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Confucian Moral Psychology
and Cognitive Science
Lecture 3
Edward Slingerland
University of British Columbia
Cognitive Science and Confucian
Virtue Ethics
“The Situationist Critique and Early Confucian Virtue Ethics,”
Ethics 121.2 (January 2011): 390-419. [Also selected as a
target article for discussion on the Philosophy blog “Pea
Soup”: http://peasoup.typepad.com/]
“‘Of What Use Are the Odes?’ Cognitive Science, Virtue
Ethics, and Early Confucian Ethics,” Philosophy East & West
61.1 (January 2011): 80-109. [To be reprinted in New
Directions in Chinese Philosophy (ed. Cheng Chung-yi and
Cheung Chan-fai), Chinese University of Hong Kong Press,
2013.]
my website
http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/eslingerland/index.html
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals

people of “sympathetic temper,” who
“take an inner pleasure in spreading
happiness around them”
◦ “amiable,” but actions of “no genuinely
moral worth”
◦ because actions done “out of inclination”
(aus Neigung) rather than “out of duty”
(aus Pflicht)
What’s so bad about
Neigung?
What’s so bad about
Neigung?

arbitrary (subjective)
What’s so bad about
Neigung?
arbitrary (subjective)
 unreliable (changeable)

What’s so bad about
Neigung?
arbitrary (subjective)
 unreliable (changeable)
 heteronomous

What’s so bad about
Neigung?
arbitrary (subjective)
 unreliable (changeable)
 heteronomous

◦ alien to our true, rational natures
What’s so bad about
Neigung?
arbitrary (subjective)
 unreliable (changeable)
 heteronomous

◦ alien to our true, rational natures
“Rationalism”
“Rationalism”
•
human reasoning, judgment and
decision-making
“Rationalism”
•
human reasoning, judgment and
decision-making
◦ “amodal” (not subserved in any significant
manner by sensory-motor systems or our
embodiment)
“Rationalism”
•
human reasoning, judgment and
decision-making
◦ “amodal” (not subserved in any significant
manner by sensory-motor systems or our
embodiment)
◦ propositional
“Rationalism”
•
human reasoning, judgment and
decision-making
◦ “amodal” (not subserved in any significant
manner by sensory-motor systems or our
embodiment)
◦ propositional
◦ fully conscious (transparent)
“Rationalism”
•
human reasoning, judgment and
decision-making
◦ “amodal” (not subserved in any significant
manner by sensory-motor systems or our
embodiment)
◦ propositional
◦ fully conscious (transparent)
◦ cleanly separable from emotions
Challenge to rationalism
Challenge to rationalism
“Embodied cognition” challenge to
disembodied rationalism
Challenge to rationalism
“Embodied cognition” challenge to
disembodied rationalism
Traditional Chinese
ethics, with its
emphasis on the
embodied, social
agent
Challenge to rationalism
“Embodied cognition” challenge to
disembodied rationalism
Traditional Chinese
ethics, with its
emphasis on the
embodied, social
agent
•
can be productively brought into
dialogue
Challenge to rationalism
“Embodied cognition” challenge to
disembodied rationalism
Traditional Chinese
ethics, with its
emphasis on the
embodied, social
agent
•
•
can be productively brought into
dialogue
insights from each can inform, flesh
Challenge to rationalism
Challenge to rationalism

emotions crucial for “reason”
Challenge to rationalism
emotions crucial for “reason”

-
emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial
biasing / filtering function
Antonio Damasio
emotion and reason
“Gage syndrome” patients
 damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortex
emotion and reason
“Gage syndrome” patients
 damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortex
 “higher” cognitive faculties intact
◦
◦
◦
◦
short- and long-term memories
abstract reasoning skills
mathematical aptitude
performance on standard IQ tests
emotion and reason
“Gage syndrome” patients
 damaged prefrontal cortex
 “higher” cognitive faculties intact
◦
◦
◦
◦

short- and long-term memories
abstract reasoning skills
mathematical aptitude
performance on standard IQ tests
specific impairment: ability to experience
and process emotions
emotion and reason
“Elliot”

