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Anger Modern psychology and psychoanalysts have to some measure removed the onus that medieval Christianity attached to anger when identifying it as one of the seven cardinal, or deadly, sins. It is now viewed as a natural, reactive, even a mature emotion experienced by all humans at some time in their lives, as unavoidable as other primary emotions such as fear, sadness, and joy. Still, orthodox moral philosophers knew that unabated anger, or wrath, could be destructive, particularly in the guise of vengeful fury, and argued that in that form it should be God’s prerogative alone. As the Greek theologian St. Basil (330-379) proclaimed, in mortals it was viewed as a reprehensible, “temporary madness.” The primitive, physiological “humors” theory that persisted from antiquity through the Renaissance and explained emotions as “passions” should have called into question the idea that anger per se could be deemed sinful. After all, if a person was disposed to choler because of an imbalance in body chemistry, an excess, specifically, of yellow bile, anger could arise without permission of the will, making sin a moot concept. Morality must hinge on both the cognitive distinction between good and evil and a voluntary choice between them—that is, free will. The implications of the pseudo-scientific idea of the humors simply remained as remote from moral philosophy as contemporary physiological study is likely to remain. Knowing, for example, that under stress, as in an angry condition, there is a decrease of lymphocytes in the blood but an elevation of free fatty acid avails the moralist nothing. Knowing that anger can contribute to destructive behavior, however, provides some food for ethical thought. Moral principles based on emotions must therefore focus on their effects rather than on the emotions themselves. Anger is engendered by some sort of stimulus, usually in the present but possibly recalled from memory. It is normally a conscious feeling accompanied by physical discomfort and tension, and may be outwardly expressed by glaring, gritting of teeth, clenching of the fists, or even quaking of the bodily frame, depending on its intensity. Most psychologists believe that it is a realistic, healthy emotion, unlike hostility, which is based in immature fear. It is, however, a delimited emotion, and unless it subsides or finds outlet in expression, it can yield to more destructive reactions such as anxiety, depression, and aggression. When sublimated through creative energy, it can lead to positive behavior, such as efforts to ameliorate social injustice. Anger tends to become dangerous when it is suppressed, repressed, or displaced. Both suppression and repression work to deny its expression an outlet, while displacement, common in dreams, redirects the expression of anger from the actual stimulus to a surrogate or scapegoat. Repressed, seething anger may find sudden, explosive release as it did the 1992 riot in Los Angeles, which was prompted by the acquittal of the police officers in the Rodney King beating trial. The violence erupted because the demands of a collective anger aroused by the beating were not satisfied by the jury’s verdict. The anger was then displaced as violence against persons and property that had no rational link to the King affair. The widespread deflection of anger away from its actual cause toward a scapegoat has affected even whole nations. A prime example is Nazi Germany, where Jews were blamed for the economic ills of the nation, and displaced anger gradually gave way to hatred and murderous, genocidal aggression. How that could have happened in such a highly developed culture remains something of a mystery, but the basic paradigm of hatred arising from anger joined to frustration is clear enough. The vestiges of the idea of anger as a sort of madness persist in law, as, for example, in the “temporary insanity” defense, or as a mitigating factor in sentencing in “crimes of passion.” Moreover, the cumulative effect of long-suppressed anger has increasingly been used as a defense in court when, for example, a battered wife has killed her spouse under circumstances that would otherwise preclude a plea of selfdefense. For some theorists, that defense has opened a legal version of Pandora’s box. Furthermore, as the Rodney King case reveals, the legal process is a potential hostage to collective anger. The video tape of King’s beating, repeatedly aired by the media, aroused great public indignation, which could have intimidated and suborned the jury. It did not, but the lawlessness that followed in the wake of that jury’s verdict may weigh heavily on some future jury. Although modern psychologists can agree on the symptomatic behavior and physiological phenomena accompanying anger, they can provide no definitive conclusions regarding what it is or even where, anatomically, it resides. Practical ethics must take anger and other emotions into account, but using them as primary building blocks of moral principles is at best subjective and very risky. John Fiero