
rich nations (G8) to cut global emissions in half by 2050, consistent with limiting global long-term temperature
increase to 2 °C — and to do this without slowing economic development — would require a tripling of the
average annual rate of decline in carbon intensity for the next 40 years. This accelerated decline in carbon
intensity requires a revolution in energy technology that has not yet started.
[My note: The 1.4% annual
decline of global carbon intensity is belied by current data as I explain below.] It is simply not an option to "use
... economic growth" to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. Thus, the solution must lie a "revolution in energy
technology that has not yet started." The Kaya variable per capita gross domestic product (GDP/P) must and is
expected to grow. The option of manipulating this variable is off the table. Similar observations apply to the
population variable P, as Galiana and Green note above. Indeed, the effects of the "Great" recession have been
quite severe, underscoring the "reluctance" of policy-makers to put the brakes on economic growth to mitigate
climate change. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, "official" unemployment is 10% as of this writing,
but the broader U6 measure shows that total unemployment and under-employment is 17.3%. Even this number
does not reflect all those who have dropped out of the labor force due to the impossibility of finding work. It is
no wonder that politicians refuse to tell voters that jobs growth will not be possible now because of the
necessity of fending off warming whose worst effects are likely some decades away. In 2006, primary energy
from fossil fuels (oil, natural gas & coal) made up 85% of total energy consumed in the United States (Figure
1). Figure 1 — The primary energy mix in the United States in 2006, as cited in the National Academy of
Sciences report What you need to know about energy (2009). Wind and solar energy made up 0.4% of primary
energy consumption in the United States in 2006. With such a small contribution from so-called "renewable"
sources, which make up 7% of the total, and with most of that (5% of the total) coming from resourceconstrained supplies of wood to burn and water to dam, the carbon intensity (C/GDP) of the American
economy, which has been falling steadily since 1980, is still very high. This EIA data indicates that in 1980,
U.S. carbon intensity was 917 metric tons of CO2 per 1 million (chained) 2000 US dollars. By 2007, carbon
intensity had dropped to 520 metric tons per million 2000 dollars. Although the carbon intensity decrease
provided reason for optimism to many observers, total CO2 emissions in the United States increased from
4,780.831 million metric tons in 1980 to 6,003.263 in 2007 (EIA data). The overall increase was due to the
economic growth that took place during those years, and occurred despite efficiency (energy intensity E/GDP)
gains during the period. Our historical inability to constrain emissions growth defines the economy/climate
dilemma, not only for the United States but globally as well. Figure 2 from the IEA's 2009 WEO gives us some
sense of just how daunting it will be to support future economic growth while reducing emissions to the levels
required in a 450 ppmv scenario. Figure 2 — Source: IEA's 2009 World Energy Outlook. As the IEA's caption
notes, global economic growth (in real terms) is assumed to be 2.7% per year after 2030. The historic reversal
required to both keep the global economy growing and reduce CO2 emissions to the required levels is simply
breathtaking. It does not seem possible. If it is not, something has to give. I believe that when push comes to
shove, and it has been demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that humanity can not grow the economy
while reducing the carbon intensity of that growth to the extent required for a 450 scenario, it will not be
economic growth which will be sacrificed. Thus I shall argue here that humanity seems to have backed itself
into a corner from which there is no escape. 2. The Radical Hypothesis In an earlier article The Radical
Hypothesis, I explored the plausibility of whether economic growth can continue in the 21st century under
conditions where CO2 emissions—a proxy for fossil fuel consumption—are falling (Figure 1). The world
experienced phenomenal economic growth in the 20th century, but history suggests that the concomitant rise in
emissions was a necessary condition of that growth. The rule is expressed in (1) & (2).
(1) If the economy is
growing, then anthropogenic CO2 emissions are growing It follows that—
(2) If anthropogenic CO2
emissions are not growing, the economy is in recession Figure 3 — A conceptual depiction of the Radical
Hypothesis. Economic growth (dotted line) has always been accompanied by growth in CO2 emissions (black
line). Emissions are a proxy for fossil fuels consumption. At a future inflection point, emissions begin to decline
as economic growth continues. A third alternative, a reduction in the carbon intensity (C/GDP) of economic
growth, is also shown (dashed line). In this case, economic and emissions growth are still tightly linked; only
the rate (slope) of positive emissions growth has changed. Compare Figure 2 above. Thus the Radical
Hypothesis rejects the requirement that growing emissions from fossil fuels have been a necessary condition for
economic growth, and might be stated as in (3).
(3) The economy is growing but anthropogenic CO2
emissions are shrinking This view contradicts our historical experience as stated in rules (1) & (2) above and
illustrated in Figure 4 below. Figure 4 — CO2 emissions in the United States since 1980 (based on the EIA
data cited above) compared with recessions (gray bars). Recessions are defined according to the widely
recognized National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle data. The tendency for emissions to decline
during recessions is most pronounced during the severe dual recession in the 1980's and the current "Great"
recession. Interestingly, emission declines continued between the recessions in the early 1980s, and started to
decline before the short-lived recessions of 1991-1992 and 2001, which implies that economic activity had
slowed before the NBER officially recognized this condition. This phenomenon requires more study, but
otherwise the historical pattern does not contradict Rule (2)—if anthropogenic CO2 emissions are not growing,
the economy is in recession. On longer time scales, the overall historical trend is absolutely clear as shown in
Figure 2. If the Radical Hypothesis is false, meaning rising anthropogenic emissions can not be unlinked from
economic growth, what outcome might we expect? There is a very wide range of bad outcomes for future
consumption of fossil fuels in the SRES climate scenarios. The worst case is called business-as-usual (BAU),
but less carbon-intensive paths are also possible. Outcomes are shown conceptually in Figure 5. Figure 5 — A
truncated range of SRES outcomes if the Radical Hypothesis is false (i.e. there is no inflection point as in
Figure 3.) The CO2 emissions curve (black line) illustrates a worst-case business-as-usual scenario for
anthropogenic emissions. The dashed line illustrates a less carbon-intensive scenario in which the rate of
positive emissions growth declines as in Figure 3 above. The Radical Hypothesis consensus rests upon
assumption (4) (and more humorously, Figure 6). I call (4) the Assumption of Technological Progress (ATP)
(4) Technological progress marches on. Improvements are always sufficient to meet the requirements of
economic expansion, or drive that expansion. These improvements include, most importantly, civilization's
need for energy to fuel growth. For example, net energy returns on investment (EROI) for currently inefficient
processes (e.g. biomass to cellulosic ethanol conversions) do not matter because they are based on current
science & technology.
Figure 6 — The Assumption of Technological Progress. Source. The ATP is
ubiquitous. Successful climate mitigation scenarios appeal to it directly, but so do business-as-usual scenarios.
Perhaps the only meaningful difference between these cases is the degree of technological progress which is
assumed. This is true in so far as the Radical Hypothesis seems to require far greater innovation than businessas-usual, which is itself problematic when we view resource depletion (e.g. for conventional crude oil) through
the lens of current science & technology. In BAU scenarios, the assumption is that technological progress will
improve the efficiency of current Coal-To-Liquids (CTL) technology, or extraction efficiency in other areas
(e.g. for tar sands oil, in conventional oil extraction, in biomass to liquids conversions, or in the production of
liquid fuels from oil shales). At the inflection point and “forever" after in the Radical (conventional) view,
technological improvements permit the decoupling of economic growth from fossil fuels consumption. For
example, wind or solar will replace coal, biofuels or electric vehicles will replace oil, and so on. Most
importantly, if many or all these improvements should fail to materialize, the ATP still guarantees that
something will turn up that permits economic growth to continue indefinitely. In so far as the assumption of
economic growth is unassailable, it follows that the Assumption of Technological Progress it rests upon also
can not be questioned. I criticized this deeply flawed assumption in The Secretary of Synthetic Biology, where
I examined the possibilities for success (unanticipated breakthroughs) in Energy Secretary Steven Chu's quest to
create "4th generation" biofuels. Galiana and Green made the Assumption of Technological Progress explicit in
their Nature opinion piece—
Can a technology-led approach avoid dangerous climate change? We proposed
such a policy as part of the 2009 Copenhagen Consensus on Climate, in which a panel of leading economists
ranked 15 policy responses to global warming. Our analyses show that cumulative emissions consistent with
minimizing the rise in global temperature (climate stabilization) can be achieved by investing US $100 billion a
year for the rest of the century in global energy R&D, testing, demonstration and infrastructure. It is entirely
proper for us to ask exactly how throwing $100 billion a year at the climate mitigation problem amounts to a
guarantee, as if by fiat, that the required miracles will occur. As Kenneth Boulding pointed out in 1980—
There is a nonexistence theorem about prediction in this area, in the sense that if we could predict what we are
going to know at some time in the future, we would not have to wait, for we would know it now. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the great technical changes have never been anticipated, neither the development of
oil and gas, nor the automobile, nor the computer.
[My note: This is also quoted in The Secretary of
Synthetic Biology cited above.] This is not to say we will not achieve any important breakthroughs, for some
miracles may indeed occur. And the yearly $100 billion should be invested, for otherwise our chances—
whatever they are, if they are not zero—will surely be diminished. Beyond this, there is only handwaving. 3.
The Technology Paradox It is not surprising that the Assumption of Technological Progress gives rise to a
paradox: if technological progress is guaranteed (i.e. comes "for free"), we need not try very hard to make
technological progress happen! This completes the circle of inaction that we witnessed most recently at
Copenhagen, where no binding CO2 reduction targets were specified. So, while the assumption of
technological progress (and concomitant economic growth) has fueled hope among those who believe climate
mitigation is possible, it has also retarded efforts to actually make progress in addressing the problem.
AT: “No Transition / No Mindset Shift”
4. Economic collapse now causes mindset shift
Berg, assistant professor of physics at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology, 10/16/2008
(Peter, “First global crisis of century harrowing,” http://newsdurhamregion.com/opinion/article/110488)
Whether we will go through a major recession, long and deep, or even a depression, what might emerge is the
realization that our society is much poorer than we had realized. The housing bubble, credit crunch and stock
market crash have wiped out trillions of dollars and this will not go unnoticed. This is truly the first global
crisis of the 21st century. It is not climate change. It is not pollution. It is not a fresh water crisis. It is not a food
crisis, notwithstanding current food security issues in several countries. It is not an energy crisis, although
energy prices might have played a major role in bursting the U.S. housing bubble. It is an economic crisis of
epic proportions that questions the very economic system we chose to build. The house of cards called Wall
Street and banking sector has tumbled. The Ponzi scheme has been revealed. The response of our political
leaders so far has been the nationalization of banks, insurance and mortgage companies, lowering of interest
rates (i.e. more easy money) and seizure of bad credit portfolios, to name a few. The scale is truly mind
boggling, reaching into trillions of dollars in liabilities. For example, the liabilities that the U.S. taxpayer was
forced to assume easily equals the market capitalization of the 10 largest U.S. corporations. All nationalized. It
seems that capitalism works great until the day it collapses and socialism does not look so bad after all. These
are strange and dangerous times. The world economy and financial sector are changing for good. Our young
generation will grow up and deal with a new order. And future crises are already looming. If we manage to
recover from the current disorder, will we be able to navigate through the global oil production peak?
5. Trends prove that transition is possible
Soper, philosopher at London Metropolitan University, 10/18/2008
(Kate, “The good life,” New Scientist, lexis)
BACK in the 1970s, few people listened to scientists' warnings about global warming. Even fewer heeded calls
to curb economic growth so we could protect the environment. Today, these ideas are starting to be
appreciated. We are hearing ever more about the contradiction between hanging on to a habitable planet and
the expansionary demands of the global market.
