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environmental science & policy 10 (2007) 283–294
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Including land use, land-use change, and forestry in future
climate change, agreements: thinking outside the box
R. Benndorf a, S. Federici b, C. Forner c, N. Pena d,*, E. Rametsteiner e, M.J. Sanz f, Z. Somogyi b
a
Federal Environment Agency, Bismarckplatz 1, D-1419 Berlin, Germany
Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Via Enrico Fermi 1, I-21020 Ispra, Italy
c
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Jalan CIFOR Situ Gede, Bogor Barat 16680, Indonesia
d
Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2101 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22201, USA
e
IIASA, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
f
Fundación CEAM, Charles H. Darwin 14, S-46980 Paterna, Valencia, Spain
b
article info
abstract
Published on line 21 March 2007
This paper presents a framework that encompasses a full range of options for including land
use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) within future agreements under the United
Keywords:
Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The intent is to provide options that can
Climate change mitigation
address the broad range of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and removals as well as to bring
Commitments
the broadest possible range of nations into undertaking mitigation efforts. We suggest that
GHG emission reductions
the approach taken for the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period is only one within a
Policies and measures
much larger universe of possible approaches. This larger universe includes partially or
completely ‘‘de-linking’’ LULUCF commitments from those in other sectors, and allowing
commitments specified in terms other than tonnes of greenhouse gases. Such approaches
may provide clarity and transparency concerning the role of the various sectors in the
agreements and encourage participation in agreements by a more inclusive, diverse set of
countries, resulting in a more effective use of LULUCF in addressing climate change.
# 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1.
Introduction: the need for exploring
additional options for including land-use, landuse change, and forestry (LULUCF) in future
climate change agreements
Negotiating the current international agreement on climate
change took over a decade. As part of this process, intensive
negotiations on the rules for implementing the Kyoto
Protocol’s (KP) first commitment period (CP-1) ran from 1997
to 2005. The LULUCF sector played a pivotal role in this process
(Marland and Schlamandinger, 2000; Schlamadinger et al.,
2007-a,b). The negotiations demonstrated that incorporation
of LULUCF into climate change agreements is likely to be
controversial (Marland and Schlamandinger, 2000; Schultze
et al., 2002) but also that, in spite of the difficulties, LULUCF
will, most likely, be included in future climate change
agreements. The inclusion of LULUCF is likely both because
emissions from LULUCF are responsible for an estimated 20%
of human-induced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IPCC,
2000) and because LULUCF is expected to provide costeffective, short-term mitigation options, particularly through
reducing deforestation (Pacala and Socolow, 2004).
The KP was acceptable to, and ratified by, most parties to
the UNFCCC (hereafter referred to as Parties). These Parties are
now engaged in striving to meet their commitments for CP-1.
However, not all large emitters of GHGs are bound to limit their
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. Some Parties failed to
ratify this instrument, and others are not required to limit
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: [email protected] (N. Pena).
1462-9011/$ – see front matter # 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2006.10.011
284
environmental science & policy 10 (2007) 283–294
emissions under the current rules. Bringing such Parties into a
future climate change agreement with binding commitments
seems necessary and would represent an important step
forward in addressing GHG emissions. The importance of
expanding both the range of nations participating in, and the
fraction of emissions and removals covered by, climate
change agreements, has led to a number of initiatives. The
current volume, including this paper, is part of this wider
effort to find promising avenues for climate change agreements beyond the KPs CP-1.
The KP itself includes provisions for initiating consideration of post CP-1 commitments (Art. 3.91) and for reviewing the
Protocol itself (Art. 9). In accordance with these provisions, the
COP/MOP1 in Montreal in 2005 set the stage for Parties to begin
consideration of a process that would lead to a post-2012
agreement.2 Many informal discussions preceded this decision (e.g., the Pew Center’s Climate Dialogue at Pocantico) and
some of these discussions focus on the LULUCF sector (e.g.,
Options for Including LULUCF Activities in a Post-2012
International Climate Agreement, Graz, 5–6 May 20053; 1st
Informal Dialogue on the inclusion of LULUCF in future
agreements, New Zealand, 2005). Suggestions for achieving
greater participation and coverage range from minor modifications of the current approach through climate change
agreements with substantially different architectures.
Options proposed for inclusion of LULUCF both throughout
the history of the UNFCCC negotiations and for agreements
after 2012 have been analysed in a number of papers, including
Bodansky (2003), Trines (2004), Torvanger et al. (2004).
Reasons for suggesting new approaches for LULUCF include
the complexity of the CP-1 rules for LULUCF,4 the time-limited
validity of some of these rules (i.e., for CP-1 only), and the
restrictions on use of LULUCF as a mitigation option. Restrictions include a variety of limitations on Annex I Party5 use of
LULUCF to meet commitments, such as the cap on forest
management activities and the cap on credits from CDM
projects. In addition, there is a limitation to afforestation and
reforestation projects under the clean development mechanism
(CDM). This latter limitation has the effect of excluding projects
that involve avoiding deforestation in non-Annex I countries
where the CDM is the primary avenue for formal participation in
the KP during CP-1. This exclusion is especially problematic
because most of the emissions associated with LULUCF are from
deforestation in non-Annex I Parties, and it results in the
exclusion of these emissions from the system through which
commitments are satisfied in the KP (Skutsch et al., 2007).
1
Articles (Art.) as used in this paper refer to respective articles of
the KP.
2
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_11/application/pdf/
cmp1_00_consideration_of_commitments_under_3.9.pdf.
3
http://www.joanneum.at/CarboInvent/post2012workshop.php.
4
The provisions for the CP-1 are all included in the so called Kyoto
Rulebook, see documents FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8, FCCC/KP/CMP/
2005/8/Add.1, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/
Add.3 and FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.4 under www.unfccc.int.
5
The term Annex I Parties is used in this paper to refer to
developed countries and countries with economies in transition
that are listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC. Non-Annex I Parties are
mainly developing countries.
Authors who have analysed the KP CP-1 limitations on
LULUCF (e.g., Höne et al., 2004; Schlamadinger et al., 2007-a,b)
emphasize that the limitations resulted from a number of
realities:
Agreement to include LULUCF was only reached after overall
targets, specified in allowable tonnes of GHG emissions had
already been set.
Under these circumstances the use of LULUCF could unduly
diminish efforts to reduce GHG emissions in other sectors,
including emissions from combustion of fossil fuels.