continued to score well above average on IQ
test
emotion and reason
“Elliot”
 continued to score well above average on IQ
test
 scored very well on the Kohlbergian scale of
moral reasoning ability (Standard Issue Moral
Judgment Interview)
emotion and reason
“Elliot”
 continued to score well above average on IQ
test
 scored very well on the Kohlbergian scale of
moral reasoning ability (Standard Issue Moral
Judgment Interview)
 absolutely useless as real-life reasoner
emotion and reason
“Elliot”
 continued to score well above average on IQ
test
 scored very well on the Kohlbergian scale of
moral reasoning ability (Standard Issue Moral
Judgment Interview)
 absolutely useless as real-life reasoner
◦ possessed elaborate theoretical knowledge about
what he should or could do, but completely unable
to actually decide what to do
emotion and reason
“Elliot”
 nice controlled experiment of a sort
emotion and reason
“Elliot”
 nice controlled experiment of a sort
◦ possesses everything Kant says is necessary
emotion and reason
“Elliot”
 nice controlled experiment of a sort
◦ possesses everything Kant says is necessary
◦ completely incapable of making rational decisions
emotion and reason
“Elliot”
 nice controlled experiment of a sort
◦ possesses everything Kant says is necessary
◦ completely incapable of making rational decisions

strongly suggests that embodied emotions
play a foundational role in ethical decisionmaking and practical reasoning
Challenge to rationalism
Emotions Crucial for “Reason”
1.
•
•
emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial
biasing / filtering function
moral evaluations and “gut reactions”
moral evaluations & “gut
reactions”

Hume: moral sentiments as
foundational
◦ moral knowledge the result of “immediate
feeling and finer internal sense” (Enquiry)
moral evaluations & “gut
reactions”

Hume: moral sentiments as
foundational
◦ moral knowledge the result of “immediate
feeling and finer internal sense” (Enquiry)

Jonathan Haidt: “social intuitionist”
model of moral judgment
Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social
intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 813–834
moral evaluations & “gut
reactions”

Hume: moral sentiments as
foundational
◦ moral knowledge the result of “immediate
feeling and finer internal sense” (Enquiry)

Jonathan Haidt: “social intuitionist”
model of moral judgment
Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social
intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 813–834
◦ emotional reactions are often primary
causal force in moral judgments
moral evaluations & “gut
reactions”

Hume: moral sentiments as
foundational
◦ moral knowledge the result of “immediate
feeling and finer internal sense” (Enquiry)
Jonathan Haidt: “social intuitionist”
model of moral judgment
 “neo-Humeans”

◦ Shaun Nichols. Sentimental Rules. Oxford 2002
◦ Jesse Prinz. The Emotional Construction of
Morals. Oxford 2007
moral evaluations & “gut
reactions”

Hume: moral sentiments as
foundational
◦ moral knowledge the result of “immediate
feeling and finer internal sense” (Enquiry)
Jonathan Haidt: “social intuitionist”
model of moral judgment
 “neo-Humeans”

◦ Hume with evidence
Challenge to rationalism
Emotions Crucial for “Reason”
1.
•
•
•
emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial
biasing / filtering function
moral evaluations and “gut reactions”
foundation role of innate moral emotions
innate moral emotions
innate moral emotions

empathy
innate moral emotions
empathy
 “justice”

innate moral emotions
empathy
 “justice”
 disgust /shame

innate moral emotions
empathy
 “justice”
 disgust /shame


each of these emotions has its own unique
◦
◦
◦
◦
trigger conditions
subjective feeling
objective behaviors
“entailments”
innate moral emotions
empathy
 “justice”
 disgust /shame


each of these emotions has its own unique
◦
◦
◦
◦
trigger conditions
subjective feeling
objective behaviors
“entailments”
“modular”
innate moral emotions
empathy
 “justice”
 disgust /shame


each of these emotions has its own unique
◦
◦
◦
◦

trigger conditions
subjective feeling
objective behaviors
“entailments”
“modular”
does not sit well with idea that moral
reasoning is amodal and universal
Challenge to rationalism
Emotions Crucial for “Reason”
1.
•
•
•
2.
emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial
biasing / filtering function
strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions”
foundation role of innate moral emotions
There is No Unitary Self in Charge
unitary self

Rationalist model of decision-making
requires a unitary, conscious “self”
◦ the locus of rationality and will
◦ maxim follower or utilitarian calculator
◦ even if failed “ruler” (weakness of will),
aware that it failed
no homunculus
Challenge to rationalism
Emotions Crucial for “Reason”
1.
•
•
•
emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial
biasing / filtering function
strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions”
foundation role of innate moral emotions
There is No Unitary Self in Charge
2.
•
rationales are often ex post facto
rationality as lawyer, not legislator
rationality as lawyer, not legislator

Haidt: conscious moral reasoning “is usually
a post hoc construction, generated after a
judgment has been reached” (2001: 814)
rationality as lawyer, not legislator

