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Emanuela Bozzini ([email protected]) University of Trento Paper presented at 2010 ECPR EUSG Conference – Porto (Pt) -- draft version – The environmental movement and climate change: opportunities and campaigns in the European Union evidence, Environmental social movements organisations involved in EU climate change policy and politics face difficult strategic dilemmas. They have too limited resources to campaign on all climate change-related issues simultaneously and have therefore to give priority to a few issues at time; climate change policy is science-driven and evidence is difficult to obtain and to communicate; coherence and coordination among competing and contradictory policy targets are hard to retain. The paper provides a comparison of social movements’ strategies and tactics on four climate change-related issues of central importance: mitigation policy, energy and renewable energy, agricultural land use, transport and car emissions. The analysis combines social movements literature on political opportunity structure with insights from EU policy analysis, and argues that variations in social movements’ strategies on climate change-related issues can be explained in terms of difference in sector-specific structures of political opportunities at the EU level. Introduction The year 2009 has been crucial for climate change policy and politics. In March, 2500 scientists attended the International Scientific Congress on Climate Change and warned that global warming is taking place at accelerated speed: glaciers are melting faster than expected, sea levels are likely to rise of about 1 m by 2100 (instead of the previously estimated 30 cm), and water supplies are getting scarcer. New issues - largely overlooked so far – entered the policy agenda, deforestation and the acidification of oceans above all. At the same time, policy outcomes have been disappointing in the view of many. The UN Copenhagen Conference in December largely missed to deliver 1 a deal on the post-Kyoto period and it seems safe to affirm now that Kyoto targets will not be met. Further, highly regarded policy solutions – like biofuels – appear less and less promising (Bozzini and Sicurelli, forthcoming). The gap between the evidence, the political will and policy response is a real issue. In this context the EU distinguished itself for its principled commitment: it proposed itself in a leading role in the international arena in the battle against climate change, set a binding target to limit global warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels and started new policy programmes to cut GHG emissions from different sectors, addressing issues as diverse as energy, transport, building efficiency, biofuels and biomass, deforestation, agricultural land use. These developments proved controversial: areas of risk, uncertainties and ignorance are wide and an assessment of how different measures contribute to the reduction of CO2 emissions is highly uncertain and changing over time. Further, impacts of global warming on national economies differ, are difficult to ascertain and give rise to different power configurations across the EU multi-level polity. The debate on policy options involved scientists, policy-makers, interest groups, activists and citizens. This paper focuses on the specific role of environmental movements in EU climate change policy and politics. Environmental social movements organisations face difficult strategic dilemmas. They have too limited resources to campaign on all climate changerelated issues simultaneously and have therefore to give priority to a few issues at time; many negative effects of global warming can occur in 50-100 years, thus making mobilization difficult; climate change policy is science-driven and evidence is difficult to obtain and to communicate. The paper provides a comparison of social movements’ strategies and tactics on four climate change-related issues of central importance: mitigation policy, energy and renewable energy, agricultural land use, transport and car emissions. The paper argues that variations in social movements’ strategies on climate changerelated issues can be explained in terms of difference in sector-specific structures of political opportunities at the EU level. To make this point the paper combines social movements literature on political opportunity structure with insights from EU policy analysis to take into account the complexity of European environmental system of governance. The concept of POS has been usefully adapted to the EU level by Marks and McAdam (1996), who analysed the changed opportunities for mobilisation of different social movements at the EU level. The authors convincingly showed that the environmental movement proved effective in taking advantage of expanding EU competences in the sector, of the need of the EU Commission for expertise and public legitimacy, and became one of most relevant movement in the EU arena. 2 This paper builds on this perspective and argues that political opportunities for environmentalists at the EU level on climate change are inherently issue specific. An important finding in the literature on EU policy-making suggests that ‘over the last thirty years the EU has created a system of environmental governance that is multilevel, complex, incomplete, and evolving’ (Weale and et al. 2000) p.437), meaning that over time environmental governance has come to be made of fully developed and effective policies in some areas and rather weak and patchy set of measures in others. In combining social movement literature with policy analysis this paper aims at providing a better understanding of political struggles over the highly complex and topical climate change policies as well as at refining theoretical approaches to EU POS. The paper is structured as follows. The first paragraph discusses the set of variables relevant to a definition of the concept of POS in the context of the EU and the forms of mobilisation at EU level. Paragraphs from two to five illustrate four climate changerelated issues: mitigation policy, agriculture, energy and renewable energy, car emissions. Each paragraph explains policy developments in the sector and provides evidence of social movements’ campaigns and tactics. Paragraph six discusses empirical findings and paragraph seven presents some concluding remarks. Environmental Governance and Political Opportunities In the context of the literature on social movement, the concept of POS has been utilised as an explanatory variable for the emergence of collective action, its outcomes, and for forms of mobilisation. Della Porta and Diani (2006) noted that the levels of territorial