The terrestrial carbon pool is three orders of magnitude
greater than annual fossil fuel emissions, and emissions from
these pools due to natural occurrences beyond human control
can result in very large emissions or emission reductions.
The uncertainty associated with changes in LULUCF emissions and emission reductions can also be large, particularly
in comparison with the uncertainty around the fossil fuel
emission reduction commitments.
Challenges to environmental integrity are presented by the
use of project-based credits generated in countries not subject
to an emissions limitation (i.e., projects in non-Annex I Parties
under the CDM rules). Challenges result from the need to use
baselines to determine project credits and the need to account
for permanence and leakage absent a national-level commitment (Marland and Schlamandinger, 2000).
Finally, ensuring that the use of LULUCF in non-Annex I
countries is consistent with sustainable development goals,
as specified by Art. 12 of the KP, presents challenges due to
potential conflicts between maintaining or increasing
terrestrial carbon stocks and food, income, fuel, fiber, and
related needs.
The authors of this paper believe that by expanding the
universe of approaches to LULUCF under consideration, it may
be possible to design agreements that address these realities
while avoiding the limitations they have, to date, engendered.
Most discussions to date have focused on approaches that,
like the current KP, utilize a single commitment, most often an
emissions target specified in tonnes, which covers all sectors,
although some papers and discussions have reviewed and
suggested a variety of approaches. (See for example: Aldy
et al., 2003; Bodansky, 2003; Müller et al., 2001; Murphy et al.,
2005; Philibert and Pershing, 2001; Pew Center on Global
Climate Change). This paper takes a different approach. To
assist in the search for more effective and encompassing
climate change agreements, the paper proposes and describes
a systematic way of considering a full range of options – some
with substantially different architectures than the KP – for
including LULUCF within future climate change agreements.
By providing a systematic guide, all options can be analysed,
possible gaps can be detected, and unrealistic possibilities can
be excluded.6 The present paper does not attempt to go beyond
basic descriptions of the universe of options, and employs a
6
The paper does not consider the most extreme possible
approach of excluding LULUCF altogether, an option which has
to date been rejected by the international community. It must also
be stated that the paper does not attempt to be policy prescriptive;
rather, it explores all possible options to promote negotiations.
environmental science & policy 10 (2007) 283–294
matrix and a few examples to highlight some possible
approaches within this universe.
Through considering and analyzing a complete range of
options, the authors believe that negotiators may develop
approaches more likely to accommodate the needs of more
Parties and that are more environmentally effective, simpler,
and cost-effective. This wider range of approaches is discussed in the next section.
2.
A systematic expansion of options
Before describing the full range of approaches to including
LULUCF in climate change agreements, it is useful to define
some key concepts to describe different types of commitments, and to discuss how these various types of commitments might, or might not, be inter-related.
First we define two basic types of commitments. The first
type is emission-oriented commitments, which focus, as the
name indicates, on the emissions themselves. Emissionoriented commitments are always quantified in terms of
GHG emissions or removals. This is the type of commitment
that is currently used in the KP, in which all commitments are
defined in terms of emissions.
The second type is cause-oriented commitments (also
referred to as input-based approaches, e.g., see Heller and
Shukla, 2003). In contrast to emission-oriented commitments,
cause-oriented commitments focus on, directly address, and
are expressed in terms of, the causes of emissions and/or
removals by sinks.7 Cause-oriented commitments can take
the form of non-quantified Policies and Measures (PAMs) or
they can be quantified. If they are quantified, they will most
likely be quantified in units other than tonnes of carbon
dioxide (CO2) or CO2-equivalents. Examples of quantified
cause-oriented commitments include commitments to reforest a specified land area, or to devote a certain number of manhours to educating farmers. Examples of non-quantified PAMs
might be: to reduce subsidies that encourage conversion of
old-growth forest to grazing lands, without specifying the level
of reduction; to enforce logging laws without specifying the
number of hectares to be affected; or to educate farmers
without specifying how many would be reached. Both
quantified PAMs and PAMs that initially are defined in a
non-quantified way can, under some circumstances, be
converted into ‘‘tonnes’’ of emission reductions or increased
carbon stocks. For example, if data is available on the soil
carbon increases that resulted from adoption of no-till
practices after a specified year, a PAM that focused on tillage
practices could be converted into increased carbon stocks, or
tonnes of CO2 removed from the atmosphere. Hereafter, this
paper uses the term ‘‘commitment’’ to cover both emissionoriented commitments (i.e., targets) and cause-oriented
commitments.
7
Causes of emissions encompass the entire value chain created
by human activities; all activities from resource extraction
through final use and disposal of products are (or can be) causes
of emissions. Thus, for example, coal mining, production of electricity, and use of electricity are, like human-induced deforestation and reforestation, potential causes of emissions.
285
Second we define a concept to indicate the degree of
integration or separation between LULUCF commitments and
commitments that may be undertaken in other sectors. This
option arises if, instead of undertaking a single commitment
that covers all sectors as in the current KP, nations are allowed
to undertake separate commitments in specific sectors. For
example, a country’s overall commitment could consist of a
LULUCF commitment along with independent or semiindependent commitments for non-LULUCF sectors. Countries might also be allowed to undertake a commitment only in
LULUCF, or only in non-LULUCF sectors.
If sector-specific commitments (hereafter referred to as
sectoral commitments) are allowed, over-achievement of one
sectoral commitment might be allowed to offset underachievement in commitments in other sectors (i.e., exceeding a
commitment in one sector can be used, under specified
circumstances, to assist in meeting commitments in other
sectors). In this case, the various sectoral commitments are
linked, and some form of credit trading is allowed. On the other
hand, even if sectoral commitments are allowed, it may be that
fulfillment of each commitment must be achieved independently. In this case the sectoral commitments are de-linked.
Partial linkage (or de-linkage) can also occur. Partial linkage
indicates that some restrictions are placed on the circumstances under which, or extent to which, over-achievement in
one sector can be used to meet other commitments. If
commitments in different sectors are specified in different
units, and linkage is allowed, a ‘‘currency exchange’’ is needed
to enable ‘‘fungibility’’ of achievements, i.e., credit trading,
across sectors. As suggested above, data on the carbon results of
practice or land-use changes can be used to establish such
currency exchanges. However, if a number of sectors take
Box 1. Why sectoral approaches are attracting interest
Sectoral approaches have gained interest within climate
change discussions for a number of reasons. They enable a
country to start with sectors of most concern, or most
easily addressed, in a particular country; they most closely
resemble policies countries ordinarily adopt; and they can
be designed to meet multiple social goals. Additionally,
there is a need to address specific activities or sectors that
are not currently addressed within CP-1, e.g., emissions
from international aviation and emissions from tropical
deforestation.