Haidt: conscious moral reasoning “is usually
a post hoc construction, generated after a
judgment has been reached” (2001: 814)

Tim Wilson 2002: Strangers to ourselves:
Discovering the adaptive unconscious
◦ often don’t know what we’re doing or why
rationality as lawyer, not legislator

Haidt: conscious moral reasoning “is usually
a post hoc construction, generated after a
judgment has been reached” (2001: 814)

Tim Wilson 2002: Strangers to ourselves:
Discovering the adaptive unconscious
◦ often don’t know what we’re doing or why
◦ when questioned, strongly motivated to concoct
plausible-sounding but dubious justifications
Challenge to rationalism
Emotions Crucial for “Reason”
1.
•
•
•
emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial
biasing / filtering function
strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions”
foundation role of innate moral emotions
There is No Unitary Self in Charge
2.
•
•
rationales are often ex post facto
importance of automaticity (top-down control is
expensive)
automaticity

evolution seems to have off-loaded the vast
bulk of our everyday decision-making and
judgment-formation onto automatic,
unconscious systems
automaticity

evolution seems to have off-loaded the vast
bulk of our everyday decision-making and
judgment-formation onto automatic,
unconscious systems
◦ because such systems are fast, frugal, and reliable
automaticity

evolution seems to have off-loaded the vast
bulk of our everyday decision-making and
judgment-formation onto automatic,
unconscious systems
◦ because such systems are fast, frugal, and reliable

most of everyday judgment/ decision making
is
automaticity

evolution seems to have off-loaded the vast
bulk of our everyday decision-making and
judgment-formation onto automatic,
unconscious systems
◦ because such systems are fast, frugal, and reliable

most of everyday judgment/ decision making
is
◦ unconscious
automaticity

evolution seems to have off-loaded the vast
bulk of our everyday decision-making and
judgment-formation onto automatic,
unconscious systems
◦ because such systems are fast, frugal, and reliable

most of everyday judgment/ decision making
is
◦ unconscious
◦ automatic
top-down control

the brain systems associated with abstract
reasoning and cognitive control can, at least
sometimes, bring these implicit biases and
other sorts of emotions into consciousness in
order to modify or override them
top-down control
the brain systems associated with abstract
reasoning and cognitive control can, at least
sometimes, bring these implicit biases and
other sorts of emotions into consciousness in
order to modify or override them
 however: it is equally clear that conscious
self-control is an extremely limited resource

top-down control
the brain systems associated with abstract
reasoning and cognitive control can, at least
sometimes, bring these implicit biases and
other sorts of emotions into consciousness in
order to modify or override them
 however: it is equally clear that conscious
self-control is an extremely limited resource
◦ “ego depletion” (Baumeister)

Challenge to rationalism
Emotions Crucial for “Reason”
1.
•
•
•
emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial
biasing / filtering function
strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions”
foundation role of innate moral emotions
There is No Unitary Self in Charge
2.
•
•
•
rationales are often ex post facto
automaticity /top-down control is expensive
power of situational effects
situation
•
Our behavior is often powerfully and
unconsciously effected by
situation
•
Our behavior is often powerfully and
unconsciously effected by
– physical environment (temperature, colors,
cleanliness)
– interpersonal environment (posture, dress,
expression)
– institutional environment (authority, social
markers)
– linguistic environment (priming, framing)
situation
•
Our behavior is often powerfully and
unconsciously effected by
– physical environment (temperature, colors,
cleanliness)
– interpersonal environment (posture, dress,
expression)
– institutional environment (authority, social
markers)
– linguistic environment (priming, framing)
•
extreme “situationist” critique (Doris,
Harman) of personality an exaggeration
Slingerland, Edward. 2011. The situationist critique and
early
Confucian virtue ethics. Ethics 121
(2):390-419.
situation
•
Our behavior is often powerfully and
unconsciously effected by
– physical environment (temperature, colors,
cleanliness)
– interpersonal environment (posture, dress,
expression)
– institutional environment (authority, social
markers)
– linguistic environment (priming, framing)
•
extreme “situationist” critique (Doris,
Harman) of personality an exaggeration
– but they are right about “attribution error”
regarding relative power of personality and
Challenge to rationalism
Emotions Crucial for “Reason”
1.
•
•
•
There is No Unitary Self in Charge
2.
•
•
3.
emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial
biasing / filtering function
strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions”
foundation role of innate moral emotions
rationales are often ex post facto
automaticity /top-down control is expensive
Thought is Image-based
thought is image-based
thought is image-based

