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Title: To what extent were the actions of Titus Quintius Flamininus during his command in Greece between 198 B.C. and 194 B.C. in line with the interests of the Roman state? Author: Mischa Snaije Date: April 15, 2013 Institution name/journal where submitted: McGill University The use of this database indicates agreement to the terms and conditions Academia is a database that promotes the free exchange of ideas and scholarly work, setting a platform on which to foment and improve student discourse The orthodox view of Titus Quintius Flamininus is that he was specifically suited for command in Greece. His fluency in Greek and command experience with Greek soldiers in Tarentum earned him Plutarch’s description as ‘the first Roman philhellene’ in The Parallel Lives. However, these are insufficient grounds to accept that Flamininus was the best tailored for command in Greece, since we know that consuls often randomly drew the province they were assigned;1 or even to believe his philhellenism to be entirely genuine. Philhellenism was often used by magistrates of the time as a means to secure political allies, and Flamininus must have realized that his common Hellenistic outlook with Marcellus and Scipio Africanus prevented them from ever becoming bitter enemies.2 The Roman Senate showed a general indifference towards Greece right up until the start of the Second Macedonian War. The complete Roman withdrawal from Greece after the Phoenice treaty in 205 B.C. and the harsh senatorial rejection of the Aetolian appeal for help against King Phillip of Macedonia’s aggression in 202 B.C demonstrates the lack of concern for the East before 200 B.C.3 The senate tended to ascribe greater importance to threats in Italy, and the Celtic invasion in the Po compounded with the depleted Roman resources in the wake of the Second Punic War meant that Phillip was not initially considered a priority. The senate’s dramatic change of heart can be largely explained by rumors in 201 B.C. of a secret pact formed between Antiochus III, the Seleucid King, and King Phillip.4 The senate was irrationally paranoid of imperial powers uniting against Rome, and Flamininus played on these fears, by initially exaggerating and then downplaying the threat of Antiochus in order to be granted extended command in Greece. However, Flamininus’ aggressive pursuit of prorogation was perfectly in line with the prevalent Rome military theory that the uninterrupted command of a magistrate under a given theater was often necessary to bring a campaign to a successful end.5 In light of his knowledge of Greek culture, Flamininus probably believed himself to be best suited for command in Greece, and thus he in all likeliness genuinely thought the implementation of the policy of Greek Liberation, or eleutheria, according to his own specifications was in the best interest of Rome. The startling freedom of action that Flamininus enjoyed in his command in Greece can largely be explained by the senate’s tendency to go with the decisions made by the general on the field. The 1 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p274 2 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p98 3 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p92 4 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p93 5 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p322 2 power entrusted to the magistrate with imperium was granted partly on practical reasons, such as the need to make fast decisions with poor communication methods, but chiefly upon the perception that as Romans of high-birth and often senators themselves, magistrates were the best representatives of the interests of Rome.6 Thus the relationships between magistrates and senate were based upon consensus and trust in the general on-sight, who received Gloria and political power if he successfully served the Roman State. Flamininus was obviously seeking personal Gloria from the outset, which is shown by his running for a consul at a very young age. He is often admired for his ability to ruthlessly promote his own interests, a cynical trend grounded in the Polybian tradition; but his actions in Greece had a huge impact on the evolution of Roman foreign policy in Greece in the early to mid 190’s B.C, a crucial period of Roman expansion into the Mediterranean.7 This essay will investigate whether his actions in Greece were ultimately in line with the broader interests of Rome, with a particular focus on his role in manipulating the senate into encompassing Greek Liberation in its propaganda aims, and his implementation of eleutheria in its integrity despite the threat of Antiochus III. Attention will also be devoted to how the Gloria currency system can be held accountable for the discrepancy between the actions of the magistrate with imperium and the interests of Rome. Aous negotiations – Early 198 B.C. After