AT: “Plan Solves Global Warming / Ecological Collapse”
Deep-seated change is required at every level of society – insufficient solutions like the plan only deter
necessary changes
Dr. Barry, PhD in Land Resources from UW-Madison and President and Founder of Ecological Internet,
1/5/2008
(“Time To Stop The Greenwashing,” http://www.countercurrents.org/barry050108.htm)
The Earth and all species including humans are threatened with imminent ecological ruin. You should be
afraid, very afraid. Yet real hope remains that fundamental social change can avert looming failure of global
ecosystems. The biggest current obstacle to such change is that now that everyone, every product and every
business claims to be "green"; we have been diverted from urgent, adequate ecological change required to
secure being. Many mainstream (and some "radical") environmentalists, most businesses and essentially all
governments are greenwashing -- misleading the public regarding the environmental benefits of their practices,
policies and products. Certified FSC logging destroys ancient forests, climate and water. Coal is unlikely to ever
be clean as existing plants emit into the atmosphere, and sequestration is unproven. Biofuels hurt the
environment, geo-engineering will destroy remaining natural processes, and buying more stuff is rarely good for
the environment. It is time to stop the greenwashing. After two decades of successfully raising awareness
regarding climate change, forest protection and other challenges to global ecological sustainability; increasingly
my time is spent reacting to dangerous, insufficient responses that fail to address root causes of ecological
decline, provide a false sense of action, and frequently consolidate and do more environmental harm. Many
"greenwash" to make money, some to be perceived as effective advocates, while others believe incremental
progress without changing the system is the best that can be done. Yet all are delaying policies necessary simply
to survive. The greatest obstacle to identifying, refining, espousing and implementing policies required to
maintain a habitable Earth may come from "environmentalists" proposing inadequate half-measures that delay
and undermine the rigorous work that must be done to bring humanity back into nature's fold. Sufficient
policies required to save the Earth are massive in scope and ambition. Deep-seated change is required in how
we house, feed and clothe ourselves; in our understanding of acceptable livelihoods and happy lives; and in our
relationship with the biosphere and each other. To maintain a livable Earth there is no alternative to less people
and consumption, a smaller and restorative economy, and an end to cutting natural vegetation and burning fossil
fuels.
AT: “Growth / Renewables Solve Warming”
Stopping economic growth is comparatively better than alternatives – history proves
Simms et al 10 (Andrew, policy director of nef (the new economics foundation) the award-winning UK thinkand-do tank, and head of nef's Climate Change Programme, Dr. Victoria Johnson, researcher for the climate
change and energy programme at nef, MSc (awarded with distinction) in Climate Change from the University
of East Anglia and PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College, London and Peter Chowla, Policy and
Advocacy Officer at the Bretton Woods Project, “Growth isn’t possible,” New Economics Foundation, January
25)
In the Stern Review, historical precedents of reductions in carbon emissions were examined. Their analysis
found that annual reductions of greater than 1 per cent have ‘been associated only with economic recession or
upheaval’.215 Stern points to the collapse of the former Soviet Union’s economy, which brought about annual
emission reductions of over 5 per cent for a decade. While France’s 40-fold increase in nuclear capacity in just
25 years and the UK’s ‘dash for gas’ in the 1990s both corresponded, respectively, with annual CO2 and
greenhouse gas emission reductions of only 1 per cent.
Tech fixes without decreasing consumption risk extinction – don’t address the root cause of climate
change
Godhaven 9 (Merrick, environmental writer and activist, “Swapping technologies fails to address the root
causes of climate change,” July 15, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2009/jul/15/technofixclimate-change)
Technology is part of the solution to climate change. But only part. Techno-fixes like some of those in the
Guardian's Manchester Report simply cannot deliver the carbon cuts science demands of us without being
accompanied by drastic reductions in our consumption. That means radical economic and social
transformation. Merely swapping technologies fails to address the root causes of climate change. We need to
choose the solutions that are the cheapest, the swiftest, the most effective and least likely to incur dire side
effects. On all counts, there's a simple answer – stop burning the stuff in the first place. Consume less. There is
a certain level of resources we need to survive, and beyond that there is a level we need in order to have lives
that are comfortable and meaningful. It is far below what we presently consume. Americans consume twice
as much oil as Europeans. Are they twice as happy? Are Europeans half as free? Economic growth itself is not
a measure of human well-being, it only measures things with an assessed monetary value. It values wants at the
same level as needs and, while it purports to bring prosperity to the masses, its tendency to concentrate profit in
fewer and fewer hands leaves billions without the necessities of a decent life. Techno-fixation masks the
incompatibility of solving climate change with unlimited economic growth. Even if energy consumption can be
reduced for an activity, ongoing economic growth eats up the improvement and overall energy consumption still
rises. We continue destructive consumption in the expectation that new miracle technologies will come
and save us. The hope of a future techno-fix feeds into the pass-it-forward, do-nothing-now culture typified by
targets for 2050. Tough targets for 2050 are not tough at all, they are a decoy. Where are the techno-fix plans
for the peak in global emissions by 2015 that the IPCC says we need? Even within the limited sphere of
technology, we have to separate the solutions from the primacy of profit. We need to choose what's the most
effective, not the most lucrative. Investors will want the maximum return for their money, and so the benefits of
any climate technologies will, in all likelihood, be sold as carbon credits to the polluter industries and nations. It
would not be done in tandem with emissions cuts but instead of them, making it not a tool of mitigation but of
exacerbation. Climate change is not the only crisis currently facing humanity. Peak oil is likely to become a
major issue within the coming decade. Competition for land and water, soil fertility depletion and collapse of
fisheries are already posing increasing problems for food supply and survival in many parts of the world.
Technological solutions to climate change fail to address most of these issues. Yet even without climate change,
this systemic environmental and social crisis threatens society, and requires deeper solutions than new
technology alone can provide. Around a fifth of emissions come from deforestation, more than for all transport
emissions combined. There is no technological fix for that. We simply need to consume less of the forest, that is
to say, less meat, less agrofuel and less wood. Our level of consumption is inequitable. Making it universal is
simply impossible. The scientist Jared Diamond calculates that if the whole world were to have our level of
consumption, it would be the equivalent of having 72 billion people on earth. With ravenous economic growth
still prized as the main objective of society by all political leaders the world over, that 72 billion would be just
the beginning. At 3% annual growth, 25 years later it would be the equivalent of 150 billion people. A century
later it would be over a trillion. Something's got to give. And indeed, it already is. It's time for us to call it a
crisis and respond with the proportionate radical action that is needed. We need profound change – not only
government measures and targets but financial systems, the operation of corporations, and people's own
expectations of progress and success. Building a new economic democracy based on meeting human needs
equitably and sustainably is at least as big a challenge as climate change itself, but if human society is to
succeed the two are inseparable. Instead of asking how to continue to grow the economy while attempting to
cut carbon, we should be asking why economic growth is seen as more important than survival.
Even multiple tech solutions can’t solve – don’t address the root problem, can’t solve fast enough, rising
demand will offset efficiency gains – purely tech focus guarantees rich-poor conflict
Fauset 8 (Claire, “Techno-fixes: a critical guide to climate change technologies,” Corporate Watch Report)
As the the climate crisis looms, choices about solutions become ever more important. However, the debate on
the future is surrounded by hype and vested interests. This briefing seeks to assess the large-scale technologies
that corporations and government are putting forward as solutions to climate change. It explains why they are
unlikely to prevent climate catastrophe, looks at where the decisions about our strategies for survival are being
made, and goes in search of more realistic and socially just solutions. This report includes an overview of the
issues surrounding each of the key technologies that are being held up as solutions to climate change, and
provides a joined-up analysis and a framework for comparisons. Making the right decisions about technology is
vital to avoiding devastating climate change. But many of the technologies being put forward as solutions to this
crisis simply won’t work, will worsen the situation, cause significant environmental destruction or are not going
to be available with a short enough timeframe to help us. Even combined, they would fail to address the
whole problem - for example, there can be no big technofix for deforestation, which currently causes around a
fifth of all greenhouse gas emissions. Technofixes are very appealing. They appeal to leaders who want huge
projects to put their name to. They appeal to governments in short electoral cycles who don’t want to have to
face hard choices of changing the direction of development from economic growth to social change.
Technofixes appeal to corporations which expect to capture new markets with intellectual property rights and
emissions trading. They appeal to advertising-led media obsessed with the next big thing, but too shallow to
follow the science. They appeal to a rich-world population trained as consumers of hi-tech gadgets. They appeal
to (carbon) accountants: technological emissions reductions are neatly quantifiable, if you write the sum
properly. Technofixes appeal, in short, to the powerful, because they offer an op- portunity to maintain power
and privilege. But why are they the wrong answers? Surely technology is important? The discourse of ‘magic
bul- lets’ completely ignores the complexities of different situations and needs, and the widely distributed and
poorly measured sources of climate change. In short, it isn’t addressing the problem. If we are to have
socially just and sustainable solutions to climate change, then we have to all look very criti- cally at how our
social and economic systems are failing. If the approach to this problem is primarily technological it has the
potential to deepen inequalities between rich and poor as the rich are able to afford access to proprietary
technology which enables them to maintain high standards of living while the poor suffer the worst effects of
climate change on top of continuing social injustice. This is a recipe for conflict. Climate change is already
happening. Already the air and oceans are warming, growing seasons are shifting, and ice and snow cover have
decreased across the world. Extreme weather events such as floods, cyclones and droughts are increasing across
the world.1 The World Health Organization estimates that 150,000 people died in 2000 due to the impacts of
climate change.2 It’s going to get worse. Business as usual means that a temperature rise of around four degrees
centigrade above 1990-2000 levels can be expected this century - possibly as much as six degrees..3 Many
scientists consider that limiting temperature increases to a maximum of two degrees above pre-industrial levels
is necessary if we are to avoid devastating climate change.4 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), which represents the international scientific consensus on the issue, suggests that to have a reasonable
chance of limiting warming to two degrees would require a peak in global greenhouse gas emissions by 2015 at
the latest, with emissions falling by 50-80% below 2000 levels by 2050 and in particular will need
industrialized countries to reduce their emissions by 25% to 40% before 2020, and by 80% to 95% before
2050.5 This represents a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions of about 5% per year, every year. Who owns the
technology? Not just the hardware (power stations, pipelines) but the patents and other intellectual property.