and functional decentralisation as well as the checks and balances that characterise a polity affect movements’ strategies and repertoires of action. According to Marks and McAdam the process of European integration and the building of EU institutions contributed significantly to the restructuring of collective action. They noted that ‘to the extent that European integration results in the replacement, or, more likely, the decline in the importance of the nation-state as the exclusive seat of formal institutional power, we can expect attendant changes in the forms and dynamics of social movement activity’ (Marks and McAdam 1999) p. 97-98). Along these lines a number of case studies have been carried out, assessing the relative openness of EU Commission to environmental organisations, the prevailing inclusive approach in dealing with movements and the presence of institutional allies in DG Environment (Bozzini and Ruzza 2008; Ruzza 2004). Climate change is likely to add complexity to this picture. It requires environmental considerations to be brought at the centre of all EU policy. 3 The question thus arises as to what are the POS for environmentalists in different EU climate change-related policy sectors. To answer this question, this paper combines the political opportunities approach with policy analysis and focus on three main dimensions: the prevailing mode of governance of a sector, the level of centralization of policy competences and the existence of formal channels for public consultations. A first dimension of EU POS refers to sector-specific modes of governance. EU policymaking is not a single, fixed process; rather policy areas are characterised by the predominance of a specific mode of governance. As it will explained in greater details below, it might be argued that the case of mitigation policy sector is marked by intensive transgovernmentalism, the agricultural sector is the template for the Community method of policy-making, energy policy has been dealt with according to the policy coordination mode and finally the case of car emission is characterised by the regulatory mode. In each mode of governance key players in the EU arena – the Commission, the Council, the EP - have a different role to play. Further each mode of governance provides private and public interest groups with different opportunities to access the EU system (Wallace 2005). A second dimension of EU POS is the level of centralisation of competence in a policy sector. From ‘60s onwards environmental policy became gradually institutionalised at EU level and in 1987 the SEA gave to environmental protection a clear legal basis. However policy competences are differently shared between EU and national states in related areas. More specifically, the EU has mixed competences on mitigation policy, full competence on agriculture and air pollution control (car emissions), weak competence on energy policy. Third, different formal channels for public participation are available at the EU level. Following the 2001 White Paper on Governance, the scope for public consultations has been enhanced and at the end of 2002 the Commission set general principles and minimum standard to consult the general public (COM704/2002). The setting of principles and standards for consulting EU citizens has to be seen in the context of a trend towards the lowering of the threshold for public participation and an attempt at the rationalisation of existing procedures. However it must be stressed that each DG retains considerable discretionary power on consultation processes and can decide on which proposals a consultation will be carried out, the timing and the format of the process. In particular DGs can decide whether to consult a limited number of selected experts and interest representatives in so-called ‘focused consultations’ or to address the general public launching a ‘open consultation’ and targeting ‘every citizen, association and firm across Europe’ through a on-line survey or a written consultation. Potentially open consultations are a valid tool to channel citizens’ opinions to the EU Commission and for EU organisations to mobilize their membership in EU countries. There is evidence 4 of highly differentiated use of consultation of focused and open consultation formats among DGs (Bozzini, 2009), so that fragmentation in consultation procedures is an important characteristic of EU governance (Bozzini 2009; Kohler-Koch 2008; KohlerKoch, De Bièvre, and Maloney 2008). Taken together these dimensions form the POS for environmentalists at EU level. The implications for climate change policy of these aspects of EU governance are of great relevance, since an essential condition for succeeding in curbing GHG emissions is to enact synergies among policies and adopt an integrated approach. Environmental considerations are to be taken into account in all these policy areas, though the complexity of decision-making process and the differentiated allocation of political responsibility makes it difficult to identify actors in charge, chains of accountability, etc. Climate change is then a thematic area where difficulties linked to the multi-level and multi-actor characteristic of the EU polity are of particular salience and, as this paper aims to show, have major implications for EU environmental activism. In the remaining part of this paragraph I will briefly describe environmental actors active at the EU level and the focus of the empirical research carried out for this paper. Existing research on EU civil society provides a rather consistent picture of EU environmental organisations (Greenwood 2003; Rucht 2001), stressing the importance of the so-called Green10, i.e. the coalition of ten environmental umbrella organisations based in Brussels1. More specific research on climate change confirmed their network centrality (Hadden 2009). In this paper I will focus on campaigns run by members of Green10 as units of analysis. According to Della Porta and Rucht a campaign can be defined ‘as a thematically, socially, and temporally interconnected series of interactions that, from the viewpoint of the carriers of the campaign, are geared to a specific goal.” (Della Porta and Rucht 2002) The focus on protest campaigns and their characteristics thus appears an useful tool to better capture the internal dynamics of the environmental movement, the actors involved and, more importantly in the context of this paper, their repertoires of action. Mitigation Policy– GHGs reductions Mitigation policy refers to overall efforts for reductions in GHG emissions with the aim of limiting global warming2. On the basis of IPCC scenarios the EU clearly stated that 1 G10 is composed of: Birdlife International, CEE Bankwatch Network, Climate Action Network Europe, European Environmental Bureau, Friends of the Earth Europe, Greenpeace European Unit, Health and Environment Alliance, International Friends of Nature, European Federation for Transport & Environment, , WWF European Policy Office. 