a period of stalemate in the war between Rome and Macedon, Flamininus assumes consulship in 198 and is granted the province of Macedonia. He immediately responds to Phillip’s demands for negotiations, and demands that the king withdraw from all of Greece as the price for peace. At this point, Phillip marks the distinction between territories he appropriated by conquest and hereditary possession, agreeing to withdraw only from the former.8 Flamininus does not grant him this, and in a demand incongruously uncompromising for his habitually tactful diplomacy, demands that he withdraw from Thessaly first, which had been Macedonian for over 150 years.9 When Phillip protests, Flamininus claims he is under orders from the Senate, and the negotiations end abruptly. 6 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p320 7 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p269 8 Livi 32.10.4 9 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p274 3 Ancient sources do not provide a clear answer as to whether Flamininus was indeed following Senatorial orders, or whether he and his consilium invented the specific terms as a negotiating position. Diodorus gives an account of Flamininus’ demands for a Greece left ‘ungarrisoned and autonomous’.10 This choice of rhetoric is analogous to the terms used in the Isthmian declaration, and suggests that Diodorus probably backdated the terms of the declaration made in 196 B.C. But regardless of the unreliability of Diodorus’ account, one can see in Flamininus’ demands for total withdrawal from Greece the first mention of eleutheria in his diplomacy. However, the fact that Flamininus conducted these talks without his Greek allies suggests that he alluded to Greek freedom only in a negative sense (i.e. freedom from the rule of Macedonia), as he would have gained no diplomatic advantage from speaking of an ‘ungarrisoned and autonomous’ Greece. Despite the lack of evidence of the general’s exact rhetoric, Aous is the first instance in which Flamininus uses the concept of Greek freedom as a political weapon to pressure Phillip, while maintaining the moral high ground by presenting himself as the liberator of Greece on behalf of Rome.11 In 200 B.C., the Roman Senate had proposed peace terms to Phillip at Abydus demanding the withdrawal from recently conquered territories (mainly old Ptolemaic possessions in Thrace).12 It is conceivable that after 18 months of stalemate the conditions they demanded were harsher, but not to the extent suggested by Flamininus when he demanded Phillip’s withdrawal from hereditary Thessaly. Considering that Phillip marked the distinction between inherited and conquered territory at the Aous conference itself; and that Flamininus apparently demanded the withdrawal from Thessaly on the spot, one can assume that the general was not making demands on specific senatorial instructions as he claimed. Gruen proposes that the demand to liberate Thessaly first could have been an attempt to instigate a rebellion in that land should Phillip refuse.13 It is conceivable that Flamininus may have been trying to shorten the war, thus seeking both to precipitate his acquisition of Gloria and to spare Roman lives, by making demands that would exploit the internal tensions in Macedon. But Flamininus’ decision to inflate what were probably vague orders to liberate Macedonia was most likely motivated by broader Roman security concerns and higher personal interests. Had he proposed the withdrawal only from conquered territory, Phillip would likely have accepted the peace 10 Diodorus 28.11 11 Seager, Robin, The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia, p108 12 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p275 13 Gruen, E, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, p442 4 terms 14 and Macedon would have remained a strong autonomous power, though temporarily humbled. Flamininus surely realized this and probably concluded that by offering Phillip terms he could not accept, he would force the king into further conflict that would crush the Macedonian threat definitively. 15 This interpretation suggests a compatibility at this point between Roman security concerns and Flamininus’ own personal quest for Gloria, which would be far greater for defeating Phillip in battle than for negotiating peace. Hence, interpreting what were most probably vague orders from the senate in the toughest possible way was a win-win situation for Flamininus and Rome at Aous. In the eventuality that Phillip accepted, Flamininus would have negotiated for Rome a treaty that went far beyond the instructions of the senate, and would have been credited for this. The anticipated refusal of Phillip was also mutually beneficial, as it forced the king into a war he was sure to lose, thus potentially removing the need for future Roman intervention against Macedonia and opening the prospect of more Gloria for Flamininus in