Download Where Titus Quintius Flamininus`s interests in line with those of the

 Title: To what extent were the actions of Titus Quintius Flamininus during his
command in Greece between 198 B.C. and 194 B.C. in line with the interests of
the Roman state?
Author: Mischa Snaije
Date: April 15, 2013
Institution name/journal where submitted: McGill University
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The orthodox view of Titus Quintius Flamininus is that he was specifically suited for
command in Greece. His fluency in Greek and command experience with Greek soldiers in Tarentum
earned him Plutarch’s description as ‘the first Roman philhellene’ in The Parallel Lives. However,
these are insufficient grounds to accept that Flamininus was the best tailored for command in Greece,
since we know that consuls often randomly drew the province they were assigned;1 or even to believe
his philhellenism to be entirely genuine. Philhellenism was often used by magistrates of the time as a
means to secure political allies, and Flamininus must have realized that his common Hellenistic
outlook with Marcellus and Scipio Africanus prevented them from ever becoming bitter enemies.2
The Roman Senate showed a general indifference towards Greece right up until the start of the
Second Macedonian War. The complete Roman withdrawal from Greece after the Phoenice treaty in
205 B.C. and the harsh senatorial rejection of the Aetolian appeal for help against King Phillip of
Macedonia’s aggression in 202 B.C demonstrates the lack of concern for the East before 200 B.C.3 The
senate tended to ascribe greater importance to threats in Italy, and the Celtic invasion in the Po
compounded with the depleted Roman resources in the wake of the Second Punic War meant that
Phillip was not initially considered a priority. The senate’s dramatic change of heart can be largely
explained by rumors in 201 B.C. of a secret pact formed between Antiochus III, the Seleucid King, and
King Phillip.4 The senate was irrationally paranoid of imperial powers uniting against Rome, and
Flamininus played on these fears, by initially exaggerating and then downplaying the threat of
Antiochus in order to be granted extended command in Greece.
However, Flamininus’ aggressive pursuit of prorogation was perfectly in line with the
prevalent Rome military theory that the uninterrupted command of a magistrate under a given theater
was often necessary to bring a campaign to a successful end.5 In light of his knowledge of Greek
culture, Flamininus probably believed himself to be best suited for command in Greece, and thus he in
all likeliness genuinely thought the implementation of the policy of Greek Liberation, or eleutheria,
according to his own specifications was in the best interest of Rome.
The startling freedom of action that Flamininus enjoyed in his command in Greece can largely
be explained by the senate’s tendency to go with the decisions made by the general on the field. The
1 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p274 2 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p98 3 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p92 4 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p93 5 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p322
2 power entrusted to the magistrate with imperium was granted partly on practical reasons, such as the
need to make fast decisions with poor communication methods, but chiefly upon the perception that as
Romans of high-birth and often senators themselves, magistrates were the best representatives of the
interests of Rome.6 Thus the relationships between magistrates and senate were based upon consensus
and trust in the general on-sight, who received Gloria and political power if he successfully served the
Roman State.
Flamininus was obviously seeking personal Gloria from the outset, which is shown by his
running for a consul at a very young age. He is often admired for his ability to ruthlessly promote his
own interests, a cynical trend grounded in the Polybian tradition; but his actions in Greece had a huge
impact on the evolution of Roman foreign policy in Greece in the early to mid 190’s B.C, a crucial
period of Roman expansion into the Mediterranean.7 This essay will investigate whether his actions in
Greece were ultimately in line with the broader interests of Rome, with a particular focus on his role in
manipulating the senate into encompassing Greek Liberation in its propaganda aims, and his
implementation of eleutheria in its integrity despite the threat of Antiochus III. Attention will also be
devoted to how the Gloria currency system can be held accountable for the discrepancy between the
actions of the magistrate with imperium and the interests of Rome.
Aous negotiations – Early 198 B.C.