2 Climate change policies can be distinguished mitigation – i.e. the cut in GHG emissions aiming at limiting global warming – and adaptation measure – i.e. measure aiming to adapt social and economic sectors to unavoidable effects of global warming. 5 ‘the EU must adopt the necessary domestic measures and take the lead internationally to ensure that global average temperature increases do not exceed pre-industrial levels by more than 2°C’ (European Commission, COM 2007/2 p. 2)3. In the view of the European Commission the 2°C objective represents the acceptable level of risk for EU societies and a balance between costs to mitigate climatic changes and benefits. Estimations on how much we have to cut emissions to meet the 2°C target vary from 15% to 80% by 2050. Moreover, how to share the burden of climate change among developed countries and the role of developing countries are extremely controversial. The Kyoto protocol, that in 1997 settled the matter establishing legally binding commitments on GHG reductions, will expire in 2012 and a new agreement is currently under discussion4. In December 2009 in Copenhagen governments from 192 UN countries failed to agree on a comprehensive plan for the post-Kyoto period. Uncertainties on the ‘road to Copenhagen’ were huge and despite high expectations it was by no means sure that a deal would be reached. EU Science and Research Commissioner Potočnik stated that the UN meeting in Copenhagen ‘is a one-shot chance. If we miss this chance, we really don’t know when there will be a second one with that level of opportunity’ (Euractiv). Climate change is an area of mixed competence at EU level and therefore in international negotiations both member states and the EU are present (Sbragia and Damro 1999; Zito 2005). Member states take the floor on issues of national competences, while the Commission steps in on exclusive fully Europeanized issues and illustrates a pre-agreed common EU position (Sbragia and Dumro, 1999). The definition of the EU common position results from intensive bargaining among governments on the basis of a proposal from the Commission. In January 2009 the Commission adopted a communication containing a number of recommendations to be considered by the Council (COM(2009)39). On the whole the Commission is pushing for a clear European leadership at the global level, requiring the adoption of binding commitments and the definition of fixed deadlines5. The EP adopted a resolution backing the EU Commission and asking ‘for the European Council to aim for an international agreement with industrialised countries achieving collective greenhouse gas emissions reductions at the high end of the 25-40 % range as recommended by the Fourth Assessment Report by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 4AR), and for those reductions to be domestic’ (EP 11 March 2009). The 3 It might be useful to remind that at present the increase in average temperature from pre-industrial levels is of 0.7°C. 4 In signing the Kyoto protocol the EU committed to cutting GHG emissions to 8% below the 1990 base year level by 2012. EEA estimates that the overall domestic emissions were 9.3% below 1990 level, though changes in GHG emissions range from -50% in Latvia to +53% in Spain http://www.eea.europa.eu/pressroom/newsreleases/2009-greenhouse-inventory-report 5 Generally speaking, the EU shows a consistent preference for ‘common and coordinated policies and measures’ (CCPM) as opposed to market instruments prioritised by US administrations. 6 EP has a rather marginal role in this process and does not participate formally in the definition of the mandate of the Commission in international negotiations (Zito, 2005). At both the March and June 2009 Councils of Ministers, member states proved divided and some of them clearly reluctant to commit their economies to GHG cuts on fear that the move will damage competitiveness. The EU already committed itself to a 20% reduction by 2020, to be increased to 30% ‘provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that advanced developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (Brussels European Council 19-20 March 2009 Presidency Conclusions p.11). Further, decisions on a common approach on how to finance mitigation and how to share contributions among states could not be reached and had to be postponed to the Autumn. In short, member states are key players in mitigation policy, are in control of the supranational agenda on the issue and the Commission has the difficult task to mediate among competing national interests to push its own agenda. The Presidency of the Council plays a fundamental role in intensive bargaining among national governments and on the whole the process proved closed to environmental organisations (Interview), who were disappointed by Council’s conclusions and accused governments to adopt a delaying tactic. Greenpeace – among others – in criticising the conditional approach to climate change negotiations is making the argument that developed countries have to ‘repay their carbon debt’ being the main responsible for current anthropogenic global warming and that concrete actions must be taken immediately, since ‘2012 is too late’ (Interview). Public consultations on mitigation policy have mainly been carried out in the form of online surveys, a format that has often been criticised by civil society as a mere ‘ticking exercise’ with no real significance (Interview). Indeed online questionnaires leave little space for argumentation and mainly aim at gathering information on broad public preferences on the issue at stake (as defined by the Commission). It might be argued that by launching broad wide-ranging online surveys the Commission - and more specifically DG Environment - was in search for wide, ‘easy’ popular legitimacy on its role and action. It is important to note then that consultations on mitigation policy received little attention from EU civil society and citizens. The consultation ‘Towards a comprehensive and ambitious post 2012 climate change agreement’, that run from August to October 2008 in preparation of COM(2009) 39 attracted 40 full responses from EU NGOs. Environmentalists did not mobilize their membership to cooperate with EU institutions on these specific consultation exercises6. Rather, a more conflictual approach has been prioritised. All rounds of international negotiations have been 6 This data seems quite low. Environmentalists have a high capacity for mobilising their membership on highly topical issues. The most successful examples are consultations on animal welfare in 2008 and 2006 that received 70.000 replies and 44.000 respectively. 