a decisive battle. Nicaea negotiations – Late 198 B.C. Flamininus once again responded to the Phillip’s demand for peace talks after inflicting a tactical victory over him in the summer of 198 B.C. that forced the Macedonian army to retreat into Thessaly. But despite finding himself in a far stronger negotiating position than at Aous, Flamininus and his Greek allies made demands for peace that were much laxer than those he made earlier that year.16 Livi, inspired from Polybius, claims that this is because the Roman general wanted to leave the option of peace open in case he was not reappointed for command against Macedon so as to reap some Gloria for negotiating peace in that eventuality.17 Ascertaining whether this was indeed the principle logic behind Flamininus’ terms is the key to investigating whether the magistrate was motivated by purely personal or greater Roman interests, and the extent to which these interests aligned. Eckstein observes that in the terms of peace at Nicaea, Flamininus conceded to leave Phillip the cities of Iasus, Bargylia, Phiotic Thebes and Echinus, which together formed the logical fallback 14 Livi 32.10.4 15 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p102 16 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p278 17 Livi 32.32.5-8 5 position for Phillip should he accept the terms.18 This explanation makes sense if one accepts Livi’s claim that Flamininus was motivated above all by the fear of having his command superseded: he was offering terms that Phillip could realistically accept from a military standpoint, thus setting up the possibility of obtaining credit for negotiating peace. However, this eventuality would have left Macedonia significant claims in Greece, and would not have eradicated its threat to Rome nor satisfied Flamininus’ Greek allies, who believed the terms to be too lenient. Flamininus seems to have realized this and instead banked on the apparently purposeful omission of the strategic ‘Three Fetters of Greece’ (Demetrias, Chalcis, Acrocorinth) in the talks to reignite a war should he be reappointed, or settle for peace should he be replaced.19 The final outcome of the talks at Nicaea was a referral to the Roman senate, and one of the most heated controversies around Flamininus was the extent to which this outcome was the result of his own machinations. Holleaux suggested that Flamininus himself must have proposed to Phillip the idea to refer the matter to the senate, since the king could not have fathomed this innovative diplomatic move alone.20 According to this cynical view by which the Roman general set up from the outset the framework for his own trickery, Flamininus was planning on duping either the Roman state, by setting up the conditions to reignite the war if his command was extended; or his Greek allies, by offering reasonable peace terms to Phillip if he was superseded. His later actions shows that he was ready to betray his allies if this suited his needs: in 193 B.C. he showed himself quite willing to sacrifice the Greeks of Asia Minor in order to reach a compromise with Antiochus III, 21 and he was possibly ready to similarly betray the interests of his Greek allies in the post-Nicaea negotiations. However there is also ample evidence that whitewashes Flamininus from trickery in his actions at Nicaea, at least against the Roman state. The approach of winter ensured that he offered Phillip no military advantage, and in exchange for agreeing to refer to the senate, he secured a Macedonian withdrawal from Phocis and Locris.22 F. Wood has further suggested that Flamininus’ gentle diplomacy and acceptance of senatorial reference could have been motivated by a desire to prevent a rapprochement between Phillip and Antiochus III.23 This would suggest the general’s acute 18 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p280 19 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p351 20 Holleaux, M, Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques, p65-66 21 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p104 22 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p282 23 Wood, F., The Tradition of Flamininus' Selfish Ambition in Polybius and Later Historians, p98 6 awareness of the multiple problems Rome faced back at home (the depletion of resources in the aftermaths of the Second Punic War and the Celtic invasion in the north) and a desire to alleviate pressure at home. However, this interpretation is unlikely in view of Flamininus’ consistent downplaying of the Seleucid threat during the first years of his command in Greece. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that far from only promoting his own interests above Rome, Flamininus facilitating a final Roman victory over Phillip regardless of who was in command. The most probable explanation is that Phillip hinted at bypassing his authority, and Flamininus, seeing this as an opportunity to reap benefit from the uncertainty of his position and seeking clarification of the actual wishes of the senate, actively encouraged this. Flamininus must also have realized the symbolic benefit to Roman hegemony of this referral to the senate over purely internal Greek affairs represented: it effectively established Rome as the arbiter of the Hellenistic world.24 But despite the goodwill that his efforts to safeguard Roman military and hegemonic interests suggest, Flamininus’ indirect actions back in Rome, through his supporters and Greek allies, strongly indicate an intent to manipulate the senate’s decisions. The timing of the Greek envoys, who arrived just after Flamininus’ reappointment to command in Greece, and their perfectly aligned accounts suggest a strong degree of cooperation between the general and his Greek allies.25 Flamininus in all likelihood offered the Greek factions the possibility of a fully liberated Greece, which went far beyond their individual demands for territorial concessions, provided they cooperate with his plan to sabotage the peace negotiations and rekindle the war. This is the first instance in which Flamininus explicitly uses ‘liberation propaganda’ to secure a political advantage by uniting his divided Greek allies over an issue that benefitted them all.26 Once his reappointment to command was secure, the Greek envoys made the case to the senate that as long as Phillip held the Fetters they could not be free, and their unanimity in stressing this point had a powerful effect on the senators according to Livi.27 The extent of Flamininus and the Greeks’ manipulation is evident in the envoys’ concluding appeal that the senate not disappoint the Greeks in their hope for freedom and miss the chance to win great renown, and their 24 Wood, F., The Tradition of Flamininus' Selfish Ambition in Polybius and Later Historians, p96 25 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p351 26 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p350 27 Livi 32.37.3 7 use of the influence King Anymander of Athamania as the mouthpiece for the request further points to an intent to instigate a shift in the senate’s foreign policy.28 All this evidence suggests that Flamininus purposefully avoided the subject of the Fetters at Nicaea in order to misrepresent what had been said to his own ends,29 which supports the cynical view that the referral to the senate was a masterfully executed piece of realpolitik. Flamininus knew that the liberation of the Greeks was not a priority on the senatorial agenda, but he appears to have relied on the senators understanding that Phillip would not be sufficiently weakened while still in possession of the Fetters.30 From there, it was not difficult to exploit the senator’s ignorance of strategy to manipulate them into believing that victory over Phillip and freedom in Greece were intrinsically bound. Thus, Flaminius’ manipulation of the senate was aimed solely at encompassing eleutheria in Roman policy aims, and the indirect beneficiaries of this were the Greek allies and not Rome. In the sort term, this led to the resumption of the war when Phillip’s envoys were unable to provide their king’s response on the question of the Fetters.31 The Roman victory at Cynoscephalae in 197 of course benefitted Flamininus, who obtained an opulent five day supplicatio at the news of his victory.32 But whether it was beneficial for Rome to follow the policy of Greek liberation, which appears at this point to have been appropriated by Flamininus for his own ends, remains to be determined. Ratification of Peace after Cynoscephalae – Early 196 B.C. With the defeat of Phillip’s forces at Cynoscephalae, Greece was free from Macedonian domination, and Flaminius, as the victorious general in possession of imperium enjoyed an even higher degree of political freedom to rearrange post-Macedonian Greece.33 The first issue on his agenda was what to do with King Phillip. Since he had agreed to an unconditional surrender, Flamininus decided to leave him in power on the terms agreed at Nicaea.34 However, Phillip’s deposition seemed necessary to ensure the subjugation of Macedonia to Rome, especially in view of his son Perseus being a suitable 28 Polybius 18.11.11 29 Briscoe, John, Flamininus and Roman Politics (200-189 B.C.), p29 30 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p353 31 Briscoe, John, Flamininus and Roman Politics (200-189 B.C.), p29 32 Livi 33.24.3 33 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p356 34 Polybius 18.38.1 8 candidate to take over the reigns of his kingdom.35 To justify himself, Flamininus invoked the Roman custom to spare the defeated,36 but the cunning general resorting to moral explanations suggests other motives were at stake. The most obvious is clearly personal interest: Phillip would in all likeliness not have accepted deposition and would have carried on the war at all costs, especially in