Download Terrence Chambers and Adam Marsh Dr. Crawford HIS 379

Terrence Chambers and Adam Marsh
Dr. Crawford
HIS 379 - Military History through Wargaming
29 April 2015
The Battle of Ager Falernus: Historical Background
In the summer of 217 B.C., the famed commander Hannibal of Carthage was scouring the
Roman countryside unopposed. Just that June, he had crushed the Roman army under consul Gaius
Flaminius at the Battle of Lake Trasemine, causing the Senate to elect one Quintus Fabius Maximus as
dictator (Livy 22.8). Fabius would become the namesake of a tactical approach all his own, for which
the Roman senators would come to despise him, but which successfully contained Hannibal without
risking further serious defeat. Many in Rome considered Fabius a coward, unable to stop Hannibal
from burning and plundering the beautifully lush region of Campania where many senators held
estates. The dictator would not engage Hannibal in a pitched battle, instead choosing to shadow
Hannibal, pick off his scouts and foragers, and remain on favorable ground at all times. Polybius tells
us that "His object in these manoeuvres was twofold, — to gradually diminish the limited numbers of
the enemy: and to strengthen and renew by such successes in detail the spirits of his own men..." (3.90).
Unpopular as his methods were, even to his Master of Horse Marcus Minucius, Fabius' strategy proved
effective in wearing down the captive Carthaginians. They were, after all, a finite force of invaders
deep in enemy territory, with no direct line of supply or communication to their allies. It is no surprise
then that Fabius was determined to hold his ground when Hannibal entered Ager Falernus. But his men
had other things in mind.
The fertile plains around Capua are described by Polybius as "the best in Italy for fertility and
beauty and proximity to the sea, and for the commercial harbours, into which merchants run who are
sailing to Italy from nearly all parts of the world." The valley was naturally well-protected, with the sea
to the west and the steep Apennines on all other sides, with only three passes large enough for Hannibal
to enter through. Enter they did, through the pass from Samnium, and camped themselves on the north
bank of the river Volturnus. The river was unfordable in this season, and all bridges were in Roman
hands, leaving only those few mountain passes as potential exits for Carthage. The economical and
geographical situation in Falernum was exceptional for Hannibal's purposes. He had found a marvelous
stage on which to display his terrible power to all of Rome. His plan was to make an example of the
Roman's cowardice in refusing to fight, and convince the surrounding cities that the Republic was no
longer master of the region, and that they ought to defect. (Polybius, 3.91) And, as an important aside,
now seems an opportune time to describe the Roman concept of constantia.
Roman society valued a handful of personal virtues which defined an ideal Roman. Among
these virtues was one called constantia, which might in English be called perseverance or steadfastness.
Many myths and stories were frequently told in Roman culture which prized the concept that a Roman
is not defeated until he accepts defeat. While some might have been apocryphal or even mere fiction, it
is still significant that Roman people told these stories. How does this relate to the Punic Wars? A few
times throughout the conflict, we see the Republic make major decisions based on the principle of
constantia, most notably after Cannae, but also leading up to Ager Falernus. The Roman cities that
Hannibal threatened in Campania held their gates shut fast against him. Even after the crippling defeat
at Lake Trasemine, even while Fabius made no motion to stand directly at the defense of Campanian
lands, no city in Italy thought to defect to the side of Carthage. Perhaps Hannibal did not understand the
Romans' resolve. For whatever reason, he falsely believed that marching into Ager Falernus, so close to
the wealthy Capua, would frighten Roman cities into surrender.
When word reached Fabius that Hannibal was camped on the northern banks of Volturnus, he
immediately split his forces up to cover the three passes by which Hannibal could escape. All routes of
exit from the valley were in Roman hands, and Hannibal was hemmed in. Just as before, Fabius
intended to allow Carthage to atrophy in the valley with no supply lines and no reinforcements. And
just as before, his Master of Horse Marcus Minucius (and many other detractors) criticized the dictator
for avoiding battle when the enemy was exactly where they wanted him. Hannibal knew that time was
not on his side, and he was aware of the unpopularity of Fabian tactics, so he devised a plan that relied
on some of the Romans leaving their posts to engage with him.
“The following was the ruse which he adopted. Torch-wood gathered from all the country
round, and faggots of dry brushwood were tied on the horns of the oxen which he was driving in
vast numbers, both broken and unbroken to the plough, amongst the rest of the plunder from the
fields. About 2000 oxen were collected for the purpose. To Hasdrubal was assigned the task of
setting fire to the bundles on the horns of this herd as soon as darkness set in, then driving them
up the mountains and if possible mostly above the passes which were guarded by the Romans.”
(Livy 22.16).
Just according to Hannibal's intentions, upon seeing the mass of torches approaching the ridge, the
Romans guarding one of the passes left their posts and went to engage what they believed was the
enemy attempting an escape by cover of night. When the Romans, the enraged cattle, and the
Carthaginian light troops driving the cattle collided, the Romans were perplexed. They skirmished
through the night for some time until the Romans retreated to higher ground to wait for dawn.
Meanwhile, Hannibal had been moving his heavy infantry, cavalry, Iberian and Celt warriors, and all
the plunder taken from the valley towards the pass that the Romans had just abandoned. Fabius held his
ground in another nearby pass, “some deep design suspecting” (Polybius 3.94), and Hannibal slipped
the net.
After letting the enemy escape from the valley that might have been his grave, Fabius was
forced to return to Rome to perform religious duties. He left the army in the command of his Master of
Horse, whom he urged to stay the course and refrain from risking general engagements without
overwhelming advantage and slim risk. However, Livy implies that these warnings go “unheeded”
(22.18).
How the battle or the war may have turned out had Fabius' men not abandoned their posts is up
to speculation. The dictator's tactics had successfully bottled Hannibal up in the open plain of Ager
Falernus, and Polybius mentions that he was making careful plans of how he might finally charge down
on the Carthaginians and put an end to Hannibal's Italian romp (3.93). Perhaps if his men had held fast,
no escape would have ever been made, and Hannibal would have finally capitulated under stress of
starvation and exposure. After all, his cattle plot relied on a suspicion that the Romans would abandon
their posts. Of course, alternate outcomes for the engagement are exactly what this C&C: Ancients
scenario is meant to determine.
Works Cited
Livy, Titus. History of Rome, Vol. 3. Translated by Rev. Canon Roberts. Marquette University. J.M.
Dent & Sons, Ltd., London 1905. Web. 7 April 2015.
<http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/txt/ah/livy/livy22.html>
Polybius. The Histories of Polybius, Book Three. Translated by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. York University.
In Parentheses Publications, Cambridge, Ontario 2002. Web. 7 April 2015.
<http://www.yorku.ca/inpar/polybius_three.pdf>