7 coupled with extensive popular mobilisation. Activists joined street demonstrations in Bali (2007) and in Poznan (2008) asking for precise commitment on GHG reductions. Similarly in launching the ‘Global Climate Campaign’ EU environmental organisations are calling for coordinated protests to be held all around the world on 12 December 2009, to put pressures on delegates in Copenhagen to reach an agreement. Organisations are asking citizens ‘to vote with their feet’ and join marches in EU capitals, while a ‘Euro-train’ will take people from Brussels to Copenhagen to join demonstrations. Activists target European national governments and the EU asking to take the lead in the international arena, committing themselves unilaterally and devoting substantial resources to international aid for mitigation policy in developing countries. Campaigns are mainly focusing on highly evocative issues of GHGs emissions cuts that represent the most immediate and visible goal of mobilization. At the same time EU organisations are targeting national and EU institutions directly. The ‘Big Ask’ campaign – launched by FoE Europe and actively supported by organisations from 18 countries- calls for member states to adopt a ‘climate law’7 and make ‘legally binding commitments to cut emissions year-on-year. These cuts should be equal to a 40% reduction of EU-wide domestic emissions by 2020 and 100% by 2050’ (The Big Ask). Further the Big Ask calls for more power to be given to the Commission to monitor progress (or lack of it) in member states and sanction them. The Big Ask campaign consists of a large number of public activities at both local and EU levels, including demonstrations, concerts, exhibitions. Protest and direct action are also part of the repertoire of action on mitigation policy. On March 10th 2009 around 300 Greenpeace activists blocked the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels trying to prevent EU finance ministers to exit the building. Activists called for a decision to be made on the financing of climate change and stated that ‘substantial investment must be made now to prevent runaway climate change. If not it will literally cost us the Earth’ (Greenpeace, 2009). Agriculture Agricultural production accounts for 18% of total GHG emissions in Europe and for more than 30% of total GHG emissions in the world. Despite its relevance in terms of emissions so far agriculture has been rather neglected; notably it is not included in UN talks on climate change. Experts call for the agro-food sector to be addressed in international negotiations for a number of reasons. On the positive side the sector is said to have a potential in mitigating global warming, as plants capture, store and sink CO2. On the negative side, climate change put food supplies at risk, and therefore will have a 7 To date the first (and only) country to adopt a climate law is the UK. In November 2008 the Brown government passed the Climate Change Act http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/uk/legislation . Environmentalists praised the move and FoE considers the UK Climate Law a success of environmental mobilization in the country. 8 strong direct impact on living conditions across the globe. In the debate on consequences of climate change long-term food security is thus gaining relevance, though there are different views on what the problem is about. Research shows that global warming will be beneficial to EU agriculture8 until 2050 and that ‘at the EU level, no correlation has been established between the warming of the last decades and the level of crop yields, which have generally increased. The effects of technology and farm management improvements and continuous adaptation of farming practices have so far largely outweighed the impact of climate change’ (CEC 2009 p.4). Further, ‘areas for wine and olive production can expand north and eastwards’, leading the Wales’ Chief Scientific Adviser to the conclusion that ‘global warming will bring a big opportunity for UK farmers’ (Farmers Weekly, December 2007). The link between food production, food security and climate change is thus not necessarily straightforward and of not immediate relevance for the EU. Climate change is expected to produce its worst effects in developing countries, where levels of production and adaptation capacity tend to be low. However even in the case of developing countries, it has been argued that estimations on food shortages clearly underestimate the capacity to adapt9 and the role of bio-engineering in providing – say drought-resistant and salt-tolerant seeds. In the view of environmentalists – who clearly don’t even consider GMOs as a solution to food shortages due to climate change - long term food security can only been guaranteed by sustainable methods of farming to be implemented today to improve ecosystems resilience and preserve soil fertility and biodiversity (Birdlife 2009). At the EU level the Commission started a debate on agriculture and climate change in the context of the definition of adaptation policy (see above footnote ) and a preliminary Staff Working document on the impact of climate change on EU agriculture has been published. The focus on adaptation means that the EU is discussing on how to assist EU farmers for unavoidable changes in climatic conditions and almost no attention is paid to the contribution of EU agriculture to CO2 emission and thus global warming and very limited to the adverse effect of CAP on farmers in developing countries, who are the most vulnerable to climate change. Further, the EU supported the adoption of new ‘soft’ policy instruments, like eco-labelling (Zito, Radaelli, and Jordan 2003). For instance in May 2009 the EU launched the European Food Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP) roundtable, to develop methods to assess the ecological footprint of food products. 8 To some extent anthropogenic global warming has beneficial effects on food productions: increased concentrations of carbon dioxide boosts productivity, as photosynthesis is enhanced and plants grow faster, a phenomena called ‘carbon fertilization’. 9 In its estimations on food security, the IPCC report assumes that farmers will not adjust productions and crops according to changing climatic conditions but will keep on farming the same crops in the same places with the same farming methods. 