Download Observed Climate Change and the Negligible Global Effect of

Observed Climate Change and the Negligible
Global Effect of Greenhouse-gas Emission
Limits in the State of Georgia
Table of Contents
Summary for Policy Makers
3
I. Observed Climate
A. Temperature
4
B. Precipitation
6
C. Drought
7
II. Sea Level Rise
9
III. Hurricanes
12
IV. Public Health Impacts
A. Temperature-related Mortality
21
B. “Tropical” Disease
25
V. Impacts of climate-mitigation measures in Georgia
28
VI. Costs of Federal legislation
32
VII Georgia Scientists disagree on Man-made global
Warming Hypothesis
33
VIII. Additional Readings
38
IX. References
38
2
Summary for Policy Makers
The observations we have detailed herein illustrate that climate variability from
year-to-year and decade-to-decade plays a greater role in Georgia’s climate than any
long-term trends. Such short-term variability will continue dominating Georgia’s
climate into the future.
At the century timescale, Georgia’s climate shows no statically significant trend in statewide average
annual temperature, statewide total annual precipitation, or in the frequency and/or severity of droughts.
In stead, observations show that the first part of the 20th century was warmer than the latter half — an
indication that “global warming” is anything but “global” and also provides strong evidence that local and
regional processes are more important than global ones in determining local climate and local climate
variations and changes.
The same is true for tropical cyclones impacting Georgia and the United States — there is a great degree
of annual and decadal variability that can be traced long into the past, but no 20th century trends in
frequency, intensity, or damage.
Global sea levels are rising at a pace that is not dissimilar to that experienced and adapted to during the
20th century.
And climate change is shown to have little, if any, detectable impacts on the overall health of Georgia’s
population. Application of direct measures aimed at combating the negative impacts of heat waves and
vector-borne diseases prove far and away to be the most efficient and effective methods at improving the
public health.
A cessation of all of Georgia’s CO2 emissions would result in a climatically-irrelevant global temperature
reduction by the year 2100 of no more than five thousandths of a degree Celsius. Results for sea-level rise
are also negligible. A complete cessation of all anthropogenic emissions from Georgia will result in a
global sea-level rise savings by the year 2100 of an estimated 0.08 cm, or about three hundredths of an
inch. Again, this value is climatically irrelevant.
3
I. Observed Climate
A. Temperature
A
veraged across the state of Georgia, the long-term annual temperature history shows that
the first half of the 20th century was, in general, much warmer than the most recent 50 year
period. Obviously, “global warming” has not had much of an effect on the temperatures here.
While it is often reported that globally the last 10 years were the hottest on record, the story is
much different in Georgia where only 1 of the 10 hottest years on record statewide occurred
during the past 10 years. Four of the state’s 10 all-time hottest years, including the hottest year
on record, occurred during the 1920s—more than 75 years ago. Further, while only 14 of the
recent 50 years were above the long-term average, 38 of the first 50 years of the 20th century
were warmer than average.
Georgia’s long-term statewide annual average temperature history, 1895-2006, as compiled and maintained
by the National Climate Data Center (http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/cag3/ga.html)
4
An examination of Georgia’s statewide temperature history within the four seasons, shows no
evidence of any “global warming” throughout any portion of the year. Recent temperatures are
unremarkable in every way and no long-term warming trends are present. In fact, within every
season, the temperature trend from 1895-2006 is negative, indicating a general cooling tendency.
Winter
Spring
Summer
Fall
Georgia’s long-term statewide average temperature history, 1895-2006, by season, as compiled and
maintained by the National Climate Data Center
(http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/cag3/ga.html). In each season, the 112-yr temperature trend is
downward, indicating a general cooling tendency.
5
B. Precipitation
A
veraged across the state of Georgia for each of the past 112 years, statewide annual total
precipitation exhibits no long-term trend, averaging about 50 inches per year. Georgia’s
annual precipitation is quite variable from year to year, and has varied from as much as 70.66
inches falling in 1964 and as little as 30.99 inches in 1954. Recent year’s totals show nothing
unusual when compared to the observed historical record.
Georgia’s statewide long-term annual precipitation history as compiled and maintained by the National
Climate Data Center (http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/cag3/ga.html)
6
C. Drought
A
s is evident from Georgia’s long-term observed precipitation history, there are oftentimes
strings of dry years, for instance, in the mid-1950s. Several dry years in a row can lead to
widespread drought conditions. However, as is also evident from Georgia’s precipitation history,
there is no long-term trend in the total precipitation across the state. Consequently, neither has
there been any long-term trend in drought conditions there (as indicated by the history of the
Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI)—a standard measure of moisture conditions that takes
into account both inputs from precipitation and losses from evaporation). Instead of a long-term
trend, the PDSI is dominated by shorter term variations which largely reflect the state’s
precipitation variability. Droughts in the mid-1920s, mid-1950s and late 1990s-early 2000s mark
the most significant events of the past 112 years.
Georgia’s statewide long-term monthly Palmer Drought Severity Index values as compiled and maintained
by the National Climate Data Center (http://cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov/CDO/CDODivisionalSelect.jsp)
According to the Dr. David Stooksbury, the Georgia State Climatologist, drought is a normal
part of Georgia’s climate. In a recent article titled “Historical Droughts In Georgia And Drought
Assessment And Management” Dr. Stooksbury wrote:
Drought is a normal component of the Southeastern US climate system. Many of
Georgia’s native ecosystems depend on drought for health and survival. While
7
drought is a natural component of the climate system, its negative impacts on the
state’s environmental, economic, and social systems can be major. The droughts
of the 1920s accelerated the mass migration of poor farmers from rural Georgia.
Many rural counties reached their peak population in 1920 and have remained
below the 1920 level since then.
The period from the middle 1950s through the middle 1990s was relatively benign
in climate history. During this period droughts were relatively infrequent and of
short duration. However, the 1998-2002 drought was more in line with past
Georgia climate patterns. Since the 1998-2002 drought is more indicative of the
climate record than the 1956-1997 period, planners need to use long-term records
for proper planning.
In other words, recent drought conditions appear unusual only when consulting a short record.
For instance, on the whole, the past several decades prior to 1998 were relatively drought free in
Georgia. Examining a longer term record, however, shows that extended drought conditions are
not unusual, and places recent drought conditions in their proper climate context. Thus, there is
no evidence of any recent behavior that is out of the ordinary within the long-term perspective.
This fact can be further evidenced by examining an even longer-term record of moisture
conditions in Georgia.
Using information contained in tree rings, Dr. Edward Cook and
colleagues were able to reconstruct a summertime PDSI record for central Georgia that extends
back in time more than 1500 years.
That paleoclimate record of moisture indicates that
alternating multi-decadal periods of wet and dry conditions have occurred with regularity during
the past 1500 years, emphasizing the point made by the Georgia State Climatologist, that
droughts are a normal part of the region’s climate system.
8
The reconstructed summer (June, July, August) Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) for central Georgia
from 400 A.D. to 2003 A.D. depicted as a 20-yr running mean. (National Climate Data Center,
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/pdsi.html)
II. Sea Level Rise
O
ver the course of the past 50 years or so, Georgia’s coastline has experienced a relative
sea-level rise of around six inches. This is the same order of magnitude as the one that is
forecast to occur during the next 50 years.