In the LULUCF sector, there may be sound reasons to use
commitments that take the form of implementing specified practices (e.g., reduced impact logging), or adopting
specified policies (e.g., altering subsidies from crop support to environmental benefits) rather than commitments
to achieve specified emissions or emission reductions.
There are multiple competing uses for land, and the uses
that support the highest carbon stocks will not, in many
cases, be compatible with the best use of the land from a
wider societal perspective. For instance, both cropland
and tree plantations are high-priority land uses with
lower carbon stock potential than, in most cases, native
vegetation. Consequently, on these lands the best
approach may be to prescribe best practices that take
into account multiple objectives including food, income,
286
environmental science & policy 10 (2007) 283–294
fiber, and fuel needs, as well as GHG emissions and other
environmental concerns such as water retention and
quality. These realities may lead both Annex 1 and
non-Annex 1 Parties to prefer sectoral approaches to
agricultural, forest, and other land uses since under sectoral approaches commitments can be tailored to each
sector’s characteristics.
Sectoral approaches also would allow Parties to undertake commitments only in LULUCF, only in non-LULUCF
sectors, or in both. This flexibility may be particularly
useful in enabling developing countries to accept climate
change commitments. Some developing countries may
not have significant opportunities to reduce energyrelated emissions or may view agreements to limit fossil
fuel emissions as counter to development needs. By
enabling such countries to enter into ‘‘LULUCF only’’
commitments, sectoral approaches can increase the coverage of LULUCF over space. Conversely, some countries
may be willing to adopt commitments in non-LULUCF
sectors, but may be reluctant to adopt LULUCF commitments – or an overall commitment that might impact or
include land use – for a number of reasons, including
risks, national sovereignty, and commitment to focusing
GHG policies on emissions from fossil fuels.
Additional perceived advantages of sectoral approaches
include: (a) they enable developing countries to switch
from project-based approaches to approaches that cover
their entire LULUCF sector; (b) they may be less challenging
and/or more cost-effective to implement than current
project-based approaches that occur within the CDM; (c)
if sectoral approaches become part of future climate
change accords, commitments would be set through an
iterative process. By considering, in an iterative manner,
the level of desired and feasible reductions in the overall, as
well as the sectoral commitments, the lack of clarity about
the relative contributions of LULUCF and non-LULUCF
sectors to the overall commitments, and the resultant
complexity and restrictions of LULUCF rules, might be
avoided.
It should be noted that some versions of sectoral
approaches could be accommodated within the current
KP, thereby offering some of the advantages envisioned for
sectoral approaches in general. However, other sectoral
approaches may not be compatible with the current system. In particular, sectoral approaches in which Annex I
country and/or developing country commitments are in
sector-specific terms (i.e., not in tonnes of GHG emission
reductions) may not be compatible with the KP approach.
For example, a country’s overall commitment might consist of (1) a commitment to capture and geologically
sequester some percent of CO2 emissions from coal-fired
utilities, (2) efficiency standards for appliances, (3) a biofuel
commitment in transportation, and (4) use of specified
technologies in cement and aluminium production. While
such commitments could, possibly, be translated into GHG
reduction ‘‘results,’’ establishing equivalencies would be a
challenge. Commitments of these types also represent a
quite different approach than the economy-wide caps,
specified in GHG emissions, of the KP.
commitments in terms other than tonnes of GHGs (see Box 1)
conversion and fungibility may be more challenging.
To illustrate the expansion of approaches resulting from
consideration of the concepts defined above, a matrix is used
(Fig. 1). The vertical axis of the matrix portrays the various
types of commitments, while the horizontal axis illustrates
the degree of linking that might be established by framework
rules. Put together, the matrix provides a conceptual basis for
thinking about two critical questions that arise when LULUCF
is included within a climate change mitigation agreement:
what types of commitments could be used (options shown
along the y-axis), and to what extent will achievements in
LULUCF be linked to the compliance rules of commitments in
other sectors (options shown along the x-axis). It is important
to bear in mind that the columns and rows shown in the
matrix are arbitrarily set for illustrative purposes. While the
extreme positions may be the easiest to interpret, in practice
combined, intermediate situations can occur. That is, international agreements may consist of combinations of linked
and de-linked commitment of various types (i.e., from various
rows), and in fact such intermediate, combinatorial
approaches may be the most interesting, attractive, and,
ultimately, the most successful ones.
To understand the range of possible approaches to
including LULUCF within broader climate change agreements,
it may be helpful to start by considering where the KPs
approach falls within the matrix. In CP-1, each Annex I Party
has a single, integrated, quantitative, emissions-oriented
commitment that combines all sectors;8 no sector-specific
commitments are specified within this commitment. Thus,
achievements in all sectors contribute to fulfilment of this
single commitment. In a system of this type, achievements
due to LULUCF activities under Article 3.3 and Article 3.4, and
credits from the use of afforestation and reforestation under
the CDM, are specified in terms of the total tonnes removed
from the atmosphere, and can be used by a Party to
demonstrate compliance. This approach falls in the upper
left hand corner of the matrix.
Additional approaches can be explored by moving out from
this initial ‘‘box’’ in two ways: allowing additional types of
commitments (i.e., ‘‘adding’’ rows), and allowing sectoral
commitments that can be linked to various degrees (i.e.,
‘‘adding’’ columns). The top row represents approaches that
would only involve emission-oriented commitments.9 The
middle row represents agreements in which at least some
commitments are cause-oriented. These commitments may
be quantified using some units (e.g., manpower, number of
landholders, or land area addressed). Finally, the bottom row
8
These targets are referred to as Quantified Emission Limitation
or Reduction Commitments (QELRC) and are listed in Annex B of
the KP.