view of potential support from Antiochus III advancing into Asia Minor in 196 B.C.37 This would have delayed, or even robbed Flamininus of his Gloria if he was replaced for re-starting the war. This instance exposes a fundamental flaw in the glory reward system: generals were overly concerned with safeguarded their Gloria even at the cost of leaving a potential threat to Rome in power. In this instance, Phillip did not cause more problems for Rome, but Flamininus’ lenience towards Macedon shows that he was clearly willing to make concessions to the detriment of the Roman state and his Greek allies to preserve his Gloria intact. Flamininus’ decision to leave Phillip on the throne was also motivated by a personal feud with the Aetolians. Polybius claims that the Aetolians had been key to defeating Phillip at Cynoscephalae, and had sacked his camp while the Romans were still fighting.38 This would have represented a double insult to Flamininus: it would have tarnished his claim to Gloria in battle, and undermined his relationship to his men who believed they had been robbed of their rightful booty.39 Thus, the general’s decision to maintain Phillip on the throne can be viewed as an attempt to prevent the fulfillment of Aetolian interests and the expansion of their power in Greece. Another instance confirms the personal character of Flamininus’ actions towards the Aetolians. While the peace terms were being negotiated the Aetolians claimed a number of towns evacuated by the Macedonians. Phillip appeared to comply, but Flamininus blocks the transaction, handing back only Phiotic Thebes on the dubious grounds that the treaty between Rome and the Aetolian League entitled them only to cities taken by force (i.e. Phiotic Thebes) whereas the others had surrendered. 40 Regardless of the controversy in modern scholarship over this legal claim, it is clear that the general’s interpretation of the treaty would not have mattered had he been well-disposed towards the Aetolians. Thus another flaw of the Gloria system comes to light: the immense political freedom conferred upon victorious magistrates with imperium 35 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p285 36 Polybius 18.37.1-6 37 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p287 38 Polybius 18.34.2 39 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p287 40 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p290 9 often led them to make post-war decisions based upon personal disposition, and these subjective inclinations were not always correlated with the interests of Rome. This is especially visible in Flamininus’ dealings with the Aetolians. His refusal to honor their contribution to the Roman war effort had great symbolic value, implying that the Greeks were not on an equal standing with Rome and thus were not entitled to their share of the spoils.41 It undermined the shift in the way Rome was perceived by the Greeks (from oppressive hegemon to benevolent superpower) that Flamininus was trying to promote through the propaganda of eleutheria. Polybius even goes so far as to claim that this episode laid the seeds for the later dispute between Rome and Antiochus III, who invaded Greece upon invitation by the revengeful Aetolians.42 Despite serious opposition both in Rome and from his Greek allies, Flamininus managed to obtain a senatorial ratification for peace on his own terms.43 This decision is once again testimony to the unhealthy degree of political freedom granted to the victorious Roman general; and supports the view that the discrepancy between the magistrate’s decisions and the interests of Rome were due to the nature of the glory reward system: for the Gloria to have an value, it had to be accompanied by power and agency on the field, which left important decisions hostage to human nature. The ratification of peace can be seen as marking Flamininus’ success at linking the concepts of eleutheria and Roman foreign policy in Greece in the minds of the senate. However, the first indisputable commitment to the slogan of ‘freedom for the Greeks’ in a positive sense (i.e. full autonomy and independence) came from the senate rather than Flamininus. 44 Furthermore, Livi writes that King Anymander specifically requested that the Romans withdraw in a manner that did not endanger Greek freedom.45 In light of this evidence, Rome’s commitment to the liberation of Greece can be interpreted as the senate’s response to pressure from powerful Greek elites, as proposed by Seager and Gruen, rather than a senatorial manipulation orchestrated by Flamininus. The commission of ten sent to ensure the reorganization of post-war Greece was conducted according to the wishes of the Rome appears to support the view that Flamininus had a minimal impact in the Roman adoption of eleutheria. But ultimately, Flamininus was the magistrate in possession of 41 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p292 