Download Nussbaum and Wolf Reading Study Guide Phil 240 Introduction to

Nussbaum and Wolf Reading Study Guide
Phil 240 Introduction to Ethical Theory
Martha Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach”
Recent philosophy has seen a large resurgence of interest in theorizing about the virtues, but many virtue-oriented
ethical theories have involved some version of relativism—the view that ethics can only articulate local ideals
rather than offering any universally valid norms of conduct. In contrast to this trend, Nussbaum sketches a
program, heavily based on the works of Aristotle, for developing an objective account of human flourishing and
the virtues. This program involves two stages. In the first stage, one isolates various nearly universal spheres of
human experience, areas of our lives in which we all make choices about how to act. These spheres include fear of
damages, bodily appetites and their pleasures, and the distribution of limited resources. Corresponding to each of
these spheres is a virtue, which consists of being stably disposed to act appropriately within that sphere. The
second stage of Nussbaum's Aristotelian program, which is largely left for another occasion, is to develop fuller
specifications of each virtue by describing what sorts of attitudes or behaviors are appropriate within each sphere.
Nussbaum discusses three objections to this sort of program. The first objection is that although we might agree
that certain spheres of experience are more or less universal, it does not follow that there is a single objective
virtue within each of these spheres, valid for all people at all times. The second objection goes even further,
denying that there are genuinely universal spheres of shared human experience and arguing that even our
perceptions of things like bodily appetites are highly culturally conditioned. The third objection is the most
radical, and argues that many virtues, such as generosity, are simply responses to defective social conditions (e.g.,
the institution of private property). Nussbaum argues that each of these objections must be taken seriously, and
that each forces modifications to her theory. Nonetheless, she insists that her Aristotelian framework provides a
way forward in the project of articulating and justifying objective ethical ideals.
Study Questions
1. What two-step process is involved in Aristotle’s account of each virtue? Do you agree that this two-step
process can yield an account of virtue that is objective and universal? Why or why not?
2. How does Nussbaum think we can go about discovering what the virtues are? Do you think her account gives
us a plausible way of discovering nonrelative virtues? Defend your answer.
3. Critically reflect on the objections to Aristotelian virtue ethics that Nussbaum presents. Do you think she
succeeds in defusing the objection? Why or why not?
4. What does ethical progress consist in, for Aristotle (and Nussbaum)? Does virtue ethics provide a plausible
method for making ethical progress?
5. In what sense does Nussbaum’s theory render the virtues objective? To what extent do the virtues depend on
context? Does Nussbaum’s theory deliver a desirable kind of objectivity in ethics?
6. What objection does Nussbaum think is raised by the work of Foucault and others on the historically
contingent nature of desire? How does she respond to this objection? Do you think her response is adequate?
7. Why does Nussbaum consider Marx’s view that virtues were responses to defective relations of production,
and therefore needed to be overcome? How does she respond to this challenge?
Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints”
A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who is as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might
seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is in fact not an attractive ideal. Wolf claims that any
moral saint would necessarily live a life dominated by the commitment to improving the welfare of others, but she
distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness
truly consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint does not share this trait, but simply pays little
attention to her own happiness and attaches overriding importance to the concerns of morality. Although these
different models will appeal to different thinkers—Wolf suggests that utilitarians might be more attracted to the
Loving Saint, and Kantians to the Rational Saint—Wolf claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable
ideal worth striving for.
What's wrong with moral sainthood? Wolf argues that there are many nonmoral goods in which moral saints
would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the
lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books, or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or
music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a
dry, sarcastic wit, and might very well be rather bland. By passing up on so much, either out of lack of interest or
simply an iron will, moral saints seem to miss out on developing "an identifiable, personal self." Wolf concludes
that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns
out to be an undesirable ideal. We are left with the surprising conclusion that to live a good life, one should not
strive to do as much good as possible.
Study Questions
1. What nonmoral ideals does Wolf endorse, and why does she think they are valuable? How important do you
think these are to living a good life?
2. What would moral sainthood look like for a utilitarian? What objections does Wolf raise to this as an ideal?
Do you find her objections compelling?
3. What would moral sainthood look like for a Kantian? What objections does Wolf raise to this as an ideal? Do
you find her objections compelling?
4. What is “the point of view of individual perfection”? What role would morality play in a life that is perfect
from this point of view, according to Wolf? Do you agree with her assessment? Why or why not?
5. What is a moral saint? Is moral saintliness a desirable ideal? Why or why not?
6. What two models of moral sainthood does Wolf distinguish? To whom does she think each would appeal, and
why? Do you find one model more attractive than the other? Defend your answer.
7. What lessons for moral philosophy does Wolf draw from her conclusion that moral sainthood is an
unattractive ideal? What ideal does she substitute in its place? Do you agree with her?