9
Although not further discussed in this paper, although emission-oriented targets are often expressed in absolute number of
tonnes of GHGs. They can also be intensity-based, i.e., stated in
terms of GHG emissions relative to some other socio-economic
variable. Examples of intensity targets are targets expressed as,
GHG emissions per unit of GDP, per ton of output, or per dollar of
sales. The intensity-based target approach has been proposed by
some Annex I Parties that refused to ratify the KP arguing that
absolute targets limit economic growth.
environmental science & policy 10 (2007) 283–294
287
Fig. 1 – Matrix of generic commitment options and options for linking LULUCF commitments into a wider international
climate arrangement.
represents agreements in which only cause-oriented commitments are undertaken, and at least some of them are not
quantified.
Possibly the simplest way to move beyond the current KP
system is to ‘‘remain’’ in the top row, maintaining emissionoriented commitments quantified in tonnes of GHG emissions,
while moving to the right along the columns (see explanation
of columns below). The most complex approach, but possibly
the most attractive one in terms of types of commitments,
would be a mix of cause-oriented and emission-oriented
commitments (i.e., a mix of commitments from lower two
rows and the top row). An example of such approach is the
‘‘Bottom-up’’ proposal of Reinstein (2004). Under this
approach each Party proposes its own commitment consisting
of a unique package of PAMs and emission-oriented commitments (i.e., specified in tonnes of GHG emissions) based on its
national circumstances. Agreement as to what commitments
from each Party would be accepted as part of an international
agreement would be internationally negotiated.
Moving to the right along the horizontal or ‘‘linkage’’ axis,
the linkage between LULUCF-specific sectoral commitments
(if any) and other commitments decreases. That is, restrictions
become increasingly stringent on allowing over achievement
of LULUCF commitments to be used to fulfill commitments in
other sectors (or possibly vice versa). In the right-most column
restrictions become ‘‘total’’; no linkage between LULUCF and
other sectors is allowed; over-achievement of an LULUCF
commitment can not be used to fulfill any non-LULUCF
commitment.
The left-most column represents approaches, which have a
single, integrated framework of rules. A number of systems
fall within the left-most column, including the current KP; the
proposal of Jacoby et al. (1999) where each party’s single
commitment would be based on their ‘‘ability to pay’’ (as
measured by per capita GDP); and the ‘‘Brazilian Proposal’’
(International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2003;
FCCC/AGBM/1997) based on historical responsibilities on
emissions.
The middle column includes options in which there are
separate commitments and accounting frameworks for
LULUCF and other sectors, but some linkage between
commitments is permitted for compliance, e.g., through credit
accounting rules. That is, some mechanism is provided
through which, under specified circumstances, some achievements in LULUCF might be used to fulfill commitments in
other sectors, and (possibly) vice versa. The middle column
includes options in which some countries might take
commitments only in LULUCF or some might decide to take
commitments only in non-LULUCF sectors.
Finally, the right hand column represents agreements in
which commitments and implementation arrangements in one
or more sectors – e.g., in LULUCF – are completely separated
from commitments (and their implementation) in other
sectors. In this column there is a ‘‘firewall’’ between LULUCF
and non-LULUCF arrangements. No provision is made, and no
mechanism exists, for achievements in LULUCF to count in
fulfilling other commitments; i.e., exceeding a LULUCF commitment is not allowed to ‘‘count’’ toward meeting any nonLULUCF commitment (and vice versa). This approach would
require setting a complete, stand-alone, LULUCF protocol. This
‘‘firewall’’ approach has the advantage that PAMs can be more
easily used for LULUCF commitments without impacting
commitments in other sectors. However, under a ‘‘firewall’’
approach countries could not meet non-LULUCF commitments
through achievements in LULUCF. Thus a ‘‘fire-wall’’ approach
has the disadvantage that some mechanism other than
288
environmental science & policy 10 (2007) 283–294
monetary flows induced by the need to meet non-LULUCF
commitments would have to be used in meeting LULUCF
commitments or inducing desired LULUCF changes.
The top box of the middle column includes approaches that
would modify the current KP rules, solving some of the major
problems envisaged for CP-1, while still retaining the essential
architecture of the current KP. For example, allowing nonAnnex I Parties to adopt national-level emission-oriented
commitments in LULUCF (e.g., commitments to reduce
emissions from deforestation) could address a much larger
fraction of emissions from LULUCF than the current projectbased CDM approach. The current project-by-project
approach could continue to be used by some countries and
in some sectors, but, as a complement, the CDM could
encompass ‘‘projects’’ that are sector-wide, possibly submitted through a specialized window of the CDM (Figueres,
2006). Under this approach a national-level ‘‘baseline’’ emission level or rate would be established, and achievements
beyond the baseline would be eligible for credits. An approach
of this sort would continue to use emission-oriented commitments and would allow fungibility of credits between LULUCF
and other commitments.
The most complex situation, although an attractive one,
would be an international agreement that would fall in the
middle box of the middle column. Under this scenario
commitments would be a mix of commitments quantified in
terms of emissions (emission-oriented commitments), and
quantified cause-oriented commitments. Some linkage
between the various commitments would be permitted.
Linkage could be restricted to achievements in specified
activities (e.g., to achievements in reducing deforestation rates),
by amount of tonnes that could be used to meet targets in other
sectors, or by requiring, for example, that LULUCF commitments be exceeded by specified amounts (or percents) before
excess emission reductions or removals could be used to offset
emissions from – i.e., help fulfil commitments in – other sectors.
To the extent that linkage is permitted, reductions resulting
from cause-oriented commitments would have to be translated
into ‘‘tonnes of GHG reductions achieved’’.
3.
Discussion of matrix options
3.1.
Advantages and disadvantages of different
approaches to commitments
Every approach to including LULUCF in an overall regime has
specific advantages and disadvantages. Proposed approaches
can be evaluated on the basis of a number of criteria.
Important criteria include environmental effectiveness (in
the case of LULUCF this includes coverage over space and
time10), scientific soundness, political acceptability (including
promotion of participation), ethical and equity issues, cost-
10
The non-permanance of LULUCF removals is an exceedingly
difficult issue that must be addressed regardless of approach. An
evaluation of whether, in general, non-permanence is more difficult to address, or must be addressed differently, under sectoral or
cause-oriented commitments than under single, unified, emission-oriented approaches is beyond the scope of this paper.
effectiveness, negotiability (including degree to which it is
likely to cause controversy), simplicity and transparency, and
ability to enhance sustainable development. For LULUCF some
additional key criteria are acknowledgement of national
sovereignty and ability to provide incentives for improving
land use (Trines, 2004; Bodansky et al., 2004; Schlamadinger
et al., 2007-a).