After a period of stalemate in the war between Rome and Macedon, Flamininus assumes
consulship in 198 and is granted the province of Macedonia. He immediately responds to Phillip’s
demands for negotiations, and demands that the king withdraw from all of Greece as the price for
peace. At this point, Phillip marks the distinction between territories he appropriated by conquest and
hereditary possession, agreeing to withdraw only from the former.8 Flamininus does not grant him this,
and in a demand incongruously uncompromising for his habitually tactful diplomacy, demands that he
withdraw from Thessaly first, which had been Macedonian for over 150 years.9 When Phillip protests,
Flamininus claims he is under orders from the Senate, and the negotiations end abruptly.
6 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p320 7 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p269 8 Livi 32.10.4 9 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p274 3 Ancient sources do not provide a clear answer as to whether Flamininus was indeed following
Senatorial orders, or whether he and his consilium invented the specific terms as a negotiating position.
Diodorus gives an account of Flamininus’ demands for a Greece left ‘ungarrisoned and autonomous’.10
This choice of rhetoric is analogous to the terms used in the Isthmian declaration, and suggests that
Diodorus probably backdated the terms of the declaration made in 196 B.C. But regardless of the
unreliability of Diodorus’ account, one can see in Flamininus’ demands for total withdrawal from
Greece the first mention of eleutheria in his diplomacy. However, the fact that Flamininus conducted
these talks without his Greek allies suggests that he alluded to Greek freedom only in a negative sense
(i.e. freedom from the rule of Macedonia), as he would have gained no diplomatic advantage from
speaking of an ‘ungarrisoned and autonomous’ Greece. Despite the lack of evidence of the general’s
exact rhetoric, Aous is the first instance in which Flamininus uses the concept of Greek freedom as a
political weapon to pressure Phillip, while maintaining the moral high ground by presenting himself as
the liberator of Greece on behalf of Rome.11
In 200 B.C., the Roman Senate had proposed peace terms to Phillip at Abydus demanding the
withdrawal from recently conquered territories (mainly old Ptolemaic possessions in Thrace).12 It is
conceivable that after 18 months of stalemate the conditions they demanded were harsher, but not to
the extent suggested by Flamininus when he demanded Phillip’s withdrawal from hereditary Thessaly.
Considering that Phillip marked the distinction between inherited and conquered territory at the Aous
conference itself; and that Flamininus apparently demanded the withdrawal from Thessaly on the spot,
one can assume that the general was not making demands on specific senatorial instructions as he
claimed. Gruen proposes that the demand to liberate Thessaly first could have been an attempt to
instigate a rebellion in that land should Phillip refuse.13 It is conceivable that Flamininus may have
been trying to shorten the war, thus seeking both to precipitate his acquisition of Gloria and to spare
Roman lives, by making demands that would exploit the internal tensions in Macedon.
But Flamininus’ decision to inflate what were probably vague orders to liberate Macedonia
was most likely motivated by broader Roman security concerns and higher personal interests. Had he
proposed the withdrawal only from conquered territory, Phillip would likely have accepted the peace
10 Diodorus 28.11 11 Seager, Robin, The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia, p108 12 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p275 13 Gruen, E, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, p442 4 terms 14 and Macedon would have remained a strong autonomous power, though temporarily humbled.
Flamininus surely realized this and probably concluded that by offering Phillip terms he could not
accept, he would force the king into further conflict that would crush the Macedonian threat
definitively. 15 This interpretation suggests a compatibility at this point between Roman security
concerns and Flamininus’ own personal quest for Gloria, which would be far greater for defeating
Phillip in battle than for negotiating peace.
Hence, interpreting what were most probably vague orders from the senate in the toughest
possible way was a win-win situation for Flamininus and Rome at Aous. In the eventuality that Phillip
accepted, Flamininus would have negotiated for Rome a treaty that went far beyond the instructions of
the senate, and would have been credited for this. The anticipated refusal of Phillip was also mutually
beneficial, as it forced the king into a war he was sure to lose, thus potentially removing the need for
future Roman intervention against Macedonia and opening the prospect of more Gloria for Flamininus
in a decisive battle.
Nicaea negotiations – Late 198 B.C.