The relative sea level along the Georgia coast has changed due to a combination of the land
slightly sinking and the ocean slightly rising (Aubrey and Emery, 1991; Wöpplemann et al.,
2007). Georgia’s coastal residents have successfully adapted to this change, as the unprecedented
high (and growing) population of coastal Georgia attests. From 1970 to 2000, the population of
Georgia’s 10 coastal counties grew by 62%, increasing from 342,750 residents to 558,350.
Projections for the coming decades, produced by the Center for Quality Growth and Regional
Development at the Georgia Institute of Technology, project that the coastal population will
increase by another 51% reaching a total of 844,161 people by the year 2030.
9
Georgia's Coastal Population
Population
900000
800000
700000
1970
600000
1980
500000
1990
400000
300000
2000
200000
2030
2015
100000
0
1970
1980
1990
2000
2015
2030
Ye ar
Georgia’s coastal population from census figures (blue bars) and from future projections (red bars). (Data
from Georgia Coast 2030, 2006)
According to the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) on climate change published by the
U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the potential sea level rise over the
course of the 21st century lies between 7 and 23 inches, depending of the total amount of global
warming that occurs. The IPCC links a lower sea level rise with lower future warming. The
established warming rate of the earth is 0.18ºC per decade, which is near the low end of the
IPCC range of projected warming for the 21st century of from 0.11 to 0.64ºC per decade.
Therefore, since we observe that the warming rate is tracking near the low end of the IPCC
projections, we should also expect that the rate of sea level rise should track near the low end of
the range given by the IPCC—in this case, a future rise much closer to 7 inches than to 23
inches. Thus, the reasonably expected rate of sea level rise in the coming decades is not much
different from the rate of sea level rise that Georgia’s coastlines have adapted to for more than a
century.
10
4
3
2
1
0
0
Range of sea level rise projections (and their individual components) for the year 2100 made by the IPCC
AR4 for its six primary emissions scenarios.
There are a few eccentric individuals who argue that sea level rise will accelerate precipitously in
the future and raise the level of world oceans to such a degree that they inundates low-lying areas
along the Georgia coast and other low-lying areas around the world, clamoring that the IPCC
was far too conservative in its projections. However, these rather alarmist views are not based
upon the most reliable scientific information, ignoring what our best understanding of how a
warmer world might impact ice loss/gain on Greenland and Antarctica and correspondingly,
global sea level. All of the extant models of the future of Antarctica indicate that a warmer
climate leads to more snowfall there (the majority of which remains for hundreds to thousands of
years because it is so cold), acting to slow the rate of global sea level rise (because the water
remains trapped in ice and snow). New data suggest that the increasing rate of ice loss from
Greenland observed over the past few years has started to decline (Howat et al., 2007). Scenarios
of disastrous rises in sea level are predicated on Antarctica and Greenland losing massive
amounts of snow and ice in a very short period of time—an occurrence with a likelihood of zero.
11
An author of the IPCC AR4 chapter dealing with sea level rise projections, Dr. Richard Alley,
recently testified before the House Committee on Science and Technology concerning the state
of scientific knowledge of accelerating sea level rise and pressure to exaggerate what it known
about it:
This document [the IPCC AR4] works very, very hard to be an assessment of what is
known scientifically and what is well-founded in the refereed literature and when we
come up to that cliff and look over and say we don’t have a foundation right now, we
have to tell you that, and on this particular issue, the trend of acceleration of this flow
with warming we don’t have a good assessed scientific foundation right now.
[emphasis added]
Thus the IPCC projections of future sea level rise, which average only about 15 inches for the
next 100 years, stand as the best projections that can be made based upon our current level of
scientific understanding.1 These projections are far less severe that the alarming projections of
many feet of sea level rise that have been made by a few individuals whose views lie outside of
the scientific consensus.
III. Hurricanes
D
espite the recent increase in hurricane frequency and intensity in the Atlantic Ocean, only
one hurricane has made landfall on Georgia’s coast in the past 50 years and it has been
more than a century since the last major (category 3, 4, or 5) hurricane hit Georgia.
Thanks largely to its geographic positioning; Georgia’s coastline is among the least likely places
for hurricanes to make landfall along the U.S. coast from Brownsville, Texas to the Chesapeake
Bay. Data from the National Hurricane Center indicates that the average time between hurricane
passages (hurricanes passing within 86 miles of the coast) ranges from about 11 years at the
southern portion of coastal Georgia to about 14 years along its northern part. The average time
1
Additional information and a literature survey on potential rates of future sea level rise can be
found in the article “The Role of Greenland in Sea Level Rise: A Summary of the Current
Literature” which is available from the Science and Public Policy Institute
(http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/sppi_reprint_series/the_role_of_greenland_in_sea_level_rise_
a_summary_of_the_current_literature.html)
12
between direct hurricane landfalls is even less. Consider that in the 107 years between 1900 and
2006, only 4 hurricanes made landfall in Georgia (the last being Hurricane David in 1979).
Return period (in years) of a
category 1 hurricane making
landfall at various locations along
the southeast coast. (National
Hurricane Center,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/
english/basics/return.shtml)
But this is not to say that
Georgia is immune from the
impacts of hurricanes and
tropical storms.
Quite the
contrary. Between 1881 and 1898 three strong hurricanes made landfall in Georgia and two of
them rank among the top-10 deadliest hurricanes in U.S. history. On August 27, 1881 a strong
category 2 storm made landfall just south of Savannah, at Ossabaw Island, and killed between
300 and 700 people and on August 27-28, 1893, a category 3 storm – the “Sea Islands
Hurricane” – made landfall just south of Tybee Island, directly to the east of Savannah and killed
up to 2,500 people along the Georgia and South Carolina coasts, ranking it as the 5th deadliest
hurricane ever to strike the United States. And even if the state is not subject to a direct hurricane
landfall, tropical cyclones can wreak havoc. For instance, in 1994 tropical storm Alberto came
ashore along the Florida panhandle, but stalled in its passage over Georgia, dumping 27.61
inches of rain on the town of Americus (21.10 inches of which fell in a 24-hr period setting the
state’s all-time 24-hr rainfall record). The flooding that resulted from the widespread torrential
rains resulted in 33 deaths and $500 million in damages. Just over a year later, the remnants of
Hurricane Opal traversed the state and the associated high winds, heavy rains, and tornadoes
killed 14 people and 50 counties were declared major disaster areas.
13
http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/hurdat/images/1893seaisland.jpg
Thus, despite its rather sheltered shoreline, Georgia is still quite susceptible to devastating
impacts from tropical storms and hurricanes. Therefore, any changes in the frequency, intensity,
or preferred tracks of Atlantic tropical cyclones may be of particular interest to Georgia’s coastal
and inland residents, alike.
Since 1995 there has been an increase in both the frequency and intensity of tropical storms and
hurricanes in the Atlantic basin at large. While some scientists have attempted to link this
increase to anthropogenic global warming, others have pointed out that Atlantic hurricanes
exhibit natural, long-term cycles, and that this latest upswing is simply a return to conditions that
characterized earlier decades in the 20th century.
14
One recent research group has gone even further, and provides evidence that cycles of hurricanes
impacting Georgia can be traced back several centuries. Dana Miller and colleagues recently
published a paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in which they describe
their research efforts in using chemical tracers stored in tree rings collected near Valsota,
Georgia to determine when hurricanes passed nearby.