3.2.
Advantages and disadvantages of sectoral
approaches
One advantage of specifying a separate commitment in
LULUCF is that it should encourage independent analysis
and understanding both of what might be feasible in LULUCF
and of the contribution LULUCF would make to the complete
set of commitments. Such independent analysis would
represent a significant improvement over the process that
occurred during the KP negotiations, where the lack of
independent analysis together with the use of a single,
integrated commitment ultimately resulted in the need for
complex and restrictive rules on LULUCF, compromising both
transparency and environmental effectiveness, including
coverage over space and time.
Sectoral commitments can promote environmental effectiveness both by increasing political acceptability and participation (see Box 1) and by encouraging a more
comprehensive, inclusive approach to LULUCF within both
Annex I and developing countries. Comprehensive
approaches have the potential to both increase coverage over
space and to resolve scientific challenges. In the context of the
CDM, sectoral approaches can increase coverage over space by
offering an alternative to the project-based approach. Sectoral
approaches can resolve scientific challenges posed by the
CDMs project-based approach (e.g., leakage) and challenges
posed by Articles 3.3 and 3.4 for Annex I countries (e.g.,
determining human-induced deforestation or afforestation). A
well-designed commitment in LULUCF could cover both
additions to, and reductions in, carbon stocks; or coverage
of additions could be voluntary, but coverage of reductions
compulsory. A commitment that only counted additions to
carbon stocks (e.g., via afforestation), but did not count
reductions in carbon stocks in forestlands could not be
characterized as ‘‘well-designed’’ (see also Schlamadinger
et al., 2007-a).
Allowing sectoral commitments can also address equity.
Developing countries have lower per capita emissions due to
use of energy than developed countries. Consequently equity
can be addressed by allowing developing countries to undertake
commitments only in LULUCF while opting out of energyrelated commitments at least in the near-term. Further, given
the more limited resources of developing countries, equity can
be addressed by allowing them to focus resources on particular
sectors, perhaps transportation, that are most critical to their
development path. It should be noted that incremental, stepby-step approaches, in which commitments in selected sectors
are undertaken first and emissions in other sectors addressed
subsequently, may also be attractive to developed countries
(see Box 1 and Bodansky, 2003).
Sectoral approaches are particularly well suited to
acknowledging national land-use sovereignty. A nation’s
environmental science & policy 10 (2007) 283–294
freedom to use its land may be a particularly sensitive issue
and GHG commitments can impact this freedom. For example,
incentives to decrease deforestation rates could affect
opportunities to provide food, fiber, fuel, and foreign income.
By allowing countries to take commitments only in nonLULUCF sectors, and by prohibiting the use of LULUCF credits
to meet non-LULUCF commitments, sectoral, de-linked
approaches formally acknowledge this sovereignty concern
and can serve to move the land base of developing countries
out of the sphere of interest of developed countries as they
strive to address their emissions.
Two significant disadvantages of establishing sectorspecific commitments would tend to arise where no linkage
between commitments in LULUCF and other sectors is
permitted. If achievements in LULUCF cannot be used to
comply with commitments in other sectors, it may be difficult
to find mechanisms to provide incentives to implement
desirable land use changes and management practices,
particularly in developing countries. Lack of linkage also
means that countries may not be able to take advantage of the
most cost-effective mitigation options (Bodansky, 2003).
De-linking, particularly total de-linking, may make inclusion of LULUCF in climate change agreements more acceptable
to some Parties; however, total de-linking may be unacceptable to others, so its effect on political acceptability and
participation is open to question (see Section 4).
Another disadvantage arises as a result of the ‘‘step-by-step’’
nature of sectoral commitments. Under sectoral approaches
countries may be allowed to ‘‘opt-out’’ of commitments in some
sectors, and may choose to take commitments only in sectors
where it is relatively easy or inexpensive to do so. Over time it
will be necessary to address emissions in more difficult sectors,
a task that may be difficult for political or economic reasons.
Consequently, expanding sectoral commitments to cover all
sectors may meet with resistance.
3.3.
Advantages and disadvantages of cause-oriented and
emission-oriented approaches
The major advantage of cause-oriented approaches is the
possibility of putting in place a coherent set of policies and
measures: measures that address GHG emissions; are consistent with, and assist in achieving, other national objectives
including development and adaptation needs; and avoid
perverse results. By enabling developing countries to achieve
development objectives as well as GHG mitigation, causeoriented approaches address ethical and equity issues. Use of
cause-oriented approaches to craft GHG commitments that
simultaneously achieve other high-priority goals also renders
GHG commitments more relevant to key constituencies. This,
increases political acceptability in both developed and developing countries, thus enhancing chances of their success and,
in turn, their environmental effectiveness (Heller and Shukla,
2003; Kok and de Coninck, 2004; UNEP, 2004). Such commitments will necessarily have to be designed by individual
countries, taking into account their specific national priorities
and circumstances. However, in order to be accepted as part of
an international climate change agreement, the commitments
would have to be approved by the other Parties to the
agreement.
289
Cause-oriented commitments can prescribe how a nation
will proceed to shift net emission trends in a given sector or
sub-sector. By specifying which actions are to be taken, causeoriented commitments can control possible counter-productive effects. For example, specifying a LULUCF commitment in
terms of tons of carbon or CO2 might result in destroying
valuable habitat in an effort to increase carbon stocks,
whereas a commitment that specifies reforestation of
degraded lands can avoid such undesired results while also
assisting in achieving adaptation and sustainable development goals. PAMs, in particular, tend to cover an entire sector
or sub-sector and thus can increase coverage over space –
particularly in comparison to project-based approaches – and,
if the policies remain in place, can result in coverage over time.
A second major advantage of cause-oriented approaches,
particularly in the form of PAMs, is that PAMs are familiar and
widely used to affect land uses and land-use changes in many
nations. At present, many national PAMs affecting land use
and land-use changes have adverse climate impacts. For
example, PAMs that provide subsidies, land rights, or tax
advantages for developing land (e.g., converting forestland to
agricultural use) have been effective in achieving this goal,
often with negative GHG consequences. However, some PAMs,
for example, ones that regulate buffer strips along rivers, have
carbon benefits. Redesign of national PAMs to take carbon
stocks into account can thus utilize a well-known approach
and can also take advantage of existing national land-use and
management infrastructure (Richards et al., 2006).
