Download Ambitio: The Suicidal Political System of the Roman Republic

Ambitio: The Suicidal Political System of the Roman Republic
Written by Luther Karper
On August 9, 48 BCE, Gaius Julius Caesar found himself walking amongst the corpses of his fallen
enemies on the plain of Pharsalus, in central Greece. On this day, as on many others, the general had
every right to feel proud of himself and his army. His force of around 23,000 had defeated a much
larger army of roughly 52,000. The enemy commander had fled, having suffered a loss of 15,000 men.
By his own account, Caesar had lost a mere 200 soldiers.1 Though the war was not over, this had been
an important victory. Despite its importance, it was a bittersweet day for Caesar. He was not, as he was
accustomed to doing, looking upon the corpses of barbarian tribesmen. On this day, Caesar’s army had
massacred the troops of his former political ally Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey). Caesar was
surrounded by his dead countrymen and he had killed them.
As he made his way into Pompey’s camp, the victorious general was finally overcome by the
fruits of his victory. Groaning loudly he declared, “They made this happen; they drove me to it.”2 It
would be easy (and incorrect) to declare Caesar’s comment a weak, clichéd attempt to justify a course
taken merely to satisfy one man’s unquenchable ambition. For Caesar’s comment contains remarkable
insight into the nature of the republican government of Ancient Rome. While Caesar may not have
realized it, the Roman political system was broken. What he and his contemporaries had inherited was,
essentially, a suicidal system. Slowly and surely, it had been destroying itself until, finally, it had
collapsed entirely into the civil war Caesar was now a part of. Though Caesar was talking about the
optimates3 he had recently defeated, they had not been the only ones driving Caesar on.
1
Anthony Everitt, Cicero: The Life and Times of Rome’s Greatest Politician (New York: Random House Trade
Paperbacks, 2003), 218.
2
Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives, trans. Rex Warner, ed. Robin Seager (New York: Penguin Classics,
2006), 300.
3
The optimates were a loosely allied faction of conservative politicians who tended to support the political
agendas of wealthy patricians.
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In order to fully appreciate Caesar’s comment, one must understand the structure of Rome’s
republican government and the nature of its politicians. At the center of the state was the constitution.
Rather than a written outline, establishing and organizing the Republic’s government, the constitution
was a constantly evolving set of precedents and guidelines which controlled the conduct of politics.
Rome was a society heavily dependent upon precedent and tradition. For this reason, Romans, when
confronting a crisis, would simply add new laws and layers of government to their current constitution,
rather than abolishing older ones, even if they had happened to be the cause of such problems. After
several centuries of such actions, the constitution became bafflingly complex.4 The Greek author
Polybius, confused by Rome’s complex constitution, stated that even Romans were somewhat perplexed
by it, writing: “The Romans themselves find it impossible to state for sure whether the system is an
aristocracy, a democracy, or a monarchy.”5
To the Romans, the most important thing that the constitution did was provide for a separation
of powers connected by an intricate system of checks and balances. In theory, this created a system
which perfectly combined an aristocracy, a monarchy and a democracy. In actuality, it created a tangled
mess of inefficiency that insured that almost nothing of importance was accomplished without great
difficulty. Consuls, acting as the heads of state, could veto the legislation of other politicians, including
one another’s, while Tribunes—representing the interests of the people—could veto the actions of
nearly any magistrate. Even vetoes could be vetoed.6
As the constitution grew ever more complex, the various parts of Rome’s government became
increasingly interdependent. So interdependent that it was impossible to change one part without
changing several others. 7 Laws were often written in such a way that they were supplements to
existing laws and practices. Magistrates were given powers based on the powers of other magistrates,
4
Everitt, 11-12.
Tom Holland, Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), 24.
6
Everitt, 14.
7
Ibid., 16.
