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Framework Contract No. EEA/IEA/09/003 Support for SOER 2010 Part A – Global long-term environmental trends and ecosystem shifts and their (potential) impacts on human society Inventory of evidence in support of the forward-looking component of the European State of the Environment and Outlook Report Final Report Note 2: Integration Submitted by: The SEI- Milieu Consortium 6 August 2010 _______________________________________________________________________________________ Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................... iii 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Context for Megatrend Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 2 1.2 Overview of the structure of the report ............................................................................................................ 2 2. Conceptual framework and research methodology .................................................................... 5 3. Overview of Global Megatrends ........................................................................................................ 9 3.1 4. STEEP-based megatrends .................................................................................................................................. 9 inter-relationships OF the Global Megatrends ............................................................................... 15 4.1 Rationalisation or Consistency check............................................................................................................... 15 4.2 Interlinkages among the megatrends .............................................................................................................. 15 5. Analysis of effects of the megatrends ............................................................................................. 20 5.1 Scoring approach ............................................................................................................................................. 20 5.2 Discussion of prioritised megatrends .............................................................................................................. 23 6. Overview of implications for Europe ................................................................................................ 24 6.1 Climate Change ................................................................................................................................................ 24 6.2 Pollution and health......................................................................................................................................... 25 6.3 Biodiversity and nature .................................................................................................................................... 26 6.4 Resources and waste ....................................................................................................................................... 28 7. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................... 32 7.1 Ranking the megatrends .................................................................................................................................. 32 7.2 Direct and indirect effects on Europe’s environment ..................................................................................... 32 7.3 Broader consequences: the issue of environmental security .......................................................................... 33 7.4 Technology ....................................................................................................................................................... 34 7.5 Governance ...................................................................................................................................................... 34 7.6 Final reflections................................................................................................................................................ 35 8. Annex I – Detailed summaries of the megatrends ........................................................................ 36 8.1 S1: Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration ............................................................... 37 i 8.2 S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges ........................................................................ 46 S3: Global Urbanisation ................................................................................................................................................ 52 8.3 S4: The Emerging Global Middle-income Consumer Class .............................................................................. 61 8.4 S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world ...................................... 68 8.5 S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics .............................................. 74 8.6 T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles ............................................................ 79 8.7 T2: The rise of the nano‐, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies ................................................... 86 8.8 EC1: Continued economic growth ................................................................................................................... 93 8.9 EC2: Intensified competition for resources ................................................................................................... 101 8.10 EC3: Power shifts – from a uni-polar to multi-polar world ............................................................................ 110 8.11 EnV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources ............................................................................................... 115 8.12 EnV2: INCREASINGLY UNSUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION LOAD .............................................. 127 8.13 Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change ......................................................................... 143 9. Annex II: Thematic Impact Summaries .......................................................................................... 161 9.1 Climate Change .............................................................................................................................................. 161 9.2 Pollution and Health ...................................................................................................................................... 169 9.3 Biodiversity .................................................................................................................................................... 177 9.4 Natural Resource Use .................................................................................................................................... 185 10. Annex III: Detailed Driver’s analysis ................................................................................................ 193 10.1 Identifying Common Drivers among Megatrends ......................................................................................... 193 10.2 Worked example ............................................................................................................................................ 195 References .................................................................................................................................................................. 208 ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The megatrends shaping the world’s future will affect the global environment, and they will ultimately have both direct and indirect effects for Europe. However, those effects may not necessarily arise directly from the drivers and megatrends, but also indirectly as the effects of megatrends themselves can act as drivers of further change. For these reasons, an analysis of these megatrends, their drivers and their effects is a crucial step in terms of considering future concerns for Europe’s environment and what policy action might be needed. This is the focus of this report. The research involved a four-step process which sought to lay out the logic of the way in which the sets of drivers among the megatrends were analysed and then synthesised to draw together insights into the interaction between the megatrends in terms of their impacts for Europe’s environment. The starting point was the bringing together of separate reports undertaken for social, technological, economic and environmental megatrends, and further more detailed analysis of the likely effects of the following 14 megatrends on Europe’s environment to 2050: S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges S3. Global urbanisation S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies EC1. Continued economic growth EC2. Intensified competition for resources EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change This sought to answer the first research question - What are the relevant effects? In examining the effects of these megatrends an important element was also the analysis of the interlinkages among the megatrends in order to identify some of the most significant common drivers shared by many megatrends. This part of the research sought to answer the second research question- What are the common drivers and interlinkages? Each of the megatrends was then analysed and qualitative scoring applied (based on the evidence of the literature and projections) in terms of their direct and indirect effects for Europe’s environment and in terms of their uncertainty. This sought to answer the third question - What are the key uncertainties? The scoring allowed a ranking of the megatrends in terms of their combined extent of effects and uncertainty. The final step was a more detailed analysis of the main environmental effects for Europe of the global megatrends under four key themes, in order to answer the fourth and final question – Which are the most important megatrends in terms of their effects on Europe’s environment? The four themes were Climate change Pollution and health iii Biodiversity and nature Resources and waste This analysis allowed another ranking of the megatrends, but this time based on their relative importance for each of the major environmental effects individually. Emerging from this integration analysis of global megatrends are a number of key megatrends that are likely to be particularly important for Europe’s environment. Three megatrends in particular (T1, T2 and ENV1) stand out as having a medium or strong influence on Europe’s environment across all four of the environmental effects. Climate change (ENV3) is also one of the most important megatrends in terms of the effects on Europe’s environment, though it has slightly lower consequences than the other three in terms of pollution and health. Growing global pollution levels, on the other hand have only a weak influence on pollution and health in Europe, and a much stronger influence in other categories. Economic power shifts (EC3) appears to rank higher than Continued economic growth (EC1), due in part to the opportunity that this megatrend provides in governance: agreements with a small number of large, emerging economies may have an important result in terms of the global environment and Europe’s, but also due to the greater uncertainty about the effects and scale of the power shifts megatrend compared to continued global economic growth. In terms of the effects on Europe’s environment, Shifts in population structure (S2) appears to be more important than the Shifts in population size (S1). Here, the effect of Europe’s ageing population is a key factor, as well as higher degree of uncertainty around the indirect effects of shifts in pollution structure. Of critical importance is the decreasing stocks of natural resources (ENV1), which appears to be the most important on the EU environment of all the environmental megatrends. Overall, the research has highlighted the complexity of undertaking long-term futures analysis of megatrends, subject as it is to considerable uncertainty in relation to the nature, scale and direction of the megatrends themselves as well as their likely effects, globally and for Europe. Information and quantitative data in many areas are sparse, but point to important areas for further research in the future if we are to get a better understanding of the long-term megatrends and their drivers. However, the research has also highlighted some key priority megatrends for Europe’s environment (and therefore also identified those that are less important to Europe, although important globally), and where targeted policy action will be needed if some of the most damaging environmental megatrends are to be slowed or reversed. iv v 1. INTRODUCTION The European Environment Agency (EEA) is currently producing the next European State of the Environment and Outlook Report to be released at the close of 2010 (SOER 2010). Part A of SOER 2010 will present an exploratory assessment of long-term global megatrends (e.g. to 2050), their driving forces and the uncertainties that will shape Europe's environment and policies over coming decades. To support the preparation of Part A of the report, EEA has commissioned separate assessments of social, technological, economic and environmental megatrends and their associated drivers (in addition, an assessment of health megatrends was also prepared – these are considered here under social megatrends). The different reports thus follow four of the five dimensions of the STEEP framework, which is commonly used for forward-looking analysis of driving forces: Social Technological Economic Environmental Political1 These STEEP categories relate to the different types of drivers (or driving forces) in the DPSIR analytical framework used by the EEA. This report presents the work to integrate common drivers and relevant direct and indirect consequences for Europe in order to get to a balanced assessment of of the relative importance of different megatrends and how they relate to each other. The research methodology adopted to undertake the initial synthesis is explained in Chapter 2 of this report, but focuses initially on the fact that all megatrends emerging from the separate reports are descriptive labels for trends in a set of STEEP drivers. Each of the reports on social, technological, economic and environmental megatrends has analysed the megatrends on the basis of the STEEP drivers, but each has focused on one area to generate social megatrends, economic megatrends and so on. Most of the megatrends identified are not only of a social, economic, environmental, technological or political nature, they span some or many of those categories. A total number of 14 global mega-trends have been identified under the STEEP categories. It is important to note that there is no single correct approach to the analysis. It is by definition exploratory in nature and an inductive approach to the analysis of the data provided was therefore adopted. 1 The assessments did not cover this last STEEP category. 1 1.1 CONTEXT FOR MEGATREND ANALYSIS EEA notes that “Megatrends are those trends visible today that are expected to extend over decades, changing slowly and exerting considerable force that will influence a wide array of areas, including social, technological, economic, environmental and political dimensions.”2 A complementary definition notes that megatrends “...indicate a widespread trend of major impact, composed of subtrends which in themselves are capable of major impacts”.3 The megatrends shaping the world’s future will affect the global environment, and they will ultimately have both direct and indirect consequences for Europe. However, those consequences may not necessarily arise directly from the drivers and megatrends, but also indirectly as the effects of megatrends themselves can act as drivers of further change. For these reasons, an analysis of these megatrends and their drivers is a crucial step in terms of considering future concerns for Europe’s environment and what policy action might be needed. While the STEEP analysis is helpful to understand the range of drivers contributing to megatrends, most megatrends are not only of a social, economic, environmental, technological or political nature; they span some or many of those categories. This was recognised in an earlier study for the EEA in 2007 (Sheate et al, 2007) which explored megatrends from a wide range of futures studies. It concluded:“Some megatrends may appear to arise within a single STEEP category, but in reality they are made up of multiple component trends among STEEP drivers….. This provides a potential agenda for future research foresight, since only by focusing research on these megatrends will a better understanding of the complexity and interaction between trends and drivers be forthcoming.” (pp 40-41, Sheate et al, 2007) The synthesis and integration of the separate STEEP megatrend analyses is therefore necessary before considering which of the megatrends are most important in terms of their environmental impact to Europe. 1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT Chapter 2 provides a description of the research methodology adopted. The four-step process described seeks to lay out the logic of the way in which the sets of drivers among the megatrends were analysed and then synthesised to draw together insights into the interaction between the megatrends in terms of their impacts for Europe’s environment. 2 3 EEA Specifications for this contract infinitefutures, 2003, cited in W. Sheate et al (2007) 2 Chapter 3 provides an overview of the social, technological, economic and environmental megatrends developed in the separate studies for EEA and an overview of their associated conseequnces on Europe, drawn from the original separate reports as well as further more detailed analysis presented in Annex I (this chapter thus equates to Step 1 of the process - What are the relevant effects?) Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the inter-linkages among the STEEP-based megatrends and draws out the most significant common drivers and the potential inter-relationships between the megatrends. (This chapter equates to Steps 2 of the process - What are the common drivers and interlinkages?) Chapter 5 examines the megatrends in terms of their direct and indirect effects for Europe’s environment. The impact of the priority megatrends are examined in terms of their level of contribution and degree of uncertainties) .(Step 3 - What are the key uncertainties?). A summary table with relative scores is provided, ranking the megatrends in terms of their combined extent of effects and uncertainty. Chapter 6 presents summaries of the main environmental effects for Europe of the global megatrends under four key themes (Step 4 – Which are the most important megatrends in terms of their consequences for Europe’s environment?): Climate change Pollution and health Biodiversity and nature Resources and waste The chapter draws together summaries from more detailed analyses provided in Annex II and scores each megatrend in terms of its combined direct, indirect effects and uncertainty for each theme. This allows the ranking of the megatrends in terms of the likely influence on the key thematic effects on Europe’s environment. Chapter 7 draws the analysis together to present conclusions, in particular which megatrends are the most important megatrends, , and also what this analysis offers in terms of the policy implications for Europe and considerations for governance at a global scale. A series of Annexes is presented containing:I. Megatrend analysis templates II. Europe’s environment: thematic analysis templates III. Common drivers’ analysis. 3 4 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY The approach to the integration of the megatrends has taken a systematic approach to the analysis of the separate STEEP-based reports on megatrends provided by the other EEA consultants, and then built on those reports with further in-depth analysis of the common drivers and of the consequences of the individual megatrends and the relationships between the megatrends. This has involved extensive review of existing literature. An important first part of the analysis was the need to sieve through the data presented in the individual STEEP reports and ensure that an internally consistent and coherent set of megatrends was confirmed. To some extent this process could go on indefinitely so the constraint is one imposed by the appropriateness of the level of detail required and the time and resources available. There is, for example, no point in trying to achieve a degree of accuracy that simply isn’t commensurate with the data concerned. Having done this it was then necessary to further elaborate the analyses of the consequences of the megatrends in discussion and iteration with EEA staff, not least because some of the original reports had not elaborated the potential consequences of the megatrends for Europe’s environment to the level of detail necessary to meet the objectives of this project. Figure 1 below provides the analytical framework within which this integration analysis was undertaken. Its starting point is the bringing together of the findings from the separate megatrend reports and then the focus is on the interlinkages between the drivers of the megatrends as the means to better understand the possible consequences’ of the global megatrends, particularly as they relate to Europe. The elaboration of effects and the relationships between the megatrends required progressive levels of analysis and synthesis through a series of key steps. There were four key steps in the process and each is described in relation to Figure 1 below. Steps in the megatrend integration analysis Step 1 The first step was to bring together the findings from the separate studies – each of the megatrends reports for social, technological, economic and environmental. This generated a simple overview table (Table 1 in Chapter 3) of all the megatrends from the three non-environmental studies, plus the environmental megatrends, which, in particular, provide a cross-check in terms of the environmental impacts arising from the megatrends. In parallel to this a description and more in-depth analysis of the contribution of the megatrends to effects on Europe’s environment is provided in Annex I (the templates in this annex further develop the analysis in the original reports). 5 Global megatrend studies Social Economic Technological Environmental Overview of megatrends and Annex templates Step 1 Interactions and linkages between drivers and megatrends Step 2 Analysis of effects on Europe – contribution & uncertainty Step 3 What are the relevant effects?) What are the common drivers and interlinkages? What are the key uncertainties? Step 4 Thematic summaries of environmental effects for Europe Figure 1: Integration analysis framework 6 Which are the most important megatrends in terms of their effects on Europe’s environment? Step 2 Step 2 was focused on answering the question - What are the common drivers and interlinkages? The approach adopted for exploring the linkages between the megatrends was initially based on an inductive approach (the process of forming or coming to a general conclusion from particular cases), including the coding and grouping of common themes – in this case common drivers – emerging from the data. The assumption underlying this approach was that it would be the common drivers that would provide the linkages and interactions between the megatrends. The process was done manually, by physically cutting and pasting each of the drivers associated with each megatrend and rearranging and clustering on a large piece of paper on the basis of i) those that were the same and ii) those that were similar. In this way a series of groups, and clusters within groups, emerged representing drivers common and interlinked across the separate megatrends. These groups of drivers (and clusters within them) represent common drivers that act through multiple megatrends. However, following discussion with EEA staff, it was decided that these driver groups would be used solely as a means to help understand the interactions between the megatrends rather than to generate outputs in themselves. Consequently only a summary of that work is provided, for information, in Annex III, along with a worked example to illustrate the method adopted. This analysis was useful in being able to identify which megatrends were potentially linked to other megatrends, since those linkages were through their common drivers and provided a useful learning process for the project team to tease out the complexities of the numerous issues involved. It informed also the elaboration of the templates in Annex I. The review of interactions also allows a preliminary consideration of politics and governance, the STEEP category where prior detailed assessment was not carried out. The issue of governance is addressed as part of the wider conclusions. From the development of the Annex I templates and the common drivers analysis, the key interlinkages are drawn out in a matrix, Table 2, which highlights which megatrend has the potential to interact with which other megatrends. Step 3 Step 3 addresses the question - What are the key uncertainties? In exploring this question it was necessary to bring together the direct and indirect consequences of the megatrends for Europe’s environment – using the information in the Annex I megatrend sheets, along with the potential links between megatrends (from Step 2), their level of contribution and degree of uncertainty, in order to be able to identify the most important megatrends. A summary table (Table 3) with the relative scores for each megatrend is provided, along with commentary from the analysis summaries in relation to each of the megatrends. Step 4 Step 4 seeks to answer the question – Which are the most important megatrends in terms of their consequences for Europe’s environment? Chapter 6 presents summaries of the main environmental consequences for Europe of the global megatrends under four key themes (with more detailed analysis sheets provided in Annex II): Climate change Pollution and health Biodiversity and nature Resources and waste 7 8 3. OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL MEGATRENDS This chapter addresses those aspects of the framework covered by Step 1. 3.1 STEEP-BASED MEGATRENDS This section provides an overview of each STEEP-based megatrend indentified by the separate original reports. The table below presents an overview of all the global megatrends developed in the reports for EEA. A total of 11 social, technological and economic megatrends have been identified, together with 3 environmental megatrends. This overview is based on longer summaries of each megatrend, describing the main driving forces and uncertainties as well the impacts on Europe: these are found in the megatrend factsheets (see Annex I). Table 1: Overview of Global STEEP-Megatrends Megatrend Summary Social S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges Today the world population is still growing, albeit much slower than in the past. In the future, the growth is expected to slow down, but the pace is uncertain as development of the major driver, regional fertility rates, is uncertain in long term. In global terms, population growth will take long time to slow down and long time to eventually regain momentum thereafter. This development differs significantly between regions. In large parts of the developed world populations are already in decline or are expected to begin declining soon. In contrast, many developing nations are characterised by continuingly increasing populations. It is estimated that by 2025, approximately 16 percent of the world population will live in the West, down from 18 percent in 2009 and 24 percent in 1980. However, in the future the phenomenon of declining populations will no longer be restricted to the developed world. It is expected that by 2030 many countries may decrease in size, including South Korea and China. By 2050 countries such as North Korea and Thailand are also estimated to have reached a stage of declining population. Migration is expected to play an important role in demographic change over the next 50 years. It leads to populations becoming more diverse and also has an impact on populations’ growth rates and on the amount of working population. However, the estimates on the scope and geographical spread are highly uncertain. Migration is a complex phenomena including voluntary migration for economic reasons as well as involuntary migration for political, religious, or environmental and climate change reasons. Migration induced by environment degradation and climate change impacts is expected to increase in significance in the future. Most of the environment induced migration is expected to happen within countries and regions. However, for Europe, it can be of significant relevance the potential migrants from Africa. More analyses is needed in this context. Population ageing is a global trend strongly linked to declining population. The world population is getting older at an unprecedented rate. In 2000, about 7% of the world’s population was aged over 65, and this is expected to increase to 16% by 2050. It represents demographic shift which will hit both the developed as well as developing world, but at different time. The difference between the two will remain significant in the near future, however, slowly trends in developing and developed countries might see some sort of convergence (more information on convergence to come). Speed of population ageing in the developing world is expected to be higher than in the developed world (in 2050 developing countries may reach same level of aging as is experienced in current developed countries), which will allow less time for adaptation. Additionally, this trend will hit many developing countries at lower levels of socio‐economic development, which means that consequences might be worse. This 9 trend has also significant impact on working population. For example, at present, in Europe, it is experienced a tipping point when 7 out 10 people are in traditional working age. This tipping point is expected in China around 2015. S3. Rapid global urbanisation Contrary to the trends in developed economies, many developing countries are expected to experience until 2025 substantial youth bulges (youth bulges are disproportionate concentrations of people in the 15‐to‐29 year‐old age group), for example 60% of African population is expected to be younger than 30 years. Several of the countries with the largest youth bulges are among the world’s most unstable or potentially unstable countries. It is estimated that three quarters of the countries with youth bulges will be located in Sub‐Saharan Africa with the rest located in the Middle East and a few across Asia and among the Pacific Islands. For the first time in history more than 50 % of the world’s population, or approximately 3.5 billion, live in urban areas. By 2050, about 70 % of the global population could be urban, compared with less than 30 % in 1950, according to the UN (medium fertility global population growth scenario), indicating a significant departure from the spatial distribution of population growth over the past. The urban areas of the world are expected to absorb literally all the population growth over the next four decades while at the same time drawing in some of the rural population. Of particular relevance is Asia, which is estimated to host more than 50 % of the global urban population by 2050. Urban populations are expected to generally move away from the largest settlements in the future, favoring small‐ to medium‐sized cities instead. S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class While growth of urban areas is expected to continue its rate of increase is expected to slow down in the future. Many developing countries might not have reached the same level of urban density as the now developed countries by 2050. Yet the speed and scope of the urban transition in many developing countries is far greater today than it used to be one century and more ago in the now developed world. Importantly, the proportion of the urban poor is rising faster in many developing countries than the overall rate of urban population growth. Global economic growth and trade integration have fuelled long‐term shifts in international competitiveness, characterised by a high growth of productivity and rising incomes in emerging economies. Global consumer demand had been concentrated in the OECD countries so far. The number of middle‐income consumers is growing rapidly, particularly in Asia. According to a World Bank study, there could be 1.2 billion ‘middle class’ people in the now‐developing world by 2030. Average income is expected to be much lower in the emerging economies in 2050 than in the G7‐ states now. Yet the total purchasing power of middle‐income economies and middle‐income people is growing strikingly and this is likely to continue, fuelled by a steep increase in Asian demand. S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world The focus of spending in many of the emerging economies continues to change from basic to more discretionary goods. Many parts of these populations are approaching "well to do lifestyles" and disposable income is spent, as in “Western“ societies, on high nutrient food, cars, household appliances, personal care products and other quality services. Large‐scale consumer markets are emerging which can fuel future resource demand. Brazil, Russia, India and China together could match the G7 share of global GDP by 2040‐2050. Importantly, the benefits of economic growth are not distributed evenly across populations. Relative poverty will persist and might even become more acute. The population of the world is getting older. Older persons continue to contribute productively to society; however, they are more likely to be susceptible to environmental pollution and hazards, e.g. air pollution, heat waves and floods, and to higher rates of certain diseases, e.g. Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, heart disease, cancers and arthritis. The trend of an ageing population is first seen in the developed countries. After 2020 these trends are expected to become increasingly important also in developing countries (e.g. South Central Asia, South America and the Caribbean). By 2050, it is predicted that about 80% of the elderly could be leaving in developing countries. In addition, population ageing is occurring in parallel with rapid urbanisation: in 2007 more than half of the world’s population live cities, by 2030 this figure is expected to rise to more than 60%. Technology and economic development continues enabling substantial improvements in illness treatments, access to health care and support ability of people to live longer healthy lives. In the long term, some technology optimists see radical changes in human enhancement and life extension: increasing medical breakthroughs to counter 10 ageing as well as ‘bionic’ interventions that incorporate the use of nanotechnology. Such breakthroughs, if they do come along, are likely to be very expensive and thus likely to be affordable mostly in rich countries – and even here, perhaps only for the wealthiest part of the population. Thus health inequalities are becoming significant, both between countries and within countries. However, in an optimistic scenario, the gains in access to health care, drinking water and sanitation will continue, further improving health in what are now the poorest countries of the world. This in turn depends on the absence of widespread conflict. S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics It is becoming more and more important to distinguish effects according to rich and poor and less on the country bases. It is highly uncertain to which degree positive effects (longer healthier lives) will be counter‐played by negative ones (increased inequalities, decreasing health for poorest, and spread of diseases from hot spots. Additionally, development can be seen as a “double edged sword”. Apart from providing benefits, easy access to high protein / high calorie foods, sedentary lifestyles, and the emergence of status competition, can lead to physical and mental health problems (obesity, stress and the erosion of community and traditional values and social support networks) also for the rich and middle class. There is a distinct difference in the disease burden between developed and developing countries. Malnutrition and infectious diseases are dominant in the developing world, while obesity and many non‐infectious diseases (cardiovascular, neurodegenerative, diabetes, respiratory, cancer, and mental health) are dominant in the developed world. As countries develop, infectious diseases generally become a less significant portion of the disease burden, being replaced by non‐infectious diseases, often associated with lifestyle, consumption and ageing and they face the increase in the levels of obesity, and other diseases associated with inactivity. Changes in working, living and travel practices contribute to changing the global disease burden, both between and within countries. Migration within and between countries is increasing as the world becomes more globalised. These migrations increase the opportunity for diseases to spread rapidly between populations, and may result in the re‐introduction of infectious diseases to areas where they had been eradicated (or significantly reduced) from. For example, Tuberculosis (TB) has re‐emerged to become more common in some developed countries where it had historically been reduced to extreme lows. This increase in the incidence of TB has been linked to migrants from areas of high health inequality. Migrations within countries (usually from rural to urban areas) have, resulted in increased risk from infectious diseases, violence and drug dependence, particularly when they result in chaotic slum development. Urbanisation, in the presence of good governance, may increase access to education, employment and health services, reducing the disease burden of the population. In the absence of good governance urbanisation is associated with increased burden of infectious diseases. Globalisation and the increase in global mobility may also change the disease burden of developed countries. The effectiveness of interventions such as airport screening, travel restrictions and other community mitigation measures remains uncertain. Technological T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles Over the last fifty years, the pace of technological change in several economic sectors and technologies has continuously accelerated, leading to increased pace of mass use of basic innovations and related societal and economic changes. Competition pressure is rising as emerging economies start to challenge developed countries in the core areas of their competitiveness advantages, namely high‐technology development. In spite of persisting differences, many emerging economies are stepping up their general research and innovation capacities. Growth rates in patent filings in Asian economies are beyond the level of many developed economies (figure 2). Acceleration of technology development cycles is likely to continue and might also concern those economic sectors that have been slower to change in the past, in particular energy and transport. Moreover, the very nature and process of creating, owning and sharing knowledge (in and beyond technologies) is changing in a highly inter‐linked world. In spite of all progress, a technology divide is likely to remain between developed and many developing countries. Technology transfer and support is likely to remain a critical issue in the decades to come, particularly in Europe's neighborhood. 11 T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies Large socio‐economic and environmental changes in the 21st century are expected to be driven by a cluster of rapidly emerging and converging sciences and technologies in nanosciences and nano– technologies, biotechnologies and life‐sciences, information and communication technologies, cognitive sciences and neurotechnologies (so called NBIC‐cluster). The NBIC cluster is likely to move with increasing speed from the innovation phase, where seeds have been planted over the last two decades, to the application phase, over the next 20‐30 years. Learning from nature is gaining increasing relevance as a scientific paradigm. Expectations range from moderate scepticism to broad enthusiasm, even including far‐reaching assumptions about control of matter and genes, ubiquitous intelligence and consequently a huge potential to accelerate access to sustainable energy, abundant food supply or universal health‐care. However, many observers agree that the NBIC‐cluster is likely to form the backbone of a next long‐term wave of innovation and growth. In view of all the uncertainties, in 2040‐2050 nano‐ and biotechnologies are likely to be pervasive, diverse and incorporated into all aspects of our daily live, particularly in synthetic reproduction, novel energy sources and health care. Interrelated product and process, technical, organisational and managerial innovations open up an unusually wide range of social and environmental benefits, investment and profit opportunities. Yet they also considerably increase the scale and nature of risk to human‐kind and pose fundamental challenges to current forms of risk analysis and management. Economic EC1. Continued economic growth EC2. Intensified competition for resources EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world Assumptions on global economic growth (in terms of annual changes of Gross Domestic Product) form a basic megatrend for the economic analyses in Part A. Virtually all major outlook studies assume that economic growth will be positive on average across the globe in the coming decades. Growth will be accelerating in BRIC countries and other newly emerging economies. The rate at which economies will grow is a matter of larger uncertainty than before. Due to developments like ageing and the need to better control financial circuits, growth may be smaller than usually assumed in the past, in particular in the developed world (OECD). For example the DG ECFIN 2009 report on the implications of ageing in the EU corrects common expectations in a downward direction: roughly 1.8% instead of 2.4% annually on average in the period to 2060. Economic growth continues at the global level and is accelerating in BRIC countries and other newly emerging economies. The demand for sub‐soil and natural resources will grow in absolute terms despite continuing and partly successful efforts to increase the resource efficiency of economic activities. Increased demand for subsoil resources will stimulate exploration and exploitation of new sources. Supply is expected to meet demand, both for “bulk” resources (fossil fuels, though a different mix than today, minerals) and for specific metals that are essential to facilitate market penetration of environmental and other technological innovations. Supply of natural resources increasingly competes with other land use, and in particular with conservation of biodiversity and ecosystems services. The increased need for resources stimulates political monopolization of access (e.g. China/Africa). Europe is dependent on other regions for much of its fossil fuels and minerals and needs to secure its access to major world markets. Economic power concentration tends to diversify from a single (USA) to a multi‐polar global map when BRIC countries and later on newly emerging economies (e.g. Indonesia, South‐Africa) grow in economic significance. This development both stimulates the demand for resources and the countervailing process of attempting to come to blocwise and global agreements on regulating markets and trade. Environmental Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources Human demand for natural resources has more than doubled over the past 45 years as a result of population growth and increasing individual consumption. This manifests itself in large‐scale land conversion and ecosystem deterioration. The historical decline in the area of temperate forest has been reversed, with an annual increase of 30 000 km2 between 1990 and 2005, but deforestation in the tropics, continued at an annual rate of 130,000 km2 over the same period. Within the steadily expanding farmland area, regional overexploitation has led to serious soil degradation. Since1960, alone, a third of the 12 world’s farmland has been abandoned because it has been degraded beyond use. It has been estimated that 10 million ha are destroyed per year. In addition to the effect on terrestrial ecosystems, human resource use has had a profound effect on the marine environment. Data on fish stocks (in terms of volume) exploited for at least 50 years highlight an increase in the number of stocks either overexploited or that have crashed over the last few years. Demand for natural resources will continue to rise steeply, given that the world’s population is increasing and diets are shifting from cereal to meat consumption. Demand for agricultural production may therefore increase until 2050 by as much 250 to 350 %. This can be achieved by either expanding the agricultural area and/or by intensification of production, both of which may be expected to lead to further biodiversity loss. Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load The megatrend consists of 5 sub‐trends: increasing nitrogen pollution; increasing ozone pollution; increasing importance of particulate matter pollution at global scale; increase of synthetic chemicals in the environment; and increase of waste production. Increasing nitrogen pollution at global scale is of particular concern, the production and use of artificial nitrogen fertilizers worldwide has enabled humankind to greatly increase food production, but it has also led to a host of environmental problems, ranging from eutrophication of terrestrial and aquatic systems to global acidification and stratospheric ozone loss. With humans having an increasing impact on the planet, the interactions between the nitrogen cycle, the carbon cycle and climate are expected to become an increasingly important determinant of the Earth system. Ground level (tropospheric) ozone is a global air pollution problem and an important greenhouse gas. Although not a new issue, ground level ozone remains one of the most pervasive of the global air pollutants, with impacts on human health, food production and the environment. Particulate matter indoor and outdoor pollution from burning of fossil fuels is causing significant numbers of premature deaths and chronic illnesses around the world, especially in the rapidly urbanising developing countries. Consumerism, favouring disposal over re‐use is causing major problems around the world and there are many uncertainties regarding the toxicity of waste and the ability of ecosystems to absorb and buffer waste flows. Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change The megatrend consists of seven sub‐trends; increasing threat to food security; increasing threat to water security; negative health effects due to increasing temperatures and changing prevalence of disease; loss of biodiversity; increasing oceanic acidification; increased flooding and sea level rise; improved political awareness of issue. Measurements of the global atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) show marked increases since pre‐industrial times, with levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) far exceeding the natural range of the past 650 000 years. The concentration of atmospheric CO2 has increased from a preindustrial level of about 280 ppm to more than 387 ppm in 2008. Increases in GHG emissions are largely due to the use of fossil fuels, although deforestation, land‐use change and agriculture also provide significant but smaller contributions. As a consequence, the average global air temperature by 2009 had risen by 0.7‐0.8 °C since pre‐industrial times. Current projections suggest global mean temperatures could rise by as much as 1.8‐4.0 °C over the course of this century if global action to limit GHG emissions proves unsuccessful. Recent observations give reason to believe that rate of growth of GHG emissions and many climate impacts are approaching the upper boundary of the IPCC range of projections rather than to the lower ones. Many key climate indicators are already moving beyond the patterns of natural variability within which contemporary society and economy have developed. These indicators include global mean surface temperature, sea‐level rise, global ocean temperature, Arctic sea ice extent, ocean acidification, and extreme climatic events. With unabated emissions, many trends in climate will likely accelerate. 13 14 4. INTER-RELATIONSHIPS OF THE GLOBAL MEGATRENDS This chapter address Steps 2 and 3 of the analytical framework, which included an analysis and consistency check of underlying drivers of the megatrends and explored the common drivers and inter-relatinoship among megatrends in order to synthesise the material from the earlier individual studies. 4.1 RATIONALISATION OR CONSISTENCY CHECK The STEEP tables contained in the individual megatrend reports were analysed and a consistency check performed. The aim of this was to ensure that the storyline emerged whether looking at the megatrends or at the underlying drivers developed by each detailed study. This step also checked that similar terminology was used across the STEEP analysis so that subsequent analysis would not miss major interlinkages among the megatrends. The drivers’ analysis is presented in Annex II. Its results were used in identifying interlinkages among the megatrends, which are described below and presented in detail in Annex I. 4.2 INTERLINKAGES AMONG THE MEGATRENDS The development of the templates in Annex I provided the basis for the initial exploration of interrelationships as the potential consequences of each megatrend was uncovered. This was also informed by the common drivers’ analysis of Annex II, which is not described in detail here, but is presented there. The common drivers’ analysis was essentially a learning process to understand which drivers and groups of drivers were common to which megatrends. In itself, and following discussions with EEA staff, it was felt that while a useful process it would not result in a direct output. Rather it was used to inform the understanding of the inter-relationships between the megatrends explored below. There are linkages or connections between many of the common drivers and how they relate to the megatrends, and considering these links, helps to understand and extrapolate impacts from the original megatrend reports. The identification of common drivers provided useful insights into the potential interactions which are discussed in Annex I and the potential inter-relationship identified in Table 2 below. The key relationships among the megatrends are discussed further below. 15 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 T1 T2 EC1 EC2 EC3 Env1 Env2 Env3 Extent of links KEY: Extent of links/relationships among megatrends 0-5 links/relationships 6-9 links/relationships 10-13 links relationships 16 Total no. of relationships Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Env3 Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load Env2 Decreasing stocks of natural resources Env1 Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world EC3 Intensified competition for resources EC2 Continued economic growth EC1 The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies T2 Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles T1 Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics S6 Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world S5 The emerging global middle income consumer class S4 Rapid global urbanisation S3 Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges S2 Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration S1 Table 2: Matrix of inter-relationships among the megatrends 11 5 11 10 9 9 10 9 13 9 8 9 9 10 This section reviews the megatrends which have the most important interrelationships. A brief summary is presented here: further detail on these interrelationships can be found in Annex I. Shifts in population size Links: this megatrend, shifts in population size (S1), is closely linked with all others, except the technology megatrends. Population growth will be a key driver for the environmental megatrends. Climate change (ENV3) and environmental pollution (ENV2) will in influence migration patterns, a key component in the global shifts in population size. Population size and economic growth are closely interrelated, as fertility declines with higher income levels. A major issue in terms of analysing the global future relates to their relative importance in terms of the consequences for the global environment (and Europe’s). While both are central megatrends, global population growth between 2005 and 2050 will – under the UN’s highest projection – be about 75%. (This takes the “constant fertility” scenario – however, fertility rates have consistently fallen in recent decades and this is not by the UN to be a strongly plausible scenario: its “high” scenario is about half a billion less.) In contrast, the economies of China and India for example may growth seven-fold over this period, a far faster rate (Poncet, 2006). Uncertainties: Small changes in the fertility rate can lead to large changes in future population size. A major uncertainty relates to migration: its patterns are shaped by economic differences but also by immigration policies. Moreover, estimates of the number of migrants due to climate change and environmental degradation to 2050 vary greatly, e.g. from 25 million to 1 billion under IPCC estimates (IOM). Economic growth Links: Continued economic growth (EC1) will play a central role in shaping global futures, including the impacts on the environment. It is closely linked with all the other megatrends. Global economic growth will change consumption patterns: the growth of global, middle-income consumers (S4) will have a strong impact on environment, including on increasing environmental degradation (ENV2) and on the increasing global loss of natural resources (ENV1). This megatrend is also closely linked to shifts in population size (part of S1), including migration patterns, as people will move to countries and urban areas where growth is strong, and to urbanisation (S3), as growing cities already account for half of the world’s population and the majority of its GDP. Growth also influences changing disease patterns (S6), as it will bring access to better health care – as well as a change from diseases of ‘poverty’, including many communicable diseases, to those of ‘wealth’ related to stress and obesity. Finally, economic growth will fuel the development of technology (T1 and T2) as well as benefit from it: economists have pointed out that in advanced economies where population, resources and other factors of production remain constant, technology becomes the main driver of growth. 4 Uncertainties: A key question will be the rate of growth to 2050 for key parts of the world including Europe. Minor differences in absolute growth rates will make a huge difference for the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people. Differences in relative growth rates can yield huge differences after 40 years: for example, will the Chinese economy become the largest in the world? 4 In particular, this was an insight of Robert Solow, who received the 1987 Nobel Prize in economics. See: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/press.html 17 Urbanisation Links: With rapid global urbanisation (S3), 70% of the world’s population may live in urban areas in 2050. urban areas are expected to absorb all of the growth in the world’s population, as well as draw away part of the existing rural population (UN 2010). Urban areas are closely linked to economic growth, generating about 80% of the world’s GDP (UN 2010), and they are also centres of technology development (T1 and T2). Urbanisation is linked to changes in environmental degradation (ENV2): it will exacerbate and concentrate problems such as air and water pollution and, where financing is available, urbanisation will include infrastructure to manage these problems, e.g. urban transport and wastewater treatment. Urbanisation brings better access to health care as well new problems related to stress, and thus is closely related to those for changing disease patterns (S6). Uncertainties: small shifts in fertility rates and patterns can have major influence in population size and thus in urbanisation patterns. Another major uncertainty for global cities relates to climate change and in particular to sea-level rise, as many of the world’s cities are located in coastal zones. The emerging middle-income consumer class Links: This megatrend is closely linked to the two above: economic growth, especially in emerging countries such as India and China, will lead a major growth of the middle-income class. By 2050, half of the world’s middle-income population is projected to be in these two countries alone. The link with urbanisation will also be close: most of these consumers will live in cities. In turn, their consumption patterns will be closely linked to global environmental megatrends. Uncertainties: Key uncertainties relate to those for economic growth, in particular in the emerging economies. Technology Links to other drivers: the acceleration and shifts in technology (T1) will have close links with urbanisation (S3) and with health megatrends (increasing life expectancy S5; changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics S6). It is very closely linked to economic megatrends: in addition to the links with continued economic growth (EC1), described above, the world has seen a steady decoupling over the past 50 years between economic growth and resource demand (EC2), according to the World Bank (2009), which expects this trend to continue in the coming decades; technology is one of the main factors behind this decoupling, along with the shift to services. 5 Technology acceleration will also affect the environmental megatrends, in particular areas such as new technology for energy and agriculture, which will influence future greenhouse gas emissions as well as demand for natural resources around the world. Uncertainties: the future of technology is subject to a great range of uncertainties, including the pace and direction of development of new products: for example, the Rockefeller Foundation (2009) has looked at different scenarios in which technology can move towards or away from addressing global challenges. A further uncertainty will arise as technology centres in emerging economies grow in importance in coming decades due the economic power shift (EC3) to these countries. 5 China’s high consumption of metals in the past 20 years, rising faster even than its rapid GDP growth, has broken this steady trend. The World Bank (2009) expects China’s economy to return to the overall trend in the near future. 18 Climate change Links: Climate change is closely linked with many other megatrends, both in terms of those that will influence future greenhouse gas emissions as well as those that are affected by global climate change impacts. A number of these links have been identified above. Uncertainties: the nature and extent of the linkages are subject to a number of uncertainties, for example in terms of the likely emissions pathways followed globally and regionally, the nature of feedback loops in the climate system, and the role of technology in mitigation, The review of common drivers and inter-relationships among the megatrends has provided insights into both the links among the drivers as well as some of their uncertainties. On the basis of Table 2 and the discussion above, six megatrends emerge as having the strongest links with others (scoring 10 or more in the number of inter-relationships among the megatrends in Table 2): S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration S3. Global urbanisation S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles EC1. Continued economic growth Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Here, it should be underlined that these links are not seen as either causes or effects: the links among drivers – and thus among megatrends – are by their nature complex. Moreover, while the strength of these links can be an important factor in terms of prioritising the megatrends, it is not the only one. In particular, this factor is not necessarily related to the direct and indirect environmental effects on Europe, or to other effects on Europe. 19 5. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF THE MEGATRENDS 5.1 SCORING APPROACH Table 3 below presents an initial scoring for all the megatrends in terms of their direct, indirect effects on Europe’s environment and the uncertainty of those effects. The analysis used in this table can be found in the megatrend sheets in Annex I. These sheets review likely effects on Europe’s environment and score these in terms of four categories: climate change; pollution and health; natural resources; and nature and biodiversity (the categories are based on those used in the EU’s Sixth Environmental Action Programme). The environmental impacts are presented as total scores for each megatrend, based on a rounded average for the scores across these categories. The uncertainties, on the other hand, are only presented in terms of the highest score and thus have a maximum of three. The other component of the scoring draws on the analysis of the interactions among megatrends, as presented above in Table 2. The overall scores from Table 2 are included here. While this element is a small part of the overall scoring, it is included in order to capture the overall influence of each megatrend on others that may in turn affect Europe’s environment. Thus, the overall purpose of Table 3 is to identify those megatrends which are likely to have a relatively more significant contribution to direct and indirect environmental impacts in Europe. Having scored the megatrends in Table 3, they can then be rearranged in rank order, as in Table 4 which follows immediately after. Those megatrends with high contribution to effects and high uncertainties emerge as the most important megatrends. Those of least importance are those that emerge as having a low contribution to environmental effects and low uncertainty. These uncertainties in the effects on Europe’s environment are linked first of all to uncertainties in the underlying megatrends. For many megatrends, such as Continued economic growth (EC1), Shifts in population size (S1) and Climate change (ENV3), there are ranges in existing projects. For others, such as the The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies (T1), the range of uncertainty is greater, and is explored by scenarios studies (e.g. carried out in background work for the OECD Bioeconomy project in Tait and Wield (2009)). There are also uncertainties related to the effects of the megatrends to Europe’s environment to 2050. While exploring relationships between recent trends and environmental effects, such as GDP growth and ecological footprint, may provide some insight into possible trends and effects in the future, any projections of what might happen as a consequence of the megatrends to 2050 are highly uncertain. This is due to the long timescales involved, and also the impossibility of predicting the potential interactions which eventually result in environmental effects. For example, the emergence of the internet and its role in changing how businesses function, (e.g. facilitating the outsourcing of employment to India from Europe) would have been practically impossible to predict forty years ago, and thus any environmental effects of this innovation would not have been identified. Thus when considering the potential environmental effects of the megatrends, there is a danger of assuming that relationships that have existed in the past will continue in the future, when in reality whatever does emerge in the future is unlikely to be the same as what happened in the past, as the drivers will (by definition) be different. The individual megatrend sheets in Annex I explore how these underlying uncertainties then influence the effects that the megatrends will have on Europe’s environment. 20 Table 3: Summary of the contribution of the megatrends to direct and indirect environmental effects to Europe. Effects on Europe’s environment Direct effects Uncertainty Indirect effects Uncertainty Links among megatrends Total score: Impacts + uncertainty + links S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration 9 S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges 9 8 9 n.a. n.a. 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 13 12 9 10 Megatrends S3. Global urbanisation S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies EC1. Continued economic growth EC2. Intensified competition for resources EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Strength of megatrend effect: Not applicable or no effect identified = n.a., Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= 21 10 12 10 13 Table 4: Ranking of priority megatrends to Europe’s environment Effects on Europe’s environment Megatrends T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources EC2. Intensified competition for resources EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration Direct effects Uncertainty Indirect effects Uncertainty Links among megatrends Total score: Impacts + uncertainty + links 13 13 12 12 10 10 10 9 9 9 4 n.a. 2 S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class EC1. Continued economic growth S3. Global urbanisation S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in n.a. n.a. an unequal world S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new n.a. n.a. n.a. pandemics Strength of megatrend effect: Not applicable or no effect identified = n.a., Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= 22 9 8 5.2 DISCUSSION OF PRIORITISED MEGATRENDS The megatrends that score highest under this system are those not simply with strong effects on Europe’s environment, but those with high levels of uncertainties and also strong interrelationships with other megatrends. Of the four highest scoring megatrends, two are related to technology and two are related to the global environment. All have high levels of uncertainty in terms of their effects on Europe’s environment. The technology megatrends can help address a series of environmental problems. Developments in energy technologies will be crucial for climate change. Nanotechnology is expected to develop lighter and stronger materials, reducing resource demands (Biois 2010), and thus perhaps accelerating the decoupling between GDP growth and resource consumption seen in past decades (World Bank 2009). Biotechnology is expected to affect agriculture (OECD 2008), influencing the consumption of soil and water around the world as well as in Europe. A crucial element of future technology development is its great uncertainty in terms of direction and results. Here, scenarios by the Rockefeller Foundation (Rockefeller Foundation, 2010) as well as in studies for the OECD Bioeconomy Project (Tait and Wield (2009) highlighted the role of institutions and policies in shaping research and development – though these studies also underline that discoveries are by their nature uncertain. Among the environmental megatrends, ENV3 (climate change) will be crucial for Europe’s environment. Here, one important element of the analysis is that future greenhouse gas emissions will in coming decades be largely shaped by trends occurring outside of Europe. Stocks of natural resources around the world are decreasing, including freshwater, soil, fisheries and other ecosystem services. The effects on Europe’s environment are not as strong as those for climate change, but here too uncertainties are great, including in terms of links with other global megatrends. It should be underlined that the scoring focuses on the effects on Europe’s environment. These megatrends are likely to have a broad range of other consequences on Europe in social and economic terms. These nonenvironmental consequences are explored in the separate reports for this project, analysing each megatrend in detail. The emphasis on uncertainty gives higher weight to megatrends where governance could bring major shifts. This element helps to understand why major megatrends such as EC1 (continued economic growth) and S1 (shifts in population size) rank lower. Both of these megatrends are crucial in terms of their links to others, and thus their underlying importance to global futures. The two will affect Europe’s environment – but this is less strong than the influence of climate change and the declining stocks of natural resources around the world. And crucially, these megatrends have less uncertainty. 23 6. OVERVIEW OF IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE This chapter reviews the effects of the megatrends on Europe’s environment across four categories: Climate change Pollution and health Nature and biodiversity Resources and waste These categories are based on those in the EU’s Sixth Environmental Action Programme. More detailed analysis is provided in Annex II 6.1 CLIMATE CHANGE The effects of the megatrends on climate change in Europe are discussed in Annex II, an overview is provided below: Global population growth is likely to result in increased emissions of GHGs globally. The aging of the world’s population could also increase GHS emissions, but this is highly uncertain. Aging of Europe’s population is likely to increase Europe’s vulnerability to climate change impacts, and may also reduce the amount of money available to respond to climate change. Urbanisation, rising incomes and increased economic growth are linked, and are likely to act together to increase global GHG emissions. The loss of certain global resources, such as the Amazon forests, may reduce ability of the ecosphere to regulate GHG emissions, leading to increasingly severe climate change impacts in Europe. Increased pollution, such as water and air pollution, in Europe will be exacerbated by climate change. Technology may provide a means to reduce GHG emissions, potentially reducing the effects of climate change in Europe. The role of fast-growing economies, such as India and China, in mitigating GHG emissions will becomes increasingly important over the long-term. The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on climate change in Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex 1 and Annex II for more detail). Table 5 below ranks the megatrends in terms of their priority effects to climate change in Europe. 24 Table 5: Ranking of priority megatrends to climate change in Europe Total score: Climate change Megatrends T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies 11 11 Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources 10 Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load 9 Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change 9 S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges 5 EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world 5 S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class 4 S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world 4 EC1. Continued economic growth 4 EC2. Intensified competition for resources 4 S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration 3 S3. Rapid global urbanisation S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics 2 0 The four megatrends identified as highest priority for climate change in Europe are technological and environmental (Table 5). Technology may provide the solution to climate change through improving efficiency or the development of alternative fuel sources, however both are highly uncertain. Decreasing stocks of natural resources and increasing pollution are will have Most of the direct effects to climate change in Europe are likely to arise from the environmental megatrends, with medium uncertainty, although these effects may increase or decrease the pressure of climate change on Europe. The direct effects of the global megatrends to climate change in Europe are relatively few. Technology may actually reduce the direct effects, although it could also increase the indirect effects of climate change on Europe. However any predictions of what solutions technology can offer are highly uncertain. The indirect effects of the global megatrends to climate change in Europe are likely to be strong, and S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class) and EC1 (continued economic growth) are likely to particularly significant in increasing the effect of climate change. Predictions of the likely effect of both of these megatrends have low uncertainty attached to them. S3 (global urbanisation) is closely associated with S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class) and EC1 (continued economic growth), driven by and driving both megatrends, but considered in isolation is likely to have a weak effect on increasing climate change in Europe. S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) is likely to have a medium effect on climate change in Europe, with low uncertainty attached. S2 (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges) are also likely to have an medium indirect effect on climate change in Europe, but the uncertainty of these effects is high. 6.2 POLLUTION AND HEALT H The effects of the megatrends on pollution and health in Europe are discussed in Annex II, an overview is provided below: The trends related to Europe’s population will have a variety of effects in terms of pollution levels. Ageing and population decline could reduce consumption and related emissions of a broad range of pollutants, from CO and NOx from motor vehicles to nitrogen runoff from intensive agriculture to water bodies. Migration to Europe will offset a part of this population decline: and the extent of future migration is a major area of uncertainty. Migration is expected to lead to an increase in many of the same pollutants. Overall, the changes in total population size are expected to be relatively small compared to other trends – far less than the possible 50% increase in global population to 2050. Increasing global consumption, for example, due to economic growth, increasing incomes and population increase, may increased demand for European agricultural and forestry products. If this 25 leads to an increase in the scale and intensity of agriculture in Europe to 2050, then it is likely that pollution may increase as a result; for example, run-off of nitrates and phosphates from agricultural land could increase, or the release of acidifying substances to the atmosphere could rise. Increased water demand due to increased agricultural production could also increase water stress in Europe, increasingly important in the context of climate change. Increasing global consumption could lead to increases in the exploitation of Europe’s mineral and fuel resources, which could also increase pollution in Europe to 2020. Technology is likely to have a positive effect on pollution in Europe, potentially reducing resource consumption and tackling waste / pollution issues. Technology may also offer improved pollution monitoring and provide better information to decision makers in Europe. The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on pollution and health in Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex 1 and Annex II for more detail). Table 6 below ranks the megatrends in terms of their priority effects to pollution and health in Europe. Table 6: Ranking of priority megatrends to pollution and health in Europe Total score: Pollution and health Megatrends Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles 9 9 T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies EC2. Intensified competition for resources S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change EC1. Continued economic growth S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration S3. Rapid global urbanisation 8 8 7 6 6 5 5 4 S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics 4 4 0 0 The four priority megatrends to pollution and health in Europe are ENV1 (Decreasing stocks of natural resources), T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles), T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies) and EC2 (intensified competition for resources). The global megatrends likely to have the strongest effect on pollution and health in Europe are S3 (global urbanisation), S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class), T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies), ENV2 (increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load) and ENV3 (increasing severity of the consequences of climate change). Most of the effects identified were direct, with low to medium uncertainty, and are predicted as likely to potentially increase and decrease pressure on Europe’s environment. The indirect effects identified have higher uncertainty associated with them, and are also a mix of increasing and decreasing pressures on pollution and heath in Europe. Increasing concentrations of ozone, particulate matter and POPs from intercontinental transport are projected to increase in Europe and are likely to have medium strength effects on pollution and health in Europe, which is identified through ENV2 (increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load). 6.3 BIODIVERSITY AND NAT URE The effects of the megatrends on biodiversity and nature in Europe are discussed in Annex II, an overview is provided below: Increased demand for European agriculture and forestry products due to, for example, increase in global population, increase in incomes and global urbanisation, could increase pressure on European biodiversity to 2050. An increase in the scale and intensity of European agriculture could 26 have a negative effect on biodiversity due to the potential threat of eutrophication and acidification associated with agriculture, as well as a potential increase in water stress in some European regions. Increased demand for Europe’s fuel and mineral resources could also increase pressure on biodiversity, for example by increasing offshore drilling. Projected population decline in Europe could ease existing pressures on biodiversity, however any potential reductions could be offset by projected increases in migration to Europe (to maintain population numbers in the context of population decline). As migration to Europe is generally to urban areas, it will not prevent population decline in rural areas. This could lead to land abandonment and potentially have a negative effect on the biodiversity of high-nature value farmland. Climate change is identified as likely to increase pressure on Europe’s biodiversity over the longterm, for example by changing environmental conditions such as average temperature and rainfall patterns. Increasing trade between Europe and the rest of the world may increase the spread of invasive species in Europe, which would have a negative impact on European biodiversity. The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on biodiversity and nature in Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex 1 and Annex II for more detail). Table 7 below ranks the megatrends in terms of their priority effects to biodiversity and nature in Europe. Table 7: Ranking of priority megatrends to biodiversity and nature in Europe Total score: Biodiversity and nature Megatrends Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change 10 10 EC2. Intensified competition for resources Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class S3. Rapid global urbanisation EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world 8 8 7 7 EC1. Continued economic growth S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics 3 0 7 5 5 4 4 0 The four priority megatrends to biodiversity and nature in Europe are Env1 (decreasing stocks of natural resources), Env 3 (increasing severity of the consequences of climate change), EC2 (intensified competition for resources) and Env2 (increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load). The three environmental megatrends are likely to have the strongest effects to biodiversity in Europe, and the uncertainty attached to these effects is high. Climate change is likely to have the most significant effect to biodiversity, changing the functioning of habitats and ecosystems in Europe by altering rainfall patterns and changing temperatures, for example. As stocks of natural resources decrease around the world, pressure on Europe’s resources will increase (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining) which will increase stress on Europe’s environment, with negative effect to biodiversity. However these effects are highly uncertain. This increased competition for resources is also associated with global economic growth, increased competition for resources and global population growth. This is why EC2 (intensified competition 27 for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment) and S2 (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges) are identified as important in effecting biodiversity in Europe, although the indirect effects of population growth (associated with increased migration to Europe) are highly uncertain. The effect of technology on Europe’s biodiversity is highly uncertain; new technologies could reduce pressure on Europe’s environment by improving agricultural yields around the world or by reducing the use of agricultural chemicals in Europe. However, technology could also generate new as yet unknown negative effects to biodiversity, e.g. the potential impact of transgenic crops on European biodiversity over the long term. The effects of S3 (global urbanisation) and S4 (emerging middle-income class) are relatively weak, restricted to indirect effects that are highly uncertain. Both megatrends may act to increase pressure on Europe’s biodiversity, through increased climate change or demand for agricultural products, but the strength of these effects is not likely to be high. 6.4 RESOURCES AND WASTE The effects of the megatrends on resources and waste in Europe are discussed in Annex II, an overview is provided below: Population decline in Europe may result in reduced demand for natural resources, however this may be offset by increased demand associated with increased migration to Europe. Increased demand for European agricultural and forestry products may lead to an increase in the intensity and scale of agriculture and forestry in Europe, which could increase pressure on water and soil resources in Europe. Increased global demand for energy and sub-soil resources may increase the exploitation of fuel and mineral reserves in Europe. Technology may act to reduce pressure on Europe’s natural resources by increasing the efficiency of resource use and improving agricultural yields. Climate change may increase pressure on Europe’s natural resources, for example, reducing water availability. Sea level rise as a consequence of climate change may reduce the amount of agricultural land available in Europe. The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on resources and waste in Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex 1 and Annex II for more detail). Table 8 below ranks the megatrends in terms of their priority effects to biodiversity and nature in Europe. Table 8: Ranking of priority megatrends to resources and waste in Europe Total score: Resources and waste Megatrends T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change EC2. Intensified competition for resources Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world S3. Rapid global urbanisation 9 EC1. Continued economic growth S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics 3 0 9 9 9 8 8 7 6 4 4 3 0 28 The four priority megatrends to resources and waste in Europe are T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles), T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies), Env1 (decreasing stocks of natural resources) and Env 3 (increasing severity of the consequences of climate change) The global megatrends are likely to increase pressure on natural resource use in Europe, with the majority of this increase coming from outside Europe (i.e. indirect effects). The uncertainty related to this increase ranges from low to high, but in general uncertainty around the effects is high. S1 (Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) and S2 (Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges) are predicted to have direct impacts to natural resource in Europe, which may increase or decrease resource use depending on the final outcome for Europe’s population; an increase or a decrease. Economic growth and increasing competition for resources may see an increase in the demand for European natural resources, both for export globally and for use internally in response to price increases on the global market, however this effect is highly uncertain. The technology megatrends are notable as they may have the effect of reducing pressure on natural resources in Europe, as efficiency improvements may offset or reduce demand for resources. However these effects are highly uncertain as they depend on the development of specific technologies. The environmental megatrends are likely to have both direct and indirect effects to natural resources in Europe, although these effects are highly uncertain. ENV3 (climate change) could result in food and water shortages in other parts of the world, which could trigger migration to Europe. If this were to happen the effects to resource use in Europe would be significant, but obviously this is a very uncertain effect. Climate change is more likely to affect resource use in Europe due to direct impacts related to changes to precipitation patterns, water availability, and increasingly severe and frequent extreme weather events. Table 9 below summarises the ranking of the megatrends in each of the four thematic areas, with the most important at the top (it is helpful to refer also to Table 4 (in Chapter 5), which ranks the megatrends in terms of their direct and indirect effects, uncertainties and linkages). From Table 9 it is apparent that the technology and environmental megatrends emerge as priority for Europe’s environment. The economic and social megatrends (as related to changing demographics) are also important. Of lower priority are the megatrends related to changing patterns of disease burden and increasing inequalities. While these megatrends are likely to be important to Europe socially, any impacts to Europe’s environment will be extremely limited and overshadowed by the other megatrends. 29 Table 9: Summary table ranking priority megatrends to Europe by thematic area Double Click on the Table to see animation of ranking Ranked score: Climate change Ranked score: Pollution and health Ranked score: Biodiversity and nature Ranked score: Resources and waste T1. Env1. Env1. T1. T2. T1. Env 3. T2. Env1. T2. EC2. Env1. Env2. EC2. Env2. Env 3. Env 3. S2. S2. EC2. S2. EC3. T1. Env2. EC3. Env 3. T2. S2. S4. EC1. S1. S1. S5. S1. S4. S4. EC1. S3. S3. EC3. EC2. S4. EC3. S3. S1. Env2. EC1. EC1. S3. S5. S5. S5. S6. S6. S6. S6. Three megatrends (T1, T2 and ENV1) stand out as having a medium or strong influence on Europe’s environment across all four of the areas. Climate change (ENV3) is also one of the most important megatrends in terms of the effects on Europe’s environment, though it has slightly lower consequences than the other three in terms of pollution and health (this category considers only health issues related to pollution: those related to climate change are factored under climate change as a category for Europe’s environment). One notable result is that growing global pollution levels (ENV2) have only a weak influence on pollution and health in Europe, and a much stronger influence in other categories. This is seen, for example, in the interaction between air pollutants (in particular sulphates) and climate change in the northern hemisphere, described above. Another interesting element is that Economic power shifts (EC3) has a strong influence than Continued economic growth (EC1). This relates in large part due to the the opportunity that this megatrend provides in governance: agreements with a small number of large, emerging economies may have an important result in terms of the global environment and Europe’s (PBL, 2008), but also due to the greater uncertainty about the effects and scale of these power shifts compared to continued global economic growth. Economic growth therefore appears less problematic for Europe’s environment than it might be for the global environment more generally, borne out by the scores for direct effects which are not high for Europe (see Table 4 in Chapter 5). 30 In terms of the effects on Europe’s environment, Shifts in population structure (S2) appears to be more important than the Shifts in population size (S1). Here, the effect of Europe’s ageing population would appear to be a key factor. A further issue to underline is the importance of decreasing stocks of natural resources (ENV1), which has the strongest influence on the EU environment of all the environmental megatrends across all categories.. These rankings should be treated with care, as the table includes the levels of uncertainty, which differ significantly among megatrends, but it is particularly important to be aware of those uncertain effects that may also be most significant if they are to arise. The economic megatrends exhibit a lower degree of uncertainty compared to some of the other megatrends. If uncertainty is removed from the scoring the economic megatrends move up the rankings a few places. The scoring deliberately has been kept as simple and transparent as possible, without the use of weightings, since the scores themselves are qualitative and, while one could apply sensitivity testing, e.g. by applying different weights to direct and indirect effects, it would be difficult to justify the basis for any such weights. In terms of outcomes, effects are effects whether they are direct or indirect; both may vary in magnitude, nature, location and sensitivity of the receptors. 31 7. CONCLUSIONS The analysis of long-term global megatrends undertaken here – firstly exploring the possible effects of the megatrends identified, then the potential inter-relationships among those megatrends, and then looking more closely at cross-cutting key environmental effects in Europe in relation to climate change, pollution and health, biodiversity and nature, and resources and waste – has identified a range of potential implications for Europe’s environment along with considerable uncertainty as to the actual pathways that might be followed. Long-term futures work is inevitably exploratory, however much it may be supported by quantitative modelling and/or empirical evidence of past trends. We cannot assume, for example, that patterns established in the past will continue into the future, even in the short term let alone to 2050 or beyond. On the other hand the concept of megatrends does provide an important framing device for thinking about the major influences into the future and how policy makers can be more prepared for some of the potentially most significant but highly uncertain events that may unfold. 7.1 RANKING THE MEGATRENDS Four of the 14 megatrends appear to be particularly important, when considering their effects on Europe’s environment, their uncertainties and also their linkages to other megatrends: T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles ENV3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies ENV1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources The technology megatrends are notable in terms of their pervasive influence on future global impacts on the environment. Technology offers a great variety of approaches for addressing environmental problems, from alternative energy sources to lighter materials that use less energy and raw materials to manufacture. This megatrend in particular is open to great uncertainty. The environmental megatrends will also have important effects on Europe’s environment. Their ranking underlines the importance that global environmental developments will have for Europe. 7.2 DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS ON EUROPE’S ENVIRONMENT The analysis shows that global megatrends will have a series of direct and indirect consequences for Europe’s environment. The most evident consequences will arise in the area of climate change: here, a series of global megatrends – including population growth, the growing middle-income consumer class in countries such as China and India, the accelerated development of technology and continued global economic growth – will be among the 32 main forces shaping future levels of greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, these global megatrends will play a key role in terms of the severity of climate change that Europe will face in coming decades.6 In terms of resources, the links between global megatrends and Europe’s environment are complex and uncertain. Growing energy demand and the resulting global competition is likely to stimulate offshore oil extraction and possibly unconventional gas exploration in Europe, both of which will have a series of consequences for biodiversity, pollution levels and more. It is also possible that mining in Europe, in recent decades in decline, will increase again. The analysis suggests that the megatrends will have other consequences in terms of pollution and health: in coming decades, for example, hemispheric air pollution is expected to increase as economies across Asia become stronger in the immediate decades to come (in a longer time frame, policies to address air pollution in China and elsewhere may reverse this trend). Hemispheric pollution of contaminants such as ozone and POPs are expected to contribute to the background level of air pollution across Europe; they seem unlikely to reverse improvements in air quality in urban areas due to lower local emissions. Here too, new technologies offer opportunities to reduce pollution levels. For biodiversity and nature as well, the global megatrends are expected to have a relatively weak impact on Europe itself, though globally the loss of biodiversity will be a major concern. 7.3 BROADER CONSEQUENCES: THE ISSUE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY In addition to the direct and indirect consequences on Europe’s environment, the global megatrends and their broader environmental consequences present a further set of concerns for Europe. Climate change, for example, will displace millions of people around the world. IPCC estimates of “climate refugees” by 2050 range from 25 million to one billion, indicating that this is one of the areas of great uncertainty the world will face. These and other impacts from climate change may bring instability in many parts of the world. Moreover, social and political problems related to climate change may combine with other consequences arising from the megatrends, such as youth bulges in countries with poor economic growth, to increase migration pressures as well as social and political instability. These sorts of consequences may be seen in many parts of the world, including in Europe’s neighbours in the southern and eastern Mediterranean as well as in sub-Saharan Africa. Climate change together with social instability could increase the stream of people who seek better futures and refuge in Europe. In terms of natural resources, while forecasts by the World Bank suggest that mineral and fossil fuel resources are sufficient to meet growing demand, price levels and uncertainties of supply may mark coming decades. Moreover, the concentration of many resources – from conventional oil to rare metals used in solar cells and other applications - may see future actions to establish cartels and oligopolies that drive up prices and use access to resources for political ends. Europe as a major importer of mineral and fuel resources is vulnerable to disruptions to supplies. The analysis in these two areas alone – the impacts of climate change in different parts of the world and the availability of resources for Europe’s economy – suggest that environmental security should be a major lens for long-term strategies in Europe. This perspective is based on 6 Europe’s share of greenhouse gas emissions has been steadily diminishing, though an important political issue in global discussions is how to weigh past compared to current and future emissions 33 ... [the] growing understanding that environmental degradation, inequitable access to natural resources and transboundary movement of hazardous materials increase the probability of conflict and thereby pose a risk to human and even national security (ENVSEC). This perspective implies that environment should have a growing role in foreign and defence policies, including at European level. 7.4 TECHNOLOGY The high score given to the technology megatrends underlines the fact that coming decades are likely to see accelerating technological progress, in particular in the new areas of nano, bio and cognitive sciences and technologies. Here, the implications for the world and for Europe’s environment are hard to predict, as the paths of discovery and innovation cannot be foreseen. Technology is one of the key uncertainties that will shape the global future. This uncertainty implies an opportunity for public policies in Europe to support technological developments that can solve environmental problems, both in Europe and elsewhere. The opportunities are underlined, for example, in the recent study by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Getting in the Right Lane for 2050 (PBL 2050). The results in that study as well as this analysis suggest that in the long-term, a necessary path for the protection of Europe’s environment involves research and development of new technologies to address global environmental and resource issues. 7.5 GOVERNANCE The detailed megatrend assessments prepared for EEA covered four of the five STEEP categories: no reports, however, focused on the fifth category, politics. As an initial approach to addressing this gap, the following points briefly extract some of the links to political and governance issues that arise from the megatrends. Several of the key interactions among megatrends may affect future global governance in coming decades; four areas could lead to interactions with the sphere of politics and governance: A key area is related to the decline of global public goods, seen in the environmental megatrends. Another area is in terms of managing uncertainties and risks. New technologies in particular can bring both solutions and new threats. Other uncertainties and risks arise from pandemics. S2 (shifts in population composition) includes “youth bulges” that may instability to several parts of the world, including the Middle East and Africa. One key function of governance is to develop structures (including legal agreements) to manage the uncertainties in social and economic systems. Here as in the previous areas, the issues that arise are global and need to be addressed at this level. A third area relates to coping with change. These include the shifts in economic power, which will change global political relations. Technology is likely to change our perspectives. Governance at all levels – international, national and sub-national – is needed to cope these with changes.. These interactions all suggest that stronger global governance – and potentially new forms of governance – will be needed to face the great changes underway. 34 A significant issue for Europe will be the extent to which the European Union will be able to wield the degree of influence it has been able to on the world stage in terms of global governance, given the rising and shifting power associated with the economic power houses of SE Asia and Latin America. The ability for the EU and its member states – collectively and individually – to tackle future challenges will depend on putting in place appropriate governance structures to understand, regulate and implement measures to prepare for and resolve such challenges. 7.6 FINAL REFLECTIONS Overall, the research has highlighted the complexity of undertaking long-term futures analysis of megatrends, subject as it is to considerable uncertainty in relation to the nature, scale and direction of the megatrends themselves as well as their likely effects, globally and for Europe. Information and quantitative data in many areas are sparse, but point to important areas for further research in the future if we are to get a better understanding of the long-term megatrends and their drivers. However, the research has also highlighted some key priority megatrends for Europe’s environment (and therefore also identified those that are less important to Europe, although important globally), and where targeted policy action will be needed if some of the most damaging environmental megatrends are to be slowed or reversed. 35 8. ANNEX I – DETAILED SUMMARIES OF THE MEGATRENDS This annex presents an over of the contribution of each megatrend to environmental impacts in Europe. Each of the megatrends will ultimately have a set of impacts on Europe. These have been assessed in terms of two main categories: Direct changes to Europe’s environment caused by the drivers associated with the megatrend, Changes caused to the environment in another part of the world that can have an indirect effect on Europe’s environment. Under each of these categories are a further set of sub-categories; o Increased / decreased impacts of climate change in Europe, o Increased / decrease pollution and human health impacts in Europe o Increased / decreased changes impacts to nature, biodiversity and land use change in Europe o Increased / decreased levels of natural resource use and waste in Europe. Table 10 below describes the criteria used to assign scores to the contribution of megatrends to direct and indirect environmental impacts in Europe, and associated uncertainties. Table 10: Criteria for assigning scores to contribution to environmental impacts in Europe, including uncertainty Contribution Uncertainty Score Score Weak Medium Strong Megatrend is likely to lead to a slight contribution in relation to the effect identified. The megatrend is not likely to be the primary contributor to the effect identified. Low Megatrend is likely to be one of several contributors to the effect identified, but not the principal one, but its contribution will mean that the effect will continue to increase. Medium Megatrend likely to make a significant contribution to the effect identified. High 36 Predictions around the megatrend are reliable and do not depend on multiple assumptions of varying certainty. Number of assumptions megatrend is based on increases, and the contribution of the megatrend to the impacts depends on the evolution of other trends. Contribution of megatrend is speculative, and depends on the specific evolution of other megatrends. 8.1 S1: SHIFTS IN POPULATION SIZE: INCREASE, DECLINE AND RISING MIGRATION Summary of the global megatrend Today the world population is still growing albeit much slower than in the past. In the future, the growth is expected to slow down, but the pace is uncertain as development of the major driver, regional fertility rates, is uncertain in long term. In global terms, population growth will take long time to slow down and long time to eventually regain momentum thereafter. This development differs significantly between regions. In large parts of the developed world populations are already in decline or are expected to begin declining soon. In contrast, many developing nations are characterised by continuingly increasing populations Migration is expected to play an important role in demographic change over the next 50 years. It leads to populations becoming more diverse and also has an impact on populations’ growth rates and on the amount of working population. However, the estimates on the scope and geographical spread are highly uncertain. Migration is a complex phenomena including voluntary migration for economic reasons as well as involuntary migration for political, religious, or environmental and climate change reasons. Interrelationships with other megatrends This megatrend, shifts in population size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) has close links with many other megatrends, including most other social megatrends as well as the economic megatrends and the environmental megatrends. This megatrend, shifts in population size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) is very closely linked with that of shifts in population composition (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges): in many ways, the two are sides of a single coin. This megatrend is also closely linked to urbanisation (global urbanisation) in developing countries: urban areas are expected to absorb all of the growth in the world’s population, as well as draw away part of the existing rural population (UN 2010). There are also key links with health megatrends, notably Changing patterns of disease burden globally (changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics): child health is a key factor in population growth in developing countries; so is access to family planning. While improving child health may increase population growth in the short term, in the long term this factor leads to lower fertility rates (WHO, 2002). In addition, This megatrend is linked to S5 (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world) as the successful demographic transition from high to low fertility depends to a significant extent on improvements in health (WHO 2002). 37 Figure 2. Links between fertility rates and GDP Source: Economist (2009). The social megatrends (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration, shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges, global urbanisation, increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world and changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics) are closely linked also to economic ones. This megatrend in particular (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) and Continued economic growth (EC1) have a series of strong links. For example, rising populations provide labour for fast-growing emerging economies; in contrast, ageing reduces the labour base of an economy (Biois). A further link between population and economic growth relates to fertility rates: these by and large fall with higher economic incomes (see Figure 2 above). While social and economic megatrends are closely interrelated, a key issue for the global future relates to their relative weights in terms of the consequences for the global environment (and Europe’s). Global population growth between 2005 and 2050 will – under the UN’s highest projection – be about 75%. (This takes the “constant fertility” scenario – however, fertility rates have consistently fallen in recent decades and this is not by the UN to be a strongly plausible scenario: its “high” scenario is about half a billion less.) In contrast, the economies of China and India may growth seven-fold over this period (Poncet, 2006; see also EC1 (continued economic growth) and EC3). Without diminishing the importance of population growth and migration in future trends, it appears that economic growth and associated consumption patterns may have stronger consequences on the world’s environment in coming decade – and thus on Europe’s. The close links described above between these two megatrends – shifts in population size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) and continued economic growth (EC1) also suggest that a high economic growth future is not likely to intersect with a high population growth future. At the same time, there is not a simple trade-off here, as key areas of the world where high economic growth is foreseen, such as China, are already expected to have low population growth. These two key vital megatrends – shifts in population size and continued economic growth – meet with a third megatrend, The emerging global middle-income consumer class (S4), whose consumption patterns (and the related production patterns) will closely influence the environmental megatrends (see emergence of a global middle-income consumer class). 38 This megatrend (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) is linked to the EC2 intensified competition for resources as population growth is one factor driving resource demand; however, population growth in coming decades is expected to be slower than in past decades, reducing its influence (World Bank, 2009). The growing world population will also increase pressures on resource use (ENV1) as well as those related to environmental degradation (ENV2) as well as a driver for climate change. As indicated above, slowing global population growth will reduce the effects of this megatrend: the growing middle-income consumer class (emergence of a global middle-income consumer class) and continued economic growth (EC1) are thus likely to have a strong influence on these environmental megatrends than population growth itself. Migration is also a key element of this megatrend (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) and it plays an important role in these relationships. Poverty is a key driver of migration, and thus migration trends will closely interact with continued economic growth (EC1). Many migrants seek better economic opportunities in urban areas and other countries. In doing so, migrants can increase their incomes and this can bring benefits to both their host – for example filling a labour gap created by ageing – and their home countries, through remittances (Biois, 2010). The figure above (Figure 2) presents key demographic trends around the world, including major migration patterns. While this figure shows migration leaving major developing countries such as India and China, in the longer term the fast-growing emerging economies may become a destination of migrants as their populations slow. This is expected to be the case for China (whose population will decline after 2030) and Turkey, as well as for parts of southern India (Biois). Thus, migration is also linked to megatrend EC3, Power shifts. Figure 3. A snapshot of global demographic trends Source: CIA (2001) 39 Climate change (ENV3) and other types of environmental degradation (ENV2) are likely to be linked closely with migration. These megatrends can influence long-term changes – reduced average rainfall patterns – that will combine with other factors that spur migration, such as conflict and economic conditions. In Africa, for example, an estimated 10 million people have migrated over the past decade due to desertification (IOM). Climate change may also increase the frequency of some natural disasters, such as hurricanes and droughts and will reduce the capacity of people to cope with them, leading to further migration. The total number of climate and environmental “refugees” is difficult to estimate also because these factors will combine with other reasons for migration, such as economic conditions and conflict (Biois). Migrant populations will in turn affect the environment in their new homes – sudden migrations, such as those related to conflict and disaster, can have very negative impacts. Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: Table 11: Important areas of uncertainty associated with megatrend S1. Shifts in population size Fertility rates in different areas of the world Infant and child mortality Government policies for women’s education and health Migration policy of both emigration and immigration countries Economic growth in different parts of the world Future conflicts and their impacts on involuntary emigration Climate change and its influence on migration The UN projections for the total global population size in 2050 range from under 8 billion for the low growth scenario to almost 12 billion for the constant fertility scenario, though the latter is considered unlikely – the UN’s high scenario projects a global population of about 11.5 billion. The evolution of fertility rates are one of the major uncertainties influencing population growth and decline, as small differences in fertility rates can lead to significant differences in population sizes (Biois). Mortality rates also have an influence – in particular those for infants and children. As these factors are closely related to other megatrends, the uncertainties related to population growth are closely related to their uncertainties. Notably, uncertainties in health trends are important, in particular the extent of improvements in child health in developing countries. (Unexpected health events, such as major global pandemics or major medical breakthroughs, would also influence population levels.) Reductions and adult mortality will have a slower impact globally, but can be important in countries with rapid improvements – this has been the case in Ethiopia in recent years (Biois) and could occur in other low-income countries where healthcare is poor and life expectancy is low. Here, political and governance actions at both international level and within developing countries can play a key role. These include policies for female education and employment, will also have a major influence on population and migration patterns, and health policies. Migration is however considered the most uncertain element of population shifts (UN, 2009), due in particular to the influence of other megatrends. Data on current patterns are incomplete, and the dimensions and patterns of future migration are very difficult to project. By one estimate, the share of global population living outside country of birth has risen from about 2.5% in 1960 to 3% in 2005, while absolute levels increased by about 2.5 times due to the increase in global population (DRC 2008 cited in Biois). UN projections simply project future migration based on recent levels. 40 Many factors could greatly change future migration. Possible differences and unexpected events in economic growth and conditions can change migration patterns: for example, megatrends EC1 (continued economic growth) and EC3 discussion differences in projections for India and China, as well as different scenarios for economic and political development in South Africa. Future conflicts have been a major source of migration and could bring uncertainties for future trends. In Europe in the 1990s, for example, the conflicts in the Western Balkans led to the internal displacement of about 4 million people, and an estimated 600,000 more went to other European countries (EEA, 2010) – an event little foreseen a decade before. Conflict in the Congo had left over 1 million people internally displaced (UNHCR, 2010). The scale of conflicts over the coming 40 years, their geographic distribution and their impacts on migration are all great sources of uncertainty. The influence of climate change and other environmental degradation will be important, and is open to great uncertainty. IPCC estimates cited by IOM range from 25 million to 1 billion people around the world displaced by 2050: the severity of climate impacts in different scenarios is the key factor in this uncertainty (IOM, 2009). Urbanisation trends (global urbanisation) will influence these uncertainties, as many growing cities around the world are in coastal areas and could face flooding risks related to sea-level rise (Biois). The figure below (Figure 4) provides a picture of potential sources of migration due to climate change and environmental degradation. Figure 4. Origin and destinations of international migrants: climate change and environment induced uncertainty for the future Source: Warner, 2008 Migration policies will also shape future migration paths. Many OECD countries have changed their migration policies in recent years, making it easier for highly skilled immigrants from the rest of the world to come and work but restricting access to low-skilled workers and tightening border controls. In part, these changes have been due to the recent economic crisis. At the same time, many OECD countries have strengthened efforts to integrate immigrants – while making citizenship harder to obtain (OECD, 2010). In Europe today, 41 immigration policy is a major source of debate (see e.g. Carrera and Guild, 2008), and some analysts ask whether social and political difficulties make it impossible for Europe to absorb high levels of immigrants from the rest of the world on an ongoing basis (Rand, 2004). Table 12: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S1. Shifts in population size Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= In terms of scoring, it is clear that population shifts have strong links throughout the megatrends. The uncertainties associated with population growth (and decline) are seen as relatively low compared to other megatrends: at global scale its major components, such as fertility and mortality, change slowly over decades. Indeed, the key uncertainties identified above are related in fact to other megatrends. In contrast, uncertainties associated with migration are higher – and here, patterns can change quickly. Moreover, the influence of other megatrends leads to higher uncertainties, as seen in the estimates above of the future links of climate change on migration. Likely effects for Europe’s environment This megatrend is likely to have the following consequences, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe’s environment: Table 13: Likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S1. Shifts in population size Likely effects for Europe’s environment Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Global population growth will influence climate change and its impacts on Europe (the link is discussed under ENV2) Indirect Global population growth will increase resource consumption around the world, and this in turn can increase resource consumption in Europe – e.g. through growing demand for its agricultural and forestry products, with biodiversity and pollution associated in particular with intensive production (see EC2 for a discussion of uncertainties) Indirect The decline in Europe’s population – considered separately from migration or from other megatrends – will reduce pressures on the environment (Biois). Direct Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Though not part of a global megatrend per se, Europe’s ongoing migration towards Direct Biodiversity/nature 42 Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature coastal areas, in particular in the Mediterranean, for retirement and vacation homes, may continue and this will increase pressures in coastal zones as seen for example in the Western Balkans (IEA, 2009). Migration from outside Europe would maintain Europe’s population, and related environmental pressures would remain Direct Resources/waste Biodiversity/nature Immigration is arriving mainly in urban areas in Europe (Biois). This means that other areas will see ongoing populations decline – e.g. mountain and other remote rural areas. Here, declining rural labour will contribute to the abandonment of high-nature value farmland. Indirect Biodiversity/nature Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. As shown in Table 13, global population growth will be among the megatrends that will increase pressures on natural resources and climate change around the world – and the consequences will also fall on Europe. In Europe, the population will decline slightly to 2050. This – without considering the role of other megatrends – will lead to a slightly reduction in pressures on the environment. Migration to Europe, which in recent years has been the most important driver of population growth in Europe, will have the opposite effect (Biois). In both cases, many of the environmental effects are expected to be relatively minor as governance of environment, land use and other policy areas in Europe will mediate the consequences. The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences on Europe as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related both to those for the megatrend as a whole – described and scored above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves. Overall, the direct consequences – which are related to population decline and migration – appear to be relatively low. In contrast, indirect consequences on Europe’s environment appear to be stronger: these are related to population growth around the world. The most important areas are climate change – population growth will be among the factors fuelling global emissions which will in turn affect climate change in Europe. A consideration of timing can also be made. The main UN population scenarios see a steady decline in population growth over coming decades: in the medium scenario, it will fall to 0.34% a year by 2045-2050 (Biois), less than a third of current levels (in the unlikely constant-fertility scenario, the growth rate will fall much less drastically). This implies that global population growth in itself will decline in terms of its consequences. It may remain important in some parts of the world. Moreover, other demographic changes such as migration are not likely to diminish, and their consequences will remain throughout the period. Table 14: Scoring the likely effects for Europe’s environment related to global megatrend S1. Shifts in population size Likely effects on Europe’s environment Direct Indirect Strength Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty n.a. n.a -/+ Biodiversity and nature -/+ Natural resource use -/+ Climate change Pollution and health 43 Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Other consequences (e.g. for governance) The analysis above suggests that the effects of the shifts in population size will have important consequences for Europe’s environment – though these may be smaller in magnitude than other megatrends, in particular those related to economic growth. This has important consequences for policy, as it suggests that the relationship between economic growth – and specifically production and consumption patterns – is among the most important factors for the future of the global environmental. Population shifts nonetheless remain quite important. For example, while migration could provide a solution for Europe’s declining population, some observers warn that this is not socially or politically feasible: a high number of immigrants over a long period of time is “not acceptable in the current socio-political climate prevailing in Europe”, according to one analysis (Rand 2004). The Rand analysis is in terms of accepting migration on voluntary terms. The future impacts of climate change could, however, generate political and humanitarian crises, even at levels far below the high IPCC estimate of 1 billion climate change “refugees” by 2050. Moreover, such migration shifts in can lead to social conflict (IOM). There are risks of that a vicious circle of events may arise in regions where climate change impacts and other forms of environmental degradation together with poor economic conditions lead to migrations and then further conflicts and new social problems. While this may represent a worst-case scenario, even less severe climate events could create instability in countries neighbouring Europe and beyond, posing risks to Europe’s security. Thus, the direct and indirect consequences for Europe’s environment may be overshadowed by much larger concerns related to security – and this suggests that an environmental security perspective needs to be an important element of future European policy actions, including in external aid as well as international relations more generally. Reference The analysis presented here used the following background document: Bio Intelligence Service (Biois), General support to the forward-looking assessment component of the European state of the environment and outlook report (SOER 2010 PART A): Background Paper on Demographics and Migration, Final Draft, April 2010 Other sources include: Carrera S and Guild E (2008), The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum: Intergovernmentalism vs. Europeanisation? Security vs. Rights? CEPS Policy Brief No. 170 CIA (2001) Long‐term Global Demographic Trends: Reshaping the Geopolitical Landscape. Availableat: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general‐reports‐1/Demo_Trends_For_Web.pdf Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRC, 2008) Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends and their Implications for Migration. Economist (2009), Fertility and living standards: Go forth and multiply a lot less. October, 29. 