Nations may well utilize cause-oriented policies, particularly PAMS, to meet obligations even if commitments are
emission-oriented due to the considerations described above:
familiarly, ability to achieve multiple objectives, and desire to
avoid perverse effects. Cause-oriented commitments are
highly compatible with, and possibly most effective in
conjunction with, sectoral approaches. In fact, allowing
sectoral, caused-oriented commitments can be considered a
formal recognition of the soundness of PAM approaches.
Cause-oriented approaches can also provide simplicity and
be cost-effective, particularly if no linkage is permitted
between LULUCF commitments and commitments in other
sectors. Under such agreements, there is no need for
fungibility between achievements in LULUCF and other
sectors. LULUCF commitments can be undertaken in terms
of non-quantified PAMs, thus avoiding complex and costly
monitoring and verification protocols. This combination of
simplicity and cost-effectiveness may also increase political
acceptability and promote participation.
The major disadvantage of cause-oriented commitments,
particularly non-quantified ones, is the lack of any guarantee
that the policies and measures will be sufficiently well
designed and implemented to achieve the intended goals. In
other words, cause-oriented approaches may result in fewer
negative impacts, but may carry a serious risk of not achieving
the desired reduction in net GHG emissions. In addition, these
approaches leave open the possibility that business-as-usual
policies, or those implemented for other reasons, will be
considered as ‘‘climate’’ policies even though they have no
additional effect on climate change mitigation. Finally, by
prescribing how society will move, cause-oriented approaches
provide less flexibility, less opportunity for devising and
290
environmental science & policy 10 (2007) 283–294
implementing innovative, possibly better, more effective,
alternatives for achieving the desired goal.
If linkage is permitted between commitments in LULUCF
and commitments in other sectors, a difficulty, although not
strictly speaking a disadvantage, arises because the units in
which cause-oriented commitments are specified may differ
from sector to sector. This then requires establishing
‘‘currency’’ exchanges: mechanisms that allow credits from
one sector to be translated into units deemed equivalent to the
units used in other sectors. As indicated earlier, data on the
carbon results of LULUCF activities could be used to establish
equivalencies between LULUCF achievements and tonnes of
GHG emission reductions. However, linking sectors can give
rise to both double-counting and equivalency issues. For
example, appliance-efficiency improvements might be measured in kWhs. Such improvements contribute to electricutility emission reduction commitments, which may be
specified in tonnes of GHGs. Allowing linkage (and fungibility
of credits) between sectors with cause-oriented commitments
will inevitably require strict GHG reporting and accounting,
risking sacrificing at least some of the cost-effectiveness and
simplicity of cause-oriented approaches. In establishing such
currency exchanges it will be important, and may be difficult,
to insure that environmental integrity and scientific soundness are maintained.
The major advantage of emission-oriented approaches is
the great flexibility that arises from all commitments being in
the same units, thus easing linkages between sectoral
commitments. This flexibility also can lead to the spontaneous creation of new and efficient mechanisms, and can
enable individuals, groups, and businesses to devise the most
cost-effective means to achieve the objective.
Drawbacks of emission-oriented approaches include:
inadvertently providing perverse incentives; risk of interfering
with, or not supporting, sustainable development; and
complexity and expense due to inventory, monitoring and
verification requirements. For example, in Annex I Parties an
emission-oriented commitment might provide an incentive to
replace natural forests with single-species (or single-clone)
fast-growing plantations. However, this land-use change can
have negative environmental impacts (e.g., on conservation of
biodiversity), and negative social impacts (e.g., reduced
recreational opportunities). In general, whether or not a
change from natural forests to fast-growing plantations is
consistent with sustainable development goals depends on
the particulars of the circumstances. For example, sustainability could be adversely affected if the land-use change
resulted in adverse affects on water quantity or quality, or on
opportunities for local populations to secure food, fiber, fuel,
or income.
It is important to note that the various types of
commitments are not mutually exclusive but can be
mutually reinforcing. As mentioned previously, even when
commitments are in terms of net tonnes of GHG emissions,
policies and measures are likely to be used and, especially
over the long-term, can be effective in assisting to reach
the goal. Therefore, while emission-oriented commitments
may be important, particularly at the international level,
drawing attention to and driving certain national-level
PAMs may also be effective. In short, it is important to
recognise that flexibility is needed to find the best mix of
approaches to reach UNFCCC goals in the most efficient
manner.
4.
Example of a partially de-linked option
Of all possible alternatives to the KP CP-1 approach, one
example has been selected to demonstrate how an approach
that utilizes sector-specific, partially linked commitments
might work. This option is to be understood as an example, not
a recommendation by the authors.
In this example, the actual level of carbon stocks in carbon
pools, and their expected changes in specific countries, would
be used to set country-specific commitments in the LULUCF
sector, and achievements beyond these commitments could
be used – possibly only to some specified extent – to meet
commitments in other sectors.
This approach assumes that a proposal for a post-2012
agreement will respond to two main objectives:
(1) To the extent possible, it should demonstrate continuity
with the current system.
(2) It should improve the current KP CP-1 system by
eliminating loopholes and increasing coverage and effectiveness.
The option described is also intended to meet the following
objectives:
To ensure that the LULUCF sector cannot be used to avoid
efforts in other sectors.
To provide flexibility by establishing a system in which a
variety of conditions could be set in regard to the
circumstances under, or extent to, which over-achievement
of some sectoral commitments could be utilized in meeting
the overall commitment.
To take into account different national circumstances.
To address the above objectives, the approach outlined
here envisions that two distinct commitments are set within a
single mitigation protocol. The two commitments are:
A non-LULUCF commitment (or commitments) in sectors
designed to achieve a decrease or a limited increase of
anthropogenic GHG emissions by sources listed in Annex A
of the Kyoto Protocol.
A LULUCF commitment designed to achieve an increase, or a
limited decrease, of terrestrial organic carbon stocks.
Each commitment would have its own accounting rules,
but together they would form the compliance system of a
unique emission reduction commitment. Both sub-commitments would, therefore, have to be met at the end of any
commitment period and rules would establish the conditions
under, and extent to which, over-achievement of one
commitment could be used to assist in meeting other subcommitments. Parties could elect to commit to either or both
of the separate sectoral commitments, allowing great flexibility in accommodating national circumstances.