42 Polybius 18.39.1 43 Polybius 18.42.2 44 Seager, Robin, The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia, p109 45 Livi 33.12.2 10 imperium, and the commission could not expect to contradict his decisions.46 If the senate was truly concerned with enforcing its policy of Hellenistic liberation according to its own specification, it would probably not have appointed such a weak mechanism to enforce it.47 Although the senate probably took the calls for freedom from Greek elites into consideration, it was ultimately Flamininus who singlehandedly implemented the policy of eleutheria with virtually no opposition from the senatorial commission.48 When the Aetolians started claiming that ‘it was a change of master, not the liberation of Greece which was occurring’,49 eleutheria threatened to backfire on Flamininus, and it was within the general’s power to reverse the policy.50 But instead, he pursued its integral implementation, setting out to prove the Aetolians wrong. This decision seems to be largely motivated by his personal relations with the Aetolians, which incited him to prove them wrong, and his desire to be immortalized as the liberator of Greece. Declaration at the Isthmian Games – Late 196 B.C. At the Isthmian Games in 196 B.C., Flamininus’ herald made the announcement that Greeks were to be ‘free, exempt from taxes, and living under their own laws’.51 The surprise and enthusiasm of the Greek crowd was a reflection of the drastic shift in Roman thinking about the region that the announcement represented. The unconditional and positive recognition of Greek freedom completely wiped clean the brutal and patronizing reputation that Rome had started to acquire towards its allies.52 On the one hand, the Isthmian announcement represented the culmination of Flamininus’ quest for Gloria: he was mobbed by the crowd and hailed as a savior; and long after his death, games, festivities and even religious cults appeared in Greece in his honor.53 Roman opinion mattered most, but for a relatively young consul of exceptional ambition like Flamininus the adulation of the Greek masses must have held its allure.54 Flamininus unabashedly took full credit for the announcement, and 46 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p294 47 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., p107 48 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p294 49 Polybius 18.45.6 50 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p357 51 Livi 33.32.23 52 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p300 53 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p301 54 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p363 11 Plutarch alludes to an inscription at Delphi in which he immortalizes his responsibility for the implementation of eleutheria.55 On the other hand, Flamininus’ unwavering adherence to this new approach to Roman relations with Greece all the way down to 194 B.C. suggests intent on his part to instigate a change in Roman thinking. As the undeniable architect of the liberation program, he alone knew what the Greeks expected from such a declaration. And as perhaps the Roman of his time with the most practical knowledge of Greek political rhetoric, he was the best suited to make the final announcement of the public relations campaign on behalf of Rome.56 Thus the Isthmian announcement can be viewed in the short term as a perfect alignment of Flamininus’ personal interests with those of the Roman State: regardless of the extent of the general’s manipulation of the senate into accepting eleutheria as a propaganda policy, he implemented it with the fullest integrity and brought about a real, albeit temporary, change in the perception of Rome as a hegemonic power. The inclusion of the Three Fetters in the decree made it both integral and unique, and indicated that Rome intended on following through with its policy.57 Thus, it is clear that Flamininus used liberation propaganda as a means to gain enormous prestige and lasting recognition from the Greek people; and that he succeeded in reconciling this aim with instigating a positive shift both in the way Rome perceived its Greek allies and the way the Greeks perceived Rome as a hegemonic power. All that remains to be determined is whether following a policy of withdrawal and non-intervention in Greece was a beneficial policy for Rome to follow in the long term. Withdrawal from Greece -194 B.C. The declaration of the Isthmian games was a watershed moment in Roman foreign policy, but in order for it to have any meaning, Flamininus had to convince the Roman senate to carry it through integrally. This required him to reverse his previous behavior of exaggerating the threat of Antiochus III: in order to be granted yet another extension of his command and dispose of the time to complete 55 Plutarch, Flamininus 12.6 56 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p358 Arthur, Senate