Flamininus once again responded to the Phillip’s demand for peace talks after inflicting a
tactical victory over him in the summer of 198 B.C. that forced the Macedonian army to retreat into
Thessaly. But despite finding himself in a far stronger negotiating position than at Aous, Flamininus
and his Greek allies made demands for peace that were much laxer than those he made earlier that
year.16 Livi, inspired from Polybius, claims that this is because the Roman general wanted to leave the
option of peace open in case he was not reappointed for command against Macedon so as to reap some
Gloria for negotiating peace in that eventuality.17 Ascertaining whether this was indeed the principle
logic behind Flamininus’ terms is the key to investigating whether the magistrate was motivated by
purely personal or greater Roman interests, and the extent to which these interests aligned.
Eckstein observes that in the terms of peace at Nicaea, Flamininus conceded to leave Phillip
the cities of Iasus, Bargylia, Phiotic Thebes and Echinus, which together formed the logical fallback
14 Livi 32.10.4 15 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p102 16 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p278 17 Livi 32.32.5-8 5 position for Phillip should he accept the terms.18 This explanation makes sense if one accepts Livi’s
claim that Flamininus was motivated above all by the fear of having his command superseded: he was
offering terms that Phillip could realistically accept from a military standpoint, thus setting up the
possibility of obtaining credit for negotiating peace. However, this eventuality would have left
Macedonia significant claims in Greece, and would not have eradicated its threat to Rome nor satisfied
Flamininus’ Greek allies, who believed the terms to be too lenient. Flamininus seems to have realized
this and instead banked on the apparently purposeful omission of the strategic ‘Three Fetters of
Greece’ (Demetrias, Chalcis, Acrocorinth) in the talks to reignite a war should he be reappointed, or
settle for peace should he be replaced.19
The final outcome of the talks at Nicaea was a referral to the Roman senate, and one of the
most heated controversies around Flamininus was the extent to which this outcome was the result of his
own machinations. Holleaux suggested that Flamininus himself must have proposed to Phillip the idea
to refer the matter to the senate, since the king could not have fathomed this innovative diplomatic
move alone.20 According to this cynical view by which the Roman general set up from the outset the
framework for his own trickery, Flamininus was planning on duping either the Roman state, by setting
up the conditions to reignite the war if his command was extended; or his Greek allies, by offering
reasonable peace terms to Phillip if he was superseded. His later actions shows that he was ready to
betray his allies if this suited his needs: in 193 B.C. he showed himself quite willing to sacrifice the
Greeks of Asia Minor in order to reach a compromise with Antiochus III, 21 and he was possibly ready
to similarly betray the interests of his Greek allies in the post-Nicaea negotiations.
However there is also ample evidence that whitewashes Flamininus from trickery in his
actions at Nicaea, at least against the Roman state. The approach of winter ensured that he offered
Phillip no military advantage, and in exchange for agreeing to refer to the senate, he secured a
Macedonian withdrawal from Phocis and Locris.22 F. Wood has further suggested that Flamininus’
gentle diplomacy and acceptance of senatorial reference could have been motivated by a desire to
prevent a rapprochement between Phillip and Antiochus III.23 This would suggest the general’s acute
18 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p280 19 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p351 20 Holleaux, M, Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques, p65-66 21 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p104 22 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p282 23 Wood, F., The Tradition of Flamininus' Selfish Ambition in Polybius and Later Historians, p98 6 awareness of the multiple problems Rome faced back at home (the depletion of resources in the
aftermaths of the Second Punic War and the Celtic invasion in the north) and a desire to alleviate
pressure at home. However, this interpretation is unlikely in view of Flamininus’ consistent
downplaying of the Seleucid threat during the first years of his command in Greece. Nevertheless, the
evidence shows that far from only promoting his own interests above Rome, Flamininus facilitating a
final Roman victory over Phillip regardless of who was in command. The most probable explanation is
that Phillip hinted at bypassing his authority, and Flamininus, seeing this as an opportunity to reap
benefit from the uncertainty of his position and seeking clarification of the actual wishes of the senate,
actively encouraged this. Flamininus must also have realized the symbolic benefit to Roman hegemony
of this referral to the senate over purely internal Greek affairs represented: it effectively established
Rome as the arbiter of the Hellenistic world.24
