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Internet Security ECT 582 Robin Burke Outline Homework #5  Host security  Firewalls  IPsec / VPN  Homework #5  solution Host security  Every Internet host is vulnerable to attack   Network port is a front door to the whole world How to make hosts more secure? attacks  defenses  Attacks on Hosts      DoS  flood host with requests to tie up resources Authentication breach  attack authentication system to gain access Application vulnerability  attack application program to inject foreign code Virus/Trojan Horse  attack OS with a malicious program (malware) Social Engineering  attack organization to obtain authentication or other information Denial of Service  Attacks take different forms bogus requests  abuse of Internet protocols   Characteristics sudden change in system load  services unavailable or very slow  • may cause system crash  particular hosts targeted Defenses   Turn off unused services  if bogus packets never received, fewer resources used Request throttling  only accept requests at a certain rate • prevent server overload, but may hamper legitimate users  Request filtering  only allow requests from certain hosts  allow a fixed number of requests from a given host in a certain period • doesn't work against distributed attack  Most other approaches applied elsewhere in network Authentication breach  Characteristics   attacker tries to get access by masquerading as legitimate user Needs user id and password brute-force attack  sniffing attack  cracking attack  Authentication: brute force  Execution    user ids typically easy to find (email address, user directory on web) attempt all passwords Defense   request throttling lock-out • stop allowing authentication after n failed trials • can create denial of service Authentication: sniffing  Execution    copy all network traffic look for packets with authentication information Defense  use protocols in which authentication information is encrypted • FTPS instead of FTP • SSH instead of telnet • HTTPS instead of HTTP Authentication: cracking  Execution    steal copy of encrypted password file attempt to decrypt passwords Defense  access control measures to prevent access to password files • vary by system  good passwords • more than 8 characters • combinations of numeric and non-alphanumeric, upper- and lower-case Application attack  Characteristics  application bug is exploited • often buffer overflow  inject attacker's code into system • code executes with application privileges  can be used to launch additional attacks • classic "worm" behavior  Needs    knowledge of application needs to know OS Often downloadable tools can be used Application attack cont'd  Defenses attention to software security patches  subscribe to CERT mailing list  investigate vendor's coding practices  incorporate security into development methodology  examine application logs for unexpected activities  Malware  Characteristics  user deceived into executing malicious code • Many avenues: ActiveX controls, binary email attachments, web scripts Many tools exist to create  Worm behavior possible  • email replication Malware, cont'd  Defenses  anti-virus software • signatures must be updated regularly  email scanning • server-based best  application settings • IE scripting • MS Office macros • very problematic   user education better solution • less vulnerable applications / OSes • finer grainer control Social Engineering   Scenario  Call up individual in company (typically a secretary or switchboard person) Alice  Ask for name of tech support person (Bob)  Calls 2nd secretary Eve, claiming to work for Bob.  Tell Eve to reset her account password to the one he will give her.  Eve complies and now hacker has account access Result  2 phone calls = security hole Social Engineering, cont'd  Characteristics  very easy to do • Kevin Mitnick's favorite method  many kinds of information are sensitive • names, job descriptions, hardware/software configuration  Defense  need to know • don't give information to everyone • what they don't know, they can't reveal  security policies • "Let me call you back."  user education Problematic fact  Many avenues for host security to be compromised simple user error is enough  a large organization will have many hosts  Sun Tzu on firewalls   "If [the enemy] sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak" -- The Art of War Translation   enforcing perfect host security everywhere is impossible Solution   force the confrontation to take place at a single known location concentrate defense at that point Firewall A dedicated gateway machine with special security precautions on it, used to service outside network, especially Internet connections and dial-in lines. The idea is to protect a cluster of more loosely administered machines hidden behind it... --- FOLDOC Firewalls  Idea    Build security measures into a single host Force all inbound and outbound Internet traffic to pass through Enables    establishing a single security policy that all machines share machines behind the firewall have some protection firewall machine can be specially configured Firewall policies  Both in-bound and out-bound    what the outside world can do what local users can do Applications  which applications are accessible • boils down to port numbers  Hosts   which hosts are accessible Users  which users have access Firewall features  Minimal    Better    port blocking host blocking configurable logging user authentication / blocking Best  stateful inspection • track the progress of individual sessions • allow only legal actions Other features   Often implemented at the firewall NAT  network address translation  internal machines can "illegal" IP addresses • can't be reached by routing firewall pretends to originate requests VPN  virtual private network  encrypted traffic between firewall and external host  host authenticates and then is "inside" the firewall   Limitations  Firewall only defends the connection it is on        dial-in not protected wireless LAN not protected walking out with a CD-ROM, etc. Firewall can't protect against malware Firewalls can't protect against malicious insiders Firewalls must be carefully configured and closely monitored Firewalls can lead to a false sense of security Firewall types Packet-filtering  Application-level gateway  Circuit-level gateway  Packet-filtering  Firewall inspects packets and filters according to a policy  usually host- and port-based Circuit-level gateway   Firewall decides whether to allow connection Then just passes packets along Application-level gateway  Firewall is a proxy for all interactions TCP/IP Packet  Internet communication is done through packets   A packet is a fixed-size set of bytes with a specific format A typical TCP/IP packet contains:   Source IP, Source Port, Destination IP, Destination Port Payload • message part Packet routing Email Port Port Browser File My Computer IP address: 140.192.32.123 Web Server Email Server Internet FTP Server Remote Computer IP Address: 207.46.249.27 Packet-Filtering Router   A router applies a set of rules to each IP packet and forward or discards the packet The filter is typically set up as a list of rules based on matches to fields in the IP or TCP header  The fields are source/destination IP address, port number, etc.  