Some technologies in particular – second-generation agrofuels, hydrogen, nano-solar – are likely to be
dominated by a few companies owning fundamental patents and charging royalties for their use. How will this
affect deployment if these technologies can be made to work? With over four thousand patents on ‘clean
technologies’ granted in 2006 in the USA alone,9 is it legitimate that possible solutions to climate change be
held to ransom? Who controls the technology? This is a question of control, and of democracy. If supplies are
short, who gets them – those in need, or those who can pay? Beyond this, who should decide what the solutions
to climate change are and which technologies represent the best way forward? How can these decisions be made
democratically with participation from the people who will be most af- fected? Governments make decisions on
which technologies to support through public funding. But much more money comes from the private sector,
which invests based on potential for profit, not social benefit. And even then, govern- ment money often follows
the corporate lead – corporations are widely represented on the Research Councils and other bodies which make
public funding decisions. Who gains from the technology? Who loses? Is the balance of winners and losers just
or equitable? For example, agrofuels benefit the companies that grow and trade them. They may keep fuel
prices down for vehicle owners, but push up food prices for everyone, and cause land conflicts between
plantations and small farmers. New technologies can also improve social justice: for example deployment of
small-scale hydroelectric systems can make reliable, cheap, controllable electricity supplies available to people
in areas without a centralised grid. In most discourse on climate mitigation, economic efficiency is prized above
social justice. But promoting new tech- nologies which do not help social justice will entrench and exacerbate
existing problems, making them all the harder to deal with in the future. Preferring those new technologies
which intrinsically promote equality, democratic control and accessibility has wider benefits than the simple
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In relation to climate change, emissions have largely been the fault of
the over-consuming rich, while the impacts are being felt most strongly by people in poorer countries. Climate
change itself is thus a social justice issue and it is dou- bly unjust to promote solutions which would worsen the
position of those who are already suffering. Inter-generational justice must also be considered - does a
technology impose costs on future generations without conferring any benefits? For example, nuclear waste
must be stored indefinitely, long after power stations are closed down; captured and stored carbon dioxide
would have to be monitored for centuries after cheap fossil-fuel reserves have been exhausted. How sustainable
is the technology? Greenhouse gas emissions reductions alone are not sufficient evidence of a technology’s
benefits. Does the technol- ogy deplete other resources, for example by consumption of rare minerals or through
its impact on natural ecosys- tems and biodiversity? Does it have other pollution impacts, such as hazardous
waste? Does it encourage or rely on other damaging activities? For example, carbon capture and storage relies
on coal mining and encourages greater oil extraction when used for ‘enhanced oil recovery’. Can the technology
continue to be used in the long term without increasing negative impacts? What scale of operations can the
technology reach? If a technology is being presented as the answer to a problem, eg a new source of vehicle
fuel, it needs to be avail- able at a sufficient scale. So, for example, waste cooking oil is a sustainable source of
vehicle fuel, but only available in very small quantities. First-generation agrofuels, even if social justice and
sustainability issues could be overcome, could never supply current world vehicle fuel use. Scalability does not
rule out a technology as such, but it is a crucial means of detecting hype around wrong answers which are
promoted to allow continuation of business as usual. When will it be available? Climate science shows that
emissions need to start falling within the next few years, and fall massively in 20 to 30 years. Technologies that
are unlikely to be available at an effective scale within that timeframe are not helpful – re- sources should be
diverted from these to more immediately available systems – and to ones which can be proven to work. The
focus of governments and corporations on emissions targets for 2050 can also be viewed as part of a distraction
strategy. 2050 is conveniently distant – a target for 2050 allows time to continue business-as-usual in the short
term in the expectation of future technological breakthroughs. Tough targets for 2050 are not tough at all.
Where are the techno-fix plans for a peak in global emissions by 2015? Ignoring the scale and source of the
problem Focusing on technological solutions ignores how the problem of climate change is caused, why it
continues to worsen and how much needs to be done to stop it. Climate change is the result of overconsumption of fossil fuels and of forest and land resources; about one third of emissions currently come
from deforestation and agriculture.10 This consumption continues to grow in line with economic growth.
Technological improvements will not tackle overconsumption or growth in demand; this requires radical
changes to economic systems. Without such changes, any technology-based emissions reductions will
eventually be eaten up by continued rising demand for energy and consumer goods – efficiency gains will
be converted into greater consumption not long-term reduced emissions. Technologies which encourage
consumers to maintain high energy use and fossil fuel dependency, such as carbon capture and storage, fail to
address unsustainable consumption levels which are the basis of rich country economies and the cause of both
climate change and other critical sustainability crises such as declining soil fertility and fresh water supplies.
Even the IPCC now suggests that 85% cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are needed by 2050,11 other
sources suggest as much as 90% reductions for the UK by 2030.12 Technology simply cannot deliver these
levels of reduction without accompanying changes to demand, which requires economic and social
transformation. Techno-fixation has masked the incompatibility of solving climate change with unlimited
economic growth. A rational approach to a certain problem and a set of uncertain solutions might be to say that
consumption should be limited to sustainable levels from now, with the possibility of increasing in future when
new technologies come on stream. In- stead the approach taken has been to continue consuming to the same
destructive levels in the expectation that new technologies will come on stream. The persistent claim that a
solution is just around the corner has allowed politicians and corporations to cling to the mantra that tackling
climate change will not impact on economic growth. In 2005, in his address to the World Economic Forum,
Tony Blair said: ‘If we put forward, as a solution to climate change, some- thing that would impact on
economic growth, it matters not how justified it is, it will simply not be agreed to [emphasis added]’.13 While
this view may be slowly changing, it has delayed real action for years. Climate change is not the only crisis
currently facing the planet. Peak oil (the point at which demand for oil outstrips available supply) is likely to
become a major issue within the coming decade; while competition for land and water, de- forestation and
destruction of ecosystems, soil fertility depletion and collapse of fisheries are already posing increas- ing
problems for food supply and survival in many parts of the world. That’s on top of the perpetual issues of equity
and social justice. Technological solutions to climate change generally fail to address most of these issues,
except where they may reduce oil use. Yet even without climate change, this systemic environmental and social
crisis threatens society, and demands deeper solutions than new technology alone can provide. Scarcity of
investment Governments spend a limited amount of money on mitigating climate change. Investment in energy
R&D (research and development) increased massively in the 1970s as a result of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo,
but in the last 30 years R&D investment as a proportion of GDP has continually declined to the point where it is
roughly comparable to pre-1973 levels.14 Where this investment goes is a major issue. While it makes sense to
research many options for mitigating climate change, time and resources are limited. In this context, it is worth
looking at the distinction between inventions, or technological breakthroughs, and engineer- ing improvements.
Some proposed technologies rely on things which simply don’t exist yet; synthetic microbes which ‘eat’ carbon
dioxide and excrete hydrocarbons; a safe and efficient system for distributing and using hydrogen vehicle fuel;
nuclear fusion power. This is not in itself an argument against any investment in these technological
possibilities, but it is an argu- ment against reliance on such future technological breakthroughs. Claims that
something which doesn’t exist yet will solve a known problem, and that it should take most of the available
resources, should be viewed simply as a stalling tactic on the part of vested interests. Other technologies exist,
but are benefiting from ongoing improvement; the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of pho- tovoltaic solar
panels; devices for exploiting wave and tidal power; energy-efficient electrical appliances. These areas can be
relied on to improve, though the timescale may be unpredictable. This is where technology investment needs to
focus. At present, it is the technologies that allow business-as-usual to continue that are receiving the lion’s
share of invest- ment, regardless of either potential benefit or feasibility. Investment in agrofuels or CCS means
less investment in wave power, in decentralised energy or in economic and social changes to limit the need for
high energy consumption. The US government is investing $179m (£89m) in agrofuels in 2008.15 €10bn
(£7.9bn) is being spent on an interna- tional experimental nuclear fusion reactor in France.16 Diverting this
money away from more immediately practical solutions makes the target of peaking greenhouse gas emissions
by 2015 less achievable. It both delays the transition to a low-carbon economy and endangers the future by
making devastating climate change more likely. Transition – the period of change between the high-emitting
societies of today and a distant sustainable future, is a hot topic. But while this change must come, the
‘transition’ discourse coming from governments and corporations is fre- quently a cover for arguments that
would permit use of technologies in the short term which are known to be unjustifi- able in the long term –
geoengineering, first generation agrofuels, ‘carbon-capture ready’ coal fired power stations are argued to be
necessary now. But why? Largely to prevent serious change to the rich world’s over-consuming lifestyles. The
discourse of transition delays the inevitable. When is the real transition to a low-emission, more equitable
society even going to start? How long is it going to last? Technological change is part of the solution. But only
part. It is useful only as long as it is compatible with, and prefer- ably supports, other changes to the way society
works. Even though these changes are not the focus of this report, a brief summary follows. Economic change
Current government approaches to climate change consist largely of tinkering with policy and expecting the
market to deliver emissions reductions. But the market doesn’t want to deliver emissions reductions, it wants to
deliver profits. Carbon prices are an arbitrary figure unrelated to the real social and environmental cost of
emissions. Meanwhile, poli- cies which may ‘harm’ the economy have been shied away from. This green
capitalist approach is asking the wrong question. Instead of asking how to continue to grow the economy while
living on the limited resources left on this planet, it should be asking – why is economic growth seen as more
important than survival? What is growth and do we need it? The current global economic system is based on the
assumption of indefinite growth. While ongoing growth in some areas is possible without more consumption of
natural resources and emissions of greenhouse gases, this covers only relatively small sectors of the economy –
some services and purely information-based products. Growth of the whole global economy means
consumption of an ever-increasing amount of goods, using an ever-increasing quantity of en- ergy, mineral,
agricultural and forest resources. Even if energy intensity per unit of economic activity can be reduced,
ongoing growth eats up the improvement and overall energy consumption still rises. Renewable energy alone
cannot decouple consumption from climate change – just because energy sources are called ‘renewable’ does
not mean there is an infinite amount available that can be accessed sustainably.
Stopping growth is the only solution – we’d need to build a nuclear power plant a day to offset warming
Cohen 10 (Dave, columnist for Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, “Economic Growth And
Climate Change — No Way Out?” February 2, http://peakwatch.typepad.com/peak_watch/2010/02/economyand-climate-no-way-out.html
To reach stabilization, what is required is decarbonization that is at least as fast as the economy’s rate of return.
Taking the 2005 value for η of 2.1% per year, stabilization of emissions would require an equivalent or greater
rate of decarbonization. 2.1% of current annual energy production corresponds to an annual addition of
approximately 300 GW of new non-carbon emitting power capacity—approximately one new nuclear power
plant per day. The Radical Hypothesis assumes that η will always be positive and growing, thus rejecting the
premise of (5). This standard view assumes that not only is it possible to reach CO2 stabilization, whereby
decarbonization is at least as fast as the economy’s rate of return, but it is also possible for decarbonization to
outpace growth in η to support future economic expansion, as shown in the IEA's Figure 2 above. This view is
not contradicted by anything in Garrett's model, but requires a seemingly impossible rate of decrease in carbon
intensity (one nuclear power plant per day). Outside this improbable event, we get some version of business as
usual (dη/dt > 0) or an economy that is not growing (dη/dt < 0). Thus Garrett's work supports my conclusion
that a growing economy is incompatible with falling emissions. His model also supports (albeit indirectly) my
conclusion that emissions (and thus the economy) will not be growing in a "peak oil" scenario. Thus he says in
the press release "Stabilization of carbon dioxide emissions at current rates will require approximately 300
gigawatts of new non-carbon-dioxide-emitting power production capacity annually - approximately one new
nuclear power plant (or equivalent) per day," Garrett says. "Physically, there are no other options without
killing the economy"... "If society consumed no energy, civilization would be worthless," he adds. "It is only
by consuming energy that civilization is able to maintain the activities that give it economic value. This means
that if we ever start to run out of energy, then the value of civilization is going to fall and even collapse absent
discovery of new energy sources." Garrett's study was "panned by some economists and rejected by several
journals" before being published. An economist who reviewed the paper—I wonder if he understood it?—wrote
that "I am afraid the author will need to study harder before he can contribute." In my view, this hostility relates
directly to these sacred, and thus incontrovertible assumptions— The economy will always be growing (d ln
η/dt > 0 in Garrett's model) Technology will always fix all problems, including the climate problem (S ≥ 1,
Garrett's (14)) It is generally impossible to prove a negative, as I discussed in The Secretary of Synthetic
Biology. Thus I can not prove any of the following propositions. SETI will never detect a signal from an alien
civilization The rate of return η will not be greater than zero forever The rate of decarbonization −d ln c/dt will
never exceed the rate of return η This a priori limit on our current knowledge is unfortunate in the climate
debate in so far as it makes it impossible for those skeptical of the consensus view to disprove unreasonable
assumptions (#1 and #2 above). All we can do is cast a long shadow of doubt and hope for the best. As in many
things, only time will tell who was right and who was wrong. 6. Conclusions The main conclusions of this
essay subvert standard views of how the future looks if humankind chooses to make a serious effort to mitigate
anthropogenic climate change. Historical data suggest that only recessions decrease anthropogenic CO2
emissions. Otherwise, if the global economy is growing, so are emissions. The consensus view, which I have
called The Radical Hypothesis, presumes that at some future inflection point, the global economy will continue
to grow while emissions shrink. Since nothing in our experience suggests the Radical Hypothesis is correct, and
in so far as knowledgeable people can agree that it will be very hard to achieve the technological breakthroughs
required to stabilize CO2 in atmosphere at acceptable levels (e.g. 450 ppmv), the most plausible way to achieve
such targets, all else being equal, is a planned, orderly contraction of the global economy. Mankind would
endeavor to both decarbonize the energy inputs to the economy and decrease those inputs. This implies that the
global economy, as modeled by Tim Garrett, would be shrinking. The mere assumption that technological
progress will be sufficient to achieve the desired stabilization of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere does not
guarantee success. This assumption, like the future economic growth that depends on it, is incontrovertible only
because of the faith placed in it, i.e. it must be accepted without proof or verification. It is all well & good to say
with great conviction that "failure is not an option" but in the real world, failure is definitely a possibility, so
risks grow. Worse yet, unquestioning faith in the impossibility of failure retards efforts achieve the necessary
(but still unrealized) technologies required to reduce emissions, for if technological progress—Pielke, et. al call
this "spontaneous" innovation—is guaranteed (i.e. comes "for free"), we need not try very hard to make
technological progress happen. What I have called The Assumption of Technological Progress should be tossed
out in so far as it is no longer in humanity's best interests to maintain it.