But despite the goodwill that his efforts to safeguard Roman military and hegemonic interests
suggest, Flamininus’ indirect actions back in Rome, through his supporters and Greek allies, strongly
indicate an intent to manipulate the senate’s decisions. The timing of the Greek envoys, who arrived
just after Flamininus’ reappointment to command in Greece, and their perfectly aligned accounts
suggest a strong degree of cooperation between the general and his Greek allies.25 Flamininus in all
likelihood offered the Greek factions the possibility of a fully liberated Greece, which went far beyond
their individual demands for territorial concessions, provided they cooperate with his plan to sabotage
the peace negotiations and rekindle the war. This is the first instance in which Flamininus explicitly
uses ‘liberation propaganda’ to secure a political advantage by uniting his divided Greek allies over an
issue that benefitted them all.26 Once his reappointment to command was secure, the Greek envoys
made the case to the senate that as long as Phillip held the Fetters they could not be free, and their
unanimity in stressing this point had a powerful effect on the senators according to Livi.27 The extent of
Flamininus and the Greeks’ manipulation is evident in the envoys’ concluding appeal that the senate
not disappoint the Greeks in their hope for freedom and miss the chance to win great renown, and their
24 Wood, F., The Tradition of Flamininus' Selfish Ambition in Polybius and Later Historians, p96 25 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p351 26 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p350 27 Livi 32.37.3 7 use of the influence King Anymander of Athamania as the mouthpiece for the request further points to
an intent to instigate a shift in the senate’s foreign policy.28
All this evidence suggests that Flamininus purposefully avoided the subject of the Fetters at
Nicaea in order to misrepresent what had been said to his own ends,29 which supports the cynical view
that the referral to the senate was a masterfully executed piece of realpolitik. Flamininus knew that the
liberation of the Greeks was not a priority on the senatorial agenda, but he appears to have relied on the
senators understanding that Phillip would not be sufficiently weakened while still in possession of the
Fetters.30 From there, it was not difficult to exploit the senator’s ignorance of strategy to manipulate
them into believing that victory over Phillip and freedom in Greece were intrinsically bound. Thus,
Flaminius’ manipulation of the senate was aimed solely at encompassing eleutheria in Roman policy
aims, and the indirect beneficiaries of this were the Greek allies and not Rome. In the sort term, this led
to the resumption of the war when Phillip’s envoys were unable to provide their king’s response on the
question of the Fetters.31 The Roman victory at Cynoscephalae in 197 of course benefitted Flamininus,
who obtained an opulent five day supplicatio at the news of his victory.32 But whether it was beneficial
for Rome to follow the policy of Greek liberation, which appears at this point to have been
appropriated by Flamininus for his own ends, remains to be determined.
Ratification of Peace after Cynoscephalae – Early 196 B.C.
With the defeat of Phillip’s forces at Cynoscephalae, Greece was free from Macedonian
domination, and Flaminius, as the victorious general in possession of imperium enjoyed an even higher
degree of political freedom to rearrange post-Macedonian Greece.33 The first issue on his agenda was
what to do with King Phillip. Since he had agreed to an unconditional surrender, Flamininus decided to
leave him in power on the terms agreed at Nicaea.34 However, Phillip’s deposition seemed necessary to
ensure the subjugation of Macedonia to Rome, especially in view of his son Perseus being a suitable
28 Polybius 18.11.11 29 Briscoe, John, Flamininus and Roman Politics (200-189 B.C.), p29 30 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p353 31 Briscoe, John, Flamininus and Roman Politics (200-189 B.C.), p29 32 Livi 33.24.3 33 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p356 34 Polybius 18.38.1 8 candidate to take over the reigns of his kingdom.35 To justify himself, Flamininus invoked the Roman
custom to spare the defeated,36 but the cunning general resorting to moral explanations suggests other
motives were at stake. The most obvious is clearly personal interest: Phillip would in all likeliness not
have accepted deposition and would have carried on the war at all costs, especially in view of potential
support from Antiochus III advancing into Asia Minor in 196 B.C.37 This would have delayed, or even
robbed Flamininus of his Gloria if he was replaced for re-starting the war. This instance exposes a
fundamental flaw in the glory reward system: generals were overly concerned with safeguarded their
Gloria even at the cost of leaving a potential threat to Rome in power. In this instance, Phillip did not
cause more problems for Rome, but Flamininus’ lenience towards Macedon shows that he was clearly
willing to make concessions to the detriment of the Roman state and his Greek allies to preserve his
Gloria intact.