Barsalou, Lawrence: “perceptual
symbol account”(1999. Perceptual symbol systems.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577-609)
thought is image-based

Barsalou, Lawrence: “perceptual
symbol account”(1999. Perceptual symbol systems.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577-609)
◦ abstract symbols derived from and always
grounded in perception
thought is image-based

Barsalou, Lawrence: “perceptual
symbol account”(1999. Perceptual symbol systems.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577-609)
◦ abstract symbols derived from and always
grounded in perception

Lakoff & Johnson: conceptual metaphor
theory
thought is image-based

Barsalou, Lawrence: “perceptual
symbol account”(1999. Perceptual symbol systems.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577-609)
◦ abstract symbols derived from and always
grounded in perception

Lakoff & Johnson: conceptual metaphor
theory
◦ sensory-motor analog patterns basis of abstract
thought
◦ “entailments” come from analogue, imagistic
reasoning
Challenge to rationalism
Emotions Crucial for “Reason”
1.
•
•
•
emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial
biasing / filtering function
strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions”
foundation role of innate moral emotions
There is No Unitary Self in Charge
2.
•
•
rationales are often ex post facto
automaticity /top-down control is expensive
Thought is Image-based
3.
•
categories are usually radial / prototype-based
Radial / Prototype categorization

not Aristotelian categories
Radial / Prototype categorization
not Aristotelian categories
 pattern-matching with stored
prototypes

Challenge to rationalism
Emotions Crucial for “Reason”
1.
•
emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial
biasing / filtering function
•
strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions”
•
foundation role of innate moral emotions
There is No Unitary Self in Charge
2.
•
•
rationales are often ex post facto
automaticity /top-down control is expensive
Thought is Image-based
3.
•
•
categories are usually radial / prototype-based
moral reasoning and training are metaphoric /
analogical
learning as imagistic extension

moral education involves training individuals—
explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more
sophisticated imagistic models (concepts)
learning as imagistic extension


moral education involves training individuals—
explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more
sophisticated imagistic models (concepts)
this involves being able to extend them in a
consistent manner
learning as imagistic extension


moral education involves training individuals—
explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more
sophisticated imagistic models (concepts)
this involves being able to extend them in a
consistent manner
◦ primarily through the use of metaphors or analogies
learning as imagistic extension


moral education involves training individuals—
explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more
sophisticated imagistic models (concepts)
this involves being able to extend them in a
consistent manner
◦ primarily through the use of metaphors or analogies

both internal moral reasoning and public moral
debate will often take the form of battling metaphors
learning as imagistic extension


moral education involves training individuals—
explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more
sophisticated imagistic models (concepts)
this involves being able to extend them in a
consistent manner
◦ primarily through the use of metaphors or analogies

both internal moral reasoning and public moral
debate will often take the form of battling metaphors
◦ Is the U.S. position in Afghanistan a “quagmire” like Vietnam?
learning as imagistic extension


moral education involves training individuals—
explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more
sophisticated imagistic models (concepts)
this involves being able to extend them in a
consistent manner
◦ primarily through the use of metaphors or analogies

both internal moral reasoning and public moral
debate will often take the form of battling metaphors
◦ Is the U.S. position in Afghanistan a “quagmire” like Vietnam?
◦ Is moral cultivation like carving a willow tree into cups and bowls, or
like helping a plant to grow?
In defense of “habit”

if bulk of our everyday cognition is
In defense of “habit”

if bulk of our everyday cognition is
◦ emotion-based
In defense of “habit”

if bulk of our everyday cognition is
◦ emotion-based
◦ unconscious or semi-conscious
In defense of “habit”

if bulk of our everyday cognition is
◦ emotion-based
◦ unconscious or semi-conscious
◦ automatic
In defense of “habit”

if bulk of our everyday cognition is
◦
◦
◦
◦
emotion-based
unconscious or semi-conscious
automatic
image-based, imaginative
In defense of “habit”

if bulk of our everyday cognition is
◦
◦
◦
◦

emotion-based
unconscious or semi-conscious
automatic
image-based, imaginative
reasonable to conclude that training
desirable habits might be a more
reliable way to ensure ethical behavior
In defense of “habit”

“virtue ethics”
In defense of “habit”

“virtue ethics”
◦ “virtues” arguably stable, desirable habits
In defense of “habit”

“virtue ethics”
◦ “virtues” arguably stable, desirable habits
◦ despite bad-mouthing that “habit” gets
even among virtue ethicists
In defense of “habit”