5
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to ensure that no one office became too powerful. This was the constitution’s most fatal flaw. Because
Rome’s republican government was so inflexible, the only possible way to reform it was by doing so
outside the law. This meant one of two things: either laws had to be abolished or they had to be
ignored. When men like Sulla and Caesar failed to have them done away with, laws were ignored.
In order to prepare their sons for the complexities of a political career under the constitution,
wealthy parents began training them at an early age. In republican Rome, the parents who loved their
children the most were the strictest. Most of childhood was spent in toughening the body and
expanding the mind. Games and toys did exist, but they were not nearly as prevalent as they would
become during the imperial era. 8 In the late Republic, from the ages of seven to twelve, boys (and girls)
from wealthy families were taught, either at home or in a small school, to read, write and perform basic
arithmetic. At the age of twelve, boys graduated to a sort of secondary school, where grammar and
literature were taught. In better schools, rhetoric was taught as well. All three were essential to the art
of oratory, which ambitious boys began to learn at the age of sixteen, about which time they were
considered men in Roman society. More than anything else in the Republic, politicians had to be
rhetorical masters.9
Skilled orators were respected at a level which is almost unfathomable in modernity. Crowds
packed the forum and courts of law to hear politicians and lawyers speak. Indeed, it was by eloquence
that Cicero was able to break into the senatorial class. Cicero, though he came from a wealthy family,
did not come from a patrician one. Rome was a complex society in which political worthiness was
measured by a mix of individual merit and familial prestige.10 Because Cicero lacked the later, he had to
make up for it with the former. He did so by becoming one of the greatest lawyers—which were,
essentially, orators depended upon for their persuasive abilities as much as for their legal knowledge—
8
Holland, 110-111.
Everitt, 28-30.
10
Holland, 24.
9
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of his day. It was by his reputation as a lawyer that Cicero was able to be elected questor11 in 75 BCE,
taking his first step in the cursus honorum.12 Despite the fact that Cicero was a novus homo13 with very
little military experience—he had served in the Social War with no distinction—his political career was
so successful that he was elected consul in suo anno, this is, “in his own year”, meaning that he was
elected at the earliest age he was eligible to run, forty-two.14 It is rather difficult to contribute this to
anything other than his masterful oratory.
In addition to formal training, boys would have received a good deal of informal education as
well. Aristocratic boys would accompany their fathers as they went about their daily business. In this
way, they learned firsthand what it meant to be a politician. At the same time, they would learn their
family’s history and the various honors past family members had obtained. In most patrician homes, the
walls of the atrium would be covered with the death masks, portraits and statues of ancestors, all of
which would constantly remind children of that which they should aspire. A man who failed to at least
match the accomplishments of his ancestors was generally considered to be a failure.15
Although it was important that a man live up to his name with his own accomplishments, people
often associated individuals with the deeds of their ancestors. Knowing this, individuals aspiring to
greatness often reminded somewhat forgetful people of those deeds. Julius Caesar, for example, never
stopped reminding people that he was descended from “Venus”, perhaps because his family, though
ancient and respected, had fallen into political obscurity, with his father having failed to become
consul.16 Because Cicero was the first man in his family to obtain senatorial rank, he had no family
11
I.e. an officer of the treasury.
Plutarch, 328. The cursus honorum was a series of political offices of increasing importance (quaestor, then the
optional office of aedile, then praetor, then consul). In order to qualify for an office, one must have held the
offices below it. While it was sometimes enforced by law, it was usually enforced only by precedent.
13
A “new man”; politicians who were the first members of their families to hold seats in the senate were
considered novi homines.
14
Everitt, 94.
15
Holland, 114.
16
Ibid., 113-114.
12
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prestige to flaunt. As a result, he had to flaunt his own achievements as much as possible. To this end,
he went so far as to hire an historian to write a book about his consulship; he even encouraged the
author to “waive the laws of history for once,” in order to make him appear even more accomplished
than he was.17 Interestingly enough, politicians could even be reminded by the Roman people that they
were expected to live up to their ancestors. According to Plutarch and Appian, Brutus received several
messages encouraging him to conspire against Caesar, one of which read: “You are no real Brutus.”