Flamininus’ decision to leave Phillip on the throne was also motivated by a personal feud with
the Aetolians. Polybius claims that the Aetolians had been key to defeating Phillip at Cynoscephalae,
and had sacked his camp while the Romans were still fighting.38 This would have represented a double
insult to Flamininus: it would have tarnished his claim to Gloria in battle, and undermined his
relationship to his men who believed they had been robbed of their rightful booty.39 Thus, the general’s
decision to maintain Phillip on the throne can be viewed as an attempt to prevent the fulfillment of
Aetolian interests and the expansion of their power in Greece. Another instance confirms the personal
character of Flamininus’ actions towards the Aetolians. While the peace terms were being negotiated
the Aetolians claimed a number of towns evacuated by the Macedonians. Phillip appeared to comply,
but Flamininus blocks the transaction, handing back only Phiotic Thebes on the dubious grounds that
the treaty between Rome and the Aetolian League entitled them only to cities taken by force (i.e.
Phiotic Thebes) whereas the others had surrendered. 40 Regardless of the controversy in modern
scholarship over this legal claim, it is clear that the general’s interpretation of the treaty would not have
mattered had he been well-disposed towards the Aetolians. Thus another flaw of the Gloria system
comes to light: the immense political freedom conferred upon victorious magistrates with imperium
35 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p285 36 Polybius 18.37.1-6 37 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p287 38 Polybius 18.34.2 39 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p287 40 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p290 9 often led them to make post-war decisions based upon personal disposition, and these subjective
inclinations were not always correlated with the interests of Rome. This is especially visible in
Flamininus’ dealings with the Aetolians. His refusal to honor their contribution to the Roman war
effort had great symbolic value, implying that the Greeks were not on an equal standing with Rome and
thus were not entitled to their share of the spoils.41 It undermined the shift in the way Rome was
perceived by the Greeks (from oppressive hegemon to benevolent superpower) that Flamininus was
trying to promote through the propaganda of eleutheria. Polybius even goes so far as to claim that this
episode laid the seeds for the later dispute between Rome and Antiochus III, who invaded Greece upon
invitation by the revengeful Aetolians.42
Despite serious opposition both in Rome and from his Greek allies, Flamininus managed to
obtain a senatorial ratification for peace on his own terms.43 This decision is once again testimony to
the unhealthy degree of political freedom granted to the victorious Roman general; and supports the
view that the discrepancy between the magistrate’s decisions and the interests of Rome were due to the
nature of the glory reward system: for the Gloria to have an value, it had to be accompanied by power
and agency on the field, which left important decisions hostage to human nature. The ratification of
peace can be seen as marking Flamininus’ success at linking the concepts of eleutheria and Roman
foreign policy in Greece in the minds of the senate. However, the first indisputable commitment to the
slogan of ‘freedom for the Greeks’ in a positive sense (i.e. full autonomy and independence) came from
the senate rather than Flamininus. 44 Furthermore, Livi writes that King Anymander specifically
requested that the Romans withdraw in a manner that did not endanger Greek freedom.45 In light of this
evidence, Rome’s commitment to the liberation of Greece can be interpreted as the senate’s response to
pressure from powerful Greek elites, as proposed by Seager and Gruen, rather than a senatorial
manipulation orchestrated by Flamininus.