Tech can’t solve – efficiency gains are offset by higher levels of production and consumption
Simms et al 10 (Andrew, policy director of nef (the new economics foundation) the award-winning UK thinkand-do tank, and head of nef's Climate Change Programme, Dr. Victoria Johnson, researcher for the climate
change and energy programme at nef, MSc (awarded with distinction) in Climate Change from the University
of East Anglia and PhD in Atmospheric Physics at Imperial College, London and Peter Chowla, Policy and
Advocacy Officer at the Bretton Woods Project, “Growth isn’t possible,” New Economics Foundation, January
25)
Despite the recognition that consumption levels need to decline in developed nations, governments and
businesses are reluctant to address the restriction of consumption. Yet, without limits to consumption,
improvements in efficiency are often offset by the ‘rebound effect’.125 For example, a recent report published
by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) showed an increase in energy use across all sectors
– residential, service and industry – in recent years, despite improvement in energy efficiency.126 For example,
in the domestic sector while new measures have led to some improvements, particularly in the case of ‘white
goods’ (e.g. refrigerators, washing machines, dishwashers), the increasing use of these products and other
household appliances, such as tumble driers, air conditioning and personal computers, has more than offset
savings. The ‘rebound effect’ was an observation made by William Stanley Jevons in his book The Coal
Question, published in 1865.127 Here, Jevons contended that although technological advancement improves the
overall efficiency (E) with which a resource is used, efficiency gains rebound or even backfire, causing higher
production and consumption rather than stabilisation or reduction. Since improvements generally reduce the
cost of energy per unit, economic theory predicts that this has the effect of triggering an overall increase in
consumption. If a car, for instance, can drive more kilometres on a litre of petrol, the fuel costs per kilometre
fall, and so will the total costs per kilometre. The price signal acts to increase consumption and, thus, part of the
efficiency gains is lost. One area where the rebound effect is prominent is domestic energy consumption. An
analysis of energy consumption before and after installation of energy savings measures found that only half of
the efficiency gains translate into actual reductions in carbon emissions.128 This is supported by more recent
analysis of the effectiveness of England’s Home Energy Efficiency Scheme (Warm Front). While there are
appreciable benefits in terms of use of living space, comfort, quality of life, physical and mental well-being, the
analysis found that there was little evidence of lower heating bills.129 This has also been observed in Northern
Ireland.130 In other words, improvements in energy efficiency are offset by increased levels of thermal
comfort. An more in-depth economy-wide assessment of the rebound effect carried out on behalf of the UK
Energy Research Council in 2007 found that rebound effects are not exclusive to domestic energy
consumption.131 They can be both direct (e.g., driving further in a fuel-efficient car) and indirect (e.g.,
spending the money saved on heating on an overseas holiday). Findings from the research suggest that while
direct rebound effects may be small – less than 30 per cent for households for example, much less is known
about indirect effects. Additionally, the study suggests that in some cases, particularly where energy efficiency
significantly decreases the cost of production of energy intensive goods, rebounds may be larger. A further
rebound effect is caused by ‘time-saving devices’.132 With the current work-and-spend-lifestyle implicit to
industrialised societies, there is an increase in the demand for time-saving products. Although these devices
save time, they also tend to require more energy, for example, faster modes of transport. How much energy
savings are eaten up by the rebound effect is surrounded by lively debate. Estimates range from almost nothing
in the energy services133 to being of sufficient strength to completely offset any energy efficient
savings.134,135 There are a number of empirical analyses, however, that suggest that the rebound effect may be
real and significant (Table 2).136 The majority of work investigating the rebound effect has focused on a few
goods and services.137 However, the few studies that explore the macroeconomic impact of the rebound effect,
find it to be significant. For example, using a general equilibrium model, one study by environmental economist
Toyoaki Washida assessed the Japanese Economy.139 On testing a variety of levels of CO2 tax, the rebound
effect was found to be significant (between 35–70 per cent of the efficiency savings).
No technology can lower carbon levels far enough if growth continues
Jackson, professor of sustainable development at the University of Surrey, 10/18/2008
(Tim, “What politicians are afraid to say,” New Scientist, lexis)
The Ehrlich equation, I = PAT , says simply that the impact (I ) of human activity on the planet is the product of
three factors: the size of the population (P ), its level of affluence (A ) expressed as income per person, and a
technology factor (T ), which is a measure of the impact on the planet associated with each dollar we spend.
Take climate change, for example. The global population is just under 7 billion and the average level of
affluence is around $8000 per person. The T factor is just over 0.5 tonnes of carbon dioxide per thousand
dollars of GDP - in other words, every $1000 worth of goods and services produced using today's technology
releases 0.5 tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere. So today's global CO2 emissions work out at 7 billion × 8 × 0.5
= 28 billion tonnes per year. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated that to
stabilise greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere at a reasonably safe 450 parts per million, we need to reduce
annual global CO2 emissions to less than 5 billion tonnes by 2050. With a global population of 9 billion thought
inevitable by the middle of this century, that works out at an average carbon footprint of less than 0.6 tonnes per
person - considerably lower than in India today. The conventional view is that we will achieve this by
increasing energy efficiency and developing green technology without economic growth taking a serious
hit. Can this really work? With today's global income, achieving the necessary carbon footprint would mean
getting the T factor for CO2 down to 0.1 tonnes of CO2 per thousand US dollars - a fivefold improvement.
While that is no walk in the park, it is probably doable with state-of-the-art technology and a robust policy
commitment. There is one big thing missing from this picture, however: economic growth. Factor it in, and the
idea that technological ingenuity can save us from climate disaster looks an awful lot more challenging.
First, let us suppose that the world economy carries on as usual. GDP per capita will grow at a steady 2 or 3 per
cent per year in developed countries, while the rest of the world tries to catch up - China and India leaping
ahead at 5 to 10 per cent per year, at least for a while, with Africa languishing in the doldrums for decades to
come. In this (deeply inequitable) world, to meet the IPCC target we would have to push the carbon content of
consumption down to less than 0.03 tonnes for every thousand US dollars spent - a daunting 11-fold reduction
on the current western European average. Now, let's suppose we are serious about eradicating global poverty.
Imagine a world whose 9 billion people can all aspire to a level of income compatible with a 2.5 per cent
growth in European income between now and 2050. In this scenario, the carbon content of economic output
must be reduced to just 2 per cent of the best currently achieved anywhere in the European Union. In short, if
we insist on growing the economy endlessly, then we will have to reduce the carbon intensity of our spending to
a tiny fraction of what it is now. If growth is to continue beyond 2050, so must improvements in efficiency.
Growth at 2.5 per cent per year from 2050 to the end of the century would more than triple the global
economy beyond the 2050 level, requiring almost complete decarbonisation of every last dollar. The
potential for technological improvements, renewable energy, carbon sequestration and, ultimately perhaps, a
hydrogen-based economy has not been exhausted. But what politicians will not admit is that we have no idea
if such a radical transformation is even possible, or if so what it would look like. Where will the investment and
resources come from? Where will the wastes and the emissions go? What might it feel like to live in a world
with 10 times as much economic activity as we have today? Instead, they bombard us with adverts cajoling us
to insulate our homes, turn down our thermostats, drive a little less, walk a little more. The one piece of advice
you will not see on a government list is "buy less stuff". Buying an energy-efficient TV is to be applauded; not
buying one at all is a crime against society. Agreeing reluctantly to advertising standards is the sign of a mature
society; banning advertising altogether (even to children) is condemned as "culture jamming". Consuming less
may be the single biggest thing you can do to save carbon emissions, and yet no one dares to mention it.
Because if we did, it would threaten economic growth, the very thing that is causing the problem in the first
place.
CCS Module
Focus on green tech causes CSS.
Megan Tady, national political reporter for InTheseTimes.com, 11-24-07, Carbon Capture: Miracle Cure for
Global Warming, or Deadly Liability?, http://www.alternet.org/environment/68490/
CCS is the process of collecting carbon dioxide emissions from sources such as fossil fuel-burning power plants
before it reaches the atmosphere and storing it in deep geological formations or in the ocean. While the
technology to capture the carbon is already commercially available, and CO2 injection pilot projects are under
way, any large-scale plans to capture and store carbon have been mostly elusive. What's clear, however, is that
efforts to push for CCS as one of the most promising technological fixes are heavily under way, just as holes in
the plan are slowly bubbling to the surface. This month, several scientists testified before the Senate
Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Innovation that major financial investments are urgently needed to
make CCS available within the next decade. Howard Herzog, a principal researcher with Massachusetts
Institute of Technology's Laboratory for Energy and the Environment, said a commitment of $1 billion a year is
needed. The meeting coincided with new legislation introduced by Sen. John Kerry, who chairs the
subcommittee, to advance CCS. His bill would establish three to five coal-fired "demonstration" plants with
CCS technology, and three to five facilities for sequestration, another term for CCS. In October, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced it was writing CCS regulations, and last week, OPEC
leaders unveiled CCS as the showpiece of their new "energy and environment" agenda.
CSS leaks cause environmental catastrophe.
Megan Tady, national political reporter for InTheseTimes.com, 11-24-07, Carbon Capture: Miracle Cure for
Global Warming, or Deadly Liability?, http://www.alternet.org/environment/68490/
The United States has a long history of trying to bury its burdens. The government is still scratching its head
over where to stow the country's mounting nuclear waste. And just like with nuclear waste, opponents say the
repercussions of CO2 that refuses to stay put is potentially catastrophic. "Environmentally, it's incredibly
dangerous," said Leonard, of the Rainforest Action Network. "Carbon is something that's potentially very
deadly." Leonard pointed to the disaster in Cameroon in 1986, which baffled scientists when carbon dioxide
escaped from a volcanic lake and killed 1,200 people and everything else within a 15-mile radius. Even many
CCS card-carrying scientists admit that there are uncertainties in expecting geologic formations to store carbon
forever. While Herzog told the Senate subcommittee that CCS is "likely to be safe [and] effective," he also said
key questions were, "What is the probability of CO2 escaping from injection sites? What are the attendant
risks? Can we detect leakage if it occurs?"