This was a reference to the popularly held belief that one of Brutus’ distant ancestors had played an
instrumental role in overthrowing the last king of Rome.18
By educating boys in such a way, parents were, essentially, instilling in their children that
nothing was more important than being elected to public office and obtaining the honors associated
with such appointments. Because of this, boys grew up with the wrong motives. Rather than aspiring to
become politicians for the good of Rome, they did so only to gain the respect and admiration of their
fellow citizens. As a result, Romans grew to look at politics as a personal, rather than institutional.
While Rome remained a relatively small city state, often on the defense, such a thing was actually to
Rome’s benefit, for obvious reasons. As Rome became the uncontested master of the Mediterranean,
however, new, unchecked avenues of power were opened that caused this view on politics to become
detrimental to the Republic.
One of the aspects of Roman politics that became deleterious was the Roman system of
patronage and clientship. Simplified, it was a system of mutual dependence in which wealthy, powerful
men acted as “patrons” to lower class citizens, i.e. “clients”. The patron would look out for the physical,
political and legal needs of his clients. His home was always open to them and he was a ready source of
advice, food or money. In return, clients were expected to regularly accompany patrons as they went
about their daily business. The more clients a man was seen with, the more prestige he received.
17
18
Everitt, 165.
Plutarch, 314.
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Clients could also be expected to act as body guards or even personal soldiers. The patron-client
relationship was an integral part of Roman society and was, therefore, sacrosanct. The families of
patrons and clients were linked for multiple generations. In addition to this relationship, a formal
alliance between equals (amicitia) could also be formed, in which men agreed to work in each others’
interests.19
The greatest role that clients played in the lives of patrons was that of voter. Clients were
essential voting blocs that could turn the tide in any election. A man could, in theory, use not only his
own clients, but also those of men with whom he was in allegiance. This meant that extremely wealthy
men were often guaranteed thousands of votes. One of the deals made by Pompey, Caesar and Crassus
in the first triumvirate was that Caesar would have his clients and soldiers vote for Pompey and Crassus,
who were seeking a consulship at the time.20 This system, obviously, did not ensure that the most
capable Romans were elected to office. The rapidly enlarging number of men who began acting as
clients after the advent of empire made it a particularly devastating part of Rome’s suicidal Republic.
Clients could—to a certain degree—justify their behavior. They depended upon patrons for
their survival. They may have been sellouts, but at least they were predictable. A far less predictable,
and much more dangerous group, was the urban poor. Politicians were constantly catering to them in
an effort to get their votes. There were many methods for doing so. Bribery and downright flattery
were the most common. Plutarch attributes Sulla’s appointment to the preatorship to such acts.21
While Sulla certainly had a very bad reputation among ancient historians, the fact that Plutarch wrote
this meant that the practice was very likely quite common. Bribery could take the form of both money
and food. Indeed, some men were elected simply because they promised to give people free land or
free food. Clodius, a patrician who had himself declared a plebian by Caesar, so that he could run for
19
Everitt, 30-31.
Plutarch, 128.
21
Plutarch, 61.
20
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the tribunate, promised the people free grain—as opposed to the discount grain politicians usually
promised the urban masses—if here were to be elected.22
While bribery was illegal—though it became so common in the late Republic that politicians
were rarely prosecuted for it—Romans aspiring for office had several legal ways to appeal to the
masses. Building projects, almost always paid for by politicians themselves, were quite common.