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environmental science & policy 10 (2007) 283–294
Box 2. Examples of operation of LULUCF commitment in conjunction with commitments in non-LULUCF
All numbers are in Megatons CO2-equivalents. Negative numbers indicate increased net emissions; positive numbers
indicate decreases in net emissions to the atmosphere. (Note: Due to uncertainties in estimating carbon stock changes,
in reality, significantly larger changes from the base period than illustrated would be needed for commitments.)
Country
A
B
C
D
Base FFE (a)
AA (b)
TCAbase (c)
500
500
50
50
460
460
70
70
5,000
50,000
50,000
5,000
TCAcommitted (d)
5,050
49,950
49,750
5,025
(+1%)
( 0.1%)
( 0.5%)
(+0.5%)
Total commitment = [(a)
(b)] + [(d)
(c)]
90
10
270
5
FFE, non-LULUCF emissions; AA, assigned amount (LULUCF excluded); TCAbase, total carbon stocks, value in base period; TCAcommitted,
carbon stock commitment. Country A is both reducing non-LULUCF emissions and increasing carbon stocks. Country B, while reducing
non-LULUCF emissions, does not expect to be able to retain its current carbon stock level, but may be committing to reducing expected
losses. Country C, very likely a developing nation, expects to need to increase its emissions from current levels, and also does not expect
to be able to retain current carbon stock levels. Country D, while also expecting to increase emissions, does expect to be able to increase
its carbon stocks.
The accounting system for non-LULUCF commitments
would work in the same way as the overall commitments in
the CP-1 with the same flexible mechanisms, ensuring a
complete correspondence with CP-1. The accounting system
for the LULUCF commitment should work in a different but
compatible way.
In order to determine and establish the LULUCF commitment, each Party could, for example, be required to estimate a
base-value, such as the total amount of its terrestrial organic
carbon stocks at the start of the commitment period (TCAbase)
(using either a base year or a base period). Based on the TCAbase
and expected changes, and taking into consideration the
Party’s anthropogenic GHG emissions, each Party that chooses
to undertake a LULUCF commitment would propose a LULUCF
commitment expressed, for instance, as a percentage value of
the TCAbase. Its overall commitment might consist solely of
this LULUCF commitment or its total commitment might be
allocated between non-LULUCF and LULUCF sectors. See Box 2
for numeric examples.
In order to comply with its commitment, the Party would
estimate its carbon stocks at the end of the commitment
period and compare it with the commitment. If the carbon
stocks at the end of the commitment period are higher than
the LULUCF commitment then the Party would be allowed to
issue carbon credits up to the amount of the difference, or
some fraction of the amount of the difference. The extent to
which such credits could be used to meet non-LULUCF
commitments would be specified in the overall agreement
rules. If, however, the TCA is lower, then the Party would have
to compensate for the shortfall (debit) either by over
complying with its non-LULUCF commitment [if any, and if
rules allow such transactions – see (1) and (2) below] or by
purchasing credits from other Parties (i.e., through emission
trading, JI, or CDM credits if some non-Annex I Parties are still
operating without commitments in some sectors; see below).
Therefore, the carbon stock changes during the commitment
period could result in a debit or in a credit vis-a-vis the LULUCF
commitment (see Fig. 2). Note that the example focuses on
carbon stock changes because they are simpler to describe and
understand than fluxes. There is no intent to support any
particular accounting methodology. The example is intended
to illustrate how sectoral approaches, using baselines, could
operate in differing country circumstances and possibly
reward over-achievement of a commitment.
The use of this approach avoids the need to define and
agree on a set of LULUCF activities. All that is required is to
Fig. 2 – Determination of existence of debit or credit due to LULUCF commitment.
292
environmental science & policy 10 (2007) 283–294
define the geographic boundaries of lands11 that will be used to
determine the TCA, and to define the carbon pools to be
included. These pools could be the same ones that are
included in the Marrakech Accords, but harvested wood
products could also be included.
In this example no distinction between direct and/or
indirect human-induced carbon stock changes has been
made. The TCAbase, the projected, and the actual carbon stock
changes will all, to some degree, include effects of both direct
and indirect human actions. This has the effect of avoiding the
need to separate out these two sources of change, since the
indirect effects will largely cancel each other out in the
comparisons (Canadell et al., 2007).
The system could operate in one of two ways with regard to
linkage between LULUCF and other sectors:
(1) Carbon credits issued for over-achievement of a Party’s
LULUCF commitment can only be used for meeting LULUCF
commitments of other countries. This means that the
allocation of the overall commitment between LULUCF and
non-LULUCF sectors is established ex ante when commitments are established and not ex post (during the
compliance check) as in the KP CP-1 (i.e., there is a
‘‘firewall’’ between the LULUCF and non-LULUCF commitments, and non-LULUCF commitments must be fulfilled
without using credits from LULUCF).
(2) Carbon credits issued for over-achievement of the LULUCF
commitment can be used, under some specified restrictions and conditions, to meet non-LULUCF commitments.
This would be more similar to the existing KP CP-1 system.
However, unlike the experience during the negotiations for
the KP, explicit attention is paid to expected changes in
carbon stocks during the commitment establishment
process, and commitments are set taking these expected
changes into account. Consequently, credits will only
ensue if measured carbon stocks are higher than TCA
commitments, and the LULUCF commitments play a semiindependent and clearly defined role in complying with the
overall commitment. This may forestall the need to impose
the types of complex rules presently required in the CP-1.
5.
Concluding remarks; an outlook to the
future
Talks on the future climate change regime will start soon, with
great expectations on the part of the public and, at the same
time, great reservations within negotiating Parties. Doubts
have emerged as to whether the KP agreement under the
UNFCCC will continue, unless the largest emitters join. On the
other hand, interest in instruments such as the CDM remains
strong. At this early stage, it is difficult to foresee the direction
of the process, particularly how LULUCF will be treated.