No War / K-Waves – 2NC
Economic growth makes conflict escalation more likely.
Boehmer 10 (Charles, professor of political science at the University of Texas – El Paso and Ph.D. in Political
Science from Pennsylvania State University, “Economic Growth and Violent International Conflict: 18751999,” Defence and Peace Economics, June, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pg. 249-268)
The theory set forth earlier theorizes that economic growth increases perceptions of state strength, increasing
the likelihood of violent interstate conflicts. Economic growth appears to increase the resolve of leaders to stand
against challenges and the willingness to escalate disputes. A non-random pattern exists where higher rates of
GDP growth over multiple years are positively and significantly related to the most severe international
conflicts, whereas this is not true for overall conflict initiations. Moreover, growth of military expenditures, as a
measure of the war chest proposition, does not offer any explanation for violent interstate conflicts. This is not
to say that growth of military expenditures never has any effect on the occurrence of war, although such a link
is not generally true in the aggregate using a large sample of states. In comparison, higher rates of economic
growth are significantly related to violent interstate conflicts in the aggregate. States with growing economies
are more apt to reciprocate military challenges by other states and become involved in violent interstate
conflicts. The results also show that theories from the Crisis-Scarcity perspective lack explanatory power
linking GDP growth rates to war at the state level of analysis. This is not to say that such theories completely
lack explanatory power in general, but more particularly that they cannot directly link economic growth rates to
state behavior in violent interstate conflicts. In contrast, theories of diversionary conflict may well hold some
explanatory power, although not regarding GDP growth in a general test of states from all regions of the world
across time. Perhaps diversionary theory better explains state behaviors short of war, where the costs of
externalizing domestic tensions do not become too costly, or in relation to the foreign policies of particular
countries. In many circumstances, engaging in a war to divert attention away from domestic conditions would
seemingly exacerbate domestic crisis conditions unless the chances of victory were practically assured.
Nonetheless, this study does show that domestic conflict is associated with interstate conflict. If diversionary
conflict theory has any traction as an economic explanation of violent interstate conflicts, it may require the
study of other explanatory variables besides overall GDP growth rates, such as unemployment or inflation rates.
The contribution of this article has been to examine propositions about economic growth in a global study. Most
existing studies on this topic focus on only the United States, samples of countries that are more developed on
average (due to data availability in the past), or are based on historical information and not economic GDP data.
While I have shown that there is no strong evidence linking military expenditures to violent interstate conflicts
at the state level of analysis, much of the remaining Growth-as-Catalyst perspective is grounded in propositions
that are not directly germane to questions about state conflict behavior, such as those linking state behavior to
long-cycles, or those that remain at the systemic level. What answer remains linking economic growth to war
once we eliminate military expenditures as an explanation? Considering that the concept of foreign policy mood
is difficult to identify and measure, and that the bulk of the literature relies solely on the American historical
experience, I do not rely on that concept. It is still possible that such moods affect some decision- makers.
Instead, similar to Blainey, I find that economic growth, when sustained over a stretch of years, has its strongest
effect on states once they find themselves in an international crisis. The results of this study suggest that states
such as China, which have a higher level of opportunity to become involved in violent interstate conflicts due to
their capabilities, geographic location, history of conflict, and so on, should also have a higher willingness to
fight after enjoying multiple years of recent economic growth. One does not have to assume that an aggressive
China will emerge from growth. If conflicts do present themselves, then China may be more likely to escalate a
war given its recent national performance.
Expectations and need for resources make upswing wars comparatively worse
Mauer, economist, 1986
(Nathan, The Kondratieif Waves, p 197-8)
The overall trend of the economy shapes perceptions as to its strength and direction. In a hull market, "experts"
are almost uniformly optimistic; in a bear market the owlish analysts almost universally suggest caution. It is
during the upward swings, soon after a trough and just before a peak, that wars become more likely. It
should be noted that peak wars are the result of a different kind of socioeconomic psychological pressure and
have quite different economic results than trough wars. Nations become socially and politically unsettled after a
long period of boom and expansion, perhaps because in their final stages, peoples' expectations begin to outrun
actual growth in the general level of prosperity. War then becomes the ultimate destination. Inasmuch as all
nations arc attempting to expand simultaneously, the intense competition for resources and markets leads
eventually to military confrontations, which become contagious. One explanation suggested is that during
trough wars the public is still largely concerned with private considerations and their own wellbeing. They tend
to be less interested in international disputes, world crusades, or campaigns involving large investment of cash,
effort, and the nervous energy needed to pursue projects to a conclusion. Trough wars tend to be short. They
are more a matter of choice and sudden decision by the stronger power. Inasmuch as peak wars are the result of
frustration of expectations {usually with economic elements), peak wars tend to be more desperate, more
widespread, and more destructive.
Growth increases the probability and magnitude of major conflict.
Klare 2001—Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College (Michael, The
next great arms race, Foreign Affairs. New York: Summer 1993. Vol. 72, Iss. 3; pg. 136, 17 pgs, ProQuest)
Clearly the growing military potential of the Pacific Rim countries is closely tied to their rapid growth
in economic power. Propelled in most cases by an export-driven industrial strategy, these countries
have achieved impressive gains in GNP over the past two decades, while the economies of most other
nations have declined. Between 1978 and 1989 the combined GNP of China, Japan and the so-called
little tigers--the newly industrialized countries (NICS) of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan and Thailand--increased by 166 percent, from $1.5 trillion to $4 trillion, while the total GNP of
the world increased by only 109 percent. The steady rise in GNP in these countries has provided their
governments with access to increased economic resources, which many have chosen to invest in the
expansion and modernization of military infrastructures. Total military spending by Japan and the six
NICS rose from $31.7 billion in 1979 to $51-4 billion in 1989, an increase of 62 percent.(1) More
recent data suggest that military spending by these countries, excluding Indonesia, continued to rise in
the early 1990s (see map).(2) Although reliable data on China's military outlays are difficult to acquire
(because so much of it is hidden in nonmilitary accounts), available information suggests that such
spending declined slightly in the mid-1980s but has soared since 1989, rising by 1O to 15 percent in
each of the past three years. In all of these countries, moreover, increased military spending has been
accompanied by stepped-up purchases of imported weapons and increased investment in domestic arms
production capabilities. The burgeoning economic power of the Pacific Rim countries is related to their
military potential in other significant ways. As trading nations that are highly dependent on seaborne
commerce for imports and exports, these countries naturally have a strong interest in the free
movement of maritime trade--an interest that is manifest in their growing investment in naval forces.
Japan, for instance, is building four or more Aegis-class destroyers, plus a fleet of modern frigates and
submarines; Taiwan has ordered six Lafayette-class frigates from France and is building eight PFGclass frigates under license from the United States; Singapore is building five Type-62 corvettes under
license from Germany; Malaysia has ordered two missile frigates from Britain; Thailand has acquired
six Jianghu-class frigates from China; and Indonesia has purchased 39 former East German naval
vessels (including 12 guided missile corvettes) from Germany. To finance continued economic growth
these countries seek to harvest the oil and fishing resources of their offshore territories; and because the
boundaries of these offshore regions--or "exclusive economic zones" (EEZs)--are in many cases
overlapping and contested, there is a growing risk of territorial conflict. This risk is most acute in the
case of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, two groups of islands in the South China Sea that are
subject to competing claims by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.
Because the islands are thought to sit astride vast oil reserves, each country has resisted efforts by the
others to claim and occupy the islands, and each has periodically sent naval vessels into the area to
assert its respective claim--on some occasions producing armed clashes. More recently, China has built
a military airstrip (capable of accommodating its 27 fighters) and naval facilities on Woody Island in
the Paracels. Economic growth in the Pacific Rim is closely tied to technological development, and this
too has significant military implications. To sustain their economic growth into the 21st century, many
countries have invested in the development of modern electronics, communications and aerospace
industries. While the products of these industries are intended for civilian markets, these technologies
also have significant military uses--especially the development of hightech weapons of the sort used
with such dramatic effect in the Persian Gulf conflict. As these industrial efforts mature, therefore, the
Pacific Rim countries will be in a strong position to manufacture advanced military systems and
components. Of course, the nations of the Pacific Rim will not benefit equally from the accumulation
of wealth and technology in the region. Some, like Cambodia, North Korea, the Philippines and
Vietnam, have benefited very little from the economic growth of the 1980s and are not likely to make
significant gains in the near future; others, like China and Indonesia, have generated significant pockets
of prosperity but still retain large reservoirs of poverty and underdevelopment. This disparity in the
distribution of wealth could itself prove a significant source of conflict, especially when the divide
between rich and poor coincides with ethnic or religious differences, or when disputed territories (such
as the Paracel and Spratly islands) may provide significant sources of future wealth. As memory of the
Cold War recedes, and with it fear of the Soviet Union (and its successor states), regional security
concerns will increasingly be shaped by worry over the potential military threat posed by China and
Japan, the two most powerful nations in the area, and by other regional antagonisms. China has
recently increased its military spending and appears to be placing greater emphasis on preparation for
regional conflict--an emphasis that has understandably generated anxiety in neighboring countries,
especially Taiwan. These two states have greatly increased their bilateral trade and have initiated direct
political consultations, but neither one has repudiated its historical claim to the territory of the other
and both have increased their investment in military preparedness. Indeed, the China-Taiwan nexus
probably constitutes the most vibrant arms market in the world today, with leaders of both countries
signing multibillion-dollar contracts for the acquisition of modern weapons. By agreeing to sell F-16s
to Taiwan, the United States has emboldened other Western suppliers-notably France and Germany--to
offer late-model aircraft and warships to Taipei despite threats of economic retaliation by Beijing. The
Chinese, for their part, have been taking advantage of hard times in Russia by acquiring a wide range
of sophisticated Soviet weapons at rock-bottom prices; among the items mentioned in recent reports of
Chinese bargain hunting are MiG-31 interceptors, Tu-22 bombers, T-72M main battle tanks, A-50
airborne warning and control planes, and S-300 ground-based antiballistic missiles. Equally worrisome
is Beijing's military buildup on Hainan and Woodylsland, signaling an inclination to dominate the
South China Sea area by force rather than to negotiate shared control with other claimants to the
Spratly and Paracel chains. From this perspective, China's recent acquisition of long-range aircraft and
in-flight refueling technology from the former Soviet Union is considered particularly menacing.
Should Beijing continue to acquire advanced weapons and technologies at its current pace, it will
undoubtedly spur neighbors such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia to accelerate their own armsacquisition efforts and to place further emphasis on the development of high-tech arms industries.
