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Kant and the force of duty
It is impossible to conceive of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can
be taken as good without qualification, except a good will (I 1).
1.
Context
 Kant and critical philosophy. The deflation of rationalist metaphysics and
knowledge claims of ultimate reality. Hume and an awakening from
dogmatic slumbers. Dissatisfaction with claims of empiricism. Knowledge,
the human perspective and the role of concepts.
 Causation and freedom
 Analytic/synthetic; a priori/ a posteriori. The synthetic a priori.
 Noumenal and phenomenal
 Pietism
2.
Ethics
 The need for ‘pure ethics’. The certainty of our status as free agents. The
Enlightenment goal of overcoming one’s own immaturity (our immaturity);
finding the source of authority within reason.
 Fundamental principle or basis that allows us to answer the question: what
ought I to do? Kant approaches moral philosophy by reflecting upon its
nature, upon its possibility.
 His approach connects with two intuitive questions about what makes an
action morally acceptable. What if everyone did that? Can you just use him
like that?
 An answer to the question must be one that is an answer to whoever asks it.
That is, an answer must be absolutely general or universal in scope.
Nothing can be a moral principle which can not be a principle for all. Moral
principles cannot be grounded in our contingent desires, inclinations or
needs.
3.
Ethics and reason
 Ethics to be grounded in reason and the principles of ethics to be
constructed through rational procedures.
 Inclination v. duty.
 Hypothetical v. categorical imperatives. The key point is not one of
grammar, but of motivation.
 The categorical nature of morality. The necessity of moral demands and the
contingency of the demands of inclination and desire.
 The moral law, command and our experience of it as duty. The perfect
(holy) will as infinite and wholly rational obeys the moral law
spontaneously. We are finite and have empirical concerns and inclinations.
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Action of distinctively moral worth is motivated by a sense of duty.
Intention and motivation count not consequences.
 The moral law is synthetic a priori. It is a principle of reason known by a
faculty akin to intuition.
4.
The categorical imperative and universalisation
 Maxims - principle under which one acts
 Universalisation as a test for moral permissibility.
 Formulations CI -
Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will
that it should become a universal law (II 52).
CI is the most general way in which the categorical imperative can be
expressed. Reason alone discloses to us the basis of morality, the form of the
moral law commanding and directing our intentions and actions. Kant proceeds
to give more specified formulations of the categorical imperative to show how
it can be developed in parallel ways, ways which indicate how are to
understand the concept and apply it in practice. The key formulations are:
Formula of the law of nature Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a
universal law of nature (II 52)
Law of nature? The idea is that a law of nature specifies an absolute regularity.
Such maxims would apply to everyone and everyone would always follow
them. The formulation of CI in terms of laws of nature also captures the
thought that the maxims or principles when universalised need to be consistent
with the empirical facts of the natural world in which actions are undertaken.
Formula of the end in itself Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always
at the same time as an end (II 66-67).
Formula of the kingdom of ends Act as if you were through your maxims a legislating member of the
kingdom of ends (II 74)
This captures the idea that one act on principles all can share through their
rationality and on principles which respect the capacities and dignity of each
person. In so far as we are rational each us would will just the same universal
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laws. The image of the Kingdom of Ends invites us to think of each person as
at once a legislator and bound by the very law enacted, law which respects the
like status of all. In this sense the Kantian rational self is literally autonomous self-legislating.
5.
Illustrations
 The case of false promising - the problem of contradiction in conception
and contradiction in will. The case of suicide.
 Respect for persons (perhaps most influential formulation of CI).
Individuals as rational beings with their own projects and ends. Persons as
the source of value of goods and practices. Persons as such possess dignity.
 The failure to respect the humanity of the other is a failure to act in a way
that leaves in place the capacity of another to act, to pursue her ends. It is a
violation of their status as an agent, a failure to recognise them as properly a
person.
 To be autonomous, to pursue my ends it must be possible for me to dissent
from or consent to what others do with respect to me. Reason therefore tells
us that an individual cannot be treated as an end if he is subjected to
coercion or deception.
 N.B not rule out treating others as means in some respects (e.g. the train
driver I made use of this morning), but that we ought never to treat others
merely as means.
 Intentions and actions. The ‘second best’ case of acting as if one were
acting in accordance with morally worthy maxims.
6.
Perfect and imperfect duties
 The possibility of completely discharging a duty.
 Self-development as an imperfect duty
 Assisting others as a rational response to our vulnerability and mutual
dependence. To treat finite creatures like myself as ends requires not just
that I adopt maxims which respect their capacity to act as freely
determining agents, but that I support their limited and fragile capacity to
act. However, what limits are there to the possible assistance required by
others? How could I have a perfect duty, one that can be discharged
completely?
 In a world with a plurality of agents our capacity to help others or develop
ourselves is necessarily limited, indeterminate and selective. Obligations
correspondingly imperfect.
 Towards a theory in which principles of virtue play an important role developed in Metaphysics of Morals Part II.
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7.
Freedom, God and immortality
 Tension between natural world of causal determinism (which we experience
directly through e.g. our desires and inclinations) and our experience qua
agents of freedom in decisions. Humans as parts of the natural,
phenomenal world and parts of the noumenal world. Metaphysical
incoherence? Two words or two ways of viewing our nature?
 Freedom must be postulated. We know we are free from moral experience
and it is a condition of the possibility of that experience.
 Also tension between the moral goodness at which free agents aim and the
happiness natural creatures pursue. Indeed, it might seem that often
happiness is readily secured by those who fail to aim at moral goodness.
 Co-ordination of moral goodness and happiness is the highest good and it is
possible provided we postulate a benevolent God and immortality.
 Kant accepts that three postulates cannot be theoretically known to be true,
but they are necessary postulates of practice.
 N.B. changes in later writings.
8.
Some challenges
 Empty formalism and abstraction. Cannot detach an account of morality
from our conceptions of the good. Kant places the right before the good, but
now there is no content in an understanding of morality. No appreciation of
the embeddedness of moral relations in context. Can we separate what we
ought to do from how we are, from those values and practices in which our
lives gain value, purpose and cohesion?
 Conflicts between duties - what do I tell the murderer seeking you?
 Insufficient role for inclinations, attitudes and emotions. It is morally
repugnant to act from duty alone. It is impossible to lead a worthwhile life
gripped by duty. Also, what about the consequences? We do seem to accord
a place for outcomes in our moral judgements.
 The die-hard racist, P, who consistently universalises the principle of
extermination. Even if P were in their position P would still will that they,
including P, should be killed. If that is so, then universalisation not a
sufficient criterion of moral permissibility. But universalisation is a
necessary condition. Now a question arises of whether there are moral
principles which one would be irrational to regard as a universalisable
maxim. See Hooker pp.19-20.

Does the identification of non-universalisable maxims require the
presupposition of substantive principles? False promising is incoherent, but
do we already need to accept that we ought to endorse the practice of
promising?
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