9 On the whole, the link between agriculture and GHG emissions remain underdeveloped and the specific impact of the CAP on climate change is a rather marginal issue in current discussions on EU agriculture, that mainly focus on how to further reform the CAP. On the whole cross-sectoral environmental concerns received attention in the context of rural development policy, a confirmation that the core EU agricultural sector remains rather insulated in the EU arena (Cardwell 2004; Daugbjerg 1999; Grant 1997)10 and that environmental considerations have not been fully integrated (Lenschow and Zito 1998). In terms of mode of governance the agricultural sector is the template of the community method, i.e. a method based on a strong, centralised role for the Commission, strategic bargaining among Ministers in the Council of Agricultural Ministers (CoAM) and systematic cooption of agricultural interests in the EU policy process (Wallace). The sector presents quasi-corporatist patterns of interest intermediation. For decades it proved extremely difficult, if possible at all, for environmentalists to enter the agricultural policy community. The literature shows that agro-industrial interests retained unchallenged influence in the sector until the end of the ‘90s when food-related policy crises - like BSE – and highly controversial issues – like GMOs – had the effect to open up the policy to environmentalists and consumers groups for the fist time. In the context of the community method the EP has limited influence. It might be of note that the EP took the initiative, publishing in January 2009 an own-initiative report on global food security and asking for concrete actions to be taken in the sector. In terms of consultation DG Agri started only recently to address the general public, preferring consultations with experts and representatives of farmers’ interests. In an effort to broaden discussion on EU agriculture DG Agri launched a broad process of consultation called ‘The Health Check of the CAP’, to address publicly options for further reforms in the sector and technicalities on SPS scheme, modulation, crosscompliance, etc. The consultation proved a very important exercise, though for what of interest in the context of this paper one should note that only marginal attention has been devoted to climate change and its impact on agriculture and even less attention to the contribution of agriculture to global warming. As for social movements’ strategies, it appears that EU environmentalists are trying to put the issue on the climate change agenda by providing EU institutions with evidence on the link between long term food security and global warming. Recently two important reports have been released, by Birdlife International and Greenpeace European Unit. Both reports support the preservation of biodiversity as a ‘natural insurance policy against climate change’, and reminds EU institutions of their 10 At present the CAP is structured into two pillars: the first pillar – that accounts for 85% of total spending – refers to market instruments and support to farmers, the second pillar to rural development policy and sustainability and absorbs the remaining 15% of CAP resources. 10 commitment to halt biodiversity loss by 2010 (Biodiversity Action Plan). Policy implications are potentially relevant: intensive farming should give away to organic and sustainable methods. Short food chains have to be preferred to reduce emissions. Further, genetic diversity is of central importance as research shows that the greater the number of species in a ecosystem, the greater its resilience to changing climatic conditions. Linked to this, environmentalists reinforce the argument against GMOs, highlighting that ‘no stress tolerant GE plants have ever been proven to work under real world conditions’ (Greenpeace, 2009 p. 6). In addition to providing expertise, almost all environmental umbrella drafted statements and letters to be sent to the EP and Council Presidency to call political attention on sustainable agriculture and the dangers for biodiversity. In particular the FoEE campaign ‘Food and Farming. Time to choose!’ addressed EU policy-makers asking for substantial changes in criteria for CAP subsidies. However, the campaign did not bridge CAP reform and climate change policy. Similarly, initiatives against GMOs – like the Stop the Crop campaign – do not focus explicitly on global warming. At the same time social movements campaigns on food and climate change target the general public to get people convinced to ‘buy local’ and to limit consumption of processed food. The focus on personal responsibility and consumer choices finds an echo in the priority of the Swedish Presidency of the EU that published a document on ‘Environmentally-smart Food Choices’ recommending EU consumers to ‘exchange one or two meat dishes a week against vegetarian meals’. Energy and Renewable Energy Energy policy is probably the most discussed issue in the context of climate change. More generally energy has become a major concern because of instability on oil markets and of troubled international relations with Russian and Ukrainian gas supplier. So far, national energy policies have been extremely differentiated. Only in 2005 the Council agreed on the creation of a common energy policy for the EU with the aim of constructing a single internal market for energy products. The official goal of the EU in the energy sector is to balance sustainability, competiveness and security of supply (COM(2006)105). On January 2008 the Commission proposed the so-called energy package, a comprehensive plan aiming at reducing dependence on imports, on enhancing energy efficiency and reducing emissions. After extensive informal ‘trialogue’ meetings, in November 2008 the Council approved it and on December 17 the EP adopted the text for a directive on climate and renewable energy (first reading, co-decision procedure). 