Download Impersonal methods of decision making under uncertainty I.

Impersonal methods of decision
making
under uncertainty I.
On the one hand rational choice under uncertainty is impossible, on the other
hand it is either impossible not to choose in the face of uncertainty, as the very
non-choice then also becomes a way of choosing that potentially might threaten
the survival of an individual or open a window of opportunity for routinebreaking.
Impersonal methods of decision making
In a traditional society, under perfectly working societal institutions, the goals which people
aspire to are mostly predefined by their social identity and status. The means to achieve
these goals are clearly determined by the established societal institutions and traditions
shared by all community members. A member of a traditional society is literary free of
choice, as well as of any responsibility for its consequences. The future is revealed to him
either through commandments and unspoken rules, or through divination and omens
conveying god’s will.
Impersonal methods of decision making
For the future has no place for randomness, the concepts of chance and risk have no
meaning in such a society, a result of any game of chance, such as throwing dice or running
roulette wheels, is caused by none other than the deity whose intentions are divined. The
exopsychic methods of thought and decision making are used to solicit divine direction.
Steps taken to ensure randomness in a game of chance are intended merely to eliminate the
possibility of human interference, in order the will of gods could be discerned at first-hand.
Impersonal methods of decision making
For any given game of chance is equated with the actual issue of uncertainty through a
metaphor, the observed random patterns are identified as being symbolically the same as
gods’ purpose for men in the situation. We may furthermore say that the arbitrariness of
metaphor in the game of chance epitomizes uncertainty of means, and the degree of
indeterminacy of god’s will represents uncertainty of ends of the real situation. Thus, the
outcome of such an exopsychic mechanism of decision making is always the result of
interplay between two types of uncertainty.
Uncertainty of ends and uncertainty of means
The social identity is formed through the
identifications with significant and closest others
in a kin group (primarily with parents and the
groups and social categories which they belong
to). Others, as we perceive them, contribute to
the formation of our life goals through the
processes of idealistic–identification and
defensive contra–identification. We aspire to the
characteristics, values and beliefs of those we
consider benign and wishes to dissociate
from the characteristics of malign individuals.
Uncertainty of ends and uncertainty of means
The social identity is formed through the
identifications with significant and closest others
in a kin group (primarily with parents and the
groups and social categories which they belong
to). Others, as we perceive them, contribute to
the formation of our life goals through the
processes of idealistic–identification and
defensive contra–identification. We aspire to the
characteristics, values and beliefs of those we
consider benign and wishes to dissociate
from the characteristics of malign individuals.
We strive to achieve our life goals with the help
of social institutions, the stable, valued, recurring
patterns of behavior that govern the actions
of individuals within our community.
uncertainty of ends
However, during the periods of uncertainty and confusion (such as in adolescence) when a
person’s sense of identity becomes insecure, the expected aims and the aspired role in society
also become uncertain. We shall call this type of indeterminacy as uncertainty of ends. In the
course of substantial and rapid cultural changes in the society, or during the formative years,
people may experience uncertainty about which goals are most worth pursuing, since the ends
to which they have aspired previously might become irreconcilable.
uncertainty of ends
Family
Society
• marry;
• bearing many
children at a regular
pace
• get an education in
a school
• get a job
When multiple social goals that are recognized as desirable contradict each other and the aim
itself is under contention, the social actor cannot determine what future result or outcome he
should try for.
uncertainty of means
When social institutions dissolve,
people find themselves in an
environment of uncertainty of
another kind – uncertainty of
means.
Although the aims and the aspired
role in society might remain clear,
people would experience
uncertainty about how to achieve
their goals in a situation when the
means to those ends only erratically
and unpredictably available. We
experience uncertainty of means
whenever it is unclear which course
of action will best achieve the result
which we desire.
People quite often experience the both types of uncertainty simultaneously. For
example, with the breakdown of a state, as described by the example of the former
Soviet Union, its citizens may find themselves facing the question about their
current identification: who are now the citizens of the former state? At the same
time, a series of basic issues arise, which involves deciding how possible conflicts
between and within the new states are to be resolved and order ensured, and
there are no ready-made answers to them (i.e., uncertainty of means).
