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Confucian Moral Psychology and Cognitive Science Lecture 3 Edward Slingerland University of British Columbia Cognitive Science and Confucian Virtue Ethics “The Situationist Critique and Early Confucian Virtue Ethics,” Ethics 121.2 (January 2011): 390-419. [Also selected as a target article for discussion on the Philosophy blog “Pea Soup”: http://peasoup.typepad.com/] “‘Of What Use Are the Odes?’ Cognitive Science, Virtue Ethics, and Early Confucian Ethics,” Philosophy East & West 61.1 (January 2011): 80-109. [To be reprinted in New Directions in Chinese Philosophy (ed. Cheng Chung-yi and Cheung Chan-fai), Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2013.] my website http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/eslingerland/index.html Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals people of “sympathetic temper,” who “take an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them” ◦ “amiable,” but actions of “no genuinely moral worth” ◦ because actions done “out of inclination” (aus Neigung) rather than “out of duty” (aus Pflicht) What’s so bad about Neigung? What’s so bad about Neigung? arbitrary (subjective) What’s so bad about Neigung? arbitrary (subjective) unreliable (changeable) What’s so bad about Neigung? arbitrary (subjective) unreliable (changeable) heteronomous What’s so bad about Neigung? arbitrary (subjective) unreliable (changeable) heteronomous ◦ alien to our true, rational natures What’s so bad about Neigung? arbitrary (subjective) unreliable (changeable) heteronomous ◦ alien to our true, rational natures “Rationalism” “Rationalism” • human reasoning, judgment and decision-making “Rationalism” • human reasoning, judgment and decision-making ◦ “amodal” (not subserved in any significant manner by sensory-motor systems or our embodiment) “Rationalism” • human reasoning, judgment and decision-making ◦ “amodal” (not subserved in any significant manner by sensory-motor systems or our embodiment) ◦ propositional “Rationalism” • human reasoning, judgment and decision-making ◦ “amodal” (not subserved in any significant manner by sensory-motor systems or our embodiment) ◦ propositional ◦ fully conscious (transparent) “Rationalism” • human reasoning, judgment and decision-making ◦ “amodal” (not subserved in any significant manner by sensory-motor systems or our embodiment) ◦ propositional ◦ fully conscious (transparent) ◦ cleanly separable from emotions Challenge to rationalism Challenge to rationalism “Embodied cognition” challenge to disembodied rationalism Challenge to rationalism “Embodied cognition” challenge to disembodied rationalism Traditional Chinese ethics, with its emphasis on the embodied, social agent Challenge to rationalism “Embodied cognition” challenge to disembodied rationalism Traditional Chinese ethics, with its emphasis on the embodied, social agent • can be productively brought into dialogue Challenge to rationalism “Embodied cognition” challenge to disembodied rationalism Traditional Chinese ethics, with its emphasis on the embodied, social agent • • can be productively brought into dialogue insights from each can inform, flesh Challenge to rationalism Challenge to rationalism emotions crucial for “reason” Challenge to rationalism emotions crucial for “reason” - emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial biasing / filtering function Antonio Damasio emotion and reason “Gage syndrome” patients damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortex emotion and reason “Gage syndrome” patients damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortex “higher” cognitive faculties intact ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ short- and long-term memories abstract reasoning skills mathematical aptitude performance on standard IQ tests emotion and reason “Gage syndrome” patients damaged prefrontal cortex “higher” cognitive faculties intact ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ short- and long-term memories abstract reasoning skills mathematical aptitude performance on standard IQ tests specific impairment: ability to experience and process emotions emotion and reason “Elliot” continued to score well above average on IQ test emotion and reason “Elliot” continued to score well above average on IQ test scored very well on the Kohlbergian scale of moral reasoning ability (Standard Issue Moral Judgment Interview) emotion and reason “Elliot” continued to score well above average on IQ test scored very well on the Kohlbergian scale of moral reasoning ability (Standard Issue Moral Judgment Interview) absolutely useless as real-life