11 For what of interest here it must be noted that concerns with climate change boosted a renewed attention to nuclear power11 and opened the discussion on renewable sources of energy, in particular biofuel, biomass, wind and solar energy. The plan sets a very ambitious target for renewable energy, even if the original proposal has been eventually downscaled. The overall target is to reduce GHG emission of 20%, to increase the share of renewable energy to 20% of the total and to save 20% of energy consumption by 2020 (so-called 20-20-20 target). The Commissioner Andris Piebalgs commented that ‘the EU's Climate and Energy package is a historic agreement on long-term binding emission reduction targets for all sectors of the economy’. In terms of modes of governance the plan can arguably be considered an example of policy coordination: general targets are discussed and agreed at supranational level, while instruments and detailed measures have to be decided by national and local institutions. The Commission acts as a general facilitator in the process, that generally tend to include a quite large number of experts and representatives of public and private interest groups. The policy process on the energy package included extensive public consultations. The discussion went on for three years and on the whole DG TREN organised 10 consultations open to the general public on the matter. Back in 2006 a Green Paper ‘Towards a Secure, Sustainable and Competitive European Energy Network’ has been proposed for public discussion as well as the subsequent White Paper the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan). In addition open consultations have been carried out on biomass, offshore wind energy, biofuels and energy labelling. Consultations provided environmentalists with the opportunity to channel their critical remarks on key aspects of the EU energy plans and their action proved effective in raising doubts on the efficiency of biofuels in reducing total GHGs in the atmosphere. The 2008 final deal was criticised by both the industry and NGOs. Part of the business sector reacted against the prioritization of certain technologies over others, a decision that is expected to limit innovation and research in the sector. European umbrella organisations criticised the Energy package saying that it does not hold the promise of a energy revolution and that it might result environmentally damaging, particularly because of biofuels and nuclear power. Not surprisingly, the return of nuclear power is contested because ‘dirty, costly and dangerous’. More surprisingly, agrofuels are rejected too: in commenting the EP vote that scaled down biofuels targets, FoE commented that ‘using crops to feed cars is a false solution to our climate problems and could lead to irreversible loss of wildlife and misery for millions of people in the South’ (Foe Adrian Bebb, Agrofuels Campaign Coordinator for Friends of the Earth Europe). 11 It is interesting to note that several EU governments, including Britain, France and Italy, made plans for the construction of third generation reactors on the basis of environmental considerations, as nuclear power produces very low emissions and it is ‘climate-friendly’. Curiously nuclear power is listed among renewable sources of energy. 12 Birdlife consider biofuels ‘an inefficient technology’, that is unlikely to reduce emission significantly. EU environmentalists devoted a lot of resources to campaigns on energy policy. A specific campaign on this issue has been launched by an alliance between G10 and Oxfam, Stop Climate Chaos and others organisations from Germany, Denmark etc. The ‘Time to lead’ campaigns calls for petitions to be sent to EU policy-makers throughout the policy chain from EP to Council to the Commission asking for a revision of existing energy policy, in particular targets for biofuels (Bozzini and Sicurelli 2008). Campaigners follow the policy process closely and as they stated ‘The Time to Lead! campaign will continue to adapt to target the most relevant politicians deciding Europe’s response to climate change’ (www.timetolead.eu). Similarly the ‘Energy Union’ project, run in partnership by FoEE, EREC and others and strictly connected with the Big Ask campaign (see above), calls for taking ‘individual action and push politicians to bring about the positive change we need’ http://www.energyunion.eu/ and proposes concrete technological solutions as well as policy forum for decision-makers. Transport and Car emissions Cars are emitters of nitrogen oxide as well as other pollutants and on the whole private vehicles are estimated to account for 12% of total European GHGs emissions. Further, emissions from road traffic increased by 26% from 1990, thus making it crucial issue to address if overall EU efforts have not to be jeopardised. Policy towards car emission is one of the oldest (and most analysed) EU environmental policy (Lenshow, Weale et al, Tsebelis ), as it dates back to the 1970 when a first directive was approved to harmonise standards for vehicle emissions to avoid distortion in the market (70/220/EC). Over the years the policy evolved and in the ‘90s has been linked to the problem of acidification, thus shifting from a problem related to the single market to a proper environmental issue (Weale et al 2000). In the context of the fight against climate change in 1998 the EU Commission negotiated voluntary agreements with European, Korean and Japanese car manufacturers to reduce CO2 emissions to 120g/km, by means of technological development and market instruments. Last available data for 2004 shows that voluntary agreements largely missed the goal and more generally achieved only a limited reduction in CO2 emissions12. To respond to this policy failure in 2005 the Commission decided to review its strategy and set binding legal targets for cutting emissions. The legislative process proved extremely controversial, because of fierce resistance from the 12 It might be useful to say that small cars manufactures by Fiat, Citroen, Renault and Peugeot produce roughly 140g/km, while larger vehicles made by BMW, Porsche, Volvo etc are around 282g/km. 13 car industry to regulation as well as because of conflicts between DG Environment and DG Enterprise. Commissioners Dimas (Environment) and Verheugen (Enterprise) had different views on who should be the main responsible for emission reductions, namely carmakers in the view of the former, all stakeholders in the sector (car manufactures and tyre-makers, fuel suppliers, repairers, drivers, etc) in the view of the latter. In this situation the Commission had to postpone twice the publication of its strategy and only in December 2007 advanced its proposal for regulation (COM(2007)856) to be processed on the basis of the co-decision procedure, that gives the EP a fundamental role in policy process. In September 2008 the Committee on Industry and Energy of the EP allowed car makers an extra three years to reduce CO2 emissions, a vote that outraged environmentalists and provoke their immediate reaction (see below). On September 24, against all expectations, the EP Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety revised the decision taken by the EP Committee on Industry and restored initial proposal. After the EP vote an intense period of negotiation started; a deal was finally made at the beginning of December and eventually a text regulation has been approved on 17 December 2008 by the EP in first reading and subsequently by the Council in April 2009 (Regulation (EC) No 443/2009)13. The new regulation endorses an integrated approach to emission reductions