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EU Climate Policy PostCopenhagen
Artur Runge-Metzger
Director Climate Change & Air
European Commission
Outline
COP15
Copenhagen Accord
Way forward
COP15 The Stats
No of registered participants up to 50,000
6 negotiating sessions, often in parallel
 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
 5th meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
 10th Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 10)
 8th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action
 Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
 Subsidiary Body for Implementation
 > 100 heads of state, most of EU and G20,
including all BRIC
COP15 –
Limits of the UNFCCC process
 Complexity vs consensus
 Under the LCA track it was not
possible to really discuss
developing country actions
 US did not engage on anything resembling Kyoto,
keeping all options open to accommodate internal
legislation
 These dynamics only changed when Heads of State
arrived, but time too limited to come in line with EU
expectations
 ALBA countries pursue own agenda and blocked final
consensus
The Copenhagen Accord
 Negotiated by around 30
countries during 24 hours
 Heads of state negotiate lineby-line
 Developing country
delegations either did not send
their political level, such as
Sudan and Saudi Arabia, or
tried to avoid having their
Heads of State negotiate like
China and India
The Copenhagen Accord
Countries
Covering all UN regional groups, LDCs and the
alliance of small island states:
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Algeria
Australia
Bangladesh
Brazil
China
Colombia
Ethiopia
Sweden
European Commission
Germany
France
Grenada
India
Indonesia
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Japan
Republic of Korea
Lesotho
Maldives
Mexico
Norway
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Spain
Sudan
UK
US
Share of global CO2
emissions, 2006
Share of global GDP,
2006
Share of global
population, 2006
The Copenhagen Accord I
 Recognises the 2C objective but no timing for peaking nor
2050 ambition levels
 Economy-wide emission reduction targets for developed
countries and mitigation action by developing countries
 Measurement, reporting, verification (MRV) for developed
countries based on existing and new guidelines but no clear
common accounting framework
 MRV for developing countries:
 Supported actions MRV-ed internationally and included in
a registry
 Unsupported actions MRV-ed domestically and included
in national communications + inventory (2 yearly)
The Copenhagen Accord II
 Commitment by developed countries to provide new and
additional resources approaching USD 30 billion for the
period 2010 - 2012
 Committed goal to mobilise USD 100 billion dollars by 2020
 Variety of sources, both public and private, bilateral and
multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.
 Establishment of a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund
 High Level Panel will be established to study the contribution
of the potential sources of revenue
 Weak language on (carbon) market
The Copenhagen Accord III
 Register to record supported actions and the support itself
 Mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation and other uses (not specified);
 Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology
development and transfer (not specified);
 Establish a comprehensive adaptation programme including
international support
 A review to be completed by 2015, with a reference to
exploring pathways to remain below 1.5° C temperature
increase.
Appendix to the Accord –
Developed countries
 As of 5 February 94 parties have associated themselves with the
accord or submitted actions in its appendix
 EU (-20% to -30% vs 1990), Australia (-5% to -25% vs 2000) and
Norway (- 30% to -40% vs 1990) have unconditional low end
targets and conditional high end targets.
 US (-17% vs 2005) conditiona on enactment domestic legislation
 Canadian target is a retreat from their offer under the Kyoto
Protocol. -17% vs 2005 instead of -20% vs 2006 (reversal of the
ambition compared to 1990 from -3% to +3%)
 Japanese -25% vs 1990 conditional on a fair global agreement
 Russia’s (-15% to -25% vs 1990) target also refers to a
conditionality linked to how it can use LULUCF
Appendix to the Accord –
Developing countries
 Basic countries have communicated their actions in the context of
UNFCCC, not the Copenhagen Accord.
 BASIC refers explicitly (S-Africa) or implicitly (Art 4.7, Art 12.4) to
support, unclear extent of conditionality for individual actions.
 Actions similar to what was known before COP15. Brazil being
most detailed. China not only CO2 intensity target but also Non
Fossil fuel and LULUCF target.
 Singapore (-16%) and South Korea (-30%) introduced a target but
expressed to baseline, thus remains flexible concept
 Marshall Islands have introduced target of -40% compared to a
base year (2009) but conditional on support.
Way forward Time line of UN process
2005
AWG
KP
2006
Established
2005, COP
11, Montreal
AWG
LCA
2007
2008
2009
2010
No text
agreed at
COP 15
10 sessions , 15 meetings
Established
2007, COP
13, Bali
No text
agreed at
COP 15
8 sessions, 10 meetings
Copenhagen
Accord
Text agreed
agreed
Text
Not
Unanimous
at
COP
15
but
not
1 session
unanimous
1 meeting
?
Way forward –
Negotiations plus Action Now
 Accord should be key to reinvigorate the process under the AWGs in
order to reach a legally binding agreement:
 Copenhagen accord was not adopted by the COP, only noted
(Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Cuba and to a lesser extent Tuvalu
blocked)
 Accord is not legally binding nor refers to a process towards it.
 Accord refers several times to follow up COP decisions and draft AWG
LCA and AWG KP texts forwarded to Mexico
 BASIC seems to see it now as a mere political agreement
 In parallel, the Accord requires swift implementation.
 Majority of countries wants to act now on climate change.
 Smart use of fast-start finance can build capacity and create confidence
in ramping up action.
Way forward –
Factors of success in 2010
 EU preference for a single legally binding outcome: By Mexico?
 Simple amending Annex B of Kyoto Protocol is not an option
 Completely undermines environmental integrity of 2020 target (LULUCF, surplus
AAUs)
 No level playing field between EU and US and other countries
 Positioning of the ALBA countries
 If consensus under the COP continues to be problematic, the Accord might stimulate
Parties in the near future to take action and collaborate
 COP could facilitate implementation of the Accord under Art 7(2)(c)
 Outcome US legislative debate
 Other informal processes could remain important, e.g. G20, G8, Major
Economies Forum
Way forward –
What should the EU do?
 Leadership starts at home
 Implement EU energy and climate package
 Link climate change to EU2020 strategy for sustainable growth,
innovation and jobs, i.e. focus on transport, de-carbonisation of power
sector, budget and CAP review, adaptation.
 Develop a low carbon development strategy with a vision of reducing
emissions by 80-95% by 2050 and set milestones 2020/2030.
 Reaching out internationally
 Implement the Copenhagen Accord: EU will have to act swift on fast
start finance and be transparent on how it will deliver the EU pledge of €
2.4 billion yearly over the period 2010-2012
 Develop international carbon market: design and test sectoral crediting
Mechanism. Amended ETS gives us the tools to do so.
 No alternative to the UN process: EU is ready to continue to negotiate
More information on EU climate policy:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/home_en.htm