Pompey built Rome’s first permanent theatre, which bore his name, on the Campus Martius to celebrate
his victorious—and personally enriching—campaign in the east, through which he had conquered 324
different kings, nearly doubling the size of the empire.23
The process of running for office was, as a result of appealing to the masses, quite hard on the
financial situations of many politicians. Julius Caesar is reported to have spent so much money
campaigning for the office of pontifex maximus that, on the day of the election, he is said to have told
his mother: “Today, Mother, you will see your son either as high priest or as an exile.”24 Even the
relatively moral politician was often in financial trouble, for politicians received no salary and members
of the senate were forbidden to participate in foreign trade or lend money, by which a fairly wealthy
man could make even more money, since there were no formal lending institutions in the Roman
Republic.25 The office of aedile was particularly hard on its holder, since aediles were responsible for the
upkeep of temples, buildings and markets, and for the holding of public games. The more glamorous
the games an aedile held, the more favor he gained with the public. For this reason, aediles often went
far into debt in order to please the people.26
The large debts politicians ran up during their careers are likely to blame for the irresponsible
nature of Roman provincial governors. Some governors became extremely wealthy by over taxing
22
Everitt, 141.
Holland, 214-215.
24
Plutarch, 261.
25
Everitt, 198.
26
Ibid., 12-13.
23
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provincials. Others got their wealth via military excursions—which were often barely justifiable, if at all
so—within and along the borders of provinces. Both Pompey and Caesar can trace their wealth to
military campaigns, during which time the wealth of the conquered was shared by Rome with its
conquering generals.27
A successful military career offered more than just wealth. Rome had been, since its founding, a
very militaristic society. Military victories added to a candidate’s virtue (virtus) and prestige (auctoritas).
The importance of being militarily successful as a politician is evinced by the careers of several of the
late Republics most influential politicians. Pompey’s father, Pompeius Strabo, was one of the most
hated men in Rome, and was executed by Gaius Marius when he controlled the city. In spite of this—
and the fact that he had snubbed Sulla, whom he owed for his early successes, angering the many Sullan
politicians who controlled the senate following the dictator’s death—Pompey was able to have an
extremely successful political career because of his many military victories. In fact, when he ran for
consul for the first time, he was, technically, according to the laws of his superior, Sulla, too young.
Though it was illegal, and he had never held any public office before, another Sullan requirement he
ignored, he was elected. His military victories had made him popular indeed. He was, after all, called
“Pompey the Great” (though, perhaps, “Pompey the Careful” would have been more accurate, since he
never entered battle without ensuring that his forces greatly outnumbered those of his opponents).28
So great was a politician’s desire for military success that Crassus, arguably the most connected—and
therefore most influential—Roman of his time, conspired to make war on Parthia when he was in his
sixties. His campaign against them failed and he and his son were killed. In his Life of Crassus, Plutarch
elegantly explores his motivations for undertaking such a campaign: “…he was not content to be first
and greatest among many millions; simply from the fact that two men29 were judged superior to him, he
27
Plutarch, 271.
Everitt, 73-75.
29
These men were, of course, Caesar and Pompey.
28
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concluded that he had nothing at all.”30 In this way, Crassus was like almost any Roman politician during
the Republic, about whom the exact same thing could have been said.
These were the circumstances that had combined to form a suicidal political system, ready to
tear the Republic to pieces. Though it was staring down the barrel of a loaded gun, it is important to
remember that the Republic lasted for nearly five hundred years. For the Republic to fall, a gunman was
need. The assassin arrived in the form of empire.
As Rome slowly annexed defeated kingdoms, the responsibilities of empire began to put a strain
on its military. Many men died or, as a result of lengthy campaigns and occupations, were kept away
from home for so long that their farms fell into ruin. These lands were then bought up by wealthy
patricians who turned them into large plantations. Landless, many men now did not meet the property
requirements to serve in Rome’s legions. The population of the urban poor skyrocketed as a result. The
influx of slaves from conquered lands made jobs in Rome extremely difficult to obtain.31
Under these conditions, Roman politicians found new ways to gain power, prestige and
influence. The first man to truly take advantage of this was Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. In 133 BCE,
he managed to get elected tribune, despite that fact that his political career had already been defiled by
several failures: this was his last chance. In the urban poor, he found his political saviors. As tribune, he
proposed an ambitious land bill, designed to break up massive plantations so that excess land could be
redistributed to landless citizens. Such an act would give Tiberius an unprecedented number of
constituents, who would owe him for their land. In addition to this, he would receive a vast amount of
power as the head of a three man commission in charge of the program, his brother, Gaius Gracchus,
and his father-in-law, Appius Claudius, completed the trio.32
30
Plutarch, 146.