The Terrible Storm of 1893
http://www.wtoctv.com/Global/category.asp?C=80160
“On August 27, 1893, a ferocious storm was approaching the coast of Georgia. Storm
warnings were up but the storm was much stronger that what could have ever been imagined.
The people of Tybee battened down the hatches and prepared for "Another one" as hurricanes
were a semi common storm during this period. But the storm proved to be too much for many
of the people on the islands that day as winds continued to accelerate to beyond 100 mph then
120 and perhaps gusting even up to 150 mph!
“For those who stayed, their worse fears became reality. As the eye of the storm moved
overhead, the winds suddenly died and a period of tranquility existed on the island. The
residents being "Storm-wise" knew that the winds would hit again and at the same force
except from the opposite direction very shortly. They also knew of a terrible storm surge that
was now just moments away. This would be an awful wall of water like a 20 foot tide
crashing onshore in less than 30 minutes with waves of 20-25 feet on top of it! The ferocious
winds earlier had already greatly weakened their homes; they knew there was not much
chance of surviving in them. Their only chance for survival would be to climb the tallest trees
and tie themselves in and hope and pray that they would be above the water and not be blown
away. They eye of the storm went right over Tybee and into South Carolina bringing in that
expected storm surge and it inundated all land east of the Wilmington river. When it was all
over, more than 2,000 persons died in that storm from Savannah northward to Charleston,
many washed out to sea.”
The authors explain how the isotopic make-up of tropical cyclone precipitation differs from that
of other types of precipitation that falls at Valdosta. This chemical marker of the precipitation is
stored in the annual growth rings of longleaf pine trees growing in the region and careful analysis
of the chemical make-up of the wood within each ring provides an indication as to whether
tropical cyclone precipitation fell that year in the study location. Using this technique applied to
tree rings records extending back to the late 18th century, the researchers find indications of
15
tropical cyclone passages that tend to occur in clumps, indicating alternations between active and
inactive periods.
Tree ring record of tropical cyclone passages near Valdosta, Georgia, 1770-1990 (from Miller et al., 2006).
Miller’s team writes that the proxy record “shows close agreement with instrumental records that
the 1950 decade was the busiest for hurricane activity in the 20th century. The proxy record
further supports historical records that suggest significant tropical cyclone activity for the
16
southeastern United States between 1865–1880. The isotope proxy detects six storms in the 1870
decade, although only one (1871; the largest 1870 decade anomaly) appears to have made direct
landfall on the Georgia coast. Other decades of apparent activity include the 1840 and 1850
decades, 1800–1820 decades, and 1770s decade. Periods of relative quiescence in Georgia
appear to be the 1781–1805 (except 1793 and 1795) and the 1970 decade.” They go on to
describe ‘‘Great Hurricanes’’ of 1780, 1847, and 1857.
Furthermore, they note that “Over the period 1855–1940, the isotope proxy indicates 22 years
with tropical cyclones, 21 of which are reported in the historical record to have affected the
general study area. For the period 1770–1855, the proxy suggests many more years (25 years)
affected by one (or more) tropical cyclones.” There were 2.9 storms per decade from 1770-1885
but only 2.5 storms per decade from 1855-1940.
There are many lessons from this tropical cyclone reconstruction. First, it is obvious that large
hurricanes have impacted southern Georgia throughout the past 220 years, and some of the
storms were larger than any storm in recent years. But more importantly, the record shows that
some periods are active, others are quiet, and that this has been the case for a long time into the
past (i.e. prior to any large-scale anthropogenic climate influences). This means that there is now
more reason to believe that variations during the 20th century in the frequency and intensity of
Atlantic tropical cyclones are very likely to have a significant natural component to them.
And based upon the statistics from natural variations alone, Georgia is long overdue for a direct
strike from a major hurricane as it is been more than a century since the last one directly struck
the state. And when the next major hurricane does hit Georgia, it will encounter a state whose
population demographics, as evidenced by the large influx of people to the state’s coastal
counties, have changed enormously since the last major storm impact. A direct strike from a
major hurricane (or any hurricane for that matter) will likely lead to significantly more damage
and destruction now that it did in the past. While this gives the impression that storms are
getting worse, in fact, it simply may be that there are a greater number of assets that lie in their
path. New research by a team of researchers led by Dr. Roger Pielke Jr. (2007) sheds some light
on how population changes underlay hurricane damage statistics. Dr. Pielke’s research team
examined the historical damage amounts from tropical cyclones in the United States from 1900
17
to 2005. What they found when they adjusted the reported damage estimates only for inflation
was a trend towards increased amounts of loss, peaking in the years 2004 and 2005, which
include Hurricane Katrina as the record holder for the most costliest storm, causing 81 billion
dollars in damage.
U.S. tropical cyclone damage (in 2005 dollars) when adjusted for inflation, 1900-2005 (from Pielke Jr., et al.,
2007)
However, many changes have occurred in hurricane prone areas since 1900 besides inflation.
These changes include a coastal population that is growing in size as well as wealth. When the
Pielke Jr. team made adjustments considering all three factors, they found no long-term change
in damage amounts. And, in fact, the loss estimates in 2004 and 2005, while high, were not
historically high. The new record holder, for what would have been the most damaging storm in
history had it hit in 2005, was the Great Miami hurricane of 1926, which they estimated would
have caused 157 billion dollars worth of damage. After the Great Miami hurricane and Katrina
(which fell to second place), the remaining top-ten storms (in descending order) occurred in 1900
(Galveston 1), 1915 (Galveston 2), 1992 (Andrew), 1983 (New England), 1944 (unnamed), 1928
(Lake Okeechobee 4), 1960 (Donna/Florida), and 1969 (Camille/Mississippi). There is no
obvious bias towards recent years. In fact, the combination of the 1926 and 1928 hurricanes
18
places the damages in 1926-35 nearly 15% higher than 1996-2005, the last decade Pielke Jr. and
colleagues studied.
U.S. tropical cyclone damage (in 2005 dollars) when adjusted for inflation, population growth and wealth,
1900-2005 (from Pielke Jr., et al., 2007)
This result by the Pielke Jr. team, that there has not been any long-term increase in tropical
cyclone damage in the United States, is consistent with other science concerning the history of
Atlantic hurricanes. One of Dr. Pielke co-authors, Dr. Chris Landsea, from the National
Hurricane Center, has also found no trends in hurricane frequency or intensity when they strike
the U.S. While there has been an increase in the number of strong storms in the past decade,
there were also a similar number of major hurricanes in the 1940s and 1950s, long before such
activity could be attributed to global warming.
As Pielke writes, “The lack of trend in twentieth century hurricane losses is consistent with what
would expect to find given the lack of trends in hurricane frequency or intensity at landfall.”