reasoner emotion and reason “Elliot” continued to score well above average on IQ test scored very well on the Kohlbergian scale of moral reasoning ability (Standard Issue Moral Judgment Interview) absolutely useless as real-life reasoner ◦ possessed elaborate theoretical knowledge about what he should or could do, but completely unable to actually decide what to do emotion and reason “Elliot” nice controlled experiment of a sort emotion and reason “Elliot” nice controlled experiment of a sort ◦ possesses everything Kant says is necessary emotion and reason “Elliot” nice controlled experiment of a sort ◦ possesses everything Kant says is necessary ◦ completely incapable of making rational decisions emotion and reason “Elliot” nice controlled experiment of a sort ◦ possesses everything Kant says is necessary ◦ completely incapable of making rational decisions strongly suggests that embodied emotions play a foundational role in ethical decisionmaking and practical reasoning Challenge to rationalism Emotions Crucial for “Reason” 1. • • emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial biasing / filtering function moral evaluations and “gut reactions” moral evaluations & “gut reactions” Hume: moral sentiments as foundational ◦ moral knowledge the result of “immediate feeling and finer internal sense” (Enquiry) moral evaluations & “gut reactions” Hume: moral sentiments as foundational ◦ moral knowledge the result of “immediate feeling and finer internal sense” (Enquiry) Jonathan Haidt: “social intuitionist” model of moral judgment Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 813–834 moral evaluations & “gut reactions” Hume: moral sentiments as foundational ◦ moral knowledge the result of “immediate feeling and finer internal sense” (Enquiry) Jonathan Haidt: “social intuitionist” model of moral judgment Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 813–834 ◦ emotional reactions are often primary causal force in moral judgments moral evaluations & “gut reactions” Hume: moral sentiments as foundational ◦ moral knowledge the result of “immediate feeling and finer internal sense” (Enquiry) Jonathan Haidt: “social intuitionist” model of moral judgment “neo-Humeans” ◦ Shaun Nichols. Sentimental Rules. Oxford 2002 ◦ Jesse Prinz. The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford 2007 moral evaluations & “gut reactions” Hume: moral sentiments as foundational ◦ moral knowledge the result of “immediate feeling and finer internal sense” (Enquiry) Jonathan Haidt: “social intuitionist” model of moral judgment “neo-Humeans” ◦ Hume with evidence Challenge to rationalism Emotions Crucial for “Reason” 1. • • • emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial biasing / filtering function moral evaluations and “gut reactions” foundation role of innate moral emotions innate moral emotions innate moral emotions empathy innate moral emotions empathy “justice” innate moral emotions empathy “justice” disgust /shame innate moral emotions empathy “justice” disgust /shame each of these emotions has its own unique ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ trigger conditions subjective feeling objective behaviors “entailments” innate moral emotions empathy “justice” disgust /shame each of these emotions has its own unique ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ trigger conditions subjective feeling objective behaviors “entailments” “modular” innate moral emotions empathy “justice” disgust /shame each of these emotions has its own unique ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ trigger conditions subjective feeling objective behaviors “entailments” “modular” does not sit well with idea that moral reasoning is amodal and universal Challenge to rationalism Emotions Crucial for “Reason” 1. • • • 2. emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial biasing / filtering function strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions” foundation role of innate moral emotions There is No Unitary Self in Charge unitary self Rationalist model of decision-making requires a unitary, conscious “self” ◦ the locus of rationality and will ◦ maxim follower or utilitarian calculator ◦ even if failed “ruler” (weakness of will), aware that it failed no homunculus Challenge to rationalism Emotions Crucial for “Reason” 1. • • • emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial biasing / filtering function strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions” foundation role of innate moral emotions There is No Unitary Self in Charge 2. • rationales are often ex post facto rationality as lawyer, not legislator rationality as