Appian, The Civil Wars, trans. John Carter (New York: Penguin, 1996), 5.
32
Allen M. Ward, Fritz M. Heichelheim, and Cedric A. Yeo, A History of the Roman People (Boston: Prentice Hall,
2010), 155-157.
31
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Such an act terrified Tiberius’ fellow politicians. Though it certainly might appear to have been
an altruistic act of charity, its passing would have given Tiberius a very un-republican amount of power.
As a result of this, and the fact that they stood to lose quite a bit of land, several aristocrats prompted
Gracchus’ fellow tribune, Marcus Octavius, to veto his bill when it was presented to the people for
approval. Refusing to give up, Tiberius responded to Octavius’ veto by proposing that his fellow tribune
revoke his veto or be removed from office. While such an act was not illegal, per se, it was highly
unprecedented. Never before had a tribune refused to accept the veto of another tribune. Outraged,
Octavius refused to repeal his veto. The people, desiring the land that Tiberius had promised them,
sided against Octavius and impeached him; the land bill passed.33
As his year in office approached its end, Tiberius worried that his act would be annulled and that
he would be prosecuted—the office of tribune was considered sacrosanct, making it extremely difficult
to indict one—once he stepped down. In order to prevent this from happening, Tiberius offered to run
for a second term. Though it was illegal and against custom to run again, it was possible for Tiberius to
have been elected by the concilium plebis34 (another example of the Republic’s bafflingly complex
constitution). Refusing to allow Tiberius to mock custom yet again, retaining an unconstitutional level of
power in the process, his opponents called a meeting of the senate to decide what to do. Fearing that
Gracchus intended to establish himself as king, the senate, under the pontifex maximus, invoked an
ancient law by which anyone could kill a “tyrant”. Spilling into the streets, they murdered Tiberius and
three hundred of his followers with pieces of broken furniture.35
In purpose, Tiberius Gracchus was not unique. Just as his ancestors had done before him, he
used the powers of his office to grant favors in an effort to indebt future voters. Unlike his ancestors,
however, he was willing to break precedent—and to a certain degree, laws—to save his career from
33
Appian, 7-9.
The concilium plebis was the most powerful popular assembly of the Roman Republic. Its members, exclusively
plebian, could enact legislative reform, elect magistrates and, in the early Republic, oversee judicial cases.
35
Ward, Heichelheim, and Yeo, 154-155.
34
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obscurity, empowering his family in the process. Tiberius could only have done this under his land bill,
which was directly enabled by Rome’s imperial expansion. The career and death of Tiberius Gracchus
set two dangerous precedents: ambitious politicians began to gain power via extra-legal means and the
fear this invoked often catalyzed a violent response from opponents.