and set a binding target of 120g/km to be gradually achieved by 2015. The target has to be achieved by both technological improvements – that should account for reductions to 130g/km - and other complementary (and rather unspecified) measures like an increase in biofuel use, traffic management, eco-driving (for the remaining 10g/km). Carmakers who will not meet the targets will be fined for each g/km in excess of limits. In other words, the final deal reflects a compromise between environmental and industrial positions on the matter, and while stresses the responsibility of the car industry, at the same time aims at involving a multiplicity of actors. On the whole the move is a typical example of EU regulatory mode of governance in the environmental sector, based on command-and-control regulation through uniform directives that define detailed standards to be achieved and specific means to be employed. The Commission proposes regulatory objectives, criteria for meeting them, the main target of the regulation and mechanisms to be put in place to guarantee compliance. In the entire process the Commission worked closely with stakeholders and member states. In the regulatory mode of policy-making the EP has often the opportunity of put social and environmental considerations in the agenda, and indeed EP Committee on Environment proved essential in securing a deal. Through the entire process, the European Commission, both DG Environment and DG Enterprise, launched various open consultations to gather information on public 13 It should be recalled that a Regulation does not need any ratification by national parliaments and it is directly binding in all member states 14 preferences on the issue. In June-August 2006 promoted an online survey consultation on the ‘Review of the EU strategy to reduce CO2 emissions and improve fuel efficiency from cars’ that attracted 1215 respondents. In April 2007 launched a written consultation on the ‘Implementation of the renewed strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and light-commercial vehicles’ and organised a public hearing in Brussels with representatives of main public and private interest groups. Members of G10 stressed the strategic importance of regulating car emissions, as the adoption of strict standards in Europe will be likely to facilitate similar legislation in Asia and America thus bringing global benefits to the fight against global warming. In addition, specific consultation on car labelling has been launched, in order to revise directive on consumer information on fuel economy (Revision of Directive 1999/94/EC). Intense lobbying activities have taken place through the entire legislative process. Predictably carmakers mobilised huge resources to secure a favourable deal, stressing the difficult situation of the industry due to the financial crises. Environmentalists decided to take action lobbying Dg Environment and in particular the EP (Interview). In September 2008, during EP voting sessions on the issue, Friends of the Earth Europe together with Agir Pour l'Environnement (France), Ecologistas en Accion (Spain), We Are Futureproof (UK), BUND (Germany), Amici Della Terra and Terra! (Italy) organised a three-days campaign in the European Parliament distributing leaflets to MEPs and urging them to vote for promoting fuel efficiency. Activists affirmed that both the 1948 and the 2008 VolksWagen Beetle consumed 7.5 litres per 100 km, thus suggesting that the car industry performed very poorly in developing fuel technologies. Huge efforts have been made to lobbying members of the EP Environmental Committee, who as noted above effectively endorsed a proposal for stricter regulation and watered-down the pro-industry compromise. Subsequent negotiations diluted the initial proposal and environmentalists complained about the final agreement. T&E noted that the Commission had to concede too much and that the EP was at time ambiguous in its direction. In particular environmentalists note that the ‘120 g/km figure was proposed in 1995, originally with a 2005 deadline. Therefore 2012 already represents an extraordinary 17-year lead time’ (T&E, 2007). In sum the new regulation is evaluated ‘not enough’ and compromising the overall EU efforts to fight climate change. A special attention has also been devoted to car labelling, asking for more clarity in providing info on CO2 emissions. However there are no evidence of campaigns targeting the general public on the issue of cars emissions or calling for specific actions to be undertaken. 15 Discussion EU environmentalists employed very different strategies in addressing the four issues under consideration for this paper. Action on mitigation policy includes demonstrations and protest; petitions have been sent to policy-makers involved in discussion on energy following closely all stages of policy process; reports have been delivered to make the case for sustainable agriculture and finally intense lobbying has been employed to take action on car emissions. On the whole, the target, the timing and calls for action of campaigns are significantly different. This is an important point. The analysis of campaigns on climate change reveals that EU umbrella organisations do not limit their action repertoire to lobbying EU institutions. It has often been suggested that a clear-cut division of labour is in place between EU and national social movement organisations, with the former focusing on advocacy and the latter mainly engaged in protest activities. According to the preliminary analysis carried out for this paper, the action repertoire of environmental organisations based in Brussels results wider than expected, and it is not necessarily true that EU umbrella organisations focus on lobbying leaving protest to national and local organisations (see also Parks 2009). This paper proposes to explain such differences in strategies at EU level making references to issue-specific political opportunities, and more precisely to differences in modes of governance, degrees of centralisation of policy competences and characteristics of formal channels for public consultations. As noted above, the EU environmental policy is characterised by a growing number of modes of governance, that make it complex and incomplete. Protest, demonstration and direct action are part of action repertoire in mitigation policy as intensive transgovernmentalism and bargaining among governments leaves very little space to social actors to channel their position. Although the Commission provided some access points to public interests, the Council remained out of reach of environmentalists. This is also true in the case of the closed agricultural policy that presents a clear