Social conformity as an exopsychic method of
decision making
While experiencing double uncertainty – of ends and of means simultaneously –
people would rather get by than optimize their behavior. Perhaps, the most
common and natural exopsychic method of decision making consists of listening to
what others would say to us.
Social conformity as an exopsychic method of
decision making
Let us assume that an individual j takes
a decision on a particular issue, being
guided by both his personal opinion and
some expected attitude towards the
issue expressed by other (N −1)
individuals surrounding him, i = 1, . . .
,N −1. It is important to mention that
the most of decisions we make in the
face of uncertainty are of binary nature,
as assuming a simple ”aye/nay”–
answer: To do, or not to do? To be, or
not to be? To go, or not to go? – the
individual has to make a choice,
whether to move to a particular state or
not.
Social conformity as an exopsychic method of
decision making
• Let us denote αj ∈ [0, 1] – the a
priori attitude of the individual
toward the state – the probability of
that an individual is deliberately
ready to move into a state (by
answering ”aye”) before
communicating with her kin group;
and
• the final, posterior attitude, taken
after the communication with the kin
group, is expressed by the probability
Pj ∈ [0, 1] of that the final decision is
made to move into the state (by
answering ”aye”).
Social conformity as an exopsychic method of
decision making
The person may, of course, not to
succumb to the influence of others
provided he is independent or
stubborn enough. Therefore, we also
introduce another characteristic of the
individual, the degree of obstinacy
toward the particular issue,
μj ∈ [0, 1],
determining the probability that in
this case the individual would behave
as a fully independent person.
Social conformity as an exopsychic method of
decision making
If μj = 1, then the individual is absolutely obstinate, refusing to change his opinion or
chosen course of actions, despite attempts to persuade him to do so. If μj = 0, we have
an absolute dependent individual, which perhaps does not have any particular a priori
opinion on that issue. The degree of obstinacy μj does not characterize the entire
psychological makeup of the individual j, but is rather determined by the particular
circumstances.
Social conformity as an exopsychic method of
decision making
For an obstinate individual (μj = 1), the posterior probability of that the final decision
is made to move into the state, obviously, coincides with the a priori probability,
Social conformity as an exopsychic method of
decision making
the conformity matrix of a community:
Let us assume that the possible
influence of the i-th kin on the opinion
of the j-th individual is independent
from a possible influence of any other
community member and is determined
by the number λij > 0, for i ≠= j,
assessing the probability of that the j-th
individual mimics the decision of the ith individual, whatever it would be –
answering ”aye” to the conundrum
question with the probability Pi, the
same probability as of that the
individual i would answer the same
question positively.
Social conformity as an exopsychic method of
decision making
Social conformity as an exopsychic method of
decision making
By calculating Pj as a product of the
probabilities corresponding to the factors
responsible for the both types of uncertainty,
we assume that these factors are statistically
independent.
uncertainty of ends
uncertainty of means
Social conformity as an exopsychic method of
decision making
The decreasing degree of individual obstinacy μj → 0, as then the posteriori
probability Pj is determined primarily by the opinions of the kin group, but not by
the a priori attitude of the individual himself.
The parameter complementary to the degree of obstinacy (1 − μj) can be viewed as
a personal strength of identification with the group, as when people have a strong
sense of group identification (1 − μj → 1), their self is defined at the level of the
group, rather than at the level of their personal identity, and pursuing the group’s
interest becomes a direct and natural expression of self-interest. Vice versa, when
existential threats recede, self-expression values tend to become more widespread,
and people adopt increasingly independent conceptions of themselves that
corresponds to the increasing degree of obstinacy in our model μj → 1
In a vector setting,
It can be readily shown that the system of equations possesses a unique and positive
solution P, for all 0 ≤ Pj ≤ 1,
Crowd behavior and circular reaction
All individuals in the model of social conformity are completely dependent
The multiplicity of possible solutions of is intuitively understandable: there is not a
single individual with more or less certain aspirations, within a group of absolutely
dependent individuals. Literary speaking, the whole group forms a ”majority”, and it
is far from clear what this ”majority” wants.