“virtue ethics”
◦ “virtues” arguably stable, desirable habits
◦ despite bad-mouthing that “habit” gets
even among virtue ethicists
 still influenced by the ghost of Kant
In defense of “habit”

habits are not unintelligent or inflexible
In defense of “habit”
habits are not unintelligent or inflexible
 “goal-dependent automaticity” quite
effective and flexible (when
necessary)

◦ Bargh et al 2001
◦ Chartrand and Bargh 1996
cognitive science & virtue ethics

debate between defenders of virtue
ethics, utilitarianism and deontology at
least 2,500 years old
cognitive science & virtue ethics

debate between defenders of virtue
ethics, utilitarianism and deontology at
least 2,500 years old
◦ evidence from cognitive science could
help at least partially settle it
Meta-Ethical Aside
so just about education, training?
 NO

◦ no such thing as purely cold cognition
◦ deontology
 emotional foundation
◦ utilitarianism
 objective “math” performed on metaphorical
entities
Confucian virtue ethics
Confucian virtue ethics

early Confucians never drank the
disembodied rationality Kool-Aid
Confucian virtue ethics
early Confucians never drank the
disembodied rationality Kool-Aid
 model of moral reasoning, education
might have something to useful to say
in contemporary context

Confucian virtue ethics &
emotion
•
Mencian ethics: Morality is based
upon emotions / gut reactions
Confucian virtue ethics &
emotion
•
Mencian ethics: Morality is based
upon emotions / gut reactions
• sprouts, “hearts,” are intelligent emotional
responses to the perception of value
Confucian virtue ethics &
emotion
•
Mencian ethics: Morality is based
upon emotions / gut reactions
• sprouts, “hearts,” are intelligent emotional
responses to the perception of value
• even content of the sprouts seems a
pretty good first approximation
Mencian sprouts

Ren 仁
◦ empathetic response like the burenzhixin—elicited by both
real situations (drowning sister in law, ox being led to
slaughter) and imagined (child and well)—basic mammalian
moral emotion
Mencian sprouts

Ren 仁
◦ empathetic response like the burenzhixin—elicited by both
real situations (drowning sister in law, ox being led to
slaughter) and imagined (child and well)—basic mammalian
moral emotion

Yi 義
◦ indignant refusal to accept unfair offers in Ultimatum Game
like beggar in 6:A:10
Mencian sprouts

Ren 仁
◦ empathetic response like the burenzhixin—elicited by both
real situations (drowning sister in law, ox being led to
slaughter) and imagined (child and well)—basic mammalian
moral emotion

Yi 義
◦ indignant refusal to accept unfair offers in Ultimatum Game
like beggar in 6:A:10

Li 禮
◦ role of disgust in moral judgments (Rozin, Haidt)
Other Mencian parallels
•
Moral education is about imaginative
extension / sympathetic imagination
Other Mencian parallels
•
Moral education is about imaginative
extension / sympathetic imagination
◦ primary tool is metaphor and analogy
Other Mencian parallels
•
Moral education is about imaginative
extension / sympathetic imagination
◦ primary tool is metaphor and analogy
◦ supplemented with ritual, music, prototype
modeling
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition
“Hot”
“Cold”
emotional
non-emotional
fast, “frugal”
slow, “expensive”
automatic
under executive control
mostly unconscious
mostly conscious
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition
“Hot”
“Cold”
emotional
non-emotional
fast, “frugal”
slow, “expensive”
automatic
under executive control
mostly unconscious
mostly conscious
> two systems can and often do interact
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition
“Hot”
“Cold”
emotional
non-emotional
fast, “frugal”
slow, “expensive”
automatic
under executive control
mostly unconscious
mostly conscious
> relative, not absolute difference
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition

One way to look at Confucian ethics:
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition

One way to look at Confucian ethics:
◦ “time-delayed” cognitive control
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition

One way to look at Confucian ethics:
◦ “time-delayed” cognitive control
◦ embedding higher-level desires and goals in lowerlevel emotional and sensory-motor systems
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition

One way to look at Confucian ethics:
◦ “time-delayed” cognitive control
◦ embedding higher-level desires and goals in lowerlevel emotional and sensory-motor systems
 i.e., embedding results of “cold” cognition into “hot” systems
E.g., Xunzi and creation of
ritual
E.g., Xunzi and creation of
ritual
“Discourse on Ritual”
 禮起於何也﹖曰：人生而有欲，欲而不得，則不能無
求。求而無度量分界，則不能不爭；爭則亂，亂則窮。
E.g., Xunzi and creation of
ritual
“Discourse on Ritual”
 禮起於何也﹖曰：人生而有欲，欲而不得，則不能無
求。求而無度量分界，則不能不爭；爭則亂，亂則窮。
> “hot cognition” run wild!
E.g., Xunzi and creation of
ritual
“Discourse on Ritual”
 先王惡其亂也
E.g., Xunzi and creation of
ritual
“Discourse on Ritual”
 先王惡其亂也
◦ “hot cognition” too!
E.g., Xunzi and creation of
ritual
“Discourse on Ritual”
 先王惡其亂也，故制禮義以分之，以養人之欲，給
人之求。使欲必不窮於物，物必不屈於欲。兩者相
持而長，是禮之所起也。
E.g., Xunzi and creation of
ritual
“Discourse on Ritual”
 先王惡其亂也，故制禮義以分之，以養人之欲，給
人之求。使欲必不窮於物，物必不屈於欲。兩者相
持而長，是禮之所起也。

process of self-cultivation
E.g., Xunzi and creation of
ritual
“Discourse on Ritual”
 先王惡其亂也，故制禮義以分之，以養人之欲，給
人之求。使欲必不窮於物，物必不屈於欲。兩者相
持而長，是禮之所起也。

process of self-cultivation
◦ embeds the fruits of cold-cognition (how to best
distribute limited resources)
E.g., Xunzi and creation of
ritual
“Discourse on Ritual”
 先王惡其亂也，故制禮義以分之，以養人之欲，給
人之求。使欲必不窮於物，物必不屈於欲。兩者相
持而長，是禮之所起也。

process of self-cultivation
◦ embeds the fruits of cold-cognition (how to best
distribute limited resources)
◦ into hot processes (ritually-transformed desires)
Valuing “habit” over reflection
Valuing “habit” over reflection

Xunzi’s ranking of levels of
achievement
Valuing “habit” over reflection

Xunzi’s ranking of levels of
achievement
◦ “scholar-official” (shi 士)
◦ “gentleman” (junzi 君子)
◦ “sage” (shengren 聖人)
Valuing “habit” over reflection

Xunzi’s ranking of levels of
achievement
◦ “scholar-official” (shi 士)
◦ “gentleman” (junzi 君子)
◦ “sage” (shengren 聖人)
Valuing “habit” over reflection

Xunzi’s ranking of levels of
achievement
◦ “scholar-official” (shi 士)
◦ “gentleman” (junzi 君子) increasingly “hot”
◦ “sage” (shengren 聖人)
Valuing “habit” over reflection

Xunzi’s ranking of levels of
achievement
◦ “scholar-official” (shi 士)
◦ “gentleman” (junzi 君子) increasingly “hot”
◦ “sage” (shengren 聖人)
> “effortless action” (wuwei 無為) as mark
of highest level of moral achievement
Valuing “habit” over reflection

Xunzi’s ranking of levels of
achievement
◦ “scholar-official” (shi 士)
◦ “gentleman” (junzi 君子) increasingly “hot”
◦ “sage” (shengren 聖人)
 “effortless action” (wuwei 無為) as mark
of highest level of moral achievement
 precisely the opposite of Kant’s
valuation
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition

Characteristic feature of Confucian
ethics:
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition

Characteristic feature of Confucian
ethics:
◦ replacement of
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition

Characteristic feature of Confucian
ethics:
◦ replacement of
 exertion of conscious will-power
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition

Characteristic feature of Confucian
ethics:
◦ replacement of
 exertion of conscious will-power
 on-line, rational decision-making
“hot” vs. “cold” cognition

Characteristic feature of Confucian
ethics:
◦ replacement of
 exertion of conscious will-power
 on-line, rational decision-making
◦ with
 self-activating, carefully-designed, automatic
habits
Confucian ethics
Confucian ethics

designed a model of moral education
that draws upon but also reshapes our
embodied habits and perceptions
Confucian ethics

designed a model of moral education
that draws upon but also reshapes our
embodied habits and perceptions
◦ important corrective to fetishization of
disembodied reason in the last few
hundred years of Western ethical thought
Confucian ethics

designed a model of moral education
that draws upon but also reshapes our
embodied habits and perceptions
◦ important corrective to fetishization of
disembodied reason in the last few
hundred years of Western ethical thought
◦ empirically plausible and valuable
resource for contemporary ethical theory
and education