2009 – cited in Biois 44 European Environment Agency, Environmental trends and perspectives in the Western Balkans: future production and consumption patterns, EEA Report No. 1/2010 International Organization on Migration, Migration, Climate Change and the Environment, Policy Brief, May 2009 OECD (2010), International Migration Outlook 2010 Poncet S (2006), The Long Term Growth Prospects of the World Economy: Horizon 2050, CEPII – cited in Ecorys (2010), Analysis of global long-term economic megatrends shaping Europe’s future environment Background document for SOER part A Version 22/04/10 RAND Europe (2004) Low Fertility and Population Ageing: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options. Available at: www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG206.pdf UNHCR (2010), 2010 UNHCR country operations profile - Democratic Republic of the Congo, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c366 (consulted August 2010) United Nations (2009), World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision – Highlights, 2009 United Nations (2010), World Urbanization Prospects The 2009 Revision – Highlights World Bank (2009), Global Economic Prospects: Commodities at the Crossroads 45 8.2 S2: SHIFTS IN POPULATION COMPOSITION: AGING AND YOUTH BULGES Summary of the megatrend Population ageing is a global trend strongly linked to declining population. The world population is getting older at an unprecedented rate. In 2000, about 7% of the world’s population was aged over 65, and this is expected to increase to 16% by 2050. Contrary to the trends in developed economies, many developing countries are expected to experience until 2025 substantial youth bulges (youth bulges are disproportionate concentrations of people in the 15‐to‐29 year‐old age group), for example 60% of African population is expected to be younger than 30 years. (Taken from fact sheet no. 2 – for further information sheet the fact sheet) Interrelationships with other megatrends This megatrend is closely linked to demographic and other social megatrends. The links with economic megatrends, in particular continued economic growth (continued economic growth) are also strong. The closes links are those with Shifts in population size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration): as noted in the previous sheet, these two megatrends are in many ways two sides of a coin. Youth bulges are also closely linked to migration, another element of megatrend S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration): in areas that face ongoing economic difficulties, high numbers of young people are likely to move to wealthier areas and higher-income economies to improve their prospects (see the previous sheet for further information on links between migration and economic conditions). The changing population composition will also closely interact with health drivers. Ageing in particular is closely related to increasing life expectancy (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world). As described under that megatrend, the elderly will need more health care and – in particular persons with disposable income – will seek therapies that can extend lifespans. Youth bulges are also closely tied to health megatrends. A reduction in child mortality rates can increase the size of child and youth populations. The HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa has had a different effect: by striking a large share of the adults, it has left a larger than normal share of youths in population composition (Biois). As both examples indicate, Changing patterns of disease burden (megatrend S6: changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics) will influence future youth bulges. This megatrend, Shifts in population composition, will also be closely tied to EC1 (continued economic growth). Ageing will have one set of effects: an ageing economy will see a declining share of the population in normal working age, reducing the labour force. This will affect in Europe in particular: a 2009 report by the European Commission report estimates that the ageing population in the EU will cut the Union’s estimated long-term economic growth from by over half a point, from 2.4% to 1.8% for the period to 2060 (DG ECFIN). Ageing will also place high burdens on health, pension and other social payments in Europe and other ageing economies (Biois). Ageing is also likely to change the economic structure: for example, health care will be a growing sector of the economy in Europe. The extent of ageing in Europe and its effects on labour markets can be seen in Figure 5 below: under current projections, about 90 million immigrants would be needed to replace the fall in working age population to 2050 – more than five times the projected level. It should be noted that other options, in addition to immigration, may help to address this gap, including raising the retirement age in Europe as well as increasing the share of working age population that is employed (the latter is a goal of the European Commission’s Europe 2020 Strategy). 46 Figure 5. Net migration required to hold working age population constant at 1995 levels in 2050 Source: EEA (2007) In contrast, youth bulges present a different set of issues. High numbers of young people entering an economy’s workforce can fuel economic growth – if economic conditions and governance can provide the jobs for them. Where they do not, one result will be migration (see above). Another potential result is social and political instability: “very young and youthful age structures are most likely to undermine countries’ development and security”, as large numbers of unemployed and disaffected young men are lured by revolutionary or extremist movements (PAI). A study for the US government refers to an “arc of instability” in the northern Andes, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus, and nearby regions of Asia (NIC 2009). Ageing populations thus are likely to prompt technology developments for their health care, in particular from the Rise of nano‐, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges). A key area for research will be technologies to manage problems such as mobility and other needs for care (see the sheet for the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies). In terms of environmental drivers and megatrends, ageing populations as in Europe may be more vulnerable to suffer health problems arising from climate change (EEA, 2007 – Glimpses): a particular risk can arise from heat waves, which are expected to be more frequent in coming decades due to climate change (see ENV3). In 2003, a major heatwave is linked to the deaths of thousands of elderly in northwestern Europe (BBC 2007). Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: 47 Table 15: Important areas of uncertainty associated with megatrend S1. Shifts in population composition Fertility rates in different areas of the world Child health and mortality in fast-growing regions of the world Life expectancy in different parts of the world Migrations between ageing and youthful parts of the world Links between ageing and the economy Technology development to assist ageing As this megatrend and S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) are so closely linked, they share many of the same uncertainties. One of the key ones is related to future fertility patterns: see the previous sheet for a description of these uncertainties. Ageing will also be influenced by changes in mortality rates. Here too, the uncertainties related to other megatrends are important – in particular those related to S5 (Increasing life expectancy) and S6 (changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics). Pandemics represent a wild card that could disrupt demographic trends in coming decades. Uncertainties related to Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles (T1) and to The rise of the nano‐, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies) will also influence ageing: an example of these uncertainties is seen in the health scenarios for the OECD Biotechnology Project. The “rapid change” scenario sees major advances in health care, including for the elderly, unlike the alternative, “muddling through”, scenario (see the box in the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies for further details) The links between ageing and economic growth have been questioned by some analysts, and thus the costs may be smaller than predicted in studies such as DG ECFIN (2009). Current retirement ages in Europe, for example, are based on the shorter life spans several decades ago. While raising these has not been popular, many people remain active and can contribute to the economy until late in life: in the UK, for example, only 3% of the population over 65 is currently in care homes. A new vision of ageing – helped technologies to improve their quality of life– may greatly reduce the costs and increase benefits from this megatrend (Pearce, 2010). Youth bulges are a reflection of high fertility rates, and they are also closely influenced by child mortality levels: uncertainties in these two factors will affect the future pattern of youth bulges. As described above and for S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration), other megatrends will closely influence these factors – such as the patterns of disease (changing patterns of disease burden) – and thus many of the uncertainties related to youth bulges arise from these interlinkages. Table 16: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S2. Shifts in population composition Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= 48 In terms of scoring, this megatrend has many links with others, starting with shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration. The uncertainties are scored as low: here, nearly all of the uncertainties for this megatrend arise from linkages with other megatrends (this is in contrast with shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration, which includes migration patterns, perhaps the most uncertain element of demographic trends). Likely effects for Europe’s environment This megatrend is likely to have the following effects, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe: Table 17: Likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S2. Shifts in population composition Likely effects for Europe’s environment Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Youth bulges are likely to influence migration to Europe – this increase in population will increase pressures on the environment. Indirect Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Youth bulges can lead to conflicts in countries near Europe. Sudden influxes of migrants are a possible consequence. Another is an increased difficulty in addressing common environment issues, such as protection of the Mediterranean Sea. Indirect Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste The pressure on government budgets due to ageing may reduce resources available for the environment Indirect Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Ageing populations may reduce their high-impact consumption, such as the high demand for passenger vehicle transport and also air travel Indirect Climate change Pollutin/health Ageing populations in Europe and around the world may pay greater attention to longterm issues, and thus also to environmental concerns Indirect Climate change Pollution/health 49 Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely impacts; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. One important impact from youth bulges will arise due to the increased pressures on migration to Europe. This could have a series of direct effects on the environment, as it will increase consumption and related resource use. Youth bulges may also lead to greater conflict, which can result in unexpected waves of refugees as well as less attention to global and regional environmental problems. Ageing and declining populations in Europe will increase pressures on government budgets for health and pensions, as noted above: thus, European governments may have fewer resources available for environmental protection. At the same time, ageing may have positive a positive influence on Europe’s environment. On the one hand, this may encourage a reduction in direct environmental effects such as those arising from high motor vehicle use. Another effect may be growing awareness, demands and needs for a cleaner environment (Pearce 2010). These positive effects may be seen at global scale especially in the longer period (e.g. after 2030, as population declines and ages in China, a possible global demographic turning point). The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the effects on Europe as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole – described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely effects themselves. Table 18: Scoring the likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S2. Shifts in population composition Likely effects on Europe’s environment Direct Indirect Strength Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty n.a. n.a. -/+ + -/+ Biodiversity and nature + -/+ Natural resource use + -/+ Climate change Pollution and health Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= In general, this megatrend is seen as having low direct consequences on the environment in Europe: these would arise mainly from the lower consumption patterns of an elderly population. The indirect consequences on Europe’s environment also appear to be weak; the exception is climate change, where the health effects of climate change on an ageing population may be important. While this megatrend is not seen as relatively less important than others from an environmental perspective, it should be noted that the other consequences on Europe – in social, economic and political terms, for example – could be quite significant. Other consequences (e.g. for governance) 50 Ageing populations around the world – including in Latin America and East Asia – may have greater awareness of environmental issues and greater desires and needs for environmental protection; in the longterm this could lead to stronger global action (Pearce, 2010). In contrast, youth bulges are, as noted above, seen as closely connected with social unrest, instability and conflict. Major youth bulges are seen in several areas of instability, including Gaza and the West Bank, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan (NIC 2008). This trend is thus likely to be an important factor in security issues in coming decades. Reference The analysis presented here in particular used the following background document: Bio Intelligence Service, general support to the forward-looking assessment component of the European state of the environment and outlook report (SOER 2010 PART A): Background Paper on Demographics and Migration, Final Draft, April 2010 Other references include: BBC (2007) Europe bakes in summer heatwave. Online, accessed 05 08 10 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6915157.stm European Commission (DG ECFIN), The 2009 Ageing report – Economic and budgetary projections for the 27 Member States, 2009 European Commission (EC 2010), Europe 2020: European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth EEA (2007), The pan-European environment: glimpses into an uncertain future US National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, 2008 Pearce F. (2010), Peoplequake: Mass Migration, Ageing Nations and the Coming Population Crash Population Action International (2007), The Shape of Things to Come 51 S3: GLOBAL URBANISATION Summary of the megatrend For the first time in history more than 50 % of the world’s population, or approximately 3.5 billion, live in urban areas. By 2050, about 70 % of the global population could be urban, compared with less than 30 % in 1950, according to the UN (medium fertility global population growth scenario), indicating a significant departure from the spatial distribution of population growth over the past. The urban areas of the world are expected to absorb literally all the population growth over the next four decades while at the same time drawing in some of the rural population. Of particular relevance is Asia, which is estimated to host more than 50 % of the global urban population by 2050. Urban populations are expected to generally move away from the largest settlements in the future, favoring small‐ to medium‐sized cities instead. While growth of urban areas is expected to continue its rate of increase is expected to slow down in the future. Many developing countries might not have reached the same level of urban density as the now developed countries by 2050. Yet the speed and scope of the urban transition in many developing countries is far greater today than it used to be one century and more ago in the now developed world. Importantly, the proportion of the urban poor is rising faster in many developing countries than the overall rate of urban population growth. Interrelationships with other megatrends This megatrend is linked to ENV2 (Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load) as urbanisation can exacerbate and concentrate environmental pollutants, e.g. air pollutants. Emissions of air pollutants in densely populated areas tend to higher than surrounding areas due to the total level of emission-related activity, even though per capita emissions are reduced by higher efficiency and shorter travel distances using personal transport (Figure 6). Urban areas concentrate energy demands for transport, heating, cooking, air conditioning, lighting and housing. In combination with low dispersion conditions (such as tall buildings blocking the flow of air currents), this results in the exposure of large populations to poor air quality (UNEP 2007). Although pollutant levels in cities in developing countries have been decreasing due to controls on emission sources, changing fuel use patterns, and closures of obsolete industrial facilities (UNEP 2007), in many large cities in developing countries air pollution concentrations are high, especially for PM10 (Figure 7). For example, levels of PM10, SO2 and NO2 are above WHO guidelines (WHO 2006) in a number of cities, and differences are considerable in different regions (UNEP 2007). Megacities 7 are becoming increasingly important as sources of regional and global air pollution from associated mobile and stationary sources (Akimoto 2003). 7 A megacity is a metropolitan area with over 10 million inhabitants 52 Figure 6: Activity intensity versus per capita personal car use in 58 higher income metropolitan areas around the world Note: Activity intensity is defined as the number of jobs plus the number of people per urban hectare Source: UNEP (2007) 53 Figure 7: Trends in average annual urban concentrations of pollutants (g/m3) in selected cities worldwide Source: UNEP (2007) Increasing global urbanisation is also linked to ENV1 (decreasing stocks of natural resources). Urban areas, due to their scale (which will increase significantly to 2050) drive environmental change globally, regionally and locally (Grimm et al. 2008). The material demands of production and human consumption (predominately associated with the global consumer class located in urban areas) alter land use and cover, biodiversity and hydrosystems, and urban waste discharge affects local to global biogeochemical cycles and climate (Grimm et al. 2008). Urbanisation is also linked to ENV3 (Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change), as cities worldwide consume between 60 and 80% of global energy production, and as such are primary contributors to CO2 emissions (OECD 2010). In China today the 600 million urban residents constitute 44% of the country’s population and 17% of the urban population, yet consume 75% of total national energy demand (OECD 2010). Thus urban areas in China are responsible for generating the majority of the country’s GHG emissions, which is now the second largest contributor to global warming. This interlinkage is likely to increase as projections indicate that the urban population will reach 900 million in 2030, and as such the contribution of urban areas in China to global warming is likely to increase over the 54 long-term (OECD 2010). As well as being drivers of environmental change, urban areas are also influenced by environmental change. Climate change also poses a significant risk to cities’ development and competiveness, as rising coastal waters, more severe storms and urban heat island effects threaten to damage infrastructure, reduce efficiency and exacerbate urban poverty (OECD 2010). Increasing global urbanisation is linked to EC1 (continued economic growth) and S4 (emergence of a global middle-income consumer class). Figure 8 highlights the relationship between increasing GDP and ecological impact. The global consumer class is already estimated at 2 billion people and growing rapidly; urban areas are expected to absorb all of the growth in the world’s population, as well as draw away part of the existing rural population (UN 2010). Increasing incomes lift people out of poverty and enable them to spend on nonessential items. This is fuelled by urbanisation as millions of people move from rural to urban areas and earn middle-class wages. The result is massive increases in levels of consumption, which are unsustainable (Worldwatch Institute 2004). This growth in consumption is concentrated in cities as they provide higher income jobs, as well as great access to goods, services and facilities. Cities generate the majority of wealth and are places where people expect a better quality of life, often defined in terms of the consumption of material goods. Urbanisation is driven by the structure of the global economy, as the economies of developed countries increasing rely on services, with the manufacturing of the goods they consume shifted to developing countries. The location of production in developing countries triggers significant increases in urbanisation in developing countries, which in turn stimulates increasing incomes and consumption in these developing countries. As global economic growth increases, so too does urbanisation, driving and being driven by consumption of goods and services. This megatrend is also linked to T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles), as cities are core areas for GDP growth, and their concentration of production and capital means that they bring together researchers and entrepreneurs and markets, a combination that spurs technology development (UN 2009). The growing megacities of Asia are thus likely to become new centres of technology development in coming decades and will contribute to its acceleration. There are also links to between S3 (global urbanisation) and T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies) as technological developments in these areas could provide methods to address the problems of these huge urban areas. For example, nanotechnology may weight savings that could potentially reduce emissions of greenhouse gases could be reduced (Hett, cited in Biois). Figure 8: Economy and environment, 1961 – 2003 Source: OECD (2008) 55 Global urbanisation is also linked to S6 (changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics) as urban populations often have better access to factors important for good health, e.g. education, but conversely, non-infectious disease associated with rising incomes may become more significant. There are also links to S5 (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world). In recent past rural settlements were usually the principle location of poverty and human suffering, with all measures of poverty (either based on income, consumption or expenditure) demonstrating that rural poverty was deeper and more widespread than cities (Kessides 2006). Urban centres offered better access to health, education, basic infrastructure, information, knowledge and opportunity (UNFPA 2007). However poverty is now increasing more rapidly in urban areas than in rural areas, and hundreds of millions live in poverty in the urban slums of low- and middle-income countries, and their numbers are predicted to increase in coming years (UNFPA 2007). Slum dwellers (in 2006) include one out of every three city dwellers on the planet, totalling a billion people or a sixth of the world’s population (UN-Habitat 2007). Over 90% of slum dwellers today are in the developing world; South Asia has the largest share, followed by Eastern Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, China and India together have 37% of the world’s slums (UNFPA 2007). If no preventative or remedial action is taken, slums may come to characterise cities in many parts of the developing world, where slum formation has become synonymous with slum formation (UN-Habitat 2007). Slum and urban growth rates in 2005 are presented by region in Figure 9. Figure 9: Urban and slum growth rates by region Note: % slum indicates the proportion of the urban population living in slums; 2005 figures are projections. Source: UN-HABITAT 2005, Global Urban Observatory, Urban Indicators Programme, Phase III, in UN-Habitat (2007) State of the World’s Cities 2006-07, background paper; Slums: past, present and future. The urban poor have significantly worse health compared to other city dwellers, with poor women at particular disadvantage (Montgomery 2005). Income poverty is only one income of urban poverty, as urban slums are characterised by poor-quality and overcrowded shelter, lack of public services and infrastructure such as piped water, sanitation facilities, garbage collection, drainage and roads as well as insecure land tenure (UNFPA 2007). These factors increase health and work burdens of the urban slum dwellers and increase risks from environmental hazards and crime; poor people in urban areas live in unhealthy environments (UNFPA 2007). Health risks arise from poor sanitation, lack of clean water, overcrowded and poorly ventilated living and working environments and from air and industrial pollution (UNFPA 2007). Inadequate diet reduces slum-dwellers’ resistance to disease, especially because they live in the constant presence of pathogenic micro-organisms (Bartone 2001). 56 Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: Table 19: Uncertainties associated with megatrend S3: Global urbanisation Fertility rates Wildcard: climate change Projections related to global urbanisation are relatively certain, influenced mainly by global population growth (UN 2010). Projections of global urbanisation growth depend on the continuation of fertility reductions in the developing world. If fertility were to remain constant at current (2009) levels and the pace of urbanisation remained as projected by the UN, the world urban population would increase to 7.6 billion by 2050 instead of the 6.3 billion expected when fertility is assumed to continue declining in all developing regions (UN 2010). In many countries, natural increase (the difference of births minus deaths) accounts for 60% (or more) or urban population growth. Thus if policies to facilitate the reduction of fertility (e.g. improving access to contraception) were successful, it could reduce the rate of urban population growth in many developing countries (UN 2010). There is also significant uncertainty related to climate change. There is a plausible risk that low levels of temperature change (e.g. 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels) that could raise sea levels by as much as 7 metres over centuries to come (due to melting of ice sheets), which would flood many of the world’s existing coastal cities (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). However, there are large uncertainties about the prediction of such extreme or catastrophic events, which prevents explicit quantification of their probabilities. Table 20: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S3: Global urbanisation Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Likely effects for Europe’s environment This megatrend is likely to have the following effects, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe: Table 21: Likely environmental effects on Europe related to megatrend S3: Global urbanisation Likely effects on Europe’s environment to 2050 Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: 57 Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Increased demand for Europe’s agriculture and forestry products Indirect Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Hemispheric air pollution Direct Pollution/health Emissions of greenhouses gases Indirect Climate change Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. Global urbanisation is expected to have few direct effects for Europe’s environment, limited to a potential increase in hemispheric air pollution in Europe (Akimoto 2003, UN 2007). This hemispheric air pollution could have a negative effect on climate and agriculture in Europe. The potential indirect consequences to climate change, pollution, biodiversity and resource use are closely associated with changing consumption patterns and an increase in demand for global resources. Global urbanisation is associated with rising incomes, which is likely to increase global resource consumption, and this in turn can increase resource consumption in Europe – e.g. through growing demand for its agricultural and forestry products, with biodiversity and pollution associated in particular with intensive production. The OECD-FAO Agriculture Outlook (2010) predicts that agricultural production will increase in European countries to 2019. This could have negative consequences for biodiversity in Europe, for example by increasing the amount of intensively farmed agricultural land in Europe. Urbanisation is projected to lead to significant increases in GHG emissions, most significantly in China where increases are expected to be largest (OECD 2010). In India and China, where urban growth is projected to be greatest, aging is likely to lead to a decrease in projected emissions. However recent projections have indicated that the net effect of demographic change and urbanisation is to increase projected emissions from China by 45% by the end of the century, and from India by 25-55% (Dalton et al. 2008). The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole – described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves. Figure 10: Net agricultural production for selected countries (index 2004 – 2006=100) Source: OECD-FAO (2010) 58 Table 22: Scoring the likely effects related to megatrend S3. Global urbanisation Likely effects on Europe’s environment Climate change Pollution and health Biodiversity and nature Natural resource use Direct Indirect Strength Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty n.a. n.a. + + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. + n.a. n.a. + Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Overall, the strength of the direct effects of this megatrend to Europe’s environment are relatively low, and are related to hemispheric air pollution. The scale of hemispheric pollution in 2050, due to increasing global urbanisation, is difficult to predict accurately the uncertainty is predicted as medium. In contrast, the strength of the indirect effects to Europe’s environment are stronger, but more uncertain. It is difficult to identify the precise effect of global urbanisation on climate change as it is closely associated with increasing incomes and consumption. For this reason it is scored as likely to have a weak effect, as it is working in concert with increasing incomes. The link between urbanisation and increasing GHG emissions is well established (see above), and thus uncertainty is scored as low. The strength of the effect to Europe’s biodiversity is scored as low as demand for agricultural and forestry products due to directly to global urbanisation is likely to be low; rising incomes linked to urbanisation is likely to be more significant. The FAO projections of increasing agricultural demand in Europe only extend to 2019, so the effect to 2050 is predicted as having high uncertainty. The scale of predicted global urbanisation is large, but excluding the associated rise in incomes, is likely to only have a weak effect on natural resource use in Europe. Uncertainty is medium as, although projections on the scale of the increase in global urbanisation are relatively certain, the knock-on effects on natural resource use are less certain, but still likely. Other consequences (e.g. for governance) As the proportion of the urban poor is rising faster in many developing countries than the overall rate of urban population growth (often outstripping the capacity of cities to provide basic services), it is projected that a significant proportion of the global urban population will reside in urban slums, with insufficient sanitation systems. This could pose significant risks to health, both in the urban slums, and due to an increasingly inter-connected and inter-dependent globalised world, to other areas. The re-emergence of infectious diseases which have been successfully eradicated (or significantly reduced) in Europe due to links to disease ‘hot-spots’ could pose governance issues related to migration and disease control in Europe. These issues may be particularly acute due to the potential increase of migration to Europe associated with an aging and declining population. References The analysis presented here used the following background document: 59 Bio Intelligence Service, general support to the forward-looking assessment component of the european state of the environment and outlook report (SOER 2010 PART A): Background Paper on Urbanisation and Consumption, Final Draft, April 2010 Additional resources used include; Akimoto, H. (2003) Global Air Quality and Pollution Science 302:1716 Bartone, C. R. 2001. “Urban Environmental Management and the Poor.” Environmental Strategy Background Paper, Urban Development, Infrastructure Group. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Corfee-Morlot, Jan, Lamia Kamal-Chaoui, Michael G. Donovan, Ian Cochran, Alexis Robert and PierreJonathan Teasdale (2009), “Cities, Climate Change and Multilevel Governance”, OECD Environmental Working Papers N° 14, 2009, OECD publishing, © OECD. Dalton, M., Jiang, L., Pachauri, S., O’Neill, B. (2008) Demographic Change and Future Carbon Emissions in China and India. May 23, 2008 Draft [Update of March 16, 2007, draft presented at the Population Association of America Annual Meeting, New York, NY, 2007] Grimm, N., Faeth, S., Golubiewski, N,. Redman, C,. Wu, J., Bai, X,. and Briggs, J. (2008) Global Change and the Ecology of Cities. Science 8: Vol. 319. no. 5864, pp. 756 – 760 Kessides, C. 2006. The Urban Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction. Africa Region Working Paper Series. No. 97. Washington, D. C.: Cities Alliance. Montgomery, M. 2005. “The Place of the Urban Poor in the Cairo Programme of Action and the Millennium Development Goals,” p. XXIV-5. Ch. 24 in: United Nations Seminar on the Relevance of Population Aspects for the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals: New York: 17-19 November 2004 (ESA/P/WP.192), by the United Nations. 2005a. New York: Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. OECD-FAO (2010) Agricultural Outlook 2010 – 2019 OECD (2010) Trends in Urbanisation and Urban Policies in OECD Countries: What Lessons for China? OECD (2008) Environmental Outlook to 2030 UN (2007) HEMISPHERIC TRANSPORT OF AIR POLLUTION 2007 AIR POLLUTION STUDIES No. 16 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2010) World Urbanization Prospects, the 2009 Revision, UNEP (2007) Global Environmental Outlook 4 UN-Habitat. (2007) State of the World’s Cities 2006/7: The Millennium Development Goals and Urban Sustainability, p. 16. London: Earthscan UN-Habitat State of the World’s (2007) Cities 2006-07, background paper; Slums: past, present and future. UNFPA (2007) State of the World Population 2007: Unleashing the potential of urban growth WHO (2006) WHO Air quality guidelines for particulate matter, ozone, nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide. Global update 2005: Summary of risk assessment Worldwatch Institute 2004: State of the World 2004: the Consumer Society 60 8.3 S4: THE EMERGING GLOBAL MIDDLE-INCOME CONSUMER CLASS Summary of the megatrend Global economic growth and trade integration have fuelled long‐term shifts in international competitiveness, characterised by a high growth of productivity and rising incomes in emerging economies. Global consumer demand had been concentrated in the OECD countries so far. The number of middle‐income consumers is growing rapidly, particularly in Asia. According to a World Bank study, there could be 1.2 billion ‘middle class’ people in the now‐developing world by 2030. Average income is expected to be much lower in the emerging economies in 2050 than in the G7‐ states now. Yet the total purchasing power of middle‐income economies and middle‐income people is growing strikingly and this is likely to continue, fuelled by a steep increase in Asian demand. The focus of spending in many of the emerging economies continues to change from basic to more discretionary goods. Many parts of these populations are approaching "well to do lifestyles" and disposable income is spent, as in “Western“ societies, on high nutrient food, cars, household appliances, personal care products and other quality services. Large‐scale consumer markets are emerging which can fuel future resource demand. Brazil, Russia, India and China together could match the G7 share of global GDP by 2040‐2050. Importantly, the benefits of economic growth are not distributed evenly across populations. Relative poverty will persist and might even become more acute. Interrelationships with other megatrends The emergence of a global middle-income consumer class is linked to EC1 (continued economic growth) and S3 (global urbanisation). The global consumer class is already estimated at almost 2 billion people and is growing rapidly, potentially increasing to 3.2 billion by 2020 and to 4.9 billion by 2030; 85% of this growth will come from Asia (Kharas 2010, Figure 11). Thus this megatrend is linked to EC3 (power shifts – from a uni-polar to multi-polar world) as the growth of the middle-income class and the associated increase in wealth in China and India will influence these countries global influence. This increase in the global middle-income class is fuelled by urbanisation as millions of people move from rural areas and earn higher incomes (OECD 2010). Urbanisation in developing countries is increased by the relocation of manufacturing from developed countries (Kharas 2010). As global economic growth increases, so too does urbanisation, driving and being driven by consumption of goods and services. As people’s income’s increase they have more money available for spending on discretionary items, leading to increases in consumption (Worldwatch Institute 2004). History has shown that increases in consumption expenditures per person have been more important in increasing consumption compared to growth in global population; while consumption spending increased six-fold from $4.9 trillion in 1960 (in 2008 dollars) to $30.5 trillion in 2006, human numbers only grew by a factor of 2.2, and hence consumption expenditures per person almost tripled (Worldwatch Institute 2010). Thus projected increases in GDP, and incomes, in Asia are likely to result in a significant increase in the consumption of goods and services. Globally, the demand from the middle class may grow from USD21 trillion to USD56 trillion by 2030, with over 80% of this growth in demand coming from Asia (Kharas 2010). China is already emerging as the world’s most important consumer market, e.g. in 2000 the US accounted for 37% of global car sales, while China accounted for under 1% - in 2010 China is expected to account for 13%, including bus and truck vehicle sales, China is already one of the most largest vehicle markets in the world (Kharas 2010). This increase in consumption will be focused in rapidly growing Asian cities, as urban areas are expected to absorb the majority of population increases to 2050 (UN 2010), and incomes are typically higher in urban areas (OECD 2010). 61 Figure 11: Numbers (millions) and Share (percent) of the Global Middle Class Source: Kharas (2010) As emerging economies develop and stimulate domestic demand and consumption, subsequent increases in resource demand will intensify competition for global resources (Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment). It has been argued that it is a “new consumerism” that defines the middle-class: a constant “upscaling of lifestyle norms; the pervasiveness of conspicuous, status goods and of competition for acquiring them; and the growing disconnect between consumers desires and incomes” (Schor 1999 in Kharas 2010). If this is the case, as the numbers of people in the middle-income class increases, and their demand for goods increase, then increased resources will be required. There are also links to ENV1 (decreasing stocks of natural resources) and ENV2 (increasingly unsustainable pollution load). The scale of the increase in the global middle-income class and the consequent rise in consumption (linked to rising incomes and urbanisation) is likely to increase resource use and pollution. The material demands of production and human consumption (predominately associated with the global consumer class located in urban areas) alter land use and cover, biodiversity and hydrosystems, and urban waste discharge affects local to global biogeochemical cycles and climate (Grimm et al. 2008). For example, urban areas (where the majority of the global middle-income class will be located) are associated with higher air pollution than surrounding areas due to the total level of emission-related activity, even though per capita emissions are reduced by higher efficiency and shorter travel distances using personal transport (UNEP 2007). Figure 12 highlights the relationship between increasing GDP and ecological impact. Figure 12: Economy and environment, 1961 – 2003 Source: OECD (2008) 62 This megatrend is also linked to ENV3 (Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change) as the rise of the global middle-income class and associated increase in consumption the key drivers of the projected increase in GHG emissions, especially in emerging economies (e.g. China and are set to overrun any efficiency gains from technological developments (e.g. Guan et al. 2008)). The rise of the global middle-income consumer class is linked to S5 (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world). Although the numbers of the middle-income class will increase in urban areas, inequality is likely to persist as the numbers of urban-poor are also expected to increase (UNFPA 2007). Slum dwellers (in 2006) include one out of every three city dwellers on the planet, totalling a billion people or a sixth of the world’s population (UN-Habitat 2007). If no preventative or remedial action is taken, slums may come to characterise cities in many parts of the developing world, where urban growth has become synonymous with slum formation (UN-Habitat 2007, Figure 13). Figure 13: Urban and slum growth rates by region Note: % slum indicates the proportion of the urban population living in slums; 2005 figures are projections. Source: UN-HABITAT 2005, Global Urban Observatory, Urban Indicators Programme, Phase III, in UN-Habitat (2007) State of the World’s Cities 2006-07, background paper; Slums: past, present and future. A larger middle-income class is also linked to S6 (changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics). As incomes and urbanisation increase, healthcare is likely to become more affordable and accessible, reducing the burden of infectious disease. Urban centres offered better access to health, education, basic infrastructure, information, knowledge and opportunity (UNFPA 2007). However rising incomes of the global middle-income class may result in an increase in the non-infectious disease burden (e.g. obesity, diabetes, heart disease) (WHO 2009). Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: 63 Table 23: Uncertainties associated with megatrend S4: the emerging global middle-income consumer class Economic growth Domestic demand in Asia Transition of power The levels of economic growth, which are inextricably linked to the emergence of the global middle-income class, are uncertain. Projections related to increases in the global middle-income consumer class rely on assumptions of continued economic growth, and would not materialise if the reality was global economic failure (Kharas 2010). The OECD’s Environment Outlook to 2030 provides an illustration of implications of different assumptions for growth rates by taking average labour productivity and other economic factors from other time periods. For stronger growth, 2000 to 2007 was used as a time period; for slower growth, a longer historical trend; a final variant looked at unprecedented growth levels, based on the idea that a new economic era has started. In all, the resulting variance in China’s GDP for 2030 was over 80%; those for India’s almost 40%. To sustain the increase in the numbers of middle-class in China (where the majority of the increase in middle-class will be), domestic demand will have to increase if exports decrease. However, due to China’s unequal income distribution and the small current share of its middle class, it is not certain at all that this will happen (Kharas 2010). Policies required to rebalance growth in China towards domestic demand involve long-term institutional changes such as the creation of a social safety net, medical insurance schemes, and better public education services. If these changes are not implemented then the growth of domestic demand could be suppressed, and the Chinese economy could fail to grow beyond middle-income levels even after decades of strong performance. There are uncertainties in how the world will manage shifting relative economic power towards Asia. The projections discussed above are based on a scenario that assumes any frictions will be managed, but if the domestic politics of the major economies are not robust enough to adjust to the major structural shifts envisaged then the increases could be reduced (the extent of this potential reduction is not discussed in the literature. Table 24: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S4: the emerging global middle-income consumer class Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Likely effects for Europe’s environment This megatrend is likely to have the following consequences, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe: 64 Table 25: Likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S4: the emerging global middle-income consumer class Likely effects for Europe’s environment Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Growing demand for European agricultural and forestry products Indirect Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Indirect Increased climate change impacts in Europe Biodiversity/nature Climate change Pollution/health Direct Increase in hemispheric air pollution in Europe Increased exploitation of mineral and fuel resources in Europe Indirect Pollution/health Pollution/health Resources/waste Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. Direct consequences to Europe’s environment are relatively limited, and are likely to be related to a decrease in European air quality due to an increase in hemispheric air pollution (Akimoto 2003). Indirect consequences are more likely, and are closely related to a rise in demand for global resources. This may result in an increase in the exploitation of European resources (agriculture, forestry, mineral, fuel) with potential negative consequences for pollution and health as well as biodiversity. An increasing global middle-income consumer class will increase resource consumption around the world, and this in turn can increase resource consumption in Europe – e.g. through growing demand for its agricultural and forestry products, with biodiversity and pollution associated in particular with intensive production. The OECD-FAO Agriculture Outlook (2010) predicts that agricultural production will increase in European countries to 2019. This could have negative consequences for biodiversity in Europe, for example by increasing the amount of intensively farmed agricultural land in Europe. Increasing demand and resource use as a result of an increasing global middle-income consumer class will also increase global environmental pressures such as climate change (due to increased emissions of greenhouse gases). Increasing resource use, particularly fossil fuels, due to the rise of the global-middle class is likely to lead to increase to climate change across the world, the consequences of which will also be experienced in Europe, with negative effects to biodiversity and health likely. Increasing prices of natural resources due to increased competition is likely to encourage the exploitation of Europe’s mineral and fuel resources, which could lead to increased pollution and health effects. 65 The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole – described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves. Table 26: Scoring the likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S4: the emerging global middle-income consumer class Direct Indirect Likely effects on Europe’s environment Contribution Uncertainty Contribution Uncertainty Climate change n.a. n.a. + Pollution and health + n.a. n.a. Biodiversity and nature n.a. n.a. + Resource and waste n.a. n.a. + Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Increases in energy demand associated with increasing incomes is predicted to contribute significantly to increases in climate change, and this megatrend is scored as likely to have a strong effect, which is relatively certain due to the likelihood of the projections around the extent of the increase in the global middle-income class. The strength of the direct effects of this megatrend to Europe’s environment are low, and are related to hemispheric air pollution. The scale of hemispheric pollution in 2050, due to the emerging middle-income class, is difficult to predict accurately but it is likely that it will increase (UN 2007, Akimoto 2003). For this reason the strength of the effect and the uncertainty is predicted as medium. The strength of the effect to Europe’s biodiversity is scored as medium as the emergence of the global middle-income class is likely to be so large that demand for agricultural and forestry products is likely to increase. However the available projections from the FAO of increasing agricultural demand in Europe only extend to 2019, so the effect to 2050 is predicted as having high uncertainty. The emergence of the global middle-income class, and subsequent increase in consumption, is likely to only have a medium effect on natural resource use in Europe. Uncertainty is medium as, although projections on the scale of the increase in are relatively certain, the knock-on effects on natural resource use are less certain, but still likely. Other consequences (e.g. for governance) National economic policies can play a role in favouring domestic consumption as a stimulus for growth. At the same time, new middle-class consumers are also likely to demand better “public goods” such as education and healthcare – as well as better environmental conditions such as air quality. Initially these concerns of the new middle-income class may be related to improving local environmental issues, but their concerns could eventually extend to climate change and result in policies to reduce their contribution to it. Success in reducing the contribution of the gobal middle-income class to climate change would benefit Europe too. Over decades their concerns could extend to other global issues such as biodiversity. As globalisation moves towards the growth of consumerism, the middle-classes of Asia, North America and Europe may find increasingly share common cultural and political ideals. While this idea might sound like a simplified presentation of Fukuyama’s End of History, now often discredited, it should not be discounted as global communication brings the “Internet classes” closer together. Conflicts that could also arise from regions of the world and segments of the population bypassed by growth and middle-class comforts – and who see in their cities or on TV the lifestyles of the fortunate. 66 References The analysis presented here used the following background document: Bio Intelligence Service, general support to the forward-looking assessment component of the european state of the environment and outlook report (SOER 2010 PART A): Background Paper on Urbanisation and Consumption, Final Draft, April 2010 Additional resources include: Akimoto, H. (2003) Global Air Quality and Pollution Science 302:1716 Grimm, N., Faeth, S., Golubiewski, N,. Redman, C,. Wu, J., Bai, X,. and Briggs, J. (2008) Global Change and the Ecology of Cities. Science 8: Vol. 319. no. 5864, pp. 756 – 760 Kharas (2010) The emerging middle-class in developing countries. OECD Development Centre, working paper No. 285 OECD (2008) Environmental Outlook to 2030 OECD-FAO (2010) Agricultural Outlook 2010 – 2019 UN (2007) HEMISPHERIC TRANSPORT OF AIR POLLUTION 2007 AIR POLLUTION STUDIES No. 16 UNEP (2007) Global Environmental Outlook 4 UNFPA (2007) State of the World Population 2007: Unleashing the potential of urban growth UN-Habitat (2007) State of the World’s Cities 2006-07, background paper; Slums: past, present and future. WHO (2009) Global Health Risks: Mortality and burden of disease attributable to selected risks 67 8.4 S5: INCREASING LIFE EXPECTANCY: GROWING OLD AND SEEKING YOUTH IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD Summary of the megatrend The population of the world is getting older. Older persons continue to contribute productively to society; however, they are more likely to be susceptible to environmental pollution and hazards, e.g. air pollution, heat waves and floods, and to higher rates of certain diseases, e.g. Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, heart disease, cancers and arthritis. The trend of an ageing population is first seen in the developed countries. After 2020 these trends are expected to become increasingly important also in developing countries (e.g. South Central Asia, South America and the Caribbean). By 2050, it is predicted that about 80% of the elderly could be leaving in developing countries. In addition, population ageing is occurring in parallel with rapid urbanisation: in 2007 more than half of the world’s population live cities, by 2030 this figure is expected to rise to more than 60%. Technology and economic development continues enabling substantial improvements in illness treatments, access to health care and support ability of people to live longer healthy lives. In the long term, some technology optimists see radical changes in human enhancement and life extension: increasing medical breakthroughs to counter ageing as well as ‘bionic’ interventions that incorporate the use of nanotechnology. Such breakthroughs, if they do come along, are likely to be very expensive and thus likely to be affordable mostly in rich countries – and even here, perhaps only for the wealthiest part of the population. Thus health inequalities are becoming significant, both between countries and within countries. However, in an optimistic scenario, the gains in access to health care, drinking water and sanitation will continue, further improving health in what are now the poorest countries of the world. This in turn depends on the absence of widespread conflict. It is becoming more and more important to distinguish effects according to rich and poor and less on the country bases. It is highly uncertain to which degree positive effects (longer healthier lives) will be counter‐played by negative ones (increased inequalities, decreasing health for poorest, and spread of diseases from hot spots. Additionally, development can be seen as a “double edged sword”. Apart from providing benefits, easy access to high protein / high calorie foods, sedentary lifestyles, and the emergence of status competition, can lead to physical and mental health problems (obesity, stress and the erosion of community and traditional values and social support networks) also for the rich and middle class. Interrelationships with other megatrends This megatrend is linked to S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) as the successful demographic transition from high to low fertility depends to a significant extent on improvements in health (WHO 2002). A fall in child mortality results in a fall in fertility; with fewer children, parents are likely to invest more in the education of each child, and rising life expectances mean that there is a longer time in which to benefit from investments in education (WHO 2002). Thus this megatrend is also linked to EC1 (continued economic growth) as increasing life expectancies act to drive economic growth. Additional links to EC1 (continued economic growth) arise as ill health may leave persons able to work, but reduce productivity, shorten their working lives and increase the number of days lost to illness (World Bank 1993). Healthier workers are less likely to be absent from work due to illness or illness in their family, especially important in developing countries where a higher proportion of the workforce in engaged in manual labour (WHO 2002). Economic growth can also lead to negative environmental effects that can have an adverse effect on health; for example in many Chinese cities air quality is so poor that nationwide the costs of excess morbidity and mortality for urban residents are estimated at 5% of GDP (OECD 2000). This megatrend is linked to S2 (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges). An older population will have higher have higher rates of certain diseases, e.g. Alzheimers, Parkinsopn, heart 68 disease, cancers and arthritis (UN 2002), and are thus likely to require more health care. Persons with more disposable income will seek therapies that can extent lifespans and good health in old age. This megatrend is also linked to S3 (global urbanisation), S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class) and S6 (changing patterns of disease burden globally and risk of new pandemics) as urbanisation and rising incomes increases access to healthcare (discussed in global urbanisation and the emerging global middle-income consumer class). Increasing incomes of the global middle-income class are important in the context of health inequality, as across the world, within and between countries, ill health disproportionately afflicts poor people (WHO 2002). In poor countries income protects against poor sanitation, unhealthy working and living environments, poor nutrition, and a plethora of infectious diseases, on the other hand, in rich countries income inequality is an indicator of the quality of social arrangements, stress and mortality (WHO 2002). Thus health is closely correlated with incomes, and as incomes increase (due to rise of middle-income class) health is likely to improve in developing countries. ENV3 (increasing severity of the consequences of climate change) is also linked to this megatrend. An older global population may be more at risk of negative effects of climate change, e.g. increases in the frequency and severity of heat waves. Some climate change impacts, such as increasingly severe and frequent heat waves, are projected to be more pronounced in urban areas (IPCC 2007), and thus an increase in the population of urban areas in terms of elderly people will increase exposure and consequence of climate change impacts. Urban areas may also be particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts due to high (and increasing) levels of inequality. Even in developed countries climate change may have an adverse effect on the poor, which lack the resources to respond quickly and effectively to protect themselves from extreme weather patterns (Mathew 2007, in OECD 2010). As the urban poor often occupy the least expensive land, sometimes in illegal slum developments, that may be more exposed to climate change, for example the un-developed floodplains of the Dharavi slums in Mumbai (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). This megatrend is also linked to T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies), as these technological advances may increase life expectancy; medical breakthroughs to alleviate the problems of aging populations, including ‘bionic’ interventions that incorporate nanotechnologies, are among the possibilities (Royal Society 2004) which may increase life expectancy. Some observers imagine a “posthuman” future coming – in time frames as early as 2050 – with our bodies are increasingly changed voluntarily and integrated with machines (Bostrom 2009). New technologies are also important in reducing health inequality in developing countries, for example in 2008 around 45% of the 1.4 million HIV-positive, pregnant women in low- and middle-income countries received antiretroviral therapy to prevent the transmission of HIV to their babies (WHO 2010)8. Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: Table 27: Uncertainties associated with megatrend S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world Economic growth projections Governance of urbanisation Evolution of health technologies 8 Although more than 4 million people in low- and middle-income countries were receiving ART by the end of 2008, there were more than 5 million untreated HIV-positive people in these countries (WHO 2010). 69 Economic growth, and the associated rise in incomes and living standards, is a key uncertainty. Projections related to increases in the global middle-income consumer class rely on assumptions of continued economic growth, and would not materialise if the reality was global economic failure (Kharas 2010). The OECD’s Environment Outlook to 2030 provides an illustration of implications of different assumptions for growth rates by taking average labour productivity and other economic factors from other time periods. For stronger growth, 2000 to 2007 was used as a time period; for slower growth, a longer historical trend; a final variant looked at unprecedented growth levels, based on the idea that a new economic era has started. In all, the resulting variance in China’s GDP for 2030 was over 80%; those for India’s almost 40%. Such variation would have significantly different outcomes for health inequality and life expectancy in these countries. As health inequality is linked to urbanisation, how urbanisation manifests itself is a key uncertainty which will influence this megatrend. If the governance of urbanisation (in developing countries) is poorly managed and leads to slum development, it is likely that health inequalities will persist and increase. Poverty is now increasing more rapidly in urban areas than in rural areas, and hundreds of millions live in poverty in the urban slums of low- and middle-income countries, and their numbers are predicted to increase in coming years (UNFPA 2007). However, if urbanisation is well managed it offers the opportunity for improvements to health by improving access to health services and increasing incomes; urban centres offer better access to health, education, basic infrastructure, information, knowledge and opportunity (UNFPA 2007). It is impossible to predict how technological innovation will affect health, health inequality and life expectancy to 2050. It is likely that the effect will be positive, but there exists the possibility that this positive effect may not be evenly distributed, potentially increasing inequality. However, significant advances in the treatment of the most significant global diseases (TB, malaria, mental illness and HIV/AIDS (WHO 2002)) could radically reduce health inequality and increase life expectancy in developing countries. Table 28: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Likely effects for Europe’s environment This megatrend is likely to have the following consequences, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe: Table 29: Likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world Likely effects for Europe’s environment to 2050 Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: 70 Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Increased contribution of older people to climate change Indirect Climate change Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. The effects on Europe’s environment from increasing life expectancy and global inequality are uncertain. An older global population could potentially lead to increased GHG emissions as older people have been shown to have slightly higher GHG emissions associated with their lifestyles than the average (SEI 2008, Figure 14). However this study was based on a sample of the population in England so any inference to the global population to 2050 is highly uncertain. The effects of this megatrend on the global and European environment are indirect – and moreover cannot be clearly predicted. For example, ageing populations may be more concerned about the world’s future; they may seek healthier lifestyles for themselves and support a more ‘sustainable’ global future. An opposing view could emphasise the increased social and financial burden of care for the elderly could change how societies and economies in Europe function: one result could be increased resource use and a reduction in attention to the global environment. The long-term prospect of human enhancement, such as medical advances to extend life spans, could bring further uncertainties. Will such an opportunity distract policy makers and the wealthy from attention to the ‘real world’ and its environment? Health care may improve in many parts of the world. However, a large share of the world’s population will continue to face poor health care – as well as poor environmental conditions. Many of these people will live in the growing mega-cities in developing countries. These places may become breeding grounds for social unrest Figure 14: Age related carbon-footprint Source: SEI (2008) 71 Table 30: Scoring the likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world Direct Likely effects on Europe’s environment Indirect Strength Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty n.a. n.a. + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Climate change Pollution and health Biodiversity and nature Natural resource use Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, n.a. = not applicable Direction of contribution: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= The strength of the direct effect to climate change is scored as weak as the potential increase in climate change emissions from an older population is likely to be small in the context of the emissions associated with the rise of the global middle-income class. Uncertainty is high the consumption patterns of older people to 2050 are impossible to determine. Other consequences (e.g. for governance) Increasing global inequality may fuel conflict, particularly terrorism direct at developed countries. This may increase security risks within Europe if European countries are seen to maintain, or at least not successfully address, increasing inequality. If health inequality is significant between and within countries, infectious diseases may become increasingly common in poorer socio-economic groups. There is a risk that infectious disease could pass from these groups to the wider population, and thus pose a significant health risk to the entire population. Europe may be directly at threat of infectious diseases from beyond its borders, posing difficulties in designing an appropriate response. References The analysis presented here used the following background document: Milieu Consortium, Report on health related megatrends – identifying global health megatrends in support of SOER 2010 Part A, Final Draft March 2010 Additional resources include: Bio Intelligence Service, Support to analysis of mega-trends in the areas of nanotechnology, biotechnology and information and cognitive science, Final Draft Background paper, April 2010 Bostrom, Nick (2009) The Future of Humanity. Published in New Waves in Philosophy and Technology, eds. Olsen et al, New York: Palgrave McMillan. 72 Corfee-Morlot, J., I. Cochran and P. Teasdale (2009), “Cities and Climate Change: Harnessing the Potential for Local Action,” Competitive Cities and Climate Change, OECD, Paris, pp. 78. IPCC (2007b), Climate Change 2007: Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson (eds.), Cambridge, UK and New York, USA, Cambridge University Press. Kharas (2010) The emerging middle-class in developing countries. OECD Development Centre, working paper No. 285 Mathew, R. A. (2007), “Climate Change and Human Security,” in: Climate Change: What It Means for Us, Our Children, and Our Grandchildren, edited by J. F. C. DiMento and P. Doughman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. OECD (2000) Beyond Economic Growth; meeting the challenges of global development Royal Society (2004) Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties SEI (2008) Growing old in a changing climate – meeting the challenges of an aging population and climate change UN (2010) World Urbanization Prospects, the 2009 Revision UN (2002) World Population Aging: 1950 – 2050 UNFPA (2007) State of the World Population 2007: Unleashing the potential of urban growth WHO (2010) Millennium Development Goals: progress towards the health-related Millennium Development Goals. Factsheet No. 290 WHO (2002) Health, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction: The Report of Working Group 1 of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 73 8.5 S6: CHANGING PATTERNS OF DISEASE BURDEN GLOBALLY, AND RISK OF NEW PANDEMICS Summary of the megatrend There is a distinct difference in the disease burden between developed and developing countries. Malnutrition and infectious diseases are dominant in the developing world, while obesity and many non‐infectious diseases (cardiovascular, neurodegenerative, diabetes, respiratory, cancer, and mental health) are dominant in the developed world. As countries develop, infectious diseases generally become a less significant portion of the disease burden, being replaced by non‐infectious diseases, often associated with lifestyle, consumption and ageing and they face the increase in the levels of obesity, and other diseases associated with inactivity. Changes in working, living and travel practices contribute to changing the global disease burden, both between and within countries. Migration within and between countries is increasing as the world becomes more globalised. These migrations increase the opportunity for diseases to spread rapidly between populations, and may result in the re‐introduction of infectious diseases to areas where they had been eradicated (or significantly reduced) from. For example, Tuberculosis (TB) has re‐emerged to become more common in some developed countries where it had historically been reduced to extreme lows. This increase in the incidence of TB has been linked to migrants from areas of high health inequality. Migrations within countries (usually from rural to urban areas) have, resulted in increased risk from infectious diseases, violence and drug dependence, particularly when they result in chaotic slum development. Urbanisation, in the presence of good governance, may increase access to education, employment and health services, reducing the disease burden of the population. In the absence of good governance urbanisation is associated with increased burden of infectious diseases. Globalisation and the increase in global mobility may also change the disease burden of developed countries. The effectiveness of interventions such as airport screening, travel restrictions and other community mitigation measures remains uncertain. Interrelationships with other megatrends This megatrend is linked to EC1 (continued economic growth) and S3 (global urbanisation), as it has been shown that there is a distinct correlation between the patterns of disease burden and income levels (which increase with urbanisation and economic growth). For high- and middle-income countries, the most important risk factors are those associated with chronic diseases such as heart diseases and cancer, with tobacco the leading cause for both (WHO 2009). In high-income countries alcohol, overweight and blood pressure are also leading causes of healthy life years lost; each being responsible for 6 – 7% of the total (WHO 2009). In middle-income countries, risks for chronic diseases also cause the largest share of deaths, although risks such as unsafe sex and unsafe water and sanitation also cause a larger share of the disease burden than high-income countries (WHO 2009). In low-income countries, relatively few risks are responsible for a large percentage of the high number of deaths and loss of healthy years, risks which increase the incidence or severity of infectious disease (WHO 2009). The leading risk factor for low-income countries is underweight, micronutrient deficiencies, and suboptimal breastfeeding, causing 10%, 7% and 10% respectively of the total disease burden (WHO 2009). Figure 15 ranks selected risk factors for low, middle and high-income countries. The link between income levels and global pandemics such as AIDS is complex and poorly understood. Within Africa evidence has shown a disproportionate effect on richer countries, however within all other continents there is neither a positive nor a negative statistical association between income levels and AIDS (WHO 2002). 74 Figure 15: Ranking of selected risk factors: 10 leading risk factor causes of death by income group, 2004 Note: Countries grouped by gross national income per capita – low income (US$ 825 or less), high income (US$ 10 066 or more). Source: WHO (2009) There are also links between this megatrend to S3 (global urbanisation) and S5 (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world) as poverty is increasing rapidly in urban areas and hundreds of millions live in poverty in the urban slums of low- and middle-income countries, and their numbers are predicted to increase in coming years (UNFPA 2007). People living in urban slums face significant health risks, not just due to low incomes but also due to poor-quality and overcrowded shelter, lack of public services and infrastructure such as piped water, sanitation facilities, garbage collection, drainage and roads; which increase health and work burdens of the urban poor and increase their risks form environmental hazards and crime (UNFPA 2007). Inadequate diet reduced slum-dwellers’ resistance to disease, especially because they live in the constant presence of pathogenic micro-organisms (Bartone 2001). Increasing global migration, as part of S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration), is linked to this megatrend. Increasing volumes of migration and rising population mobility, against a background of health inequalities, increase the risk of the spread of disease between regions of the world as the infectious disease threats of a single region can become international phenomena (IOM 2004). Migrants from areas where diseases are more or less common than they are at their new destination come to represent populations with higher or lower rates of these disease when compared to the host population (IOM 2004). Thus global disparities in national capacity to manage some transmissible infectious disease 75 are significant and the prevalence of many serious infectious diseases in areas of the world where migrants can originate can be hundreds of times greater than that observed in migrant receiving nations (IOM 2004). This is highlighted by the fact that diseases such as tuberculosis, hepatitis, malaria and HI V are more common in migrant communities than host populations (Gushalak and MacPherson 2000, PHAC 2003, IOM 2004). Increasing migration and global mobility may change the patterns of disease burden globally by spreading diseases between global regions, but also potentially increasing the speed at which global pandemics spread. This megatrend is also linked to T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies) as nanotechnologies are expected to improve drug delivery, sensing and diagnosis and other sectors of medicine, boosting the fight against many diseases including cancer. Biotechnology offers many opportunities for health care, including the development of replacement organs (Biois). The integration of these new technologies is likely to provide further advances. Medical breakthroughs to alleviate the problems of aging populations, including ‘bionic’ interventions that incorporate nanotechnologies, are among the possibilities (Royal Society 2004). Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: Table 31: Uncertainties associated with megatrend S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics Rate of economic growth Governance of urbanisation Emergence of global pandemics Economic growth, and the associated rise in incomes and living standards, is a key uncertainty. Projections related to increases in the global middle-income consumer class rely on assumptions of continued economic growth, and would not materialise if the reality was global economic failure (Kharas 2010). The OECD’s Environment Outlook to 2030 (OECD 2008) provides an illustration of implications of different assumptions for growth rates by taking average labour productivity and other economic factors from other time periods. For stronger growth, 2000 to 2007 was used as a time period; for slower growth, a longer historical trend; a final variant looked at unprecedented growth levels, based on the idea that a new economic era has started. In all, the resulting variance in China’s GDP for 2030 was over 80%; those for India’s almost 40%; this variation would have significantly different outcomes for the patterns of disease burden, with higher incomes associated with a higher burden of non-infectious disease, and lower incomes a higher burden of infectious diseases. As the global patterns of disease burden are linked to urbanisation, how urbanisation manifests itself is a key uncertainty which will influence this megatrend. If the governance of urbanisation (in developing countries) is poorly managed and leads to slum development, it is likely that disease burden of infectious disease will persist and increase. Poverty is now increasing more rapidly in urban areas than in rural areas, and hundreds of millions live in poverty in the urban slums of low- and middle-income countries, and their numbers are predicted to increase in coming years (UNFPA 2007). However, if urbanisation is well managed it offers the opportunity for improvements to health by improving access to health services and increasing incomes; urban centres offer better access to health, education, basic infrastructure, information, knowledge and opportunity (UNFPA 2007), which may reduce the global burden of infectious disease. The emergence of virulent global pandemics is highly uncertain to 2050, and the emergence of such diseases would significantly change the global pattern of disease burden. 76 Table 32 below scores the likely links between this megatrend and others. Although this megatrend is closely linked to several megatrends, it is influenced by, rather than influencing, them. Thus the ‘contribution’ score is low. Table 32: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Likely effects for Europe’s environment This megatrend is not likely to have any consequences for Europe’s environment. A changing pattern of disease burden globally and the risk of new pandemics may increase the consumption of novel and existing pharmaceuticals, which could result in an increase in presence of pharmaceuticals in waste- and drinkingwater. For example steroid estrogens have been shown to be present in waste water, due to consumption of oral contraceptives (Roswell et. Al 2003). Thus increasing consumption of pharmaceuticals could result in global contamination of waste- and drinking-water. However the effects of such contamination are highly uncertain, and it is unlikely that there would be any effects to Europe’s environment. Table 33: Likely environmental effects related to megatrend S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics Likely effects on Europe’s environment Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste No effects on Europe’s environment likely Table 34: Scoring the likely consequences on Europe related to megatrend S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics Direct Likely effects on Europe’s environment Climate change Pollution and health Indirect Strength Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 77 Biodiversity and nature Natural resource use n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Other consequences (e.g. for governance) Non-infectious diseases such as obesity, heart disease and cancer are expensive to treat, and increasing prevalence of these diseases would result in more expensive public health systems. This may pose a challenge to how healthcare is provided in Europe. The link between migration and the incidence of infectious diseases in migrant populations may become increasingly significant as Europe is projected to require increasing numbers of migrants over coming years due to population decline. If perceptions of migrants change in Europe, and they are less welcome, population decline may require a different policy response. References The analysis presented here used the following background document: Milieu Consortium, Report on health related megatrends – identifying global health megatrends in support of SOER 2010 Part A, Final Draft March 2010 Additional resources include: Bartone, C. R. 2001. “Urban Environmental Management and the Poor.” Environmental Strategy Background Paper, Urban Development, Infrastructure Group. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Gushulak BD, MacPherson DW. Population mobility and infectious diseases: The diminishing impact of classical infectious diseases and new approaches for the 21st century. Clin Infect Dis 2000; 31: 776-780. IOM (2004) Population Mobility, Migration Infectious Disease Outcomes. Seminar on Health and Migration, 9-11 June 2004. Session II A – Globalization of communicable diseases Kharas (2010) The emerging middle-class in developing countries. OECD Development Centre, working paper No. 285 OECD (2008) Environmental Outlook to 2030 PHAC (2003) Tuberculosis among the Foreign-born in Canada. Accessed online 03 08 10 http://www.phacaspc.gc.ca/publicat/ccdr-rmtc/03vol29/dr2902eb.html Rowsell VF, Pang DS, Tsafou F, et al, Removal of steroid estrogens from wastewater using granular activated carbon: comparison between virgin and reactivated carbon., Water Environ Res, 2009, Vol:81, Pages:394-400, ISSN:1061-4303 UNFPA (2007) State of the World Population 2007: Unleashing the potential of urban growth WHO (2009) Global Health Risks: Mortality and burden of disease attributable to selected risks WHO (2002) Health, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction: The Report of Working Group 1 of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 78 8.6 T1: GLOBAL ACCELERATION AND SHIFTS IN TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CYCLES Summary of the megatrend Over the last fifty years, the pace of technological change in several economic sectors and technologies has continuously accelerated, leading to increased pace of mass use of basic innovations and related societal and economic changes. Competition pressure is rising as emerging economies start to challenge developed countries in the core areas of their competitiveness advantages, namely high‐technology development. In spite of persisting differences, many emerging economies are stepping up their general research and innovation capacities. Growth rates in patent filings in Asian economies are beyond the level of many developed economies (figure 2). Acceleration of technology development cycles is likely to continue and might also concern those economic sectors that have been slower to change in the past, in particular energy and transport. Moreover, the very nature and process of creating, owning and sharing knowledge (in and beyond technologies) is changing in a highly inter‐linked world. In spite of all progress, a technology divide is likely to remain between developed and many developing countries. Technology transfer and support is likely to remain a critical issue in the decades to come, particularly in Europe's neighbourhood. Interrelationships with other megatrends This megatrend will have close links with urbanisation (global urbanisation) and with health megatrends (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world S5; changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics S6). It is very closely linked to economic megatrends, in particular continued economic growth (continued economic growth). And it will have important links to environmental megatrends, in particular those related to climate change and natural resources. Of course, this megatrend is also tightly linked with the other technology megatrend, Rise of the nano, bio, ict and cognitive sciences and technologies (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies). Technology development will have strong links with megatrends (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world) and changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics. The acceleration and shifts in technology can help to reduce disease mortality and provide ways of improving nutrition in food, thus improving overall health (CEP and Milieu, WHO 2009). The links with health are most likely to arise from the rapid development of biotechnology and other parts of the “NBIC” cluster. For example, nanotechnologies are expected to improve drug delivery, sensing and diagnosis and other sectors of medicine, boosting the fight against many diseases including cancer. Biotechnology offers many opportunities for health care, including the development of replacement organs. (Biois) The integration of these new technologies is likely to provide further advances. Medical breakthroughs to alleviate the problems of aging populations, including ‘bionic’ interventions that incorporate nanotechnologies, are among the possibilities (Royal Society 2004). Technology is also likely to interact with urbanisation (global urbanisation): cities are the core areas for GDP growth, and their concentration of production and capital means that they bring together researchers and entrepreneurs and markets, a combination that spurs technology development (UN, 2009). The growing megacities of Asia (Bios, 2010) are thus likely to become new centres of technology development in coming decades and will contribute to its acceleration. Technology may also provide new methods to address the problems of these huge urban areas. Urban areas can use new IT technologies to monitor pollution levels and to manage problems such as traffic. For example, the UK study Intelligent Infrastructure 2055 presents a scenario where IT technology transforms urban traffic to flow with greater efficiency – and this in turns allows much greater mobility in cities. 79 Links with economic megatrends will also be close. On the one hand, economic growth (continued economic growth) provides the financial means to pursue scientific and technological research. OECD countries as a whole spend about 2.2% of GDP on research and development, while the average in the EU27 is slightly lower, about 1.8% (OECD, 2010). Most developing countries have a much lower level, though research and development has reached 1.5% of China’s GDP (World Bank data, 2010). The link is important in the other direction as well, as innovation supports economic growth. In fact, in advanced economies where the supply of labour and other factors of production remains constant (at least as a theoretical model), technology becomes the main driver of economic growth (this relationship was researched by Robert Solow, 1987 Nobel Prize winner in economies: see Nobel Prizes, 2010). Over the past 50 years, technology has also reduced overall demand for sub-soil resources: the World Bank estimates that global demand for metals and energy per unit of GDP has fallen by 0.9% and 0.8%, respectively. Technology is one of the two main factors for this trend (the other being the shift to a service economy). After 1995, metals intensity increased – due almost solely to China’s economy. The World Bank (2009) expects the trend to resume in coming years, in particular as China’s economy shifts towards services. This is a key link between this megatrend and EC2 intensified competition for resources. The developments in the areas of nanotechnology in particular are expected to provide stronger and lighter materials that will reduce relative demand for sub-soil resources – it is even possible that breakthroughs will increase the decoupling seen in the past 50 years (Biois). One important further consideration is that the power shift underway (power shifts – from a unipolar to a multi-polar world EC3) has strengthened technology development outside of Europe and other OECD countries. In coming decades, an increasing number of technology breakthroughs are likely to come from emerging economies such as India and China. Notably, the developing countries of East Asia and the Pacific spend about 1.5% of their GDP on research and development (China, the large country in this grouping, has the same level); this is higher than any other region of the development world (World Bank Data, 2010). The acceleration in technology will also have a series of close and direct interactions with environmental megatrends (changing stocks of natural resources EN1; increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load ENV2 and increasing severity of the consequences of climate change EN3) There is a link between this megatrend and ENV1 in that technology may help to preserve biodiversity and natural resources: in the scenarios developed for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005), for example, the “Technogarden” scenario foresees environmentally friendly research, and this is an important component of a path that allows high economic growth with low biodiversity loss. Further, new technologies are seen as a key step in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. According to an IEA assessment, a large range of technologies – from energy efficiency to carbon capture to new nuclear and alternative energy generative capacity – is needed to accommodate economic growth on a low-carbon path (IEA, 2008) showing the interrelationship between this megatrend and ENV3. Finally a key issue for the coming decades – either as part of a low-carbon path or an alternative – will be whether to experiment with large-scale “geo-engineering” methods to reduce the effects of climate change again linking this technology megatrend with ENV3. The Royal Society in the UK (Royal Society, 2009) commissioned a report for “a detailed assessment of the various methods and considers the potential efficiency and unintended consequences they may pose” (see box). Geo-engineering: Recommendations of the UK Royal Society The Royal Society’s report on geo-engineering made the following recommendations: Geoengineering methods should only be considered as part of a wider package of options for addressing climate change. Carbon dioxide removal methods should be regarded as preferable to solar radiation management 80 The UK government should fund a 10 year geoengineering research programme The Royal Society, in collaboration with international science partners, should develop a code of practice for geoengineering research and provide recommendations to the international scientific community for a voluntary research governance framework Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend This megatrend is extremely uncertain: future developments in technology, in particular over the period to 2050, are hard to predict. Table 35: Uncertainties associated with megatrend T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles The pace of scientific discovery The time to turn scientific discoveries into products on the market. The shape of future discoveries and future products: solutions for what problems? Public reaction to technologies Unexpected consequences of new technologies, including disasters A key issue will be the time needed to turn major scientific discoveries into products. While for major infrastructure – such as existing energy systems – new technologies may move slowly to market, making foresight easier, in other areas such as consumer products the uptake of a potentially profitable technology can be far quicker: this is seen today in the way that nanotechnologies are becoming pervasive in products from food to sun screen. In the energy field, the service life of large power plants, for example, is between 50 and 70 years. In contrast, industrial equipment has a much broader range, typically starting at 10 years. This makes the update of energy efficiency technologies much quicker than that of new power generation methods (IEA, 2008). A broader uncertainty regards the future of technology change. Here, recent Rockefeller Foundation study considered technology future to 2030, in particular in terms of technologies that may support the resilience and equitable growth of communities (Rockefeller Foundation, 2010). The study indicated a very broad range of outcomes (see box). Scenarios for the future of technology and international development 81 This study for the Rockefeller Foundation used two axes were used to build four scenarios: the first axis is the degree of economic integration and political governance; and the second is the adaptive capacity of society. Where both factors are strong, the “Clever together” scenario emerges: new technologies support efforts to address global problems. Where both are weak, the “Hack attack” scenario sees weak governments, growing criminality that uses sophisticated technology and also widespread counterfeiting that reduces incentives for the development of useful innovations. In a third scenario, “Lock step”, strong government combined with weak society leads to more authoritarian leadership around the world, slower innovation – and although some social and environmental problems are addressed, technology is widely used for social control. In the fourth scenario, “Smart scramble”, local technological solutions are developed to address local problems in a world where global growth has stalled. The risks of unexpected consequences and public reactions may be strongest in particular for the NBIC technologies: this is seen in a study on nanotechnology futures (Wuppertal et al 2006), discussed under megatrend T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies). On the basis of the analysis above, the following scores are assigned regarding the extent of links of this megatrend as well as its uncertainty: Table 36: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Technology is, as described above, closely linked with many megatrends. Moreover, the uncertainty of its future development and effects is high (and this uncertainty is expected to growth over time). Likely effects for Europe’s environment Due to the great uncertainty associated with future technology, the range of possible consequences on Europe’s environment is very wide and equally uncertain. The following table provides a set of examples that should not be considered exhaustive: 82 Table 37: Likely effects for Europe’s environment arising from megatrend T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles Likely effects for Europe’s environment Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Technology is expected to continue to reduce the amount of energy and raw materials needed per unit of GDP of the global economy. This will reduce pressures on climate change in particular. Indirect Climate change New energy technologies promise to reduce GHG emissions, reducing future (longterm) climate change consequences in Europe Indirect Climate change The development of geo-engineering technologies could provide opportunities to reduce global climate change – with difficult-to-foresee results and effects Indirect Climate change New technologies for alternative energy and energy efficiency developed elsewhere in the world will reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Europe. Direct Climate change New process technologies developed elsewhere in the world can reduce industrial pollution in Europe Direct Pollution/health Resources/waste The examples in the table above show that the acceleration of technology is likely to have strong consequences for Europe’s environment, in particular in terms of indirect consequences. For technology in particular, it is difficult to separate events around the world from those in Europe, as many aspects of scientific research and technology development are global activities. On a broad scale, technology will bring greater efficiency in the use of energy and metals (World Bank 2009), thus reducing greenhouse gas emissions and resulting climate change impacts on Europe in the decades to 2050. The development and deployment of alternative energy generation and energy efficiency technologies around the world will also reduce climate change: this is already underway in China, which reportedly has 22 nuclear reactors under construction, together with new hydroelectric capacity and a growing industry for solar cells (Fairley). The use of geo-engineering technologies around the world may have further results in terms of reducing climate change effects on Europe. Deployment is expected to be decades away, and the effectiveness, broader consequences and overall acceptance of such approaches are all far from certain. In all these areas and in particular in the last, the possible future effects are highly uncertain. In coming decades, continued economic growth (EC1) and the power shift (EC3) towards emerging economies will mean that a greater share of technologies will be developed outside of Europe. As noted above, for example, China is becoming a major developer and producer of solar cells. Enterprises, households and governments in Europe will be able to choose from these new technologies and use the ones that reduce effects on the environment. 83 These direct consequences of Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles are likely to be positive: one key reason is that the precautionary principle is part of European policy-making (though the effectiveness of and approach to its application are open to debate). The indirect consequences are far more uncertain. The key uncertainty, as suggested by the Rockefeller Foundation scenarios (see above) as well as scenarios on biotechnology for OECD (see the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies), is whether technology paths will support efforts for global sustainability or rather follow other priorities, such as security. The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties focus on the relationship between the megatrend and Europe’s environment. Table 38: Scoring of the likely effects for Europe’s environment arising from megatrend T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles Likely effects on Europe’s environment Direct Indirect Strength Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty - -/+ - -/+ Biodiversity and nature -/+ -/+ natural resource use - - climate change pollution and health Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High Overall, the scores are strongest in the areas of climate change, pollution and health and natural resource use: here, the sources cited in this section (and those for T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies) as well) identify specific technologies that could influence these areas of the environment. Links to biodiversity and nature are less clearly identified: they are part of the “technogarden” scenario for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005): here, the effects appear to be indirect, in terms of reducing resource demands. Moreover, technology here appears to be especially important in terms of reducing negative effects on biodiversity in developing countries: the effects on Europe are thus even more indirect and weaker. While not scored here, one further consideration is that the scale of effects is likely to increase over time, as new technologies come to market and influence an ever greater range of economic, social and other sectors. Other consequences (e.g. for governance) The future development of technology will pose challenges for global governance. The application of the precautionary principle in other major economies and at global scale will be a key challenge. So will the use of new technologies to tackle global problems: a global debate will be needed on whether to undertake geoengineering methods to tackle global warming. Technology can also influence conflict. Many technologies, from airplanes to computers, have had military applications. To some degree, terrorism today relies on the web and other new technologies, and the fight against terrorism has developed sensors, pilot-less planes and other technologies. Technologies thus will change conflict around the world – and will also be fuelled by it. 84 There may be some areas of hope: in the long term, for example, cognitive sciences might provide new insights and methods for reaching political agreements, thus leading to better environmental governance. Here too, negative applications could be imagined. Reference The analysis presented here used in particular the following background document: Bio Intelligence Service, Support to analysis of mega-trends in the areas of nanotechnology, biotechnology and information and cognitive science, Final Draft Background paper, April 2010 Other sources include: Fairley P (2010), China Cleans Up, Technology Review: May/June 2010 IEA (2008), Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 Hett A. from Swiss Re. Nanotechnology Small matter, many unknowns. 2004: www.swissre.com/resources/31598080455c7a3fb154bb80a45d76a0-Publ04_Nano_en.pdf Millenium Ecosystems Assessment (MEA 2005), Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Scenarios, Finding of the scenarios working group OECD (2010), MAin Science and Technology Indicators: Volume 2010/1 Rockefeller Foundation (2010), Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development Royal Society (2004) Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties Royal Society (2009) Geoengineering the climate: science, governance and uncertainty Nobel Prizes (2010), Solow, R, accessed at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/press.html UK Government: Office of Science and Technology, Intelligent Infrastructure Futures: The Scenarios – Towards 2025, 2006 UN (2010), World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision – Highlights, March 2010 WHO (2009a) Global Health Risks: Mortality and burden of disease attributable to selected risks World Bank (2009) Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads World Bank Data (2010), Science and Technology web page: http://data.worldbank.org/topic/science-andtechnology (accessed August 2010) UK Government: Office of Science and Technology, Intelligent Infrastructure Futures: The Scenarios – Towards 2025, 2006 Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy (Wuppertal 2006), The future of nanotechnology: We need to talk 85 8.7 T2: THE RISE OF THE NANO‐, BIO, ICT AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGIES Summary of the megatrend Large socio‐economic and environmental changes in the 21st century are expected to be driven by a cluster of rapidly emerging and converging sciences and technologies in nanosciences and nano– technologies, biotechnologies and life‐sciences, information and communication technologies, cognitive sciences and neurotechnologies (so called NBIC‐cluster). The NBIC cluster is likely to move with increasing speed from the innovation phase, where seeds have been planted over the last two decades, to the application phase, over the next 20‐30 years. Learning from nature is gaining increasing relevance as a scientific paradigm. Expectations range from moderate scepticism to broad enthusiasm, even including far‐reaching assumptions about control of matter and genes, ubiquitous intelligence and consequently a huge potential to accelerate access to sustainable energy, abundant food supply or universal health‐care. However, many observers agree that the NBIC‐cluster is likely to form the backbone of a next long‐term wave of innovation and growth. In view of all the uncertainties, in 2040‐2050 nano‐ and biotechnologies are likely to be pervasive, diverse and incorporated into all aspects of our daily live, particularly in synthetic reproduction, novel energy sources and health care. Interrelated product and process, technical, organisational and managerial innovations open up an unusually wide range of social and environmental benefits, investment and profit opportunities. Yet they also considerably increase the scale and nature of risk to human‐kind and pose fundamental challenges to current forms of risk analysis and management. Interrelationships with other megatrends This megatrend is closely linked to social megatrends, in particular those for health (increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world S5; changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics S6). It will of course be inextricably linked with global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles, global acceleration in technology. Moreover, the links with all the economic megatrends (continued economic growth, Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment and EC3) and one of the environmental megatrends (EN1 changing stocks of natural resources EN1;) will also be close. In terms of social megatrends (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration – changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics), the new NBIC technologies are expected to influence health megatrends (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world and changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics) in particular: medical research may find solutions for many of the infectious diseases that are still wide-spread, especially in developing countries. Biotechnology in particular is expected to yield results against major infectious diseases and also in the fight against possible future pandemics (Biois); wider use of IT could also greatly improve health care (Hynes 2010). For example, nanotechnologies are expected to improve drug delivery, sensing and diagnosis and other sectors of medicine, boosting the fight against many diseases including cancer. Biotechnology offers many opportunities for health care, including the development of replacement organs (Biois 2010). The integration of these new technologies is likely to provide further advances. Medical breakthroughs to alleviate the problems of aging populations, including ‘bionic’ interventions that incorporate nanotechnologies, are among the possibilities (Royal Society 2004). Longer life expectancy may be one outcome from nanotechnology (Biois 2010) and biotechnology (Tait and Wield, 2007). Some 86 observers imagine a “post-human” future coming – in time frames as early as 2050 – with our bodies are increasingly changed voluntarily and integrated with machines (Bostrom, 2009). Technology is also likely to interaction with urbanisation (global urbanisation). As noted under megatrend T1: global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles, urban areas are centres of technology development – and the growing megacities of Asia are likely to become major new technology hubs. Urban areas can use new IT technologies to monitor pollution levels and to manage problems such as traffic. For example, the UK study Intelligent Infrastructure 2055 presents a scenario where IT technology transforms urban traffic to flow with greater efficiency – and this in turns allows much greater mobility in cities (OST, 2006). Technology has a close relationship with economic megatrends: accelerating technology development will be a key element of economic growth in coming years (continued economic growth). For the NBIC technologies, one important consideration is that the ongoing power shift (EC3) has already strengthened technology development outside of Europe and other OECD countries. In coming decades, with economic and power shift strengthening emerging economies, in particular India and China, an ever greater share of research will occur outside Europe. At the same time, these technologies are an important element in development, including for lower income countries: the Millennium Development Goals include a target to “make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications” to developing countries as part of Goal 18, a global partnership for development. In the developing world, the use of mobile telephone has grown rapidly and now reaches about half of the population (UN 2010a). With respect to EC2 intensified competition for resources technologies have steadily reduced the amount of metals and energy used per unit of GDP, a trend that is expected to continue (World Bank 2009). The NBIC technologies are expected to play a key role in continuing and perhaps increasing this trend. For example, developments in nanotechnology and related fields offer the prospect of lighter, stronger materials that use less raw materials (Biois 2010). New technologies for alternative energy and for energy efficiency could change the current path of global fuel demand from coal and oil and their greenhouse gas emissions (IEA, 2009). As this example indicates, the NBIC technologies will interact closely with environmental megatrends, specifically ENV1 changing stocks of natural resources. For example, China currently a net food importer, could feed itself in 2025 using less land than it did at the turn of the century by applying existing technology already in use elsewhere (OECD, 2008). Moreover, NBIC technologies can contribute solutions to environmental pollution and greenhouse gas emissions (ENV2). For example, nanotechnology may offer new manufacturing techniques requiring fewer raw materials and producing less toxic waste. Through reduced weight emissions of greenhouse gases could be reduced (Hett 2004 cited in Biois, 2010). Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend This megatrend, as its partner global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles, is extremely uncertain: future developments in technology, in particular over the period to 2050, are hard to predict. The two also share many uncertainties. 87 Table 39: Uncertainties associated with megatrend T2: The rise of the nano‐ , bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies The pace of scientific discovery in each of the NBIC fields. The time to turn scientific discoveries into products on the market. The shape of future discoveries and future products. Approaches towards risk and precaution in different parts of the world. Public reaction to new NBIC products Unexpected consequences of new technologies, including disasters Uncertainties related to the pace of scientific discovery and the time for new products to reach market are introduced under megatrend T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles). One important factor, especially for NBIC technologies, is the difficulty in changing well-established systems such as health care in OECD countries; however, new technologies together with institutional change can bring period of rapid change (Tait and Wield 2007). Scenarios developed by the OECD Bioeconomy Project provide a further glimpse of these uncertainties (see box below). The uncertainties related to the shape of future discoveries are highlighted in the scenarios by the Rockefeller Foundation, also presented under megatrend T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles)(Rockefeller Foundation 2010). Approaches towards risk and precaution will be particularly important for developments related to the NBIC technologies. These approaches already different between the US, where for example GMO crops cover about 70% of land planed with corn and over 90% of that planed with soybeans (USDA 2010) and Europe, where the use such crops remains extremely limited. In the next four decades, greater differences may be seen as emerging economies become important centres for research. These differences may be due to a greater priority given to technology as a means for economic growth, or to differences in the strength of environmental and sustainability policies. Some observers go further, arguing that different cultural and religious backgrounds in East Asia will lead to easier acceptance towards research currently shunned in Europe or North America, such as cloning and other applications of genetic engineering (Silver). Not all may agree with this analysis. Nonetheless, the OECD bioeconomy scenarios cited in the box below include breakthroughs that occur in India and China in part due to lower attention to risk. Scenarios for biotechnology and health (OECD Bioeconomy Project) In the “muddling through” scenario, health care systems in OECD countries are resistant to change, and biotechnology in this area focuses on pharmaceuticals, led by large multinationals. After 2015, however, India and China lead breakthroughs in areas such as new methods of engineering human tissues, where risk avoidance (as well as the dominance of large multinational drug companies) hinders research and 88 development in OECD countries. In the “rapid change” scenario, biotechnology makes greatly changes health care systems. Private research and development occurs across many companies, as today’s large pharmaceutical manufacturers are eclipsed. Strong links are made between biotechnology and IT developments. This scenario includes the deployment of technologies to assist the growing number of elderly in OECD countries live more productive lives. Source: Tait and Wield 2009 The reactions of people around the world – and policy makers – to new products may also vary. These reactions will be greatly influenced by events and perceptions. For example, in the study on The future of nanotechnology: we need to talk (Wuppertal et al 2006), prepared for the European Commission, looks at three scenarios for the public acceptance and policy regulation of nanotechnology: in one, “Disaster recovery”, an industrial accident releases large amounts of nanoparticles, raising concerns about their safety for human health and the environment. In response, the EU and other OECD countries adopt strict regulations. On the basis of the analysis above, the following scores are assigned regarding the extent of links of this megatrend as well as its uncertainty: Table 40: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend T2: The rise of the nano‐ , bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= The NBIC technologies are, as described above, closely linked with many megatrends. Moreover, the uncertainties related to their future development and effects are high (and these uncertainties are expected to growth over time). Likely effects for Europe’s environment The range of possible consequences on Europe’s environment is very wide – and uncertain. For this reason, the following table provides a set of examples that should not be considered exhaustive: Table 41: Potential consequences on Europe’s environment arising from megatrend T2: The rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies Likely effects for Europe’s environment Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature 89 Resources/waste NBIC technologies introduced around the world can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, thus reducing the climate change impacts on Europe Indirect Climate change NBIC technologies introduced around the world can reduce resource consumption, with the result of reducing demands on sub-soil (non-renewable) resources in Europe Indirect Resources/waste NBIC technologies introduced around the world can improve agricultural yields, reducing demands on agricultural products from Europe and related impacts on resources (soil and water) and pollution (chemical runoff to water bodies) as well as the further effects on biodiversity Indirect Resources/waste NBIC technologies introduced in Europe can tackle pollution and waste problems and reduce to resource consumption Direct New technologies for agriculture could increase yields around the world and reducing the use of agricultural chemicals as well as biodiversity impacts Direct New sensors and information technology could make environmental monitoring much less expensive and provide better information for decision-makers in Europe Direct Pollution/health Pollution/health Resources/waste Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste The NBIC technologies offer many opportunities to reduce pollution levels and resource consumption in industry. One recent example is the use of enzymes replacing chemicals used in textile production could become common throughout industrial production (Biois 2010). Future opportunities include nanotechnologies to boost solar cell efficiency (Biois 2010). These technologies could also support a new path for agricultural research for a sustainable path to increase yields (PBL 2009; see also megatrend EC2, Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment). Where these technologies are used outside of indirect. These effects can be quite important emissions is expected to decrease in coming the quality of life in developing countries can likely to be attenuated. Europe, their effects on Europe’s environment are likely to be in the area of climate change, where Europe’s share of total decades. In other areas, the effects on the environment and be very important – but those on Europe’s environment are These effects are also open to great uncertainty: as the Rockefeller Foundation scenarios cited above suggest, the development of technology to support sustainability is only one of several possible pathways in future decades. The NBIC technologies deployed in Europe are likely to have strong consequences for Europe’s environment, both direct and indirect. At the same time, unexpected events around the world could influence Europe’s environment, as well as future technology development: the nanotechnology scenario cited above, involving a major industrial accident, provides one picture of the consequences of accidents and misuse of new technology. The 90 precautionary principle is closely integrated in European policy-making (though the effectiveness of and approach to its application are open to debate), and this can be expected to highlight areas of risk with the introduction of new technologies here. Elsewhere in the world, these risks may be greater. Overall, these are seen as potential unexpected events – i.e. something beyond the normal uncertainties that are part of megatrends. The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties focus on the relationship between the megatrend and Europe’s environment. Table 42: Scoring of the likely effects for Europe’s environment arising from megatrend T2. The rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies Direct Likely effects on Europe’s environment Indirect Strength Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty - -/+ - -/+ Biodiversity and nature -/+ -/+ natural resource use - - climate change pollution and health Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= While both positive and negative effects are foreseen, it should be noted that these are quite different in nature. Overall, the NBIC technologies are expected to have a broad range of positive effects on the global environment and in Europe. A key uncertainty, however, is whether future technology paths will provide solutions for sustainability (this uncertainty is seen in the Rockefeller Foundation scenarios, described under megatrend T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles). A further issue is that new technologies may yield unexpected events, including accidents, with grave consequences for the global environment and Europe’s. These “wild cards” or “Black Swans” are hard to predict, though precautionary approaches to risk assessment may identify them. Other consequences (e.g. for governance) The future development of the NBIC technologies will pose challenges for global governance, as will the acceleration of technology (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles). As noted above, different economies and cultures may apply the precautionary principle in diverging ways. Biotechnology in particular poses ethical dilemmas (Biois 2010; Silver); this may be the case for future applications of cognitive science as well. For example, cognitive sciences might provide new insights and methods for reaching political agreements, thus leading to better environmental governance, as well as negative applications (Biois 2010). Dialogue to seek common approaches among major players – including OECD countries and the emerging economies – will be needed. Reference The analysis presented here used in particular the following background document: 91 Bio Intelligence Service, Support to analysis of mega-trends in the areas of nanotechnology, biotechnology and information and cognitive science, Final Draft Background paper, April 2010 Other sources include: Bostrom N (2009) The Future of Humanity. Published in New Waves in Philosophy and Technology, eds. Olsen et al, New York: Palgrave McMillan. Hett A. from Swiss Re. Nanotechnology Small matter, many unknowns. 2004: www.swissre.com/resources/31598080455c7a3fb154bb80a45d76a0-Publ04_Nano_en.pdf Hynes et al (2010) Use of Health Information Technology to Advance Evidence-Based Care: Lessons from the VA QUERI Program. Journal of General Internal Medicine. 25(1):1525-1497 Rockefeller Foundation (2010), Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development Royal Society (2004) Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties Silver L (2009, Biotech’s Trouble with Religion (http://bigthink.com/ideas/16347) Tait J and Wield D (2007), OECD International Futures Project on The Bioeconomy to 2030: Designing a Policy Agenda: Health Biotechnology to 2030 UK Government: Office of Science and Technology (OST 2006), Intelligent Infrastructure Futures: The Scenarios – Towards 2025, US Department of Agriculture (USDA 2010), Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.: available at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/ (consulted in August 2010) UN (2010a), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010 UN (2010b), World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision – Highlights, March 2010 World Bank (2009), Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy (Wuppertal 2006), The future of nanotechnology: We need to talk 92 8.8 EC1: CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH Summary of the megatrend Assumptions on global economic growth (in terms of annual changes of Gross Domestic Product) form a basic megatrend for the economic analyses in Part A. Virtually all major outlook studies assume that economic growth will be positive on average across the globe in the coming decades. Growth will be accelerating in BRIC countries and other newly emerging economies. The rate at which economies will grow is a matter of larger uncertainty than before. Due to developments like ageing and the need to better control financial circuits, growth may be smaller than usually assumed in the past, in particular in the developed world (OECD). For example the DG ECFIN 2009 report on the implications of ageing in the EU corrects common expectations in a downward direction: roughly 1.8% instead of 2.4% annually on average in the period to 2060. Interrelationships with other megatrends This megatrend has a great number of close links with other megatrends. It is closely linked to social megatrends, in particular the shifts in population size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration), shifts in population structure (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges) as well as urbanisation (global urbanisation) and the growth of middle-income consumers (emergence of a global middle-income consumer class). It is also closely related to technology megatrends. The two other economic megatrends are closely linked to – in many ways stem from – this one. And continued economic growth is also closely linked to the environmental megatrends. In terms of demographic megatrends, economic growth is an important factor reducing fertility rates in the long-term (see Shifts in population size, in particular Figure 2). A key issue for the global future relates to the relative weight of demographic and economic megatrends in terms of the consequences for the global environment (and Europe’s). Global population growth between 2005 and 2050 will – under the UN’s highest projection – be about 75%. (This takes the “constant fertility” scenario – however, fertility rates have consistently fallen in recent decades and this is not by the UN to be a strongly plausible scenario: its “high” scenario is about half a billion less.) In contrast, the economies of China and India may growth seven-fold over this period (Poncet, 2006; see also EC3). Without diminishing the importance of population growth and migration in future trends, it appears that economic growth and associated consumption patterns may have stronger consequences on the world’s environment in coming decade – and thus on Europe’s. Economic growth will be also be an important factor in migration, as many people move to escape poverty and improve their economic opportunities: migration is thus likely to occur between poorer and richer economies, and in particular arise from lower income economies with low growth rates. The UN, extrapolating from past migration trends, estimates that from 2005 to 2050 the high income economies will be the major recipients of migration: the UK, Spain and Italy would each receive more than 150,000 immigrants annually, while populous low-income countries in Asia including India and Pakistan would be among the largest source of emigration (UN 2009).9 (Climate change is expected to be a major factor and 9 Some countries will both receive immigrants and be a source of emigration: this has been and is projected to remain the case in particular for Mexico, which takes in immigrants from poorer Central American countries to its south and is a source of emigration to the US. 93 uncertainty for migration to 2050, and this will combine with economic growth: see S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) for further information.) In terms of Shifts in population structure (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges), the ageing populations seen in most EEA countries and in Eastern Europe will lead to declines in workforce populations, and this together with the rising burden on pension and health systems is expected to slow economic growth unless migration fills the gap. For example, a 2009 report by the European Commission report estimates that the ageing population in the EU will cut the Union’s estimated long-term economic growth from by over half a point, from 2.4% to 1.8% for the period to 2060 (DG ECFIN). Migration may fill part of this gap. Where migrants can be absorbed in their host economies, they migrants can thus support economic growth there and also, through their remittances, in their home countries. (see shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration for further details on these interrelationships). Economic growth is also closely linked to urbanisation (global urbanisation). Urban areas, which concentrate investment and production, generate an estimated 80% of the world’s GDP (UN, 2010). Economic growth is also driving, and is driven by, the increase in the global middle-class consumer class (emergence of a global middle-income consumer class): by 2050, about of the world’s middle-income class is projected to live in India and China (see emergence of a global middle-income consumer class). Continued economic growth has a close relationship with technology, which is a key driver of economic growth especially in advanced economies. In turn, economic growth provides the financial resources to support research and development in new technologies. The link between technology and economy is discussed under megatrend T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles). In terms of economic megatrends, continued economic growth will be a key factor in increased competition for resources: economic growth leads to increased demand, though resource demand grows more slowly due to technology developments and shifts towards services (World Bank 2009; see megatrends EC2; Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment for a further description of this relationship). Moreover, economic growth will also stimulate exploration of new sources and increased supply. Continued economic growth is also the motor behind the power shift towards China, India and other emerging economies: this is described under megatrend EC3. Continued economic growth is also a key factor linked to the environmental megatrends. Economic growth and environmental megatrends are linked in a series of ways. Positive economic growth means that consumption patterns change, mobility increases, replacing becomes dominant over repairing, and high-caloric food crowds out low-caloric food. It all may lead to increased pressure on the environment and natural resources by an increased demand for resources and growing emissions of polluting substances. Although in many areas resources efficiency is increasing and pollution content of lifestyles tends to get lower relatively, the sheer volume of economic activities pushes resources use and pollution volumes to higher levels. At the same time, slower growth may generally have a lower environmental effect, but this is not automatically secured in the longer term. Slow growth and in particular shrinking indicates a stagnant economy with reduced efficiency, little innovation, continuation of obsolete processes, and the chance of neglecting the environment. These links are seen in how economic growth, together with the changing consumption patterns of the increasing number global middle-income consumers (emergence of a global middle-income consumer class), will increase demand for natural resources (ENV1). For example, demand for agricultural products may rise by up to 300% to 2050: this may increase consumption of natural resources including soil and water. These projections reinforce the discussion above concerning the greater relative importance of economic growth over population growth in many areas. Global population growth alone is expected to be about 50% (see S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) for uncertainties in projections); the largest share in the growth in demand will come from changing consumption patterns, including growing demand for meat (see ENV1). 94 OECD countries have nonetheless in recent decades seen a decoupling between growth in many areas of natural resource consumption – for example water – and economic growth (OECD, 2008): a key issue to 2050 is whether fast-growing economies will see similar trends. Economic growth is also linked to environmental degradation (ENV2). Here there is a debate concerning the Kuznets curve theory by which pollution levels will increase with income until a turning point and then decrease. This is seen, according to its proponents, in examples such as improving air quality in European cities. Among the issues for debate is the fact that no turning point has been seen in areas such as solid waste generation. Moreover, trade links are an important factor here as pollution related to raw materials extraction and to goods production may have shifted to other countries (OECD 2008 provides references to the debate). Economic growth is closely intertwined with the climate change megatrends. Growth – without changes in technology or policy – will directly affect future emissions of greenhouse gases (IPCC). The impacts of climate change can harm economic growth, through effects ranging from decreased agricultural production in areas of declining precipitation (a climate change impact projected in much of southern Europe) to longterm sea-level rise that could lead to increased flooding in coastal cities around the world. One measure, the ecological footprint developed by WWF, provides an overall view of human effects on the global environment, thus encompassing the different themes covered under the three environmental megatrends. By this measure, the world saw a relative decoupling from the mid-1980s to the middle of the past decade (see Figure 16). At the same time, this indicator suggests that the footprint of human activities already exceeded the world’s carrying capacity by the time this relative decoupling start – and it has continued to rise since then. Figure 16: Relative decoupling between global GDP and the total ecological footprint Source: OECD (2008) 95 Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend The following table provides an overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: Table 43: Uncertainties associated with megatrend EC1. Continued economic growth Future growth rates, globally and in major regions of the world Global trade Global conflict Resource availability and cost The rate of economic growth in coming years is a major source of uncertainty. Studies looking to 2030 or 2050 can focus on a long-term average and ignore fluctuations. Nonetheless, changes in assumptions can lead to major variations. For example, a 2006 study saw China’s economy growing by less than 5% a year between 2005 and 2050, and in relative terms reaching about 60% of the size of the EU economy and 40% of the size of the US economy, while India’s economy would be about one-third of China’s (Poncet, 2006, cited in Biois). China and India in recent years have achieved much higher growth, and recent studies have used higher rates in their projections: a 2009 assessment sees China’s economy exceeding that of both the US and EU in 2050, with India’s close in size to the EU (PBL, 2009). The influence of different rates of growth can be seen in OECD’s Environment Outlook to 2030: for its main scenario, this study used 1980-2007 as a basis for its economic projections. The study then looked at the implications of different assumptions for growth rates taking average labour productivity and other economic factors from other time periods: for stronger growth, 200 to 2007 was used as a time period; for slower growth, a longer historical trend; a final variant looked at unprecedented growth levels, based on the idea that a new economic era has started. In all, the resulting variance in China’s GDP for 2030 was over 80%; those for India’s almost 40%. Variance for OECD economies was generally lower. A few studies have imagined futures where the assumption of steady economic growth, at least in Europe, no longer holds: for example, Forum for the Future (2007), Retail Futures 2022 look at different growth patterns, high vs. low/no growth, as a factor to build its scenarios. A long period without growth, even in Europe, should however be beyond the normal range of uncertainty for this megatrend. 10 Finally, some uncertainty relates to global trade. The background reports for this study and forecasts by international organisations such as the World Bank all assume that world trade, which has expanded greatly in recent years, will continue in coming decades. However, a few studies have considered the possibility of alternative future paths: for example, UNEP’s GEO4 contains a scenario called “Security First”, where global trade is restricted due to security concerns (UNEP, 2007). Scenarios where future global trade decreases are considered in several other studies: for example, for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005), by the Shell Corporation (Shell 2005), and IPCC (IPCC 2000). A breakdown in trade is unlikely and also beyond the normal range of uncertainties: it is perhaps linked only to dire conflict. Nonetheless, a possible risk would be a shift towards greater regional trade patterns rather than global ones: regional trade agreements and international trade are compatible, as long as the regional agreement maintain low external barriers (World Bank, 2005), and here could arise possible uncertainties for the future. This GEO scenario touches on a further uncertainty – that of conflict in major areas of the world. A recent scenario study by the US National Intelligence Study highlights the risks from youth bulges in volatile areas of the world are one (see megatrend shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges). In addition, it develops one scenario where conflict arises from resource competition between India and China (see 10 This possibility was also considered unlikely by the corporate partners involved in the study, but has turned out to be no inaccurate in the short term for the UK, where the studied was drawn. Personal communication, Forum for the Future (2008). 96 megatrends EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment and EC3). Uncertainties arise from links with other megatrends: notably, the close link between technology and economic growth (see above and megatrend global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles) suggests that an acceleration of technology could lead to faster global growth rates. Another uncertainty arises from resources: the World Bank (2009) and IEA (2009) estimate that sufficient fossil fuel reserves exist for the coming four decades and beyond; if assumptions about oil reserves turn out to be optimistic, however, prices may increase dramatically and global growth could slow (see EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment). Table 44: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend EC1. Continued economic growth Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= In terms of scoring, this megatrend clearly has very strong links with other megatrends. The uncertainties are important, though many arise from other megatrends. Likely effects for Europe’s environment This megatrend is likely to have the following consequences, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe’s environment: Table 45: Likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC1. Continued economic growth Likely effects on Europe’s environment Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Global economic growth will be directly related to global climate change in coming decades and thus its effects in Europe Indirect Climate change Economic growth will be a key factor behind global resource demand: for Europe, this could mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports. Indirect Biodiversity/nature 97 Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased minerals and fuels extraction, especially in the EU12 and in offshore marine areas Indirect Economic growth, at least in coming decades, is likely to be associated with local air emissions, increasing hemispheric air pollution that will reach Europe Direct Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Pollution/health Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. Economic growth around the world is likely to have a series of consequences for Europe’s environment. Economic growth is one of the main factors behind increased greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in climate change impacts in Europe. Economic growth also leads to greater global demand for resources, seen notably in the projections for increased food demand. While most of food demand projected for coming decades should be met by production outside of Europe (World Bank, 2009), several quantitative scenarios foresee global demand increasing the land used for intensive agriculture to 2030 in Europe (RIKS 2010; see EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment for further details). Such an increase would put pressure on other natural resources in to land, notably water resources, and could lead to an increased use of agricultural chemicals. These effects will in turn affect biodiversity and lead to the runoff of pollution (notably nitrogen pollution in water bodies). Global economic growth will also lead to growing demand for minerals and fuels (though demand for these should growth more slowly than the economy as a whole). Although Europe imports most of its minerals, with growing economic growth mining may increase, especially in the EU12. Oil and gas exploration may also increase: oil exploration in particular in marine areas including in the Arctic; and unconventional gas on land (see EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment). As has been noted above, global economic growth will also provide the resources to address environmental problems in fast-growing developing countries. Thus, in the longer term, some effects such as hemispheric air pollution might decline. The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences on Europe as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole – described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves. Table 46: Scoring the likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC1. Continued economic growth Likely effects on Europe’s environment climate change pollution and health Biodiversity and nature Direct Indirect Strength Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty n.a. n.a. + -/+ + n.a. n.a. + 98 natural resource use n.a. n.a. + Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Direct consequences for Europe’s environment are expected to be weak: this will mainly be in terms of hemispheric air pollution, is likely to increase in coming decades (see ENV2). A direct link to pollution and health in Europe will arise from hemispheric air pollution. Overall, however, this is expected to be relatively less important and is not expected to outweigh the expected declines in air pollution from emission in Europe. While hemispheric pollution may increase in the immediate coming decades, it is possible that towards the end of the period considered (2050), economic growth will provide a the financial means that lead to a decrease in hemispheric pollution. The most important indirect consequences are likely to arise from climate change and its effects in Europe. Economic growth is expected to have a strong effect exacerbating GHG emissions. as well as those in terms of natural resource use. For climate change, developed countries have been up to now the main source of emissions: in coming decades, without accounting for the effect of past emissions, this relationship will shift and developing countries will be the main source of emissions. Moreover, uncertainties are low: these, as well as any possible change in direction, arise from other megatrends – in particular those tied to technology – as well as issues related to global governance. Other consequences (e.g. for governance) Future economic growth will be closely linked to governance. National political and social stability is a key factor for economic growth; and with globalisation, worldwide stability in coming decades will be a key factor for growth. Policy decisions will also shape growth patterns – for example towards growth that is lower in terms of current economic accounting but more sustainable in terms of the environment and thus in terms of a longerterm view. (The GEO4 “Sustainability First” scenario imagines a world that moves in this direction.) In turn, economic growth can influence governance – and instability. Citing the history of the last century, a US government warns of “a strong correlation between rapid economic change—both positive and negative—and political instability” and notes that “today’s globalization... has spurred the movement of people, disrupting traditional social and geographic boundaries” (NIC, 2008). Reference The analysis presented here in particular used the following background document: Ecorys Nederland (Ecorys 2010), Analysis of global long-term economic megatrends shaping Europe’s future environment: Background document for SOER part A, Version 22/04/10 Other references include: European Commission (DG ECFIN), The 2009 Ageing report – Economic and budgetary projections for the 27 Member States, 2009 Millennium Ecosystems Assessment (MEA 2005), Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Scenarios, Finding of the scenarios working group, 2005 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL, 2008), 99 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL, 2009), Getting in the Right Lane for 2050 OECD (2008), Environmental Outlook to 2030 Shell (2005), The Shell Global Scenarios to 2025 – The future business environment: trends, trade-offs and choices United Nations (2009), World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision – Highlights United Nations (2010), World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision – Highlights US National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, 2008 UNEP (2007) Global Environment Outlook 4 (GEO-4): Environment for Development World Bank (2005), Global Economic Prospects 2005: Trade, Regionalism, and Development World Bank (2009), Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads 100 8.9 EC2: INTENSIFIED COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES Summary of the megatrend Economic growth continues at the global level and is accelerating in BRIC countries and other newly emerging economies. The demand for sub‐soil and natural resources will grow in absolute terms despite continuing and partly successful efforts to increase the resource efficiency of economic activities. Increased demand for subsoil resources will stimulate exploration and exploitation of new sources. Supply is expected to meet demand, both for “bulk” resources (fossil fuels, though a different mix than today, minerals) and for specific metals that are essential to facilitate market penetration of environmental and other technological innovations. Supply of natural resources increasingly competes with other land use, and in particular with conservation of biodiversity and ecosystems services. The increased need for resources stimulates political monopolisation of access (e.g. China/Africa). Europe is dependent on other regions for much of its fossil fuels and minerals and needs to secure its access to major world markets. Interrelationships with other megatrends This megatrend, Intensified competition for resources, is closely linked to demographic megatrends, to technology megatrends, to economic megatrends, in particular continued economic growth (continued economic growth) and to environmental megatrends, especially Changing stocks of natural resources (ENV1). In terms of demographic megatrends, this megatrend is linked in particular with shifts in population size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) and with the emerging middle-income consumer class (global urbanisation). On the economic side, continued economic growth (continued economic growth) is also an important link. The technology megatrends (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles and the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies) will also play a key role. For environmental megatrends, the closest link is with ENV1, Changing stocks of natural resources. Sub-soil and natural resources cover a broad spectrum of materials used for production and consumption. The analysis here focuses on sub-soil resource, and in particular on two of the most important categories: minerals, including metals; and fossil fuels. Increased demand for natural or renewable resources – including water, land, soil and biodiversity – are also an important element. While these are discussed here, greater detail on natural resources is found under megatrend ENV1, Changing stocks of natural resources. 101 This megatrend is linked to the shifts in population size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration): population growth will increase resource demand. As under that megatrend, however, population growth in coming decades is likely to have a smaller effect in terms of resource demand than economic growth (continued economic growth). Among social drivers and megatrends, the consumption patterns of the emerging global middle class (global urbanisation) will closely influence resource demand. This is seen in terms of food consumption: in Asia, where demand for meat has grown much faster than population over the past 15 years – a trend that is expected to continue in coming decades as the middle class population increases (World Bank, 2009). Greater food demand is expected to lead to growing pressures on natural resources, in particular land and water used in agriculture. Figure 17: Global Demand for commodities compared to economic growth in recent decades The links with economic drivers are particularly close. Continued economic growth (continued economic growth) will play a key role in terms of increasing resource demand and competition. Globally, the world economy has seen a relative decoupling as the demand for many commodities – from iron ore and petroleum to logs – has risen more slowly than economic growth (World Bank 2009; see Figure 17). The World Bank expects this decoupling to continue in coming decades. Nonetheless, the absolute demand is expected to increase for nearly all resources in the coming decades, assuming continued global economic growth. It should also be noted that this decoupling has not be an iron rule. Notably, the intensity of metals consumption per GDP in the global economy has grown since the 1980s: and this is almost entirely due to demand in China related to that country’s export-oriented manufacturing boom. In coming decades, China’s economy is expected to reduce its metals-intensity and the world to return to its long-term decoupling trend; nonetheless, most of the absolute growth in metals demand is still expected to come from the fast-growing emerging countries (World Bank, 2009). For some resources used in new products, moreover, demand is expected to grow rapidly. This is discussed below under technology. Economic growth is also linked to investment in resource extraction and use: growth will provide the resources to explore and exploit new mineral and fossil fuel deposits. Nonetheless, in the energy sector, the financial needs are great: the International Energy Agency estimates that at least US$ 26 trillion (in 2008 dollars) in investments are needed to meet projected global energy demand in 2030, both to tap energy reserves and for new power plants and other infrastructure. The investment needs rise even higher if a lowcarbon energy path, using fewer fossil fuel resources, is to be taken (IEA, 2009). New investments are also needed to expand agricultural production to meet growing global food demand, in particular if global effects on biodiversity are to be limited (PBL, 2009). Another megatrend will also play a key role: the economic power shifts underway (EC3) are also linked to resource competition, as India and China increasingly seek to obtain raw materials to fuel their economic growth. This can be seen in the role of China in metals consumption since the mid-1980s, described above. At the present day, this country is investing heavily in nuclear and alternative energy, which may reduce its future fossil fuel consumption, and have a major effect on global trends as well (Fairley; see also below). 102 Technology drivers have a series of strong links with resource demand. Technology contributes to a greater efficiency in the use of mineral and metal resources – and this in turn is one of the two main factors in the long-term decoupling between economic growth and resource demand, the other being the long-term shift towards service-based economies (World Bank, 2009). For example, developments in nanotechnology and related fields offer the prospect of lighter, stronger materials that use lower amounts of raw materials (see global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles / the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies). New technologies for alternative energy and for energy efficiency could change the current path of global fuel demand from coal and oil and their greenhouse gas emissions (IEA, 2009). Another example of this interaction is seen in an estimate for China: by applying existing agricultural technology already in use elsewhere, China could feed itself in 2025 using less land than it did at the turn of the century (OECD, 2008). While technology will contribute make the use of many resources more efficient, rising demand for products such as solar cells and vehicle batteries has spurred demand for rare minerals – a trend expected to continue in coming decades: the table on the following page provides forecasts for growing world demand. For agriculture, new research can improve yields around the world while reducing biodiversity effects: IAASTD estimates that US$ 1 trillion are needed over the next 50 years (cited in PBL, 2009). A growing share of agricultural research is taking place in developing countries, in particular China where new GMO strains are being developed (World Bank, 2009). This highlights the growing importance of economic power shifts (megatrend EC3). In terms of environmental megatrends, close links are seen first of all with ENV1 (Changing stocks of natural resources). The competition for resources includes natural ones such as land and water and their products, such as food. Moreover, sub-soil and natural resources can in some cases substitute each other, as seen in the current efforts to use biofuels instead of crude oil as a basis for transport fuels. There are also links with ENV2 (environmental degradation): the extraction of many minerals and fuels can lead to high environmental damage, even when carried out properly. And the competition for natural resources is also linked to global climate change (ENV3): the competition for fossil fuels can encourage alternatives, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, many renewable energies depend on scarce metals such as neodymium (used in wind turbine magnets, with over 90% of reserves found in China) or lithium, used for electric vehicle and other batteries (over 80% of the reserves of this metal are found in Bolivia). The table below provides an overview of several rare metals whose global demand is expected to increase significantly from 2006 to 2030. 103 Table 47: Projected global demand for rare metals 104 Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend The following table provides an overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: Table 48: Uncertainties associated with megatrend EC2. Intensified competition for resources Future growth in energy demand Extent of recoverable fossil fuels reserves Extent of mineral reserves, including for rare metals whose demand is rising Extent of natural resource monopolies and cartels Growth in agricultural yields, especially in developing countries Extent of sustainability focus for agricultural research Continued global trade Future conflicts The future growth in global energy demand is not certain: for example, IEA reduced its growth estimates from its 2007 to its 2008 energy outlook, and again in 2009. The extent of fossil fuel reserves is a topic of intense debate. The World Bank, for example, argues that oil and gas reserves are sufficient to meet world demand in coming decades (World Bank, 2009), though concerns about “peak oil” and other supply constraints are seen as an important issue for EU climate and energy policy (Piebalgs, 2008). Another major uncertainty relates to the affect of monopolies and cartels on price and supply of resources. Many vital sub-soil resources are concentrated geographically in the world. About 60% of global oil reserves are found in the Middle East (Ecorys). More generally, there is a split between oil producers and oil consumers: twelve of the world’s countries control more than 80% of the total global proven conventional oil and gas reserves; while these countries currently produce less than 10% of global GDP; in contrast, countries that produce more than three-quarters of global GDP hold only about 10% of total proven oil and gas reserves (Milov). A similar concentration of resources is seen for some of the rare metals used in new applications, such as neodymium and lithium, cited above. A key issue for the future is the extent to which countries controlling these resources will seek to use them to extract monopoly rents or political influences. In agriculture, the growth in agricultural yields has declined in recent years World Bank, 2009). The pace of the growth in yields in future decades will influence other key factors, such as the extent of land in the developing world that will be converted to agriculture (land conversion can have a major effect on biodiversity in these countries). A closely related uncertainty is the extent to which agricultural research will address sustainability issues: this is a key uncertainty that arises from the technology megatrends (see for example the Rockefeller Foundation scenarios described under global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles). Further uncertainties relate to global trade and to conflict. A few forward-looking studies by organisations including UNEP, IPCC and Shell have considered the possibility of paths where global trade is restricted, in particular due to security concerns (these are described in continued economic growth). While this is considered beyond the normal range of uncertainties for the current analysis, restrictions in global trade would greatly change commodity supplies and prices. 105 Table 49: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend EC1. Continued economic growth Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Likely effects for Europe’s environment This megatrend is likely to have the following consequences, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe’s environment: Table 50: Likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC1. Continued economic growth Likely effects on Europe’s environment Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Global competition for energy resources can increase attention to alternative energy (and nuclear power) around the world Indirect Climate change Since the late 1970s, nearly all the increase in oil production around the world has come from offshore sites (World Bank, 2009): although oil production is declining in EEA countries, pressures for offshore drilling may increase, including in sensitive areas such as the Arctic, with risks for the marine environment Direct Biodiversity/nature The boom in unconventional gas extraction seen in the US may move to Europe: this typically requires high levels of water Direct Resources/waste If food production does not grow in developing countries, demand for European exports will increase: this would support intensive agriculture and result in runoff and possible loss of biodiversity from land use changes and agricultural chemicals. Indirect Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. Resource competition may have some beneficial consequences, in particular by providing important economic and energy security motivations for emerging economies to shift away from fossil fuels. China, for example, reportedly has 22 nuclear reactors under construction, together with new hydroelectric capacity (notably the Three Gorges Dam) and is rapidly expanding its renewables capacity (Fairley). All of these 106 investments will reduce China’s future greenhouse gas emissions, and thus reducing climate change effects in Europe. (At the same time, however, China also continued to build new coal-fired power plants.) While Europe is a major importer of fossil fuels, small shares of its oil and natural gas come from domestic sources. In future decades, the direct consequences for Europe’s environment are likely to arise from new fossil fuel extraction in offshore areas (possibly including the Arctic) and also from unconventional gas development, which has greatly increased US natural gas production (IEA, 2008). Major consequences are not expected in the area of minerals. Here, the EU imported 175 million tonnes of metals in 2004, while its domestic production was only 30 million tonnes. European mining is expected to continue, but not to expand significantly (European Commission, 2009). Europe is a major importer and exporter of agricultural products. Growing global food demand may lead to increased agricultural production in Europe – however, the link is far from certain. In a recent review of land use projections for Europe found that a few studies forecast increases in cropland in the range of 15% between 2005 and 2050. This included studies that factored in global growth in demand. Other studies, however, saw a decline in total agricultural land (for many, due to a decline in extensive pasture land rather than intensively farmed areas). (RIKS, 2010) The uncertainties related to future European agriculture and resulting land use and other consequences for Europe’s environment appear to be wide-ranging. They are linked to future demand for agricultural products, to future production in the rest of the world, and thus to research and investment in this area. This assessment of likely consequences for Europe has not included a consideration of a future where trade in commodities is significantly restricted. In this case, Europe would need to fall back on domestic supplies – which could include returning to coal for energy – the environmental consequences may be far greater. The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences on Europe as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole – described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves. Table 51: Scoring the likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC2. Intensified competition for resources Likely effects on Europe’s environment climate change pollution and health Biodiversity and nature natural resource use Direct Indirect Strength Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty n.a. n.a. - 0/+ -/+ 0/+ -/+ 0/+ -/+ Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= The direct consequences are seen mainly arising from increased fossil fuel extraction in Europe can include water use for extraction (especially for unconventional gas) and resulting water pollution (IEA, 2008). Offshore oil production carries the risk of pollution and of biodiversity effects. 107 The indirect consequences are more wide-ranging. Resource demand may lead to a search for alternative energy sources, reducing climate change consequences in Europe, as seen in China’s development of nuclear and alternative energy, described above. The RIKS scenarios show that global food demand may result in increased European exports, in particular from intensive farming, with consequences that include the runoff of agricultural chemicals as well as biodiversity loss from greater land use. In general, the strength of these consequences is seen as weak: for example, resource competition may be one factor in a global move towards a low-carbon future, but other megatrends (e.g. technology) as well as governance are expected to be the most important. This consequence is highly uncertain. So are those stemming from global food demand, where uncertainties arise in particular in terms of agricultural yields and production in the rest of the world. Other consequences (e.g. for governance) The background paper for this megatrend identified significant risks for Europe’s economy, which is dependent on imports of many resources and in particular minerals and fossil fuels, as global competition grows. In other words, this megatrend has major implications in terms of Europe’s economic and energy security. This contrasts with the consequences for Europe’s environment, which in this analysis appear not to be strong. For sub-soil resources, including minerals and fossil fuels, this is because Europe is relatively poor. In other words, most of the environmental consequences of resource competition are likely to be seen outside of Europe, especially in developing countries, as well as some fragile areas close to Europe, notably the Arctic and the Mediterranean. The situation is slightly different for natural resources, where for example Europe is a major agricultural producer. Here too, while some effects are expected to arise in Europe, the World Bank (2009) and other institutions foresee that most of future demand will be met by increases in yields and the conversion of land in developing countries to meet growing world demand. The consequences could include biodiversity loss as well as agricultural runoff – again, outside of Europe. While this megatrend appears not to be so important in terms of the consequences for Europe’s environment, from the perspective of environmental security, this megatrend is crucial for Europe’s future. Reference The analysis presented here used the following background document: Ecorys Nederland (Ecorys 2010), Analysis of global long-term economic megatrends shaping Europe’s future environment: Background document for SOER part A, Version 22/04/10 Other references include: European Commission (2009), Public Consultation on Commission Raw Materials Initiative: Background paper Fairley P (2010), China Cleans Up, Technology Review: May/June 2010 International Energy Agency (2008), World energy outlook 2008 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009, 2009 Milov V (2008), Russia and the West, the Energy factor, Centre for Strategic and international studies, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, July 2008 108 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), Getting in the right lane for 2050, October 2009, with the Stockholm Resilience Centre Piebalgs A. (2008), Die Strategie der EU in der Energieund Klimapolitik – Ist die Energieversorgung langfristig gesichert? RIKS, Exploration of land use: trends under SOER 2010 – final report, May 2010 World Bank (2009), Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads 109 8.10 EC3: POWER SHIFTS – FROM A UNI-POLAR TO MULTI-POLAR WORLD Summary of the megatrend Economic power concentration tends to diversify from a single (USA) to a multi‐polar global map when BRIC countries and later on newly emerging economies (e.g. Indonesia, South‐Africa) grow in economic significance. This development both stimulates the demand for resources and the countervailing process of attempting to come to blocwise and global agreements on regulating markets and trade. Interrelationships with other megatrends This megatrend is closely linked with other economic megatrends, with at least two of the social megatrends and also with the technology megatrends. This megatrend very closely tied to EC1 (continued economic growth): global growth is one of the factors enabling growth in China and India, and the power shift is dependent on the positive growth forecasts in these and other emerging economies. For example, its faster growth rates may make China the largest economy in the world in 2050, with total GDP greater than that of the EU or the US (PBL 2008). This megatrend also plays a key role in the EC2 (increased competition for resources).. For example, China’s fast-growing consumption of metals has, in the past two decades, reversed the long-standing decoupling between consumption of these resources and global GDP growth (World Bank, 2009). The World Bank expects China’s Cities are centres for economic growth and power (see EC1 (continued economic growth)), and the shift is also closely linked to urbanisation and the growth of Asian megacities (see S3 (global urbanisation)). While some analysts expect future growth to shift to smaller cities, the UN’s population projections nonetheless foresee over 70% of China’s population and about 55% of India’s living in urban areas by 2050 (UN cited by Biois). An important part of the growth of India and especially China will be the rise of the middle-income consumer classes: by one estimate, about half of the middle-class across the world will live in these two countries (see S4 (emergence of a global middle-income consumer class)). In demographic terms, this megatrend is linked to migration, as migrants will be drawn to fast-growing economies – and within these, from rural to urban areas (see (S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration)). With its slowly growing and ageing population combined with its rapid economic growth, China may also receive economic immigrants from elsewhere in the world after 2030 (Biois) (see S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration)). The shift in economic power is being accompanied by a growth in the role of research and development as China and India take stronger roles in terms of technology development: this is a key factor in its acceleration (T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles)) and these countries may also become important players in new technologies such as the “NBIC cluster” (T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies)). Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: 110 Table 52: Uncertainties associated with megatrend EC3. Power shifts – from a uni-polar to multi-polar world The economic growth rates of emerging economies in coming decades Political stability in major economies such as China and India Availability of raw materials New emerging economies Global trade Global conflict China, India and other emerging economies have seen unprecedented growth in recent years, and their future growth rates are open to uncertainty. This can be seen in relative terms: projections several years ago saw China’s economy in 2050 as smaller than the US or EU economies (e.g. Poncet, 2006 cited in Ecorys); more recent forecasts see China’s economy as exceeding both by 2050 (PBL, 2009). Similarly, the variations in growth rates for China tested for OECD’s Environmental Outlook to 2030 led to 80% differences in the country’s GDP by 2050. Both China and India have enjoyed relative political stability in recent decades, a key factor in their economy growth. However, this growth increases has increased the inequalities among people, among regions and between rural and urban areas, factors that could lead to political instability in future decades. China’s growth has relied on imports of raw materials from many parts of the world, including Africa. Indeed, China’s consumption of metals has grown faster than GDP (see EC2 (intensified competition for resources)). While resource use is expected to grow more efficient, both in China and around the world, the future growth of emerging economies is tied to the availability of these resources as well as their prices, which are factors of uncertainty. Uncertainties regarding the availability of resources might bring the risk of conflict. For example, the US National Intelligence Council’s 2009 study, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, includes a scenario called “BRICS bust-up”, in which competition for natural resources between China and India leads to war (US NIC 2009). A key uncertainty relates to the future of economies of today’s low-income countries, such as many in subSaharan Africa. These and other parts of the world are not among those listed as “emerging”. Africa as a whole is nonetheless expected to see about 5% growth in 2010 and 2011; however, many countries remain very poor: GDP per capita (at purchasing power parties) is under US$ 1000 (760 Euros) in over a dozen Sub-Saharan countries (OECD, 2010). An optimistic 2025 scenario prepared in 2008 by the South African government, “Nkalakatha”, sees policies for economic equity and environmental protection rather than breakneck growth; none of this study’s scenarios imagine the country or Africa as a whole taking a new role on the world stage by 2025. Such a role might instead take place in a longer time frame, perhaps building on this sort of optimistic scenario for the coming decades (PAS, 2008). Thus, a number of elements of uncertainty will influence this megatrend, in particular in terms of its dimensions. The overall direction of a shift in power, in particular towards emerging economies in Asia remains fairly clear. Indeed, while this megatrend represents a huge shift away from the economic powers of the past two centuries, in a longer-term perspective it is a return of the pendulum. For much of the past two millennia, in fact, the great majority of the world’s population and economic activity lay in Asia (Diamond). 111 Table 53: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend EC3. Power shifts – from a uni-polar to multi-polar world Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Likely effects for Europe’s environment This megatrend is likely to have the following effects, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe: Table 54: Likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC3. Power shifts – from a uni-polar to multi-polar world Likely effects for Europe’s environment Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Global economic growth will be directly related to global climate change in coming decades and thus its effects in Europe Indirect Climate change Economic growth will be a key megatrend fuelling global resource demand: for Europe, this could mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports, with resulting effects on natural resources (land, water) as well as biodiversity and agricultural runoff Indirect Pollution/health Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased minerals and fuels extraction Indirect Economic growth, at least in coming decades, is likely to be associated with air emissions, increasing hemispheric air pollution that will reach Europe Direct Pollution/health The fast-growing economies – including China and India – will have a growing role in terms of global environmental issues as well as policies to address them Indirect Climate change Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely impacts; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. 112 This megatrend is very closely linked to continued economic growth: it presents a dominant pattern of the world’s continued economic growth. For this reason, most of the consequences from the power shift are the same as those in EC1(continued economic growth) (though slightly less powerful in strength). One further consequence can be seen in terms of are channelled through changes in global governance, and thus become quite uncertain. The shift in power will directly affect global decision-making on climate change. Moreover, it can influence power relations in terms of access to natural resource use. This is seen in the simulations in the background paper for OECD’s Environment Outlook to 2030: the results of policy packages were forecast for their application in OECD countries alone, for OECD and the “BRICs” (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and for the world as a whole. For measures to cut greenhouse gas emissions, the participation of the BRICs yields almost equals the reductions to 2030 of OECD countries, and global participation adds a smaller further reduction. To 2050 as well, the participation of BRICs is a key factor in global emissions reductions. The weight of the BRICs is also significant for other environmental pressures, such as air emissions of SO2 (PBL, 2008). Table 55: Scoring the likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC3. Power shifts – from a uni-polar to multi-polar world Likely effects on Europe’s environment Climate change Pollution and health Biodiversity and nature Natural resource use Direct Indirect Strength Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty n.a. n.a. -/+ -/+ -/+ n.a. n.a. -/+ n.a. n.a. -/+ Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= The scoring of the effects is in many ways similar to that of EC1 (continued economic growth), as this megatrend is seen as closely tied to that one. As with EC1 (continued economic growth), the direct consequences for Europe’s environment are seen in particular in terms of hemispheric air pollution. Indirect consequences are strongest in terms of climate change, as emerging economies are expected to have a growing share in global greenhouse gas emissions. Other indirect consequences are seen as lower. An important difference is that this megatrend may have both positive and negative consequences for Europe’s environment. The positive consequences arise from the possibility of reaching environmental agreement with India, China and other emerging economies. In the immediate decade to come (e.g. to 2030, as suggested by the PBL study), agreements between OECD countries and these key emissions sources would address the largest share of global emissions. The power shift also presents an opportunity to address other environmental issues, such as air emissions of SO2 – while the BRICs can play a major role in reducing global emissions in coming decades, the consequences for Europe are attenuated as they arrive through hemispheric transport. 113 The uncertainties, however, are very high – in particular when the interaction between rapid economic growth of emerging economies and the unclear prospects of reaching environmental agreements with them. Other consequences (e.g. governance) It appears that the most important effect of this megatrend – when considered separately from others, such continued economic growth – will mainly be in terms of global political and governance issues. Notably, as shown in the PBL study cited above, agreements with the major emerging economies can have significant results in terms of addressing climate change and other global issues. Thus, the opportunity exists for OECD countries to seek ambitious agreements on key issues with the “BRICs”. More generally, agreement with these countries will be a key step in any global agreements. While beyond the topic of this study, it should be noted that shift in power can also bring risks of conflict. The study Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, also includes a scenario called “World without the West”, in which the rise of new powers vying for influence leads to instability. References The analysis presented here used in particular the following background document: Ecorys Nederland (Ecorys 2010), Analysis of global long-term economic megatrends shaping Europe’s future environment: Background document for SOER part A, Version 22/04/10 Other references include: Diamond J. (1997), Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies Ecorys Nederland BV (Ecorys), Analysis of global long-term economic megatrends shaping Europe’s future environment: Background document for SOER part A – Version 22/04/10 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), Background report to the OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030: Overviews, details, and methodology of model-based analysis, 2008 OECD (2010), African Economic Outlook 2010 Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services, Presidency of the Republic of South Africa (PCAS, 2008), South Africa Scenarios 2025: The future we choose? US National Intelligence C 114 8.11 ENV1: DECREASING STOCKS OF NATURAL RESOURCES Summary of the megatrend Natural resources include renewable resources that can be replenished if used sustainably (e.g. land/soil, forest, water, fisheries and biodiversity) and non-renewable resources that are in finite supply which are not replenished over foreseeable timescales (e.g. fossil fuels and water, metals, certain nutrients). While this megatrend covers both, the analysis here focuses on the loss of renewable resources (issues related to nonrenewable resources are covered more closely under megatrend EC2 (Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment). Increased competition for resources). Loss of biodiversity, including ecosystems, species and genetic resources, which could be viewed as a key overarching megatrend in its own right, is included here as it provides the fundamental underpinning of all natural stock; crucial for the resilience and adaptive capacity of ecosystems. The growing global populations and wealth associated with industrialised and industrializing countries, in particular, are driving demand for food, water, energy and manufacturing raw materials, which are then provided using unsustainable and exploitative practices as the norm. Humanity’s demand on the planet’s living resources, its ‘Ecological Footprint’, now exceeds the planet’s regenerative capacity by about 30 per cent (WWF, 2008). The Ecological Footprint measures humanity’s demand on the biosphere in terms of the area of biologically productive land and sea required to provide the resources we use and to absorb our waste (Figure 18). Figure 18: Humanity’s ecological footprint, 1961-2005 Source: WWF (2008) This manifests itself in large‐scale land conversion and ecosystem deterioration. The historical decline in the area of temperate forest has been reversed, with an annual increase of 30 000 km2 between 1990 and 115 2005, but deforestation in the tropics, continued at an annual rate of 130,000 km2 over the same period. Within the steadily expanding farmland area, regional overexploitation has led to serious soil degradation. Since1960, alone, a third of the world’s farmland has been abandoned because it has been degraded beyond use. It has been estimated that 10 million ha are destroyed per year (Schade and Pimentel, 2010). In addition to the effect on terrestrial ecosystems, human resource use has had a profound effect on the marine environment. Data on fish stocks (in terms of volume) exploited for at least 50 years highlight an increase in the number of stocks either overexploited or that have crashed over the last few years. Demand for natural resources will continue to rise steeply, given that the world’s population is increasing and diets are shifting from cereal to meat consumption. One projection shows that global agricultural production will need to increase by more than 50% in order to feed a population more than 27% larger and roughly 83% wealthier than today’s (PBL, 2008). This can be achieved by either expanding the agricultural area and/or by intensification of production, both of which may be expected to lead to further biodiversity loss. Changes in other parts of the world which could lead to direct consequences for Europe include increased likelihood of more severe impacts of climate change through deforestation and loss of GHG regulating ecosystem services, biodiversity loss via loss of habitat, and impacts relating to exploitation of new and more polluting sources of fossil fuels, such as tar sands/ shales as peak oil/coal is reached. Indirect environmental consequences could be linked to increasing scarcity of resources in developing countries resulting in more competition for Europe and more stress on Europe’s environment (e.g. provision of food, water, fisheries, timber, mining) and destabilization of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting livelihoods and leading to migration from developing countries to Europe and increased pressure on Europe’s environment. Indirect social-economic consequences could be positive e.g. shortage of water and soil resource could drive food price rises (as long a food is produced in a sustainable way) and European export potential or negative higher pressure for EU to engage in conflicts caused by resource loss and degradation; requiring European humanitarian aid efforts/ peace-keeping etc. Potential interrelationships with other megatrends Changing patterns of resource use are mainly determined by the growing population (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) linked with increasing per capita consumption of the emerging global middle-income consumer class (emergence of a global middle-income consumer class), which is in turn linked to growing economies (continued economic growth), intensified competition for resources (EC2) and global urbanization (S3). These links are developed in the text below. Land/soil For terrestrial systems increasing demand for livestock products is a principal driver of land use change and is projected to increase in the future (Figure 19). Expanding urban areas (global urbanisation) will also have a significant impact on pressure for land, not the least because urban expansion worldwide tends to sprawl on the best agricultural soils (PBL, 2008). Even if past productivity growth in agriculture can be achieved, more people and a shifting diet mean more agricultural land use. Worldwide, the bulk of the expansion is projected before 2030. Later, technology (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles and the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies) is expected to catch up with increasing demand – first in OECD countries and BRIC (see Figure 19). For example, up to 2030, one projection shows that global agricultural production will need to increase by more than 50% in order to feed a population more than 27% larger and roughly 83% wealthier than today’s (PBL, 2008). Although it is assumed that productivity of land will increase substantially (e.g. Royal Society, 2009), the global agricultural area will have to increase by roughly 10% to sustain this production (Figure 20). 116 Figure 19: Agricultural projection of agricultural area Source: PBL (2008) A major constraint on agricultural productivity is soil loss and degradation which has strong links to population growth (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration), economic growth (continued economic growth), technological development (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles), pollution (Env2) and climate change (Env3). The expansion of agriculture, together with the development of other pressures, leads to an increase of the global agricultural area with high soil erosion risk by 30% between 2000 and 2030, from 20 to 27 million km 2 (21% of the world land area) (OECD, 2008). This estimate is based on soil erosion by water will increasingly undermine soils’ capacity to support food production. Water scarcity Water scarcity will worsen due to unsustainable use and management of the resource as well as climate change (Figure 21). The number of people living in areas affected by severe water stress has been projected to increase by another 1 billion to over 3.9 billion (47% of the world population) by 2030, mostly in nonOECD countries (OECD, 2008). According to the OECD Outlook Baseline, agricultural production will increase two times faster in developing countries than in OECD countries, further exacerbating water scarcity in those regions. Almost all of the projected 34% population increase to 2030 will occur in developing countries, and growing urbanisation in both OECD and non-OECD countries will also increase demand for public water supply. Electricity and industrial production will also increase much faster in non-OECD countries than in OECD countries. Overall, pressures on water use are thus projected to increase at a much higher pace in developing countries than in OECD countries. 117 Figure 20: Growth of world population, GDP per capita, agricultural production and crop area; Baseline Source: PBL (2008) Figure 21: People living in areas of water stress, by level of stress (millions of people) Source: OECD (2008) Biodiversity The complexity of the interrelationships with other megatrends for biodiversity is illustrated by Figure 22. The five principal pressures directly driving biodiversity loss, recognised by the Convention on Biological Diversity 118 (CBD), i.e. habitat change, overexploitation, pollution, invasive alien species and climate change, have been recently reviewed and are either constant or increasing in intensity (GBO3, 2010). Modelling projections using a range of scenarios show the importance of factors such as infrastructure, crop area and climate change to global biodiversity loss (e.g. Figure 23). Figure 22: Links between biodiversity loss and the direct and indirect drivers of change Source: PBL (2008) 119 Figure 23: Biodiversity loss between 2000 and 2050: baseline, global policy package and 450 ppm multigas stabilisation. OECD Environmental Outlook modelling suite, final output from IMAGE cluster (GLOBIO) Source: PBL (2008) Forests Deforestation, mainly conversion of forests to agricultural land, is showing signs of decreasing in several tropical countries but continues at an alarmingly high rate (GBO3, 2010, FAO, 2010). The net loss of forests has slowed substantially, from approximately 83,000 square kilometres per year in the 1990s to just over 50,000 square kilometres per year from 2000-2010. This is mainly due to large-scale planting of forests in temperate regions and to natural expansion of forests. Deforestation is likely to remain high, given the increasing competition for different land-uses such as food production, biofuel production and urbanization discussed above. Fisheries The FAO estimates that more than a quarter of marine fish stocks are overexploited (19%), depleted (8%) or recovering from depletion (1%) while more than half are fully exploited. Although there have been some recent signs that fishing authorities are imposing more realistic expectations on the size of catches that can safely be taken out of the oceans, some 63% of assessed fish stocks worldwide require rebuilding. Coastal habitats have come under pressure from many forms of development including tourism and urban infrastructure, shrimp farming and port facilities including dredging. This is compounded by sea level rise, creating what might be termed a “coastal squeeze”. 120 Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: Table 56: Uncertainties associated with megatrend Env1. Changing stocks of natural resources Actual status of stocks of some key resources Future trends in demand for food, water, energy and materials Conservation efforts and moves to more sustainable practices Impact on food production of diminishing supply of key nutrients Resilience of ecosystems and potential for tipping points Implications of emerging technologies and potential efficiency gains Future path of energy sector and renewable The first key uncertainty is over the actual magnitude of resources available. For renewable, it is clear that land/soil, biodiversity, water, forests and fisheries are under tremendous and growing pressure in the 21 st Century but most recent studies point towards stocks being sufficient if the resource in managed in a sustainable way. For example, a comprehensive assessment of water management in agriculture was conducted by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and posed the questions: ‘Is there enough land, water, and human capacity to produce food for a growing population over the next 50 years— or will we “run out” of water?’.The answer given was that ‘It is possible to produce the food—but it is probable that today’s food production and environmental trends, if continued, will lead to crises in many parts of the world. Only if we act to improve water use in agriculture will we meet the acute freshwater challenges facing humankind over the coming 50 years’ (IWMI, 2007). Similar arguments have been put forward for land, forest and fishery management (e.g. GBO3, 2010; FAO, 2008; Worm et al., 2009). However, overexploitation is still significant in large parts of the world e.g. about 80 percent of the world marine fish stocks for which assessment information is available are fully exploited or overexploited (GBO3, 2010). Future growth is thus assumed to come from aquaculture (e.g. Figure 24), although aquaculture is in part dependent on capture fisheries for fishmeal feed. However, as the price of fish products increases, it is projected that substitutes for fish feed for aquaculture, such as soya-based feed, will become more economically viable for those species that can be fed a vegetarian diet. There is therefore a great deal of uncertainty. 121 Figure 24: Projected composition of world fisheries to 2030: capture and aquaculture Methodologies for estimating the trends also introduce uncertainty e.g. modelling of soil loss and degradation is based on a water runoff compound index that does not capture cultivation practices, such as tillage (bound to exacerbate the erosion risk) or contour ploughing and terracing (both enhancing soil conservation) (PBL, 2008). There is a high risk of dramatic biodiversity loss and accompanying degradation of a broad range of ecosystem services if ecosystems are pushed beyond certain thresholds or tipping points (GBO3, 2010). For example, the Amazon forest, due to the interaction of deforestation, fire and climate change, could undergo a widespread dieback, with parts of the forest moving into a self-perpetuating cycle of more frequent fires and intense droughts leading to a shift to savanna-like vegetation. While there are large uncertainties associated with these scenarios, it is known that such dieback becomes much more likely to occur if deforestation exceeds 20 – 30% (it is currently above 17% in the Brazilian Amazon). It would lead to regional rainfall reductions, compromising agricultural production. There would also be global impacts through increased carbon emissions, and massive loss of biodiversity. Future technology gains may not to be sufficient to slow use of food, water, energy and materials in the near term for example, the ecological footprint developed by WWF, provides an overall view of human impacts on the global environment, and shows a relative decoupling of the footprint and world GDP from the mid-1980s to the middle of the past decade (see Figure 25). However, the indicator also suggests that the footprint of human activities has already exceeded the world’s carrying capacity and it has continued to rise since then. Technologies megatrends (T1 and T2) may accelerate this decoupling in coming decades, however, it is far from clear if they can reverse absolute increases in resource consumption. 122 Figure 25: Relative decoupling between global GDP and the total ecological footprint Source: OECD (2008) On the basis of the analysis above, the following scores are assigned regarding the extent of links of this megatrend as well as its uncertainty: Table 57: Scoring of the extent of the links and scale of the uncertainties associated with Megatrend Env3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties associated with megatrend Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Where: Megatrend likely to make a significant contribution to the impact identified. Number of assumptions megatrend is based on increases, and the contribution of the megatrend to the impacts depends on the evolution of other trends. Likely effects for Europe’s environment 123 Table 58 shows the direct and indirect consequences this megatrend is likely to have on Europe’s environment, based on its trends and pressures, and the environmental issues they will affect. Loss of habitats around the world will affect migratory species, e.g. birds, and the GHG regulating ecosystem services of ecosystems such as forests and peatlands will influence global climate change (GBO3, 2010). Direct impacts relating to exploitation of new and more polluting sources of fossil fuels, such as tar sands/ shales as peak oil/coal is reached, is related to non-renewable resources that are covered more closely under megatrend EC2 (Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment). The likelihood of indirect environmental effects in Europe due to migration and increased completion for resources is covered in megatrend S1 (Shifts in Population Size: Increase, Decline and Rising Migration) and Ec2 respectively. Table 58: Likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend Env.1 Resource Likely effects on Europe’s environment Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Effects on biodiversity due to loss of habitat Direct Biodiversity/nature Increased likelihood of more severe impacts of climate change in Europe as GHG regulation lost in other parts of the world e.g. deforestration Direct Climate change Impacts relating to exploitation of new and more polluting sources of fossil fuels, such as tar sands/ shales as peak oil/coal is reached Direct Pollution/health Increasing pressure on resources in DCs will potentially mean more competition for Europe and more stress on Europe’s environment (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining) Indirect (env) Resources/waste Climate Change Resources/waste Biodiversity/nature Pollution health Destabilisation of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting livelihoods and leading to migration from DCs to Europe and increased pressure on Europe’s environment Indirect (env) Climate Change Resources/waste Biodiversity/nature Pollution health 124 The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole – described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves. Table 59: Scoring of the megatrend Env.1 resource use Direct Effects in Europe on: climate change Pollution and Health Biodiversity and nature natural resource use Strength Indirect Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty +/- +/- + + + + + +/- Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Direction of contribution: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= The influence of deforestation on climate change is well recognised and of international concern but the future direction and magnitude of GHG emissions is still very uncertain. Full account should be taken of the greenhouse gas emissions associated with large-scale conversion of forests and other ecosystems into cropland. This will prevent perverse incentives for the destruction of biodiversity through large-scale deployment of biofuel crops, in the name of climate change mitigation (GBO3, 2010). When emissions from land-use change rather than just energy emissions are factored into climate negotiations, plausible development pathways emerge that tackle climate change without widespread biofuel use. Use of payments for ecosystem services, such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) mechanisms may help align the objectives of addressing biodiversity loss and climate change. However, these systems must be carefully designed, as conserving areas of high carbon value will not necessarily conserve areas of high conservation importance – this is being recognized in the development of so-called “REDD-Plus” mechanisms. The direct impacts on resource use and nature and pollution and health relate to exploitation of new and more polluting sources of fossil fuels, such as tar sands/ shales as peak oil/coal is reached. There is a high level of uncertainty attached to these effects as discussed under megatrend EC2 (Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment). All the indirect effects on Europe of decreasing natural resources are highly uncertain and related to the development of the economic, social and technological megatrends. Other consequences (e.g. for governance) There are various indirect socio-economic effects that could occur in Europe. Some are positive, such as potential exploration of reserves in Europe previously considered not economically viable and shortages of water and soil resource driving food price rises and European export potential, and some are negative, such loss of genetic resource limiting potential to find new drugs and feed stocks for bio-based materials in Europe. 125 There may also be higher pressure for the EU to engage in conflicts caused by resource loss and degradation; requiring European humanitarian aid efforts/ peace-keeping etc The challenge for international governance is to overcome resistance of countries around the world to accept the large scale environmental policy changes that may be necessary to protect global resources. Reference FAO (2008). The State of Food Insecurity in the World. High food prices and food security – threats and opportunities. FAO (2010). Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010. Key Findings: http://www.fao.org/forestry/fra/en/ GBO3 (2010). Global Biodiversity Outlook 3, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montréal, 94 pages. http://gbo3.cbd.int/ IWMI (2007). Water for Food, Water for Life, A Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture. International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Earthscan. OECD (2008). OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030. http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649_34305_39676628_1_1_1_37465,00.htmls PBL (2008). Background report to the OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030. Overviews, details, and methodology of model-based analysis. PBL (2009). PBL Getting into the Right Lane to 2050 at: http://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/500150001.pdf Royal Society (2009). Reaping the benefits. Science and the sustainable intensification of global agriculture. http://royalsociety.org/Reapingthebenefits/ Schade, C and Pimentel, D. (2010). Population crash: prospects for famine in the twenty-first century. Environ. Dev. Sustain., 12: 245-262. Worm B et al. (2009). Rebuilding global fisheries. Science, 325, 578. WWF (2008). Living Planet Report 2008. WWF–World Wide Fund For Nature. http://assets.panda.org/downloads/living_planet_report_2008.pdf 126 8.12 ENV2: INCREASINGLY UNSUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION LOAD Summary of the megatrend Pollution releases around the world are affecting human well-being, interacting with climate change and harming ecosystems and contributing to biodiversity decline in heavily affected areas around the world. Although there will be both increases and decreases in different global regions over the next decades, pollution issues are expected to remain significant and be important for Europe’s environment. Pollutant emissions around the globe are related to a large number of production and consumption patterns, including fossil fuel combustion, industrial processes and agricultural production as well as land use changes related to these. In developing countries, often, poor and under-resourced environmental policies, institutions and enforcement leads to high pollution rates to water, land and air; a share of this pollution is related to goods bound for the European market. The megatrend consists of 5 sub-trends of particular importance: Anthropogenic nitrogen additions into air, water and marine ecosystems Increasing nitrogen pollution at global scale is of particular concern, the production and use of artificial nitrogen fertilizers worldwide has enabled humankind to greatly increase food production , but it has also led to a host of environmental problems, ranging from eutrophication of terrestrial and marine systems to acidification and stratospheric ozone loss (Grennfelt, 2009) and antropogenic conversion of nitrogen to reactive forms now concert around 120 million tonnes of N 2 from the atmosphere, now exceeding all natural terrestrial ecosystem processes (Rockstrom et al, 2009a,b). Future additions of reactive nitrogen from agriculture and sewage are expected to increase globally, despite increasing efficiency of fertiliser use and implementation of sewage treatment in many countries (MNP OECD 2008). Anthropogenic disturbance of river nutrient loads and export to coastal marine systems is a major global problem affecting water quality and biodiversity. The OECD projections indicate an overall increase in the global quanitity of reactive nitrogen exported by rivers to coastal marine systems of about 4% over the next three decades, with a decrease in OCED countries of about 5 % being overshadowed by an 11% increase in BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries (MNP OECD 2008). Tropospheric ozone pollution from increasing hemispheric precursor emissions Ground level (tropospheric) ozone is a global air pollution problem undergoing hemispheric transport (Royal Society, 2008) and ozone is an important greenhouse gas, ranked third after carbon dioxide and methane (Forster et al., 2007) although it was not included in the Kyoto Protocol as its contribution to greenhouse warming was difficult to quantify (Pleijel et al., 2009). Ground level ozone, formed from emitted precursors, has been recognised for decades as an important problem and remains one of the most pervasive of the global air pollutants, with impacts on climate change, human health, food production, the terrestrial carbon cycle and biodiversity (Royal Society 2008; Pliejel et al., 2009; Sitch et al., 2007). Importance of atmospheric particulate matter pollution on health in developing countries and its interaction with climate change at global scale With humans having an increasing impact on the planet, the interactions between the nitrogen cycle, the carbon cycle and climate are expected to become an increasingly important determinant of the Earth system. 127 Particulate matter indoor and outdoor pollution from burning of fossil fuels is causing significant numbers of premature deaths and chronic illnesses around the world, especially in rapidly urbanising developing countries is one of the major environmental causes of premature death and chronic illness (Cohen et al., 2004, 2005). The WHO estimated that particulates in urban areas worldwide account for 2 per cent of mortality from cardiopulmonary disease in adults and 1 per cent of premature deaths in the world each year (WHO 2002). Some of the substances that make up particulate matter also affect radiative forcing and the warming of our planet. Some cool (such as sulphate and organic carbon OC) and some warm (black carbon – BC) (Forster et al., 2007; Ramanthan and Feng 2008; Hansson 2009). The balance of these particles in the atmosphere will determine the extent of the warming from GHGs that are realised over the next decades. Some particulate matter also affects cloud formation and rainfall distribution (UNEP 2002), although these effects are subject to a large uncertainty (Hansson 2009). Increased number of synthetic chemicals in the environment Chemicals are used in every aspect of life. More than 50,000 compounds are used commercially and hundreds are added each year, and the global chemical production is projected to increase by 8.5 per cent over the next 20 years (OECD 2001; Dent et al., 2007) and the impacts on health are not fully known (MNPOECD 2008) due to insufficient information about amounts released, their toxic properties, effects on health and safe limites for exposure (Dent et al., 2007). Persistent chemicals give the perspective of very long time frames for the potential impact. The number of chemicals found in different terrestrial, aquatic and marine ecosystem compartments, and in different organisms along food chains and in different tissues and organs in the human body. Increase of solid waste production. Our modern consumption-driven society, favouring disposal over re-use, leads to increasing volumes of waste in the EU (CEC 2005) and rapidly increasing volumes of waste in Asia (see Figure 26), Africa and Latin America (Barr et al., 2007). The use of unsanitary land fills is becoming a problem in these regions, as they contaminate land and groundwater. Recycling electronic waste can involve exposure to dangerous metals including lead, mercury and cadmium if improperly handled and more than 90 per cent of the 20-50 million tonnes of electronic waste generated each year in the world ends up in China, India, Myanmar and Pakistan (Brigden et al 2005). 128 Figure 26: Per capita municipal waste generation in selected Asian countries () Source: UNEP GEO4 in Barr et al 2007 Potential interrelationships with other megatrends The megatrends of economic growth (continued economic growth), increasing wealth (the emerging global middle-income consumer class) and an increasing global population (S1) will drive the processes that lead to emissions of waste and the different pollutants, including reactive nitrogen, particulate matter and ozone precursors. Although there will be an increase in the activities that lead to emissions, the implementation of legislation and new technologies that lead to reductions in emissions (T1. global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles), will contribute to decoupling pollution from economic growth. For example, economic growth and energy use per unit GDP have decoupled in several key economic regions since 1990. This is shown in Figure 27: energy use per GDP has declined globally and in Europe, Asia and the Pacific and Latin America. 129 Figure 27: Energy use per US$1000 GDP (in PPP for 2000) from UNEP GEO 4, Kuylenstierna et al. 2007 These interactions can be seen in detail in terms of one of the pollution sub-trends, nitrogen, and specifically the issues related to the creation of reactive nitrogen (Nr). Here a key factor is that population shifts (S1), together with changing consumption patterns to due the rise of the middle-income consumers (S4) will increase the demand for food and therefore increase the use of nitrogen fertiliser, with associated release into the environment (Figure 28 – Haber Bosch line). The increasingly affluent population will tend to eat more meat, again increasing the amount of nitrogen in each person’s diet and thus total nitrogen use and release (Galloway et al., 2003). While nitrogen fertiliser is a key element in growing global nitrogen pollution, another arises from air emissions of NOx. The more affluent global population will lead to rapidly increasing electricity demand, increasing the emission of nitrogen oxides from fossil fuel-based power stations and transport. However, counteracting this would be fuel switching for electricity generation (e.g. to renewable or nuclear energy), in particular related to climate change policies. 130 Figure 28: Global population trends from 1860 to 2000 and reactive N creation Similarly, for particulate matter (PM) pollution, a growing population in poorer countries, using current cooking methods will give rise to increased emissions and indoor particulate matter concentrations. However, a shift to more modern fuels (e.g. LPG) or improved stoves, which is related to the megatrend of continued economic growth of EC1, will eliminate or reduce PM emissions. An increasing population with access to more resources will lead to increasing transport demand, potentially using diesel vehicles, causing further particulate matter pollution. However, fuel switching (e.g. to compressed natural gas) or the incorporation of particle traps (EURO 5 standard) globally would reduce the PM burden substantially. Ozone pollution follows a similar trend, as the anthropogenic emissions of precursors is driven by population (S1) and the emerging global middle-income consumer class (S3) affecting NOX, CH4, CO and nmVOC (nonmethane Volatile Organic Compound) emissions, but tempered by technological development and application of control measures to key precursor emissions, the resulting emissions over the next few decades will result in the interplay of these megatrends. The emissions of air pollutants are of direct relevance to climate change (ENV3 Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change). Many substances considered traditional air pollutants also have radiative forcing properties. For example, sulphate formed from sulphur dioxide emissions cool the atmosphere. As stated above ozone warms the atmosphere and black carbon, making up part of the total PM burden, is another pollutant that warms the atmosphere and also reduces the albedo of snow, leading to increase rates of melting of snow and ice, exacerbating the influence of climate change in sensitive glacial regions (Forster et al, 2007). The effect of changing the concentrations of these substances, together with methane and CO, both important precursors of tropsopheric ozone that also warm the atmosphere, may be significant to climate changes over the next few decades, either making the impacts more or less severe in Europe and other regions, depending on the emission levels of the different substances. Some projections of methane emissions show an increase over the next decades which will affect background ozone concentrations (see Figure 29). Changes in climate (ENV3 Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change) and land use (decreasing stocks of natural resources) will influence the production of emissions from natural sources. Increased demand for energy, transport, food and non-food crops and other resources will influence emissions arising from human activity, and changes in patterns of consumption and production will affect the distribution of the pollutants (continued economic growth, Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment, power shifts – from a uni-polar to multi-polar world). 131 Figure 29: Methane emissions from human sources by World region for the new scenario (B2+current legislation) compared to the original IPCC SRES B2 scenario (Royal Society 2008) Source: Royal Society 2008 The chemical sector constitutes the third largest European manufacturing industry, providing 1.7 million jobs and indirect employment for a further three million people (Enterprise Europe, 2001). As such there is a political interest in keeping the growth of the sector and the demands of chemicals at a high level. This has the potential for increasing the emissions of new synthetic substances to the environment, but is counteracted by increasingly stringent regulation and enforcement in Europe (e.g. REACH legislation). This has an effect on the rest of the world, especially for any products that are to be exported to the EU, that will tend to reduce pollutant releases. However, the pollution loads in many Asian, African and Latin American countries remains very high and in many cases largely unregulated, as compliance is underfunded. The continued development of new synthetic and, in some cases, persistent chemicals leads to an ever increasingly complex cocktail of chemical residues in the environment and in food (Vallack et al 1998, Dent et al 2007). As it is virtually impossible to test for the toxicity of very many pollutants acting together on key receptors (in people or the environment), the impact that this mixture is having remains rather unclear, but it is potentially significant (Dent et al 2007 in GEO4). Rapid economic growth (continued economic growth), urbanisation (Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) and new lifestyles associated with greater affluence (the emerging global middle-income consumer class), have led to rapid changes in consumption patterns. This has contributed to the generation of large quantities of solid waste, and changes in waste composition due to for example, increased use of packaging and the development of cheap disposable technologies (e.g. electronic devices). There is also an increasing global trade in waste with, for example, electronic waste being shipped in large quantities from Europe to Asia (Brigden et al 2005), where they are recycled or disposed of in circumstances that lead to health or environmental impacts in these countries. Improvements in biodegradable materials arising from new technology may offset this trend (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles). 132 Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend Table 60 provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: Table 60: Uncertainties associated with megatrend ENV2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load Areas of uncertainty and indications of their dimension Environmental governance at global scale, including climate change agreements Environmental governance in world regions, in particular in Asia National environmental governance in emerging economies Technology development and diffusion Interaction of air pollution (sulphates) with climate change A key uncertainty for this megatrend is environmental governance. At global level, possible agreements on climate change can lead to a decline in pollution, notably NOx and other forms of air pollution emissions. At regional level, the development of agreements in areas such as transboundary air pollution can play an important role. The success of the Convention on LRTAP (Grennfelt 2009) and the EU programmes has inspired South Asia to initiate inter-governmental cooperation on transboundary air pollution issues under the Malé Declaration on Pollution Control and Prevention in South Asia (Hicks et al., 2001; Kuylenstierna et al 2007) which may, in time, be used to set regional standards. One of the functions of the increasingly close interaction between the LRTAP Convention and these emerging Asian inter-governmental agreements is in relation the transfer of the considerable experience in Europe about air pollution to these regions. Environmental governance in emerging economies, and in particular in India and China, will play a key role in shaping the future pollution trends. In some areas, pollution control methods are spreading among countries. An example of this is the adoption of the EURO standard approach in many Asian countries, though their European origins are not always clear (In India similar emission standards are known as ‘Bharat Standards’). (See Figure 30). This may increase as other regions of the world use European experience in reducing pollution; the possibility of intergovernmental agreements in this area is also possible. 133 Figure 30: Level of automobile emission limits in Asian countries, compared with the European Union, for new light-duty vehicles (as of March 2008) CAI Asia, 2008 Source: Royal Society 2008 The uncertainties associated with technology are also major, as described in T1 and T2. For example, biotechnology may have a transformative effect on economic sectors such agriculture. One element of the policy uncertainties will be the degree of greenhouse mitigation as some (though not all) air pollutants are co-emitted with carbon dioxide. The impact of air pollution on the degree of warming and climate change has a large uncertainty, mainly related to the uncertainty in global emissions of radiatively active substances or their precursors. Key uncertainties relate to the future use of coal worldwide, quantity as well as the technology used, and also the degree of implementation of abatement equipment e.g. in China (MNP OECD 2008). Future ozone concentrations are dependent on the future emissions of precursors globally, and there is uncertainty about these. There is also an interaction with climate change and the influence of climate change on future ozone concentrations is spatially and temporally variable, but there is a general tendency for climate change to increase ozone over polluted land regions and reduce it over the oceans (Royal Society 134 2008). Over Europe, total ozone is expected to decrease in different scenarios (Royal Society 2008), but there is another feature of ozone which means that concentrations in European urban areas have increased as NOX controls have been implemented due to the interaction (titration) between NOX and ozone, and levels in European cities are expected to occur as more NOX emissions are reduced (Royal Society 2008). As well as uncertainty in emissions there is also current scientific uncertainty relating to the extent of the interaction of pollution and climate change. For example the impact of black carbon on warming has a high uncertainty (Forster et al., 2007), whereas the impact of sulphate, ozone, CO and methane on radiative forcing are better quantified (Forster et al., 2007) (see Figure 31). The level of PM pollution in Europe will decrease and the level of uncertainty is rather low. However, projections see increases in other developing and industrialising regions (MNP OECD 2008) where the uncertainty is much higher due to the lack of knowledge of the long-term prospects for pollution control in many countries. 135 Figure 31: Summary of the principal components of the radiative forcing of climate change. All these radiative forcings result from one or more factors that affect climate and are associated with human activities or natural processes. The values represent the forcings in 2005 relative to the start of the industrial era (about 1750). Human activities cause significant changes in long-lived gases, ozone, water vapour, surface albedo, aerosols and contrails. The only increase in natural forcing of any significance between 1750 and 2005 occurred in solar irradiance. Positive forcings lead to warming of climate and negative forcings lead to a cooling. The thin black line attached to each coloured bar represents the range of uncertainty for the respective value Source: Forster et al. 2007 On the basis of the analysis above, the following scores are assigned regarding the extent of links of this megatrend as well as its uncertainty: 136 Table 61: Scoring of the extent of the links and scale of the uncertainties associated with Megatrend ENV3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties associated with megatrend Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Low uncertainty: little doubt over magnitude and direction of megatrend’s effects Medium uncertainty: some doubt over magnitude and direction of megatrend’s effects High uncertainty: difficult to determine magnitude and direction of megatrend’s effects The linkages between drivers of pollutant emission and transformation of the environment are well established in the scientific literature, especially in Europe. Many of the megatrends interact with pollutant emissions, including those related to population, technology, affluence, climate change, burden on health and global regulation. Therefore, the aggregate extent of linkages is categorised as ‘strong’. Pollution covers a multitude of substances, emitted across the globe, having many different impacts. In some cases the pathway from emission transport in the environment and impact is well known. In other cases the details are less well established or the complexity such that it is more difficult to quantify. Therefore, the scale of overall uncertainties is classified as ‘medium’ as the megatrend contains a mixture of more certain and less certain relationships. Likely effects for Europe’s environment Table 62 shows the direct and indirect consequences this megatrend is likely to have on Europe’s environment, based on its trends and pressures, and the environmental issues they will affect. The biggest impact of pollutants on Europe will be related to pollutants emitted in Europe, directly affecting health and ecosystems. Air pollutants emitted in other regions will also directly affect the European environment. This includes imports of regional air pollution from neighbouring regions (e.g. PM from N Africa or parts of Asia close to Europe) and of hemispheric air pollutants, especially tropospheric ozone. Overall, these imports will be relatively small compared to European emissions: even where ozone is concerned, European precursor emissions are forecast to have a greater impact on European ozone levels (Royal Society 2008). However, with the increasingly successful implementation of protocols and legislation in Europe, the proportion of remaining ozone caused by other regions will become more significant. In more remote locations, changes in background ozone concentrations driven by changes in methane and hemispheric emissions of ozone precurors subject to long range transport will dominate (Royal Society 2008). While these levels will remain low, it is becoming increasingly understood that the total health impact of ozone is driven more by baseline ozone concentrations (i.e. made up of background concentrations and emission in Europe) than the peak ozone (Royal Society 2008), and therefore the currently rising hemispheric background concentration levels is a concern for Europe. At present, tropospheric ozone 137 concentrations have been estimated to cause 21,400 premature deaths each year (EEA 2007), and has a direct impact on crop yield and quality and was estimated to cause an annual economic loss in arable crop production of €6.7 billion in the EU (in 2000 – Royal Society 2008). While imports in coming decades are likely to be only related to only a small share of total impacts, they will nonetheless play a growing role. The emissions of persistant organic pollutants (POPs) are also important for Europe as POPs released into the environment in other regions can concentrate in important European ecosystems, especially the Arctic and concentrate in food chains (Vallack et al 1998). Here, impacts should decline due to global restrictions on these chemicals, for example through the Stockholm Convention. A significant issue for Europe is the interaction between air pollution and climate change. There are suggestions that recent rapid warming of Europe over the last decades has been significantly related to the reduction in sulphate over Europe (Hjorth and Raes, 2009). Tropospheric ozone is the third most important greenhouse gas (after CO2 and methane) and warms the atmosphere and black carbon is another important warming agent (Forster et al, 2007). The trajectory of temperature changes in Europe could be heavily dependent on what happens to pollution emissions in Europe and elsewhere (Ramanathan and Feng 2008). While the precursors of ozone formation have decreased in Europe, background concentrations of ozone have increased over time (Figure 32). The increasing methane emission over this time period is one likely contributing factor (see Figure 4). However, global modelling indicates that the overall impact of measures in Europe will lead to decreased ozone concentration overall, but with projected increases in parts of Asia (Royal Society 2008). Figure 32: Trends in monthly mean and 12 month running mean (solid line) baseline oxzone concentration from April 1987 to April 2007 at Mace Head, Ireland Source: Derwent et al, 2008 as shown in Royal Society 2008 The impacts on Europe of the growing volume and number of synthetic chemicals released around the world are not possible to estimate. While information on the health effects of chemicals is incomplete, Europe is developing a growing understanding of this as well as the impact of chemicals acting together through 138 REACH and other legislation. However, as shown for megatrends T1 and T2, a growing share of technological development will occur outside of Europe and OECD countries in coming decades. Table 62 Likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend ENV2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load Likely effects on Europe’s environment of pollution from outside Europe Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Climate change Pollution Biodiversity Resources Atmospheric pollution (ozone and its precursors including methane, aerosols) and nitrogen effects on terrestrial ecosystems can influence climate change Direct Climate Change Health and crop impacts from emissions outside of Europe increasing background concentrations of ozone and intercontinental transport of particulate matter and POPs Direct Pollution Health impacts from pesticide residues in imported food Indirect (env) Biodiversity Pollution The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole – described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves. Table 63: Scoring of the megatrend ENV2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load Direct Effects in Europe on: Climate change Pollution and health Biodiversity and nature Natural resource use Strength Indirect Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty +/- +/- + N/A - + +/- +/- Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Direction of contribution: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= The effects on Europe are discussed in terms of the following specific areas. 139 Climate Change Air pollution emissions from the northern hemisphere outside of Europe have a significant direct impact on climate change in Europe. This is due to the transport of pollutants in the atmosphere that affect radiative forcing over Europe. For example, precursors of ozone emitted outside Europe (especially methane) affects ozone concentrations across Europe, and ozone is the third most important GHG according to the IPPC (Forster et al., 2007). There are limited imports of other radiatively active pollutants such as sulphate and black carbon, but these are smaller in size as they have shorter residence times in the atmosphere compared to ozone or methane. Any emissions of air pollution in the northern hemisphere which are radiatively active will affect temperature change in Europe (Shindell et al, in press). This includes total sulphate emission, which has a cooling effect on the climate affecting This includes sulphate concentrations which cool the atmosphere, the emissions of sulphur dioxide will therefore effect the rate of change of global temperature (Ramanathan and Feng 2008). N emissions have various indirect impacts on climate change in Europe: N deposition will affect N2O emissions which is a very important GHG. Nitrogen deposition will also affect carbon sequestration in terrestrial ecosystems. Pollution and Health The impact of PM on human health is very important in Europe, but only a small proportion of European PM arises from outside Europe. Due to rapid economic growth and increasing fossil fuel combustion, particularly of coal, sulphur emissions (and therefore sulphate concentrations – an important part of total PM burden in many regions) in many developing countries have increased substantially in the past few decades and global levels are expected to remain fairly constant at global scale until 2050 (MNP-OECD, 2008). Ozone transported from other regions affects human health, but the health impact of ozone is not as large as PM. Chemical pollution imported in food has the potential to affect health in Europe, although this is tempered by increasingly stringent food quality standards. Biodiversity POPs emitted in the N hemisphere will tend to move and concentrate in the arctic environment. There is concern about the direct eco-toxicological effects on Europe’s arctic wildlife due to high levels of POPs (Vallack et al. 1998). Pollution by POPs, or of waterways where migratory birds reside for part of the year, could affect the populations of migratory birds that visit Europe. The Stockholm Convention for POPs should mean that this treat reduces in the future. Eutrophication of terrestrial ecosystems by nitrogen will potentially have a large biodiversity impact, but the timescales for the impact are large and uncertainty high, and the proportion of N deposited over Europe from outside the region is relatively small. Ozone does effect biodiversity but the magnitude of the effect in still highly uncertain. Natural Resources Pollution, by nitrogen for example, affects marine ecosystems globally and this impacts on fish and shellfish populations and therefore can have an indirect impact on supply of seafood to European markets. Other consequences (e.g. for governance) While climate change is a major issue for global governance, air pollution has been addressed mainly on a regional level. The interactions between air pollutants, notably SOx emissions, and climate change are not fully understood, but nonetheless underline the importance of addressing these issues together. More generally, it appears that pollution issues will need to be addressed further at global level. For example, the waste trade has grown rapidly in recent decades: exports of paper and plastic from the EU15 more than five-fold between 1995 and 2005 (EEA 2009). Legal exports and illegal shipments of hazardous waste and electronic waste have grown in prominence (Milieu et al, 2009). In future decades, however, the 140 solid waste produced in emerging economies is likely to grow significantly – including economies such as China that now receive major shipments from the EU. 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World Bank (2006). World Development Indicators 2006. (in UNEP GEO Data Portal, UNEP Nairobi). 142 8.13 INCREASING SEVERITY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE Summary of the megatrend Climate change has arguably become the first truly global environmental mega-trend driven mostly by GHG emissions from fossil fuel use for energy but also by unsustainable agricultural practices such as forest clearance for agriculture (IPCC 2007a). It can be viewed as a driver of environmental change in its own right as it affects the direction and magnitude of other trends and indeed megatrends. It represents an additional pressure on top of factors such as freshwater extraction, urban sprawl, use of natural capital, and other forms of socio-economic development and land use changes. Temperature rises over 2 °C above pre-industrial levels are likely to cause major societal and environmental disruptions through the rest of the century and beyond, and make it challenging for human and natural systems to cope and adapt at affordable economic, social and environmental costs. Vulnerabilities differ across regions, sectors and communities in Europe, with pronounced consequences expected in the Mediterranean basin, North-Western Europe and the Arctic. Many coastal zones, river-flood prone areas and mountains are vulnerable to climatic changes, as are cities and urban areas. In Europe, current and projected climate change encompasses far-reaching impacts including: temperature increases; sea-level rise; changes in precipitation patterns and water availability; and more frequent and intense extreme weather events (e.g. floods and droughts). This suggests that climate change will affect the vulnerability of European society as a whole in many of its dimensions, including threats to human health, damage to economic sectors (e.g. energy, agriculture, and tourism) and to ecosystem goods and functions as well as loss of biodiversity at all levels. Europe has a dual role as "victim" of global change impacts and at the same time a major contributor to global change - both aspects are policy relevant. On the one hand, adaptation can reduce the vulnerability of human and natural systems and strengthen their resilience to current and expected climate change. On the other hand, GHG emissions to date have predominantly been from the industrialised countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) but in the future an increasing proportion of GHGs will originate from non OECD countries (e.g. Brazil, China and India) (Figure 33 and Figure 34), including embodied emissions associated with imports to Europe. If Europe were to take its full responsibility for global environment impacts, it would need to properly internalise the externalities related to its activities and consumption. Figure 33: Energy-related CO2 emissions in the World Energy Outlook 2008 Reference Scenario by fuel and region Source: OECD-IEA (2009) 143 Figure 34: Total Greenhouse gas emissions by region (1970-2050) Simulation runs showing baseline case with no further action taken to reduce emissions (on left) and to stabilise atmospheric concentration at 450ppm CO2eq (on right), one of the most ambitious targets being discussed. The simulation shows that to reach this target, actions by all countries are needed to achieve a 39% reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 relative to 2000 levels. Such action would reduce GDP by 0.5% and 2.5% below Baseline estimates in 2030 and 2050 respectively, equivalent to a reduction in annual GDP growth of about 0.1 percentage points per annum on average. Source: OECD (2008) Increasing pressure on resources in developing countries will mean more competition for resources for Europe and this could have serious consequences considering the high level of imports to Europe that rely on the availability of key resources such as water. Climate change impacts outside of Europe could trigger migration towards Europe which could potentially increase pressure on Europe resources and political unrest over competition for resources could require European humanitarian aid efforts/ peace-keeping etc. Potential interrelationships with other megatrends This megatrend is the result of several of the other megatrends acting together to produce increasing emissions of GHGs globally. These include shifts in population size (Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration), the emerging global middle-income consumer class (global urbanisation), global urbanisation (the emerging global middle-income consumer class), continued economic growth (continued economic growth), decreasing stocks of natural resources (decreasing stocks of natural resources) and increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load (Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load) (IPCC, 2007a, Raupach et al. 2007). Economic growth and increasing levels of consumption are the key drivers especially in emerging economies. In turn climate change affects other megatrends such as changing patterns of disease burden (changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics) and feeds back on the environmental megatrends (decreasing stocks of natural resources and Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load). For example, ‘tipping points’ may exist in the Amazon for total deforested area (>40%) and for global warming (DT > 3–48C) where crossing these limits could mean that the regional climate changes induced by the large-scale deforestation itself could prevent the re-establishment of parts the forest (Nobre et al. 2009). Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend 144 The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend: Table 64: Uncertainties associated with megatrend ENV3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Areas of uncertainty and indications of their dimension Scientific: - climate sensitivity to CO2 concentration; - rate of climate change - understanding the dynamics of glaciers and their melting; - magnitude of feedbacks between biogeochemical cycles and climate change and potential for tipping points; - magnitude of effects of climate change and atmospheric CO2 concentration on food production; - magnitude of effects of climate change on water availability; - magnitude of long-term health impacts from altered climate; - response of disease vectors and transmission mechanisms to changed climate; - 2010 biodiversity targets not met in Europe and elsewhere and adaptive capacity is being lost with largely unknown consequences; - how loss of biodiversity will affect resilience of ecosystems and human-dominated systems; - unknown potential uses for genetic resources that are lost; - extent of sea level rise/inundation: very hard to anticipate, very location-specific; - relative importance of sea level rise vs. incidence of severe storms on coastal areas Other key uncertainties: - Technological developments - Regional and sectoral differences in climate change vulnerabilities and socio-economic conditions make adaptation a context and location-specific challenge; - Political uncertainty and potential to mitigate future emissions Table 64 illustrates that there is still some scientific uncertainty over the potential severity of the consequences of climate change, especially as projections require assumptions to be made about socioeconomic variables such as economic growth, available technology, GDP and population. 145 IPCC scenario projections suggest global mean temperatures could rise by as much as 1.8-4.0 °C over the course of this century (Figure 35) if global action to limit GHG emissions proves unsuccessful (IPCC, 2007a). Recent observations give reason to believe that rate of growth of GHG emissions and many climate impacts are approaching the upper boundary of the IPCC range of projections rather than to the lower ones, as illustrated by comparing the IPCC projections (Figure 35) with observations of CO2 emissions (Figure 36). Figure 35: Atmosphere-Ocean Circulation Model Projections of surface warming Source: IPCC AR4, 2007b, Synthesis report 146 Figure 36: Comparison of IPCC Scenario projections with observed global fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions Source: Richardson et al. (2009) 147 The Summary for Policy Makers of the Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007a) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that “there is high confidence that recent regional changes in temperature have had discernible impacts on many physical and biological systems”, where ‘high confidence is defined as ‘about 8 out of 10 chance’. The impacts this statement is referring to are illustrated in Figure 37 and it can be seen that they are wide-ranging and linked to the uncertainties detailed in Table 64. As Figure 34 states the impacts will vary by extent of adaptation, rate of temperature change and socio-economic pathway but will also depend on the actual increase in global average temperature. Past emissions are estimated to involve some unavoidable warming (about a further 0.6°C by the end of the century relative to 1980-1999) even if atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations remain at 2000 levels (see Figure 35) (see Working Group I AR4, 2007b) and Figure 37 and Figure 34 show that further warming is inevitable. 148 Figure 37: Key impacts identified by the IPCC AR4 with a high level of confidence associated with them Source: IPCC (2007a) Figure 38 is a new version of the so-called “burning embers diagram”, which shows the increasing risk of various types of climate impacts with an increase in global average temperature. Using the same methodology, the reasons for concern have been updated based on the most recent research (Smith et al. 2009). Several insights relevant to the definition of dangerous climate change are obvious from a comparison of the 2001 and 2009 diagrams. First, risks of deleterious climate change impacts now appear at significantly lower levels of global average temperature rise in the more recent analysis. Second, a 2oC guardrail, which was thought in 2001 to have avoided serious risks for all five reasons for concern, is now inadequate to avoid serious risks to many unique and threatened ecosystems and to avoid a large increase in the risks associated with extreme weather events. Third, the risks of large 149 scale discontinuities (see below) were considered to be very low in 2001 for a 2 oC increase but are now considered to be moderate for the same increase. Figure 38: Diagram relating the potential impacts of climate change to the rise in global average temperature. Zero on the temperature scale corresponds approximately to 1990 average temperature, and the bottom of the temperature scale to pre-industrial average temperature. The level of risk or severity of potential impacts increases with the intensity of red colour. The 2oC guardrail is shown for reference Source: Richards et al. (2009) in Smith et al (2009) In summary, although a 2oC rise in temperature above pre-industrial remains the most commonly quoted guardrail for avoiding dangerous climate change, it nevertheless carries significant risks of deleterious impacts for society and the environment. Stabilising atmospheric concentrations at any level will require emissions to be reduced to near-zero levels in the long term. Some of the projected pathways that give a reasonable chance of staying within the 2°C guardrail (Figure 12) suggest that global society may need to develop the capacity to remove carbon from the atmosphere. Although some promising technologies - for example, Carbon Capture and Storage, CCS – are under development, they are still some way from being deployed commercially and on a large-scale. Stochastic models and probabilistic projections have been increasingly developed in recent years to quantify key uncertainties. For example, IPCC AR4’s projections show that a reduction by 50% of global GHGs by 2050 would give a 50% chance of staying in the long term below a 2 oC increase in global temperature compared to pre-industrial levels (IPCC AR4, 2007 quoted in EEA, 2010a). Although many early impacts of climate change can be effectively addressed through adaptation, the options for successful adaptation diminish and the associated costs increase with increasing climate change. At present we do not have a clear picture of the limits to adaptation, or the cost, partly because effective adaptation measures are highly dependent on specific, geographical and climate risk factors as well as institutional, political and financial constraints. 150 There are some impacts for which adaptation is the only available and appropriate response. An indication of these impacts can be seen in Figure 37. A wide array of adaptation options is available, but more extensive adaptation than is currently occurring is required to reduce vulnerability to future climate change. There are barriers, limits and costs, but these are not fully understood. Figure 39: Energy-related emission trajectories from 2000 to 2100 to achieve stabilisation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at three different targets (coloured lines). The black line is a reference trajectory based on no climate policy. Estimated (median) probabilities of limiting global warming to maximally 2°C are indicated for the three stabilisation targets Source: Richardson et al. (2009) On the basis of the analysis above, the following scores are assigned regarding the extent of links of this megatrend as well as its uncertainty: Table 65: Scoring of the extent of the links and scale of the uncertainties associated with Megatrend ENV3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Extent of potential links with other megatrends Scale of uncertainties associated with megatrend Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= 151 Likely effects for Europe’s environment The direct effects to Europe’s environment listed in Table 3 reflect the key past and projected effects of climate change on sectors for the main bio-geographical regions of Europe (Figure 40). These are covered in more detail in the impact summary sheet annex of this report. Figure 40: Key past and projected effects on sectors for the main bio-geographical regions of Europe Note: Please notice that original biogeographical regions of Europe have been regrouped as follows: Arctic: Arctic; Boreal region: Boreal region; North-western Europe: Atlantic region; Central and eastern Europe: Continental region minus North/West of Italy + Pannonian region + Steppic region; Mountain areas: Alpine – Alps 152 + Alpine – Apennines + Alpine – Balkan – Rhodope Mountains + Alpine – Carpathian + Alpine – Fennoscandian + Alpine – Pyrenees + Anatolian region + Alpine – Dinaric Alps; Mediterranean region: Mediterranean region + Black sea region + North/West of Italy. Arctic – Greenland does not belong to a biogeographical region of Europe. Source: EEA (2010) Indirect effects The indirect impacts hinge upon the socio-economic repercussions in regions outside of Europe. For example, from Figure 41 it is clear that Europe is heavily reliant on imported goods, and impacts of climate change in other parts of the world can affect resource availability. This could include food and water shortages and this could lead to increased migration pressure on Europe which is likely to be less effected than other regions. In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) expressed that the greatest single impact of climate change might be on human migration by the displacement of millions of people as a result of agricultural disruption, shoreline erosion and coastal flooding (Lonergan, 1998). Climate Change drivers for migration can be slow-onset changes e.g. sea-level rise, growing water scarcity, desertification and food insecurity or sudden hazards known as climate events e.g. monsoon floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, glacial lake flood outbursts and typhoons (McLeman and Smit, 2005). Environment-related migration can be both regional and international. In Africa, climate change is having a major impact in the area of Darfur and the European Commission predicts that both international and national migration is ‘likely to intensify’ (European Commission, 2008). According to OECD (2009), while climate change will lead to population movement, the true extent of migration (international to regional) ‘is far from certain’ (see Figure 42, Figure 43, Figure 44 and Figure 45) Figure 41: International trade – importers and exporters Source: FAO (2009) 153 Likely consequences on Europe’s environment Direct/ Indirect Environmental Area: Increasing threat to food production in parts of Europe due to changing length of growing season and increase in extreme climatic events Direct Climate change Changes in precipitation patterns and water availability; and more frequent and intense extreme weather events (e.g. floods and droughts). Direct Climate change Negative health effects due to increasing temperatures and changing prevalence of tropical diseases in Europe Direct Loss of biodiversity in terms of species and habitats, shifts in phenology Direct Biodiversity/nature Sea level rise Direct Climate change Food and water shortage and destabilization of ecosystems could trigger migration from DCs to Europe or have economic repercussions, and increased pressure on Europe’s environment Indirect Climate change Climate change Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Resources/waste Climate change Pollution and health Pollution/health Biodiversity/nature Resources/waste Table 66: Likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend Env.3 Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change. 154 Figure 42: Countries facing food crises as of August 2008 Source: FAO (2008) Figure 43: Multiple Stress Zones: Instability is likely to be greatest in areas of Multiple Environmental Stress Source: DCC (2007) 155 156 Figure 44: Global impacts of climate change. Source: IAASTD (2008) 157 Figure 45. Origin and destinations of international migrants‐ climate change and environment induced uncertainty for the future Source: Warner (2008) The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole – described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves. Table 67: Scoring of the megatrend Env.3 Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change for likely effects on Europe’s environment. Direct Effects in Europe on: climate change Strength Indirect Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty +/- + + + Biodiversity and nature + + natural resource use +/- + Pollution and health Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong= Direction of contribution: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= 158 Other consequences (e.g. for governance) Food and water shortage, destabilization of ecosystems and health effects might lead to social unrest; requiring European humanitarian aid efforts/ peace-keeping etc Reference DCDC, (2007).The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036, Third Edition. 1-106. European Commission (2008) Climate Change and International Security”, Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf, accessed 3rd August 2010. EEA 2010. Adapting to Climate Change. SOER Part B 2010. EEA, Copenhagen (DRAFT). FAO (2008). The State of Food Insecurity in the World. High food prices and food security – threats and opportunities. IAASTTD (2008).Agriculture at the Crossroads. Synthesis Report. International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development.Washington. IPCC (2007a). Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Summary for Policy Makers. IPCC (2007b). Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf Lonergan, S. (1998) The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement”, Environmental Change and Security Project Report, Issue 4, 5-15. McLeman R. and Smit B. (2005) Assessing the Security Implications of Climate Change- related Migration, Presentation to Workshop on Human Security and Climate Change, 21-23, Oslo, pp. 8-9. Nobre, C.A and De Simone Borma, S. (2009). Tipping points for the Amazon Forest. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2009, 1:28–36 OECD (2008). OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030. http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649_34305_39676628_1_1_1_37465,00.html OECD-IEA 2009. World Energy Outlook 2009. IEA, Paris. OECD (2009) The Future of International Migration to OECD Countries, OECD. 1-285 Srichandan, S.P. (2009) Climate Change, Migration and EU Security, European Security and Defence Forum Workshop 2: New Transnational Security Challenges and Responses. 1-20. Smith, J.B., Schneider, S.H., Oppenheimer, M., Yohe GW, Hare W, Mastrandrea, M.D.,Patwardhan, A., Burton, I., Corfee-Morlot, J., Magadza, C.H.D., Fussel, H.-M., Pittock, A.B., Rahman, A., Suarez, A. and J.-P. van Ypersele (2009) Assessing dangerous climate change through an update of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) “reasons for concern”. PNAS. 106, 4133-4137. Richardson et al. (2009). Synthesis Report. Climate Change, Global Risks, Challenges and decisions, report from Copenhagen conference March, 2009. http://climatecongress.ku.dk/ Raupach, M.R., Marland, G., Ciais, P., Le Quere, C., Canadell, J.G., Klepper, G. and Field C.B., 2007. Global and regional drivers of accelerating CO2 emissions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 104, 10288-10293, doi:10.1073/ pnas.0700609104. (http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/0700609104v1) Warner, K, EFMSV Germanwatch Session, October 2008 159 160 9. ANNEX II: THEMATIC IMPACT SUMMARIES 9.1 CLIMATE CHANGE The 14 global megatrends were reviewed in terms of their interlinkages and uncertainties, and likely effects to four environmental areas were identified for Europe; Climate change Pollution and health Biodiversity and nature Natural resource use. These effects are classed as direct or indirect. Direct effects are changes to Europe’s environment caused by the drivers associated with a megatrend. Changes caused to the environment in another part of the world which impact on Europe’s environment are indirect effects. The likely effects identified for climate change is presented in Table 70 in below. From the likely effects identified in Table 70 there are several key issues which emerge. These are discussed in more detail in Annex I but it is useful to provide an overview here; Global population growth is likely to result in increased emissions of GHGs globally. The aging of the world’s population could also increase GHS emissions, but this is highly uncertain. Aging of Europe’s population is likely to increase Europe’s vulnerability to climate change impacts, and may also reduce the amount of money available to respond to climate change. Urbanisation, rising incomes and increased economic growth are linked, and are likely to act together to increase global GHG emissions. The loss of certain global resources, such as the Amazon forests, may reduce ability of the ecosphere to regulate GHG emissions, leading to increasingly severe climate change impacts in Europe. Increased pollution, such as water and air pollution, in Europe will be exacerbated by climate change. Technology may provide a means to reduce GHG emissions, potentially reducing the effects of climate change in Europe. The role of fast-growing economies, such as India and China, in mitigating GHG emissions will becomes increasingly important over the long-term. The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on climate change in Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex 1 for more detail). Table 68 below provides a summary of the strength and uncertainty of likely effects to climate change in Europe, by megatrend. Table 68: Strength and uncertainty of likely effects to climate change in Europe Direct Megatrend Strength S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration 161 n.a. Indirect Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty n.a S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges n.a. n.a. -/+ S3: Global urbanisation n.a. n.a. + S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class n.a. n.a. + S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world n.a. n.a. + S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics n.a n.a n.a n.a T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles - -/+ T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies - -/+ EC1: Continued economic growth n.a. n.a. + EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment n.a. n.a. - EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world n.a. n.a. -/+ ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources +/- +/- ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load +/- +/- ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change +/- + Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= Most of the direct effects to climate change in Europe are likely to arise from the environmental megatrends, with medium uncertainty, although these effects may increase or decrease the pressure of climate change on Europe. The direct effects of the global megatrends to climate change in Europe are relatively few. Technology may actually reduce the direct effects, although it could also increase the indirect effects of climate change on Europe. However any predictions of what solutions technology can offer are highly uncertain. The indirect effects of the global megatrends to climate change in Europe are likely to be strong, and S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class) and EC1 (continued economic growth) are likely to particularly significant in increasing the effect of climate change. Predictions of the likely 162 effect of both of these megatrends have low uncertainty attached to them. S3 (global urbanisation) is closely associated with S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class) and EC1 (continued economic growth), driven by and driving both megatrends, but considered in isolation is likely to have a weak effect on increasing climate change in Europe. S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) is likely to have a medium effect on climate change in Europe, with low uncertainty attached. S2 (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges) are also likely to have an medium indirect effect on climate change in Europe, but the uncertainty of these effects is high. Outlooks for Europe’s environment A review of existing environmental outlooks for Europe’s environment provides an indication of the scale of potential climate change effects. There is extensive amount of data and information available describing the potential impacts of climate change in Europe (for example see EEA 2008), a summarised selection of which is presented below. This summary is followed by a description of the spatial and temporal distributions of these impacts. Table 69: Impacts of climate change on Europe from EEA (2008) Impacts of Europe’s changing climate – 2008 indicator-based assessment Temperature change The annual average temperature for Europe is projected to increase by 1.0–5.5 °C (comparing 2080–2100 with the 1961–1990 average) (Figure 46). Extreme high temperature events across Europe, along with the overall warming, are projected to become more frequent, intense and longer this century. Night temperatures are projected to increase considerably (Figure 47) (possibly leading to additional health problems and even mortality, at least partly compensated by reduced mortality in winter). Figure 46: Modelled change in mean temperature over Europe between 1980–1999 and 2080–2099 Source: EEA (2008) Figure 47: Modelled number of tropical nights over Europe during summer (June–August) 1961– 1990 and 2071–2100 163 Source: EEA (2008) Changing rainfall patterns Climate models project changes in precipitation that vary considerably from season to season and across regions. Geographically, projections indicate a general precipitation increase in northern Europe and a decrease in southern Europe (Figure 48). Many parts of Europe are projected to experience dryer summers Relatively small precipitation changes are projected for spring and autumn. Figure 48: Modelled precipitation change between 1980–1999 and 2080–2099 Source: EEA (2008) River floods Although there is as yet no proof that the extreme flood events of recent years are a direct consequence of climate change, they may give an indication of what can be expected: the frequency and intensity of floods in large parts of Europe is projected to increase. In particular, flash and urban floods, triggered by local intense precipitation events, are likely to be more frequent throughout Europe. Flood hazard will also probably increase during wetter and warmer winters, with more frequent rain and less frequent snow. Even in regions where mean river flows will drop significantly, as in the Iberian Peninsula, the 164 projected increase in precipitation intensity and variability may cause more floods (Figure 49) Figure 49: Projected change in 100-year return level of river discharge between 2071–2100 and the reference period 1961–1990 Source: EEA (2008) River droughts In most of Europe, the projected decrease in summer precipitation, accompanied by rising temperatures which enhances evaporative demand, may lead to more frequent and intense summer droughts. As a result of both climate change and increasing water withdrawals, more river basins will be affected by severe water stress, resulting in increased competition for water resources (Figure 50). Figure 50: Projected change in mean annual and summer minimum 7-day river flow between 2071– 2100 and the reference period 1961–1990 Note: Red indicates more severe droughts, blue less severe droughts Source: EEA (2008) 165 Spatial distribution Spatial distribution Temperature increase Warming is projected to be greatest over eastern Europe, Scandinavia and the Arctic in winter (December to February), and over south-western and Mediterranean Europe in summer (June to August). The temperature rise in parts of France and the Iberian Peninsula may exceed 6 °C, while the Arctic could become on average 6 °C and possibly 8 °C warmer than the 1961–1990 average. The maximum temperature during summer is projected to increase far more in southern and central Europe than in northern Europe, whereas the largest reduction in the occurrence of cold extremes is projected for northern Europe. Changing rainfall patterns The change in annual mean between 1980–1999 and 2080–2099 for projections varies from 5 to 20 % in northern Europe and from – 5 to – 30 % in southern Europe and the Mediterranean River floods In snow-dominated regions such as the Alps, the Carpathian Mountains and northern parts of Europe, spring snowmelt floods are projected to decrease due to a shorter snow season and less snow accumulation in warmer winters. River droughts The regions most prone to an increase in drought risk are the Mediterranean and south-eastern parts of Europe, which already suffer most from water stress. River flow droughts are projected to increase in frequency and severity in southern and south-eastern Europe, the United Kingdom, France, Benelux, and western parts of Germany over the coming decades. In snow-dominated regions, where droughts typically occur in winter, river flow droughts are projected to become less severe because a lower fraction of precipitation will fall as snow in warmer winters. Temporal distribution Temporal distribution Temperature increase Temperature increases projected for Europe are to the end of the century. Changing rainfall patterns Projections of changing rainfall patterns are to the end of the century. River floods Projections of river floods are to the end of the century. River droughts 166 Projections of changing river droughts are to the end of the century. Table 70: Likely effects of global megatrends to climate change use in Europe Direct/ Indirect Likely effects S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration Global population growth will influence climate change and its impacts on Europe (the link is discussed under ENV2) Indirect The decline in Europe’s population – considered separately from migration or from other megatrends – will reduce pressures on the environment (Biois). Direct S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges Youth bulges can lead to conflicts in countries near Europe. Sudden influxes of migrants are a possible consequence. Another is an increased difficulty in addressing common environment issues, such as protection of the Mediterranean Sea. Indirect The pressure on government budgets due to ageing may reduce resources available for the environment Indirect Ageing populations may reduce their high-impact consumption, such as the high demand for passenger vehicle transport and also air travel Indirect Ageing populations in Europe and around the world may pay greater attention to long-term issues, and thus also to environmental concerns Indirect S3: Global urbanisation Emissions of greenhouses gases Indirect S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class Increased climate change impacts in Europe Indirect S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world Increased contribution of older people to climate change Indirect S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics No effects to climate change in Europe’s identified T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles Technology is expected to continue to reduce the amount of energy and raw materials needed per unit of GDP of the global economy. This will reduce pressures on climate change in particular. Indirect New energy technologies promise to reduce GHG emissions, reducing future (long-term) climate change consequences in Europe Indirect The development of geo-engineering technologies could provide opportunities to reduce global climate change – with difficult-to-foresee results and effects Indirect New technologies for alternative energy and energy efficiency developed elsewhere in the world will reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Europe. Direct 167 T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies NBIC technologies introduced around the world can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, thus reducing the climate change impacts on Europe Indirect EC1: Continued economic growth Global economic growth will be directly related to global climate change in coming decades and thus its effects in Europe Indirect EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment Global competition for energy resources can increase attention to alternative energy (and nuclear power) around the world Indirect EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world Global economic growth will be directly related to global climate change in coming decades and thus its effects in Europe Indirect The fast-growing economies – including China and India – will have a growing role in terms of global environmental issues as well as policies to address them Indirect ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources Increased likelihood of more severe impacts of climate change in Europe as GHG regulation lost in other parts of the world e.g. deforestration Direct Increasing pressure on resources in DCs will potentially mean more competition for Europe and more stress on Europe’s environment (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining) Indirect Destabilisation of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting livelihoods and leading to migration from DCs to Europe and increased pressure on Europe’s environment Indirect ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load Atmospheric pollution (ozone and its precursors including methane, aerosols) and nitrogen effects on terrestrial ecosystems can influence climate change Direct ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Increasing threat to food production in parts of Europe due to changing length of growing season and increase in extreme climatic events Direct Changes in precipitation patterns and water availability; and more frequent and intense extreme weather events (e.g. floods and droughts). Direct Negative health effects due to increasing temperatures and changing prevalence of tropical diseases in Europe Direct Sea level rise Direct Food and water shortage and destabilization of ecosystems could trigger migration from DCs to Europe or have economic repercussions, and increased pressure on Europe’s environment Indirect Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. References EEA (2008) Impacts of Europe’s changing climate – 2008 indicator-based assessment 168 9.2 POLLUTION AND HEALTH The 14 global megatrends were reviewed in terms of their interlinkages and uncertainties, and likely effects to four environmental areas were identified for Europe; Climate change Pollution and health Biodiversity and nature Natural resource use. These effects are classed as direct or indirect. Direct effects are changes to Europe’s environment caused by the drivers associated with a megatrend. Changes caused to the environment in another part of the world which impact on Europe’s environment are indirect effects. The likely effects identified for pollution and health is presented in Table 70 in below. From the likely effects identified in Table 70 there are several key issues which emerge. These are discussed in more detail in Annex I but it is useful to provide an overview here; The trends related to Europe’s population will have a variety of effects in terms of pollution levels. Ageing and population decline could reduce consumption and related emissions of a broad range of pollutants, from CO and NOx from motor vehicles to nitrogen runoff from intensive agriculture to water bodies. Migration to Europe will offset a part of this population decline: and the extent of future migration is a major area of uncertainty. Migration is expected to lead to an increase in many of the same pollutants. Overall, the changes in total population size are expected to be relatively small compared to other trends – far less than the possible 50% increase in global population to 2050. Increasing global consumption, for example, due to economic growth, increasing incomes and population increase, may increased demand for European agricultural and forestry products. If this leads to an increase in the scale and intensity of agriculture in Europe to 2050, then it is likely that pollution may increase as a result; for example, run-off of nitrates and phosphates from agricultural land could increase, or the release of acidifying substances to the atmosphere could rise. Increased water demand due to increased agricultural production could also increase water stress in Europe, increasingly important in the context of climate change. Increasing global consumption could lead to increases in the exploitation of Europe’s mineral and fuel resources, which could also increase pollution in Europe to 2020. Technology is likely to have a positive effect on pollution in Europe, potentially reducing resource consumption and tackling waste / pollution issues. Technology may also offer improved pollution monitoring and provide better information to decision makers in Europe. Table 71: Strength and uncertainty of likely effects to pollution and health in Europe Direct Megatrend Strength Indirect Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration -/+ S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and + -/+ 169 youth bulges S3: Global urbanisation + n.a. n.a. S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class + n.a. n.a. S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics n.a n.a n.a n.a T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles - -/+ T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies - -/+ EC1: Continued economic growth -/+ + EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment 0/+ -/+ EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world -/+ -/+ ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources + + ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load + n.a. n.a. + + ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= The global megatrends likely to have the strongest effect on pollution and health in Europe are S3 (global urbanisation), S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class), T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies), ENV2 (increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load) and ENV3 (increasing severity of the consequences of climate change). Most of the effects identified were direct, with low to medium uncertainty, and are predicted as likely to potentially increase and decrease pressure on Europe’s environment. The indirect effects 170 identified have higher uncertainty associated with them, and are also a mix of increasing and decreasing pressures on pollution and heath in Europe. Increasing concentrations of ozone, particulate matter and POPs from intercontinental transport are projected to increase in Europe and are likely to have medium strength effects on pollution and health in Europe, which is identified through ENV2 (increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load). Outlooks for Europe’s environment A review of existing environmental outlooks for Europe’s environment provides an indication of the scale of potential pollution and health impacts. Data was not available for every effect identified, but where data was identified it is present below. Pollution and agriculture The use of mineral and organic fertilizers in agriculture to increase cropping power increases environmental hazards, such as water and soil pollution, and has negative effects on other environmental components, interfering with the natural balance of soil microflora. High levels of nitrate and nitrite in drinking water are a hazard to human health (EEA 2010). The actual environmental effects will depend on pollution abatement methods, soil and plant types, and meteorological conditions (EEA 2010). Figure 51 demonstrates projections of fertilizer consumption in Europe between 2001 and 2020, for EU15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and EU 8 (new EU states (Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). Figure 51: Projections of fertilizer consumption 171 Source: European environment outlook, EEA Report No 4/2005, in EEA (2010) European air pollution Figure 52 shows the general trend of emissions of primary particulate precursors and ozone-forming substances in EECCA, WCE and SEE for 2000-2004, and projections to 2020 (EEA 2007). The bars show the quantities emitted, scaled to take into account their contribution to the formation of particulate matter, ground-level ozone and acidifying and eutrophying gases. It is apparent from Figure 52 that between 2005 and 2020 emissions in Europe overall are projected to decline further, with the largest reduction (35%) projected for WCE. In SEE, emissions are also projected to fall (27%) over the period, as a result of harmonisation of air quality and emission reduction targets with the EU. Emissions in EECCA are projected to have increased slightly above 20015 levels by 2020. Figure 52: Emission trends and projects by region Source: EEA (2007) Figure 2.2.1 Modelling studies of inter-continental transport of fine aerosols into Europe (Liu et al. 2009) estimate that 10, 000 premature mortalities annually can be attributed to emissions from outside Europe (Figure 53b) and that 20,000 deaths annually in other regions as a result of inter-continental transport of Europe’s emissions. Due to rapid economic growth and increasing fossil fuel combustion, particularly of coal, sulfur emissions in many developing countries have increased substantially in the past few decades and are expected to grow further in the future. Key uncertainties include the future use of coal worldwide, quantity as well as technology; use or non-use of existing abatement equipment in power plants in China; and industrial emissions for example from metallurgy in Russia (PBL, 2008). 172 Figure 53: compares the impact on premature mortalities of intercontinental import and export of fine aerosols. ‘Import’ indicates the total number of premature mortalities in a region caused by aerosol emissions that arrive from the 9 other regions. ‘Export’ indicates the total number of premature mortalities outside the region resulting from inter-continental transport of the region’s emissions. Impacts of ozone on human mortality have also been estimated (Anenberg et al., 2009) and show that currently for EU, the largest influence of intercontinental impact is due to the influence of North American ozone precursor emissions (Table 72) Table 72: Annual Avoided Cardiopulmonary Mortalities (Hundreds) Following 20% NOx, NMVOC, and CO Emission Reductions in. Each Region, Assuming No Concentration Threshold (bold) and Assuming a Concentration Threshold of 35 ppb (normal font) Source: PBL 2008 background for OECD outlook 173 Spatial distribution Spatial distribution Pollution and agriculture Global megatrends may play a small role in influencing fertilizer use and related runoff. It is projected that in EU15 the overall level of fertilizer consumption will be largely stable to 2020. However in EU8, where average levels are much lower, the projections are for an increase over this period. Air pollution In Europe, emissions of key air pollutants such as PM and ozone precursors are expected to decline to 2020, with the largest reductions in Western and Central Europe, and smaller reductions in South East Europe. Emissions of these pollutants are projected to increase in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Temporal distribution Temporal distribution Pollution and agriculture Fertilizer consumption projections are to 2020. After 2020 the direction of fertilizer consumption is uncertain. It could potentially increase, as discussed in the global megatrends, for example due to increased global demand for European agriculture and forestry products. European air pollution European air pollution is expected to improve in most of Europe to 2020. The effect of the global megatrends on European air pollution is uncertain, but hemispheric air pollution could become increasingly important. Table 73: Likely effects of global megatrends to pollution and health Likely effects Direct/ Indirect S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration Global population growth will increase resource consumption around the world, and this in turn can increase resource consumption in Europe – e.g. through growing demand for its agricultural and forestry products, with biodiversity and pollution associated in particular with intensive production (see EC2 for a discussion of uncertainties) Indirect The decline in Europe’s population – considered separately from migration or from other megatrends – will reduce pressures on the environment (Biois). Direct S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges Youth bulges are likely to influence migration to Europe – this increase in population will increase 174 Indirect pressures on the environment. Youth bulges can lead to conflicts in countries near Europe. Sudden influxes of migrants are a possible consequence. Another is an increased difficulty in addressing common environment issues, such as protection of the Mediterranean Sea. Indirect The pressure on government budgets due to ageing may reduce resources available for the environment Indirect Ageing populations may reduce their high-impact consumption, such as the high demand for passenger vehicle transport and also air travel Indirect Ageing populations in Europe and around the world may pay greater attention to long-term issues, and thus also to environmental concerns Indirect S3: Global urbanisation Hemispheric air pollution Direct S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class Increased climate change impacts in Europe Indirect Increase in hemispheric air pollution in Europe Direct Increased exploitation of mineral and fuel resources in Europe Indirect S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world Increased contribution of older people to climate change Indirect S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics No likely effects to Europe’s environment identified T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles New process technologies developed elsewhere in the world can reduce industrial pollution in Europe Direct T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies NBIC technologies introduced around the world can improve agricultural yields, reducing demands on agricultural products from Europe and related impacts on resources (soil and water) and pollution (chemical runoff to water bodies) as well as the further effects on biodiversity Indirect NBIC technologies introduced in Europe can tackle pollution and waste problems and reduce to resource consumption Direct New sensors and information technology could make environmental monitoring much less expensive and provide better information for decision-makers in Europe Direct EC1: Continued economic growth Economic growth, at least in coming decades, is likely to be associated with air emissions, increasing hemispheric air pollution that will reach Europe Direct EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment If food production does not grow in developing countries, demand for European exports will increase: this would support intensive agriculture and result in runoff and possible loss of biodiversity from land use changes and agricultural chemicals. EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world 175 Indirect Economic growth will be a key megatrend fuelling global resource demand: for Europe, this could mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports, with resulting effects on natural resources (land, water) as well as biodiversity and agricultural runoff Indirect Economic growth, at least in coming decades, is likely to be associated with air emissions, increasing hemispheric air pollution that will reach Europe Direct ENV1: Intensified competition for resources Impacts relating to exploitation of new and more polluting sources of fossil fuels, such as tar sands/ shales as peak oil/coal is reached Increasing pressure on resources in DCs will potentially mean more competition for Europe and more stress on Europe’s environment (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining) Destabilisation of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting livelihoods and leading to migration from DCs to Europe and increased pressure on Europe’s environment ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load Health and crop impacts from emissions outside of Europe increasing background concentrations of ozone and intercontinental transport of particulate matter and POPs Direct Health impacts from pesticide residues in imported food Indirect ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Negative health effects due to increasing temperatures and changing prevalence of tropical diseases in Europe Direct Food and water shortage and destabilization of ecosystems could trigger migration from DCs to Europe or have economic repercussions, and increased pressure on Europe’s environment Indirect Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. References EEA (2010) Indicators and fact sheets about Europe’s environment. Accessed online 04 08 10 http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/fertilizer-consumption-outlook-from-eea/fertilizerconsumption-outlook-from-eea EEA (2007) Europe’s Environment – the Fourth Assessment Liu, JF; Mauzerall, DL; Horowitz, LW (2009). Evaluating inter-continental transport of fine aerosols:(2) Global health impact. Atmospheric Environment 43 (2009) 4339–4347 176 9.3 BIODIVERSITY The 14 global megatrends were reviewed in terms of their interlinkages and uncertainties, and likely effects to four environmental areas were identified for Europe; Climate change Pollution and health Biodiversity and nature Natural resource use. These effects are classed as direct or indirect. Direct effects are changes to Europe’s environment caused by the drivers associated with a megatrend. Changes caused to the environment in another part of the world which impact on Europe’s environment are indirect effects. The likely effects identified for biodiversity is presented in Table 76 in below. From the likely effects identified in Table 76 there are several key issues which emerge. These are discussed in more detail in Annex I but it is useful to provide an overview here; Increased demand for European agriculture and forestry products due to, for example, increase in global population, increase in incomes and global urbanisation, could increase pressure on European biodiversity to 2050. An increase in the scale and intensity of European agriculture could have a negative effect on biodiversity due to the potential threat of eutrophication and acidification associated with agriculture, as well as a potential increase in water stress in some European regions. Increased demand for Europe’s fuel and mineral resources could also increase pressure on biodiversity, for example by increasing offshore drilling. Projected population decline in Europe could ease existing pressures on biodiversity, however any potential reductions could be offset by projected increases in migration to Europe (to maintain population numbers in the context of population decline). As migration to Europe is generally to urban areas, it will not prevent population decline in rural areas. This could lead to land abandonment and potentially have a negative effect on the biodiversity of high-nature value farmland. Climate change is identified as likely to increase pressure on Europe’s biodiversity over the long-term, for example by changing environmental conditions such as average temperature and rainfall patterns. Increasing trade between Europe and the rest of the world may increase the spread of invasive species in Europe, which would have a negative impact on European biodiversity. Table 74: Strength and uncertainty of likely effects to biodiversity in Europe Direct Megatrend Strength S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth 177 Indirect Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty -/+ + -/+ bulges S3: Global urbanisation n.a. n.a. + S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class n.a. n.a. + S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics n.a n.a n.a n.a T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles -/+ -/+ T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies -/+ -/+ n.a. n.a. + 0/+ -/+ n.a. n.a. -/+ ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources + + ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load - + + + EC1: Continued economic growth EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= The three environmental megatrends are likely to have the strongest effects to biodiversity in Europe, and the uncertainty attached to these effects is high. Climate change is likely to have the most significant effect to biodiversity, changing the functioning of habitats and ecosystems in Europe by altering rainfall patterns and changing temperatures, for example. As stocks of natural resources decrease around the world, pressure on Europe’s resources will increase (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining) which will increase stress on Europe’s environment, with negative effect to biodiversity. However these effects are highly uncertain. This increased competition for resources is also associated with global economic growth, increased competition for resources and global population growth. This is why EC2 (intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment) and S2 (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges) are 178 identified as important in effecting biodiversity in Europe, although the indirect effects of population growth (associated with increased migration to Europe) are highly uncertain. The effect of technology on Europe’s biodiversity is highly uncertain; new technologies could reduce pressure on Europe’s environment by improving agricultural yields around the world or by reducing the use of agricultural chemicals in Europe. However, technology could also generate new as yet unknown negative effects to biodiversity, e.g. the potential impact of transgenic crops on European biodiversity over the long term. The effects of S3 (global urbanisation) and S4 (emerging middle-income class) are relatively weak, restricted to indirect effects that are highly uncertain. Both megatrends may act to increase pressure on Europe’s biodiversity, through increased climate change or demand for agricultural products, but the strength of these effects is not likely to be high. Outlooks for Europe’s environment A review of existing environmental outlooks for Europe’s environment provides an indication of the scale of potential biodiversity effects. Most projections for biodiversity in Europe are related to climate change, and some of these are presented below in Table 75. In addition to this information, a recent review of land use projections for Europe found that a few studies forecast increases in cropland in the range of 15% between 2005 and 2050. This included studies that factored in global growth in demand. Other studies, however, saw a decline in total agricultural land (for many, due to a decline in extensive pasture land rather than intensively farmed areas) (RIKS, 2010)). While this does not related directly to biodiversity, it may indicate that biodiversity could decrease due to a loss of highnature value farmland. The EEA’s Indicators and factsheets on Europe’s environment (EEA 2010) provide an excellent description of the projected effect of climate change on biodiversity in Europe to 2050. This description is provided in Table 75 below. Table 75: EEA (2010) description of the projected effect of climate change on Europe to 2050 By the late 21st century, distributions of European plant species are projected to have shifted several hundred kilometres to the north, forests are likely to have contracted in the south and expanded in the north, and 60 % of mountain plant species may face extinction. The rate of change will exceed the ability of many species to adapt, especially as landscape fragmentation may restrict movement. A combination of the rate of climate change, habitat fragmentation and other obstacles will impede the movement of many animal species, possibly leading to a progressive decline in European biodiversity. Distribution changes are projected to continue. Suitable climatic conditions for Europe's breeding birds are projected to shift nearly 550 km northeast by the end of the century, with the average range size shrinking by 20 %. Projections for 120 native European mammals suggest that up to 9 % (assuming no migration) risk extinction during the 21st century. Distribution of plant species Projections indicate that, by the late 21st century, the potential range of many European plant species may shift several hundred kilometres in a northerly direction. The greatest changes are projected for endemic plant species in Mediterranean, Euro-Siberian and many mountain regions. Mountain communities may face up to a 60 % loss of plant species under 179 high emission scenarios. This will be higher if migration is restricted due to continuing fragmentation or if there is competition with invasive species. Figure 54 provides a geographical description of the projected change in the number of plant species to 2050. Figure 54: Projected changes in number of plant species in 2050 Source: EEA (2010) Distribution of animal species Projections suggest that the northward and uphill movement of many animal species will continue this century. Widespread species may be less vulnerable, while threatened endemics -- already under pressure -- will be at greatest risk, although there will be spatial variation. An important constraint will be the ability of species to move. Species richness is likely to reduce dramatically this century in the Mediterranean region, but increase towards the northeast and in mountainous areas such as the Alps and Pyrenees, assuming that movement through fragmented landscapes is possible. Figure 55 highlights the projected effect of climate change on the distribution of reptile and amphibian species in Europe to 2050. Figure 55: Projected impact of climate change on the potential distribution of reptiles and amphibians in 2050 180 Source: EEA (2010) Spatial distribution The most important effects from global megatrends on Europe’s nature and biodiversity in coming decades are expected to be those resulting from climate change. Global megatrends are going to be the main force shaping greenhouse gas emission to 2050, and thus will have a strong effect in terms of climate change impacts in Europe. Global megatrends will also play an important role in the increasing pressure on global fisheries will affect marine biodiversity around the world, including in Europe. Another link is the increased competition for resources, which can lead to new offshore oil exploration and exploitation in Europe’s marine areas: this too can harm marine biodiversity. Here, the main effects are expected to be weak – except in the event of major accidents. Spatial distribution plant species Due to climate change, many plant species currently found in the south of Europe are expected to be become increasingly common in northern regions, and with this change in the range of plant species forests are expected to expand in the north and contract in the south, with broadleaved species replacing native coniferous species in western and central Europe. Several European plant species are also predicted to change their altitudinal range. The greatest changes are projected for endemic plant species in Mediterranean, Euro-Siberian and many mountain regions. animal species Climate change is projected to dramatically reduce the species of native terrestrial mammal species in the 181 Mediterranean region, but increase it in northeast Europe and also in mountainous areas such as the Alps and Pyrenees. This change is the distribution of species richness depends on the assumption that movement through fragmented landscapes is possible The ranges of European breeding birds are projected to shift about 550 km to the northeast by the end of the 21st century, but the average range size is expected to be 20% smaller. Arctic, sub Arctic and some Iberian species are projected to suffer the greatest range losses. Other categories Loss of marine biodiversity due to overfishing, both in European waters and around the world. Potential loss due to new oil exploration, in particular in the event of accidents. Temporal distribution Effects to biodiversity are likely to be gradual, but significant to 2050. Temporal distribution Plant species The impacts of climate change on plant species are expected to become increasingly significant to 2050, and will happen gradually until then. Impact of climate change on animal species The impacts of climate change on animal species are expected to become increasingly significant to 2050, and will happen gradually until then. Other categories The impacts of overfishing are also expected to increase steadily to 2050. There are risks of tipping points due where the population of a species may decline rapidly. Impacts from oil exploitation are likely to arise mainly in the event of accidents, and thus do not follow a pattern. Table 76: Likely effects of global megatrends to biodiversity and nature in Europe Likely effects Direct/ Indirect S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration Global population growth will increase resource consumption around the world, and this in turn can increase resource consumption in Europe – e.g. through growing demand for its agricultural and forestry products, with biodiversity and pollution associated in particular with intensive production (see EC2 for a discussion of uncertainties) Indirect The decline in Europe’s population – considered separately from migration or from other megatrends – will reduce pressures on the environment (Biois). Direct 182 Though not part of a global megatrend per se, Europe’s ongoing migration towards coastal areas, in particular in the Mediterranean, for retirement and vacation homes, may continue and this will increase pressures in coastal zones as seen for example in the Western Balkans (IEA, 2009). Direct Migration from outside Europe would maintain Europe’s population, and related environmental pressures would remain Direct Immigration is arriving mainly in urban areas in Europe (Biois). This means that other areas will see ongoing populations decline – e.g. mountain and other remote rural areas. Here, declining rural labour will contribute to the abandonment of high-nature value farmland. Indirect S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges Youth bulges are likely to influence migration to Europe – this increase in population will increase pressures on the environment. Indirect Youth bulges can lead to conflicts in countries near Europe. Sudden influxes of migrants are a possible consequence. Another is an increased difficulty in addressing common environment issues, such as protection of the Mediterranean Sea. Indirect The pressure on government budgets due to ageing may reduce resources available for the environment Indirect Ageing populations in Europe and around the world may pay greater attention to long-term issues, and thus also to environmental concerns Indirect S3: Global urbanisation Increased demand for Europe’s agriculture and forestry products Indirect S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class Growing demand for European agricultural and forestry products Indirect Increased climate change impacts in Europe Indirect S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world No effects to biodiversity and nature in Europe’s identified S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics No effects to biodiversity and nature in Europe’s identified T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles No effects to biodiversity and nature in Europe’s identified T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies New technologies for agriculture could increase yields around the world and reducing the use of agricultural chemicals as well as biodiversity impacts Direct New sensors and information technology could make environmental monitoring much less expensive and provide better information for decision-makers in Europe Direct EC1: Continued economic growth Economic growth will be a key megatrend fuelling global resource demand: for Europe, this could mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports. Indirect Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased minerals and fuels extraction, especially in the EU12 and outside EEA countries (W. Balkans, EECCA) as well as in offshore marine areas Indirect 183 EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment Since the late 1970s, nearly all the increase in oil production around the world has come from offshore sites (World Bank, 2009): although oil production is declining in EEA countries, pressures for offshore drilling may increase, including in sensitive areas such as the Arctic, with risks for the marine environment Direct If food production does not grow in developing countries, demand for European exports will increase: this would support intensive agriculture and result in runoff and possible loss of biodiversity from land use changes and agricultural chemicals. Indirect EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world Economic growth will be a key megatrend fuelling global resource demand: for Europe, this could mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports. Indirect Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased minerals and fuels extraction, especially in the EU12 and outside EEA countries (W. Balkans, EECCA) as well as in offshore marine areas Indirect The fast-growing economies – including China and India – will have a growing role in terms of global environmental issues as well as policies to address them Indirect ENV1: Intensified competition for resources Effects on biodiversity due to loss of habitat Direct Increasing pressure on resources in DCs will potentially mean more competition for Europe and more stress on Europe’s environment (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining) Indirect (env) Destabilisation of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting livelihoods and leading to migration from DCs to Europe and increased pressure on Europe’s environment Indirect (env) ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load Health and crop impacts from emissions outside of Europe increasing background concentrations of ozone and intercontinental transport of particulate matter and POPs Direct ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Loss of biodiversity in terms of species and habitats, shifts in phenology Direct Food and water shortage and destabilization of ecosystems could trigger migration from DCs to Europe or have economic repercussions, and increased pressure on Europe’s environment Indirect Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. References EEA (2010) Indicators and fact sheets about Europe’s environment. Accessed online 04 08 10 http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/change-in-species-diversity-as/change-inspecies-diversity-as-1 184 9.4 NATURAL RESOURCE USE The 14 global megatrends were reviewed in terms of their interlinkages and uncertainties, and likely effects to four environmental areas were identified for Europe; Climate change Pollution and health Biodiversity and nature Natural resource use. These effects are classed as direct or indirect. Direct effects are changes to Europe’s environment caused by the drivers associated with a megatrend. Changes caused to the environment in another part of the world which impact on Europe’s environment are indirect effects. The likely effects identified for climate change is presented in Table 70 in below. From the likely effects identified in Table 78 there are several key issues which emerge. These are discussed in more detail in Annex I but it is useful to provide an overview here; Population decline in Europe may result in reduced demand for natural resources, however this may be offset by increased demand associated with increased migration to Europe. Increased demand for European agricultural and forestry products may lead to an increase in the intensity and scale of agriculture and forestry in Europe, which could increase pressure on water and soil resources in Europe. Increased global demand for energy and sub-soil resources may increase the exploitation of fuel and mineral reserves in Europe. Technology may act to reduce pressure on Europe’s natural resources by increasing the efficiency of resource use and improving agricultural yields. Climate change may increase pressure on Europe’s natural resources, for example, reducing water availability. Sea level rise as a consequence of climate change may reduce the amount of agricultural land available in Europe. The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on natural resource use in Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex I for more detail). Table 77 below provides a summary of the strength and uncertainty of likely effects to natural resource in Europe, by megatrend. Table 77: Strength and uncertainty of likely effects to natural resource use in Europe Direct Megatrend Strength Indirect Uncertainty Strength Uncertainty S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration -/+ S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges + -/+ S3: Global urbanisation n.a. n.a. + S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class n.a. n.a. + 185 S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics n.a n.a n.a n.a T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles - - T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies - - EC1: Continued economic growth n.a. n.a. + 0/+ -/+ EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world n.a. n.a. -/+ ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources + +/- ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load +/- +/- ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change +/- + EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a. Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High= The global megatrends are likely to increase pressure on natural resource use in Europe, with the majority of this increase coming from outside Europe (i.e. indirect effects). The uncertainty related to this increase ranges from low to high, but in general uncertainty around the effects is high. S1 (Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) and S2 (Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges) are predicted to have direct impacts to natural resource in Europe, which may increase or decrease resource use depending on the final outcome for Europe’s population; an increase or a decrease. Economic growth and increasing competition for resources may see an increase in the demand for European natural resources, both for export globally and for use internally in response to price increases on the global market, however this effect is highly uncertain. The technology megatrends are notable as they may have the effect of reducing pressure on natural resources in Europe, as efficiency improvements may offset or reduce demand for resources. However these effects are highly uncertain as they depend on the development of specific technologies. The environmental megatrends are likely to have both direct and indirect effects to natural resources in Europe, although these effects are highly uncertain. ENV3 (climate change) could result in food and water shortages in other parts of the world, which could trigger migration to Europe. If this were to happen the effects to resource use in Europe would be significant, but obviously this is a very 186 uncertain effect. Climate change is more likely to affect resource use in Europe due to direct impacts related to changes to precipitation patterns, water availability, and increasingly severe and frequent extreme weather events. Outlooks for Europe’s environment Land/soil Increased demand for agricultural products could increase pressure on Europe’s soil resources. In the European region it is projected that the area of agricultural land use may increase slightly (under the baseline scenario), however under a scenario where global agricultural markets are liberalised the area of agricultural land in Europe will fall (Figure 56). Thus effects to land / soil are highly uncertain. Figure 56: Land cover distribution in 2000 and 2050 under different scenarios Source: EEA (2008) Water Increased demand for agricultural products could increase pressure on Europe’s water resources; however this could be offset by reductions due to decreased abstractions associated with new power stations. In southern Europe climate change is projected to increase pressure on Europe’s water resources (Figure 57). 187 Figure 57: Changes in water availability, 2000 - 2030 Source: EEA (2010a) Waste A recent assessment prepared for the EEA projected that municipal waste generation in the EU-12 would increase by roughly 33% between 2005 and 2020 if economic growth is strong. If economic growth is weak, a 22% increase is still projected (Figure 58). Municipal waste is expected to increase by 25% over the period (Figure 59). This could lead to an increase in environmental pressures and also strain the waste management capabilities of countries will less developed infrastructure. Figure 58: Generation of municipal waste in the EU-12, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020 Source: EEA (2010b) 188 Figure 59: Growth in waste quantities and GDP (2020/2000) Source: EEA (2010c) Spatial distribution Spatial distribution Land / soil Disaggregated information on projections of land-use in Europe was not identified. It is possible that there could be regional variation in land-use patterns. For example the small farms of eastern Europe may increase in size and agricultural intensity, but the pastoral high-nature value farmland of western Europe may be abandoned as farming there becomes increasingly uncompetitive. Water In northern Europe water stress is likely to decrease, due to changing rainfall patterns and reduced abstraction. In contrast, climate change is expected to reduce water availability and increase irrigation withdrawals in the Mediterranean river basins to 2030, reducing water availability by as much as 10% (or more) by 2030. In the longer term, changes in water availability are likely to develop more noticeably in southern and south-eastern Europe. Waste In the EU-15 the municipal waste stream is expected to decouple relatively from GDP by 2020, however none of the countries are expected to decouple absolutely (EEA 2010c) Another set of projections has shown that in the EU-15, the municipal waste stream is expected to decouple relatively from GDP by 2020, however, none of the countries are expected to decouple absolutely. In the New-10, and Bulgaria and Romania, relative decoupling of municipal waste from GDP is expected to 2020 (EEA 2010c). Temporal distribution 189 Temporal distribution Land / soil The modelled data presented in Figure 56 extends to 2050, which does not indicate large differences in the baseline of 2000. Thus changes to land / soil due to land use change are likely to be gradual to 2050. Water Reductions in water stress are predicted for northern Europe to 2030, however in southern Europe, there is likely to be a significant increase in water stress to 2030. Waste generation is projected to increase to 2020, but projections after 2020 are not available. Table 78: Likely effects of global megatrends to natural resource use in Europe Direct/ Indirect Likely effects S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration The decline in Europe’s population – considered separately from migration or from other megatrends – will reduce pressures on the environment (Biois). Direct Migration from outside Europe would maintain Europe’s population, and related environmental pressures would remain Direct S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges Youth bulges are likely to influence migration to Europe – this increase in population will increase pressures on the environment. Indirect Youth bulges can lead to conflicts in countries near Europe. Sudden influxes of migrants are a possible consequence. Another is an increased difficulty in addressing common environment issues, such as protection of the Mediterranean Sea. Indirect The pressure on government budgets due to ageing may reduce resources available for the environment Indirect Ageing populations in Europe and around the world may pay greater attention to long-term issues, and thus also to environmental concerns Indirect S3: Global urbanisation Increased demand for Europe’s agriculture and forestry products Indirect S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class Growing demand for European agricultural and forestry products 190 Indirect Increased exploitation of mineral and fuel resources in Europe Indirect S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world No effects to natural resource use in Europe’s identified S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics No effects to natural resource use in Europe’s identified T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles New process technologies developed elsewhere in the world can reduce industrial pollution in Europe Direct T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies NBIC technologies introduced around the world can reduce resource consumption, with the result of reducing demands on sub-soil (non-renewable) resources in Europe Indirect NBIC technologies introduced around the world can improve agricultural yields, reducing demands on agricultural products from Europe and related impacts on resources (soil and water) and pollution (chemical runoff to water bodies) as well as the further effects on biodiversity Indirect NBIC technologies introduced in Europe can tackle pollution and waste problems and reduce to resource consumption Direct New technologies for agriculture could increase yields around the world and reducing the use of agricultural chemicals as well as biodiversity impacts Direct New sensors and information technology could make environmental monitoring much less expensive and provide better information for decision-makers in Europe Direct EC1: Continued economic growth Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased minerals and fuels extraction, especially in the EU12 and in offshore marine areas Indirect EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment The boom in unconventional gas extraction seen in the US may move to Europe: this typically requires high levels of water Direct EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world Economic growth will be a key megatrend fuelling global resource demand: for Europe, this could mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports, with resulting effects on natural resources (land, water) as well as biodiversity and agricultural runoff Indirect Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased minerals and fuels extraction Indirect The fast-growing economies – including China and India – will have a growing role in terms of global environmental issues as well as policies to address them Indirect ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources 191 Impacts relating to exploitation of new and more polluting sources of fossil fuels, such as tar sands/ shales as peak oil/coal is reached Direct Increasing pressure on resources in DCs will potentially mean more competition for Europe and more stress on Europe’s environment (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining) Indirect (env) Destabilisation of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting livelihoods and leading to migration from DCs to Europe and increased pressure on Europe’s environment Indirect (env) ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load No effects to natural resource use in Europe’s identified ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change Changes in precipitation patterns and water availability; and more frequent and intense extreme weather events (e.g. floods and droughts). Direct Food and water shortage and destabilization of ecosystems could trigger migration from DCs to Europe or have economic repercussions, and increased pressure on Europe’s environment Indirect Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further. References EEA (2010a) Indicators and fact sheets about Europe’s environment. Accessed online 04 08 10 http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/use-of-freshwater-resources-outlook/use-offreshwater-resources-outlook EEA (2010b) Environmental trends and perspectives in the Western Balkans: future production and consumption patterns. EEA report No. 1/2010 EEA (2010c) Indicators and fact sheets about Europe’s environment. Accessed online 04 08 10 http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/municipal-waste-generation-outlook-eea/municipalwaste-generation-outlook-eea EEA (2008) Catalogue of forward-looking indicators from selected sources; A contribution to the forward-looking component of a shared environmental information system (SEIS/Forward). Technical report No. 8/2008 192 10. ANNEX III: DETAILED DRIVER’S ANALYSIS 10.1 IDENTIFYING COMMON DRIVERS AMONG MEGATRENDS The approach taken was premised on the fact that numerous drivers lie behind each megatrend. Look across these drivers can identify deeper patterns and also provide a basis for identifying the linkages among the megatrends. The first stage in the process was to collate all of the STEEP drivers for each megatrend, and label each one according to the megatrend with which it was originally associated (Table 79). Table 79: Megatrend code assigned to each driver Code and related megatrend S1: Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration S2: Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges S3: Global urbanisation S4: The emerging global middle income consumer class S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles T2: The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies EC1: Continued economic growth EC2: Intensified competition for resources EC3: Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world Env 1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources Env2: Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load Env 3:Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change In addition to the megatrend labels assigned to each driver, the drivers were also colour coded according to the STEEP category they belonged to (Table 80). This was done to ensure that the STEEP analysis was not lost and was available to be carried through to the later stages – the design of successful interventions to ameliorate negative, or enhance positive, impacts to Europe’s environment may depend on targeting drivers by STEEP category. This first stage is represented in Figure 60 below, marked 1. Table 80: Colour assigned to each STEEP category STEEP Category Colour Social Technological Economic Environment Policy The next step was to examine the drivers and to identify those that were i) the same (because the wording and phrasing were almost identical) and ii) similar (because the wording and phrasing implied they were closely related or were drivers acting in a similar direction) across the megatrends. A systematic approach was taken, placing the same and then similar drivers together until the majority of drivers had been placed in a set of broad driver groups (see 2 in Figure 60). The initial 193 groupings were initially relatively loose, but an iterative approach showed that multiple common drivers influenced several broad categories such as resource use, growth of consumer economy, and environmental degradation: these emerged as initial major groupings. With further review, other distinct groupings also then emerged. At this stage it was clear that patterns were emerging, but further refinement within each of the driver-groups was required. Within each driver-group, the drivers were clustered together more closely based on their similarities (see 3 in Figure 60). This step was also used to ensure that the drivers in each larger drivergroup had been categorised correctly. ‘Non-drivers’ were separated out from the clustering process as false data. The end result was a series of driver-clusters within each driver-group (see 4 in Figure 60). A further iteration of the process was undertaken to ensure consistency, and to identify links between the drivergroups and driver-clusters. The driver groups and clusters represent those drivers that are most commonly shared across the megatrends. A worked example is provided below to illustrate the process of grouping and how the groupings of common drivers emerged. 194 Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver 1 All drivers Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver 2 Increasing global loss of natural resources Increased Increased scarcity of demand 4 Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Increasing population growth / aging resources Changing values Population growth Increasing migration & urbanisation Increasing economic disparity Reduced Driver Population aging Increased permeation of technology Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver 3 Sub-groups Technology permeation employment opportunity Changing health patterns Changing disease burden Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver groups Increasingly globalised economic growth Increasing Increasing international market allocation of liberalisation capital Growth of the global market economy Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Emerging groups Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver Improving healthcare Increasing environmental degradation Changing Increasing patterns of land environmental management pollution Increased impact of production on the environment Figure 60: Common drivers analysis showing grouping and sub-grouping of drivers to deliver ‘integrated’ megatrends. Drivers are colourer dark blue, red, light blue, green and yellow per each respective STEEP category. Grouped by smaller clusters (white bubble) and then clusters organised by group (green bubble). 10.2 WORKED EXAMPLE Figure 60 above provides a clear diagrammatic representation of how the megatrends were analysed according to the analytical approach outlined in section 2. From the bubble marked 4 in Figure 60 it is apparent that each driver group contains one or more sub-groups. Each of these clusters contains drivers identified in the original megatrends. The group Increasing migration and urbanisation provides a useful example to demonstrate the basis for the grouping of the drivers. Figure 61 below provides a diagrammatic representation of where these tables fit in the analysis. 195 Increasing global loss of natural resources Increased Increased scarcity of demand Increasing population growth / aging resources Changing values Increasingly globalised economic growth Increasing Increasing international market allocation of liberalisation capital Growth of the global market economy Increasing migration & urbanisation Increasing economic disparity Reduced Population aging Increased permeation of technology Technology permeation employment opportunity Changing health patterns Changing disease burden Population growth Improving healthcare Increasing environmental degradation Changing Increasing patterns of land environmental management pollution Increased impact of production on the environment Migration & urbanisation Increasing economic disparity Reduced employment opportunity Driver-cluster: Employment opportunity S3: Mechanisation of agriculture S3: Changes in agricultural productivity S6: AEnv3ess to employment ENV1(R): Increased land use of productive land for urban development S6: Efficiency improvements leading to increased unemployment S3: Innovation S3: Lack of employment opportunities in urban areas EC3: access to employment S1: Access to employment S6: Increase in (male)working age population in poorer, fast-growing countries S1: Insufficient economic opportunities in home country S3: Poverty induced rural-urban migration S3: Land use policy S3: Shift of industrial production from developed countries to developing countries ENV1: Global population growth ENV2: Global population growth ENV3: Global population growth S1: High fertility S2: High fertility S3: Global population growth S4: Global population growth S6: Global population growth EC2: Global population growth S3: Foreign Direct Investment EC3: industrial relocation S6: Fall in working age population in advanced and emerging countries S1: Climate change S3: Climate change S6: Climate change ENV1: Climate change ENV3: Climate change EC1: Climate change T1 & T2: Climate change Driver-cluster: Economic disparity S1: Instability of the political system of home country is a factor of migration ENV1: Urban planning that favours motorised transport S2: Low living standards for youth bulges S3: Absence of well developed state pension system S1: Environmental degradation S1: Better information about migration possibilities S1: Disproportionate growth in vulnerable regions S1: Family links S6: Improvement of commuting technology S1: Religious factors S1: Increased mobility S3: Population displacements due to dam constructions T1 & T2: Need for better living spaces ENV1: Global population growth ENV2: Global population growth ENV3: Global population growth S1: High fertility S2: High fertility S3: Global population growth S4: Global population growth S6: Global population growth EC2: Global population growth S1: Climate change S3: Climate change S6: Climate change ENV1: Climate change Climate change The growth of populations in rural areas and theENV3: increasing mechanisation of agriculture are likely toEC1:increase Climate change unemployment in rural areas, driving people to T1 migrate to & T2: Climate change There are several additional drivers important in migration / urbanisation, although these drivers are not necessarily similar. Some of the populations with the highest projected increases in fertility levels are in countries with unstable political systems, or the political system which do not provide the social supports necessary to allow people to live unsupported in rural areas. Increased inequality between regions and countries will increase migration as people seek opportunities. Population growth, particularly of young men, could lead to increased instability and trigEc1 migration. Climate change could exacerbate political instability and migration by reducing employment opportunities associated with agriculture, or by triggering migration, e.g. due to sea level rise. urban areas. Economic liberalisation, facilitating industrial relocation and foreign direct investment, provides employment in urban areas, and acts as an added incentive for rural – urban migration. Increasing population decline in developed countries is likely to drive migration from areas with increasing populations and low employment opportunities. This is due to the need in countries with declining populations to maintain a workforce capable of supporting an elderly (non-working) population. Climate change could increase the rate of migration, both between countries and rural-urban, by reducing the productivity of agricultural areas and reducing employment opportunities. Figure 61: Increasing migration and urbanisation ‘group of common drivers showing smaller clusters of drivers in white circles and corresponding tabulated drivers Following the process of grouping and sub-grouping of drivers, the drivers in each group were tabulated by cluster, which included a colour code for the driver’s STEEP classification category, and also the code of the megatrend from which the driver was originally associated (see Table 81 and Table 82 below). From these tables it is apparent that the drivers of Increasing migration and urbanisation come from a wide range of the STEEP megatrends, and from a wide range of STEEP categories. In addition, some of the drivers present in the Increasing migration and urbanisation group may also appear in other megatrends, e.g. climate change may cause migration, and may also cause biodiversity loss. The cluster Reduced employment opportunity is described in Table 81 below. Each of the drivers contained in this table influence employment opportunities, either acting to limit or increase employment opportunity. Reduced employment opportunity is an important factor influencing rural-urban migration and urbanisation, causing people to leave areas of low opportunity to move to areas of high opportunity. For example, S3: Mechanisation of agriculture and S3: Changes in agricultural productivity in Table 81 could reduce employment available in rural areas. This is likely to increase urbanisation as people move from rural to urban areas in search of work. S3: Innovation and S6: Efficiency improvements leading to increased unemployment could reduce employment opportunities, which could in turn drive migration. These drivers are not presented in a geographically specific context, and their impacts would be very different in Europe compared to China, for example. Nonetheless, in either of these global regions, both drivers are likely to drive migration. Further down the table, some of the drivers associated with the environmental megatrends, such as ENV1: Low access to fertilizer and poor incentives for soil conserving technology with smallholders and ENV3: Severe droughts and flooding affecting food production, are both different from the drivers described above, but are both likely to drive migration. Poor soil quality may reduce productivity of agricultural land, and thus cause people to leave rural areas, migrating to cities or further afield. Droughts reducing food production are likely to have a similar affect. 196 Table 81: Increasing Migration and Urbanisation – reduced employment opportunity. Driver-cluster: Reduced employment opportunity S3: Mechanisation of agriculture S3: Changes in agricultural productivity S6: Access to employment ENV 2: Growth of industrial and transport sector S6: Efficiency improvements leading to increased unemployment S3: Innovation S3: Lack of employment opportunities in urban areas EC3: access to employment S1: Access to employment S6: Increase in (male)working age population in poorer, fast-growing countries S1: Insufficient economic opportunities in home country S3: Poverty induced rural-urban migration S3: Land use policy ENV3: Insufficient response to challenge of adaptation and mitigation S3: Shift of industrial production from developed countries to developing countries ENV 3: Global markets comprising local food availability ENV1(R): Low access to fertiliser and poor incentives for soil conserving technologies with smallholders ENV 3: Prohibitive costs of required defences ENV 1(R): La of investment in agriculture in poor countries The growth of populations in rural areas and the increasing mechanisation of agriculture are likely to increase unemployment in rural areas, driving people to migrate to urban areas. Economic liberalisation, facilitating industrial relocation and foreign direct investment, provides employment in urban areas, and acts as an added incentive for rural – urban migration. Increasing population decline in developed countries is likely to drive migration from areas with increasing populations and low employment opportunities. This is due to the need in countries with declining populations to maintain a workforce capable of supporting an elderly (non-working) population. Climate change could increase the rate of migration, both between countries and rural-urban, by reducing the productivity of agricultural areas and reducing employment opportunities. S3: Foreign Direct Investment EC3: industrial relocation S6: Fall in working age population in advanced and emerging countries ENV 3: Severe droughts and floods affecting food production ENV 3: Increasing frequency of severe droughts and floods EC1: Climate change T1 & T2: Climate change Note: Colours correspond to STEEP category (Social is dark blue, Technology is red, Economic is light blue, Environment is green and Social is yellow). Codes to the left correspond to megatrend with which the driver was associated. The cluster Increasing economic disparity is similar to Reduced employment opportunity, but the drivers are related to poverty rather than employment. For example, S1: Low living standards for youth bulges and S3: Absence of a well-developed state pension system are both likely to drive migration as people seek economic well-being elsewhere. Other drivers, such as S1: Family links, S1: Religious factors and S1: Increased mobility are also likely to drive migration and urbanisation as people seek better economic conditions in which to live. Table 82: Increasing Migration and Urbanisation – increasing economic disparity. Driver-cluster: Increasing economic disparity S1: Instability of the political system of home country is a factor of migration ENV1: Urban planning that favours motorised transport or lack of urban planning S2: Low living standards for youth bulges S3: Absence of well developed state pension system S1: Environmental degradation S1: Better information about migration possibilities S1: Disproportionate growth in vulnerable regions S1: Family links S6: Improvement of commuting technology S1: Religious factors S1: Increased mobility 197 There are several additional drivers important in migration / urbanisation, although these drivers are not necessarily similar. Some of the populations with the highest projected increases in fertility levels are in countries with unstable political systems, or the political system which do not provide the social supports necessary to allow people to live unsupported in rural areas. Increased inequality between regions and countries will increase migration as people seek opportunities. Population growth, particularly of young men, could lead to increased instability and trigger migration. Climate change could exacerbate political instability and migration by reducing employment opportunities associated S3: Population displacements due to dam constructions T1 & T2: Need for better living spaces ENV 1(R): Increasing automation and scale of harvesting technologies ENV 1(R): Increasing automation and scale of harvesting technologies ENV 1(R): Poverty and insecure land tenure ENV 1(R): Increased use of productive land for urban development ENV 3: National strategies prioritising development over environment ENV 3: Land competition for food / fuel ENV 3: Land competition for food / fuel with agriculture, or by triggering migration, e.g. due to sea level rise. Note: Colours correspond to STEEP category (Social is dark blue, Technology is red, Economic is light blue, Environment is green and Social is yellow). Codes to the left correspond to megatrend with which the driver was associated. Following the process described above in the worked example, the clustering and grouping of drivers went through a number of iterations, including internal discussions and interrogation of the groupings within the research team. Figure 62 summarises the final groups and clusters of common drivers. Increasing global loss of natural resources Increased Increased scarcity of demand Increasing population growth / aging resources Changing values Increasingly globalised economic growth Increasing Increasing international market allocation of liberalisation capital Growth of the global market economy Population growth Increasing migration & urbanisation Increasing economic disparity Reduced Increased permeation of technology Technology permeation employment opportunity Increasing environmental degradation Changing health patterns Changing disease burden Population aging Changing Increasing patterns of land environmental management pollution Increased impact of production on the environment Improving healthcare Figure 62: The final common driver groups and clusters (groups in green bubbles, clusters in white bubbles) These groupings were then used to inform the research team’s analysis of the inter-relationships among the megatrends during the compilation of the templates in Annex I and in the development of the interactions matrix in Chapter 4. 198 The tables below present each driver cluster, together with the specific drivers for each and an overview description to give an indication of how it links to other driver-clusters and driver-groups. Driver-cluster: Changing values S4: Spread of radios, televisions and the internet in rural areas (exposure to media stimulating consumerism) S4: Changing consumption preferences ENV2: Consumerism, favouring disposal over reuse ENV1: Value shift: preference for individual transport Vs public transport S6: Emphasis of economy on output and productivity (rather than wellbeing) S4 / S6: Rebalancing of values S4: Marketing and advertising Consumption of goods and services will increase, as countries get richer and fulfil basic needs, and as status and success is expressed in terms of material goods. This trend is already firmly entrenched in developed countries, and the amount consumed is growing per person, but consumption is also increasing due to the significant growth in consumer markets as Asian economies develop and their populations expand. The development of Asian economies is facilitated by economic liberalisation. Marketing and advertising seek to increase consumption. The lifetime of consumer goods is relatively short, with a significant proportion disposed of within months of purchase. This contributes to the environmental impacts of consumption. Driver-cluster: Increased demand ENV1(R): Growth of resource demand, especially by emerging economies and biofuel demands by developed countries ENV1: Global population growth ENV1: Global population growth [driving demand for food and agricultural production] ENV1: Improved methods of extracting fossil water T1 & T2: Thirst for new products and access to free information T1 & T2: Consumer demand for new innovative products T1 & T2: Consumer demand T1 & T2: Human appetite for innovation and information T1 & T2: Consumer’s choice ENV1: Growth of economies e.g. China and India and demand for key high-tech metals ENV1(R): Upstream extraction of water resource ENV1: Fossil water cheaper than alternatives ENV1: Growth of resource demand, especially by emerging economies ENV1(R): Growth of resource demand (timber and paper etc) especially by emerging economies and biofule demands by developed countries ENV1(R): Growth of resource demand, especially be emerging, more affluent, economies and biofuel demands by developed countries – more international trade and water use for export agriculture ENV1: Water not priced to capture externality of dwindling supply EC2: Change in diet (meat requires much more land than vegetable food products) ENV1: Agricultural subsidies ENV3: Rising incomes increase demand for food, including meat ENV1: Increasing incomes driving demand for energy services EC2: Growth of resources demand by emerging economies EC2: Increased demand ENV1(R): Increasing demand for food / fuel linked to increasing affluence S6: Demand for cheap food T1 & T2: Changing demands and growing competition in a globalised economy 199 The global population rise will increase the demand for natural resources. In addition, as the global middle class expands more people will consume more goods and services, which in turn will increase the exploitation of natural resources. As consumer preferences change, for example the increased consumption of meat and dairy, the rate of resource use / demand will increase per capita, and in net terms. Increased resource use will also have negative impacts on the environment, which will rise as more resources are consumed. For example, increased consumption of fossil fuels will increase the amount of greenhouse gases, which could have a negative impact on the availability of water resources due to climate change. Technological innovation is driven by this resource demand, e.g. improving efficiency, but also drives resource demand as new products and technological applications require more resources. Technological innovation and new applications of technology is closely related to consumerism and the consumer market. Driver-cluster: Increased scarcity of resources ENV2: Slow uptake of new technology developments ENV1: Climate change creating demand for alternative technologies requiring high-tech metals EC2: Loss of productive capacity of environment due to over exploitation and pollution ENV2: Development of zero emission vehicles S6: Application of technology to farming EC2: Growth of energy intensive consumer goods (e.g. air-conditioning) ENV1: Concerns about impact on sensitive ecosystems of exploiting nonconventional fossil fuel sources ENV3: Increase agricultural production in Canada, northern Europe and Asia ENV1: Increasing options and efficiency of renewables ENV1(R): Chemical and mechanical ‘abuse’ of soils ENV1: Rising population in water-scarce area ENV1(R): Increased use of productive land of urban development ENV1(R): Urbanisation ENV1: Growing demand for meat and dairy products (requiring more phosphorus) ENV1(R): Increasing demand for livestock products ENV1(R): Increased use of productive land for urban development ENV1(R): Global population growth ENV3: Global population growth and increased demand ENV1(R): More water-intensive lifestyles, including increasing demand for livestock products ENV3: Global population growth and increased demand for water ENV1: Demand for inexpensive water ENV1(R): Irrigation schemes ENV1(R): Biofules targets / directives ENV1(R): Demand for building materials EC1: Water shortages EC1: Climate change may change productivity of agricultural land EC2: Shifting mineral demand due to technological change ENV1(R): Increasing demand for shrimp etc ENV1: Improvements in extractive technology (e.g. non-conventional oil reserves) extending effective life of fossil resources EC3: Scarcity of natural resources ENV1(R): Continued strong increase in paper, pulp and cardboard demand ENV2: Waste treatment and disposal costs not sufficiently internalised S4: Loss of arable land to fossil fuel extraction ENV1(R): Coastal pollution ENV1R): Pollution e.g. tropospeheric ozone EC1: Scarcity of resources EC2: Climate change leading to a reduction of arable land, shortage of water, increased flooding and prolonged droughts EC3: Scarcity of natural resources S3: Scarcity of agricultural land ENV3: Global population growth and increased demand for food ENV2: Development of cheap disposable technologies ENV1(R): Poor land management T1 & T2: Rising concerns about food and energy security T1 & T2: Growing concern over the stability of food supply, climate change, water scarcity and resource depletion T1 & T2: Increasing production costs/ price of oil and other resources (biofuels et al. As substitute) ENV1(R): Irrigated crop production ENV1(R): Increasing demand for livestock products (and feed e.g. soy) ENV1(R): Electricity demand (hydro, cooling water) ENV1(R): increasing demand for and exploitation of wild fish T1 & T2: Dematerialisation 200 The increasing consumption of natural resources, driven by population increase, the emergence of a global middle class and existing / growing consumerism, will lead to shortages and scarcity of some natural resources. Economic liberalisation and the growth of market economies are key factors increasing the scarcity of resources, facilitating their exploitation and in turn being supported by this exploitation. In the future there will be less to go around per person, and at the same time, each person will be consuming (or seeking to consume) more. This will increase resource exploitation as resources which have previously been economically unviable become profitable (e.g. tar sand exploitation in Canada). New technologies will also drive the exploitation of new natural resources, or increase the exploitation of resources for which there might not currently be a significant demand. However novel technological applications could also reduce resource demand by offering substitutes in place of scarce resources, or by improving the efficiency of processes which require input of natural resources. Resource exploitation often has negative impacts on the environment, and thus negative environmental impacts would be likely to increase over time. Climate change could exacerbate resource scarcity, e.g. water shortages, reducing the agricultural productivity of agricultural land. ENV1: Low rainfall and natural recharge ENV1(R): Lack of resources for fisheries protection in developing countries ENV1(R): Expansion of EU fishing activities in other parts of the world, such as along West African coast ENV1: Climate change T1 & T2: Need for increased food production T1 & T2: Energy efficiency T1 & T2: Renewable energy ENV1(R): Climate change is leading to a reduction or arable land, shortage of water, increased droughts, desertification ENV1(R): Climate change (increased fire frequency) and collapse of forest ecosystems e.g. Amazonia EC1: Climate change T1 & T2: Climate change Driver-cluster: Employment opportunity S3: Mechanisation of agriculture S3: Changes in agricultural productivity S6: Access to employment ENV 2: Growth of industrial and transport sector S6: Efficiency improvements leading to increased unemployment S3: Innovation S3: Lack of employment opportunities in urban areas EC3: access to employment S1: Access to employment S6: Increase in (male)working age population in poorer, fast-growing countries S1: Insufficient economic opportunities in home country S3: Poverty induced rural-urban migration S3: Land use policy ENV3: Insufficient response to challenge of adaptation and mitigation S3: Shift of industrial production from developed countries to developing countries ENV 3: Global markets comprising local food availability ENV1(R): Low access to fertiliser and poor incentives for soil conserving technologies with smallholders ENV 3: Prohibitive costs of required defences ENV 1(R): Lack of investment in agriculture in poor countries The growth of populations in rural areas and the increasing mechanisation of agriculture are likely to increase unemployment in rural areas, driving people to migrate to urban areas. Economic liberalisation, facilitating industrial relocation and foreign direct investment, provides employment in urban areas, and acts as an added incentive for rural – urban migration. Increasing population decline in developed countries is likely to drive migration from areas with increasing populations and low employment opportunities. This is due to the need in countries with declining populations to maintain a workforce capable of supporting an elderly (non-working) population. Climate change could increase the rate of migration, both between countries and rural-urban, by reducing the productivity of agricultural areas and reducing employment opportunities. S3: Foreign Direct Investment EC3: industrial relocation S6: Fall in working age population in advanced and emerging countries ENV 3: Severe droughts and floods affecting food production ENV 3: Increasing frequency of severe droughts and floods EC1: Climate change T1 & T2: Climate change Driver-cluster: Economic disparity S1: Instability of the political system of home country is a factor of migration ENV1: Urban planning that favours motorised transport or lack of urban planning S2: Low living standards for youth bulges S3: Absence of well developed state pension system S1: Environmental degradation S1: Better information about migration possibilities S1: Disproportionate growth in vulnerable regions S1: Family links 201 There are several additional drivers important in migration / urbanisation, although these drivers are not necessarily similar. Some of the populations with the highest projected increases in fertility levels are in countries with unstable political systems, or the political system which do not provide the social supports necessary to allow people to live unsupported in rural areas. Increased inequality between regions and countries will increase migration as people seek opportunities. Population growth, particularly of young men, S6: Improvement of commuting technology S1: Religious factors S1: Increased mobility S3: Population displacements due to dam constructions T1 & T2: Need for better living spaces ENV 1(R): Increasing automation and scale of harvesting technologies ENV 1(R): Increasing automation and scale of harvesting technologies ENV 1(R): Poverty and insecure land tenure ENV 1(R): Increased use of productive land for urban development ENV 3: National strategies prioritising development over environment ENV 3: Land competition for food / fuel ENV 3: Land competition for food / fuel could lead to increased instability and trigEc1 migration. Climate change could exacerbate political instability and migration by reducing employment opportunities associated with agriculture, or by triggering migration, e.g. due to sea level rise. Driver-cluster: Market liberalisation S6: Economic growth and restructuring Countries around the world are opening their economies to global trade, most significantly in China and India. This liberalisation process is supported by deliberate governance policies designed to spur investment, develop export capacity and internal markets. Increasing supranational cooperation results in free trade agreements, but also in the rise of global cartels and the formation of state backed monopolies based on natural resources. As economies open to trade, comparative wage difference between developing and developing economies encourages industrial re-location to take advantage of a more competitive producer base. As more industries relocate, economies of scale and producer specialisation increase price competition, in turn increasing the incentive for industrial re-location. Lower manufacturing costs result in cheaper consumer goods, facilitating increased consumption and thus increased resource exploitation. As industrial employment increases in liberalised economies rural – urban migration increases as people seek employment. A developing market economy, increased industrialisation and urbanisation give rise to environmental impacts. Developed countries shift to a service based economy as their industry re-locates and their imports increase. This shift to a service based economy is facititated by technological innovation, particularly in information services, and also drives further innovation in information services. S4: Economic policy choices S6: Subsidies / taxation S3: Industrial policy S3: Market liberalisation and free trade EC2: Market liberalisation EC3: Market liberalisation S4: Multinational companies entering Chinese and Indian market S6: International trade EC1: WTO EC1: Rise of multi-nationals and anti-trust laws Ec1: (more) supranational cooperation / coordination EC2: Global cartel formations S6: Producer specialisation S6: Price competition EC1: Shifts in international competiveness EC1: Increasing productivity levels in BRICs T1 & T2: Globalisation in societal activities (education) T1 & T2: Switch to service-oriented economy continues T1 & T2: Competitiveness concerns and opportunities Driver-cluster: Growth of the global market economy S6: Rapid economic growth EC2: Growth of Asian consumer market S4: Increasing incomes S6: Economic development Economic progress in BRICs S4: Development of a state pension / health care system and the resulting changes in household savings rates S4: State policy to develop the consumer market EC2: Policies which encourage development of market economy EC3: Foreign Direct Investment EC3: Industrial relocation EC1: Increased diffusion of technology T1 & T2: Potential for job creation increases social demand (biotechnology) T1 & T2: Job creation prospects (information sciences) 202 As economies develop their consumer market develops, incomes increase and consumption increases. Policies which develop the state pension and health systems allow people to save less and spend more, contributing to the growth of the market economy. Foreign Direct Investment and industrial re-location in China and India provide the employment necessary to simulate demand for goods and services in these developing economies, and the associated rise in incomes in turn encourages more investment and more manufacturing / industry. Combined with population growth and economic reforms in China and India, the size of the global market economy is likely to increase significantly. This is likely to increase global consumption and increase pressure on natural T1 & T2: Commercial expectations and growth of potential NBIC markets (household products, pharmaceuticals, industrial goods, agrifood sector,etc.) T1 & T2: Increased diffusion of technology T1 & T2: Globalisation in economic activities T1 & T2: Decreased cost of computing components resources, e.g. water and agricultural land. In developed countries, technological innovation in NBICs may potentially drive the next wave of growth as recent discoveries are exploited on a wide scale. Driver-cluster: International allocation of capital S4: Availability of new financing options EC1: Integration of capital markets EC3: Inter-connectivity of markets S6: Globalisation of industry EC2: Globalised markets EC1: Increased trade levels EC1: Developments in ICT T1 & T2: Increased diffusion of technology Developments in ICT have facilitated the development of new financing options which have encouraged the integration of financial and capital markets. Combined with economic liberalisation and the globalisation of industry, this internationalisation of financial capital has spurred investment in developing economies, enabling the growth of regional and the global economy. Driver-cluster: Land management ENV 1: Expanding irrigation-based agriculture ENV 2: Population and agricultural growth ENV 3: Climate change putting pressure on habitats ENV 1(R): National strategies prioritising development over environment EC2: Technological solutions to increase crop yield ENV 1(R): Genertic engineering behind monoculture of crops and cultivars ENV 1: Intensive farming techniques require more phosphorus ENV 1(R): Poor economic incentives for bio-diverse agro-ecological production systems ENV 1(R): Monoculture with reduced diversity and resilience ENV 3: Prevalence of unsustainable agricultural practice ENV 3: Global population growth and increased demand EC1: Climate change T1 & T2: Climate change As the population and wealth of the world increases, and particularly the size and wealth of the global middle-class, pressure on the worlds limited resources increases, particularly in relation to agricultural land. To obtain increased harvests from productive land technological solutions are applied which increase the intensity of land management. These technological applications may be positive, such as facilitating a reduction in the amount of fertilizer used, or may be harmful, such as increasing mechanisation which increases erosion of soil. In addition, agricultural land is likely to face increased pressure between growing biofuels or food. Climate change may compound the pressure on agricultural land by changing the productive capacity of the land, increasing the demand for biofuels or changing rainfall patterns. Economic liberalisation coupled with increasing demand may result in more countries farming the agricultural land of other countries for their own purposes. Driver-cluster: Production and the environment ENV 1(R): National strategies prioritising development over environment S4: Shift of industrial production from developed countries to developing countries LEI: Pollution due to production transfer and waste trade to developing countries ENV 1(R): Poor governance and enforcement of national legislation ENV 2: Lack of inter-country co-ordination ENV 2: National strategies prioritising development but not keeping up with waste management strategies and regulations ENV 2: Transfer of waste from high-income to low-income countries ENV 2: Commercial viability of ‘dirty’ technologies e.g. brick kilns in developing countries T1 & T2: Prospects for innovative tools for soil protection, waste reduction, treatment and reduction of use of agrochemicals ENV 2: Technologies for lower pollution levels not widely applied ENV 2: Shift in chemical production to countries with lower environmental 203 In addition to increased employment, industrial relocation associated with economic liberalisation can, depending on the environmental policies of the recipient country, increase environmental pollution. It can also lead to reduced environmental pollution in the donor country as the pollution relocates along with the industry. The cost of environmental pollution, or environmental impacts, associated with industrial processes is often not reflected in the price of the final product. This can result in the over exploitation of resources, e.g. water, and lead to increased pollution. The capacity of the environment to absorb pollutants and provide ecosystem services is likely to be diminished by climate change. Combined with projected increases in population stimulating increased demand, the net result in likely to be damaged ecosystems and reduced provision of ecosystem services. There is, however, the possibility that advances related to NBIC technologies may offer viable means standards ENV 2: Technology for reduced particulate emissions not widely applied ENV 3: Target delivery systems not well-developed ENV 1(R): Increaseing automation and scale of harvesting technologuy (sea and sea floor) EC1: Climate change T1 & T2: Climate change of reducing the environmental impact of industrial process. Due to the relative immaturity of these technologies it is difficult to predict what exactly they might offer, but the possibility is there. Driver-cluster: Pollution ENV2: Limited capacity of ecosystems to absorb waste ENV1: Contamination of aquifer by salt water in coastal areas ENV1: Increase in invasive alien species ENVR: Climate change (coral) and ocean acidification T1 & T2: Prospects for environmental remediation, such as wastewater treatment, energy storage, decrease of volume of discarded devises (nanotechnology) ENV1(R) Climate change and pollution ENV2: Population and increased demand ENV2: Limited treatment options available ENV2: Difficulty of quantifying and capturing external costs ENV3: Poor governance and enforcement of national legislation ENV2: Lack of awareness ENV2: Lack of inter-country co-ordination ENV2: Scope of international agreements too limited ENV1(R): Lack of governance / political will and enforcement of legislation ENV(R): National strategies prioritising development over environment ENV2: Inertia in dealing with non-crisis problems ENV2: Lack in inter-country co-ordination ENV1(R): Lack of governance and enforcement of legislation ENV2: Viability of dirty fuels in households ENV 2: Low awareness of risks associated with spread of chemicals in the environment and the subsequent exposure to humans and ecosystems ENV2: Insufficient public awareness and education ENV 2: Growth of transport sector ENV 2: Awareness of waste as a problem growing, but not always understood ENV 3: Increased settlement in coastal areas e.g. urbanisation / industrialisation along in developed countries ENV 2: Low understanding of alternatives ENV 1(R): Water pollution externalities not captures by markets where pressures currently on increase ENV 2: Excess fertiliser application ENV 3: Water pricing not realistic – water still often seen as a free good ENV (R): Economic benefits of biodiversity (e.g. as source of new medicines) not captured in countries where genetic resource is found ENV 2: Increased consumption and innovation in the chemical industry ENV 3: Lack of innovation T1 & T2: Climate change Pollution increases as the through-put of resources in the global economy increases. Thus the projected increase in population and the rise of a global middle class may increase pollution globally; however marked regional disparity is likely. The increase in the demand for consumer electronics, which often use small quantities of heavy metals in forms difficult to recycle, is likely to significantly increase pollution in the longterm. Coastal water pollution, driven by industrial processes and urbanisation, and linked to the pollution of river systems, is likely to increase over the long-term. Climate change is likely to compound coastal water pollution, reducing river flows and concentrating pollutants and potentially increasing migration towards urban areas. Driver-cluster: Improving healthcare T1 & T2: Improved gene sequencing technologies T1 & T2: Health care improvements T1 & T2: Ageing population strives for higher quality of life S5: Increasing concern with wellness The application of technological innovation to healthcare is leading to advances in the standard of care available, increasing the range of treatable diseases and allowing people to live longer and healthier lives. This 204 S2: Improvements in health technology S5: Emerging economies have resources to improve access to healthcare S6: Improved access to sanitation and clean drinking water S6: Increased vaccination against existing and persistent diseases S6: Improvements in, and increased access to, healthcare/ health systems S5: Existing inequalities in wealth and access to healthcare S1: Longevity S6: Reduced cost of drugs S5: Reduced disease burden of infactious diease S5: Application of novel technologies, e.g. nanotechnologies ENV1(R): Improvements in sanitation (reducing pressure) S2: Increasing living standards and healthcare for population aging S5: Increasing range of treatable diseases S6: Increased divide in levels of exposure to environmental hazards between rich and poor S5: Improved environmental standards (developed countries) S6: Increased government spend on basic healthcare S1: Reduced disease burden of infectious disease S5: Improvements in health technology S6: Risk of bacterial resistance to medicines S6: Wider range of treatable diseases S2: Longevity S1: Improved healthcare health-related technological innovation is driven by ageing populations, wealthier populations and success in treating infectious diseases in developing countries. These technological improvements in healthcare are not available on an equal basis as they are often expensive, and this expense may become increasingly important as the population of Europe ages towards 2050. Populations in developing countries are also experiencing improved health, due to the increase in government spend on basic healthcare, combined with improvements related to basic sanitation, vaccination programmes, and increased availability of contraceptives. Driver-cluster: Changing disease burden S6: Less need for physical activity during work or leisure time ENV3: Vaccination programmes lack universality T1 & T2: Aging of population (increase mental illness) ENV3: Governments insufficiently committed disease prevention (public health) programmes ENV3: Insufficient resources for vaccines and medicines in developing countries ENV3: Climate change leading to spread of disease vectors T1 & T2: Increasing healthcare costs S6: Changing attitudes to food and eating habits S6: Increased availability of food S6: Hierarchical class structure S6: Changing income distribution (increased social inequality) S6: Reduced cost of food (often weighted towards high calorie / low nutrient foods) ENV3: Insufficient resources for vaccines and medicines in developing countries S6: Climate change S3: Absence of well developed health care system S5: Lack of research into neglected / orphan diseases S6: Technological innovation reducing physical activbity ENV3: Governments insufficiently committed disease prevention (public health) programmes S6: Physical effort engineered out of the built environment in cities and towns 205 Health improvements associated with new technologies are limited when the resources are not available to implement them. This is principally an issue in the poorest developing countries which do not have the resources to provide basic sanitation or vaccination programmes. In the poorest developing countries, population growth is compounding access to healthcare, reducing the resources available per person and overwhelming underfunded healthcare systems. In developed countries, decreasing health is associated with non-infectious disease, often associated with obesity and ageing. Obesity is an increasing trend in developed countries and is also emerging as a trend in other less developed countries (China, India, Brazil). As a population ages, the proportion of certain degenerative diseases increases, such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s disease etc. These diseases have significant cost implications for national health systems. S6: Failure to implement vaccination programmes S6: Direct marketing of food ENV3: Vaccination programmes lack universality S5: Healthcare policies that put the cost of healthcare onto individuals (increasing the cost of healthcare and increasing health inequalities) Population growth S2: Little access and / or information about contraception S4: Shifts in demographic composition S2: Better medical supply decreases infant mortality S2: Fertility levels S5: Lack of education S2: Declining infant mortality influence youth bulges The global population is increasing, and this is likely to continue to 2050. Global population growth is driven by high fertility levels, which is closely linked to poverty and poor access to contraceptives. In addition, improved medical supply decreases infant mortality, contributing to population growth. Population growth is likely to have significant impacts on global resource consumption, and thus on environmental pollution and climate change. It may also contribute to migration and urbanisation. Population decline S4: Longevity EC3: Aging population in developed countries S2: High HIV / AIDS prevalence is a major cause of premature adult deaths S1: Education (esp. Women) S2: Better medical supply increases longevity S6: Changing patterns of sexual behaviour S4: Improvements in health technology S1: Improvements n health technology increasing longevity S1: Increasing living standards and healthcare S5: Low fertility S1: Diffusion of information on contraceptives EC3: Low fertility rates in developed countries S1: Availability of effective contraceptives S2: Improved healthcare S5: Increased gender equality and education of women S5: Reduction in proportion of working age population in aging societies S1: Fertility levels Low fertility rates in developed countries change the demographic composition of populations, leading to a higher proportion of older people. Low fertility levels are associated with the education of women and an increased role of women in the working population, and increased use of contraceptives. The effects of low fertility levels on population aging are complimented by advances in medical technology which help people to live longer and healthier. Older populations are more susceptible to certain degenerative diseases, which are expensive to treat and could pose a significant cost to national health services, especially if combined with a fall in the proportion of working people. Elderly populations are also more susceptible to the extreme weather effects predicted as a consequence of climate change. In certain developing countries where the HIV / AIDS epidemic is particularly prevalent, the proportion of elderly (and young) people in the population is increasing as the virus increases mortality amongst the those people in the middle-aged bracket. The people in this age bracket are typically the working-age of the population, and thus this change to demographics has significant social implications for the affected developing countries. Increased permeation of technology T1 & T2: New military devices, monitoring systems and surveillance systems ENV1: Changing behaviour e.g. increased demand for electronic devices containing high-tech (rare earth) metals 206 The rate of technological innovation is increasing, as is the range of issues for which technological applications are being developed for. This is likely to continue and accelerate to 2050. Recent developments in nano, bio T1 & T2: ubiquitous broadband T1 & T2: Increased device complexity / multifunctional devices T1 & T2: Development of knowledge society T1 & T2: Advances in molecular biology EC3: Increased diffusion of technology T1 & T2: Better knowledge of the decision making processes toward environmental friendly actions T1 & T2: Developments of ICT mimicking human brain T1 & T2: Need for flexibility T1 & T2: Competition for new resources T1 & T2: Wireless networks T1 & T2: Decreased device size T1 & T2: Development of innovative devices T1 & T2: Improved processing power T1 & T2: Need for new molecular tools for bio-medical research S5: Long-term (post 2020/2030) human ‘enhancement’ with technology (bio/nano/IT) EC2: Technological solutions to water management ENV1(R): Development of desalinisation technology EC2: Developing alternative resources T1 & T2: Global pandemics requiring new therapeutic tools T1 & T2: Development of transportation devices ENV1: Rare earth metals in new technology T1 & T2: Development of robotics T1 & T2: New social movements facilitate by ICT T1 & T2: Need for GM models for medical and biological research T1 & T2: Demand for decreasing size of technological applications T1 & T2: Changes in educational approaches T1 & T2: Quality of life – information sharing (video-conferences, blogs, social networks etc.) ENV1: Climate change concerns leading to improve energy efficiency and switch to renewable forms of energy T1 & T2: Need for better prostheses and ortheses T1 & T2: Need for new active molecules in pharmaceutics ENV1: Resources to promote new technologies 207 and information technologies have the potential for significant impacts on society and the environment. 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