The commission of ten sent to ensure the reorganization of post-war Greece was conducted
according to the wishes of the Rome appears to support the view that Flamininus had a minimal impact
in the Roman adoption of eleutheria. But ultimately, Flamininus was the magistrate in possession of
41 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p292 42 Polybius 18.39.1 43 Polybius 18.42.2 44 Seager, Robin, The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia, p109 45 Livi 33.12.2 10 imperium, and the commission could not expect to contradict his decisions.46 If the senate was truly
concerned with enforcing its policy of Hellenistic liberation according to its own specification, it would
probably not have appointed such a weak mechanism to enforce it.47 Although the senate probably took
the calls for freedom from Greek elites into consideration, it was ultimately Flamininus who singlehandedly implemented the policy of eleutheria with virtually no opposition from the senatorial
commission.48 When the Aetolians started claiming that ‘it was a change of master, not the liberation of
Greece which was occurring’,49 eleutheria threatened to backfire on Flamininus, and it was within the
general’s power to reverse the policy.50 But instead, he pursued its integral implementation, setting out
to prove the Aetolians wrong. This decision seems to be largely motivated by his personal relations
with the Aetolians, which incited him to prove them wrong, and his desire to be immortalized as the
liberator of Greece.
Declaration at the Isthmian Games – Late 196 B.C.
At the Isthmian Games in 196 B.C., Flamininus’ herald made the announcement that Greeks
were to be ‘free, exempt from taxes, and living under their own laws’.51 The surprise and enthusiasm of
the Greek crowd was a reflection of the drastic shift in Roman thinking about the region that the
announcement represented. The unconditional and positive recognition of Greek freedom completely
wiped clean the brutal and patronizing reputation that Rome had started to acquire towards its allies.52
On the one hand, the Isthmian announcement represented the culmination of Flamininus’
quest for Gloria: he was mobbed by the crowd and hailed as a savior; and long after his death, games,
festivities and even religious cults appeared in Greece in his honor.53 Roman opinion mattered most,
but for a relatively young consul of exceptional ambition like Flamininus the adulation of the Greek
masses must have held its allure.54 Flamininus unabashedly took full credit for the announcement, and
46 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p294 47 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p107 48 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p294 49 Polybius 18.45.6 50 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p357 51 Livi 33.32.23 52 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p300 53 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p301 54 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p363 11 Plutarch alludes to an inscription at Delphi in which he immortalizes his responsibility for the
implementation of eleutheria.55
On the other hand, Flamininus’ unwavering adherence to this new approach to Roman
relations with Greece all the way down to 194 B.C. suggests intent on his part to instigate a change in
Roman thinking. As the undeniable architect of the liberation program, he alone knew what the Greeks
expected from such a declaration. And as perhaps the Roman of his time with the most practical
knowledge of Greek political rhetoric, he was the best suited to make the final announcement of the
public relations campaign on behalf of Rome.56 Thus the Isthmian announcement can be viewed in the
short term as a perfect alignment of Flamininus’ personal interests with those of the Roman State:
regardless of the extent of the general’s manipulation of the senate into accepting eleutheria as a
propaganda policy, he implemented it with the fullest integrity and brought about a real, albeit
temporary, change in the perception of Rome as a hegemonic power. The inclusion of the Three Fetters
in the decree made it both integral and unique, and indicated that Rome intended on following through
with its policy.57
Thus, it is clear that Flamininus used liberation propaganda as a means to gain enormous
prestige and lasting recognition from the Greek people; and that he succeeded in reconciling this aim
with instigating a positive shift both in the way Rome perceived its Greek allies and the way the Greeks
perceived Rome as a hegemonic power. All that remains to be determined is whether following a
policy of withdrawal and non-intervention in Greece was a beneficial policy for Rome to follow in the
long term.
Withdrawal from Greece -194 B.C.