If there is a match to one of the rules, that rules is invoked to determine whether to forward or discard the packet  If there is no match, the a default action is taken • Default discard policy • Default forward policy Example Action Ourhost Port Theirhost Port comment Block * * * * Default Action Ourhost Port Theirhost Port comment Block * * 207.46.29.27 * We don't trust this host Allow 140.192.32.1 25 * * Connection to our SMTP port Action Ourhost Port Theirhost Port comment Allow 140.192.*.* * * 25 Connection to their SMTP port Windows Firewall  Note this is a software firewall  not a dedicated firewall machine Outbound policies     Typically less restrictive than in-bound But – good citizenship  make it more difficult for hackers A packet filter can reject outbound packets with illegal IP addresses  could not have been legally generated inside the network Example  140.192.*.* are DePaul IP addresses  if an outbound packet has a source address of 207.34.102.2 • it is probably forged Characteristics   Pluses  Packet-filtering routers are simple, transparent to users, and fast Minuses  The router cannot prevent attacks that employ application-specific vulnerabilities or functions  The logging functionality in the router is limited  Most routers do not support advanced user authentication schemes  The router is vulnerable to attacks and exploits that take advantage of flaws in TCP/IP  The routers are susceptible to security breaches caused by improper configurations Circuit-Level Gateway  It does not permit end-to-end TCP connection    It can be a stand-alone system Or, it can be a specialized function performed by an application-level gateway for certain application It sets up two TCP connections    One TCP connection between inner host to the gateway Another TCP connection between the gateway to outside host It relays TCP segment from one connections to the other without examining the contents Characteristics  Pluses    Each established connection can be logged Can protect against some DoS attacks Minuses   May slow establishment of TCP connections Does not protect against attack to legal services • buffer overflow Application-level gateway   Also "proxy server" The firewall relays application-level traffic    external host contacts gateway gateway contacts internal host If the gateway does not support a specific application  the service cannot be forwarded across the firewall Characteristics  Pluses     every operation can be inspected and logged user authentication can be done at the gateway identity of internal system is hidden Minuses    slowest firewall hardest to configure costliest Asymmetric gateway Application-level gateway on inbound connections  Circuit-level gateway on outbound connections  internal users implicitly trusted  lower overhead  Bastion host  From firewall definition "dedicated gateway machine"  "special security precautions"   Precondition for gateway firewalls need a computer to perform gateway operations  but this computer is the first thing hackers will attack  Host  Secure operating system  OpenBSD Minimal services installed  Very restrictive authentication    one-time passwords Often some type of write-once logging  CD-ROM, uni-directional tape Proxy software    Specialized proxy software for each service being gatewayed Relay only to specific internal hosts Each proxy process runs without disk access    except for startup Each proxy process runs with minimal system privileges Each proxy process maintains detailed logs Example firewalls singled-homed screened host  dual-homed screen host  screened-subnet  Single-homed screened host   Router allows inbound IP packets only to bastion host, and outbound IP packets from bastion host Bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions Dual-homed screen host  Bastion host has two network addresses   one internal, one external If router is compromised, firewall host still protects internal network Screened-subnet   Internal network is completely separate Internal network is invisible to Internet Tunneling  Restrictive firewall is good for security bad for availability  users cannot work from home  Firewall F Host B X Host A Please access service S on Host B Denied. Local users only! internal service S Tunneling cont'd   Tunnel encrypts original packet and creates a new packet  source = tunnel entrance  destination = tunnel exit Tunnel exit decrypts payload and insert packet into local network  as if packet had originated locally Firewall Please deliver contents to tunnel at Host F Host A Please access service S on Host B Tunnel Host B Tunnel Please access service S on Host B internal service S Please access service S on Host B IPsec  Goals authenticate packet origins  provide integrity for packet contents  encrypt packets  tunnel packets  IPsec, cont'd Two protocols  Authentication Header Protocol    authentication + integrity Packet Encryption Protocol  authentication + integrity + confidentiality Authentication Header Protocol  source IP cannot be spoofed depends on secret key agreement  based on public key certificates   message contents cannot be modified secure hash of payload is computed by sender  verified by receiver  Packet Encryption Protocol Use AHP and  Symmetric encryption of packet payload  Diffie-Helman key agreement is part of protocol  Security association  Endpoints of tunnel must agree on protocol type  cryptographic algorithms  keys  duration of key   Each packet contains an identifier  labeling the particular security association used for that packet VPN  Establish a tunnel between    remote user (or site) local firewall Requires     availability of IPsec installing VPN software on each remote client VPN server at firewall, called the gateway public key certificate for gateway VPN, cont'd  Users access Internet normally (dial-up, DSL, etc.)  then turn on VPN  VPN has authentication procedure  User's machine becomes part of the internal network  • inside the firewall VPN, cont'd   Need good authentication of users  because once authenticated, machine becomes virtually local  "trusted" Tunnel is reasonably secure  IPsec cryptographic hash protects against modification  DH key exchange provides mechanism to share secret keys  secret key exchange prevents session hijacking  server public key certificate protects against man-inthe-middle Next week  Web application security  online reading