While Japan has publicly eschewed any intention of building up a large, offensively oriented military
capacity, its neighbors retain such traumatic memories of the Japanese conquest and occupation during
World War II that any sign of increased military activity by Japan inevitably generates anxieties
throughout the region. Thus, Tokyo's recent decisions to send (noncombatant) peacekeeping forces to
Cambodia--the first overseas deployment of Japanese troops since World War II--has provoked much
concern in Southeast Asia. Also worrisome to some neighbors is Japan's planned procurement of large
tank-transport ships and long-range transport aircraft--acquisitions that suggest an interest in power
projection capabilities of a sort the Japanese have not possessed since 1945. Should Tokyo proceed
with these plans, it will surely rekindle fears of Japanese expansionism thereby spark increased arms
spending by other Pacific Rim nations. Regional tensions have also been fed by North Korea's apparent
pursuit of nuclear weapons and its continuing refusal to open suspect nuclear facilities to international
inspection. Although Pyongyang's nuclear activities are of greatest concern to South Korea and the
United States (which still stations 35,000 troops in Korea), they also menace other countries in the area,
especially Japan, and are an added spur to regional arms buildups. No other Pacific Rim countries pose
a threat on a scale comparable to China, Japan and North Korea, but other regional rivalries abound and
are contributing to the widespread increases in military spending. With 700,000 troops, the Vietnamese
army remains a potent military force, and is often cited by Thailand as a justification for its continuing
arms buildup. Similarly, the military buildup in Malaysia evokes understandable concern in
neighboring Singapore, as does the steady improvement in Indonesian capabilities. AU of these
rivalries are balanced by growing trade and political links within the region, but are nevertheless likely
to figure in the long-term security planning of Pacific Rim states. For all of these reasons, the Pacific
Rim nations are likely to continue the expansion and modernization of their military capabilities in the
years ahead. These enhancements will take several forms. First is the development of modern naval and
ground forces with a significant capacity for power projection--that is, the ability to project military
power to neighboring countries or to offshore locations. Second is the importation of modern weapons
and combat-support systems. Third is the development of domestic military industries. And for some
countries, this process could entail a fourth dimension: the development or enhancement of weapons of
mass destruction and their associated delivery systems. No doubt the most significant development in
military organization is the transformation of the Chinese military from a large manpower-intensive
force with relatively obsolete equipment to a smaller but much better equipped force. The total strength
of the People's Liberation Army has dropped from approximately four million troops in the mid-1980s
to roughly three million today, while more money has been channeled toward the development and
production of modern missiles, air and naval craft In 1985 China's Central Military Commission
directed the PLA to shift its primary strategic focus from preparation for all-out war with the U.S.S.R.
to preparation for regional conflicts on China's periphery. In line with this shift, the Chinese are
upgrading their power projection capabilities and have deployed additional forces at bases in Zhanjiang
on the southern coast and on Hainan Island in the South China Sea. While the total strength of the
Japanese Self-Defense Forces is likely to remain quite modest (under 250,000 soldiers), reflecting both
internal and external concerns over the possible revival of Japanese militarism, the SDF is acquiring
increasingly capable equipment and, under pressure from the United States, has extended its maritime
defensive screen to 1,000 nautical miles from the main islands. Taiwan and South Korea are also
placing greater emphasis on their long-range air and naval capabilities, procuring hundreds of new
combat planes from the United States and building dozens of new frigates and destroyers. North Korea,
unable to compete with South Korea in high-tech conventional arms due to its financial straits and the
collapse of the U.S.S.R., appears to have placed greater emphasis on the development of ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction. In the southern area, regional powers--notably Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand--are developing modern multiservice military forces with significant
power projection capabilities. These countries had until recently emphasized the counterinsurgency
capabilities of their militaries and thus lagged behind the northern powers (China, Japan, Taiwan and
the two Koreas) in the development of modern air and naval forces. To make up for this deficiency and
to enhance their capacity for power projection these countries are investing in the development of "blue
water" navies (that is, forces capable of oceanic rather than merely coastal operation) as well as in the
formation of mobile combat forces and long-range bomber/attack squadrons. Characteristic of these
efforts are plans by Malaysia to acquire two modern frigates (with more likely to follow) from Britain
and to create a division-sized rapid deployment force equipped with mobile artillery and antitank
weapons. Singapore is also constructing a bluewater navy (to be organized around the Type-62
corvettes now being built) and, like Malaysia, is creating a division-sized RDF. Meanwhile, Thailand is
modernizing its navy and air force and building new air and naval facilities on its southeastern coast,
giving Bangkok a greater military presence in the South China Sea. Indonesia is also expanding its
blue-water naval capabilities and, like Singapore and Thailand, has ordered F-16 fighters from the
United States. To equip their new forces and to enhance the combat capabilities of existing units, the
Pacific Rim countries are buying significant quantities of modern weapons and support systems. Total
spending on imported arms by the major Pacific Rim powers (China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia,
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the two Koreas) rose from an average of $2.5 billion per year in
1979-81 to $4.6 billion in 1987-89 (in current dollars), an increase of 84 percent.(3) More recent arms
import statistics are not yet available, but press reports from the region suggest that the trend toward
ever-increasing levels of weapons spending has continued into the 1990s. The data on arms transfers
also indicates that many of the Pacific Rim countries are acquiring sophisticated radar and electronic
gear, airborne reconnaissance and patrol planes and other high-tech equipment. Military officials in
these countries are acutely aware of the impact of modern technology on combat operations and are
determined to provide their forces with as much high-tech equipment as their budgets will allow. Thus
Japan, Singapore and Taiwan have all purchased E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft from
the United States (Japan will also acquire two Boeing E-767 Airborne Warning and Control System
planes in 1998), and both Taiwan and Japan have drawn on domestic and imported technology to
develop advanced radar systems of their own. HOME-MADE WEAPONS To a greater degree than in
any other arms importing area of the Third World, acquisitions in the Pacific Rim have been
accompanied by "offset" agreements entailing the transfer of military technology from supplier to
recipient and by direct government investment in military research and development and production.
All the NICS, plus China, Japan and North Korea, are now producers of at least some military
equipment, and many have invested considerable resources in the establishment of modern naval and
aerospace production facilities. As a result these countries are becoming increasingly self-sufficient in
the production of advanced weapons systems and, in some cases, have emerged as major arms
exporters. The development of domestic arms industries by emerging industrial powers is not unique to
the Pacific Rim area. What makes the situation in the region so significant, however, is the combination
of growing economic resources with which to pursue these plans and the emergence in many of these
countries of civilian industries with considerable scientific and technological expertise. Because the
more advanced Pacific Rim countries are able to finance their military endeavors through growing
trade surpluses and can draw upon domestic firms for necessary technical know-how, they are likely to
outstrip all other Third World producers in the early 21st century and to move much closer to the
advanced industrial powers. Currently the Pacific Rim countries with the most elaborate arms
production capabilities are China and Japan. China has long produced a wide variety of military
equipment, much of it based on Soviet designs of the 1950s and 1960s. In recent years the Chinese
have attempted to upgrade their equipment with imported technology and have begun to produce
missiles and electronic systems of a relatively modern design. Some of this technology has come from
the West, through both licit and illicit channels.(4) Recently, China has sought to benefit from
economic hardship in Russia by buying Soviet weapons and technology at bargain-basement prices.
Japan, although not normally known as a major arms producer, has become self-sufficient in many
combat systems and is producing a host of advanced weapons under license from the United States.
South Korea's defense expenditures rose from about $10.6 billion in 1990 to an estimated $12.4 billion
in 1992, an increase of 17 percent, and are expected to rise by similar amounts in the years to follow.
Moreover, the proportion of its defense budget devoted to research and development is scheduled to
grow steadily throughout the 1990s, from 1.5 percent in 199O to 3 percent in 1996 and 7 percent at the
beginning of the next century. These funds will be used to develop indigenous military-technological
capabilities and to attract foreign technology through arms-related offset programs. Ultimately, Seoul
seeks to become self-sufficient in the production of basic combat systems and to rely on domestic
sources for all but the most advanced technologies. Taiwan's development plans look much like South
Korea's, spurred by a similar goal of achieving self-sufficiency in the production of all but the most
sophisticated weapons systems by the year 2000. As in South Korea, Taiwanese defense spending is
expected to rise in the years ahead, with much of this increase devoted to the enhancement of
indigenous research and development and production capabilities. To promote greater self-reliance in
the development of military-related technologies, Taipei has funneled vast sums into government
laboratories and private research and development firms and has financed the education of thousands of
Taiwanese scientists and engineers--many of them at advanced educational institutions abroad,
especially the United States. Although similar to the South Korean arms program in many respects, the
Taiwanese effort differs from South Korea's in the degree to which it relies on government facilities
rather than private firms. Hence, the design and development of the aircraft and missiles is largely the
responsibility of the government-owned Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, while the
actual production of such systems is performed by the air force's Aero Industry Development Center.
Similarly, major ship construction is conducted by the state-owned China Shipbuilding Corporation.
After China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan the most ambitious arms production endeavors in the
Pacific Rim area are to be found in Indonesia and Singapore. Since the mid-1970s the Indonesian
government has devoted considerable resources to the development of a domestic aerospace and
shipbuilding capacity. Until now these firms have concentrated on the acquisition of foreign
technology through licensing and coproduction ventures; like South Korea and Taiwan, however,
Indonesia is increasing its investment in military research and development and seeks to become more
self-reliant in the development of key military technologies. Singapore, in line with its policy of
promoting export-oriented industrial growth, has developed a diversified defense industry with a strong
research and development base. As in Taiwan, the state has played a key role in the development and
management of domestic arms firms. Major projects at present include the overhaul and modernization
of military aircraft, assembly of Italian S-211 jet trainers and French AS-332 Super Puma helicopters,
and licensed production of German Type-62 missile corvettes. In addition to producing arms for
domestic use, Singaporean companies also assemble and manufacture a wide variety of military
systems for export. Given the current limitations of their scientific-industrial infrastructures, Indonesia
and Singapore are not likely to achieve the high degree of military self-sufficiency expected of South
Korea and Taiwan in the early 21st century. The same, of course, can be said for Malaysia and
Thailand. Nevertheless, these countries are enjoying high levels of economic growth and are placing
greater emphasis on the development of high-tech industries. If these trends continue for another 1O or
15 years, many of these countries will be capable of producing a wide variety of modern weapons with
substantial indigenous design input.
Countries can afford war in the upswing – empirically proven since 1495
Modelski, professor of political science, and Thompson, professor of political science, 1996
(George and William, Leading Sectors and World Powers, pg 20-22)
Goldstein (1985, 1987, 1988, 1991a) has probably contributed more than anyone else to reviving the question of
how wars and prosperity are linked. His 1988 analysis went some way in summarizing many of the arguments
concerning economic long waves and war. His 1991 analysis is one of the more sophisticated empirical studies
to emerge after nearly a century of controversy (spatiotemporal boundaries: world system from the mideighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries). The basic perspective that emerges from his analyses, outlined in
figure 2.2, sees economic upswings increasing the probability of severe wars. Severe wars usher in a phase
of stagnation from which the world economy eventually recovers leading to another resurgence of robust
economic growth. Goldstein’s analysis suggests that this process has gone on since at least 1495. Economic
upswings create economic surpluses and full war chests. The ability to wage war makes severe wars more
likely. Severe wars, in turn, consume the surpluses and war chests and put an end to the growth upswing.
Decades are required to rebuild. While there may be some gains registered in terms of resource mobilization for
combat purposes, these gains are offset by the losses brought about by wartime distortions and destruction.
Goldstein is careful to distinguish between production and prices. Prices, in his view, are functions of war.
Other things being equal, the severity of the war greatly effects the rate of war-induced inflation—in other
words, the greater the severity, then the higher the rate of inflation. When prices rise, real wages decline. Yet he
also notes that production (production waves are said to precede war/price waves by some ten to fifteen years)
is already stagnating toward the end of the upswing. This phenomenon is explained in terms of demand
increases outstripping supply. As a result, inflation occurs. The lack of clarity on this issue may be traceable to
the lack of specification among innovation, investment, and production. Cycles in innovation and investment
are viewed as reinforcing the production long wave. Increases in innovation facilitate economic growth but
growth discourages further innovation. Investment increases on the upswing but, eventually, over investment
results. Investors retrench and growth slows down as a consequence. What is not exactly specified is whether
innovation, investment, war, or some combination of the three processes is responsible for ending the upswing.