The declaration of the Isthmian games was a watershed moment in Roman foreign policy, but
in order for it to have any meaning, Flamininus had to convince the Roman senate to carry it through
integrally. This required him to reverse his previous behavior of exaggerating the threat of Antiochus
III: in order to be granted yet another extension of his command and dispose of the time to complete
55 Plutarch, Flamininus 12.6
56 Walsh,
Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p358 Arthur, Senate and General, p301 57 Eckstein,
12 the Roman withdrawal from Greece, the senate had to be convinced that Roman security was
safeguarded.58 This reveals yet another flaw in the way Gloria was attributed: the fact that it went to
the magistrate who completed the task, rather than the one who struggled most vigorously for it, meant
that generals often made decisions simply to be strategically positioned to reap reward. Many obstacles
made it difficult for Flamininus to play down the Seleucid threat in the year 194 B.C, such as the
advance of Antiochus into Europe without provocation and the presence of Hannibal at his side as
military advisor.59
The Scipio Africanus, the hero of the Second Punic War, had also been elected consul in the
year 194 B.C., and he advocated against a total Roman withdrawal from Greece on the grounds that
Antiochus would be tempted to fill the power vacuum left by a sudden and total ungarrisoning of
troops.60 The difference between Scipio and Flamininus was about means rather than ends: both were
in favour of Greek independence and acutely aware of the Seleucid threat. But while Flamininus
believed that integral liberation was the surest way of ensuring the Greeks’ goodwill and loyalty to
Rome, Scipio wanted to compromise and leave Roman garrisons in the Three Fetters to dissuade
Antiochus from invading.61 It is questionable whether Flamininus actually believed in the coherence of
his approach, since he had an obvious personal stake in the matter: in the short term Scipio would
probably supersede his command if the senate aligned with his view, and in the long term Flamininus’
immortalization as the liberator of Greece was contingent upon his integral delivery of the Isthmian
announcement.
Ultimately, the Roman senate sided with Flamininus and called for the return of Flamininus to
Rome and no consul to be sent to Greece.62 It is possible that the senate was concerned with the
response from Greece if it decided to compromise its liberation policy, but as Eckstein observes it most
likely wanted to prevent the hero of the Second Punic War from accumulating even more Gloria.63
Thus again we observe the shortcomings of the system of Gloria, which clearly lead the senate astray
in this instance by making it side with the personally motivated interests of Flamininus over Scipio’s
for the sake of maintaining a balance of powers between the Roman generals. Flamininus personally
58 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p309 59 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p309 60 Briscoe, John, Flamininus and Roman Politics (200-189 B.C.), p49 61 Briscoe, John, Flamininus and Roman Politics (200-189 B.C.), p49 62 Livi 34.43.8 63 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p310 13 conducted the withdrawal from Greece in the spring of 194 B.C., surrounded by the cheers of the
Greek masses who saluted him as their liberator. 64 The reaction of the crowd to his dramatic
withdrawals seems engineered to prove to the Senate the validity of his policy and thus reinforce his
credibility as a promoter of healthy Greco-Roman relations.
Despite Flamininus’ best efforts to align his personal quest for Gloria with the interests of the
Roman state, the implementation of his policy of total withdrawal had disastrous consequences. Only
two years after the Roman withdrawal, Antiochus arrived in Greece and with a mere 10 000 men he
destroyed Flamininus’ fragile political system in Greece. 65 The conditions that led the Seleucid
invasion of Greece so soon after peace had been established can be traced directly back to Flamininus’
personal actions. His personal feud with the Aetolians, and his subsequent treatment of them as a
subject of Rome not entitled to its share of the war spoils backfired violently when they invited
Antiochus to ‘liberate’ Greece from supposed Roman oppression, even offering the Seleucid King
Demetrias as his base of operations.66 As predicted by Scipio, the military void left by the complete
Roman withdrawal was perceived as an open invitation by Antiochus; and the Greek loyalty to Rome,
which Flamininus hoped his ‘magnanimous’ gesture would ensure, proved unreliable when their
personal interests were at stake: although some Greek states (including Macedonia, a noteworthy
achievement) remained loyal to Rome, most sided with Antiochus.67 In light of this, it is clear that the
Roman general’s desire to implement eleutheria integrally so as to reap the prestige associated with it,
and his inclination to disprove the Aetolian claims that Rome had simply supplanted Phillip as the
arbiter of Greek affairs, led him to promote an unfeasible policy that drew Rome into a protracted war.