19
Even in the absence of any long-term trends in hurricane landfalls along the Georgia or the U.S.
coast, or damage to U.S. coastlines when population demographics are taken into account, the
impact from a single storm can be enormous as residents of Georgia know well. The massive
build-up of the coastline has vastly raised the potential damage that a storm can inflict. Recently,
a collection of some of the world’s leading hurricane researchers issued the following statement
that
reflects
the
current
thinking
on
hurricanes
and
their
potential
impact
(http://wind.mit.edu/~emanuel/Hurricane_threat.htm):
As the Atlantic hurricane season gets underway, the possible influence of climate
change on hurricane activity is receiving renewed attention. While the debate on
this issue is of considerable scientific and societal interest and concern, it should
in no event detract from the main hurricane problem facing the United States: the
ever-growing concentration of population and wealth in vulnerable coastal
regions. These demographic trends are setting us up for rapidly increasing human
and economic losses from hurricane disasters, especially in this era of heightened
activity. Scores of scientists and engineers had warned of the threat to New
Orleans long before climate change was seriously considered, and a Katrina-like
storm or worse was (and is) inevitable even in a stable climate.
Rapidly escalating hurricane damage in recent decades owes much to government
policies that serve to subsidize risk. State regulation of insurance is captive to
political pressures that hold down premiums in risky coastal areas at the expense
of higher premiums in less risky places. Federal flood insurance programs
likewise undercharge property owners in vulnerable areas. Federal disaster
policies, while providing obvious humanitarian benefits, also serve to promote
risky behavior in the long run.
We are optimistic that continued research will eventually resolve much of the
current controversy over the effect of climate change on hurricanes. But the more
urgent problem of our lemming-like march to the sea requires immediate and
sustained attention. We call upon leaders of government and industry to undertake
a comprehensive evaluation of building practices, and insurance, land use, and
disaster relief policies that currently serve to promote an ever-increasing
vulnerability to hurricanes.
However, all impacts from tropical cyclones in Georgia are not negative. In fact, precipitation
that originates from tropical systems and that eventually falls over the state of Georgia proves
often to be quite beneficial to the state’s 8 billion dollar/year agriculture industry. The late
summer months is the time during the year when, climatologically, the precipitation deficit is the
greatest and crops and other plants are the most moisture stressed. A passing tropical cyclone
20
often brings much needed precipitation over large portions of the state during these late summer
months. In fact, recent research shows that Georgia, on average, receives almost 20 percent of
its normal September precipitation, and about 9 to12 percent of its total June through November
precipitation from passing tropical systems. And since about three-quarters of Georgia’s field
crops such as corn, wheat, cotton, and soybeans are grown under non-irrigated conditions,
widespread rainfall from a tropical cyclone becomes almost an expected and relied upon late
summer moisture source.
Percentage of June through November precipitation that comes from tropical systems (Knight et al., 2007).
IV. Public Health Impacts
A. Temperature-related Mortality
A
number of studies have shown that during the several decades, the population in major
U.S. cities has grown better adapted, and thus less sensitive, to the effects of excessive
heat events (Davis et al., 2003ab). Each of the bars of the illustration below represents the annual
number of heat-related deaths in 28 major cities across the United States. There should be three
21
bars for each city, representing, from left to right, the decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990. For
nearly all cities, the number of heat-related deaths is declining (the bars are get smaller), and in
many cities in the southeastern United States, there is no bar at all in the 1990s, indicating that
there were no statistically distinguishable heat-related deaths during that decade (the most recent
one studied). In other words, the population of those cities has become nearly completely
adapted to heat waves.
Annual average excess summer mortality due to high temperatures, broken down by decade, for 28 major
cities across the United States. For each city each of the three bars represents the average mortality during
successive decades (left bar 1964-66 + 1973-1979; middle bar 1980-1989, right bar 1990-1998). Bars of
different color indicate a statistically significant difference. No bar at all means that no
temperature/mortality relationship could be found during that decade/city combination (taken from Davis
et al., 2003b).
22
This adaptation is most likely a result of improvements in medical technology, access to airconditioned homes, cars, and offices, increased public awareness of potentially dangerous
weather situations, and proactive responses of municipalities during extreme weather events. A
notable exception to this pattern of declining sensitivity to heat waves is found in Atlanta,
Georgia. In Atlanta, there seems to have been little difference in the mortality rate from extreme
heat events from the 1960s to the 1990s.
The actual reason behind this anomalous behavior is presently unclear. However, it most likely
represents some rather unique situation that is local to the city of Atlanta. As other surrounding
cities all have become better adapted to the occurrence of high temperature events, even in light
of the rising temperature which accompany landscape changes associated with urban and
suburban growth. Atlanta’s lack of adaptation perhaps suggests that more proactive measures
need to be developed in the Atlanta metropolitan area—improved watch/warning systems, more
available cooling centers, etc.—to make the public better aware of the threats that can
accompany heat waves. As the period of record in the Davis et al. (2003b) study ended in 1998,
it is possible that in the intervening years, Atlanta has improved its measures to respond to high
temperature events, if not, perhaps this situation presents an opportunity for steps that can readily
be taken to improve the city’s response to heat waves, to better prepare themselves not only for
any future climate warming, but simply for the extremes of summertime temperatures that are
natural to the climate of Georgia.
In general, the overall pattern of the distribution of heat-related mortality shows in cities across
the United States indicates that in locations where extremely high temperatures are more
commonplace, such as along the southern tier states, the prevalence of heat-related mortality is
much lower than in the regions of the country where extremely high temperatures are somewhat
rarer (e.g. the northeastern U.S.). This provides another demonstration that populations adapt to
their prevailing climate conditions. If temperatures warm in the future and excessive heat events
become more common, there is every reason to expect that adaptations will take place to lessen
their impact on the general population.
23
In a subsequent study, Davis et al. (2004) focused not just on summertime heat/mortality
relationships, but looked across all months of the year. Davis et al. (2004) found that, in Atlanta,
like in most cities across the United States, higher temperatures in the months of July and August
were often associated with increased mortality, but that in the most other months, the association
ran in the opposite direction, that is, cooler temperatures were associated with mortality
increases.
Relationship between monthly average temperature and monthly average
mortality for Atlanta, Georgia
Relationship between average monthly temperature and total monthly mortality in Atlanta. Positive bars
mean high temperatures lead to higher mortality, while negative bars mean lower temperatures lead to high
mortality. Only the bars shaded in black represent statistically significant relationships (from Davis et al.,
2004).
The figure above (taken from Davis et al., 2004) illustrates this pattern of
temperature/mortality relationships for Atlanta. Negative bars indicate a negative relationship
between temperature and mortality, that is, the colder it is, the more people die and vice versa
for warmer than average conditions (i.e., the warmer it is, the fewer people die). Solid bars
mean the relationship is statistically significant. Positive bar indicate positive relationships
between temperature and mortality, that is more people die when it is hotter than normal, and
few die when it is below normal. For the most part, Atlanta exhibits more negative bars than
positive ones, with the cold season months showing negative relationships and a couple
months in summer showing weak positive relationships. Taken together, this indicates that if
the future was marked by a warming climate, especially one in which winters warmed a
24
greater degree than summers (in character, matching the pattern of warming that has been
observed in the Northern Hemisphere for the past 50 years or so), that this would result in
fewer temperature-related deaths in Atlanta and probably throughout Georgia.
All told, however, the total annual number of direct weather-related deaths, whether as a result
of cold or warm conditions, is quite small compared to the annual overall mortality. For
instance, in general, in the United States, the annual mortality rate is a bit less than 1% per
year, meaning that about 8,000 to 9,000 people die each year out of every million persons. In
Atlanta, the net effect of the weather in a typical year is about 1,000 times less, or fewer than
±10 deaths per million people. So, despite proclamations to the contrary, the weather and
climate have only an exceedingly small impact on overall mortality when the population at
large is considered. This is true now and will remain true into the future, no matter how the
climate evolves.
B. “Tropical” Disease
T
ropical diseases such as malaria and dengue fever have been erroneously predicted to
spread due to global warming. In fact, they are related less to climate than to living
conditions. These diseases are best controlled by direct application of sound, known public
health policies.
The two tropical diseases most commonly cited as spreading as a result of global warming,
malaria and dengue fever, are not in fact “tropical” at all and thus are not as closely linked to
climate as many people suggest. For example, malaria epidemics occurred as far north as
Archangel, Russia, in the 1920s, and in the Netherlands. Malaria was common in most of the
United States prior to the 1950s (Reiter, 1996). In fact, in the late 1800s, a period when it was
demonstrably colder in the United States than it is today, malaria was endemic in most of the
25
Malaria Distribution in the United States
Shaded regions indicate locations where malaria was endemic in the United States (from Zucker et al., 1996).
United States east of the Rocky Mountains—a region stretching from the Gulf Coast all the way
up into Northern Minnesota—including the southern half of Georgia. In 1878, about 100,000
Americans were infected with malaria; about one-quarter of them died. By 1912, malaria was
already being brought under control, yet persisted in the southeastern United States well into the
1940s. In fact, in 1946 the Congress created the Communicable Disease Center (the forerunner
to the current U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) for the purpose of eradicating
malaria from the regions of the U.S. where it continued to persist. The CDC was located in
Atlanta, Georgia primarily because this region was the primary one which was still affected by
the disease. By the mid-to-late 1950s, the Center had achieved its goal and malaria was
effectively eradicated from the United States. This occurred not because of climate change, but
because of technological and medical advances. Better anti-malaria drugs, air-conditioning, the
use of screen doors and windows, and the elimination of urban overpopulation brought about by
the development of suburbs and automobile commuting were largely responsible for the decline
in malaria (Reiter, 1996; Reiter, 2001). Today, the mosquitoes that spread malaria are still widely
present in the Unites States, but the transmission cycle has been disrupted and the pathogen
leading to the disease is absent. Climate change is not involved.
26
Mortality rate in the United States from malaria (deaths per 100,000) from 1900 to 1949, when it was
effectively eradicated from the country. (Figure from
http://www.healthsentinel.com/graphs.php?id=4&event=graphcats_print_list_item)
The effect of technology is also clear from statistics on dengue fever outbreaks, another
mosquito-borne disease. In 1995, a dengue pandemic hit the Caribbean and Mexico. More than
2,000 cases were reported in the Mexican border town of Reynosa. But in the town of Hidalgo,
Texas, located just across the river, there were only seven reported cases of the disease (Reiter,
1996). This is just not an isolated example, for data collected over the past several decades has
shown a similarly large disparity between the high number of cases of the disease in northern
Mexico and the rare occurrences in the southwestern United States (Reiter, 2001). There is
virtually no difference in climate between these two locations, but a world of difference in
infrastructure, wealth, and technology—city layout, population density, building structure,
window screens, air-conditioning and personal behavior are all factors that play a large role in
the transmission rates (Reiter, 2001).
27
Number of cases of Dengue Fever at the Texas/Mexico border from 1980 to 1999. During these 20 years, there
were 64 cases reported in all of Texas, while there were nearly 1,000 times that amount in the bordering states
of Mexico. (figure from Reiter, 2001).
V. Impacts of climate-mitigation measures in Georgia
GLobally, in 2003, humankind emitted 25,780 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (mmtCO2:
EIA, 2007a), of which Georgia accounted for 168 mmtCO2, or only 0.65% (EIA, 2007b). This
proportion of manmade CO2 emissions from Georgia will decrease over the 21st century as the
rapid demand for power in developing countries such as China and India outpaces the growth of
Georgia’s CO2 emissions (EIA, 2007b).
During the past 5 years, global emissions of CO2 from human activity have increased at an
average rate of 3.5%/yr (EIA, 2007a), meaning that the annual increase of anthropogenic global
CO2 emissions is more than 5 times greater than Georgia’s total emissions. This means that even
a complete cessation of all CO2 emissions in Georgia will be undetectable globally, and would
be entirely subsumed by rising global emissions in just less than 2 month’s time. A fortiori,
regulations prescribing a reduction, rather than a complete cessation, of Georgia’s CO2 emissions
will have no effect on global climate.
Wigley (1998) examined the climate impact of adherence to the emissions controls agreed under
the Kyoto Protocol by participating nations, and found that, if all developed countries meet their
commitments in 2010 and maintain them through 2100, with a mid-range sensitivity of surface
28
temperature to changes in CO2, the amount of warming “saved” by the Kyoto Protocol would be
0.07°C by 2050 and 0.15°C by 2100. The global sea level rise “saved” would be 2.6 cm, or one
inch. A complete cessation of CO2 emissions in Georgia – a worse than stone-age existence –
would represent only a tiny fraction of the worldwide reductions assumed in Dr. Wigley’s global
analysis, so the reductions impact on future trends in global temperature and sea level would be
only a minuscule fraction of the negligible effects calculated by Dr. Wigley.
We now apply Dr. Wigley’s results to CO2 emissions in Georgia, assuming that the ratio of U.S.
CO2 emissions to those of the developed countries which have agreed to limits under the Kyoto
Protocol remains constant at 39% (25% of global emissions) throughout the 21st century. We
also assume that developing countries such as China and India continue to emit at an increasing
rate. Consequently, the annual proportion of global CO2 emissions contributed by human activity
in the United States will decline. Finally, we assume that the proportion of total U.S. CO2
emissions in Georgia – now 2.9% – remains constant throughout the 21st century. With these
assumptions, we generate the following table derived from Wigley’s (1998) mid-range emissions
scenario (which itself is based upon the IPCC’s scenario “IS92a”):
Table 1
Projected annual CO2 emissions (mmtCO2)
U.S.
Global
Developed
emissions:
countries:
Wigley, 1998
Wigley, 1998
2000
26,609
14,934
5,795
168
2025
41,276
18,308
7,103
206
2050
50,809
18,308
7,103
206
2100
75,376
21,534
8,355
242
Year
(39% of
Georgia
developed
(2.9% of U.S.)
countries)
Note: Developed countries’ emissions, according to Wigley’s assumptions, do not change
between 2025 and 2050: neither does total U.S or Georgia emissions.
29
In Table 2, we compare the total CO2 emissions saving that would result if Georgia’s CO2
emissions were completely halted by 2025 with the emissions savings assumed by Wigley
(1998) if all nations met their Kyoto commitments by 2010, and then held their emissions
constant throughout the rest of the century. This scenario is “Kyoto Const.”
Table 2
Projected annual CO2 emissions savings (mmtCO2)
Year
Georgia
Kyoto Const.
2000
0
0
2025
206
4,697
2050
206
4,697
2100
242
7,924
Table 3 shows the proportion of the total emissions reductions in Wigley’s (1998) case that
would be contributed by a complete halt of all Georgia’s CO2 emissions (calculated as column 2
in Table 2 divided by column 3 in Table 2).