lawyer, not legislator Haidt: conscious moral reasoning “is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached” (2001: 814) rationality as lawyer, not legislator Haidt: conscious moral reasoning “is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached” (2001: 814) Tim Wilson 2002: Strangers to ourselves: Discovering the adaptive unconscious ◦ often don’t know what we’re doing or why rationality as lawyer, not legislator Haidt: conscious moral reasoning “is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached” (2001: 814) Tim Wilson 2002: Strangers to ourselves: Discovering the adaptive unconscious ◦ often don’t know what we’re doing or why ◦ when questioned, strongly motivated to concoct plausible-sounding but dubious justifications Challenge to rationalism Emotions Crucial for “Reason” 1. • • • emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial biasing / filtering function strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions” foundation role of innate moral emotions There is No Unitary Self in Charge 2. • • rationales are often ex post facto importance of automaticity (top-down control is expensive) automaticity evolution seems to have off-loaded the vast bulk of our everyday decision-making and judgment-formation onto automatic, unconscious systems automaticity evolution seems to have off-loaded the vast bulk of our everyday decision-making and judgment-formation onto automatic, unconscious systems ◦ because such systems are fast, frugal, and reliable automaticity evolution seems to have off-loaded the vast bulk of our everyday decision-making and judgment-formation onto automatic, unconscious systems ◦ because such systems are fast, frugal, and reliable most of everyday judgment/ decision making is automaticity evolution seems to have off-loaded the vast bulk of our everyday decision-making and judgment-formation onto automatic, unconscious systems ◦ because such systems are fast, frugal, and reliable most of everyday judgment/ decision making is ◦ unconscious automaticity evolution seems to have off-loaded the vast bulk of our everyday decision-making and judgment-formation onto automatic, unconscious systems ◦ because such systems are fast, frugal, and reliable most of everyday judgment/ decision making is ◦ unconscious ◦ automatic top-down control the brain systems associated with abstract reasoning and cognitive control can, at least sometimes, bring these implicit biases and other sorts of emotions into consciousness in order to modify or override them top-down control the brain systems associated with abstract reasoning and cognitive control can, at least sometimes, bring these implicit biases and other sorts of emotions into consciousness in order to modify or override them however: it is equally clear that conscious self-control is an extremely limited resource top-down control the brain systems associated with abstract reasoning and cognitive control can, at least sometimes, bring these implicit biases and other sorts of emotions into consciousness in order to modify or override them however: it is equally clear that conscious self-control is an extremely limited resource ◦ “ego depletion” (Baumeister) Challenge to rationalism Emotions Crucial for “Reason” 1. • • • emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial biasing / filtering function strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions” foundation role of innate moral emotions There is No Unitary Self in Charge 2. • • • rationales are often ex post facto automaticity /top-down control is expensive power of situational effects situation • Our behavior is often powerfully and unconsciously effected by situation • Our behavior is often powerfully and unconsciously effected by – physical environment (temperature, colors, cleanliness) – interpersonal environment (posture, dress, expression) – institutional environment (authority, social markers) – linguistic environment (priming, framing) situation • Our behavior is often powerfully and unconsciously effected by – physical environment (temperature, colors, cleanliness) – interpersonal environment (posture, dress, expression) – institutional environment (authority, social markers) – linguistic environment (priming, framing) • extreme “situationist” critique (Doris, Harman) of personality an exaggeration Slingerland, Edward. 