Goldstein also raises the question of how these economic/war cycles impact the distribution of capabilities
among the major powers. War severity increases capability concentration. Relative capabilities then begin a
process of diffusion as they move toward equality among the major powers. Another bout of severe war ensues
and the cycle repeats itself. In addition to war, differential rates of innovation and production influence relative
capability standings. Presumably, all three factors share some responsibility for generating the fluctuations in
capability concentration.
Worse wars in the upswing
Goldstein, professor of International Relations at American University, 1988
(Joshua S., Long Cycles, pg 29)
Kondratieff’s response to Trotsky’s argument was that Trotsky “takes an idealist point of view.”17 New
markets and resources are drawn into the capitalist system “not by accident, but in face of the existing economic
preconditions.” That is, the internal dynamics of capitalism shape the long wave, which in turn shapes the
superstructural factors such as innovation and war that Trotsky called “external.” Specifically, Kondratieff
argued that “during the recession . . . an unusually large number of important discoveries and inventions in the
technique of production and communication are made, which, however, are usually applied on a large scale
only at the beginning of the next long upswing” ([1926] 1935:111). Likewise, “the most disastrous and
extensive wars and revolutions occur” on the upswing of the long wave (p. 111), because long-term economic
expansion aggravates the international struggle for markets and raw materials while domestically sharpening the
struggle over the distribution of the fruits of that economic growth ([1928] 1984:95). Wars, revolutions, and
innovations are thus products, not causes, of the long wave.
A2: Power Gaps
Chinese economic slowdown now
Straits Times 10 (Grace Ng, China Correspondent, 7/10/10, "China losing steam; To boost or not to boost? As
Beijing frets over when to exit its economic stimulus plan, Washington is mulling a fresh round of measures.
The Straits Times looks at the dilemmas faced by the two countries which are facing slowing growth", lexis]
China's sizzling economic growth is starting to lose steam, putting its policy makers in a bind about whether to
ease out of stimulative policies or clamp down further on overheating. After expanding by a blistering 11.9 per
cent in the first quarter of the year, the world's third-largest economy is showing signs of slowing down,
particularly in its vital manufacturing, auto and property sectors. In a way, the slowdown comes as good news.
Chinese economists and policy-makers have been warning that the party cannot go on forever, and a cool-down
in the second half of the year might well be needed to prevent the economy from overheating. Yet, there is at
the same time a growing sense of disquiet about whether the Chinese economy is peaking too early - a
development that may bode ill in a global economy still struggling to come to terms with the euro zone financial
crisis, and a wobbly recovery in the United States. Such fresh uncertainties are putting Beijing's policy-makers
in a precarious position: When to exit its stimulus policies - and whether the Chinese economy is ready for this.
This is reflected in the Chinese central bank's nuanced announcement on Thursday that it will continue its
relatively loose monetary policy during the second half of the year - but still needs to prepare expectations for
an orderly exit. Compounding this conundrum are concerns that the leading economic indicators in June are
coming in even lower than expected. China's gigantic manufacturing sector, for instance, has been softening
since April. The purchasing managers' index, which tracks industrial activity, came in lower than expected last
month. A services-industry index, meanwhile, slid to a 15-month low, while auto sales - the poster-child of
China's economic rebound last year - failed to hit targets last month. And growth in China's exports is likely to
have slowed to 40 per cent last month according to a Dow Jones Newswires survey of economists. The
concerns about weakness in the country's growth, combined with warnings from a top official this week about a
price correction in the property sector in three months' time, has seen stock markets slumping. And the outlook
is likely to get even more cloudy, according to analysts. Mr Wang Jian, a research fellow at the China Society
of Macroeconomics, expects demand from China's key trading partners, especially Europe, to weaken. Chinese
exporters, he says, are likely to be hit as countries in the West increasingly adopt austerity measures to cope
with the crisis. 'The US and European economies are likely to decline in the second half of the year. This will
drag down China too.' All this comes as the effects of a four trillion yuan (S $814 billion) stimulus package,
unveiled in late 2008, continue to fade, and Beijing's curbs on the housing market, implemented to choke off
speculation, rein in the property sector. It has led analysts like Professor Yuan Gangming of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences to warn of a growth reversal. 'The biggest risk China faces this year is a
slowdown in the economy - and wrong government policies to cope with this, which may exacerbate the
slowdown,' he said.
Slow growth will sustain the power gap – China relies on US demand to grow
Friedberg 10 (Aaron, served from 2003 to 2005 in the office of the Vice President of the United States as
deputy assistant for national-security affairs and director of policy planning, PhD in Politics from Harvard,
Director of Princeton's Research Program in International Security at the Woodrow Wilson School as well as
Acting Director of the Center of International Studies at Princeton, former fellow at the Smithsonian
Institution’s Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, and Harvard
University’s Center for International Affairs, “Implications of the Financial Crisis for the US–China Rivalry”,
Survival, Volume 52, Number 4, pg. 31 – 54)
While there are some optimistic outliers, the emerging consensus among forecasters is that the United States
will not bounce back immediately to its pre-crisis performance. Instead of averaging 3-3.5% per year (to say
nothing of the 4% some had predicted at the turn of the century, before the dot.com bubble burst) growth is
expected to remain at about 2-2.5% for much of this decade and perhaps beyond.3 As for China, after rising to a
peak of 13% in 2007, its annual growth was cut almost in half (to around 7% on a year-on-year basis), during
the initial stages of the global crisis.4 Thanks to a very aggressive response by the central authorities, growth
climbed back to just under 9% in 2009. Some estimates show it hovering between 9 and 10% for at least the
next few years, while others are even more bullish, at least in the near term.5 If China can return to something
near its pre-crisis, double-digit growth rates while the United States continues to limp along at roughly 0.5-1%
less than its earlier performance, the gap between the two countries will obviously close even more rapidly than
it was before. Whether or not China can sustain its initial recovery remains to be seen. At least in the near term,
Beijing responded to the crisis by doubling down on a development model that was already approaching the
limits of its utility. Rather than taking aggressive steps to boost consumer spending as a share of GDP, a course
that both outside experts and many Chinese officials have identified as essential to sustaining long-term
growth, the regime chose initially to pump even more money into infrastructure projects and to provide both
direct and indirect support for a variety of export industries.6 While this approach may have been effective in
preventing an even steeper short-term drop in output, it threatens to create massive excess capacity, fuelling
asset bubbles, weighing down banks with more non-performing loans and setting the stage for another
slowdown that will be even deeper and more difficult to manage. As economist Stephen Roach points out,
Beijing appears to have acted on the assumption that, as in previous recessions, foreign (and especially US)
demand would soon recover, leading to a rise in exports and a resumption of rapid growth. If this turns out not
to be the case, however, Roach concludes that China 'runs the real risk of facing a more pronounced shortfall in
economic growth'.7 In sum, short-term expedients may end up hastening the day of reckoning for China's
investment-heavy, export-led development strategy. While the regime has recently taken steps to encourage
domestic demand, permitting workers wages to rise and the renminbi to appreciate, the changes to date have
been small and tentative.8
A2: Resiliency
Unnatural disruption of the environment makes warming a unique risk.
Environmental Defense Fund, a US-based nonprofit environmental advocacy group, “Global Warming
Myths and Facts,” 1/13/2009, http://mrgreenbiz.wordpress.com/2009/01/13/global-warming-myths-andfacts-2/
There is no debate among scientists about the basic facts of global warming. The most respected scientific
bodies have stated unequivocally that global warming is occurring, and people are causing it by burning fossil
fuels (like coal, oil and natural gas) and cutting down forests. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences, which in
2005 the White House called "the gold standard of objective scientific assessment," issued a joint statement
with 10 other National Academies of Science saying "the scientific understanding of climate change is now
sufficiently clear to justify nations taking prompt action. It is vital that all nations identify cost-effective steps
that they can take now, to contribute to substantial and long-term reduction in net global greenhouse gas
emissions." (Joint Statement of Science Academies: Global Response to Climate Change [PDF], 2005) The only debate in the science community about global warming is about how much and how fast warming
will continue as a result of heat-trapping emissions. Scientists have given a clear warning about global warming, and we have more than enough facts — about causes and fixes — to implement solutions right now. MYTH
Even if global warming is a problem, addressing it will hurt American industry and workers. FACT A well designed trading program will harness American ingenuity to decrease heat-trapping pollution cost-effectively,
jumpstarting a new carbon economy. Claims that fighting global warming will cripple the economy and cost hundreds of thousands of jobs are unfounded. In fact, companies that are already reducing their heat-trapping
emissions have discovered that cutting pollution can save money. The cost of a comprehensive national greenhouse gas reduction program will depend on the precise emissions targets, the timing for the reductions and the
means of implementation. An independent MIT study found that a modest cap-and-trade system would cost less than $20 per household annually and have no negative impact on employment. Experience has shown that
properly designed emissions trading programs can reduce compliance costs significantly compared with other regulatory approaches. For example, the U.S. acid rain program reduced sulfur dioxide emissions by more than 30
percent from 1990 levels and cost industry a fraction of what the government originally estimated, according to EPA. Furthermore, a mandatory cap on emissions could spur technological innovation that could create jobs and
wealth. Letting global warming continue until we are forced to address it on an emergency basis could disrupt and severely damage our economy. It is far wiser and more cost-effective to act now. MYTH Water vapor is the
Although water vapor traps more
heat than CO2, because of the relationships among CO2, water vapor and climate, to fight global warming
nations must focus on controlling CO2. Atmospheric levels of CO2 are determined by how much coal, natural
gas and oil we burn and how many trees we cut down, as well as by natural processes like plant growth.
Atmospheric levels of water vapor, on the other hand, cannot be directly controlled by people; rather, they are
determined by temperatures. The warmer the atmosphere, the more water vapor it can hold. As a result, water
vapor is part of an amplifying effect. Greenhouse gases like CO2 warm the air, which in turn adds to the stock
of water vapor, which in turn traps more heat and accelerates warming. Scientists know this because of satellite measurements documenting a rise in
water vapor concentrations as the globe has warmed.