However, it is not unreasonable to expect substantial changes
11
Because the difficulty to define properly the word ‘‘management’’ and consequently the management activities, it is better to
simply refer to land in which carbon stock changes in the defined
carbon pools are occurring as a direct consequence of human
activities.
in the way commitments are negotiated, as well as in the rules
that govern the obligations. As Parties consider ways forward,
they may want to consider commitments specified in terms
other than tonnes of emissions; the use of non-quantified,
cause-oriented commitments; and the option of sectorspecific commitments. Such changes may lead to a system
that accommodates a wider range of country circumstances
and, in particular, more fully accounts for emissions and
removals due to LULUCF, e.g., by encouraging more countries
to adopt LULUCF commitments and by including emissions
due to deforestation in developing countries.
Given past experiences, if commitments include LULUCF
and non-LULUCF sectors, the relation or linkage between, and
relative contributions of, LULUCF is likely to be given more
attention in future negotiations. These issues are likely to be
discussed from the start of negotiations, and Parties are likely
to invest in more careful assessments or forecasts of future
(net) emissions from all relevant sectors. The present paper
presents a systematic way to consider both possible linkages
and types of commitments with a view towards facilitating
these discussions—discussions whose success may require
delegates to explore rules and commitments well beyond, or
substantially different from, those established during the
negotiations in Kyoto.
The views and political positions of Parties are complex and
are affected by multiple considerations ranging from economic concerns, ideologies, and even the personal views of
individual negotiators. It is possible, however, based on past
discussions, to infer some general, likely, characteristics of
Party positions.
At a very general level, some Parties are likely to partially or
totally favor inclusion of LULUCF in broader climate change
agreements. Historically, countries with substantial forest
resources such as United States, Norway, New Zealand,
Australia, and the Russian Federation have taken such a
position (Marland and Schlamandinger, 2000). Such Parties
may not only favor commitments in LULUCF, but may also be
inclined to favor linkages between LULUCF and non-LULUCF
commitments. Other Parties are likely to be partially or totally
against inclusion of LULUCF. Such Parties might not want to
take on LULUCF commitments themselves and may want at
least some degree of de-linking, if not total de-linking.
Stakeholders that have taken positions against inclusion of
LULUCF include the European Union, Brazil, and some
environmental groups (Goetze, 1999; Marland and Schlamandinger, 2000). Such stakeholders might consider the intrinsic
non-permanence of the removals achieved through LULUCF
as presenting unacceptable risks due to increasing extreme
events, such as extended drought and associated fires.
Underlying views – the reasons why a Party does or does
not favor inclusion of LULUCF – will also affect positions, both
on the type of commitment in LULUCF and the degree of
linkage. For example, Parties may favor inclusion of LULUCF
because they want to achieve reductions at least cost. Such
Parties might want all commitments to be in tonnes of (net)
emissions and might want few if any restrictions on the use of
LULUCF credits to meet commitments in other sectors. These
features would maximize fungibility of credits and facilitate
emission-trading; the United States might be an example of
such a Party. On the other hand, the same concern with
environmental science & policy 10 (2007) 283–294
inexpensive achievement of reductions might lead a Party,
particularly a developing country, to a preference for PAMs
due to the lower reporting costs entailed, the lower risk of
liability in case of failure to meet commitments, and on the
grounds that alterations in land use policies will eventually be
the most effective and cost-effective mechanisms.
The basic positions of Parties will also lead to inter-play
between positions on the types of commitments and the
degree of linkage. If both LULUCF and non-LULUCF commitments are specified in terms of tonnes of GHG emissions,
those Parties against LULUCF would be more likely to favor
complete de-linking. In this way the level of effort devoted to
reducing GHG emissions from fossil fuels, and the commitments set for fossil fuel related emissions, would not be
reduced or compromised by LULUCF actions. In addition,
under complete de-linking LULUCF credits would not be
fungible with other credits. If, on the other hand, PAMs are
used for LULUCF commitments while other commitments are
quantified, the difficulty of rendering the PAM-based credits
fungible with, and therefore utilizable as, credits in other
sectors may reduce concerns about linkage.
We expect that the interest of the international community
in expanding the number of countries that participate in a
future climate change agreement is sufficiently strong to
result in more flexibility in how LULUCF will be incorporated
into the agreement. This increased flexibility may include both
flexibility in type of commitment and degree of linkage. It may
also extend beyond the LULUCF sector, translating into
acceptance of commitments only in, e.g., the transportation
or electricity generation sector. Such flexibility may require
partial or total de-linking, particularly to prevent actions
within LULUCF from inappropriately affecting actions in other
sectors. Whatever transpires, the outcome of the next round of
negotiations will be critical to the international effort to
address climate change, and the fuller the range of approaches
under consideration the more likely that these discussions
will meet with success.
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delegation.
S. Federici holds a PhD in forest management, is member of the
UNFCCC Roster of Expert, and is Researcher in the Climate Change
Unit, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.
C. Forner works for the Center for International Forestry Research
(CIFOR) as the coordinator of climate change activities of this
organisation. Before joining CIFOR, he worked for the UNFCCC
secretariat, where he was in charge of negotiations on LULUCF.
N. Pena works at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change in the
United States. She has, for the past 7 years, focused on the use of
terrestrial and geological sequestration as options to assist in
addressing greenhouse gas emissions.
E. Rametsteiner is forest policy scientist with more than 10 years
of experience in international forest policy analysis. He is currently inter alia working as a researcher at IIASA’s FOR Programme
INSEA Project on Integrated Sink Enhancement Assessment.
M. Sanz is a senior researcher and Head of Program at Fundación
CEAM. She represented Spain in international climate change
talks since COP6 in The Hague. She is a lead author of the Good
Practice Guidance for LULUCF (IPCC, 2003), as well as the 2006
Guidelines of the IPCC and the Fourth Assessment Report of IPCC
that is now under development. She participates in the UN
CLRTAP as chair of the WG on Air Quality of the ICP-Forests. With
her activities in various international and domestic research projects, she has also contributed to the better understanding of the
carbon cycle in different land uses, as well as documenting air
pollution dynamics and effects in the Mediterranean Region.
Z. Somogyi represented Hungary in international climate change
talks since COP6 in The Hague. He is a lead author of various
chapters of the Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF, as well as the
2006 Guidelines of the IPCC. With his activities in various international and domestic research projects, he has also contributed to
the better understanding and to the improved estimation of the
carbon cycle of forests. He is a certified reviewer of national inventory reports submitted to the UNFCCC. Currently he is seconded
from the Hungarian Forest Research Institute to the Climate Change
Unit of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission.