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POLICY BRIEF Which Countries are Particularly Vulnerable? Science Doesn’t Have the Answer! Key Findings • Discussions about the prioritisation of adaptation finance under the UNFCCC are characterised by ambiguity, reflecting the lack of agreement among Parties on what it means to be ‘particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.’ • ‘Vulnerability’ is not a quantifiable attribute that can be objectively measured. There is no objectivist ‘truth’ in vulnerability assessment; instead it is the socially constructed outcome of a negotiation process, reflecting different and biased interpretations of vulnerability. • Climate negotiators would be misguided to think scientists could develop a definitive, objective and unchallengeable method to rank countries according to their vulnerability to climate change. Scientists cannot resolve political ambiguity. • To measure and rank the vulnerability of countries requires normative decisions. To make such decisions is the domain of politics and should therefore be the responsibility of negotiators, not of scientists. • It is unlikely that Parties could reach agreement on any one of the vulnerability indices put forward. Any resulting ranking is likely to be contested by countries that, according to the ranking, are not particularly vulnerable and therefore not prioritised for adaptation funding. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defines vulnerability as ‘the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes.’ Unfortunately this definition provides no guidance on how to interpret Article 4.4. None of the research on vulnerability to date has resulted in a systematic and agreed way of assessing, measuring, expressing and comparing the vulnerability of countries to climate change. As a result, discussions about vulnerability under the Convention are characterised by ambiguity (Box 1). Photo: © sbuwert-flickr Vulnerability: a poorly defined concept without an agreed metric The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change commits developed countries ‘to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects’ (Article 4.4). Ever since the Convention was agreed in 1992, the question has arisen of what it means to be ‘particularly vulnerable’, and how it is decided which countries fall into this category. The question is important, because countries classified as ‘particularly vulnerable’ would be prioritised for adaptation funding. There is therefore an overt political dimension to what appears otherwise to be a purely academic question. Box 1: Ambiguity about the meaning of ‘particularly vulnerable’ in the climate negotiations The word ‘vulnerable’ appears four times in the Convention; it is preceded by the adverb ‘particularly’ three times. Its first mention is in the nineteenth preambular paragraph, which already appears to give at least a partial answer to the question of which countries are particularly vulnerable: ‘… low-lying and other small island countries, countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought and desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change …’ The second mention is in Article 3.2, which is the principle that ‘[t]he specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration.’ The third mention is in Article 4.4, cited above, which can be considered as making the first part of Article 3.2 operational. Article 4.8 of the Convention reiterates in part the nineteenth preambular paragraph, listing several groups of countries with ‘specific needs and concerns’: ‘In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give full consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures, especially on: (a) Small island countries; (b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas; (c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to forest decay; (d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters; (e) Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification; (f) Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution; (g) Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems; (h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products; and (i) Land-locked and transit countries.’ However, this listing is of limited use in the negotiations because it includes countries vulnerable to the impact of the implementation of response measures as well as countries vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The group of least developed countries gets a special mention in the Convention. Article 4.9 states that ‘[t]he Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of technology.’ The Kyoto Protocol contains the word ‘vulnerable’ once, in Article 12.8. This article provided the basis of what later became the Adaptation Fund: ‘The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities [under the Clean Development Mechanism] is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.’ Meanwhile, the question of which countries might be considered particularly vulnerable remained unsolved. The Adaptation Fund Board faced this issue when preparing the Strategic Priorities, Policies and Guidelines of the Adaptation Fund. In Paragraph 10 it states: ‘Eligible Parties to receive funding from the Adaptation Fund are understood as developing country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change including low-lying and other small island countries, countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought and desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems.’ This is the same listing as in the UNFCCC preamble, but the additional word ‘including’ implies that the possibility exists that countries not covered by the preamble could still be particularly vulnerable and therefore eligible for funding from the Adaptation Fund. An approach towards the prioritisation among eligible Parties is presented in Paragraph 16 of the Strategic Priorities, Policies and Guidelines of the Adaptation Fund. It lists seven criteria that ‘[t]he decision on the allocation of resources of the Adaptation Fund among eligible Parties shall take into account.’ The first of these criteria is ‘Level of vulnerability’; other criteria include ‘Level of urgency and risks arising from delay’ and ‘Adaptive capacity to the adverse effects of climate change.’ While the Adaptation Fund Board follows the UNFCCC preamble, in 2007 Parties had put forward a different grouping of ‘particularly vulnerable’ countries in the Bali Action Plan. The Bali Action Plan lists the issues Parties wish to see addressed in an ‘agreed outcome’, which include: ‘1(c)Enhanced action on adaptation, including, inter alia, consideration of: (i) International cooperation to support urgent implementation of adaptation actions … taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially the least developed countries and small island developing States, and further taking into account the needs of countries in Africa affected by drought, desertification and floods; … (iii) Disaster reduction strategies and means to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.’ The word ‘especially’ in Paragraph 1(c)(i) does not exclude the possibility of support to developing countries not listed here. However, it implies that a certain priority be given to the countries listed. The Copenhagen Accord, formulated in 2009, was not the ‘agreed outcome’ the Bali Action Plan set out to reach, and its interpretation of ‘particularly vulnerable’ is again different. The Copenhagen Accord states that ‘[e]nhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required … in developing countries, especially in those that are particularly vulnerable, especially least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa.’ Note the double use of the word ‘especially’ and the inclusion of all of Africa (as opposed to countries in Africa affected by drought, desertification and floods). The Bali Action Plan established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWGLCA), which continued its work towards an agreed outcome during four negotiation sessions between Copenhagen and Cancún. Various interpretations of ‘particularly vulnerable’ appeared in successive negotiating texts. The text presented for discussion in Cancún in December 2010 includes options put forward by three different groups of countries. The options still contain several square brackets, further highlighting the lack of agreement. Photo: © Kok Leng Yeo Photo: © World Bank Photo Collection The politics of establishing an index The ambiguity presented in Box 1 reflects the lack of agreement among Parties on what it means to be particularly vulnerable. The idea of establishing a vulnerability index that can provide an ‘objective’ answer is therefore increasingly viewed with interest. However, a vulnerability index will not resolve the ambiguity, because ‘vulnerability’ is not a quantifiable attribute that can be objectively measured. ‘Vulnerability’ means different things to different people. Human life, productive land, physical infrastructure and biological diversity are all vulnerable to climate change, but there is no consensus on which are more or most important. Is Vietnam more vulnerable than Vanuatu because more people will be affected? Or is Vanuatu more vulnerable than Vietnam because all of its land is exposed? Is Mexico more vulnerable than Mali because more economic assets are at risk? Or is Mali more vulnerable than Mexico because it is already affected by drought? And if a country were considered more vulnerable, what would make it ‘particularly vulnerable’? relatively easy to construct a whole range of vulnerability indices. And this is exactly what has been done over the past ten years. Scientists have developed a series of different indices, each of which produced a different ranking of vulnerable countries, based on different views and assumptions about what makes a country vulnerable. This experience has shown that measuring vulnerability is not an exact science, and that scientists can never provide an objectively ‘true’ answer to what is essentially a political question. In principle it is relatively easy to construct a vulnerability index to rank Vietnam, Vanuatu, Mexico, Mali and all other countries on a scale from, say, 1 to 10. In fact, it is Photo: © global finland This is not to say that measuring vulnerability is a futile exercise. However, a clear distinction must be made between the positive and the normative steps involved in constructing a vulnerability index. Scientists may well make an important contribution (for example by proposing methods and collecting data), but the normative decisions are best left to negotiators. These decisions include which variables to consider, what weights – if any – to attach to them, and where to set the threshold beyond which countries are considered ‘particularly vulnerable’. These decisions will greatly influence the ranking produced by the index, and thereby the allocation of money for adaptation. This policy brief is based on the paper ‘Identifying countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change: an academic or a political challenge?’, which was published in Carbon & Climate Law Review (2009, 3). Conclusions ‘Vulnerability’ is a complex concept for which there is no broadly agreed definition, and no common metric to express it. As a result, it is technically difficult to compare countries with different levels of vulnerability. In addition, due to the normative judgment required in the assessment of vulnerability, it is also politically difficult to agree on a method that would allow for such comparisons. Despite current calls for the development of a vulnerability index to guide the prioritisation of countries, it is unlikely that Parties could reach agreement on any proposed index. Any resulting ranking is likely to be contested by countries which, according to the ranking, are not particularly vulnerable and therefore not prioritised for adaptation funding. The ambiguity surrounding the questions of which countries are particularly vulnerable and how to determine this is at the heart of the political problem of prioritisation. This policy brief does not offer a solution to this problem. Instead it emphasises that negotiators would be misguided to think they could rely on external experts to develop a definitive, objective and unchallengeable method to rank countries according to their vulnerability to climate change. There is no objectivist ‘truth’ in vulnerability assessment; any agreed approach will have to be the socially constructed outcome of a negotiation process, reflecting different and biased interpretations of vulnerability. Scientists may well provide input into this process, but eventually it requires normative decisions on how vulnerability is defined, what constitutes ‘particular vulnerability’, and which countries can be designated as such. To make such decisions is the domain of politics and should therefore be the responsibility of negotiators, not of scientists. Recommendations • Negotiators need to be aware of the political decisions involved in constructing vulnerability indices. They also need to understand how these decisions would influence the ranking of countries and thereby the allocation of adaptation finance. • Before considering any vulnerability index, negotiators must agree on which variables to consider, what weights – if any – to attach to them, and where to set the threshold beyond which countries are considered ‘particularly vulnerable.’ Photo: © nattu/flickr • Negotiators should avoid creating a situation where resource allocation decisions are informed by a ranking of countries derived from a non-transparent assessment based on criteria not previously agreed by Parties. Published by: Stockholm Environment Institute Kräftriket 2B SE -106 91 Stockholm Sweden +46 8 6747070 sei-international.org 2010 Author: Richard J.T. Klein, [email protected] Further Information: SEI Head of Communications Emma Lindberg +46 73 4607458