However, the behavior of individuals in
such a crowd is not chaotic at all. Quite
the opposite, all individuals mimic each
other, as
so that all the posterior
probabilities Pj = P are equal and
all individuals behave in the same
way, similar to a flock of birds or a
street crowd without a leader.
However, the behavior of individuals in
such a crowd is not chaotic at all. Quite
the opposite, all individuals mimic each
other, as
so that all the posterior
probabilities Pj = P are equal and
all individuals behave in the same
way, similar to a flock of birds or a
street crowd without a leader.
In essence, the behavior of such a crowd is unpredictable, although they act as a
single unit, always moving to a new ”collective” state uniformly, with a probability
P, which value is arbitrary. However, the crowd might be driven out from such a
state of collective indifference by any provocative action – formally, a small
perturbation of any of the parameters μi (the degree of obstinacy) or 1 − μi (the
strength of identification with the group).
Once a single individual somehow
finds his way, it is enough for the
whole crowd to follow him. If the k-th
individual with μk > 0 suddenly
appears in the crowd, the situation
changes dramatically, as a single
solution for all individuals Pj = αk
arises at once, where αk is an a priori
probability of the k-th individual.
Thus, the behavior of the k-th
individual is immediately mimicked by
everybody in the crowd.
the stochastic matrix of conformity Λ,
in general, is not symmetric, its left
and right eigenvectors are not equal.
Moreover, the left eigenvector,
belonging to the same eigenvalue
1, is not uniform, πi= ̸= P.
satisfies the condition of detailed balance
A time reversible random walk on an undirected weighted connectivity graph of
individuals joining the crowd is described by the stochastic conformity matrix Λ.
the stochastic matrix of conformity Λ,
in general, is not symmetric, its left
and right eigenvectors are not equal.
Moreover, the left eigenvector,
belonging to the same eigenvalue
1, is not uniform, πi= ̸= P.
The random walks can be considered as an archetypal model for diffusion and
autoinfection processes in various communities. It is known that for a stationary,
discrete valued stochastic process the expected recurrence time to return to a
state is the reciprocal of the probability of this state. The expected recurrence
time of random walks defined on Λ, which indicates how long a random walker
must wait to revisit the individual i is inverse proportional to πi,
The special psychological mechanism of
circular reaction: certain emotional states
experienced by people in a crowd can
circulate, recurrently triggering emotional
flooding in people and maintaining the
emotional unity of the crowd.
The characteristic duration of
recurrence times depends upon the
connectivity structure encoded by
the conformity matrix Λ, but not of
its size. In general, short recurrence
times correspond to
well connected individuals, strongly
influenced by the group identity.
Vice versa, individuals weakly
connected to the group are
characterized by longer recurrence
times
A random crowd is usually formed under the influence of a certain emotion,
such as curiosity or anger. As curiosity continuously pulls the new members into
the crowd, the circular reaction could start and maintain itself at a full speed.
The information of interest or a particular emotional story is continuously
retold to the newcomers creating a self-sustaining whirl of emotion catching
more and more people and attracting them to the crowd.
Public choice and the role of mass media.
Why and when does propaganda work?
Individuals do not give any personal preference to each other.
The expectation of the number of individuals
(apart from j) who have already answered
aye” (moved to the state of interest).
Public choice and the role of mass media.
Why and when does propaganda work?
The expectation of the number of individuals
(apart from j) who have already answered
aye” (moved to the state of interest).
Public choice and the role of mass media.
Why and when does propaganda work?
Public choice and the role of mass media.
Why and when does propaganda work?
Let one candidate suggests to raise taxes (so that his a priori attitude toward this
issue is definitive α1 = 1) and his degree of obstinacy μ = μ1, and another
candidate promises to keep the taxes unchanged, and therefore α2 = 0 and his
degree of obstinacy is μ = μ2. We also suppose that the electorate is characterized
by μ = 0, as people would take the both proposals seriously and keep their minds
open. However, the range of a priori opinions in the electorate about the need to
raise taxes might be quite wide, indeed – all αj are different.
Public choice and the role of mass media.
Why and when does propaganda work?
Public choice and the role of mass media.
Why and when does propaganda work?
Let us consider a family consisting of Nf people and a ”television set” representing
mass media in our model. The television set will be characterized by the features of
a possessed individual, i.e. with the absolute degree of obstinacy (μ = 1) and a
definite political position, P0 = α0 = 1. We do not distinguish between the other
community members, assuming that they are characterized by some a priori
attitude αj = α and a certain degree of obstinacy μj = μ < 1.
Public choice and the role of mass media.
Why and when does propaganda work?
We assume that the propaganda campaign is organized in the form of n ≫ 1
sequential stages, during which the fraction of persuaded individuals f(n−1)
achieved at the end of each previous stage, becomes a priori probability α for
the input of the next round of the campaign, f(n−1) = α(n).
Public choice and the role of mass media.
Why and when does propaganda work?
The recurrence relation describing the efficiency of propaganda campaign lasting for
k steps has the following solution:
Public choice and the role of mass media.
Why and when does propaganda work?
It is obvious that as the degree of obstinacy of the community members μ < 1 and
the number of the kin group is not very large, Nf = O(1), the fraction in the latter
brackets is always less than unity, so that f(k) → 1 inevitably, as k → ∞.
Public choice and the role of mass media.
Why and when does propaganda work?
Propaganda among
stubborn loners is inefficient
It is obvious that as the degree of obstinacy of the community members μ < 1 and
the number of the kin group is not very large, Nf = O(1), the fraction in the latter
brackets is always less than unity, so that f(k) → 1 inevitably, as k → ∞.
Nevertheless, in the case of absolutely obstinate individuals, μ = 1, it is obvious that
the fraction in the last brackets equals 1 for any number Nf , and therefore the
propaganda campaign fails to achieve the goals, f(∞) = α.
Public choice and the role of mass media.
Why and when does propaganda work?
Propaganda would not work
over large enough groups of
cooperating individuals.
Nevertheless, in the case of absolutely obstinate individuals, μ = 1, it is obvious that
the fraction in the last brackets equals 1 for any number Nf , and therefore the
propaganda campaign fails to achieve the goals, f(∞) = α.
Another strategy to reduce the influence of propaganda consists of increasing the
number of community members to Nf ≫ 1. The fraction in the last brackets tends to
unity for any value μ > 0, and then the propaganda campaign fails to achieve its
goals either.
The last but not least remark is about a popular wording: ”propaganda does not
work on well-informed people”. In our opinion, the reason for this confusion lies in
a misunderstanding of the profound difference between propaganda and deceit
(disinformation). As a matter of fact, propaganda would work on well-informed,
excellently educated people as well as on uninformed, ignorant individuals of
philistine tastes, simply because it has nothing to do with information or
knowledge.
Propaganda does not start with distortion of any kind of information, but rather
emerges in response of the common atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity,
such as that one arising under a threat of terror attacks or following the
explosions with multiple civilian casualties. Submission to a decisive opinion of a
self-confident leader in the face of uncertainty is always a deliberate choice of the
socialized majority.
Conclusions
• Under uncertainty, people try to evade personal decision making at all
costs, with the use of a variety of exopsychic/impersonal methods.
• We have introduced and analysed a simple model for social conformity.
Our conclusions suggest that the behaviour of a crowd without a leader is
irrational and intransitive, being characterized by the loss of responsibility
of the individuals for the outcome.
• However, as soon as people come together in a group or crowd, they could
spontaneously begin to obey one among them. It is remarkable that in the
face of uncertainty, the actual political platform of a leader does not play
an important role in determining the outcome of elections, as people
would rather vote for the more self-confident and decisive candidate.
• We have also discussed the problem of public choice and the role of mass
media in that. We have shown that the mass media would always win in a
small enough community of docile and cooperative individuals.
Nevertheless, propaganda among stubborn loners is practically inefficient.
Propaganda also would not work over large enough groups of cooperating
individuals.