2011. The situationist critique and early Confucian virtue ethics. Ethics 121 (2):390-419. situation • Our behavior is often powerfully and unconsciously effected by – physical environment (temperature, colors, cleanliness) – interpersonal environment (posture, dress, expression) – institutional environment (authority, social markers) – linguistic environment (priming, framing) • extreme “situationist” critique (Doris, Harman) of personality an exaggeration – but they are right about “attribution error” regarding relative power of personality and Challenge to rationalism Emotions Crucial for “Reason” 1. • • • There is No Unitary Self in Charge 2. • • 3. emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial biasing / filtering function strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions” foundation role of innate moral emotions rationales are often ex post facto automaticity /top-down control is expensive Thought is Image-based thought is image-based thought is image-based Barsalou, Lawrence: “perceptual symbol account”(1999. Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577-609) thought is image-based Barsalou, Lawrence: “perceptual symbol account”(1999. Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577-609) ◦ abstract symbols derived from and always grounded in perception thought is image-based Barsalou, Lawrence: “perceptual symbol account”(1999. Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577-609) ◦ abstract symbols derived from and always grounded in perception Lakoff & Johnson: conceptual metaphor theory thought is image-based Barsalou, Lawrence: “perceptual symbol account”(1999. Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577-609) ◦ abstract symbols derived from and always grounded in perception Lakoff & Johnson: conceptual metaphor theory ◦ sensory-motor analog patterns basis of abstract thought ◦ “entailments” come from analogue, imagistic reasoning Challenge to rationalism Emotions Crucial for “Reason” 1. • • • emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial biasing / filtering function strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions” foundation role of innate moral emotions There is No Unitary Self in Charge 2. • • rationales are often ex post facto automaticity /top-down control is expensive Thought is Image-based 3. • categories are usually radial / prototype-based Radial / Prototype categorization not Aristotelian categories Radial / Prototype categorization not Aristotelian categories pattern-matching with stored prototypes Challenge to rationalism Emotions Crucial for “Reason” 1. • emotional-somatic reactions perform crucial biasing / filtering function • strong (moral) evaluations and “gut reactions” • foundation role of innate moral emotions There is No Unitary Self in Charge 2. • • rationales are often ex post facto automaticity /top-down control is expensive Thought is Image-based 3. • • categories are usually radial / prototype-based moral reasoning and training are metaphoric / analogical learning as imagistic extension moral education involves training individuals— explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more sophisticated imagistic models (concepts) learning as imagistic extension moral education involves training individuals— explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more sophisticated imagistic models (concepts) this involves being able to extend them in a consistent manner learning as imagistic extension moral education involves training individuals— explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more sophisticated imagistic models (concepts) this involves being able to extend them in a consistent manner ◦ primarily through the use of metaphors or analogies learning as imagistic extension moral education involves training individuals— explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more sophisticated imagistic models (concepts) this involves being able to extend them in a consistent manner ◦ primarily through the use of metaphors or analogies both internal moral reasoning and public moral debate will often take the form of battling metaphors learning as imagistic extension moral education involves training individuals— explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more sophisticated imagistic models (concepts) this involves being able to extend them in a consistent manner ◦ primarily through the use of metaphors or analogies both internal moral reasoning and public moral debate will often take the form of battling metaphors ◦ Is the U.S. position in Afghanistan a “quagmire” like Vietnam? learning as imagistic extension moral education involves training individuals— explicitly or implicitly—to develop more and more sophisticated imagistic models (concepts) this involves being able to extend them in a consistent manner ◦ primarily through the use of metaphors or analogies both internal moral reasoning and public moral debate