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Why did the Romans win the Second Punic War? (25 marks)
The Second Punic War, fought from 218-201 BC was the most serious struggle faced by the Roman
Republic until that time. The conflict, most of which was characterised by the Carthaginian general
Hannibal’s occupation of Italy, brought Rome to her knees. In three battles alone, Hannibal routed
four consular armies, killing more than 75,000 Roman soldiers. The Roman Republic was, however,
victorious, and with victory came unopposed domination of the Western Mediterranean. There were
a range of factors contributing to this victory, including the impact of significant individuals such as
Scipio Africanus and Fabius Maximus, as well as a number of key elements of Roman state structure.
The work of Quintus Fabius Maximus was undoubtedly a significant contributing factor to Rome’s
eventual victory. After the disaster of Lake Trasimene, Polybius writes that the Romans ‘’did what
had never been done before that day, and created a dictator by popular election’’. This dictator,
Fabius, in order to nullify Hannibal’s obvious stragic superiority, implemented a strategy of nonconfrontation. He enacted a scorched-earth policy, began a sort of guerrilla war against Hannibal’s
army and set about shoring up Rome’s allies in the Italian confederacy. However, after Hannibal
managed to escape what appeared to be a clear ambush, these ‘Fabian tactics’ were abandoned.
The result of the subsequently adopted aggressive tactics was the worst defeat in Roman history, at
Cannae in 216 BC.
After this defeat, when Rome had no available standing army, the Fabian clan again gained influence
in the Senate. Fabius’ tactics were reintroduced, and Rome sought to contain Hannibal in Southern
Italy. The focus of the Fabian tactics on diplomacy became extremely important; the Romans were
able to stop many cities from opening their gates to Hannibal. Similarly, as Hannibal conquered a
number of large towns and cities, the Romans were able to take advantage of his ever-increasingly
divided forces and eventually re-take them. Guerilla tactics were also utilised in order to ‘’hamper
seriously the provisioning of his forces’’ (Sinnegen and Boak).
Another key reason for the eventual Roman victory was its ability to widen the war beyond Italy.
Despite successive defeats in Spain, they persevered there and also repulsed Carthaginian attacks in
Sicily. By around 211 BC, Spain had become the main battle ground of the Second Punic War. Publius
Cornelius Scipio, son of the like-named consul whom Hannibal had defeated, was sent to lead the
Roman forces in Spain. He immediately took the initiative and daringly sacked the Carthaginian base
of New Carthage.
Over the next five years, Scipio’s actions ensured that he was indeed a chief reason for the Roman
victory. By a combination of tactical brilliance reminiscent of Hannibal himself, as well as able
diplomacy, he managed to conquer all of the Carthaginian territory in Spain. It was around this time
that Rome had perhaps its first major victory in Italy. In the year 207 BC, Hannibal’s brother
Hasdrubal mimicked his daring march across the Alps with reinforcements. Two Roman consuls, in a
show of unity not yet seen in the war, combined their forces and defeated Hasdrubal at the
Metaurus River.
By 205 BC, the Fabian tactics were beginning to have a significant impact. Hannibal steadily lost
those cities which he had originally taken, such as Capua and Tarentum. At the same time, a number
of features of the very structure of the Roman state were beginning to turn the tide. First, Rome’s
system of universal military service was what had allowed her to continue to put armies into the
field. When this was not enough (in the immediate aftermath of Cannae), the Romans demonstrated
their flexibility and will to win by arming slaves and convicts.
Carthage, on the other hand, had to raise her forces from mercenaries or subject allies. Despite
being at least equal to the Romans in fighting ability, they had no sense of patriotism. Rome’s nearinexhaustable manpower (stemming from her universal military service and support of her allies)
gave her ‘’a citizen soldiery superior in morale and numbers’’ (Sinnegen and Boak). Indeed, by 206
BC, Rome had an unprecedented 25 legions in the field in Spain, Italy and Sicily.
The Roman state was also forced to adapt on the economic side of things. Loans were sought from
Hiero of Syracuse in the early years of the war, whilst as it progressed it was financed in no small
part by private businessmen. Flexibility was also demonstrated with regards to Roman state and
military administration. First, the election of Fabius as Dictator was a step taken in response to a
clear problem regarding the divided consular command. Similarly, laws were altered in order to
allow Publius Cornelius Scipio to take command of forces in Spain despite his young age.
The strong leadership of the Roman government was an advantage that grew as the war progressed.
Whilst the government of Carthage became more factionalist as the war went on, with the
supporters of the Barcid clan constantly opposed by Hanno and his supporters, the Senate in Rome
were to some extent united. Although factions did vie for influence, including the Scipionic clan,
there was no group advocating peace or an abandonment of the war effort. The Senate’s actions in
deciding to continue prosecuting the war in Spain, despite successive defeats by 213 BC was a
significant factor contributing to Roman victory.
The reasons for the Roman victory are not all to be found by examining the Roman Republic and its
actions. Moreover, there were a number of factors relating to the Carthaginians that ultimately
contributed to their defeat. First, Hannibal’s main shortcoming was that he relied too heavily on his
conviction that Rome would soon submit after Cannae. Similarly, his refusal to march on Rome itself
may also indicate a certain sense of hesitancy in doing what was needed (although his army was
certainly not properly outfitted for a siege). Furthermore, the failure of the Carthaginian government
to reinforce Hannibal holds great weighting. Carthage, due to a combination of factional rivalry,
Roman action in Spain and especially Roman superiority at sea, was unable to send Hannibal troops
which may have helped to secure an ultimate victory.
It is fitting that the Second Punic War ended due to the action of Publius Cornelius Scipio. After
conquering Spain, he was elected consul and convinced the Senate to allow him to take the war to
Africa. Here, recognising the superiority of the Numidian cavalry, Scipio defeated an army of
Numidians and Carthaginians at the Battle of the Great Plains. After putting an ally on the throne of
Numidia, he gained the use of their masterful cavalry. Scipio, having terrorised the countryside, met
the recalled Hannibal at the battle of Zama in 202 BC. Here, through a combination of tactics
including defusing Hannibal’s elephant charge and utilising cavalry encirclement, he defeated the
Carthaginians who then sued for peace.
Rome was victorious in the Second Punic War for a variety of reasons. The Roman writer Ennius
credits Fabius Maximus’ tactics as being a significant contributing factor, writing; ‘’One man, by
delaying, restored the state to us’’. It must also be recognised that Rome’s universal military service,
as well as the continued support of her allies meant that she possessed a significant superiority in
military manpower. The political, administrative and economic structures of the Roman state also
contributed in their flexibility. Finally, it was undoubtedly the actions of Scipio Africanus in first
conquering Spain and then taking the war to Africa which secured Rome’s ultimate victory.