Download Opportunities for China-US Cooperation on Climate Change Policy

Opportunities for China-US Cooperation
on Climate Change Policy
Jonathan B. Wiener
Duke University
Conference on China-US Climate Change Action and Cooperation
DKU, Kunshan, China
September 11, 2015
All slides © 2015 Jonathan B. Wiener; not for copying or redistribution without permission.
My perspective …
• First visit to China: Shanghai, 1987
• US Government, DOJ, OSTP and CEA, Sept. 1989 – Dec. 1993
– IPCC 1st Assessment Report, 1990
– FCCC negotiations, 1990-92: “comprehensive approach,” “trading / JI”
• Duke University, 1994 – present
– Research and teaching on Climate policy – international, US, EU, China
– Research and teaching on Risk Regulation – across risks, across countries
– IPCC 5th Assessment Report, 2014 – WG III, co-author of chapter 13 on
“International Cooperation”
– Member of CCICED special policy study team on “Environmental Risk
Management” for China, 2015
Yale Law Journal, 108: 677-800 (1999)
Key points:
• Optimal policy design is different at the
international level from the national level,
because of different voting rules and institutions,
which affect all instruments.
• Consent voting rule favors economic incentives
over prescriptive regulation (to attract
participation via lower abatement costs), and also
favors trading over taxes (to attract participation
via initial allocation of allowances). Examples:
US acid rain SO2 trading program; EU ETS;
climate accords FCCC/KP.
• Countries acting as both policy principals in
international accords, and implementing agents,
favors quantity over price instruments in order to
overcome “fiscal cushioning” and associated
monitoring costs.
Richard B. Stewart &
Jonathan B. Wiener,
Reconstructing
Climate Policy (2003)
Key points:
• Climate change warrants serious policy
• Kyoto Protocol has pros and cons
• Good design: trading, comprehensive scope
• Targets: too brief, not based on BCA
• Key flaw: omission of China, India, Brazil et al., whose
emissions will grow rapidly
• “Leakage” is a serious problem, both environmentally
and politically; need participation of all major emitters
• US should act & engage China et al. in a new
international regime (parallel to KP)
• How to engage cooperation?
• Moral suasion?? (effectiveness?)
• Trade sanctions? (WTO; credibility?)
• Government $$ transfers, CDM (perverse results?)
• Joint US-China et al. cap & trade, with headroom allowance
allocations to attract China et al.
• Progress? MEF, Copenhagen/Cancun/Durban/Paris,
China-US joint announcements, domestic actions …
IPCC 2014:
• International
cooperation is
essential, but
difficult.
• Avenues for
action and
cooperation are
multiplying.
Source: Matthew Paterson,
Univ. Ottawa (draft for IPCC,
AR5, WG III, Ch. 13 on
“International Cooperation,”
Figure 13.1, p.1013).
Options for policy action and cooperation –
throughout the risk chain
Economic
activities
GHG
Emissions
Climate
change
Reduce
emissions
Sequester
emissions
Geoengineering
(tax,
trading,
tech, etc.)
(CCS, REDD)
(SRM)
Impacts
Adaptation
Factors shaping climate policy in China – and the US
• Climate impacts: evolving science; drought; sea level rise; storms; refugees
• Co-benefits (primary domestic benefits): public health, air pollution,
PM2.5, black carbon … Ancillary risks (e.g. nuclear?).
• Economic challenge: growth and jobs via coal, or via gas, wind, solar.
“Solution aversion”: perception that mitigation is costly.
• Domestic politics: national/regional/provincial/state/local relations
• International politics: roles as global leaders
• National security: climate and energy as security priorities
• Social stability: environmental crises (accidents, droughts, storms) may spur
public outcry (?); history of dynastic change due to climate stress
• Emissions trading: gains from lower abatement costs; from innovation;
from linking with international carbon markets
• Others ?
(See: Wiener 2008; Wiener & Richman 2010; Campbell & Kay 2014)
Some opportunities for China-US
Research on Cooperation & Cooperation on Research
• Joint China-US announcements
• 2009 (pre-Copenhagen); 2014 (pre-Lima); 2015 (pre-Paris) ?
• China-US relations have been essential to the new phase of global climate regime.
• Mutual confidence enhances mutual action (and action by others).
• Energy research & development
• Getting energy prices right – US as well as China – externalities, subsidies, markets, oversight …
• Solar, wind. Electric vehicles. Storage (batteries).
• CCS (carbon capture & storage).
• Policy learning and diffusion – comparing, borrowing, testing, improving (Wiener 2013)
• Policy design + societal context = performance outcomes. Taxes and trading markets. Caps, auctions,
reserves, price ceilings/floors, banking, offsets, exchange platforms, oversight institutions …
• Subnationals – as pilots; and, US federal/state and China central/provincial relations.
• Impact Assessments – Ex ante and Ex post. Toward a global “policy laboratory.”
•
•
•
•
Data – collecting, sharing, verifying, analyzing … and forecasting
Linking trading markets ? (China & US; subnationals; also EU ?)
Finance? Adaptation ? Sharing innovations to assist cities, coasts, agriculture, ...
Geoengineering (solar radiation management)? Research. Restraint.
Thank you.
Jonathan B. Wiener, Duke University
www.law.duke.edu/fac/wiener
Policy Shock:
Regulatory
Responses to
Oil Spills, Nuclear
Accidents and
Financial Crises
(Ed Balleisen, Lori
Bennear, Kim
Krawiec &
Jonathan Wiener,
eds.)
(Harvard University
Press, 1995)
(AEI Press, 2003)
(RFF/Earthscan/
Routledge, 2011)
(Cambridge
University Press,
forthcoming)