predominance of national governments in decision-making processes. In this case environmentalists have not been able to put their issues on the agenda and a general lack of activities seems to characterise the sector14. The policy coordination mode that characterise energy policy seems to favour public and private interest groups, insofar as it requires wide and open consultation processes and provides social actors with multiple access point to EU system. As noted, petitions have been sent to all relevant actors following stages in decision-making and trying to put EU institutions under public pressure. Finally, the traditional regulatory mode of governance leaves very little discretion to national authorities – in our case on car emissions the regulation defines 14 This is likely to change, as food security is rapidly gaining relevance at the International level (see for example G8 conclusions, July 2009). However the main point here is the link between climate change and the Common Agricultural Policy, that is still underdeveloped. The CAP remains rather insulated from climate change discussions. 16 strict, binding rules immediately enforceable at national level – all efforts are concentrated in lobbying EU policy-makers, and in particular the EP because of its fundamental role in co-decision procedure. The uncertain allocation of policy competences in crucial climate change-related sectors – in particular energy and mitigation – makes it difficult for the Commission to achieve a coherent, cross-sectoral plan against global warming. The problem of policy coordination is of particular salience for climate change policy, though the general issue is not new. Back to the ‘90s the Cardiff European Council (1998) affirmed the idea that environmental considerations should enter the debate around all EU policy and the Treaty formally states ‘environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities in particular with a view of promoting sustainable development’ (art. 11 Lisbon Treaty, ex art. 6 TEC). In other words, environmental policy should be mainstreamed across policy areas and integrated in energy, agriculture, etc. There is evidence however that the mainstreaming strategy succeeded only partially and that ‘niche seeking’ are still important options to pursue environmental policy in the EU arena (Lenschow 2005). This research seems to confirm this finding. EU action on climate change depends on institutionalised patterns of policy-making in different sub-sector and, despite the urgency of tacking global warming and ambitious commitments, constraints in terms of distribution of competences limits EU capacity to design and implement policy. At the same time, the de facto expansion of policy competences at EU level due to climate change policy has the effect to attract activists’ attention to the European arena. This results from data on participation of national and local organisations in EU open consultation processes. Formal channels for consultations, the third structural characteristic here taken into account, have been put in place to address all four issues, though with rather different characteristics. It is of note that DG Environment, DG Transport and Energy, DG Agriculture, DG Enterprise – the four Dgs in charge with the issues under consideration - present different preferences in terms of consultation with citizens and organised citizens. It might be argued that tools for online participation in EU policy processes is of particular relevance for local, regional and national associations, which can channel their comments to EU institutions more easily. As noted, some consultations on car emissions and energy attracted a considerable number of contributions from member states. On the whole, formal consultations appear of limited relevance for EU groups. For Brussels-based umbrella organisations – who generally developed daily contacts with EU policy-makers - open consultation processes complement ‘traditional’ lobbying and direct contacts with EU officials. Further, umbrella organisations are routinely invited to take part in focused consultations for experts and public hearings in Brussels. 17 This research shows that the EU presents multiple structures of political opportunities for collective action on environmental issues. EU environmentalists diversify their strategies according to different modes of governance and the relevance of EU institutions in a specific area. In terms of strategies evidence is that the more access points to EU policy-making, the more environmentalists tend to utilise institutional channels and moderate their actions. New modes of governance – like policy coordination – tend to be more inclusive and EU environmentalists are in position to take advantage of different access points to the EU system. Further, it might be noted that environmentalists tend to push for the further Europeanization of climate changerelated areas, like energy policy, and support the idea to give more powers to the European Commission to monitor and sanction member states. Conclusions This paper argued for the usefulness of complementing social movements’ perspective with insights from policy analysis approach to achieve a better understanding of activism and advocacy in the EU environmental arena. The incremental character of the process of integration, the different degrees of Europeanization of policy areas, the sector-specific modes of governance are all factors that contribute to make the EU arena highly diversified and fragmented. In particular environmental policy developed gradually over the years ‘from silence to salience’ (Weale 1996) and does not represent a homogeneous policy sector generally open to social actors. Rather, issue-specific patterns of governance emerged and currently characterised the sector. This is even more salient for climate change policy, that is expected to produce a remarkable impact on multiple policy sectors, creating crosssectoral interdependencies and requiring synergies to be exploited. This paper tried to show that strategies and tactics adopted by EU environmental organisations vary, are sector-specific and can be understood making reference to diversified, issue-specific political opportunities. To conclude, it might be noted that, regardless of differences in repertoires of action, a number of common normative principles underpin issue-specific proposals and advocacy. In particular, activists stress the principle of historical responsibility for emissions and the principle of the capacity to pay. In addition the irreversible character of climate change is a powerful argument to warn against the dangers of inaction. 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