The best way to lower temperature and thus reduce water vapor levels is to
reduce CO2 emissions. MYTH Global warming and extra CO2 will actually be beneficial — they reduce cold-related deaths and stimulate crop growth. FACT Any beneficial
effects will be far outweighed by damage and disruption. Even a warming in just the middle range of
scientific projections would have devastating impacts on many sectors of the economy. Rising seas would inundate coastal communities,
contaminate water supplies with salt and increase the risk of flooding by storm surge, affecting tens of millions of people globally. Moreover, extreme weather events, including heat
waves, droughts and floods, are predicted to increase in frequency and intensity, causing loss of lives and
property and throwing agriculture into turmoil. Even though higher levels of CO2 can act as a plant
fertilizer under some conditions, scientists now think that the "CO2 fertilization" effect on crops has been
overstated; in natural ecosystems, the fertilization effect can diminish after a few years as plants
acclimate. Furthermore, increased CO2 may benefit undesirable, weedy species more than desirable
species. Higher levels of CO2 have already caused ocean acidification, and scientists are warning of
potentially devastating effects on marine life and fisheries. Moreover, higher levels of regional ozone (smog), a result of warmer temperatures, could worsen
most important, abundant greenhouse gas. So if we’re going to control a greenhouse gas, why don’t we control it instead of carbon dioxide (CO2)? FACT
respiratory illnesses. Less developed countries and natural ecosystems may not have the capacity to adapt. The notion that there will be regional “winners” and “losers” in global warming is based on a world-view from the
1950’s. We live in a global community. Never mind the moral implications — when an environmental catastrophe creates millions of refugees half-way around the world, Americans are affected. MYTH Global warming is
The global warming we are experiencing is not natural. People are
causing it. People are causing global warming by burning fossil fuels (like oil, coal and natural gas) and
cutting down forests. Scientists have shown that these activities are pumping far more CO2 into the atmosphere
than was ever released in hundreds of thousands of years. This buildup of CO2 is the biggest cause of global
warming. Since 1895, scientists have known that CO2 and other greenhouse gases trap heat and warm the earth. As the warming has intensified over the past three decades, scientific scrutiny has
increased along with it. Scientists have considered and ruled out other, natural explanations such as sunlight, volcanic
eruptions and cosmic rays. (IPCC 2001) Though natural amounts of CO2 have varied from 180 to 300 parts per million (ppm), today's CO2 levels are around 380 ppm. That's 25% more than
the highest natural levels over the past 650,000 years. Increased CO2 levels have contributed to periods of higher average temperatures
throughout that long record. (Boden, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center) As for previous Arctic warming, it is true that there were stretches of warm periods over the Arctic earlier in
just part of a natural cycle. The Arctic has warmed up in the past. FACT
the 20th century. The limited records available for that time period indicate that the warmth did not affect as many areas or persist from year to year as much as the current warmth. But that episode, however warm it was, is
not relevant to the issue at hand. Why? For one, a brief regional trend does not discount a longer global phenomenon. We know that the planet has been warming over the past several decades and Arctic ice has been melting
unlike the earlier periods of Arctic warmth, there is no expectation that the current upward trend in
Arctic temperatures will reverse; the rising concentrations of greenhouse gases will prevent that from
persistently. And
happening. MYTH We can adapt to climate change — civilization has survived droughts and temperature shifts before. FACT Although humans as a whole have
survived the vagaries of drought, stretches of warmth and cold and more, entire societies have collapsed from
dramatic climatic shifts. The current warming of our climate will bring major hardships and economic
dislocations — untold human suffering, especially for our children and grandchildren. We are already seeing significant costs from today's global warming which is caused by greenhouse gas pollution. Climate
has changed in the past and human societies have survived, but today six billion people depend on interconnected ecosystems and complex technological infrastructure. What's more, unless we limit the
amount of heat-trapping gases we are putting into the atmosphere, we will face a warming trend unseen
since human civilization began 10,000 years ago. (IPCC 2001) The consequences of continued warming at
current rates are likely to be dire. Many densely populated areas, such as low-lying coastal regions, are highly vulnerable to climate shifts. A middle-of-the-range projection is that the homes
of 13 to 88 million people around the world would be flooded by the sea each year in the 2080s. Poorer countries and small island nations will have the hardest time adapting. (McLean et al. 2001) In what appears to be the
first forced move resulting from climate change, 100 residents of Tegua island in the Pacific Ocean were evacuated by the government because rising sea levels were flooding their island. Some 2,000 other islanders plan a
similar move to escape rising waters. In the United States, the village of Shishmaref in Alaska, which has been inhabited for 400 years, is collapsing from melting permafrost. Relocation plans are in the works.
<continues…>
Scarcity of water and food could lead to major conflicts with broad ripple effects throughout the globe. Even if
people find a way to adapt, the wildlife and plants on which we depend may be unable to adapt to rapid climate
change. While the world itself will not end, the world as we know it may disappear. MYTH Recent cold winters and cool summers don’t feel like global warming to me. FACT While different
pockets of the country have experienced some cold winters here and there, the overall trend is warmer winters.
Measurements show that over the last century the Earth’s climate has warmed overall, in all seasons, and in
most regions. Climate skeptics mislead the public when they claim that the winter of 2003–2004 was the coldest ever in the northeastern United States. That winter was only the 33rd coldest in the region since
records began in 1896. Furthermore, a single year of cold weather in one region of the globe is not an indication of a trend in the
global climate, which refers to a long-term average over the entire planet. MYTH Global warming can’t be happening because some glaciers and
ice sheets are growing, not shrinking. FACT In most parts of the world, the retreat of glaciers has been dramatic. The best available scientific data indicate that Greenland's massive ice sheet is shrinking. Between 1961 and
The consensus among scientists is that rising air temperatures are the most important
factor behind the retreat of glaciers on a global scale over long time periods. Some glaciers in western Norway, Iceland and New Zealand have been
1997, the world’s glaciers lost 890 cubic miles of ice.
expanding during the past few decades. That expansion is a result of regional increases in storm frequency and snowfall rather than colder temperatures — not at all incompatible with a global warming trend. In Greenland, a
NASA satellite that can measure the ice mass over the whole continent has found that although there is variation from month to month, over the longer term, the ice is disappearing. In fact, there are worrisome signs that
melting is accelerating: glaciers are moving into the ocean twice as fast as a decade ago, and, over time, more and more glaciers have started to accelerate. What is most alarming is the prediction, based on model calculations
and historical evidence, that an approximately 5.4 degree Fahrenheit increase in local Greenland temperatures will lead to irreversible meltdown and a sea-level rise of over 20 feet. Since the Arctic is warming 2-3 times faster
than the global average, this tipping point is not far away. The only study that has shown increasing ice mass in Greenland only looked at the interior of the ice sheet, not at the edges where melting occurs. This is actually in
line with climate model predictions that global warming would lead to a short-term accumulation of ice in the cold interior due to heavier snowfall. (Similarly, scientists have predicted that Antarctica overall will gain ice in
the near future due to heavier snowfall.) The scientists who published the study were careful to point out that their results should not be used to conclude that Greenland's ice mass as a whole is growing. In addition, their data
suggested that the accumulation of snow in the middle of the continent is likely to decrease over time as global warming continues. MYTH Accurate weather predictions a few days in advance are hard to come by. Why on
earth should we have confidence in climate projections decades from now? FACT Climate prediction is fundamentally different from weather prediction, just as climate is different from weather. It is often more difficult to
make an accurate weather forecast than a climate prediction. The accuracy of weather forecasting is critically dependent upon being able to exactly and comprehensively characterize the present state of the global atmosphere.
Climate prediction relies on other, longer ranging factors. For instance, we might not know if it will be below freezing on a specific December day in New England, but we know from our understanding of the region's climate
.
Today’s climate models can now reproduce the observed global average climates over the past century and
beyond. Such findings have reinforced scientist’s confidence in the capacity of models to produce reliable
projections of future climate. Current climate assessments typically consider the results from a range of models
and scenarios for future heat-trapping emissions in order to identify the most likely range for future climatic
change.
that the temperatures during the month will generally be low. Similarly, climate tells us that Seattle and London tend to be rainy, Florida and southern California are usually warm, and the Southwest is often dry and hot
Best research proves that the risk of warming is skyrocketing.
David Chandler, MIT News Office, 5-19-09, Climate change odds much worse than thought,
http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2009/roulette-0519.html
The most comprehensive modeling yet carried out on the likelihood of how much hotter the Earth's climate will
get in this century shows that without rapid and massive action, the problem will be about twice as severe as
previously estimated six years ago - and could be even worse than that. The study uses the MIT Integrated
Global Systems Model, a detailed computer simulation of global economic activity and climate processes that
has been developed and refined by the Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change since the
early 1990s. The new research involved 400 runs of the model with each run using slight variations in input
parameters, selected so that each run has about an equal probability of being correct based on present
observations and knowledge. Other research groups have estimated the probabilities of various outcomes, based
on variations in the physical response of the climate system itself. But the MIT model is the only one that
interactively includes detailed treatment of possible changes in human activities as well - such as the degree of
economic growth, with its associated energy use, in different countries. Study co-author Ronald Prinn, the codirector of the Joint Program and director of MIT's Center for Global Change Science, says that, regarding
global warming, it is important "to base our opinions and policies on the peer-reviewed science," he says. And
in the peer-reviewed literature, the MIT model, unlike any other, looks in great detail at the effects of economic
activity coupled with the effects of atmospheric, oceanic and biological systems. "In that sense, our work is
unique," he says.
Growth Causes Terrorism
Growth causes terrorism.
Audrey Kurth Cronin, Specialist in International Terrorism at the Congressional Research Service at the
Library of Congress, winter 2002/2003, Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,
International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 30–58
The objectives of international terrorism have also changed as a result of globalization. Foreign intrusions and
growing awareness of shrinking global space have created incentives to use the ideal asymmetrical weapon,
terrorism, for more ambitious purposes. The political incentives to attack major targets such as the United States
with powerful weapons have greatly increased. The perceived corruption of indigenous customs, religions,
languages, economies, and so on are blamed on an international system often unconsciously molded by
American behavior. The accompanying distortions in local communities as a result of exposure to the global
marketplace of goods and ideas are increasingly blamed on U.S.- sponsored modernization and those who
support it. The advancement of technology, however, is not the driving force behind the terrorist threat to the
United States and its allies, despite what some have assumed.59 Instead, at the heart of this threat are frustrated
populations and international movements that are increasingly inclined to lash out against U.S.-led
globalization. As Christopher Coker observes, globalization is reducing tendencies toward instrumental
violence (i.e., violence between states and even between communities), but it is enhancing incentives for
expressive violence (or violence that is ritualistic, symbolic, and communicative).60 The new international
terrorism is increasingly engendered by a need to assert identity or meaning against forces of homogeneity,
especially on the part of cultures that are threatened by, or left behind by, the secular future that Western-led
globalization brings. According to a report recently published by the United Nations Development Programme,
the region of greatest deªcit in measures of human development— the Arab world—is also the heart of the most
threatening religiously inspired terrorism.61 Much more work needs to be done on the signiªcance of this
correlation, but increasingly sources of political discontent are arising from disenfranchised areas in the Arab
world that feel left behind by the promise of globalization and its assurances of broader freedom, prosperity,
and access to knowledge. The results are dashed expectations, heightened resentment of the perceived U.S.-led
hegemonic system, and a shift of focus away from more proximate targets within the region. Of course, the
motivations behind this threat should not be oversimpliªed: Anti-American terrorism is spurred in part by a
desire to change U.S. policy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions as well as by growing antipathy in the
developing world vis-à-vis the forces of globalization. It is also crucial to distinguish between the motivations
of leaders such as Osama bin Laden and their followers. The former seem to be more driven by calculated
strategic decisions to shift the locus of attack away from repressive indigenous governments to the more
attractive and media-rich target of the United States. The latter appear to be more driven by religious concepts
cleverly distorted to arouse anger and passion in societies full of pent-up frustration. To some degree, terrorism
is directed against the United States because of its engagement and policies in various regions.62 AntiAmericanism is closely related to antiglobalization, because (intentionally or not) the primary driver of the
powerful forces resulting in globalization is the United States. Analyzing terrorism as something separate from
globalization is misleading and potentially dangerous. Indeed globalization and terrorism are intricately
intertwined forces characterizing international security in the twenty-ªrst century. The main question is whether
terrorism will succeed in disrupting the promise of improved livelihoods for millions of people on Earth.
Globalization is not an inevitable, linear development, and it can be disrupted by such unconventional means as
international terrorism. Conversely, modern international terrorism is especially dangerous because of the
power that it potentially derives from globalization—whether through access to CBNR weapons, global media
outreach, or a diverse network of ªnancial and information resources.