Ten years later, Tiberius’ brother, Gaius, followed in his footsteps. He was elected to the
tribunate of 123 BCE. Gaius took office with two important goals in mind: to avenge his brother by
repairing their family’s honor and to build an even wider base of constituents than his brother had
attempted to do. He began by pushing a law through the concilium plebis which made it illegal for the
senate to condemn political offenders without appeal to the people. This gave the tribunate a new edge
over the senate. In order to gain rural followers, he then commissioned the building of roads,
connecting farms to markets. This not only increased trade, but also allowed for more citizens to come
to the city of Rome to vote.36 In order to gain urban voters, he passed his infamous lex Frumentaria,
which provided for state sold grain at a fixed price, promoting price stability in the grain market. By
gaining constituents in such a way, Gaius Gracchus effectively prevented other politicians from courting
the masses before an election by promising them cheap grain.37 He put even more people in his debt
by: creating laws which required the state to equip soldiers, founding new colonies, and reorganizing
tax collection in such a way that it benefited members of the equestrian class (driving a wedge between
them and his rivals in the senate).38
In 123 BCE, he was again elected to serve as a tribune of the people, despite the fact that he had
not run. Taking office in 122 BCE, he supported Fulvius Flaccus and his proposal to grant citizenship to
Rome’s Italian allies. He then went to Africa to oversee the founding of a new colony. While Gracchus
was away, the tribune Marcus Livius Drusus began to turn the urban populace, whose status would
36
Ibid., 159.
Appian, 12.
38
Ward, Heichelheim, and Yeo, 160-161.
37
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decrease of the number of Roman citizens increased, against Flaccus’ proposal. By doing so, he
managed to reduce Gaius’ support in Rome without him realizing it. Returning to Rome, he failed to
obtain a third term as tribune. Lacking the protection of office, Gaius was now vulnerable to enemy
attack. In 121, the consul Lucius Opimius convinced the senate that Gaius was a threat to the state,
after his armed followers had provoked an attack from those of Gaius. The senate authorized the killing
of Gracchus via a Senatus Consultum Ultimum, which granted consuls the power to do everything within
their means to protect the Republic. After Opimius killed many of his followers and allies, including
Flaccus, Gaius Gracchus ordered one of his slaves to help him end his life.39
The tribunates of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus demonstrate perfectly the suicidal nature of
Roman politics. Reform was always linked to the names of reformers. As a result, even altruistic
reforms benefitted those who enacted them. Naturally, the personal, competitive nature of Roman
politics made reform rather difficult to pass, so that one man could not gain an edge over his peers. This
meant that reformers, like the Gracchi, had two options: admit defeat, or break from tradition and
ignore the constitution.
In addition to changing the nature of politics in Rome, the advent of empire changed the role of
the soldier. Originally, the Roman military was made up of farmer-soldiers who took up arms only to
defend their country from foreign invaders. They were responsible for outfitting themselves and there
was a property requirement to enlist. The needs of empire, however, demanded ever more soldiers
from Rome, despite the fact that the pool of eligible applicants was decreasing as a result of the very
same wars. Regardless, the Republic still needed soldiers. To solve the problem, Gaius Marius, a
celebrated general and rather successful politician (seven times he had reached the consulship)
redesigned the army in 107 BCE. He removed the property requirement, greatly increasing the size of
Rome’s armies. Because many of the men he recruited were from the urban poor, they had nothing to
39
Ibid., 161-162.
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return to after a war, so they remained in the army, usually for twenty years. In this way, Rome’s army
of farmer-soldiers became a professional standing army, training and completing civic construction
projects when there was no war to be fought. 40
At the end of their terms of service, soldiers expected to be rewarded with land grants and cash
bonuses. Soldiers depended upon their generals to secure their retirement bonuses from the senate.
Many generals also supplemented this with funds from their own wallets. During campaigns, generals
shared loot with their men, adding greatly to the wages the state paid them. Because of this
dependence upon their generals, soldiers were entirely loyal to them. They did not join the army to
defend their country, as their ancestors had done; they joined the military so that they could, one day,
obtain financial security. It was not the Republic that guaranteed them this; it was their generals.41
Lucius Cornelius Sulla, who had previously served under Gaius Marius in the Jugurthine War
(112-106 BCE), put the loyalty of his soldiers to the test when he used them to march on Rome in 88
BCE. Having been elected consul for that year, he looked forward to a lucrative military endeavor
against the king of Pontus, Mithradates. Marius, however, had been seeking a war against Mithradates
for a long time. This, combined with the fact that he had been granted what he considered to have
been an insultingly low position during the Social War (91-88 BCE), caused Marius to attempt to regain
his honor by conspiring to have himself appointed over Sulla to fight Mithradates. Once Sulla had
departed from Rome to go to his army, Marius had himself appointed commander through the workings
of the tribune Publius Sulpicius. When he learned of this, Sulla and his soldiers—who were looking
forward to the profits of war as much as he was—returned to Rome to remind Marius that the sun had
40
Jo-Ann Shelton, As the Romans Did: A Sourcebook in Roman Social History (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998), 243-244.