and General, p301 57 Eckstein, 12 the Roman withdrawal from Greece, the senate had to be convinced that Roman security was safeguarded.58 This reveals yet another flaw in the way Gloria was attributed: the fact that it went to the magistrate who completed the task, rather than the one who struggled most vigorously for it, meant that generals often made decisions simply to be strategically positioned to reap reward. Many obstacles made it difficult for Flamininus to play down the Seleucid threat in the year 194 B.C, such as the advance of Antiochus into Europe without provocation and the presence of Hannibal at his side as military advisor.59 The Scipio Africanus, the hero of the Second Punic War, had also been elected consul in the year 194 B.C., and he advocated against a total Roman withdrawal from Greece on the grounds that Antiochus would be tempted to fill the power vacuum left by a sudden and total ungarrisoning of troops.60 The difference between Scipio and Flamininus was about means rather than ends: both were in favour of Greek independence and acutely aware of the Seleucid threat. But while Flamininus believed that integral liberation was the surest way of ensuring the Greeks’ goodwill and loyalty to Rome, Scipio wanted to compromise and leave Roman garrisons in the Three Fetters to dissuade Antiochus from invading.61 It is questionable whether Flamininus actually believed in the coherence of his approach, since he had an obvious personal stake in the matter: in the short term Scipio would probably supersede his command if the senate aligned with his view, and in the long term Flamininus’ immortalization as the liberator of Greece was contingent upon his integral delivery of the Isthmian announcement. Ultimately, the Roman senate sided with Flamininus and called for the return of Flamininus to Rome and no consul to be sent to Greece.62 It is possible that the senate was concerned with the response from Greece if it decided to compromise its liberation policy, but as Eckstein observes it most likely wanted to prevent the hero of the Second Punic War from accumulating even more Gloria.63 Thus again we observe the shortcomings of the system of Gloria, which clearly lead the senate astray in this instance by making it side with the personally motivated interests of Flamininus over Scipio’s for the sake of maintaining a balance of powers between the Roman generals. Flamininus personally 58 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p309 59 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p309 60 Briscoe, John, Flamininus and Roman Politics (200-189 B.C.), p49 61 Briscoe, John, Flamininus and Roman Politics (200-189 B.C.), p49 62 Livi 34.43.8 63 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p310 13 conducted the withdrawal from Greece in the spring of 194 B.C., surrounded by the cheers of the Greek masses who saluted him as their liberator. 64 The reaction of the crowd to his dramatic withdrawals seems engineered to prove to the Senate the validity of his policy and thus reinforce his credibility as a promoter of healthy Greco-Roman relations. Despite Flamininus’ best efforts to align his personal quest for Gloria with the interests of the Roman state, the implementation of his policy of total withdrawal had disastrous consequences. Only two years after the Roman withdrawal, Antiochus arrived in Greece and with a mere 10 000 men he destroyed Flamininus’ fragile political system in Greece. 65 The conditions that led the Seleucid invasion of Greece so soon after peace had been established can be traced directly back to Flamininus’ personal actions. His personal feud with the Aetolians, and his subsequent treatment of them as a subject of Rome not entitled to its share of the war spoils backfired violently when they invited Antiochus to ‘liberate’ Greece from supposed Roman oppression, even offering the Seleucid King Demetrias as his base of operations.66 As predicted by Scipio, the military void left by the complete Roman withdrawal was perceived as an open invitation by Antiochus; and the Greek loyalty to Rome, which Flamininus hoped his ‘magnanimous’ gesture would ensure, proved unreliable when their personal interests were at stake: although some Greek states (including Macedonia, a noteworthy achievement) remained loyal to Rome, most sided with Antiochus.67 In light of this, it is clear that the Roman general’s desire to implement eleutheria integrally so as to reap the prestige associated with it, and his inclination to disprove the Aetolian claims that Rome had simply supplanted Phillip as the arbiter of Greek affairs, led him to promote an unfeasible policy that drew Rome into a protracted war. Conclusion Overall, Flamininus’ actions in Greece were incompatible with the long-term interests of Rome. Although his decision to exaggerate the senatorial instructions at Aous to force Phillip into further conflict was in touch