Table 3
Georgia’s percentage of emissions savings
Year
Georgia
2000
0.0%
2025
4.4%
2050
4.4%
2100
3.1%
Using the percentages in Table 3, and assuming that temperature change scales in proportion to
CO2 emissions, we calculate the global temperature savings that will result from the complete
cessation of anthropogenic CO2 emissions in Georgia:
30
Table 4
Projected global temperature savings (ºC)
Year Kyoto Const
Georgia
2000
0
0
2025
0.03
0.001
2050
0.07
0.003
2100
0.15
0.005
Accordingly, a cessation of all of Georgia’s CO2 emissions would result in a climaticallyirrelevant global temperature reduction by the year 2100 of no more than five thousandths of
a degree Celsius. Results for sea-level rise are also negligible:
Table 5
Projected global sea-level rise savings (cm)
Year Kyoto Const
Georgia
2000
0
0
2025
0.2
0.01
2050
0.9
0.04
2100
2.6
0.08
A complete cessation of all anthropogenic emissions from Georgia will result in a global sealevel rise savings by the year 2100 of an estimated 0.08 cm, or about three hundredths of an
inch. Again, this value is climatically irrelevant.
Even if the entire United States were to close down its economy completely and revert to the
Stone Age, without even the ability to light fires, the growth in emissions from China and
India would replace our entire emissions in little more than a decade. In this context, any cuts
in emissions from Georgia would be extravagantly pointless.
31
VI. Costs of Federal Legislation
What are the potential costs to Georgia of enactment of recent legislation designed to cap
greenhouse gas emissions? The analysis was completed by the Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC), under contract from the American Council for Capital
Formation and the National Association of Manufacturers (ACCF and NAM), using the National
Energy Modeling System (NEMS); the same model employed by the US Energy Information
Agency. For additional information, see map here:
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/economic-impact/index.php
32
VII. Georgia Scientists Reject UN’s Global Warming Hypothesis
At least 3,709 Georgia scientists have petitioned the US government that the UN’s human caused
global warming hypothesis is “without scientific validity and that government action on the basis
of this hypothesis would unnecessarily and counterproductively damage both human prosperity
and the natural environment of the Earth.”
They are joined by over 31,072 Americans with university degrees in science – including 9,021
PhDs.
The petition and entire list of US signers can be found here:
http://www.petitionproject.org/index.html
Names of the Georgia scientists who signed the petition:
liam G. Adair Jr., William P. Adams, L. A. Adkins, Frank Jerrel Akin, PhD, Robert H. Allgood,
Mike E. Alligood, Bruce Martin Anderson Jr., Byron J. Arceneaux, Robert Arnold Jr., DVM,
Doyle Allen Ashley, PhD, R. Lee Aston Esq, PhD, James Atchison, Keith H. Aufderheide, PhD,
C. Mark. Aulick, PhD, Paul E. Austin, Dany Ayseur, Charles L. Bachman, Robert Leroy Bailey,
PhD, James A. Bain, PhD, George C. Baird, Dana L. Baites, Bill Barks, Larry K. Barnard, Ralph
M. Barnes, Gary Bartley, Frank A. Bastidas, Thomas L. Batke, George L. Batten, PhD, Joseph E.
Baughman, PhD, Joseph H. Baum, PhD, William Pearson Bebbington, PhD, Gordon Edward
Becker, PhD, Wilbur E. Becker, Terrence M. Bedell, James E. Bell, Robert Bell, William A.
Bellisle, Steve J. Bennet, Denicke Bennor, Jack C. Bentley, James M. Berge, Gary C. Berliner,
Christopher K. Bern, Ray A. Bernard, PhD, Vicky L. Bevilacqua, PhD, Don Black, M. Donald
Blue, PhD, Barry Bohannon, J. R. Bone, Jim Bone, Charles D. Booth, Arthur S. Booth Jr., MD,
Edward M. Boothe, Richard E. Boozer, Sorin M. Bota, James Ellis Box, PhD, Harry R. Boyd,
Paul R. Bradley, George B. Bradshaw, Edward L. Bragg Sr., Elizabeth Braham, Greg R.
Brandon, J. Allen Brent, PhD, William M. Bretherton Jr., Robert N. Brey, PhD, F. S. Broerman,
Jerome Bromkowski, MD, Paul C. Broun, MD, Robert E. Brown, Bill D. Browning, William
Bruenner, Paul J. Bruner, Sibley Bryan, Richard W. Bunnell, James Lee Butler, PhD, Sabrina R.
33
Calhoun, Ronnie Wayne Camp, Thomas M. Campbell, James Cecil Cantrell, PhD, Patricia D.
Carden, PhD, Laura H. Carreira, PhD, Peter J. Carrillo, MD, Wendell W. Carter, Marshall F.
Cartledge, Robert E. Carver, PhD, Billy R. Catherwood, Michael Cavanaugh, Matilde N.
Chaille, MD, Kevin L. Champion, John Champion, Jack H. Chandler Jr., Chung-Jan Chang,
PhD, Chung Jan Chang, PhD, Edmund L. Chapman Jr., Chellu S. Chetty, PhD, Ken Chiavone,
Raghaven M. Chidambaram, MD, George Andrew Christenberry, PhD, Alfred E. Ciarlone, PhD,
James A. Claffey, PhD, James William Clark, Mark A. Clements, PhD, Arthur E. Cocco, PhD,
Harland E. Cofer, PhD, Charles Erwin Cohn, PhD, Gene Louis Colborn, PhD, James C. Coleman
Jr., Francis E. Coles, Frank E. Coles, Platon Jack Collipp, MD, P. J. Collipp, MD, Clair Ivan
Colvin, PhD, Leon L. Combs, PhD, Henry P. Conn, David Constans, James H. Cook, Allen
Costoff, PhD, Marion Cotton, PhD, R. E. Courtney, Jack D. Cox, Joe B. Cox, John A. Cramer,
PhD, Howard Ross Cramer, PhD, Valerie Voss Crenshaw, Robert A. Cuneo, Thomas Curin,
PhD, Alan G. Czarkowski, Geoffrey Z. Damewood, Ernest F. Daniel, MD, Anne F. Daniels,
Charlie E. Daniels, Jagdish C. Das, Shelley C. Davis, PhD, James F. Dawe, DVM, Harry F.
Dawson, Reuben Alexander Day, PhD, Juan C. De Cardenas, Richard E. Dedels, Johnny T.
Deen, PhD, Robert E. Deloach Jr., G. E. Alan Dever, PhD, G. E. Dever, PhD, David Walter
Dibb, PhD, John I. Dickinson, MD, John W. Diebold, John Dieterman, Herbert V. Dietrich Jr.,
MD, Charles J. Dixon, Hugh F. Dobbins, Harry Donald Dobbs, PhD, Thomas P. Dodson, Clive
Wellington Donoho Jr., PhD, John Dorsey, PhD, Douglas P. Dozier, MD, Thomas E. Driver,
Dennis P. Drobny, Earl E. Duckett, Robert L. Dumond, R. E. Dunnells, John W. Duren, James
R. Eason, Donald D. Ecker, Teresa Ecker, Stephen W. Edmondson, MD, Marvin E. Edwards Jr.,
Gary L. Elliott, Gary M. Ellis, Frampton Ellis, I. Nolan Etters, PhD, W. E. Evans, Martin
Edward Everhard, PhD, H. Facey, Joan H. Facey, Wayne Reynolds Faircloth, PhD, Miguel A.