41
Everitt, 16-17.
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already set on his career. Though Sulla captured the city, Marius managed to escape. Sulla condemned
many of his enemies to die, but managed to execute only Sulpicius.42
His authority unchallenged, Sulla marched east and defeated Mithradates. While he fought the
king of Pontus, Marius had returned to Rome and captured it, just as Sulla had done. Marius took this
opportunity to murder many of his personal enemies in the senate, confiscating and auctioning their
property. In 86 BCE, he was elected consul for the seventh time, though he could not enjoy his restored
prestige for long, as he died from an illness a few days after he took office.43
In 83 BCE, Sulla returned to Rome and defeated the armies the city had prepared to meet him.
This time, more than one man would die. Having himself appointed dictator for an undefined period of
time so that he could “reconstitute” the state, he embraced absolute control. He proscribed thousands
of people, seizing their estates to pay his army.44 This, however, did not provide him with enough
money to pay his soldiers. In order to get enough land on which to settle his veterans, he coerced cities
and towns into donating land. Towns which had opposed him during the Social War or one of his civil
wars, he burned to the ground, enslaving their citizens.45
Now that he had complete control of Rome and had settled his veterans, he turned his attention
to reforming the constitution. He began by increasing membership of the senate from three hundred to
six hundred. Many of these new senators were equites46. Because of this, Sulla was able to return jury
duty to the senate from the equites, reforming the courts in the process, making them more efficient.
He also abolished the office of the princeps senatus47, so that one man could not gain too much power in
the senate. Recognizing that political competition and unorthodox careers were particularly dangerous
42
Appian, 30-31.
Ward, Heichelheim, and Yeo, 176-177.
44
Plutarch, 97.
45
Ward, Heichelheim, and Yeo 179.
46
Members of the “equestrian” class. Historically, these were men who were wealthy enough to own and outfit
their own horses (equi) for battle.
47
The princeps senatus (first man of the senate) set the agenda for senate meetings and controlled the progression
of debate, giving him a large amount of influence over state affairs.
43
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to the state, he set strict age requirements for the holding of office and began legally enforcing the
cursus honorum. He also increased the number of praetors from six to eight and the number of
quaestors from ten to twenty, granting quaestors admission to the senate as well, stealing that power
from the censors48 in the process. Sulla severely reduced the powers of the tribunate, and reorganized
the provinces, making new laws to limit the independence of governors, so that they could not rebel
against the senate. Believing he had saved the Republic from collapsing, he resigned his dictatorship
and served as consul in 80 BCE. He then retired to his estate in the country, dying in 78 BCE.49
Though several of his reforms were admirable, including his reorganization of the courts,
organization of the provinces and inclusion of the equites in the senate, they failed to reduce
competition for office—in actuality, they had caused this to increase, since the number of consuls
stayed fixed at two50—and failed to fix the social, economic and political problems that had enabled
unorthodox careers in the first place. The safeguards he had established to prevent governors from
gaining too much independence were simply impractical, since a commander merely needed a loyal
army to defy the senate; something he himself had proved.51
The civil wars of Sulla and Marius demonstrate perfectly the potential results of a commander
whose army was loyal to him and not to the state. The civil war between Caesar and Pompey provides
an equally perfect example. This war may even have been avoidable, since Caesar had agreed to give up
his command if only Pompey were to do the same. Pompey refused, however, out of pride. His
popularity in Rome had been on the decline and he feared that, if he agreed to a compromise, he might
appear weak and cowardly in the eyes of the senate.52 It is this conflict more than any other that
48
Censors had arguably been the most powerful magistrates of the Roman republic, since they decided which
families were worthy of senatorial rank.