Conclusion
Overall, Flamininus’ actions in Greece were incompatible with the long-term interests of
Rome. Although his decision to exaggerate the senatorial instructions at Aous to force Phillip into
further conflict was in touch with Roman security concerns and hegemonic interests, his dedication to
completing eleutheria despite the Seleucid threat was ultimately harmful to the Roman state. His policy
64 Livi 34.50.9 65 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p314 66 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p314 67 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p314 14 of liberating Greece can be viewed as his attempt to find a logical solution to post-war Macedonia that
would ensure the loyalty of the Greeks to Rome and create an inviolable buffer zone in the East against
foreign invasion. The fact that the liberation of Greek cities appeared at first view entirely consistent
with the hegemony of Rome, along with the splendid positive propaganda such a policy represented,
convinced the senate to follow Flamininus’ decisions. His dedication to the integral completion of
Greek liberation instigated a real shift in the way the Greeks perceived Rome as a hegemonic power,
which is apparent from the prestige acquired by Flamininus both during and after his life. But the
general’s attachment to eleutheria, which he almost single-handedly implemented on behalf of Rome
from its embryonic form, and his personal interests in seeing its completion, induced the senate into
error. Initially, Flamininus seems to have only considered the advantages of Greek freedom as
propaganda, but when at Nicaea it became a rallying point for the Greeks and his best possibility at
gaining Gloria, he vigorously advocated this policy in the face of common sense.68 Ultimately, the war
with Antiochus left Rome the dominant military power in the Mediterranean, but the war was neither
inevitable nor even necessary for that purpose and was largely a result of Flamininus’ actions.69
This discrepancy between Flamininus’s personally motivated behaviour during his command
in Greece and the interests of the Roman state can be largely explained by the structure of the system
of reward for Roman magistrates. The sacred nature of Gloria, and the personal credibility attached to
it, is largely responsible for Flamininus’ determination to prove to the Greeks the goodwill of his
policy of liberation, especially under the accusations of the Aetolians. It is also what appears to have
motivated Flamininus to pursue eleutheria in its integrity, even when it was clear that a compromise as
proposed by Scipio was safer for Roman security. The political capital associated with Gloria also
seems to have played a role in the senate’s decision to side with Flamininus rather than Scipio, who
was already dangerously powerful. The rapid accumulation of Gloria, as was the case with Flamininus,
gave Roman magistrates in possession of imperium an unhealthy degree of freedom on the field, which
they could exploit for their personal ends. The quest for more Gloria gave Roman magistrates both the
incentive and the means to obtain an extension of their command; and its attribution to the individual
who completed the task caused magistrates to often promote their own interests over those of Rome.
68 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p363 69 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p314
15 Flamininus undoubtedly believed that he was acting in the interests of the Roman state as well as his
own. But his virtually unchecked control over the reorganization of post-Macedonian Greece on
account of the Gloria he possessed led him to fanatically uphold a policy he had a personal stake in,
and that ultimately induced Rome into an unnecessary war.
16 Bibliography
Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, University of California Press, Los Angeles (California), 1987
Wood, F., The Tradition of Flamininus' Selfish Ambition in Polybius and Later Historians, John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (Maryland), 1939
Seager, Robin, The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia: From Alexander to Antiochus, The Classical
Quarterly Vol. 31 No. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1981
Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, Historia Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte
Bd 45 H. 3, Franz Steiner Verlag, Germany, 1996
Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK), 1951
Briscoe, John, Flamininus and Roman Politics (200-189 B.C.), Latomus Vol. 31 No. 1, Society of
Latin Studies of Bruxelles, Bruxelles (Belgium), 1972
Gruen, E, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, Vol. II, University of California Press,
London (UK), 1984
Holleaux, M, Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques, Tome IV: Rome, la Macedoine, et l'Orient
Grecque, L. Robert, Paris, 1952
Ancient sources
Livi, The Dawn of the Roman Empire, Books 31-40
Polybius, The Histories
Diodorus, Historical Library
Plutarch, Flamininus, Parallel Lives Vol X
17