Faria Jr., MD, Charles Farley, Christopher J. Farnie, Thomas Farrior, Royal T. Farrow, Michael
A. Faten, Mike D. Faulkenberry, John C. Feeley, PhD, Lorie M. Felton, Brent Feske, PhD,
Robert Henry Fetner, PhD, Burl M. Finkelstein, PhD, Joanna Finkelstein, William R. Fisher,
MD, Reed Edward Fisher, J. Ed Fitzgerald, PhD, Carl W. Flammer, Eugene L. Fleeman, K.
Fleming, PhD, G. Craig Flowers, PhD, Robert E. Folker, Walter R. Fortner, Gary D. Fowler Jr.,
Thomas G. Frangos, PhD, Dean R. Frey, Ralph Fudge, Thomas R. Gagnier, A. Gahr, PhD,
Tinsley Powell Gaines, Richard E. Galpin, Gary John Gasche, PhD, George S. Georgalis,
Reinhold A. Gerbsch, PhD, Istvan B. Gereben, Lawrence C. Gerow, Georgina Gipson, Charles
34
G. Glenn, Clyde J. Gober, Maria Nelly Golarz de Bourne, PhD, Eugene P. Goldberg, PhD, Earl
S. Golightly, Thomas L. Gooch, Monty P. Goolsby, Walter Waverly Graham, PhD, John B.
Gratzek, PhD, John B. Gratzek, PhD, James S. Gray, PhD, Robert M. Gray, Clayton Houstoun
Griffin, Edward M. Grigsby, Ramon S. Grillo, PhD, William F. Grosser, Erling JR Grovenstein
Jr., PhD, Krishan G. Gupta, MD, Robert E. Hails, Kent W. Hamlin, John R. Haponski, Clyde D.
Hardin, James Lombard Harding, PhD, Cliff Hare, Kenneth E. Harper, MD, Joseph Belknap
Harris, PhD, Raymond K. Hart, PhD, Lynn J. Harter, Roger Conant Hatch, Yuichi B. Hattori,
Harry T. Haugen, MD, J. Hauger, PhD, William D. Haynes, Thomas D. Hazzard, Charles
Jackson Hearn, PhD, Norman L. Heberer, Kenneth F. Hedden, PhD, Walter A. Hedzik, Jeffrey J.
Henniger, Gustav J. Henrich, John M. Hester Jr., Craig U. Heydon, Donald G. Hicks, PhD, Terry
K. Hicks, Harold Eugene Hicks, Thomas J. Hilderbrand, Kendall W. Hill, Roland W. Hinnels,
Robert Francis Hochman, PhD, Dewey H. Hodges, PhD, Kirk Hoefler, Ross Hoffman, W.
Hogge, Cornelia Ann Hollingsworth, PhD, Leonard Rudolph Howell Jr., PhD, Chenyi J. Hu,
Richard L. Hubbell, James R. Hudson, Brad Huffines, John Hughes, William C. Humphries,
Hugh F. Hunter, Richard Hurd Jr., MD, William John Husa Jr., PhD, Al J. Hutko, R. D. Ice,
PhD, Walter Herndon Inge, PhD, Donald A. Irwin, James W. Ivey, Thomas W. Jackson, MD,
Dabney C. Jackson, David I. Jacob, Stephen B. Jaffe, Vidyasagar Jagadam, Kenneth S. Jago, Jiri
Janata, PhD, Robert H. Jarman, MD, Stanley J. Jaworski, Roger D. Jenkins, MD, Wayne Henry
Jens, PhD, David R. Jernigan, Robert H. Johnson, PhD, Ben S. Johnson, James P. Jollay, Alan
Richard Jones, PhD, Dick L. Jones, James K. Jones, MD, E. C. Jones, Miroslawa Josowicz, PhD,
Paul F. Jurgensen, MD, Gerald L. Kaes, Donald Kaley, Judith A. Kapp, PhD, M. Katagiri, Ray
C. Keause, Raymond J. Keeler, William L. Kell Jr., Craig Kellogg, PhD, Gerald D. Kennett,
Warren W. Kent, DVM, Joyce E. Kephart, Boris M. Khudenko, PhD, Cengiz Kicic, Cengiz M.
Kilic, C. Louis Kingsbaker Jr., R. C. Kinzie, Adrian F. Kirk, Steven Knittel, PhD, Mark A.
Knoderer, Juha P. Kokko, PhD, Jenny E. Kopp, Tsu-Kung Ku, Frederick Read Kuc, PhD, Steven
B. Kushnick, W. Jack Lackey, PhD, Alexander O. Lacsamana, Myron D. Lair, Trevor G.
Lamond, PhD, Willis E. Lanier, Paul H. Laughlin, MD, Leo R. Lavinka, Brian K. Lawrence,
Gerald W. Lawson, John C. Leffingwell, PhD, John P. Leffler, Philip I. Levine, Edward L.
Lewis, MD, Kermit L. Likes, Dennis Liotta, PhD, Robert L. Little, PhD, Fred Liu, PhD, Robert
Gustav Loewy, PhD, Robert Loffredo, PhD, Stanley Jerome Lokken, PhD, William L.
Lomerson, PhD, Earl Ellsworth Long, Larry Lortscher, Jerry Loupee, G. A. Lowerts, PhD, John
35
Lauren Lundberg, PhD, Sarah R. Mack, Joseph Edward MacMillan, PhD, Patrick K. Macy,
David A. Madden, James M. Maddry, L. T. Mahaffey, John B. Malcolm, Philip L. Manning,
Dale Manos, David E. Marcinko, PhD, Natale A. Marini, John R. Martinec, Arlene R. Martone,
MD, Henry Mabbett Mathews, PhD, Walter K. Mathews, PhD, Mike Matis, Curry J. May,
Georges S. McCall II, Neil Justin McCarthy, PhD, Morley Gordon McCartney, PhD, James R.
McCord III, PhD, Burl E. McCosh Jr., Sean McCue, MD, Malcolm W. McDonald, PhD, Charles
W. McDowell, MD, Larry F. McEver, Ray McKemie, D. K. Mclain, PhD, Archibald A.
McNeill, MD, Larry G. McRae, PhD, David Scott McVey, PhD, Thomas R. McWhorter,
Andrew J. Medlin Jr., Jacob I. Melnik, Ronald E. Menze, Walter G. Merritt, PhD, Allen C.
Merritt, PhD, Karne Mertins, Glenn A. Middleton, Miran Milkovic, PhD, Jean P. Millen, W.
Jack Miller, PhD, R. W. Milling, PhD, Carey R. Mitchell, Brett A. Mitchell, G. C. Mitchell Jr.,
Carl Douglas Monk, PhD, W. Dupree Moore, Iraj Moradinia, PhD, Thomas D. Moreland,
Stephen T. Moreland, Robert G. Morley, PhD, Seaborn T. Moss, MD, Don L. Mueller, Juan A.