will often take the form of battling metaphors ◦ Is the U.S. position in Afghanistan a “quagmire” like Vietnam? ◦ Is moral cultivation like carving a willow tree into cups and bowls, or like helping a plant to grow? In defense of “habit” if bulk of our everyday cognition is In defense of “habit” if bulk of our everyday cognition is ◦ emotion-based In defense of “habit” if bulk of our everyday cognition is ◦ emotion-based ◦ unconscious or semi-conscious In defense of “habit” if bulk of our everyday cognition is ◦ emotion-based ◦ unconscious or semi-conscious ◦ automatic In defense of “habit” if bulk of our everyday cognition is ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ emotion-based unconscious or semi-conscious automatic image-based, imaginative In defense of “habit” if bulk of our everyday cognition is ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ emotion-based unconscious or semi-conscious automatic image-based, imaginative reasonable to conclude that training desirable habits might be a more reliable way to ensure ethical behavior In defense of “habit” “virtue ethics” In defense of “habit” “virtue ethics” ◦ “virtues” arguably stable, desirable habits In defense of “habit” “virtue ethics” ◦ “virtues” arguably stable, desirable habits ◦ despite bad-mouthing that “habit” gets even among virtue ethicists In defense of “habit” “virtue ethics” ◦ “virtues” arguably stable, desirable habits ◦ despite bad-mouthing that “habit” gets even among virtue ethicists still influenced by the ghost of Kant In defense of “habit” habits are not unintelligent or inflexible In defense of “habit” habits are not unintelligent or inflexible “goal-dependent automaticity” quite effective and flexible (when necessary) ◦ Bargh et al 2001 ◦ Chartrand and Bargh 1996 cognitive science & virtue ethics debate between defenders of virtue ethics, utilitarianism and deontology at least 2,500 years old cognitive science & virtue ethics debate between defenders of virtue ethics, utilitarianism and deontology at least 2,500 years old ◦ evidence from cognitive science could help at least partially settle it Meta-Ethical Aside so just about education, training? NO ◦ no such thing as purely cold cognition ◦ deontology emotional foundation ◦ utilitarianism objective “math” performed on metaphorical entities Confucian virtue ethics Confucian virtue ethics early Confucians never drank the disembodied rationality Kool-Aid Confucian virtue ethics early Confucians never drank the disembodied rationality Kool-Aid model of moral reasoning, education might have something to useful to say in contemporary context Confucian virtue ethics & emotion • Mencian ethics: Morality is based upon emotions / gut reactions Confucian virtue ethics & emotion • Mencian ethics: Morality is based upon emotions / gut reactions • sprouts, “hearts,” are intelligent emotional responses to the perception of value Confucian virtue ethics & emotion • Mencian ethics: Morality is based upon emotions / gut reactions • sprouts, “hearts,” are intelligent emotional responses to the perception of value • even content of the sprouts seems a pretty good first approximation Mencian sprouts Ren 仁 ◦ empathetic response like the burenzhixin—elicited by both real situations (drowning sister in law, ox being led to slaughter) and imagined (child and well)—basic mammalian moral emotion Mencian sprouts Ren 仁 ◦ empathetic response like the burenzhixin—elicited by both real situations (drowning sister in law, ox being led to slaughter) and imagined (child and well)—basic mammalian moral emotion Yi 義 ◦ indignant refusal to accept unfair offers in Ultimatum Game like beggar in 6:A:10 Mencian sprouts Ren 仁 ◦ empathetic response like the burenzhixin—elicited by both real situations (drowning sister in law, ox being led to slaughter) and imagined (child and well)—basic mammalian moral emotion Yi 義 ◦ indignant refusal to accept unfair offers in Ultimatum Game like beggar in 6:A:10 Li 禮 ◦ role of disgust in moral judgments (Rozin, Haidt) Other Mencian parallels • Moral education is about imaginative extension / sympathetic imagination Other Mencian parallels • Moral education is about imaginative extension / sympathetic imagination ◦ primary tool is metaphor and analogy Other Mencian parallels • Moral education is about imaginative extension / sympathetic imagination ◦ primary tool is metaphor and analogy ◦ supplemented with ritual, music, prototype modeling “hot” vs. “cold” cognition “hot” vs. “cold” cognition “Hot” “Cold” emotional non-emotional fast, “frugal” slow, “expensive” automatic under executive control mostly unconscious mostly conscious “hot” vs. “cold” cognition “Hot” “Cold” emotional non-emotional fast, “frugal” slow, “expensive” automatic under executive control mostly unconscious mostly conscious > two systems can and often do interact “hot” vs. “cold” cognition “Hot” “Cold” emotional non-emotional fast, “frugal” slow, “expensive” automatic under executive control mostly unconscious mostly conscious > relative, not absolute difference “hot” vs. “cold” cognition One way to look at Confucian ethics: “hot” vs. “cold” cognition One way to look at Confucian ethics: ◦ “time-delayed” cognitive control “hot” vs. “cold” cognition One way to look at Confucian ethics: ◦ “time-delayed” cognitive control ◦ embedding higher-level desires and goals in lowerlevel emotional and sensory-motor systems “hot” vs. “cold” cognition One way to look at Confucian ethics: ◦ “time-delayed” cognitive control ◦ embedding higher-level desires and goals in lowerlevel emotional and sensory-motor systems i.e., embedding results of “cold” cognition into “hot” systems E.g., Xunzi and creation of ritual E.g., Xunzi and creation of ritual “Discourse on Ritual” 禮起於何也﹖曰:人生而有欲,欲而不得,則不能無 求。求而無度量分界,則不能不爭;爭則亂,亂則窮。 E.g., Xunzi and creation of ritual “Discourse on Ritual” 禮起於何也﹖曰:人生而有欲,欲而不得,則不能無 求。求而無度量分界,則不能不爭;爭則亂,亂則窮。 > “hot cognition” run wild! E.g., Xunzi and creation of ritual “Discourse on Ritual” 先王惡其亂也 E.g., Xunzi and creation of ritual “Discourse on Ritual” 先王惡其亂也 ◦ “hot cognition” too! E.g., Xunzi and creation of ritual “Discourse on Ritual” 先王惡其亂也,故制禮義以分之,以養人之欲,給 人之求。使欲必不窮於物,物必不屈於欲。兩者相 持而長,是禮之所起也。 E.g., Xunzi and creation of ritual “Discourse on Ritual” 先王惡其亂也,故制禮義以分之,以養人之欲,給 人之求。使欲必不窮於物,物必不屈於欲。兩者相 持而長,是禮之所起也。 process of self-cultivation E.g., Xunzi and creation of ritual “Discourse on Ritual” 先王惡其亂也,故制禮義以分之,以養人之欲,給 人之求。使欲必不窮於物,物必不屈於欲。兩者相 持而長,是禮之所起也。 process of self-cultivation ◦ embeds the fruits of cold-cognition (how to best distribute limited resources) E.g., Xunzi and creation of ritual “Discourse on Ritual” 先王惡其亂也,故制禮義以分之,以養人之欲,給 人之求。使欲必不窮於物,物必不屈於欲。兩者相 持而長,是禮之所起也。 process of self-cultivation ◦ embeds the fruits of cold-cognition (how to best distribute limited resources) ◦ into hot processes (ritually-transformed desires) Valuing “habit” over reflection Valuing “habit” over reflection Xunzi’s ranking of levels of achievement Valuing “habit” over reflection Xunzi’s ranking of levels of achievement ◦ “scholar-official” (shi 士) ◦ “gentleman” (junzi 君子) ◦ “sage” (shengren 聖人) Valuing “habit” over reflection Xunzi’s ranking of levels of achievement ◦ “scholar-official” (shi 士) ◦ “gentleman” (junzi 君子) ◦ “sage” (shengren 聖人) Valuing “habit” over reflection Xunzi’s ranking of levels of achievement ◦ “scholar-official” (shi 士) ◦ “gentleman” (junzi 君子) increasingly “hot” ◦ “sage” (shengren 聖人) Valuing “habit” over reflection Xunzi’s ranking of levels of achievement ◦ “scholar-official” (shi 士) ◦ “gentleman” (junzi 君子) increasingly “hot” ◦ “sage” (shengren 聖人) > “effortless action” (wuwei 無為) as mark of highest level of moral achievement Valuing “habit” over reflection Xunzi’s ranking of levels of achievement ◦ “scholar-official” (shi 士) ◦ “gentleman” (junzi 君子) increasingly “hot” ◦ “sage” (shengren 聖人) “effortless action” (wuwei 無為) as mark of highest level of moral achievement precisely the opposite of Kant’s valuation “hot” vs. “cold” cognition Characteristic feature of Confucian ethics: “hot” vs. “cold” cognition Characteristic feature of Confucian ethics: ◦ replacement of “hot” vs. “cold” cognition Characteristic feature of Confucian ethics: ◦ replacement of exertion of conscious will-power “hot” vs. “cold” cognition Characteristic feature of Confucian ethics: ◦ replacement of exertion of conscious will-power on-line, rational decision-making “hot” vs. “cold” cognition Characteristic feature of Confucian ethics: ◦ replacement of exertion of conscious will-power on-line, rational decision-making ◦ with self-activating, carefully-designed, automatic habits Confucian ethics Confucian ethics designed a model of moral education that draws upon but also reshapes our embodied habits and perceptions Confucian ethics designed a model of moral education that draws upon but also reshapes our embodied habits and perceptions ◦ important corrective to fetishization of disembodied reason in the last few hundred years of Western ethical thought Confucian ethics designed a model of moral education that draws upon but also reshapes our embodied habits and perceptions ◦ important corrective to fetishization of disembodied reason in the last few hundred years of Western ethical thought ◦ empirically plausible and valuable resource for contemporary ethical theory and education