49
Ibid., 179-181.
50
He had increased the number of men who would one day be eligible to run for consul by increasing the number
of praetors and quaestors, but he had not increased the number of consuls.
51
Ibid. 181.
52
Appian, 83-84.
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demonstrates the destructive power of the suicidal system. Both Caesar and Pompey cared for their
own glory and prestige more than they cared for anything else; both had had unorthodox careers and
had used extralegal means in the form of the triumvirate to obtain vast amounts of unconstitutional
power; both had obtained tremendous riches and political resources as the result of military campaigns;
both had used their armies against their fellow Romans in order to obtain dominance. In the end,
Caesar defeated Pompey.
After finishing off the remainder of Pompey’s optimates allies, Caesar returned to Rome to
unprecedented honors and powers. He was crowned dictator perpetuus53 (which was roughly
equivalent to king) in February of 44 BCE. Though there is very little pre-civil war evidence suggesting
that he had sought to establish a monarchy, his acceptance of this office, along with many other
unconstitutional honors he had received following Pompey’s defeat, leads one to believe that he had at
last sought a kingship. Perhaps he had finally realized that imperialism and Roman republicanism were
incompatible. He had, after all, seen the collapse of Sulla’s reforms. Despite these things, it is important
not to place too much emphasis on the importance of Caesar. He was not unique among Roman nobles
in that he had done essentially the same thing as they had for centuries: sought individual glory through
military and political success. If he had not been the first man crowned dictator perpetuus, another
Roman surely would have. His assassination on March 15, 44 BCE failed to save the Republic. It merely
set the stage for another generation of violent civil wars which culminated in the rise of Rome’s first
emperor, Augustus. Under his reign, Rome at last was restored to political stability.54
Until the rise of Augustus, politics in the Roman Republic consisted of individuals competing for
offices which would bring honor, prestige and power to their families. While Rome remained a
relatively small city-state, its largely precedent-based constitution was able to limit the power and
prestige any one man could obtain. As Rome expanded into an empire, however, circumstances arose
53
54
I.e. “perpetual dictator”.
Ward, Heichelheim, and Yeo 212-213.
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which essentially rendered the constitution obsolete. Ambitious politicians quickly realized this, and,
pushing the obsolete constitution aside, began seizing unprecedented powers. These men did not,
however, seek to end the Republic. They merely sought to obtain as much prestige as they could, just as
their ancestors had done for hundreds of years. In spite of this, the Republic did end. The competitive
political system which had ensured the continuity of the Republic became suicidal. With the
constitution unable to prevent the individualistic nature of Roman politics from destroying the state, the
traditional rhetorical battles between politicians erupted into chaotic civil wars, the magnitude of which
caused nearly irreparable damage to the state, which could only be repaired under the absolute
authority of an emperor. Regardless of the intentions of politicians, territorial expansion and Roman
constitutional Republicanism had proven to have been incompatible.
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Bibliography:
Appian. The Civil Wars, translated by John Carter. New York: Penguin, 1996.
Everitt, Anthony. Cicero: The Life and Times of Rome’s Greatest Politician. New York: Random House
Trade Paperbacks, 2003.
Holland, Tom. Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic. New York: Anchor Books, 2005.
Plutarch. Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives, translated by Rex Warner, edited by Robin Seager. New
York: Penguin Classics, 2006
Shelton, Jo-Ann. As the Romans Did: A Sourcebook in Roman Social History. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998.
Ward, Allen M., Fritz M. Heichelheim, and Cedric A. Yeo. A History of the Roman People. Boston:
Prentice Hall, 2010.
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