Mujica, MD, Karl W. Myers, George Starr Nichols, PhD, Jonathan H. Nielsen, Frec C. Nienaber,
Fred C. Nienaber, Ray A. Nixon, Prince M. Niyyar, Stephen R. Noe, MD, Susan J. Norwood,
Sidney L. Norwood, James Alan Novitsky, PhD, Wells E. Nutt, Stanley Miles Ohlberg, PhD,
Philip D. Olivier, PhD, William L. Otwell, Frank B. Oudkirk, William E. Owen, Jerry Owen,
Brent W. Owens, Joseph L. Owens, MD, J. Pace, PhD, Ganesh P. Pandya, MD, Les Parker,
James Parks, John H. Paterson, William R. Patrick, Daniel D. Payne, Franklin E. Payne, MD,
William F. Payne, Terry Peak, Ira Wilson Pence Jr., PhD, Mel E. Pence, DVM, Edgar E. Perrey,
Parker H. Petit, Peter J. Petrecca, David W. Petty, Calvin Phillips, John R. Pickett, PhD, Arthur
John Pignocco, PhD, Gus Plagianis, Robert V. Plehn, MD, Gayther Lynn Plummer, PhD, Robert
A. Pollard Jr., Joseph W. Porter, Jerry V. Post, Cordell El Prater, Russell Pressey, PhD, Milton
E. Purvis, Michael Pustilnik, PhD, Robert E. Rader, Bradford J. Raffensperger, Michael R.
Rakestraw, MD, Periasamy Ramalingam, PhD, Stephen C. Raper, Oscar Rayneri, Earnest H.
Reade Jr., James L. Rhoades, PhD, Robert A. Rhodes, PhD, Peter Rice, Terrence L. Rich, Allan
A. Rinzel, Paul W. Risbin, Ken E. Roach, Dirk B. Robertson, PhD, John S. Robertson, PhD,
David D. Robertson, PhD, Douglas W. Robertson, David G. Robinson, PhD, Wilbur R.
Robinson, Willie S. Rockward, PhD, Gwenda Rogers, Stephen A. Roos Jr., W. Jeffrey Row,
William J. Rowe, George F. Ruehling, Michael K. Rulison, PhD, James H. Rust, PhD, James
Ryan, Marcus Sack, Thomas F. Saffold, George Sambataro, B. Samples, Ronald E. Samples,
36
Gary L. Sanford, PhD, Deborah K. Sasser, PhD, Herbert C. Saunders, William E. Sawyer, Henry
Frederick Schaefe, PhD, James R. Schafner, Thomas J. Schermerhorn, PhD, William Schierholz,
Robert C. Schlant, Michael Charles Schneider, PhD, Cecil W. Schneider, Terril J. Schneider,
Barry P. Schrader, Randy C. Schultz, Robert John Schwartz, PhD, Florian Schwarzkopf, PhD,
David Frederick Scott, PhD, Gerald E. Seaburn, PhD, Oro C. Seevers, Robert Seitz, PhD,
Morton O. Seltzer, Premchard T. Shah, W. A. Sheasin, MD, Andrew J. Shelton, Louis C.
Sheppard, PhD, Chung-Shin Shi, PhD, William G. Shira, Joseph John Shonka, PhD, Ronald W.
Shonkwiler, PhD, John V. Shutze, PhD, Valery Shver, Steven W. Siegan, MD, Samia M. Siha,
PhD, John A. Slaats, Herbert M. Slatton, Earl Ray Sluder, PhD, Morris Wade Smith, PhD, Ralph
Edward Smith, PhD, Joel P. Smith Jr., MD, Tom Smoot, PhD, Charles C. Somers Jr., Richard C.
Southerland, Jon A. Spaller PG, Guy K. Spicer, Firth Spiegel, MD, Charles Hugh Stammer,
PhD, Carey T. Stark, Ralph Steger, Fredric Marry Steinberg, MD, John Edward Steinhaus, PhD,
Robert J. Stewart, Michael J. Stieferman, Richard C. Stjohn, Geo L. Strobel, PhD*, Bill Styer,
Thomas G. Swanson, Eric Swett, Darrell G. Tangman, Robert Techo, PhD, Robert L. Terpening,
Robert A. Theobald, Peter R. Thomas, M. D. Thompson, PhD, William Oxley Thompson, PhD,
L. H. Thomson, Francis N. Thorne, PhD, Aloysius Thornton, PhD, Wilfred E. Tinney, Mark
Tribby, PhD, Nancy Turner, R. W. Turner, Richard Suneson Tuttle, PhD, Noble Ransom
Usherwood, PhD, Ahmet Uzer, PhD, James H. Venable, MD, Matthew J. Verbiscer, Jim Vess,
Herbert Max Vines, PhD, Terry L. Viness, John Vogel USAF Ret, Susan Voss, PhD, Carroll E.
Voss, Donald L. Voss, William C. Walker, PhD, Russell Wagner Walker, PhD, Peter Walker,
Gregory C. Walter, MD, Daniel F. Ward, MD, Fred F. Warden, Raymond Warren, Roland F.
Wear, MD, Charles Edward Weaver, PhD, Warren M. Weber, MD, Robert M. Webster, MD,
Donald C. Wells, Richard Whalen, PhD, Mike D. Whang, PhD, James Q. Whitaker, MD, Arlon
Widder, Richard L. Wilks, Paul T. Willhite, Dansy Williams, Jeffrey P. Wilson, PhD, Carlos A.
Wilson, Herbert Lynn Windom, PhD, Ward O. Winer, PhD, Alan R. Winn, Robert H. Wise Jr.,
Robert J. Witsell, Monte Wolf, PhD, Edward Wolf, Monte W. Wolfe, PhD, Scott Wood, James
H. Wood, MD, Gerald Bruce Woolsey, PhD, Jerry K. Wright, PhD, Neill S. Wyche, Hwa-Ming
Yang, PhD, Raymond H. Young, PhD, Andrew T. Zimmerman, Clarence Zimmerman, Glenn A.
Zittrauer, Marvin H. Zoerb, D. Zuidema, PhD
37
VIII. Additional Reading
Kentucky Climate Profile
http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/originals/kentucky_climate_profile.html
Hurricane Threat to Florida: Climate Change or Demographics?
http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/originals/hurricanethreat.html
Observed Climate Change in S. Carolina
http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/originals/south_carolina_negligible_climate_effect.html
Observed Climate Change in Texas
http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/originals/texas_climate_observation.html
IX. References
Aubrey, David G, and K.O. Emery, 1991. Sea Levels, Land Levels, and Tide Gauges, SpringerVerlag, New York, NY, 237pp.
Blake, E.S., et al., 2007. The deadliest, costliest, and most intense United States tropical cyclones
from 1851 to 2006 (and other frequently requested hurricane facts). NOAA Technical
Memorandum NWS TPC-5, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/NWS-TPC-5.pdf
Cook, E.R., Woodhouse, C.A., Eakin, C.M., Meko, D.M., and Stahle, D.W.. 2004. Long-Term
Aridity Changes in the Western United States. Science, 306, 1015-1018.
Cook, E.R., Meko, D.M., Stahle, D.W. and Cleaveland, M.K. 1999. Drought reconstructions for
the continental United States. Journal of Climate, 12, 1145-1162.
Davis, R.E., et al., 2003a. Decadal changes in summer mortality in the U. S. cities. International
Journal of Biometeorology, 47, 166-175.
38
Davis, R.E., et al., 2003b. Changing heat-related mortality in the United States. Environmental
Health Perspectives, 111, 1712-1718.
Davis, R.E., et al., 2004. Seasonality of climate-human mortality relationships in US cities and
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