with Roman security concerns and hegemonic interests, his dedication to completing eleutheria despite the Seleucid threat was ultimately harmful to the Roman state. His policy 64 Livi 34.50.9 65 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p314 66 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p314 67 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p314 14 of liberating Greece can be viewed as his attempt to find a logical solution to post-war Macedonia that would ensure the loyalty of the Greeks to Rome and create an inviolable buffer zone in the East against foreign invasion. The fact that the liberation of Greek cities appeared at first view entirely consistent with the hegemony of Rome, along with the splendid positive propaganda such a policy represented, convinced the senate to follow Flamininus’ decisions. His dedication to the integral completion of Greek liberation instigated a real shift in the way the Greeks perceived Rome as a hegemonic power, which is apparent from the prestige acquired by Flamininus both during and after his life. But the general’s attachment to eleutheria, which he almost single-handedly implemented on behalf of Rome from its embryonic form, and his personal interests in seeing its completion, induced the senate into error. Initially, Flamininus seems to have only considered the advantages of Greek freedom as propaganda, but when at Nicaea it became a rallying point for the Greeks and his best possibility at gaining Gloria, he vigorously advocated this policy in the face of common sense.68 Ultimately, the war with Antiochus left Rome the dominant military power in the Mediterranean, but the war was neither inevitable nor even necessary for that purpose and was largely a result of Flamininus’ actions.69 This discrepancy between Flamininus’s personally motivated behaviour during his command in Greece and the interests of the Roman state can be largely explained by the structure of the system of reward for Roman magistrates. The sacred nature of Gloria, and the personal credibility attached to it, is largely responsible for Flamininus’ determination to prove to the Greeks the goodwill of his policy of liberation, especially under the accusations of the Aetolians. It is also what appears to have motivated Flamininus to pursue eleutheria in its integrity, even when it was clear that a compromise as proposed by Scipio was safer for Roman security. The political capital associated with Gloria also seems to have played a role in the senate’s decision to side with Flamininus rather than Scipio, who was already dangerously powerful. The rapid accumulation of Gloria, as was the case with Flamininus, gave Roman magistrates in possession of imperium an unhealthy degree of freedom on the field, which they could exploit for their personal ends. The quest for more Gloria gave Roman magistrates both the incentive and the means to obtain an extension of their command; and its attribution to the individual who completed the task caused magistrates to often promote their own interests over those of Rome. 68 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, p363 69 Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, p314 15 Flamininus undoubtedly believed that he was acting in the interests of the Roman state as well as his own. But his virtually unchecked control over the reorganization of post-Macedonian Greece on account of the Gloria he possessed led him to fanatically uphold a policy he had a personal stake in, and that ultimately induced Rome into an unnecessary war. 16 Bibliography Eckstein, Arthur, Senate and General, University of California Press, Los Angeles (California), 1987 Wood, F., The Tradition of Flamininus' Selfish Ambition in Polybius and Later Historians, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (Maryland), 1939 Seager, Robin, The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia: From Alexander to Antiochus, The Classical Quarterly Vol. 31 No. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1981 Walsh, Joseph, Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation, Historia Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte Bd 45 H. 3, Franz Steiner Verlag, Germany, 1996 Scullard, H, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C., Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK), 1951 Briscoe, John, Flamininus and Roman Politics (200-189 B.C.), Latomus Vol. 31 No. 1, Society of Latin Studies of Bruxelles, Bruxelles (Belgium), 1972 Gruen, E, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, Vol. II, University of California Press, London (UK), 1984 Holleaux, M, Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques, Tome IV: Rome, la Macedoine, et l'Orient Grecque, L. Robert, Paris, 1952 Ancient sources Livi, The Dawn of the Roman Empire, Books 31-40 Polybius, The Histories Diodorus, Historical Library Plutarch, Flamininus, Parallel Lives Vol X 17